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The Finite-Infinite God of Edgar Sheffield Brightman

By ARTHUR CARL PIEPKORN

AMONG the noteworthy deaths of last year was that of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, from 1919 to his death Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, who died at the age of 68 on February 25, 1953. Born in 1884 and educated at Brown, Boston, Berlin, and Marburg Universities, he exerted great influence both on American Protestant theology and on American philosophy. As a philosopher he was one of the most articulate exponents of Personalism. In the field of religion, he will be remembered for having popularized among American Protestant theologians and clergymen the concept of a finite God, that is, "a god whose power is limited by realities which he did not create."¹

Ever since 1880, and especially during the past quarter century, the doctrine of a finite—or finite-infinite—God has become increasingly fashionable in Protestant theological circles as well as among theistic philosophers. It is explicit not only in the philosophy of Brightman, but in varying degrees also in the philosophies, to cite only some of many, of James Ward, F. R. Tennant,² and Alfred North Whitehead,³ all of which posit a finite or a merely immanent God;⁴ of William Pepperell Montague,⁵ Radoslav A. Tsanoff,⁶ Francis Herbert Bradley,⁷ Henri Bergson,⁸ and Peter Anthony Bertocci.⁹ It dominates much liberal Protestant theological thinking. Its influence manifests itself, for instance, in W. R. Matthews¹⁰ and others who reject divine impassibility; in Edward Scribner Ames' temporalistic theism,¹¹ and in Charles Hartshorne's panpsychistic panentheism.¹²

Others whom Brightman himself claimed on behalf of the doctrine of a finite God are Paul Elmer More, Raphael Demos, Georgia Harkness, Hastings Rashdall, Nicholas Berdyaev, Paul Tillich, William Kelly Wright, John Bennett, Robert L. Calhoun (who speaks of "rigidities" within God), Henry Nelson Wieman (with his im-

personal naturalistic conception of God), and Vergilius Ferm. Brightman also finds support for a temporalist God in the traditional theist Franz Brentano, who suggested that the imperfection of the world is a token of a God whose works are becoming infinitely more perfect.¹³ "This," says Brightman, "points to a God who is in some sense actually developing and growing." He also notes that John M. E. McTaggart—while rejecting a Creator, because this postulates the reality of time, which McTaggart denied—held that a finite God is *logically* preferable to an infinite one.¹⁴

I

It is useful, in view both of Brightman's influence and of Brightman's death, to inquire in some detail into his concept of a finite-infinite God as the Controller of The Given.

In the minds of its exponents the doctrine of a finite God is a kind of theodicy, a defense and a vindication of His goodness. Brightman himself was a devout Methodist, a regular worshiper at divine service, and a philosopher whose sensitive nature was appalled by the tragedy of the world. "So, it would seem, he sought to absolve the Deity from responsibility by demoting him from some of his own powers."¹⁵ In *A Philosophy of Religion*, Brightman himself sets forth the utility of his hypothesis under five heads:¹⁶

First, he declares, *it does not need to derive any of its basic evidence from our ignorance*. All that it asserts is based on an interpretation of actual experience. We do not need to wait for the fuller light of immortality to make clear what we do not now know. The *voluntas Dei* does not have to be the *asylum ignorantiae*.

Second, Brightman affirms, *the surd* (that is, superfluous) *evils are not ascribed to the will of God*. Historically, the doctrine of a finite God has usually been born out of the consideration of the problem of evil. Our human experience includes not only God's goodness, but also "alcohol and syphilis, insanity and arteriosclerosis, or their equivalents." We have the choice of following Schopenhauer and believing God "either must have an element of malice in his nature and be possessed by a devil, or else he must be suffering from some harsh necessities of existence which he did

not create." According to Brightman, "traditional theism exalts the omnipotence of God but obscures his moral perfection by leaving it in an unintelligible relation to the evils of existence." The doctrine of a finite God "exalts God's moral perfection, denies his omnipotence, but ascribes to him sufficient power to solve all problems and to bring good out of all evil." This supplies "a more intelligible faith" and enables us "to feel a profounder religious satisfaction" than we could under the old view.¹⁷ The "truly futile and purposeless evils of existence" are "God's suffering as well as ours."¹⁸

Third, according to Brightman, *the eternal distinction between what is good and evil is maintained*. We do not have to take the difficult position of absolute theism that all apparent evil is real good, with its corollary danger of producing complete skepticism about values.

Fourth, Brightman described his hypothesis as *an inspiring challenge to eternal co-operative moral endeavor*. God's will is "an eternal, but suffering and limited, will for good, which has never yet been broken by the struggle, but has moved on in loyalty to reason and the eternal ideals of right. God is strong, but tragic; suffers, but conquers; meets obstacles, but controls himself and them. Worship of such a God includes a sharing of his task and of his unfailing purpose, as well as of his suffering."¹⁹ Since religious experience is basically "*a faith that religious communion is taking place*" (italics not original), and "persons who believe that God is finite are in no way precluded from such communion or co-operation with God," it is perfectly possible not only for a believer in a finite God to enjoy religious experience but also for "the very limitation on God's power . . . to increase our reverence for his goodness."²⁰ On this point there is some contact between believers in a finite God and those pragmatists who feel that the orthodox view of God (as altogether immutable, absolute, wholly independent, and utterly incapable of receiving any good from His creatures) actually betrayed the religious values this view sought to embody.

