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### Anglican Christology of the Upper Stream From *Lux Mundi* to *Essays Catholic and Critical*

By N. NAGEL \*

WHEN a certain theologian was asked what in English theology would most reward study, with twinkling and Teutonic eye he replied, "They don't have any." Now it is true that the issues which have most exercised churchmen in this country do not seem to have been primarily theological. One never ceases to wonder at the thousands of parish priests in the sixteenth century who found no difficulty in making do whatever new or revised prayer book happened to come to them in the post. When divisions came, they were summed up in terms more of polity than of theology.

The temptation to explain it all in terms of some peculiar English temperament must, I think, be resisted; but a persuasive case can be made out for it. Does, for example, an understanding of cricket illuminate what goes on in the Anglican Church? There is found that lack of enthusiasm which some would call indifference, but others a massive common sense.<sup>1</sup> It is all very decent. The dust and heat, the heavy breathing, the jostling and bludgeoning of continental theological controversy, seem in England as of another

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and a barbarous world. The English deference and complaisance have led many to suspect that the value of a decent working arrangement is more highly esteemed than a clear stand for doctrine with an inflexible "Here I stand; I can do no other." The lack of a clear and united statement of doctrine does seem appalling to a Lutheran. There is nothing approaching agreement concerning the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments.

It is really quite baffling. There is the facility for compromise; the ability to contain within its organization extreme divergences; the traditional reluctance to change anything so long as it somehow works, and the attitude that if change must be made, the exterior must at least be preserved; the episcopal, ecclesiastical, and ecumenical concerns; the level-headed refusal to be captivated by the big names and schools that come and go by fashions on the continent; the contact with the multifarious currents of contemporary life; the comprehensiveness; and the highest word that the Church of England would claim for herself, the catholicity. Nobody could call the Church of England a sect. Yet on any point of doctrine it would be impossible to make an assertion beginning with the words "The Church of England teaches." Some dean or bishop would soon make you a liar.

There is nothing under the sun less susceptible of generalization than that admirable, exasperating, and mystifying salmagundi that is gathered together under the name of the Church of England. What shall we say then? It must, I think, be observed that deference does not necessarily prove poverty of conviction. It may grow from a confidence in the virility and hardihood of truth. However perilous we may consider her doctrinal confusion, the fact remains that she continues to play a very significant part in the church catholic. A consideration of her contributions to missions, worship, and learning must give pause before pronouncing her a dead or dying church.

The measure of her strength is the subject of this paper, i.e., her Christology. In order not to get lost amid the confusion of Low, Broad, and High, and in order to make at least some tenable assertions, this paper will attempt to present Anglican Christology as it has developed in the "upper stream."

The exclusion of the Low Church from the discussion is of course regrettable, but there is such disparity as would demand constant juxtaposition, though it is not quite a case of Low is Low and High is High and never the twain do meet. The members of the Low Church, or Evangelicals, as they would prefer to be called, are clearly not in the ascendancy, and their vitality would seem to be diminishing. Their scholars do not dominate the scene. They have largely gone into opposition, and therefore their role has been all too sadly negative. The resort to Caesar to put the ritualists in line was altogether lamentable and betrayed the lack of that kind of strength which is alone serviceable to the Gospel. Nevertheless much of the finest preaching comes from the Evangelicals. Justification by faith does ring through, though not quite matching Lutheran definitions. Among Evangelicals there is no decrying of the Reformation nor that ignorance or misunderstanding of things Lutheran that elsewhere sometimes simply leaves one aghast. In their doctrines of the sacraments and of the church a Lutheran cannot fail to discern impoverishment. Though the Evangelicals may be nearer the Lutheran position — a supposition not altogether easily demonstrable — and while it may be heartening to hear agreement with one's own position, I still suggest that, if choose we must, there is more for our instruction and learning to be found among the High Churchmen, for it is here that Christological discussion has been most keen.

We must go back at least as far as the publication of *Lux Mundi* in 1889. It is, of course, not without its background, but one cannot begin, however much one may covet such spacious scholarship, with Bede at Caius Julius Caesar. *Lux Mundi* comes at the end of the Tractarian movement. Pusey died in 1882.

The work of the Tractarians was in large measure within the church. They looked more backward than about. What they saw as the impoverishments of Protestantism and the corrosions of rationalism they sought to make good by going back to the primitive church, thence to recover orders, sacraments, and creeds for the revitalization of the worship and life of the church. Their attitude toward the Scriptures was conservative. Their Christology was informed by the ecumenical creeds and the Greek Fathers. Its emphasis was on the Incarnation. {

The Tractarians declined to come to terms with "science," Darwinism, and Higher Criticism. By these the allegiance of many people was being alienated from the church, and the disgraceful controversies about candles and incense did not serve to draw men back into the fold.

*Lux Mundi* was the work of men who combined "to succour a distressed faith." They addressed themselves to those whose faith was disturbed by the "established results of science." They saw their task to involve "great changes in the outlying departments of theology, where it is linked on to other sciences, and to necessitate some general restatement of its claim and meaning."<sup>2</sup> The task of apology was as difficult as it was necessary, but they did tackle it. Immediately the question arises whether, in speaking intelligibly to their contemporaries, what they spoke was the Christ of Scripture. That they won a hearing is clear from the appearance of the twelfth edition within two years.

