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Huldreich Zwingli, the Father of Reformed Theology

Theo. Dierks
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis

the Scriptures, she must die; and how the unionists kept telling her that unless she was ready to introduce altar fellowship with the Reformed, she will perish from the face of the earth. And the Lutheran Church still lives! But mark this: if and when she dies, it will be by her own hand. If she succumbs to the spirit of indifference, compromising the truth of God's Word in order to gain the good will of men, she has dug her own grave. Hear the warning cry of Werner Elert: "Should our several Lutheran churches sell the birthright of the pure preaching of the Gospel for all kinds of syncretistic pottage, they would not only be digging their own grave, but would also defraud Christendom of the message which God has given to us in trust for all the others." (*Allg. Ev.-Luth. Kirchenzeitung,* Nov. 18, 1927.)

This, then, is the Lutheran answer to the unionistic slogan: "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty," as given by Dr. W. H. Greever, editor of the *American Lutheran Survey:* "No part of the Lutheran Church can consistently practice unionism without disloyalty to the truth which it confesses and without unfaithfulness to the tasks which are specifically its own. . . . To concede any part of the revealed truth is to go against conscience and to become disloyal to truth, and to compromise it is to concede it. No part of the revealed truth may be conceded because of the unity of truth as well as because of the essential value of all truth." (See *Theological Monthly,* 1926, pp. 322, 324.) A Lutheran woman, writing in *The Farmer's Wife* (St. Paul, Minn.), gives the same answer: "When Lutheran Christians are criticized in these 'unionistic' days by their Protestant friends for their strict adherence to God's Word and are asked to join in forming one big united Church including all denominations, they show these friends how impossible and wrong that would be for them, for they would have to sacrifice clearly revealed truths of God's saving Word and thus prove faithless stewards of His sacred trust." TH. ENGELDER

(To be continued)

Huldreich Zwingli, the Father of Reformed Theology

II

In the doctrine of atonement Zwingli merely repeated the traditional language of the Church. Zwingli tells us that, long before he even heard of Luther, he learned from Thomas Wyttenbach, one of his teachers at Basel, that "the death of Christ is the sole price of the remission of sins" (III:544). This was nothing unusual, for such statements can be found in many Catholic writers before Luther. The eighteenth and nineteenth of Zwingli's Sixty-seven

Articles of 1523 read: "Christ, having sacrificed Himself once, is to eternity a certain and valid sacrifice for the sins of the faithful. . . . Christ is the only Mediator between God and us." (I:154.) He explains: "Inasmuch as He took upon Himself the punishment of sins . . . which cling to us because of the sin of Adam, and in order that divine justice might be satisfied, Christ was slain in all innocence because of our guilt and reconciles us to God." (I:310.) "Adam exposed himself through his sin to nakedness and necessity; so Christ, in order to placate divine justice, should experience want, cold, and all evils, which were inflicted on man because of sin. For this was justice, that He through whom we were all created, in whom there was no sin, from whom we had departed, innocently bore those things for us which we had deserved by sinning." (III:189.)

But Christ came "not only to redeem us but also to teach the true love of God and works which God requires of us" (I:180). Hence He is also the "Guide and Teacher promised by God to all human beings" (I:195), whom we should follow (III:194, 211). "Christ, therefore, inculcates everywhere these two things, *viz.*, redemption through Him and that those who have been redeemed by Him ought now to live according to His example." (III:324.)

On faith Zwingli wrote: "Our faith which we have in God and in Christ Jesus makes us blessed. . . . Whoever believes, him God has previously elected and drawn. . . . Faith is nothing but to be dependent on God, for thus God has made a covenant with all the elect, that they pray to Him alone, worship Him (as God) alone, and cling to Him alone. . . . From which follows that to trust in the Lord Jesus Christ is to build our faith altogether on His deity. . . . We place our faith in Christ Jesus solely [because of the fact] that He is true God. Why, then, His humanity? It is a certain pledge of grace; which was therefore given into death that divine justice might be satisfied and reconciled to us, so that we may confidently run to the grace and mercy of God through the precious pledge of His own Son given to us." (II:II, 7.) Zwingli wrote these words in his *Friendly Defense*, addressed to Luther in 1527. Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:59, rightly says: "Although Zwingli upheld the tradition materially, faith in Christ's work of redemption appeared merely as knowledge or historical faith and not, as with the Wittenberg reformers, as direct trust in Christ as the Mediator. In Zwingli religious trust directs itself solely to God and His gracious disposition and in Christ only inasmuch as He is God. Accordingly His humanity and His human actions were appreciated only as a pledge of the grace of God. Here Zwingli's fundamentally dualistic Christology reveals itself." In fairness, we agree with Ritschl when in a footnote he adds that Zeller goes too far in

maintaining that Zwingli regarded the death of Christ merely as a penal example.

On Zwingli's view of faith the following words throw some light: "It is to be remembered that the word 'faith' is taken in various ways in Holy Scripture; first, as credulity; then, as firmness; and finally, as confidence in God; of the last alone it must be understood that faith saves. He who does not see that faith, hope, and charity are the same thing, namely, this confidence in God, is compelled to leave many knots in Scripture undone. . . . That whole confidence of the human heart in God is therefore called at times faith, at times hope and charity, and is nothing but piety in God, be it that you love, hope, or believe." (III: 285 f.) Here we have an altogether different conception of faith from that found in Luther after he began his reformatory work. It is the Catholic conception of faith as being hope in God and as including charity. Zwingli speaks of faith as that "love" which God "through His Spirit infuses in our hearts" (VI: II, 92). Faith, hope, and charity are "nothing but the heart inflamed in God"; and when Paul says that charity is the greatest of the three, he wants to say that "charity, that is, confidence through love, is absolution" (VI: II, 175). In opposition to the "dead faith" of the demons Zwingli knew only of a "faith operating through charity" (VI: II, 271 ff.), which reminds us of the Scholastic "faith formed through charity." Melanchthon had not read the last quoted statements, and yet he did not unjustly accuse the Zwinglians at Marburg, "Improperly they also speak and write about the justification of man before God and do not inculcate the doctrine of faith enough, but they thus speak of justification as though the works which follow faith are the righteousness of man." (IV: 185.)

Since Zwingli expressly says that by the Law "no man will be justified, *i. e.*, will be just" (VI: II, 87), he seemingly taught justification by faith alone. Yet he did not share Luther's and Melanchthon's ideas of justification. It is true, all three often used similar language, and yet his view was fundamentally different, for he did not go beyond Augustine's conception of justification through the infusion of grace. Zwingli once defined grace as "favor according to which God . . . forgives sin" (VI: II, 135); yet when he says that "salvation is solely in the grace of God, which has been exhibited in and through Christ" and which is "infused in the conscience and heart through the Spirit" (VI: I, 553), this is more in agreement with Augustine's view of justification. Zwingli did not understand "justification by faith" in the same sense as Luther did; and when he emphasized justification by faith "alone," this was done to exclude the thought that the Sacraments can justify or make gracious. (IV: 33.) Zwingli ascribed justification and salva-

tion to faith only in an improper sense, for in reality it is election which saves, and faith is merely a "seal and pledge" of election.

With Zwingli justification consists essentially in trusting in God as the source of all good. Man ought to recognize that, even as his physical existence comes from God, so his salvation depends wholly on God, on His eternal and immutable election. It is true, Zwingli says that Christ is our redemption, but he looked on Christ primarily as the revelation of God's justice and a pledge of His mercy, whereby we are incited to have faith, hope, and charity. If man feels such confidence in himself, he has proof that he belongs to the elect of God.

As to Zwingli's teaching on the Church, one finds that he distinguishes between the visible and the invisible Church. He refers to this distinction in his *Exposition of the Christian Faith,* when he says: "We believe in one holy Catholic, *i. e.,* universal Church, that it is either visible or invisible. . . . It is called invisible because it is not revealed to human eyes who believes; the faithful are known only to God and to themselves. . . . But the visible Church [includes] as many as have given their name to Christ throughout the earth. . . . In the visible Church are such as are not members of that elect and invisible Church." (IV:58.)