Fifth, Brightman pointed out, *finitism is empirical*. Religious experience leads to a finite God because "no possible experience could reveal unlimited and absolute power."²¹ We can best account

for the structure of our own experience, "which in the end is the sole touchstone of truth," by the hypothesis that "God too is an experient, whose action is limited by the content and by the possibilities of subsistence which he finds within himself as experient."²² (Brightman defined an "experient" — the term is James Ward's — as "any actual complex of awareness felt as a whole"; it is a unity within itself by virtue of "its unique togetherness or its self-identity." Experiens range from "the lowest and simplest forms of animal and perhaps of vegetable life" through persons to "the supreme experient, God." Selves, that is, unified wholes of momentary experiens, and persons, that is, selves capable of evaluating their valuations, emerge by self-identifying memory-linkages which unify momentary experiens with previous experiens into a larger whole. Experience includes content, form, and activity. Since "God is the supreme experient, his content would include awareness of all qualities in the universe; his form would include all possible relations; and his activity would select from among the qualities those of ideal value and would direct the cosmic process toward their realization.")²³ This empirical value of finitism, Brightman argued, reflects the sources of the idea of a finite God in the course of the last three generations: The awareness of the suffering and waste in the prehuman and human struggle for survival; a keen sense of the problem of suffering in and of man; the development of modern physics, with the unpredictable behavior of *quanta* and the discovery of Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy"; a heightened religious sensitivity to the goodness of God; and an increasing confidence in empirical as against *a priori* methods.²⁴

To the foregoing five Brightman added a sixth value; finitism is *the only logical alternative to a narrow naturalism and atheism*. One can accept the telic facts of experience and relegate the dystelic facts into outer darkness; this is what they charge traditional theology with having done. "A more coherent view will either eliminate God entirely or will recognize the fact of complex structure and struggle within God. But when God is eliminated, he soon reappears in some other form, Superman or Proletariat. Empirical thinking may well find a finite God to be the most comprehensive hypothesis for the interpretation of all the facts."²⁵

II

The doctrine of a finite God is new neither in the history of religion nor in the history of philosophy. While Brightman went too far in saying that all primitive gods were finite, certainly the problem is as old as polytheism,²⁶ and Zoroastrianism's Ahura-Mazda was limited by the existence of Ahriman.

In the history of philosophy Brightman traced the concept of a finite God back to the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* of Plato, who "preserves the goodness of God at the cost of metaphysical coherence," and who "seems to have believed that axiological coherence was more important than cosmological coherence."²⁷ A personal friend, co-religionist, and fellow-philosopher of Brightman, Cornelius Krusé, declares: "A close study of Plato, especially Plato's *Timaeus*, sheds, I believe, much light on Brightman's valiant attempt to find a solution for the problem of evil. Brightman went a step beyond St. Thomas' attribution of the Platonic Ideas to the mind of God: he placed the Platonic *Surd* confronting the demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus* also within the person of God himself. In fact, both the Ideas and the *Surd*, not too successfully harmonized, it must be admitted, constitute the coeternal 'passive given' factors within God, which his will did not create, but with which, like a creative artist, recognizing both their responsiveness and their recalcitrance, he must and does work."²⁸

Epicurus, despite his disclaimers, also had a finite God who was "morally neutral."²⁹

Brightman found that among early Christian heretics Marcion and Mani had finite gods, while Jakob Boehme, the seventeenth century mystic, affirmed a "bitter torment," a "fire of anger," a "struggle within God." Brightman described some of the articles in Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697) as finitistic.

Of David Hume, Brightman said that his "exclusively analytic method blinded him to a synoptic view," but that he came close to affirming the logical necessity for a finite God.

It is true that in an *obiter dictum* Hume did speak of a God "perfect in his finite capacity," but he does not develop the idea. He also made Cleanthes say:

I scruple not to allow that I have been apt to suspect the frequent

repetition of the word *infinite*, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savor more of panegyric than of philosophy, and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, *admirable*, *excellent*, *superlatively great*, *wise* and *holy*, these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and anything beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. . . . If we abandon all human analogy . . . I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must forever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less, can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted.³⁰

Hume stood in a tradition of logicometaphysical skepticism that had been arguing the issues here involved as far back as Carneades of Cyrene in the second century before Our Lord.³¹

Brightman further pointed out that Samuel Clarke in *A Demonstration of the Being and Attribution of God* (1705) and Immanuel Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* held that teleology cannot prove an infinite and perfect cause of the world. Instead of proceeding to the doctrine of a finite God toward which Kant admitted that the evidence pointed, however, they discredited the teleological proof, according to Brightman, because theistic absolutism, in view of the ontological argument, had too firm an *a priori* grip on their minds. He declared that what Kant called the physico-theological argument for God's existence is more satisfactory than the ontological or cosmological arguments.

Its failure to demonstrate the omnipotent God of the ontological argument, instead of being a defect, as has been supposed, may be a revealing insight into the truth that divine value is not unlimited in power, but has to contend against a cosmic drag.³²

According to Brightman, the Hegelian dialectic—Brightman here admittedly went beyond Hegel himself—"points to antitheses, negativities and conflicts within God." Brightman further quoted Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling as talking about *die*

goettliche Unvernunft and *der goettliche Unwille*. He also quoted John Stuart Mill that "it is not too much to say that every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer."³³ Brightman likewise recalled F. C. S. Schiller's assertion that a finite god "may be proved."³⁴ William James (who may have been influenced by John Stuart Mill) admittedly exerted a strong influence on Brightman. The latter made much of a statement by James in which he underlines the fact that "something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of (life's) cup."³⁵ But James, Brightman observed, was not interested in "defining precisely the nature of the God who is capable of improving" the human situation. He has failed to think through the meaning of the idea of God to which he commits himself; it "is an intuition rather than an explanation."