Attention fastened on the cardinal contribution of Charles Gore, principal of Pusey House, successor to Pusey in the leadership of the High Churchmen and later successively bishop of Worcester, Birmingham, and Oxford. "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration" was the title of his essay. It was the old question, How much can you concede and still retain the essential? "Myth and allegorical picture"<sup>3</sup> were admitted into the Old Testament. Nevertheless he stands firm for the New Testament, recognizing that these things, "admitted in the Old Testament, could not without disastrous results to the Christian Creed be admitted in the New."<sup>4</sup>

However, when the Old Testament springs a leak, the water is soon seen seeping into the New. When Gore discusses the appeal to Christ's acceptance of the historicity of the Old Testament, we find a Christology certainly not saturated but obviously already damp. Our Lord's use of the Old Testament is not "an argument against the proposed concessions."<sup>5</sup> "For example, does His use of Jonah's resurrection as a *type* of His own depend in any real degree upon whether it is historical fact or allegory? It is the essence of a *type* to suggest an idea, as the *antitype* to realize it."<sup>6</sup> This does not appear immediately relevant to Christology, but in the next paragraph we have the matching Christology.

It is contrary to His whole method to reveal His Godhead by any anticipation of natural knowledge. The Incarnation was a self-emptying of God to reveal Himself under condition of human nature and from the human point of view.<sup>7</sup>

Thus the utterances of Christ about the Old Testament do not seem to be nearly definite or clear enough to allow of our supposing that in this case He is departing from the general method of the Incarnation, by bringing to bear the unveiled omniscience of the Godhead, to anticipate or foreclose a development of natural knowledge.<sup>8</sup>

This kenotic Christology he expounded more fully elsewhere.

(Phil.2:5-7) . . . The Incarnation is the supreme act of self-sacrificing sympathy, by which one whose nature is divine was enabled to enter into human experience. He emptied Himself of divine prerogatives so far as was involved in really becoming man, and growing, feeling, thinking and suffering as man.<sup>9</sup>

In view of what developed later Gore's kenoticism appears most cautious.<sup>10</sup> To Liddon, Pusey's brother by conviction, *Lux Mundi* caused such grief as is said to have killed him. In turn, Gore was saddened by the developments to which *Lux Mundi* gave rise. He protested his orthodoxy. He was stubborn against any "symbolic" interpretation which denied the historical facts of the Apostles' Creed, just as he had been stubborn, if not consistent, in his drawing the line at the New Testament. He had said *A*, but that was as far as he was willing to go. When others went on to *C*, *D*, and *Z*, Gore was left behind, no longer the leader of the High Church party. Long before his death in 1932 Gore was already engaged in bailing out the rising water that he had helped to let into the boat.

However, to the present day no Christological discussion in England is complete without reference to Gore. The problems which he raised were not new, but he gave them modern expression. Even when he disclaimed any answer, his statement of the problems has been much alive in subsequent discussion. This is particularly true of the psychological problems of the Incarnation. He saw the difficulties<sup>11</sup> but concluded, "We have not the knowledge of the inner life of Jesus which would make an answer possible."<sup>12</sup> Such humility was seldom exceeded by his successors.

Let us take leave of *Lux Mundi* with a glance at the essay on the Atonement by the Rev. and Hon. Arthur Lyttleton. From this it is possible to discern from which direction the wind is freshening. There are some superb passages on the vicarious expiation and propitiation achieved on the cross. His complaint that the understanding of the Atonement has been damaged by its isolation and one-sided emphasis is a signpost for all subsequent Christological discussion in England. The point is of course not new, but henceforward it becomes the standard point of departure.

Lyttleton does indeed enrich the understanding of the Atonement by showing its relation to the Incarnation.

How was it a sacrifice for us? It was, we can see, a perfect offering acceptable to God: but how has it availed "for us men"? The mind shrinks from a purely external Atonement, and part of the imperfection of the Mosaic sacrifices consisted in the merely artificial relation between the offender and the victim. In the perfect sacrifice this relation must be real; and we are thus led to the truth, so often overlooked, but impressed on every page of the New Testament, that He who died for our sins was our true representative in that He was truly man. Without for the present going into the more mystical doctrine of Christ as the second Adam, the spiritual head of our race, what is here emphasized is the reality and perfection of His human nature, which gave Him the right to offer a representative sacrifice.<sup>13</sup>

By the Incarnation we are taken up into Him, and therefore the acts that in His human nature He performed are our acts, by virtue of that union which is described by Him as the union of a vine and its branches, by St. Paul as that of the head with the members of a body.<sup>14</sup>

The Scriptural loyalty and the devotional and vital power of this doctrine cannot be said to be inferior to the forensic imputation of the active obedience. Its fruitful implications for the doctrine of the church are not far to seek. Lyttleton's understanding of the Atonement is further enriched by his clear perception of its relation to the Resurrection and Ascension, though in the interest of sanctification he synergizes faith.

Lyttleton's regret over the isolation of the Atonement bears fruit in the enrichment of its understanding. Subsequent expressions of similar regret have tended to issue in its impoverishment and its

reduction to almost an appendage illustrative of some consequence of the Incarnation. Attention has been much directed toward "the more mystical doctrine of Christ as the second Adam, the spiritual head of our race." Since *Lux Mundi* Christology has ranged far from *sola cruce*, and only quite recently are attempts again being made to see the Atonement as the *crux*.

Before we can come back, however, we must wander a little farther. With a touch of our cap to *natura nihil facit per saltum*, we come to *Foundations* published in 1912. Of the seven contributors five became bishops. Among the notable names are those of Temple, Rawlinson, Streeter, and Moberly. While *Foundations* is not epochal as *Lux Mundi* was, it shows the course covered since the departure of that work. The purpose is here also apologetic as the subtitle, "A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought," clearly discloses.