Since the "visible Church has within itself many contumacious and traitors," and since "shepherds" are designated in the Church as "princes, it is established that the Church is infirm and maimed without the magistracy. Far be it, O pious King, that we shun the magistracy or vote for its abolition, but we teach that the magistracy is necessary for the perfection of the ecclesiastical body" (IV:58 f.). Here we have the germ of the social gospel so prevalent in the Reformed Church in our day. Zwingli originally held with Luther that the kingdom of God is spiritual (VI: II, 184), but later insisted that Christ's kingdom is also external (VIII:175 f.). In the little pamphlet *On Divine and Human Righteousness* Zwingli says that there are two laws, even as there are two righteousnesses. The one pertains to the inner man, and the other to the outer man. The former no one can fulfill, hence "no one is righteous but God and he who is made righteous through grace, of which Christ is the pledge, through faith"; but according to the latter a person may be outwardly pious and righteous and yet be condemned before God. (I:435.) Zwingli insists that the "inferior law" (I:456) is a "directing and guiding of the divine Spirit. . . . Only the believers understand the law of nature, for it is known only of God, in whom no one believes except he who is drawn of God." (I:360.) Hence the heathen do not know the law of nature from their own reason "but from the illuminating Spirit of God." (I. 361.) Zwingli ascribed less moral quality to natural man than Luther did, and in this he was followed by most Reformed

theologians. Luther maintained that man could by nature of himself lead an outwardly godly life, since the natural law was written in man's heart. Zwingli, however, insisted that it is due solely to the influence of divine grace — called "common grace" by the Reformed — that man leads an outwardly godly life. Here we have a fundamental difference between Reformed and Lutheran theology, which shows itself in the relationship between Church and State. The Lutheran Church holds that it is the business of the State to preserve and uphold the natural law, but Zwingli maintained that the State must also uphold the revealed law of God. In the Second Disputation at Zurich in 1523 Zwingli declared, "My lords should prescribe no laws unless according to the divine Scriptures." (I:524.) The State should do all in its power to bring the people to the "right knowledge of God," and those are "tyrants" who will not permit the "Gospel of Christ" to be preached to the people. (I:363; cf. 731, 453.) The State should not compel individuals to accept the various articles of faith but should merely decree that the Word of God be preached, and if shepherds do not preach the Word of God faithfully, they should be removed, "yes, even slain according to the law of Moses" (I:578). Well has Seeberg, *History of Doctrines*, II:317 f., said: "The theocratic ideal which he pursued allows to neither Church nor State its proper position. On the one hand, the secular government conducts the discipline of the Church in such a way that the doctrine of the latter becomes directly the law of the State; while, on the other hand, the secular government is absolutely subject to the authority of the Scriptures, its laws and ordinances being valid only in so far as they are Scriptural. . . . The carrying out of his reformatory work embraced both a new system of doctrine and a new order of social and practical life, which must be enforced by the agency of the State. Christianity is an affair of the State, but the State is the organ of the Church." Here as elsewhere Zwingli's medievalism and humanism appears in opposition to Luther. Reformed theology is a true child of the so-called Christian Renaissance.

Saving faith is wrought in the heart of man solely by the Spirit of God. Zwingli emphatically rejected the *fides acquisita* of the Scholastics, which man can produce in himself. (III:174.) "Faith which is confidence in God no one can give except the Spirit, no external thing. . . . No one can come to Christ unless the Father draw him." (IV:55.) But such faith is always wrought without means. Zwingli distinguished between the "external calling," through the preaching of the Word, and the "internal calling," which Christ calls drawing (III:427) and in which the "Spirit rouses the ear of the elect" (IV:121). The outlines of this theory were developed by Zwingli at a very early date (cf. I:73 f., 76 ff.), and with his symbolical interpretation of the Sacraments it was but

natural that he would also regard the preaching of the Word as an external thing which is unprofitable unless the Holy Spirit illumines and draws. Writing against Valentinus Compar in 1525, he asks: "How does a person become a believer? Does the word make him believing? No, for we see that many hear of the gracious works of the Gospel and yet do not believe. . . . Faith does not come from human reason, skill, or knowledge but only from the Spirit of God illuminating and drawing." (II:1, 11.) Writing against Luther, he says that the "elect of God inwardly taught by the Spirit firmly believe" (III:498). "Faith cannot be drawn out of the words, but when faith teaches me, I understand the words." (III:517.) "Faith is not learned from the words, but God teaches it to us, and then we also find faith in the words, *i. e.*, as we believe we also find in the word." (II:11, 9.) In *Reckoning of the Faith* he says: "A conductor or vehicle is not necessary to the Spirit, for He Himself is the virtue and the energy whereby all things are borne and has no need of being borne. . . . Everyone that is born of the Spirit [is] invisibly and imperceptibly drawn." (IV:10.) When Paul says that faith cometh by hearing, then he ascribes faith to a "cause which is of the Spirit alone and not of the external preaching as the Sacramentarians [Lutherans] contend. . . . The opinion of the Apostle is that the word is to be preached whereby God, who alone gives the increase, as through His instrument plants faith, but with His near and own hand. For the work of the Apostle comes from the hand of God, but only as a means; the inner drawing, however, is the immediate working of the Spirit" (IV:125). Zwingli also distinguished between the external and the internal word. The former is the preaching of the Gospel, the latter is faith itself, "the believing in the heart and the understanding of the mind." That we believe in Christ is neither the effect of the external nor of the internal word but of the Father who draws us. (III:472 f.) Here we have a doctrine akin to the spiritualism of the Anabaptists, though Zwingli was hardly influenced by them. We would rather trace it to his Humanistic background or more specifically to the Platonism which he had imbibed through his Humanistic studies. (Cf. Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:57.)

In his "Explanation" of the Eighteenth Article, Zwingli says that a "Sacrament properly signifies an oath." Sacraments are those things which "God has set up, promised, and ordained in His Word so firmly as though He had set it down with an oath" (I:238). Hence the Sacraments are nothing more than a "sure sign and seal" (I:239) and a "certain pledge and seal" (I:245). But in his *Commentary on True and False Religion* Zwingli says that the Sacrament is nothing more than a "dedication and consecration,"

a "public setting apart" (III:229). He gives as his opinion that the "Sacraments are signs and ceremonies by which man proves to the Church that he is a candidate or a soldier of Christ, and makes the whole Church more certain of your faith than you are" (III:231). He says that we dare not attribute to the symbols the things which "are solely of the divine power and the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit in our souls" (IV:119). In *Reckoning of the Faith* he writes: "I believe, yes, I know, that all the Sacraments are so far from conferring grace that they do not even convey or distribute it. In this matter, most powerful Caesar, I may seem to thee perhaps too bold. But my opinion is fixed. For as grace is produced or given by the Divine Spirit (for when I use the term 'grace,' I am speaking the Latin for pardon, *i. e.*, indulgence and gratuitous kindness), so this gift pertains to the Spirit alone." Then follows the passage quoted above, that the Spirit needs no conductor or vehicle. "The Sacraments are given as a public testimony of that grace which is previously present to every individual." (IV:9 f.)

Regarding Baptism, Zwingli says in the "Explanation" of the Eighteenth Article that "dipping does not wash away sins unless the baptized [person] believes the salvation of the Gospel, *i. e.*, the gracious redemption of Christ" (I:252; cf. VII:298). Again he says, "We come to Christ through faith without a medium." (I:412.) Soon after the Second Disputation in 1523 he came into conflict with the Baptists, or Anabaptists, who denied infant baptism (the primitive Baptists were not interested in the question of immersion or sprinkling) and carried out his ideas to their logical conclusion. Since Zwingli regarded Baptism merely as something external which does not wash away sins, and since he maintained that we come to Christ through faith without a medium, therefore the Baptists drew the logical conclusion that infant baptism was useless. Formerly Zwingli had himself questioned the propriety of infant baptism (II:1, 245; VII, 365); hence it cannot be denied that the Baptists were the spiritual children of Zwingli even though he disowned them (cf. Baur, *op. cit.*, II:56 f., 803 ff.), for if Baptism is not a means of grace, then there is no benefit in infant baptism, and as a mere external ceremony it might as well be discarded. Now, in order to refute the logical conclusions of his own teachings, Zwingli had to revise his teaching somewhat. He continued to deny that Baptism washes away sins and maintained that the Holy Spirit immediately effects faith, but in his book *Baptism, Rebaptism, and Infant Baptism*, which appeared in May, 1525, he insisted that Baptism was a sign of allegiance. Zwingli summarized his view at the end of the book in these sentences: "Of Baptism in General. No element or outward thing in this world can cleanse the soul, but the purification of the soul is by divine grace. Hence it follows

that Baptism cannot wash away sin. Since it cannot wash away [sin], yet has been instituted by God, it must always be to the people of God a sign of allegiance and nothing else. II. Of Infant Baptism. Even as in the Old Testament, so the children of Christians are, like their parents, the children of God; since they are of God, who will hinder their water-baptism? To the ancients circumcision was for a sign, even as Baptism is to us [a sign]; and as it [circumcision] was given to children, so likewise Baptism should be given to children. III. Of Rebaptism. Rebaptism is neither taught nor exemplified nor confirmed from the Word of God; hence those who rebaptize themselves crucify Christ anew either because of egotism or to present something new." (II:1, 301.)