Brightman might—but seems not to—have quoted an even more emphatic declaration of James in his Hibbert Lectures for 1909:

The drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some sort of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious. . . . The outlines of the superhuman consciousness thus made probably must remain, however, very vague. . . . Only one thing is certain, and that is the result of our criticism of the absolute: the only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from a species of auto-intoxication . . . is to be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has itself an external environment, and consequently is finite. . . . The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once. These, I need hardly tell you, are terms in which common men have usually carried on their active commerce with God; and the monistic perfections that make the notion of him so paradoxical practically and morally are the colder additions of remote professional minds operating *in distans* upon conceptual substitutes for him alone.³⁶

From S. S. Laurie, who recognized "superfluous evil," Brightman

took a description of God that he quotes over and over again, as "a spirit in difficulty."³⁷ He also admitted to having been influenced strongly by Henri Bergson's conception of time as *durée réelle* rather than physical space-time and — indirectly but markedly — by Edmund Noble's *Purposive Evolution*.³⁸ Brightman was also aware of the finite god theory of H. G. Wells in his book *God the Invisible King* (1917), but Wells is said to have retracted it later; in any case he defines it so vaguely as to be philosophically valueless.³⁹

Against this total background Brightman proposed his doctrine of a finite God in *The Problem of God* in 1930. In 1931 *The Finding of God* came out, in 1934 *Personality and Religion* (where the doctrine is restated in Lecture III), and in 1940 *A Philosophy of Religion*.⁴⁰

We may point out here that some of Brightman's conclusions were anticipated by Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801—1887), a modern panentheist, who, while professing not to deny the omnipotence of God, said: "I would rather take His omnipotence to mean that He can do everything that He wills, and that everything that He wills is good. . . . I seek the cause of that which is not good in the world outside of God's will, although not outside of God, since I rather see therein the cause against which the might and activity of His higher will opposes itself."⁴¹

Another adumbration of Brightman's position is the "quasi-human" God of the later John Fiske.⁴²

We might also refer to the assertions of Ludwig Paul Feuerbach on the necessity of creation for omnipotence to realize and prove itself. "God as God, that is, as a being not finite, not human, not materially conditioned, not phenomenal, is only an object of thought. . . . Is God almighty without creation? No! Omnipotence first realizes, proves itself in creation. . . . What is omnipotence, what all other divine attributes, if man does not exist? Man is nothing without God; but also, God is nothing without man; for only in man is God an object as God; only in man is he God."⁴³

More recent are Charles Sander Peirce's musings that God is omniscient "in a vague sense" and omnipotent "vaguely speaking." With reference to God's omniscience Peirce says that he does "not see why we may not assume that He refrains from knowing

much." With reference to God's omnipotence he observes that Leibnitz held "that this is the best of 'all possible' worlds. That seems to imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless others were created, too, it would seem that, all things considered, this universe was the only possible one." Such questions, however, Peirce dismisses as "gabble."⁴⁴

III

It must be kept in mind that Brightman's doctrine of a finite-infinite God is a philosophical rather than a theological doctrine, in the sense that it deliberately refuses to operate with authoritative revelation and restricts itself resolutely to experimental data. In the opinion of at least one historian of American philosophy, Brightman "has subordinated his theism and his defense of belief in a 'finite God' to a generalized axiology or metaphysics of value."⁴⁵

Brightman is an *empiricist* and a *rationalist*. "The belief in an objectively real, value-seeking God" is not an *a priori* metaphysical truth, but "there is an *empirical* basis for the hypothesis that such a God is real, and that the basis for theism is *empirically* more ample and *rationally* more coherent than that for solipsism and naturalism" (italics not original).⁴⁶

In essence, Brightman is confessedly engaged in an intellectual making of God in the expanded image of man.

All that we can think or imagine about God is based on our experience, and there is no definite reason for supposing that any of God's unknown attributes are anything other than forms of conscious experience. . . . If the structure of God's experience . . . bears any analogy to man's, . . . his creative will would always act under the conditions which are presented by the passive factors in his experience, namely, the given unchanging principles of reason, and the given eternal facts of divine sensation.⁴⁷

Experience includes all experience available to the "datum self," his own and the experience of all other experients to which he has access. For Brightman,

the empirical evidence most directly relevant to the cosmic fate of values and hence to the power of goodness in objective reality, is to be found in the facts of evolution—both celestial and terrestrial. Astronomy gives us the former, biology the latter. . . .

The order, mutual adaptation, and progress in evolution, above all the so-called "arrival of the fit," point to a power other than the curve of probability, arriving at relevance, wholeness and value. To deny this is to appeal to magic. But . . . the incalculable wastage, the blind alleys, the internecine warfare, the natural plagues and disasters, of the evolutionary process are empirically ineradicable evidence of dysteleology.⁴⁸

By this philosophical, empiricist, rationalist, evolutionist pathway he comes to his "hypothesis of a finite God, shorn of the old attribute of omnipotence."⁴⁹

IV

Finitism does not regard God as merely finite, as some forms of polytheism do. It does not say of God that he is in no respect absolutely perfect, or that he is "in all respects surpassable by something conceivable, perhaps by others or perhaps by (himself) in another state."⁵⁰ Brightman insisted that "there are certain senses in which one must, on rational grounds, view God as infinite if one adopts the hypothesis of God at all."⁵¹ As a description of this absolute aspect of God, most of traditional theology is acceptable to proponents of finitism.⁵²

Specifically, "as regards goodness, God must be infinite, never failing in devotion to the highest ideals."⁵³

In a sense, God is omnipresent.