Modern thought was taken to be inductive, psychological, and evolutionary. Inductively Dr. Temple writes:

The fact is that most of us are not able to attribute any such meaning to the word "*Divine*" as will enable us to use that word of Christ, unless we have first seen God in Christ Himself. To ask whether Christ is Divine is to suggest that Christ is an enigma while Deity is a simple and familiar conception. But the truth is the exact opposite of this. We know, if we will open our eyes and look, the life and character of Christ; but of God we have no clear vision.<sup>15</sup>

Dr. Luther concurs: *incipit ibi ubi inceptit; in utero matris factus homo . . .* and adds immediately *prohibe sensum speculationis*,<sup>16</sup> a sentiment not very Greek,<sup>17</sup> nor very Anglican, but certainly a sentiment which would lead him to have some misgivings about the virtue of the lady who on the next page takes the center of the stage. "It [science/modern thought] assumes that reality is rational, that the principle of Reason governs it. But still it is possible to ask, what is the character of this principle of Reason?"<sup>18</sup> The character of this principle of reason is disclosed in the character of Jesus. Further, the character of Jesus is the character of God.<sup>19</sup> But not incidentally of Jehovah; the Old Testament never fails to be a frightful nuisance to platonizing theologians. "The only tenable explanation of the world is the doctrine that it



proceeds from and expresses the Reason and Will of an Absolute Being."<sup>20</sup> This certainly sounds rather less inductive, but he does proceed to build his case for the divinity of Christ on the effect which He produces in men.<sup>21</sup> The results men recognize in themselves as produced by Christ are the measure of His divinity. This is surely inductive enough and psychological, too. It is with psychological terms also that Temple attempts a sweeping refurbishing of Christology. Chalcedon is quite hopeless: "a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek Patristic Theology,"<sup>22</sup> "a breakdown of theology."<sup>23</sup> True, "any attempt to state in terms of ordinary thought the whole meaning of the Divinity of Christ must be inadequate."<sup>24</sup> However, "the first two decades of the century was a time when psychology was looked upon as a key to unlock every problem."<sup>25</sup> Psychology was modern thought, and already Temple's father had indicated the way in 1857. "Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould, i. e., all based on Logic. We are in need of and we are being gradually forced into a theology based on psychology. This transition, I fear, will not be without much pain; but nothing can prevent it."<sup>26</sup>

The pain caused by the discussion of the knowledge and the manner of the sinlessness of Christ prompted by *Lux Mundi* was slight in comparison with the outrage of the scrutiny to which the mind of Jesus was subjected, though, thank God, the mind which they scrutinized was not so much His as the one with which they furnished Him — "the reflection of a Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well."<sup>27</sup> However, our interest here is not with radical liberalism. "Its [the psychological manner] first English exponents, like the exponents of the kenotic theory, were not men who desired to part company with the traditional faith of the church but men who desired to put that same faith on newly adjusted and unshakable foundations."<sup>28</sup> Weston is representative of this endeavor.<sup>29</sup> Yet all the talk of consciousness did not so much solve as multiply the difficulties. With a brave stroke Temple would show the way and even correct the patron saint of the psychologizers. "Let us take first the Divinity of Christ and try to interpret it not in terms of substance but of Spirit — that is of Will. This will not be a repetition of Paul of Samosata, because we shall not distinguish between Will and

Substance. For, after all, Will is the only Substance there is in a man."<sup>30</sup> Christ is Divine in this that the content of His will, i. e., His purpose, is the same as the content of the Father's will.<sup>31</sup> Yet God revealed in Christ is less than the whole of God.<sup>32</sup> Yet again God can find expression through man because in God there has always been a humanity. Christ is the expression of this divine humanity. And this quite unblushing Platonic idea is, we are told, what St. John really meant with the *Logos*.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, very little escapes being brought into captivity to the Academy.

Redemption is by Christ only—that is, by the Spirit of Christ. Christ is Divine, and therefore His Spirit is the Spirit of the Universe. His Spirit of service (which is only perfect in love) is the spirit of all life. . . . Many may be brought to a high degree of excellence without coming personally under the direct influence of the historic Christ. But in Him alone the Divine Spirit of service to the point of sacrifice and sacrifice to the point of death is fully manifest. Others have the Divine Spirit in their degree; He alone is altogether God. When all else fails, the Cross must at last prevail.<sup>34</sup>

The evolutionary orientation is psychologically expounded by Streeter, the least conservative of the contributors. The consciousness of Jesus is psychologically explicable in terms of the Hebrew Prophets.<sup>35</sup> His first intimation of Messiahship was at his Baptism. His temptation "may be a reminiscence of something He told the disciples, insensibly cast by them in the retelling into more pictorial form. It is even possible that the effects of a long hunger combined with the nervous reaction of the stirring experience of His Call actually caused His inner conflict to become visualized in the form related. In any case its psychological appropriateness to the situation is undeniable."<sup>36</sup> Surely an alarming *principium cognoscendi*. Here Prestige's observation would certainly appear to be apposite. "Psychology, in ancient times at least, was ever the parent of heresy."<sup>37</sup>

W. H. Moberly propounds the vicarious penitence notion of the Atonement that his father had devised, and with as little telling effect. He finds the Atonement fallen into disfavor, and understandably so. "For, so far as he [the average man/modern thought] can understand the doctrine at all, it seems to him actively immoral. Jesus saved men, it seems to teach, from the penalties of

sin — in fact, from hell — by undergoing those penalties in their place. But such a transaction seems doubly immoral."<sup>38</sup> The strength of the modern mind is to demand of any doctrine "What is its cash value in terms of moral experience?"<sup>39</sup> This is surely going with him twain.