As to the salvation of unbaptized infants Zwingli held that original sin does not damn the children of Christians. If children die in infancy, it is a sign that they were the elect of God, for in the case of infants, faith or unfaith does not exclude from election. "It is my opinion that all infants who are under the testament are doubtless of the elect by the laws of the testament." (III:428.) "If Esau had died an infant, he would doubtless have been of the elect. . . . But he could not die whom divine providence had created that he might live, and live wickedly." (III:429.) Zwingli's doctrine of Baptism can only be understood in the light of his doctrine of election, for he himself says that, if his inquirers would read his book *De providentia Dei*, they would have reached the harbor long ago. (III:572.)

III

In 1521 Oecolampadius of Basel, the friend of Zwingli, declared in a sermon on the Sacrament of the Eucharist: "I do not pronounce it a mere figure, such as was the paschal lamb. Far from us be the blasphemy of attributing to the shadow as much as to the light and truth; and to those figures, as much as to the most sacred mystery. For this bread is not merely a sign, but is the very body of the Lord itself. We simply confess, therefore, that the flesh and blood of Christ are present and contained; but in what manner we do not seek to discover, nor is it necessary nor useful that we should. . . . In what mode He who sits above the heavens, at the right hand of the Father, is truly present on the altars, inasmuch as it is a thing which it is impossible for us to know, is a matter which should not disturb us. What wonder is it since we know not in what mode Christ, after His resurrection, came into the presence of His disciples while the doors were closed? . . . What is that thing of inestimable price which is hidden within this covering? It is the true body and true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, that body which was born, suffered, and died for us, and was afterwards glorified in the triumph of the resur-

rection and ascension." (Quoted in Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology*, p. 756.) Already in 1520 Luther had stated his views in his *Sermon on the New Testament* (St. Louis ed., XIX:1037 ff.) and in his *Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (St. Louis XIX:1 ff.). Luther rejected transubstantiation but taught a real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Sacrament and emphatically stated that "the sixth chapter of John does not with a single syllable speak of the Sacrament" (XIX:14). Zwingli was acquainted with some of Luther's works;[3] yet he secretly disagreed on the Lord's Supper. In his *Sixty-seven Articles* he wrote in the Eighteenth Article: "The Mass is not a sacrifice, but is a remembrance of the sacrifice and assurance of the salvation which Christ has given us" (I:154); and in his *Exposition and Proof of the Conclusions or Articles*, published immediately after the Zurich debate in 1523, he compared his own teaching with that of Luther and found no difference between the two, even though he himself called the Lord's Supper a "remembrance," while Luther called it a "testament." (I:249.) Zwingli wrote his *Exposition* against the Romish doctrine and says that the Lord's Supper is not a sacrifice but a remembrance of the sacrifice of Christ and a "guarantee to the weak that Christ has redeemed them, so that they are certain of it if they firmly believe that Christ paid their sin on the cross and in such faith eat and drink His flesh and blood. . . . To them their sins are forgiven." He expressly states that there is "no contention" whether or not Christ's body and blood are eaten and drunk, "for no Christian doubts this" (I:242). But in opposition to Luther, who maintained that John 6 did not with a single syllable refer to the Lord's Supper, Zwingli found his interpretation of the Lord's Supper in those words and claimed: "The body and blood of Christ is nothing else than the word of faith, namely, that His body was slain for us and His blood was shed for us, has redeemed and reconciled us to God. If we firmly believe this, then our soul is nourished and refreshed with the body and blood of Christ. Nevertheless, Christ has, in order that the testament itself may be comprehensible to the simple-minded, given to His body an edible form, the bread, and to His blood the drinking vessel, or drink, so that they are strengthened in the faith by

3) Cf. Jackson, *Huldreich Zwingli*, p. 139 ff., where Jackson quotes from the correspondence of Zwingli in 1519. Later, when Zwingli became exceedingly jealous of Luther's fame, he tried to tell everyone that he had discovered the Gospel long before he even heard of Luther and that he purposely refrained from reading Luther's works. In the latter half of 1520 there appeared an anonymous Latin pamphlet with an appendix entitled "A Defense of Martin Luther by Christ our Lord, addressed to the City of Rome." (III:1—6.) That Zwingli had a hand in its composition is proved by the fact that a draft in Zwingli's own handwriting has been preserved to this day. (Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 155.)

a visible transaction." (I:252; cf. letter to Wyttenach, VII:297 ff.) Baur, *op. cit.*, II:277, has well said: "The celebration of the Lord's Supper as something external with external elements can only be symbolical, as is clear from the words of Zwingli, even though the exegetical proof from the words of institution is still lacking." Zwingli therefore believed in a symbolical interpretation of the Lord's Supper long before he had a Scriptural "proof" for his theory. Melanchthon (*Corpus Reform,* IV:970) expressly states that Zwingli confessed to him at Marburg that Erasmus had first suggested this theory to him. Previous to this time Rode, the Rector of the Brethren School at Utrecht, had brought to Luther some of the writings of Wessel Gansfort and a treatise of Cornelius Hoen (Honius) in which Hoen treated the Lord's Supper as a spiritual eating and drinking of Christ's body and blood and maintained "*is* must be taken for *signifies.*" Wessel Gansfort, the greatest theologian of the Brethren of the Common Life, had distinguished between a sacramental and a spiritual eating and drinking of Christ's body and blood and had emphasized the latter, and it was but natural that one of his followers would develop his thoughts further. This was done by Hoen, who wrote: "Christ has instituted the Holy Supper in order that the soul may firmly believe that she really has a Bridegroom of her own, who gave Himself for her and shed for her His precious blood. By this means she is induced to avert her affections from the objects she formerly loved, to fix them on Christ alone, and to make Him her chief good. This means, as the Savior says John 6, to feed upon Christ and to drink His blood; and whoever partakes of the Lord's Supper without such faith feeds rather upon the manna of the Jews than upon Christ. . . . Paul does not say: The bread is the body of Christ. It is rather evident that in this passage *is* must be taken for *signifies,* which may be clearly inferred from the comparison between the bread and the sacrifices to idols." (Quoted in Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation,* Eng. trans., II:519 ff.) Luther approved of the writings of Wessel but emphatically rejected Hoen's treatise, and therefore Rode went to Oecolampadius and later, with Saganus, visited Zwingli, who published Hoen's treatise in 1525. Zwingli says: "I saw that the words 'This is My body' are figurative, but I did not see in what word the figure lay. At this point, by the grace of God, it happened that two learned and pious men came to consult on this matter; and when they heard our opinion (for they had concealed their own, for it was not then safe to express opinions on the subject freely), they thanked God, and gave me an untied package, the letter of a learned and pious Hollander [Hoen]. In it I found this precious pearl that *is* here means *signifies.* When we were compelled to explain our opinions openly, it seemed more discreet to open with that key the word in which the figure lies

than simply to say: 'It is a figure.'" (III:606; cf. II:II, 61 f.) Zwingli knew of Hoen's treatise already in 1521 (cf. Baur, *op. cit.*, II:280, footnote); but why did he not bring this exegetical "proof," this "precious pearl" which he had found in Hoen, in his *Exposition* of 1523? The answer is found in his attitude towards Luther. Baur, *op. cit.*, II:283, would have it that Zwingli was so eager to preserve peace between the Wittenberg and Zurich theologians. That can hardly be true. Rather, as Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:88, says, Zwingli showed himself as a cautious and astute politician in carrying out his reformatory plans, and therefore he held back for a long time with the propaganda for his Lord's Supper doctrine. Zwingli claimed: "I began to preach the Gospel of Christ in the year 1516, before anyone in my locality had so much as heard the name of Luther; for I never left the pulpit without taking the words of the Gospel as used in the Mass service of the day and expounding them by means of the Scriptures." (I:253.)[4] He ex-