We can find God as a presence at all times. . . . He is present, whether we recognize him or not, both as sustainer of our existence and as a source of what is given to us from beyond ourselves. Yet his constant presence is also a proof of his absence; since he is with all and in all, he is more than is ever disclosed in our experience. He exists as absent from us because he is present in all pasts, all futures, all beings everywhere. In adoring him, we adore a presence that is more than presence and an absence that is never wholly absent.⁵⁴

Likewise, in a sense, God is omniscient. He knows "all that can be known."⁵⁵ God "must be unlimited in his knowledge of all that is, although human freedom and the nature of The Given probably limit his knowledge of the precise details of the future."⁵⁶

God is inexhaustible, that is, although God is not a mathematical infinity, he, like the series of mathematical infinities, cannot be exhausted.⁵⁷

God is eternal. He "is personal consciousness of eternal duration; his consciousness is an eternally active will, which eternally finds and controls The Given within every moment of his eternal experience."⁵⁸

God is "infinite in time and space, by his unbegun and unending duration and by his inclusion of all nature within his experience."⁵⁹

V

The issue on which absolutist and finitist thinkers part company is "the problem of the power of goodness" — the reconciliation of the goodness of God with the omnipotence of God. Here there emerges for Brightman "the paradoxical truth that, though God is infinite, his will is finite, being limited by that in him which is not his will."⁶⁰

"God is the source of all being,"⁶¹ and can in a sense be regarded as a creator. But creation in Brightman is not *ex nihilo*; it means the production of novelties within divine experience, not of beings in any way external to God.⁶²

Brightman holds that every conscious being must have a nature—a definite structure, definite properties and qualities. In the nature of a conscious being it is possible for it to make choices; this fact we call its will. Will is not a separate faculty or power; it is the act of a whole self possessing a specific nature. In the case of God, the *power* of His will is limited by The Given.⁶³

This obviously goes farther than the traditional limitations that even absolutists have conceded with reference to the nature of God. Absolutists and finitists alike agree that God cannot do the inherently impossible, that He cannot make a round triangle, or a two that being multiplied by itself makes six, or a time prior to His own existence. They would also agree that He is self-limited by His own will and generally that He is limited by the free choices of the beings He has created.⁶⁴

Thus Canon Hastings Rashdall (whom Brightman frequently claimed as a personalist that believes in a finite God) uses the term "finite God" to emphasize certain features inherent in all theism when he says: "God is certainly limited by all other beings in the Universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as he is not those selves." But, he goes on, God "is not limited by anything which does not proceed from his own Nature or Will or Power."⁶⁵

Brightman, however, went so far as to urge that "it may be asked whether a God" conceived of as submitting himself only to the limitations involved by rationality and goodness and human will "stands in a sufficiently explanatory relation to the dualisms of experience to be either religiously satisfactory or ontologically real."⁶⁶

Modern finitists, in Hartshorne's words, mean to say by "finite God" or "imperfect God" that "the traditional idea of perfection is erroneous, and the empirical method (which such writers are likely to profess) cannot establish any sort of perfection in God. . . . They are seeking a minimal conception of God."⁶⁷

To the finitistic theorist God is not almighty.

The advance of modern thought has compelled us to modify our faith either in God's character or in his omnipotence. We believe that it is far more reasonable to deny the absolute omnipotence of the power manifesting itself in the world than to deny its goodness. On our view, God is perfect in will, but not in achievement; perfect in power to derive good from all situations, but not in power to determine in detail what those situations will be. It is not a question of the kind of God we should like to have. It is a question of the kind of God required by the facts.⁶⁸

In another place, Brightman put it this way:

Divine power . . . is not magical; much less is it lawless or arbitrary; and it is mistaken to regard it as absolutely omnipotent. God's power is best described as sufficient for man's need. God is man's fellow sufferer. He dies every Good Friday but rises every Easter. He experiences new Calvaries and new tombs whenever men suffer and die; but his power is never defeated and he is able to create new life in this world and new life in the world to come. This experience and this faith are what the power of God means.⁶⁹

This single step from absolutism to finitism "involves the entire difference between admitting and not admitting real change, growth, possibility of profit, suffering, true sociality, as qualities of the divine, along with radical differences . . . in the meanings ascribed to creation, the universe, human freedom, and in the arguments for the existence of God."⁷⁰

Since God is not omnipotent, he is eternally perfectible.

Our finite God is not one of a finished perfection; his perfection and the perfection of his world consist in their perfectibility. This

does not mean that God is ever ignorant or evil in his will; he always knows all that can be known and his will is always guided by perfect devotion to the ideal of love. Yet it does mean that he confronts within his own experience genuine difficulties, out of which arise the apparent defects of the physical world. On this view, God does not deliberately choose the cruelties of evolution and the sufferings of creation; they represent, rather, the necessary outcome of his eternal Given nature, out of which he is always bringing a higher good.⁷¹

An essential element of Brightman's conception of God is that God is temporal. This does not mean that he is not eternal; he is. It means that he is not timeless. It rejects the idea that he is not intimately related to and concerned with events in time.⁷²

The God of religion, from everlasting to everlasting, is a temporal being. Indeed, it may be said that all reality, all experience, whether human or divine, is a temporally moving present. Nothing real is a *nunc stans*. Activity, change, duration, are the essence of the real. The real endures; the real changes; the real grows. God is the real, or at least the most significant part of the real. . . . Nothing real is timeless, in the sense of being out of time, atemporal. Eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity.⁷³

Time as Brightman conceived of it is not the space-time of physics. "Physical time is not an adequate basis for thought about God," because physics tends to reduce or subordinate time to space and by the very nature of its problem ignores personality and value as well as the epistemological problem. Time is "the form of the inner sense."⁷⁴ Temporality is one of the chief characteristics of immediate experience.

Experience is always a duration, a real before and after; since Bergson's exposition of "*durée réelle*" and Heidegger's of "*Dasein*" and Whitehead's emphasis on process, there can be no doubt of this. An experience which is at no time and contains no temporal sequence is a round triangle. . . . If God is a real being, he must stand in real relations to our temporal experience. He must be the ground and explanation of our time; and events in our time must make a difference to him. The temporal character of the self points to the temporal character of God.⁷⁵

This is a necessary corollary of the process of evolution, which means that time and change are of fundamental importance in the universe.