However, there must be something to this Atonement. "It does not follow that the belief on which our fathers laid so much stress must disappear,"<sup>40</sup> and the inductive study of religions finds something similar to the Christian conception of the Atonement at the heart of all religions. Moberly is at pains to set out the liberal position on the left hand and the conservative on the right and then to give us the best of both worlds. The result is a thinly veiled liberalism that it is difficult any longer to take altogether seriously. He adduces three reasons why Christ died. Martyrdom has always power. It was an example of vicarious penitence. It perfected the human character of Jesus.<sup>41</sup> "The death is regarded, from this point of view, only as the crown of a life: it is still the will of the Saviour, not His suffering, which is regarded as directly efficacious. And yet, is it quite satisfactory to assure ourselves, 'Jesus lived for me,' when the whole language of Christianity makes at once for the turning-point, and says, 'Jesus died for me?'"<sup>42</sup> This is from R. A. Knox, whose *Some Loose Stones* not only provides a scintillating examination of *Foundations*, but is also representative of an alternative method that is constantly gaining wider adherence in the upper Church of England. Knox had been closely associated with the authors of *Foundations*. He had regularly shared Friday's SEXTS, lunch, and Nones with them, but the theology of *Foundations* he did not share. To the two basic questions whether it is still the Christian belief that is being expressed and whether the terms of the apology are apposite and modern, Knox returns a double negative. The most lethal of his observations, and a good case can be made to support it, is that the modern thought to which the authors of *Foundations* addressed themselves was unfortunately several decades antique. "In a word, our objection is, not that Jones is unreal, or unimportant, or unrepresentative, but that he is sixty."<sup>43</sup> And what is behind the "restatement" he fails to recognize as the historic faith. "Words like 'static,' 'corporate,' 'inclusive,' 'experience,' above all,

'restatement' recur continually, jarring upon the ear with the strangeness of a partially understood dialectic, hypnotizing rather than enlightening us. . . . It is hopelessly discontinuous with the tendencies of historic Christianity."<sup>44</sup> While applauding much that Knox points out with such penetrating and saline simplicity,<sup>45</sup> one cannot avoid the question whether the Lyceum is the only alternative to the Academy. Knox is utterly deductive.

God is All-Wise, All-Powerful, All-Good: Jesus was God; therefore Jesus was All-Wise, All-Powerful, and All-Good.<sup>46</sup>

If, as Mr. Temple seems to suggest, we are to look entirely to the character of Jesus for our conception of the Divine, we shall seem to be arguing in something of a circle. To say that Jesus was Divine will be merely to say that Jesus was Jesus-like. I know that there are certain qualities which I expect to find in God; and if there is to be any meaning in the term at all, I must also believe that certain of these qualities are essential to, constitutive of, the character of God.<sup>47</sup>

Such a method does admittedly provide you with a pretty tidy Christology, but it also involves you in some rather fettering considerations of authority and is no kin to the *evangelischer Ansatz*.<sup>48</sup>

Knox had not yet made his submission to Rome, and his method is representative of the growing number of Anglo-Catholics whose feet, unlike his, have not followed their eyes. They would not regard kindly the inclusion of *Foundations* in a discussion of the "upper stream," but the term is deliberately imprecise, the work exemplifies a significant progression, and, although we have admittedly swung wide, it is perhaps not far from the truth to suggest that *Foundations* does represent a development of what was conceived in *Lux Mundi*; children are sometimes a shock to their mothers.<sup>49</sup>

Apology by concession and the kenoticizing and psychologizing of Christ brought diminishing returns, and this was a fact which World War I did not fail to underline. Again a distressed faith called for succor.

*Foundations* was in 1912; *Some Loose Stones*, 1913. The war pressed the question "What can be said?" rather more urgently than the question "What can be conceded?" Apology came to see that it must treat from strength rather than by appeasement. From

the concessions of *Foundations* there was a return to a more conservative Christology. The kenotic and psychological Christ was not persuasive with men who no longer cherished high trust in man's Christly potential. Knox's diagnosis was sounder than that of *Foundations*, and the method he represented provided a more solid statement of Christ and gained many observants. If *Foundations* witnessed the surrender of dogmatics to apology, the postwar movement has been in the opposite direction. Not all the way of course; that would not be quite English. The pretty general compromise effected between the results of "modern thought" and the need for a constant and solid statement of Christ is clearly illustrated both in the title and the contents of *Essays Catholic and Critical* of 1926. In the Preface E. G. Selwyn writes:

Among precursors in the same field, the essayists owe pre-eminent acknowledgment to the authors of *Lux Mundi*, a book which exercised upon many of them a formative influence and still has a living message. But by two forces especially, both of them operating with great intensity, theology has been constrained both to lengthen its cords and to strengthen its stakes during the generation which has elapsed since that work was first published. On the one hand many thoughtful men have been led by the spectacle of a disordered and impoverished Christendom to renewed interest in the expressions of it which are seen in Catholic unity and authority. . . . On the other hand, the critical movement, which was already in *Lux Mundi* allowed to effect a significant lodgment in the citadel of faith, has continued with unabated vigour to analyse and bring to light the origins and foundations of the Gospel. As the title of this volume implies, it is the writers' belief that these movements can and must be brought into synthesis.<sup>50</sup>

How representative this synthesis is can be seen by comparison with the report of the Archbishops' Commission of Christian Doctrine,<sup>51</sup> though the both shoulders on which this report sought to carry water were rather more disparate. "Liberal Catholicism" is how one of the contributors describes the position of *Essays Catholic and Critical*.<sup>52</sup> Its position of compromise represents, by and large, the bulk of the "upper stream" to the present day. On the fringes are the arrant liberals and those who lack only the formal acknowl-

edgment of the Pope to make them quite Roman. The periodic jolts these receive from the Vatican do not seem to impede their expansion. Without venturing too far upon the hazard of contemporary assessment, we are perhaps not too far from the truth when we say that since *Essays Catholic and Critical* the position we have seen represented by Knox has been increasingly adopted.