4) But, as Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:30 f., points out, in 1516 Zwingli, as the admirer of Erasmus, did not understand by the Gospel anything else than what Erasmus meant thereby, namely, a practical Christianity based on the Sermon on the Mount. Baur, *op. cit.*, II:784 ff., says, while referring to Erasmus and Beatus Rhenanus, who both regarded Christianity as a philosophy, that by thus grouping Christianity with the philosophical systems of the Graeco-Roman world, the Humanists showed that they valued Christianity not so much because of the idea of redemption (though naturally that thought also appeared in their writings) but mainly because of its practical suggestions as to a pious life after the example of Christ; in short, the Humanistic viewpoint concerned itself not so much with religion but rather with a religiously colored Christian morality. In a letter dated Dec. 6, 1518 (VII:57 ff.), Rhenanus describes Zwingli's preaching in these words: "You and those like you bring forth to the people the pure philosophy of Christ, straight from the fountain, uncorrupted by interpretation of Scotist or Gabrielist, but expounded by Augustine, Ambrose, Cyprian, Jerome faithfully and correctly. But those people standing in a position where whatever is said the people at large think is true, bleat out nonsense about the power of the Pope, remission, purgatory, counterfeit miracles by the saints, restitution contracts, vows, pains of the damned, Antichrist. But you, in preaching to your congregation, show the whole doctrine of Christ briefly displayed as in a picture: how Christ was sent down to the earth by God to teach us the will of the Father, to show us that this world, *i. e.*, riches, honor, authority, pleasures, and all that kind of thing, are to be contemned so that the heavenly country can be sought with the whole heart; to teach us peace and concord and the attractive community of all possession (for Christianity is nothing else) even as Plato dreamed of in his Republic, for he is to be numbered among the great prophets; to take away from us foolish affections of earthly affairs concerning country, parents, relatives, health, and other possessions; to declare that poverty and disadvantages in this life are not real evils." If this is a correct description of Zwingli's preaching of that time, his preaching was indeed altogether different from that of the monks; but his gospel was a half mystical-ascetic and half rationalistic-Pelagian Christianity, certainly not the true Gospel of Christ. Zwingli at this time opposed the peddling of indulgences and at the same time pleaded with the Bishop of Constance and the papal legate to remove the gross abuses and superstitions from the Church, but in all this Zwingli was merely repeating what hundreds had said before him.

pressly maintained that he had purposely not read much of Luther's writings so as to give the Papists no cause to accuse him. (I:255.) Zwingli objected to being called a "Lutheran" and even warned his readers against praising Luther too highly. "Therefore let us, pious Christians, not change the honored name of Christ into the name of Luther. For Luther did not die for us, but teaches us to know Him from whom alone we have all salvation. . . . If Luther preaches Christ, he does the same as I do." (I:256.) "Zwingli was jealous of Luther because he was so much more famous." (Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 279.)

Luther had meanwhile become involved in a controversy with Carlstadt, who denied the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Sacrament, maintaining that Christ at the institution of the Supper with the words "Take, eat" referred to the bread, and then pointed to himself with the words "This is My body." When two pastors of Reutlingen, Matthew Alber, who adhered to the Lutheran view, and Conrad Hermann, who approved of Carlstadt's explanation, wanted to debate publicly on the question, Zwingli advised against it in a letter to Alber on November 16, 1524. In this letter Zwingli admitted that in John 6 Christ does not treat of "this Sacrament," but nevertheless stated that the passage serves to refute the false conceptions concerning this Sacrament. Zwingli regarded John 6 as "the most fortified and strongest battleground" since Christ there draws away from the "sensible things to the internal and spiritual" (III:593). When Christ speaks of eating His flesh, He speaks "of faith, not of the Sacrament of the Eucharist" (III:595), and yet Zwingli says: "This word (John 6:63) is an obstacle which excludes all efforts of those who speak of an essential body of Christ"; for when Christ says that he who eats and drinks His flesh and blood has eternal life, He does not mean "that which is liquid or that which has weight, but that which we recognize in our mind as the pledge of our salvation because it has been slain for us on the cross. These words, I say, believed by us and sunk into the inward parts of our heart acquire eternal life, for by faith alone are we justified." (Note the reason for the emphasis on faith alone.) "Faith therefore which is certain that the crucified Christ is our redemption and salvation is itself those words which Christ has spoken, which are spirit and life." (III:596.) Zwingli then took up the words of institution. He lauded Carlstadt for his emphasis on faith and because he recognized that the words of institution must be understood in another sense, but he rejected his interpretation in order that he might put forward his own, that *is* must be understood as *signifies*. (III:597 ff.) As Baur, *op. cit.*, I:485, shows, Zwingli was not opposed to Carlstadt's doctrine as such, but to his manner of interpreting the words

of institution. Zwingli insisted that "eating the Eucharist does not remove sin, but is a symbol for those who firmly believe and give thanks that through the death of Christ their sins have been exhausted and deleted" (III:602). Then, warning against the propensity of some who are ready to swear an oath on the words of their master (referring to Luther), he adjured Alber "by Jesus Christ, the Judge of the quick and the dead, not to show this letter to anyone of whom he did not certainly know that he was sincere in the faith" (III:603). Why this secrecy? Was this the way in which a shrewd politician was making propaganda for his symbolic doctrine? Copies of the letter soon circulated in Southern Germany, and Zwingli himself helped to disseminate it by sending copies to his friends Bucer and Capito in Strassburg and to Oecolampadius in Basel. In January, 1525, Luther published his *Wider die himmlischen Propheten,* directed mainly against Carlstadt, but also directed against all those who held the symbolic view of the Lord's Supper. Zwingli now put aside his "peculiar secretive conduct" (Ritschl) and in March of that year published his letter to Alber and at the same time issued his *Commentary on True and False Religion,* which contained a lengthy statement in which he insisted that *is* was the equivalent of *signifies.* "This signifies My body. . . . This thing, to wit, which I offer you to eat, is the symbol of My body. . . . This which I now command you to eat and drink shall be to you a symbol. . . . As often as ye eat this symbolic bread." (III:257 ff.) Zwingli expressly says that in his previous treatment of this matter in the *Sixty-seven Articles* he had written for the times rather than to declare the whole truth "that he might not cast pearls before swine." (III:238 f.) The *Commentary* (the part on the Lord's Supper was later separately issued in a German translation) was directed chiefly against the Roman Catholic doctrine, and Luther's name was not even mentioned; but Luther could not fail to see that he was included in the condemnation of those who maintained that there was a corporeal presence in the Supper. Meanwhile on Tuesday of Holy Week in 1525 Zwingli and his colleagues appeared before the Zurich Council with the request that at the coming Easter Festival the Lord's Supper should be celebrated according to its original institution. Zwingli, who was opposed by the town clerk Am Gruet, insisted that the words "This is My body" must be understood as "This signifies My body" and quoted such passages as "The seed is the Word"; "I am the Vine"; "The rock was Christ." But Am Gruet replied that these passages were all taken from parables and therefore proved nothing. That evening, before going to bed, Zwingli tried hard to find a Bible passage which would prove beyond a doubt that *is* has the sense of *signifies.* He looked in vain. Later that night he had a dream,

and four days later he published his *Crown of the Eucharist*, where we read the following story. Zwingli writes: "I am about to narrate a fact — a fact of such a kind that I would wish to conceal it, but conscience compels me to pour forth what the Lord has imparted, though I know to what reproach and ridicule I am about to expose myself. On the thirteenth of April I seemed to myself, in a dream, to contend with an adversary, a writer, and to have lost my power of speech, so that what I knew to be true my tongue failed me in the effort to speak. . . . Though, as concerns ourselves, it be no more than a dream, thanks be to God, to whose glory also we are telling these things. We seemed to be greatly disturbed. At this point, from a machine" (the theatrical apparatus by which supernatural persons were made to appear in the air) "an adviser was present (whether he was black or white I do not at all remember; for it is a dream I am telling), who said: You weakling! answer him that in Ex. 12:11 it is written: 'It is the Phase [cf. Vulgate], that is, the passing over, of the Lord.' On the instant that this apparition showed itself, I sprung from my couch. I first examined the passage thoroughly in the Septuagint, and preached upon it before the whole congregation with all my strength. This sermon dispelled the doubts of the students who had hesitated because of the obstacle of the parable. Such a Passover of Christ was celebrated on those three days as I never saw, and the number of those, it is thought, who look back to the garlic and fleshpots of Egypt is going to be far less." (III:341; cf. Krauth, *op. cit.*, p. 616 ff., where this interpretation is proved untenable; also Pieper, *op. cit.*, III:391.)