The only God worth believing in, . . . in the light of the evidence, is a God in living relation to the facts of cosmic and human history. He is a God into whose very being time enters; we need a temporalistic rather than a purely eternalistic view of God. Indeed, taking evolution in the largest sense, it may be that the development of the entire physical universe as we know it is but an insignificant episode in the eternally active history of God.⁷⁶

Religion as well as evolution requires "ages" of real time. "Science needs them for the evolution of matter and mind, and religion needs them for the unfolding of a divine plan. . . . If the ongoing of history reveals God, it reveals one for whom events happen and to whom the order of events is of real importance." Morality is another illustration of the data from which we infer God. "It is true that the good life is a life of loyalty to timeless ideas; but it is even truer that the good life is a task, a development. Although ideals may be regarded as timeless, every realized ideal is in time."⁷⁷

This is a good place to note how far and how radically Brightman departed from even his distinguished predecessor, Borden Parker Bowne. In Chapter IV, "The Metaphysical Attributes of the World-Ground," of his *Theism*, Bowne attributed to God without any qualification *unity* ("it is uncompounded, indivisible, and without distinction of parts . . . [and] there is but one such fundamental existence"), *unchangeability* ("not the rigidity of a logical category but the self-identity and self-equality of intelligence"), *omnipresence* (in the sense that space is no limitation or barrier for God), *eternity* ("the absolute intelligence and will must lie beyond all temporal limits and conditions as their source, but never included in them"), *omniscience* ("on the assumption of a real time . . . there is no way out [of the difficulty of foreknowledge and freedom] unless we assume that God has ways of knowing that are inscrutable to us. . . . On our own view of ideality and relativity of time the problem vanishes in its traditional form, and nothing remains but the general mystery which shrouds for us the epistemology of the Infinite and the existence of the finite") and *omnipotence* ("God is absolute will or absolute agent, forever determining himself according to rational and eternal principles").⁷⁸

Bowne likewise argued for the nontemporal character of God:

The world-ground is, indeed, unconditioned by anything beyond itself; but it must be conditioned by its own nature in any case, and the question arises whether this conditioning involves temporal sequence in the infinite life itself.

To maintain the affirmative here would involve us in the gravest speculative difficulties. . . . [God] is not to be viewed as conditioned by time with regard to his own self-consciousness or self-possession. . . . God in Himself, then, is not only the eternal or ever-enduring; he is also the non-temporal, or that which transcends temporal limits and conditions.⁷⁹

From God's temporal character Brightman inferred limitations on his omniscience. It is clear from the nature of consciousness, he argued, that God must be finite. Every human consciousness is largely determined by factors beyond its control — the past and the environment. Freedom can be rationally defined only with reference to such limitations, as consisting "in the choice or election of elements from a total field of experience which is determined by a power beyond our control." The effects of our choice are beyond our control, although not beyond our powers of prediction and indirect control. "It is not impossible that there is something analogous in the divine freedom, though only remotely so. With all the creative power of God there may be something Given in his nature as subject matter for his choice. I offer this particular argument very diffidently." If man is truly free, God must be finite as regards his knowledge.⁸⁰

At least, if our temporalistic view of God be true, and God is not utterly above and beyond all time, he cannot be thought of as knowing in advance what a free person will choose. . . . Man's freedom is an actual limitation on the foreknowledge of God. A thinker no less than John Locke said: "I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to."⁸¹

But Locke, Brightman held, was inconsistent!⁸²

VI

The quotations from Brightman up to this point have repeatedly referred to what he calls The Given. This is one of the most important aspects of his concept of a finite God.

In his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, "An Empirical Approach to God," Brightman says that in addition to eternal *verités de raison*, "the will or active and purposive principle of the cosmos also confronts *verités de fait*. Let us call whatever is not an act or product of the will of God by the name of The Given. God is finite, I hold, not in the sense that The Given is ultimately external to him, as devil or Platonic matter, but in the sense that his will is limited by formal and factual conditions eternally given within his experience, conditions which that will did not produce."⁸³

That The Given exists Brightman concluded from four types of evidence: First, the facts of evolution; second, the nature of consciousness; third, the principle of dialectic; fourth, religious experience.

Evolution "seems to display prodigality and wastefulness." But evolution is also obviously purposive. "We are led to say that nature is the work of a power that is achieving its ends in the fact of what seems to be opposition. There is evidence of design in nature; there is also evidence of frustration of design and delay in its achievement."⁸⁴

Arguing from the nature of consciousness, Brightman pointed out that every state or process of consciousness that we know is a combination of active and passive factors: We do and suffer; we choose and are determined in the same act. "Experience consists of form and content. There are an element of will and an element of sensation in every moment of our life." We have to ascribe our passive experiences to the action of an external world beyond us. As subjective products they would be fantastic ravings. To acquire meaning they must be related objectively to an external world. Brightman's hypothesis is that the divine life is constituted in the way in which all known experience is constituted, namely, as a union of active and passive elements. Since God's nature contains within itself the explanation of the whole world, this does not mean that God must be acted upon by some world or power external to himself in order to have these passive experiences analogous to our sensations. Furthermore, if you posit a supergod who causes this passive element, you are only under necessity of ascribing the same division of active and passive to this supergod. "We must

acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of things, in which the active is indeed in control, but maintains its control with struggle and pain. This view is at once nearer to the facts observed by science and to the Christian faith in a God who can save only through the shedding of blood." This hypothesis accounts for the fact that God "appears to be a spirit in difficulty; for the active side of his nature, his rational will, confronts a problem in the passive side of his experience." This enriches or thickens our thought of the divine life; it is more realistic, more dramatic, truer.⁸⁵

Even though Hegel insisted upon the infinity and absoluteness of God, the principle of dialectic argues for the existence of The Given.

All reality is full of opposition and contrast; everything that is stands in contrast with something else; every thesis implies some sort of antithesis. This means that the nature of God is to contain opposition and tension. But every opposition leads to a higher level of life; every struggle points to a higher meaning or synthesis. Thus, for Hegel as for our view, the divine life consists essentially of struggle and victory over opposition, a victory for which a price has always to be paid even by God himself. The traditional view almost inevitably engenders the idea that God's task is an easy one; that he stands apart from the struggle in spotless white. Our view sees him as the greatest sufferer in the universe and through this the greatest victor; his nature is not merely goodness but also dialectic struggle, or, rather, his goodness is not merely an abstract quality but the constant victory of constant effort.⁸⁶

A fourth type of evidence is furnished by religious experience in particular.