From *Essays Catholic and Critical* we see that Chalcedon is in again, and with a good working majority. J. K. Mozley calls it "a bulwark against restatements which involve an alteration not only in the form but also in the substance of the doctrine."<sup>53</sup>

If criticism has at times its conventions which are obstacles to a clear understanding of the way in which progress may best be made, that is also true of theology. In the doctrine of Christ's Person the disparagement of the formula of the Two Natures has become in some circles almost a convention. It is one from which we have gained very little.<sup>54</sup>

There is much in the clear statement of the doctrine of the person of Christ to gladden the heart of an orthodox theologian. This unfortunately cannot be said of the doctrine of the work of Christ, and, after all, the test of any Christology is the cross.<sup>55</sup> The essay on the Atonement is not equal to that on the Incarnation. There is that same, and what must unfortunately be called typical,<sup>56</sup> free and easy attitude toward "formulas" or "theories" of the Atonement. Not that by this observation one would suggest a single "formula" as regulative to the exclusion of others, but rather to suggest that the center of Anglican interest is not in the Atonement, that the "formulas" that are favored win their place by their amenability to a certain doctrine of the Incarnation, and that this use of these favored "formulas" does, in fact, exclude other and uncongenial "formulas" of the Atonement. St. Paul is the *bete noire*.

K. E. Kirk begins his essay on the Atonement with a clever illustration of a point Knox had made.

He died that we might be forgiven,  
He died to make us good,  
That we might go at length to heaven,  
Saved by His precious blood.

This he parodies to liberal taste.

He *lived* that we might be forgiven,  
 He *lived* to make us good,  
 That we might go at length to heaven,  
 Saved by His precious *love*.<sup>57</sup>

The promise of this beginning is unfulfilled, for soon we come upon the appalling statement: "Whatever other benefits may have been secured for us by this mystery which we call the Atonement, one benefit was not secured, offered or intended—that man should be saved without any contributory effort of his own will towards good."<sup>58</sup> There goes *sola gratia*, and in its place the contumacious assertion of the necessary action of man in the very heart of soteriology. "The fulfilment of God's purposes depends even more upon man being reconciled to God than upon God being reconciled to man."<sup>59</sup> And so to the *brennender Punkt* of *satisfactio vicaria*.

It can hardly be denied that St. Paul perpetuated, in Christianity, a Jewish idea singularly difficult for the Gospel to assimilate with other elements as fully, or more fully, integral to itself—the idea of the "wrath of God" from which man has to find "justification"; and that he adds to it a conception which to many appears equally infelicitous—the conception, namely, that this wrath could be evaded, by the unrighteous, on the basis not so much of a conversion to righteousness as on that of the appropriation of justification—a righteousness not of obvious fact but of apparent legal fiction—from another source.<sup>60</sup>

God may not be angry,<sup>61</sup> and in place of "God's holiness" we have the anemic "natural fitness."<sup>62</sup>

The Gospel is not full strength because the Law is not full strength. The cry goes up for the right distinction between Law and Gospel, between justification and sanctification. Yet it is precisely these that the Anglo-Catholics explicitly reject.<sup>63</sup> Why?

Is the muddle of soteriology a matter of authority? The canon of catholicity: "There is no 'catholic' doctrine of the Atonement in the sense in which, for example, there is a 'catholic' doctrine of the Incarnation. . . . But the main stream of Christian thought has carried along with it certain definite phrases as applicable to the Atonement, and it is with reference to these that we may test

what has been written above."<sup>64</sup> One such, it must be admitted, is *substitutionary*.

That it can be called *substitutionary* is not, on the theory we have stated, very apparent; but we have frankly to recognize that, while the New Testament constantly speaks of Christ suffering "on our behalf," it very rarely indeed uses language suggesting that he suffered "in our stead"; and it may reasonably be supposed that such language crept into Christianity through an interpretation of Isaiah 53 which neither the author nor, for example, his Septuagint translators would for a moment have endorsed, or from a similar vulgarisation of the ritual of the Day of Atonement.<sup>65</sup>

The canon of Scripture: St. Paul is taken as saying: "Justification is far from being salvation; it is just that acknowledgment of past offenses without which salvation is impossible, but which does not in itself guarantee salvation."<sup>66</sup> Little wonder really, for "the claim that the Bible alone is the final and sufficient guide for Christian belief and morality was entirely untenable."<sup>67</sup> There goes *sola Scriptura*, and in its place an authority that rests "upon the broad basis of continuous verification in reason and experience."<sup>68</sup>

We are approaching the spot where "the dog lies buried." Nothing is more repugnant to reason than the *satisfactio vicaria*. "It is the term to which critics of the Doctrine of the Atonement most commonly take exception."<sup>69</sup> "It is a theory inherently immoral."<sup>70</sup> "It jars most sharply upon many twentieth-century minds."<sup>71</sup> Origen, then, is quite modern in discerning that "to know Christ Crucified is the knowledge of babes."<sup>72</sup>

When the doctrine of the person of Christ is so rich and the doctrine of the work of Christ so poor, one must go beyond the factors which give rise to either to those which can be seen to give rise to both. If it is catholicity and Scripture that give so splendid a doctrine of the person of Christ, why have they failed to do so in the doctrine of the work of Christ? Are they, then, not decisive? The alternative is the question in reverse, i. e., whether the factors which give rise to the doctrine of the work of Christ are capable of producing the doctrine of the person of Christ? *Satisfactio vicaria* is displaced because of its recalcitrancy to reason,



or let us rather say philosophy as suggestive of the magisterial use of reason. The doctrine of the work of Christ is clearly conditioned by philosophical considerations. The cross is death to philosophy, but philosophy can somehow contrive to come to terms with the Incarnation.<sup>73</sup> The factor by which both the doctrine of the person and of the work of Christ are, then, Anglicanly explicable is philosophy.