In the fall of 1525 Luther wrote that he intended to let others answer Zwingli and Oecolampadius (De Wette, 3:32 f.), but soon he recognized that he could not remain silent in the long run because of the clamor of the Zwinglians (3:43), though as yet he did not have time (3:87). Zwingli's *Commentary* was answered by John Bugenhagen, and in October of that same year Zwingli wrote his *Responsio* (III:604—614), where he insisted that the words of institution must be interpreted in the light of the words: "The flesh profiteth nothing." In this connection he says that he was always filled with disgust when he read the title "Doctor or Professor of Theology" written in books of men who "perhaps" are theologians. (III:609.) This was directed against Luther, for Bugenhagen did not receive his doctorate until 1533. Again he says: "Your opinion or conclusion when you declare: 'That you call us Christ devourers and flesh eaters is blasphemy,' I hear gladly. I acknowledge that it is a little blasphemous that I have called those flesh eaters who certainly do not eat flesh where they think." (III:610.) We must remember that the Zwinglians called

all believers in the Real Presence new Papists, Capernaites, flesh devourers, anthropophagi, blood drinkers, stupid men who worship a baked god, and pronounced the doctrine itself impious, foolish, inhuman, and an absurd superstition long before Luther wrote a single word against the Zwinglians. Shortly before this, Oecolampadius had attacked the Real Presence in his tract entitled *De genuina verborum Domini expositione liber*, which he dedicated to the brethren in Swabia with the plain intention of winning them away from Luther to Zwingli, and in February the following year (1526) Zwingli tried to popularize his teaching in the German treatise *Ein klare Unterrichtung vom Nachtmal Christi* (II:1, 427—468). Most astonishing is that Zwingli at the end of this treatise said that he did not want to get mixed up with the very learned Martin Luther (II:1, 467). The Zwinglians meanwhile carried on a well-planned and vigorous propaganda to undermine Luther's authority and to win friends for their symbolic views. In this they were encouraged by Bucer of Strassburg, who at first agreed with Luther, but was later won over to the symbolic view through the efforts of Rode and the treatise of Hoen. At first Bucer tried to make peace between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians, but he was only interested in a peace with a Zwinglian victory, or, as Eells, *Martin Bucer*, p. 76, puts it, he desired a "Zwinglian victory attained by peaceful means." But Bucer only added fuel to the flames. In his translation of Bugenhagen's *Commentary on the Psalms* he substituted in some places his own Zwinglian perversions for the original. For this he was condemned with hard words by the Lutherans. Somewhat later, on July 27, 1526, in publishing the fourth volume of his Latin translation of Luther's commentaries, he added what he called the true doctrine of the Supper; but everyone could easily recognize that this doctrine was altogether different from that of Luther. In a "Letter to the Christian Reader" added to the 9th chapter of First Corinthians, Bucer, while lauding Luther as an exegete, directed his readers to the work of Oecolampadius for a study of the Eucharist. Eells, *op. cit.*, p. 80, says: "Bucer had not erred again by publishing his own beliefs as those of another, but he had apparently stooped to a dishonorable use of Luther's name to gain publicity and a market for statements which he knew Luther would not approve. . . . Actually he used Luther's reputation to sell an attack upon him." Luther was furious. He acknowledged Bucer's skill as a translator but declared that "he had contaminated that gift of fecundity and intelligence, yea, lost it, in that pestilent poison of the monstrous blasphemy of the sacramentarian spirit. . . . He finished the first volumes piously and purely, but in the fourth volume he could not restrain himself from boasting and propagating

his own interpretation, and an incredible madness of a covetous spirit — first in a virulent and sacrilegious preface, then in noxious notes, he has crucified my work" (St. Louis, XVII:1580; Enders, V:384). Luther wrote this letter to Herwagen, the publisher, asking him to include it as an antidote if a second edition were printed; but somehow a rival printer, Secerius, gained a copy of the letter and immediately printed it. The letter naturally raised a storm in the camp of the Zwinglians, who clamored: "Why does Luther keep silence? Why does he not come out with his opinion?" (St. Louis, XVII:1581; De Wette, 3:202.) In the spring of 1526 Luther had written the preface to the German translation of the *Swabian Syngramma* (St. Louis, XX:576), in which he asserted that the arguments advanced in his *Wider die himmlischen Propheten* had not been refuted and that not only the *touto* of Carlstadt, but also the *significat* of Zwingli and the *figura corporis* of Oecolampadius were suggestions of the devil. (The original *Swabian Syngramma*, which had appeared late in 1525, was an answer written by Brenz and a number of Swabian clergymen to Oecolampadius' *De genuina verborum Domini expositione liber*. Oecolampadius had answered with his *Antisyngramma*.) Eells, *op. cit.*, p. 84, writes: "Aroused by the challenge, Bucer wrote to Oecolampadius on July 8, 1526, requesting that he and Zwingli should reply to Luther's *Prologum galeatum*. In order that they might not lack ammunition, he added as definite suggestions that Zwingli should admonish Luther as an erring brother not to injure the Church by strife and endeavor to rule it; that the fault in Luther's exegesis should be revealed; that the weakness of his objection to the use of reason and the patristics as authority should be disclosed." Both Zwingli and Oecolampadius were anxious to cross swords with Luther, and in a letter dated August 31, 1526, Zwingli made this slighting remark on Luther: "I think you are too solicitous in the matter of that man who is writing against me in German and Latin on the Eucharist. In nothing do I promise myself a more certain victory." (VII:538.) That month Oecolampadius published his *Billiche Antwort*, in which he combined a German translation of the *Antisyngramma* with a refutation of Luther's preface, and in February, 1527, Zwingli published his *Amica exegesis* (III:459—502), which he accompanied with an open letter to Luther. Luther pronounced it fierce. We agree with Luther. Zwingli sought to gain Luther's good will; but his friendly words were in vain, for on account of his many bitter and hateful words and the manner in which he lectured Luther like a schoolboy his writing had the opposite effect. Zwingli, as said before, was an astute politician and knew human nature, and therefore we can see in all this a well-planned campaign against Luther. Previous to this time the Zwinglians were plotting under

the pretence of peace and love, but now they came out into the open. Zwingli was a bitter enemy of the Lutherans, more so even than of the Papists. Luther's keen mind immediately saw through this plotting and hypocrisy and therefore attacked the Zwinglians with unparalleled severity. All this we must remember if we would properly evaluate the language of the opponents. In March of that year Zwingli issued his *Friendly Criticism and Defense on the Sermon of the Excellent Martin Luther Preached in Wittenberg Against the Fanatics and to Defend the Reality of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Sacrament* (II:II, 1—15). Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 278, says: "This was really an attack upon Luther, and two days later he followed it up with another letter (VIII:39—41) full of insinuations and exceedingly riling, and stirred Luther up as no other attack had done, as Luther's correspondence abundantly shows." Despite their amicable titles these writings abound in coarse, contemptuous, bitter, and truly blasphemous statements. Luther (St. Louis, XXIa:936; de Wette, 3:172 f.) complained in May, 1527: "There is no offense or cruelty of which he does not accuse me, so that even the Papists, my enemies, do not wound me as these our friends do." In answer to Zwingli's *Amica exegesis* and Oecolampadius' *Antisyngramma* (Enders, *op. cit.*, V:383) Luther issued in March, 1527, his book entitled *Dass diese Worte Christi: "Das ist mein Leib" usw., noch fest stehen wider die Schwarmgeister*, and in the following year he answered Zwingli's *Friendly Defense* with his *Bekenntnis vom Abendmahl Christi.* (It is the latter book which caused Bucer to see that he was wrong in his judgment of Luther, and this book caused him to modify his own views. Cf. Eells, *op. cit.*, p. 87 ff.) In his polemics against the Zwinglians, Luther used exceedingly coarse language, but he was only giving them a taste of their own medicine. They had attacked him first, and these his seeming friends had wounded him more deeply than even the Papists. But what they resented most was that he insisted that their doctrine came from the devil himself. We can understand this expression of Luther only if we know Luther's own experience, for, as Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:91 f. (cf. Holl, *Aufsaetze zur Kirchengeschichte*, I:355) points out, Luther regarded those disturbances of faith which he himself had and was experiencing as suggestions of the devil. All denials of, and all opposition to, his personal religious convictions were treated similarly; hence in the eyes of Luther those who differed from him and whose views he regarded as coming from the devil were to some extent excusable, for Satan and not they were actually responsible for such errors.