The testimony of most religious experience points to something like the finiteness we assert. It worships a God who is, on the one hand, reasonable and good, and, on the other, mysterious and above our comprehension. . . . It seems to be the voice of religion that there is something above and beyond reason in the reasonable God. . . . Rudolph Otto describes the irrational element in the divine nature as "the numinous." This dark aspect of religion points to a tragic reality in God. God is not simply a happy, loving Father; he is the struggle and the mysterious pain at the heart of life. He is indeed love; but a suffering love that redeems through a Cross.⁸⁷

Brightman held that this evidence precludes both the traditional theistic or a dualistic solution.⁸⁸ This element of opposition cannot be a product of the creative will of God, chosen as the best means of attaining his ends. Nor can it be external to God himself. For then he must either have created it or he did not create it. If he created it, "one needs something within the divine nature to explain why he should create that sort of thing. If he did not, we are again confronted with a dualism of God and The Given."⁸⁹

The Given must thus be within the divine consciousness, for "otherwise it does not explain why God has so much genuine difficulty in expressing his ideal purposes, combined with so much control and achievement."⁹⁰

Brightman was not always as precise as he might have been either in describing The Given or in relating it to God's nature. Bertocci traces a development between *The Problem of God* and *The Finding of God*; in the former The Given is simply something nonformal and retarding, while in the latter The Given includes moral and logical necessities.⁹¹ Elsewhere The Given includes "the laws of reason and all else."⁹²

Again, Brightman in *The Problem of God* described God's nature as including "reason, never-ending activity in time, and the rich realm of The Given with which his will has to cope in the task of world building and development."⁹³ Again he declared: "God is eternal reason and eternal will, dealing with what I have called the Given in his eternal experience. God's will is the creative aspect of the universe, but that will is limited by the laws of eternal reason and by the facts of The Eternally Given."⁹⁴ In *The Finding of God* he referred to "a necessity, an uncreated 'Given' in his nature, which he did not produce, but is a factor with which, as a part of his very existence, he always has to deal."⁹⁵ Likewise, in *Personality and Religion* he spoke of "the triumph of the rational will of God over the passive and chaotic side of his being."⁹⁶ But Brightman also identified God's nature with The Given by saying that God's "uncreated nature, *The Given*, plainly includes reason and moral law."⁹⁷ (Italics not original in these quotations.)

The Given in any case, however, is, first, "not any unconscious stuff, material substance, or mysterious entity of any sort; it is conscious experience of God." It is matter only in the sense of "con-

scious content." ⁹⁸ Brightman was an idealist in the tradition of Plato, of Rudolph Hermann Lotze, and of Rudolph Christoph Eucken. He held, therefore, that the arguments for idealism make supposition of nonmental or extramental content or matter unreasonable. "Qualitative dualism raises more problems than it solves." The Given may be conceived of as a conscious datum or perception, analogous to human sense experience, yet not produced by any stimulus or cause external to God.

Just as human sense data create for men an *unendliche Aufgabe*, so The Given is the source of an eternal problem and task for God. It is irrational, not in the sense of containing logical contradictions or immoral purposes, but in the sense of being given to reason as a datum and not derived from rational premises or purposes. In itself it cannot be understood; yet an understanding use may be made of it, and through the conquest and shaping of it meaning may be achieved. Our hypothesis is that God can make an increasingly better conquest of it throughout eternity without ever wholly eliminating it. The divine perfection, then, is an infinite series of perfectings. Perfection means perfectibility.⁹⁹

Second, "The Given is complex; it stands for the entire uncreated and eternal nature of God." In addition to reason and the moral law, it includes "an empirical factor, and eternal subject matter . . . which eternal divine thought and goodness have to reckon with in all their dealings. . . . This Given enters as a partially distorting and delaying factor into every creative act of God. Time, also, is an aspect of the complex Given."¹⁰⁰

Third, The Given is eternal; otherwise it would have to be a creature.¹⁰¹ It is "an eternal form and an eternal content in the temporal God. . . . There is an eternal Wisdom and an eternal Cross. Each is an enduring aspect of the unbegun and unending process which is reality."¹⁰²

Fourth, The Given is internal to God. "It casts its shadow on his inner life. It limits him within as truly as without . . . an uncreated limitation within the divine nature."¹⁰³

Fifth, The Given is controlled. Control implies subjection and guidance, but not creation. "Every obstacle and delay is real; The Given causes the world to be other than it would be if God were strictly omnipotent; it explains the presence of the horrible evils and distortions." Divine control means a possible divine future

beyond every frustration and pain. "God is not responsible for evils which he did not will; but he is responsible for overcoming the evils and helping man to higher levels of goodness."¹⁰⁴

The Given would take over many of the functions of matter, potentiality, the devil, and what the Germans call "the irrational." Yet there would be no dualism of stuff or of ultimate principle in the universe; there would only be a "dualism of process"¹⁰⁵ within the Supreme Person.