The basic philosophical orientation betrays itself in the role the *Logos* has persistently played.<sup>74</sup> It is perhaps not unfair here to quote some words of Mackintosh on the Apologists. "Here 'Logos' comes on the scene with a settled independent meaning of its own; it stands for the vast diffused world-reason; its antecedents are metaphysical, not historical; and from the outset it is capable of being analysed and explicated quite apart from the Jesus of the Gospels. In this case cosmology, not soteriology, gives tone to the discussion."<sup>75</sup> A *Logos*-incarnation theology can be made to do such service as renders the cross, strictly speaking, unnecessary and finally the First Article suffices. The *Christus pro nobis* does not fit, and Christology becomes medicinal; redemption is not *satisfactio vicaria* but the creation of a new human nature.<sup>76</sup>

The basic philosophical orientation is betrayed by the ontological categories that Mascall so learnedly and Aristotelianly propounds. He dispenses most efficiently with the psychologizers, but to accuse them of a *metabasis eis allo genos* is to assume that one has established the proper genus, and the Incarnation is, to be sure, *sui generis*.<sup>77</sup> Mascall himself rejects reason as the arbiter. A theologian is to be "a mouth through which the consciousness of the Mystical Body can find expression."<sup>78</sup> This would be more compelling if it were not so closely contiguous with his mysticism. The ontological categories lead him to find the central principle of Christian theology in "the permanence of Christ's manhood."<sup>79</sup>

The basic philosophical orientation is betrayed in the doctrine of God. We have seen how God is not permitted to be angry. One hears a good deal of His impassibility.<sup>80</sup> The consistently felt necessity to resolve all in a final unity in God not only is a suspiciously philosophical impulse, but also is quite inimical to the full paradox of Law and Gospel, sin and grace. Even though one

may have some malicious pleasure in seeing the blow fall, it is probably such a philosophical impulse which provokes Canon Balmforth to decry "that plaguey 'either-or' delusion."<sup>81</sup>

In the interest of cohesive conclusion I have doubtless gone too far. Any coherent explanation of things highly Anglican is *prima facie* untenable, and there are great quantities of *glückliche Inkonsequenz* in the Church of England. Most regrettable in a study of this sort is that one is more apt to take warning from aberrations rather than instruction from positive achievements. The most important warning is probably the jeopardy of an atonement subservient to the Incarnation, instead of an atonement that finds the guarantee of its efficacy in the Incarnation. Of instruction there is so much. One who has had more than the normal quota of semester hours in our seminaries and yet never found a professor who took in hand to expound the Athanasian Creed, naturally finds the Anglican pasturage rich in the patristic field. They have catholicly not lost the Fathers. A catalog is here not in place, but one instruction calls for relevant mention. If it be true that in Anglicanism the Second Article has suffered to the benefit of the first, it is perhaps also true that the Lutheran attitude to this world and our work in it has lacked that enrichment from the implications of the Incarnation which we might well learn from our brothers of the Anglican communion.<sup>82</sup>

If, however, the suggested diagnosis is not altogether misleading, it may begin to indicate something of the upper Anglican temper and Christology. There does persist that basic philosophical orientation which even the access of Biblical studies and more positive assertion of dogma<sup>83</sup> have not overcome. With no *Schriftprinzip* all the insistence on catholicity, tradition, and the mind and mouth of the Mystical Body gives still an uncertain sound. The question of method cannot be overlooked. Ultimately, of course, it is simply the question "Who is Jesus?" and that we must allow Him to answer, and no other answer is given us from Him than that of the Scriptures. *Tolle Christum e Scripturis, quid amplius in illis invenies?*<sup>84</sup>

One final consideration: If we rejoice in the Anglican affirmation of Chalcedon, we must also face the question, "Can that be an adequate doctrine of the person of Christ which permits such an

inadequate doctrine of the work of Christ?"<sup>85</sup> The goal of the theologian would seem to be such a doctrine of the person of Christ as would permit of no despoiling of the doctrine of the work of Christ, and *vice versa*.<sup>86</sup> And great Chalcedon also must be weighed in this balance.<sup>87</sup> The goal of the theologian would also seem to be such a doctrine of the person and work of Christ as would not leave one to be tossed about by sundry winds of authority. We have seen how the crack in the Cornerstone did not start there but in some remote Old Testament part of the building. Can it be adequate therefore to patch up the crack in the Cornerstone, to put up the props of tradition and reason, and leave the rest of the crack still agape?

London, England

#### NOTES

1. Cf. Esme Winfield-Stratford, *The History of British Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1945), p. 51. There is also G. J. Renier's amusing book *The English: Are They Human?* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1931). Cf. particularly pp. 121—139.
2. *Lux Mundi*, ed. Charles Gore (London: John Murray, 1904; 15th ed.), Pref. to 1st ed., p. viii.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
9. Charles Gore, *Belief in Christ* (London: John Murray, 1922), p. 225.
10. Gore's Christology exercised great influence through its expression in R. L. Ottley's *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (London: Methuen, 1896).
11. Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation* (London: John Murray, 1896; 2d ed.), p. 206.
12. Gore, *Belief in Christ*, p. 226.
13. Arthur Lyttleton in *Lux Mundi*, p. 216.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
15. William Temple in *Foundations*, ed. B. H. Streeter (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), p. 214.
16. W. A., XL, No. 1, p. 76. See also W. A., XXV, 107: *Deus enim omnibus incomprehensibilis est, in sola autem carne Christi est comprehensibilis.*
17. "To Western Theology the Incarnation was always a fact, whereas to the Greeks it was also a philosophy." William Temple, p. 231.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 217; cf. W. A., XVIII, 719.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
25. J. S. Lawton, *Conflict in Christology* (London: S. P. C. K., 1947), p. 314.