When Charles V had concluded a treaty with Pope Clement VII and solemnly pledged himself to suppress Protestantism, the Land-

grave Philip of Hesse was eager to have the Swiss included in a defensive alliance of the German Protestants against Charles V. Zwingli and the Zwinglians were anxious at least to appear as being at one with the Lutherans and thus permitted to join the Protestant alliance. But the controversy on the Lord's Supper between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians stood in the way of their admittance, and therefore a colloquy was arranged between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians, especially between the Lutheran leaders Luther and Melanchthon and the Swiss leaders Zwingli and Oecolampadius. The colloquy was held at Marburg on October 1—4, 1529, but it did not and could not bring about the desired union between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians, for there was a different spirit in the leaders, and their theology was so radically different. When the conference was drawing to a close, Luther was requested to draw up certain articles in which both parties agreed, and thus originated the so-called Marburg Articles. (St. Louis, XVII: 1939 ff.; Zwingli, IV: 181 ff.).

The Fifteenth Article reads: "We all believe and hold with regard to the Supper of our dear Lord Jesus Christ that it ought to be celebrated in both kinds, according to the primitive institution; also, that the Mass is not a work by which one obtains pardon for another, whether dead or alive; also, that the Sacrament of the Altar is a Sacrament of the very body and blood of Jesus Christ and that the spiritual eating and drinking of this body and blood is especially necessary to every Christian. In like manner, as to the use of the Sacrament, we are agreed that, like the Word, it was given and ordained of Almighty God to excite weak consciences to faith and charity by the Holy Spirit. But although at present we are not agreed on the question whether the true body and blood of Christ are bodily present in the bread and wine, still each party shall show to the other Christian love, so far as each one's conscience may permit." These Marburg Articles were signed by both Lutherans and Zwinglians, and seemingly they agreed in all points except in one; but this was not so, as later developments proved.

When the public debate had been ended, the Zwinglians sought to have the Lutherans recognize them as brethren in the faith and the Landgrave earnestly besought both parties to be united and to regard one another as brothers. Then, as the Reformed Christoffel, *Zwingli* (Eng. trans.), p. 362, says: "Zwingli, magnanimous and noble as he always was, came forward to Luther, with tears in his eyes, saying: 'There are none in the world with whom I should more desire to be at peace than the Wittenbergians.' But the hand stretched forward in largeness of heart was pushed back by Luther with the hard words: 'You have another spirit. I am surprised that you regard me as a brother, whose doctrine you

recently stigmatized as false. You surely cannot hold much of your own doctrine.' This "narrow-minded obstinacy" of spirit gave deep offense, not only to the Swiss and the men of Strassburg, but also the Landgrave. 'Choose between the two,' said Bucer; 'either you recognize none as brother who differs from you in opinion in but a single point, and then you have not one brother on earth, no, not even in your own party, or you accept individuals who differ from you, in which case you must accept us.'" Rightly Drewes in "Why Did Luther Refuse Zwingli's Hand of Brotherhood at Marburg?" (*Theol. Quart.*, 1906, Vol. X, p. 197) says: "This rejection of Zwingli's hand has received many unfavorable criticisms. The Reformed and indifferentistic writers regard it as highly discreditable to the great Reformer. With but a few exceptions, they all ascribe it to hatred, envy, want of charity, contentiousness, obstinacy, and the like ignoble motives. This harsh uncharitable censure, which is to be found in nearly every non-Lutheran history and cyclopedia, need not surprise us, however; for Luther's critics view his conduct at Marburg through glasses that are colored by partisanship or by religious indifference. They are either the spiritual children of Zwingli, or they have drunk of the intoxicating cup of indifferentism and unionism. To expect praise and approval of Luther's attitude at Marburg from such persons would be expecting a psychological miracle." Read the whole article by Drewes! The Zwinglians had begun the vicious attack on Luther, and for a while they feigned friendship with the Lutherans in order that they might be admitted to the Protestant alliance against the Papists. They were willing to sign almost anything in order to attain their end, for they were interested only in an external union, and their theology was so broad as to permit fellowship with those who did not agree with them. Luther on the other hand was interested in a Christian unity in faith and doctrine. "The Word and doctrine must effect Christian unity or fellowship; . . . where there is no agreement in doctrine, no unity will remain anyway." (St. Louis, IX: 831.) Luther had refused to give Zwingli the hand of brotherhood, but, as he says, "We gave them the hand of peace and love that meanwhile the hard words and writings should rest and each teach his opinion without invective, but not without defense and refutation." (St. Louis, XVII: 1955.) Zwingli on the other hand soon dried his tears and boasted: "Truth was so clearly superior that, if anyone was overcome, Luther the impudent and obstinate was beaten." (VIII: 370.) A few months later, in his *Reckoning of the Faith*, he referred to the Lutherans as those "who long for the fleshpots of Egypt" (IV: 11). Throughout the controversy Zwingli showed himself as a smooth, astute, and crafty politician, so different from the simplehearted but blunt and outspoken Luther.

Zwingli maintained that Luther had either never learned to know the "glorious splendor of the Gospel" or else had forgotten it. Referring to absolution, he says that the "certainty of faith comes from the Gospel, since we know that the Son of God has paid for our sin with His death. If faith is present, then absolution, or release, is present; hence there is no need of [further] assurance to man, for man must become certain solely through faith, which no one but God gives." No one can accept Christ except the Father draw him, and "as soon as he is drawn, he believes. If he believes, he is certain. But during the time that there is no certainty, there is no perfect faith; for if faith is present, certainty is also present" (II:II, 22). Man, therefore, needs no external assurance to strengthen his faith. Zwingli insisted that faith alone saves, but he believed this excludes the thought that the Sacraments justify. "If faith alone does not save without the virtue of external things, then a person goes back to works." (III:460.) "Faith is the work which saves, not the corporeal eating of the body" (III:595), and he who "believes" is "not ignorant on what ground salvation is based," and therefore needs no eating of corporeal flesh. (III:248.) To believe and to perceive are two separate things. "See what a monstrosity of speech this is: I believe that I eat sensible and corporeal flesh. If it is corporeal, then it has not the work of faith, for it is perceived. But those things which are perceived need no faith, for through the sense they are altogether certain. . . . Faith . . . draws to invisible things . . . and does not occupy itself with sensible and corporeal things and has nothing in common with them." (III:249.) Zwingli claimed that the chief error of his opponents consisted in not knowing what faith is. Faith is not merely "to think" or "to imagine" or "to suppose" but "to trust." The opponents are guilty of a fallacious argument, for "they who eat Christ, *i. e.*, who believe in Him, *i. e.*, trust in Him, have eternal life, not those who believe that the bread is His flesh, for to this opinion salvation is nowhere promised" (III: 350). As we noted before, Zwingli maintained that faith is not effected through the external Word, but solely through the inward working of the Holy Spirit, who also causes the believer to accept the external Word. Thus the Sacraments also effect a "historical faith," which refreshes the memory in the things which have happened, but nothing gives trust in God but the Spirit" (IV:55).

Zwingli says that to understand the words of institution in their natural sense is "absurd" (III:517), for "if *is* is taken essentially, then we would have to eat His body with flesh, bone, veins, nerves, marrow, and the other members, which I will not mention here" (II:I, 438). "Then the substance of bread is plainly changed into the substance of flesh," and it is false to say, "Bread

remains bread," or, "Under the bread a person eats the flesh" (II:1, 432). Then the Pope is right in insisting that the bread is substantially changed into the body of Christ. (II:II, 5, 40.) Zwingli asserted that on the basis of such Scripture passages as Gen. 41: 26 f.; Ex. 12:11, 27; Matt. 11:14; 12:49; 13:19 f., 37 ff.; Luke 8: 11, 14 f.; John 8:12; 9:5; 10:7, 9; 14:6; 15:1; Gal. 4:24 *is* was the equivalent of *signifies*. He did not maintain that *is* must always be understood thus, but this interpretation was necessary in the words of institution (III:257, 336, 484, 553, 606; II:1, 457; II:II, 41, etc.), for the words of Christ, John 6:63, "The flesh profiteth nothing" and the words of the Creed "He ascended into heaven and sitteth at the right hand of God" do not permit the body of Christ to be corporeally present and corporeally eaten in the Lord's Supper. (II:1, 499.)