VII

Brightman himself anticipated some of the objections to his view and answered others as critics filed them.¹⁰⁶

He conceded that the idea of a finite-infinite God might be psychologically or "morally" impossible for many sincere minds to accept. They would find "religious confusion, if not nonsense, in ascribing finiteness to the infinite." For them Brightman had no answer; the idea would simply be incompatible with personal religion and they would have no choice but to reject it.¹⁰⁷

Others objected that it renders the goal of the universe precarious and irrational. Brightman answered that it "would cause tactical difficulties, not difficulties in major strategy." Taking James' picture of God as the "cosmic chess-player," Brightman was confident that God can figure out all possible moves and make the one that will lead to victory for his cause.¹⁰⁸

Again, religious experience and reason allegedly demand an absolute God. Brightman admitted that "there is a certain majesty in the very absoluteness of such a God which is both religiously and aesthetically satisfying and uplifting," while the "unity and coherence of the universe on this view make it appeal to reason."¹⁰⁹ Yet he urged that the experience of both mystics and practical people, of philosophers and theologians, among Christians, Jews and Hindus, testifies that religious faith does not require us to have an absolutely true or even any one idea about God to serve as a source of genuine religious life. Sincere, fruitful, and enduring religious experiences have come to men with utterly divergent ideas about God.¹¹⁰ "Life without any beliefs is impossible; and religious life is impossible without religious beliefs." While religious experience is not dependent on knowing the absolute truth, it is dependent both on the action of absolute reality on us and in us, and

on our attitude toward the divine. Our attitude will include the sincerity with which we hold our beliefs and seek for truth.¹¹¹ He urged that most religious believers have regarded God as finite; that every desire must be subjected to the dialectic of reason and fact; that the objective of religious worship is a perfect ideal rather than a perfect power; and that there are certain positive religious values that attach to the idea of a finite God.¹¹²

Some critics condemned the doctrine of a finite God as an anthropomorphism, as an evasion, not a solution, that merely translates man's problem into God's dimension. Brightman's answer was that "we face real problems which we cannot solve; God also faces real problems, but he can solve them all."¹¹³

Other objections, all based upon a measure of misunderstanding of the implications of Brightman's concept of a finite-infinite God, are the alleged failure to absolve God of responsibility for creation, its presumed implication that God has developed from zero, and the supposed unworthiness of man as an object of divine love.¹¹⁴

Ultimately some questions remained unanswered and unanswerable. The effort to evade an ethical dualism in the universe by positing a "dualism of process" in God merely projected the problem one step farther back. In addition, the fact that The Given was merely a substantivized perfect passive participle was more than a matter of the morphology of the English language. It involved a basic semantic question: Who is the Giver of The Given?

VII

To a Christian in the conservative tradition of Catholic, Western, and Lutheran theology, the mere statement of Brightman's position is enough to make a theological refutation of it unnecessary.

Belief in the finite-infinite God of Edgar Sheffield Brightman is wholly inconsistent with belief in the infinite God of the Sacred Scriptures (1 Kings 8:27; Job 42:2; Ps. 102:26, 27; 115:3; 135:6; 139:4; 147:5; Is. 40:28; 46:9, 10; 57:15; Matt. 19:26; Mark 14:36; Luke 1:37; 2 Peter 3:8; 1 John 1:5; 3:20; Rev. 19:6).

It is inconsistent with the Catholic Creeds.

It is inconsistent with the Symbolical Books of the Lutheran Church (Augsburg Confession and Apology, Articles I, III, XIX; Large and Small Catechisms, Creed, First Article; Smalcald Articles, Part I; Formula of Concord, Articles I, VIII, XI).

Brightman would have been prompt to concede this, since he said: "An omnipotent and absolutely infinite God could be revealed only to an *a priori* faith,"¹¹⁵ which includes faith based on revelation.

The major theological weakness of Brightman's hypothesis lies in its refusal to admit revelation, either through the Incarnation and the Atonement of Our Blessed Lord or through the Sacred Scriptures, as an authoritative and objective element in religious experience.

Its major theological significance lies in two areas:

Negatively, it has helped to widen the growing chasm between Nicene orthodoxy and modern Protestantism.

Positively, it has furnished additional evidence of the logical inadequacy of the traditional apologetics as soon as it goes beyond demonstrating the necessity of God's existence and attempts to determine concretely the attributes of the God who must exist, such as omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, or goodness. The only soteriologically, therefore *really*, significant knowledge that we have of God is that which we have in Christ Jesus. But in His Holy Face we see the glory of a God who transcends the alternatives that Brightman presented, the malicious God of Schopenhauer or the schizophrenic Deity of his own hypothesis: We see the God who in Christ was reconciling the world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them.

St. Louis, Mo.

NOTES

1. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, *s. v.* "Finite God," in Vergilius Ferm (ed.), *An Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 279.
2. F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: University Press, 1928, 1930).
3. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929).
4. Eric Lionel Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p. 163.
5. William Pepperell Montague, *Belief Unbound* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).
6. Radoslav A. Tsanoff, *The Nature of Evil* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931).
7. Francis Herbert Bradley, "God and the Absolute," in *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914).

8. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935).
9. "What the source of the limitation [in God] is remains a matter of speculation, but we are bound as rational beings to speculate with our feet on the ground and all our balloons tied firmly to our earthly anchorage, and Brightman's solution is most acceptable" (Peter Anthony Bertocci, *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938], p. 281).
10. W. R. Matthews, Article, "Theism," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), XX, 52.
11. "We are . . . required to be content with a finite God" (Edward Scribner Ames, *Religion* [New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929], p. 153). Yet Ames can consider a "sense in which God is cosmic."
12. Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1941).
13. Franz Brentano, *Vom Dasein Gottes* (Leipzig: Peter Meiner, 1929), pp. 62, 175.
14. John M. E. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion* (London: Edward Arnold, 1906), and *The Nature of Existence* (Cambridge: University Press, 1921).
15. Letter of Charles A. S. Dwight, "Brightman," in the *Christian Century*, Vol. LXX, No. 14, April 8, 1953, p. 418.
16. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion* (7th printing; New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 314; see also pp. 315—24.
17. Brightman, *The Finding of God* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1931), pp. 91—93; compare his *The Problem of God* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1930), pp. 126, 127, 180.
18. Brightman, *Personality and Religion* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1934), p. 100.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 115.
21. Brightman, *The Finding of God*, p. 115.
22. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," in Walter G. Muelder and Laurence Sears, *The Development of American Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 522. This was the Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at Cambridge, Mass., December 29, 1936; Muelder and Sears have reproduced it in full from *The Philosophical Review*, XLVI (1937), 147—69.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 513, 514.
24. Brightman, *s. v.* "Finite God," in Ferm, *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, p. 280.
25. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 522. The entire address from which these sentences are quoted is a development of the thesis that experience requires postulating the existence of God, but that a finite God is the only view that can be reconciled with the observed facts of experience.
26. In vulgar Roman Catholic thinking, the individual canonized saint becomes a kind of finite deity. This notice from the "Personals" column of the *St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch*, Sunday, September 6, 1953, p. 1-D, may serve as an example: "THANKS Sacred Heart Blessed Virgin St. Odillia for sparing son's eyesight. A. J. C."
27. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 286—89.