26. William Temple, p. 226. Frederick Temple was Archbishop of Canterbury 1896—1902, and in 1860 had contributed one of the less disturbing essays to *Essays and Reviews*.
27. George Tyrell, *Christianity at the Crossroads*, p. 44, quoted by D. M. Baillie in *God Was in Christ* (New York: Scribner's, 1948), p. 40.
28. J. S. Lawton, p. 166.
29. F. Weston, *The One Christ* (London: Mowbray, 1907). Cf. E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946), pp. 28 ff.
30. William Temple, p. 247. Cf. his *Christus Veritas* (London: Macmillan, 1924), p. 150.
31. *Foundations*, p. 248. Lawton comments on Temple's preference for the distinction between the form and content of a will rather than the distinction between substance and hypostasis: "Naturally, it is not a sufficient criticism of the writer to point out that he has based his reconstruction upon an intellectual refinement similar to that which it is intended to replace; it is, however, relevant to point out that the union of God and man thus conceived is at least as closely dependent upon the maintenance of an idealistic philosophy as was ever the Patristic theology linked up with realism." Lawton, p. 318.
32. William Temple in *Foundations*, p. 251.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 251, Note 1.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
35. Streeter in *Foundations*, p. 94.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
37. Quoted by Mascall, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
38. *Foundations*, p. 270. This is rather stronger than Lyttleton allowed himself in *Lux Mundi*, q. v., p. 227. Here the pangs of death perform their cleansing function, and by the pilfered *satisfactio vicaria* the door of purgatory is also left ajar. Cf. C. S. Lewis, *Beyond Personality* (London: Bles, 1944), p. 45.
39. *Foundations*, p. 270.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 306 ff.
42. R. A. Knox, *Some Loose Stones* (London: Longmans, Green, 1913), pp. 172 f.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
44. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
45. In the smoke-filled contemporary dialectic and abstruse humbug a keen gust of Knoxian clarity is most bracing. "Orthodox theology is not easily intelligible, for on the face of it it passes man's understanding. But however difficult it may be to fathom, it can be stated on a half-sheet of note-paper." (*Ibid.*, p. 15.) Luther seems somewhere to have said something rather similar. Knox further observes: "The ordinary doctrine of the Atonement is a thing you can carry in your head. But if you adopt Mr. Moberly's view of the Atonement, you would have to read the chapter over at the beginning of each Holy Week, to remember what it was all about. If we are to have a shop-window theology, a theology which we are to present to the waverer for acceptance, it is before all things necessary that it should be lucid." (*Ibid.*, pp. 14 f.) However unecumenical it may appear, it can scarcely be denied that the use of wit in the Roman apologetic and polemic, notably in Chesterton and Knox, has been more trenchant than the efforts of those who, when confronted with nonsense, have dignified it with recondite and sober disquisitions. Cf. Knox's *Essays in Satire* (London:

Sheed and Ward, 1928) for "Absolute and a Bit of Hell," a parody on "Absolom and Achitophel," composed upon the publication of *Foundations*. Of which a sample:

They were content Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John  
Should bless the old-fashioned beds they lay upon;  
But we, for ev'ry one of theirs, have two,  
And trust the watchfulness of blessed Q.