Zwingli rejected the idea of eating the true and corporeal body of Christ "spiritually." These two things do not go together. "Body and spirit are so different from each other that, if you accept one, it cannot be the other. . . . To eat corporeal flesh spiritually is nothing else but to maintain, What is body is spirit." (III:249; cf. III:493.) And yet he admitted an eating of Christ's body by faith. Explaining John 6, he said: "Therefore the bread, *i. e.*, the food of the soul which I [Christ] have promised, is My flesh, but not, as you think, as it lives and dwells with you, but as it is given for the world, *i. e.*, is atrociously slain for the dead to quicken them. . . . My flesh, therefore, inasmuch as it is afflicted with death, is food, *i. e.*, is the hope of the mind. From this we clearly see that the flesh of Christ is in no other manner food or hope of the human mind but only in so far as it has been slain for us." (III:594.) Again he says: "The body of Christ is then eaten when His death for us is believed." (III:595.) "Christ understands in this chapter [John 6] under bread and eating nothing else but Gospel and faith, that he who believes that He has sacrificed Himself for us, and relies on it, has eternal life." (III:243.) "To eat His flesh and to trust in Him is one thing." (II:1, 443.) "To eat His flesh and drink His blood must be understood as to trust in Him, that His flesh and blood has been given for the redemption and washing away of our sins." (II:1, 438.) Zwingli says in *Reckoning of the Faith* that "the true body of Christ is present by the contemplation of faith, *i. e.*, that they who thank the Lord for the kindness conferred on us in His Son acknowledge that He assumed true flesh, in it truly suffered, truly washed away our sins in His own blood, and thus everything done by Christ becomes present to them by the contemplation of faith. But that the body of Christ in essence and really, *i. e.*, the natural body itself, is either present in the Supper or masticated with our mouth or

teeth, as the Papists and some who long for the flesh pots of Egypt assert, we not only deny but firmly maintain is an error opposed to God's word." (IV:11.) We must remember that according to Zwingli faith "draws to invisible things" and "does not occupy itself with sensible and corporeal things and has nothing in common with them" (III:249). He could conceive of only two modes of eating and drinking Christ's body and blood: a Capernaitic, or carnal, or physical, eating and drinking and an eating or drinking by faith (faith, of course, pertaining only to invisible things). He could not conceive of a sacramental, supernatural, incomprehensible eating and drinking of the true and real body and blood of Christ.

Zwingli formerly explained the words of institution according to John 6 (I:272), but later he admitted that "in this place [John 6] Christ does not speak of the Sacrament" (II:1, 438; cf. III:595). Already in his *Commentary on True and False Religion* he brought six reasons to prove that those err grievously who maintain that "Christ in this whole chapter speaks of the Sacrament." (III: 241 ff.) Why, then, did he constantly refer to John 6? Zwingli says that he did this "so that they who force all Scripture, whether it will or not, to serve their own opinions cannot here find weapons to defend their error" (III:241). Since the same question of eating Christ's body is raised in the Sacrament and in John 6, why not revert to that passage where Christ with a sharp sword cut the knot so that no hope remains to bring those two things together: "body and eating"? (III:490 f.) Again he says, "How could I better answer error than with the words of Christ with which He Himself answered a similar error." (II:1, 447.) Zwingli held that the words of John 6:63 forbid the assumption of a corporeal eating of the body of Christ. "The flesh of Christ profits in every way much and indeed immsensely, but . . . slain, not eaten. Slain it delivers us from death, but eaten inwardly it profits nothing." (III:246.) Hence the words of John 6:63 compel us to interpret the words of institution as "This signifies My body." (III:253.) These words are "strong enough to hinder that the words of Christ 'This is My body' may be understood of an essential, corporeal flesh; for if the flesh profiteth nothing, then Christ did not give it." (II:1, 446.) The words of institution are "dark" and must therefore be explained by the "clear" words of John 6:63. (II:1, 450; cf. II:11, 85 ff., 184 ff.; II:1, 480; III:484, 487 ff., 609, etc.) Note the rationalism of Zwingli. Zwingli condemned those who would force Scripture to serve their own opinion and seek in John 6 a weapon to defend their error (III:241), and yet he did the very same thing; for he took a weapon from John 6:63 to bolster his peculiar opinion that the body of Christ cannot be corporeally and essentially present in the Lord's

Supper. But note his even crasser rationalism. "Faith is the teacher" and is to be consulted as to the meaning of the words of institution. Now the words "The flesh profiteth nothing" forbid that we take the words of institution in a corporeal and proper sense, hence "according to our judgment *is* stands here for *signifies*. But this is not our judgment but the judgment of the eternal God inasmuch as faith comes from the invisible God and also tends to the invisible God and is throughout a thing altogether foreign to all sensibility. . . . And we say according to our judgment this word must be understood thus in this place: we speak so because of certain weak people, not as though this meaning could be overthrown by any Scripture passages. Either a person must reject "The flesh profiteth nothing" . . . which to say is impious, or that alone must be the simple meaning." (III:257.) It is Zwingli's subjectivism which is the final authority in the interpretation of the words of institution. Faith has been immediately wrought in man's heart through the Holy Spirit, and such faith "cannot be drawn out of words; but when faith teaches me, I understand the words" (III:517). "The tropes must always be apprehended by the light of faith." (III:606.) Zwingli believed. His faith, according to his own teaching, was the immediate effect of the working of the Holy Spirit, and this faith, so he asserted, taught him to understand the word *is* as being the equivalent of *signifies*. Here we have the origin of Schleiermacher's theory that man's religious self-consciousness is the ultimate source of Christian doctrine. Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:93, speaks of Zwingli and Oecolampadius as *Wahrheitsfanatiker* and says that they are the representatives of all later liberal theologians. Every authority, even that of the divine Word and divine revelation, is decisive only in so far and inasmuch as it agrees with one's own honest convictions. A person should not desist from all independent judgment even over against Scripture. Hence a faith like that of Luther, which accepts as true every word of God, even if it seems contrary to one's own honest convictions, was absolutely foreign to Zwingli. Ritschl may call such people *Wahrheitsfanatiker;* we would call them just plain, ordinary rationalists.

Zwingli insisted that the body and blood of Christ could not be present in the Lord's Supper because in the Creed we confess that Christ ascended into heaven and sitteth at the right hand of God. (III:484; II:1, 448 ff., 452 ff., 499; II:II, 2, 12, 19, 61; IV:52.) But Zwingli had a twofold conception of the right hand of God. He acknowledged that the right hand of God is an expression of divine majesty, power, and omnipresence. Inasmuch as Christ is God, He, Zwingli claimed, partakes of these divine qualities (II:II, 65, 173 ff.), but according to His humanity Christ is present in

heaven locally and circumscribed (III:512, 535; II:II, 82 ff.; IV: 13, 51). "The humanity of Christ is not everywhere where the right hand of God is. But Christ is everywhere where the right hand of God is, not according to both natures but solely according to the divine." (II:II, 81.) And yet Zwingli maintained that he did not thereby destroy the unity of the person of Christ. (II:II, 83 ff.; IV:12.)