28. Cornelius Krusé, "Edgar S. Brightman's Contribution to American Philosophy," in *Religion in Life*, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Autumn, 1953, p. 601.
29. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 289, 290.
30. Norman Kemp Smith (editor), *Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), Part XI, p. 249.
31. Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (Tuebingen: Ludwig Friedrich Fues, 1851), III, 303, 304.
32. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 514.
33. John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays on Religion* (New York: Holt, 1874), pp. 176, 177, quoted in Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 128.
34. F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, rev. ed. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910), pp. 302—16, quoted in Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 296 and n. 31.
35. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), p. 295, quoted in Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 181.
36. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, ed. by Ralph Barton Perry with James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943), pp. 308—11.
37. S. S. Laurie, *Synthetica: Being Meditations Epistemological and Ontological* (London: Longmans, 1906), Vol. II, 336, 337; quoted in Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 127.
38. Edmund Noble, *Purposive Evolution* (New York: Holt, 1926); see Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 130.
39. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 180.
40. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 130; *The Finding of God*, p. 14; *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 286—304; s. v. "Finite God," in Ferm, *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, pp. 279, 280; "Personalism," Ch. XXVII in Ferm (ed.), *A History of Philosophical Systems* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 349. Brightman regarded *A Philosophy of Religion* as the most explicit formulation of his doctrine of a finite-infinite God (s. v. "Finite God," in Ferm, *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, p. 280).
41. Gustav Theodor Fechner, *Zend-Avesta: Oder ueber die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits vom Standpunkt der Naturbetrachtung* (Hamburg and Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1906), I, 247.
42. John Fiske, *Through Nature to God* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1899), pp. 163—67.
43. Ludwig Paul Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by Marian Evans (London: John Chapman, 1854), pp. 34, 225, 226.
44. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), VI, pars. 508, 509.
45. Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 468.
46. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," *op. cit.*, p. 521.
47. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, p. 84.
48. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," *op. cit.*, p. 521.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 521.
50. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 12.
51. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 521.
52. Hartshorne, p. 17.

53. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 521.
54. Brightman, *Nature and Values* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945), p. 158.
55. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 182.
56. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 337.
57. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, p. 74.
58. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 336.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
60. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, p. 84.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
62. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 331—34 and n. 44.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 337; *The Problem of God*, pp. 132, 133.
64. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 133.
65. Hastings Rashdall, "Personality: Human and Divine," in H. Sturt (ed.), *Personal Idealism* (London: Macmillan, 1902), p. 390; quoted in Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 180, 181. Compare the views of the nineteenth century French temporalist Jules Lequier, *La recherche d'une première vérité*, fragments edited by Charles Renouvier (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1924), pp. 145—47, 250—53, and the modern Moslem philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 75, 76, in Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 229, 230, 296, 297.
66. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 180.
67. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 5, 6.
68. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 137, 138.
69. Brightman, *Nature and Values*, pp. 158, 159.
70. Hartshorne, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
71. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 130, 131.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
73. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," in *Journal of Religion*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (October, 1932), p. 544.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 550.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 545, 546.
76. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 129, 130.
77. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," pp. 546—48.
78. Borden Parker Bowne, *Theism* (New York: American Book Co., c. 1902), pp. 173—98.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 182—84.
80. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 131, 132.
81. Letter to Molyneux, January 20, 1693, cited by J. W. Hudson, *Personality in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1911), p. 41; quoted by Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 132.
82. Brightman, *loc. cit.*
83. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 522.
84. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 126.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 133—35.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 136.

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 137.
88. Such as H. M. Kallen's statement that "a surd lurks under every law of nature, a flaw in every design of God" (*Why Religion* [New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927], p. 300) or J. C. Smuts' "dark opaque character of the universe" ethically and rationally (*Holism and Evolution* [New York: Macmillan, 1926], pp. 318, 344, 345); so Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 125, 126.
89. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 183.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 182, 183. "God's finiteness does not mean . . . that he is limited by anything external to himself" (Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 337).
91. Bertocci, p. 280, n. 56 (see fn. 9 above).
92. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," p. 554; cp. *The Finding of God*, p. 175.
93. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 133.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 127.
95. Brightmann, *The Finding of God*, p. 92.
96. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, p. 98.
97. Brightman, *The Finding of God*, p. 175.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 175.
99. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 182—84.
100. Brightman, *The Finding of God*, p. 175.
101. *Ibid.*
102. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," p. 545.
103. Brightman, *The Finding of God*, pp. 176, 177.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
105. Cp. James Bissett Pratt's term, "duality of process."
106. Brightman himself found "by far the best statement of objections" in Albert Cornelius Knudson's *The Doctrine of Redemption* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933), pp. 204-12. For a bibliography of criticism to 1940, see Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 324, 325, n. 33.
107. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, pp. 112, 116.
108. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 186.
109. Brightman, *Personality and Religion*, pp. 95, 96.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
112. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 324—28.
113. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, pp. 181—86; *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 328—30.
114. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 331—36.
115. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 522.