46. R. A. Knox, *SLS*, p. 87.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 97. At the bottom of this page we find the canny note:  
Aristotelianism is doubtless out of date, but it is impossible, even for the modern mind, not to have some sympathy with the undergraduate who, when asked in his Viva Voce what Aristotle would have said if he had met a cow with five legs, replied, "He wouldn't have been such a—fool as to call it a cow."
48. Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1931), *passim*.
49. R. A. Knox, *SLS*, p. 36: "It is even whispered that the survivors of the *Lux Mundi* school have seen cause for searchings of heart in connection with *Foundations*."
50. E. G. Selwyn, ed., *Essays Catholic and Critical* (London: S. P. C. K., 1926), p. v.
51. *Doctrine in the Church of England*; the report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922 (London: S. P. C. K., 1938).
52. J. K. Mozley, *Some Tendencies in British Theology* (London: S. P. C. K., 1952), p. 73.
53. *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 194. On the other hand Lawton points out that the restaters could also preserve the form. "It is possible to employ traditional language on a lavish scale without any apparent indication that the underlying meaning has vanished" (p. 321).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 190. H. R. Mackintosh, whose *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912) is a popular textbook in Anglican theological colleges, is the most influential culprit here. Cf. Elert, pp. 195 ff., also his "Fragen um Chalkedon," *Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung, Festschrift aus Anlass der Vollversammlung des Lutherischen Weltbundes*, 1952, p. 232: "Inkarnation ist ein Vorgang. Die Formel von Chalkedon dagegen definiert einen Zustand. Während zum Beispiel das Apostolikum über Christus in dramatischen Kategorien (natus, passus, descendit, ascendit, venturus, etc.) redet, sind die christologischen Aussagen dieser späteren Bekenntnisse durch die Bevorzugung von Seinskategorien (Physis, Usia, Hypostasis, Prosoyon, etc.) gekennzeichnet, die zusammen auch ein metaphysisches Denkgefüge bilden." Mozley, however, maintains, and not unconvincingly, that Chalcedon "does not appear to me to commit the Church to anything that can properly be called a metaphysic or a psychology." *op. cit.*, p. 142.
55. Cf. P. Althaus, *Die Christliche Wahrheit* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949), II, 228.
56. Cf. Lytleton in *Lux Mundi*, p. 201; Moberly in *Foundations*, p. 270; C. S. Lewis (see fn. 38 above), p. 31. One's youthful adulation of the work of Mr. Lewis tends to diminish with the perception of the lineaments of the theology into which he fits so conformably.
57. K. E. Kirk in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 249 f.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
63. Cf. E. S. Abbott and others, *Catholicity* (London: Dacre, 1947), p. 25. "The first of the two radical errors of Luther is, then, the dissociation of Justification from the doctrine of Creation: the second is that of Justification from Sanctification." Cf. also *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 254.
64. *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 270.
65. *Ibid.* Men who are ridiculed for some of their harmonizing defences of Verbal Inspiration might well be instructed by such ingenuity. *Lux Mundi* had similarly been embarrassed by this intractable piece of Catholic tradition ". . . as if the Atonement consisted in the propitiation of the wrathful God by the substituted punishment of the innocent for the guilty. It will be seen that while this statement seems to represent the Catholic doctrine, in reality, it introduces a most vital difference." (Page 226.)
66. K. E. Kirk, in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 272.
67. W. L. Knox, in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 99.
68. A. E. J. Rawlinson, p. 95. Cf. R. C. Moberly in *Lux Mundi*, pp. 165 ff.; Gore in the Preface of *Belief in God* (London: John Murray, 1921); and R. Brook, in *Foundations*, p. 59: "The ultimate appeal for each is to his own experience." R. A. Knox, p. 59: "The two headlights of Scripture and Tradition." *Doctrine in the Church of England*, p. 32. Mascall, a waxing Anglo-Catholic of large learning and growing influence, refuses (p. 82) to allow the meaning of *dikaioo* to make the world too small for himself and his views on impartation rather than imputation. He understandably finds an ally in Aulen and his *Christus Victor*, but not of course in Nygren and *Agape and Eros*. Then follows that tiresome invocation of the mystics that one finds Lutherany hardest to bear. Nobody knows what they mean but they themselves, and that only while they are up. 1 Cor. 14:9! A soteriology that is consonant with such an unknown tongue is to say the least suspect. Cf. A. Köberle, *The Quest for Holiness* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1938), pp. 7 ff. and 51; and H. Sasse, *Here We Stand* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1946), p. 45.
69. Kirk, p. 277.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Mascall (see fn. 29 above), p. 88.
72. Quoted by Mackintosh (see fn. 54 above), p. 168. Cf. T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays of T. S. Eliot* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1950), p. 365.
73. Vide supra, fn. 17; fn. 75 infra.
74. Cf. Mozley, op. cit., p. 31: "That in Jesus the divine Logos was incarnate has always been the most firmly held conviction of the English theologian." On the other hand Elert declares that a doctrine of the *Logos* is for Lutherans peripheral. *Morphologie* I, 200. Similarly, R. Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902), p. 203: "The Church has framed all her great creeds without employing it."
75. Mackintosh (see fn. 54 above), p. 143.
76. Mascall, p. 3. A. G. Hebert, *The Form of the Church* (London: Faber, 1944), p. 29. H. E. Symonds in *The Doctrine of Justification by Faith* (London: Mowbrays, 1954), p. 88.
77. Cf. Mozley, in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 195 ff. W. A., XXXIX, No. 2. p. 94. Thesis 23. Symonds, loc. cit., makes a very interesting distinction. "It is held by some that this recreation of man restores him to the condition in which God created him—Original Righteousness—and from which he fell by sin. The change in man's status is described by Catholics as an ontological change and by Protestants as an ethical one."
78. Mascall, p. 240.

79. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vii.
80. The standard work is Mozley's *The Impassibility of God* (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1926). Cf. Mascal, p. 66.
81. Quoted by Mascal, p. vii. Mozley speaks of "the philosopher's conviction that in the end there must be a manifested unity" (*Tendencies*, p. 138). Nevertheless he also observes "the unsystematic character of modern philosophy" (op. cit., p. 95). This last, however, he refuses to recognize as a philosophical advance. The solution he sees not in theology coming to terms with the modern unsystematic philosophy, but of this unsystematic philosophy being brought to soundness and solution by hearkening to Christian theology's "answers of metaphysical relevance which point the way out of these discordant and chaotic tendencies." (*Ibid.*) Here the difficulty lies not between *Glaube* and *Unglaube*, nor yet between *Glaube* and *Glaube*, but between two philosophical positions, with the one Mozley favors, and here he is widely representative, pretty obviously out of fashion, and so Jones is sixty again.
82. Cf. D. L. Sayers, "Why Work," in *Creed or Chaos* (London: Methuen, 1947), and also *The Mind of the Maker* (London: Methuen, 1941).
83. Cf. D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ* (New York: Scribners, 1948), p. 23. His criticism of Barth and Bultmann, whose doctrinal assertions are far more positive than their attitude to Scripture will support, would seem to be in place here also. In England the tradition of the church is invoked, which is an appeal that the Continentals are, perhaps fortunately, in not so likely a position to permit themselves.
84. Luther quoted by Elert, *Morphologie*, p. 195.
85. Cf. Elert, *Fragen um Chalkedon*, p. 232: "Lässt sich, wenn das dogmatische Denken hier nicht kapitulieren darf, das Inkarnationsdogma ohne die griechischen soteriologischen Konsequenzen vertreten und vielmehr mit dem paulinisch-reformatorisches Heilsverständnis verbinden?"
86. Cf. Apology, IV, 101, *Triglotta*, p. 151: "What is the knowledge of Christ unless to know the benefits of Christ?"
87. Cf. E. Schlink, *Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1947), p. 123 ff., and Elert, *Morphologie*, I, 202.