In spite of the fact that Zwingli originally stated that "we Germans do not need the word Sacrament" (I:241), he continued to use the term, but in an improper sense, and he even spoke of the "sacramental body of Christ" (IV:36 ff., 58). That the Sacraments do not impart grace was to him self-evident. "I believe, yea, I know, that all the Sacraments are so far from conferring grace that they do not even convey or distribute it." (IV:9; cf. 36.) What, then, did Zwingli understand by the Lord's Supper? To Zwingli the Lord's Supper was merely a commemoration, or proclaiming, or a thanksgiving for the death of Christ (III:263) or a communion which showed that the partakers were members of the body of Christ, the Christian Church (III:260). Zwingli argued as follows: (1) the blood of Christ is the blood of the New Testament in so far as it was shed; (2) but the blood of Christ was not yet shed when He proffered the cup to His disciples; (3) therefore Christ did not give the blood of the New Testament to drink, and therefore "we do not today drink the blood of the New Testament itself, but the symbol of the blood of the New Testament" (III:333 f.). "The cup is the figure, or symbol, of My blood, which is the blood of the New Testament, inasmuch as it was poured out for many for the remission of sins." (III:335.) The cup is not the testament of blood but "a symbol or figure of the testament of blood." As the external sign of the Passion of Christ, "through which the covenant and testament was perfected," the Sacrament is the "symbol of that festival in which bread and wine in commemoration of the death of Christ are divided by the faithful with thanksgiving in one mind" (III:354). Zwingli interpreted the words of institution as follows: "Take and eat; that, namely, which I command you to do, will signify and recall to you my body which will now be given for you." The Lord's Supper is a "sign through which they who trust in Christ's death and blood, prove to the brethren that they have the same faith" (III:599). In 1 Cor. 10:16 the word *communion* does not refer to the corporeal blood of Christ but "to those who in that act of thanksgiving drink together. The meaning is: When we drink the cup of thanksgiving together, we who have been redeemed through His death and washed by His blood, assemble together in one body." Here Paul does not speak of the distribution of our Lord's body and blood, but he calls "the

communion of the body and blood of Christ those who together celebrate their redemption" (III:351 f.). Again he says: "The cup of blessing which we bless, *i. e.*, when we bless the cup of blessing, is not this our coming together, our communion, *i. e.*, our people, church, assembly, of the blood of Christ? For you are the communion of the blood of Christ, who drink out of the one cup; and the bread which we break is it not the communion or body, or coming together, people, church, assembly, of the body of Christ? ... For we who partake of one bread and drink of one cup come together in one body." (III:505.) Those who partake of the Lord's Supper show that "they are one body and people, who trust in Christ, the Son of God, and give thanks for His death, in which He entered for us." Hence the Lord's Supper, and here Zwingli returns to his original idea of a Sacrament, is a "public profession" or an "oath of allegiance" (III:508). The Eucharist is an "external sign of His love and ours" (II:II, 196), and the elements are not simply bread and wine, but "signs of obligation and unity" (II:II, 29; cf. 55, 61); for those who partake of the Lord's Supper publicly testify that they believe in Christ and that they will live with each other as Christians. (II:I, 498.)

Zwingli claimed that every miracle of Christ has been perceived and transmitted by someone and that there were only visible miracles. He admitted, however, that faith, which a person cannot give to himself, is an *afflatus* of the Father and is an invisible miracle, and yet he maintained that this *afflatus* of the Father could be felt in the soul, in the heart, and in the virtues of the mind. "What God instills and inspires in our mind is not numbered among the miracles, but what happens in crass things outside of the (natural) order, that we dignify with the name miracle." Hence he claimed that nothing miraculous happened when Christ instituted the Lord's Supper. (III:494; cf. II:I, 435 f.) But if nothing miraculous occurred in the Lord's Supper, then Christ as man was restricted to the visibility and circumscription of all other men. Here we have the real reason why Zwingli denied the corporeal and real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Lord's Supper.

Regarding the person of Christ, Zwingli says in his *Reckoning of the Faith:* "I believe and understand that the Son assumed flesh, because He truly assumed of the immaculate and perpetual Virgin Mary the human nature, yea, the entire man, who consists of body and soul. But this in such a manner that the entire man was so assumed into the unity of the hypostasis, or person, of the Son of God, that the man did not constitute a peculiar person, but was assumed into the inseparable, indivisible, and indissoluble person of the Son of God. Moreover, although both natures, the divine and the human, have so preserved their character and property

that both are truly and naturally found in Him, yet the distinct properties and works of the natures do not separate the unity of the person; no more than, in man, soul and body constitute two persons; for as they are of most diverse nature, so they operate by diverse properties and operations. Yet man, who consists of them, is not two persons, but one. So God and man is one Christ, the Son of God from eternity, and the Son of man from the dispensation of time to eternity; one person, one Christ; perfect God and perfect man; not because one nature becomes the other or they are confused with one another, but because each remains itself; and nevertheless the united person is not separated by this property." (IV:3 f.; cf. IV:48; II:II, 166, 180, 182 f.) But Zwingli so differentiated between Christ as God and Christ as man that Luther rightly accused him of Nestorianism. Zwingli repeated the ancient formulas of the *enhypostasia* of the human nature in the divine person, but he insisted that, when Scripture sometimes attributes to one nature that which belongs to another or attributes to the entire person the attribute of one nature, this must be explained through the figure of speech mentioned before, known as *alloeosis*, or interchange, or "communication, or commutation, of attributes." He explained the *alloeosis* as an "exchange by which, when speaking of the one nature of Christ, we use the terms belonging to the other. As when Christ says, 'My flesh is meat indeed,' there the human flesh is peculiar to the human nature, nevertheless through commutation it is there taken for the divine nature" (III:525). "A person names one of the two natures and understands nevertheless only one of the two" (II:II, 68; cf. 72 f., 151 ff.), yet "each [nature] preserves its qualities perpetually." (III:525; II:II, 153, 158; VI:I, 538, 712.) "John 1:14: 'The Word was made flesh,' or God became man, must be rightly understood through interchange as follows: Since God cannot become anything, otherwise He were imperfect, therefore this word dare not be understood according to its first appearance, but must have the meaning: the man is become God; so that that which is said of the deity, that it became man, must be understood of the humanity by interchange: the man is become God." (II:II, 69.) But if that be true, then John 1:14 does not teach an incarnation of the Son of God but a deification of the Son of man. Zwingli emphatically rejected the statement of Luther "Outside of Christ there is simply neither God nor Godhead" and claimed that "God is also outside of the human nature of Christ in all creatures, and was thus, before Christ became man" (II:II, 73). In this connection he explains John 3:13 as follows: "When He says, 'even the Son of Man which is in heaven,' then 'Son of Man' is there taken for the divine nature in Him; for at that time He was not corporeally in heaven according

to the human nature. But when He said, 'Even so the Son of Man must be lifted up,' then 'Son of Man' is only taken for the human nature." (II:II, 74.) "The humanity of Christ is not everywhere, where the right hand of God is. But Christ is everywhere where the right hand of God is, but not according to both natures, but only according to the divine." (II:II, 81.) The humanity of Christ is "finite and circumscribed at the right hand of God; although the right hand of God is by no means circumscribed and encircled" (II:II, 82). Hence "the humanity of Christ is not everywhere where the Godhead is." (II:II, 83; cf. II:II, 151 ff.) All that Christ experienced in this world belonged solely to the human nature and can be ascribed to the divine nature only by interchange. (IV:4.) Thus Christ suffered and died only according to His humanity, for this was impossible to His divine nature. (III:525; II:II, 163 ff.) Since faith pertains only to invisible things, Zwingli would trust in Christ only inasmuch as He was true God. His humanity was merely a pledge of grace, which was given into death to satisfy divine justice. (II:II, 7.) As God, not as man, Christ is the life of the world, the life of the soul, and nourishment unto eternal life. (VI:I, 712; cf. III:497 f.) Here we have the great difference between Zwingli and Luther and between Reformed and Lutheran theology. Luther regarded the act of redemption as an act of the indivisible theanthropic person of Christ. As the Council of Chalcedon, which rejected Nestorianism, declared: "Each form does the acts which belong to it in communion with the other." (Cf. Dierks, "Rejection of Eutychianism and Nestorianism in the *Genus Apotelesmaticum* and a Short Review of Reformed Christology, in Conc. Theol. Mthly., 1932, Vol. III, p. 653 ff.) Zwingli did not comprehend the fundamental thought in Luther's theology that even the human words and works of Christ are a revelation and an action of God Himself, of course, through the human nature. It is God Himself who redeemed us, for if only the human nature of Christ died for mankind, then Christ was indeed a poor Savior, who needed a Savior Himself. However, if God Himself died, then the death of Christ was of inestimable worth. Since the Son of God suffered and died as man's substitute, therefore His death became a preponderating equivalent for all the sins of mankind. The penal suffering which all men deserved was fully paid and perfectly balanced by the suffering and death of the Son of God.

Thank God, Luther did not give to Zwingli the hand of fellowship at Marburg! Had he done so, he would have denied important divine truths.

Morrison, Ill. Theo. Dierks