

5-1-1943

Huldreich Zwingli, the Father of Reformed Theology

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Recommended Citation

Dierks, Theo. (1943) "Huldreich Zwingli, the Father of Reformed Theology," *Concordia Theological Monthly*. Vol. 14 , Article 31.

Available at: <https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol14/iss1/31>

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union . . . is one which makes it its business to raise all to the level of the purest Christianity which by the grace of God they already possess." (See *Lehre und Wehre*, 1917, p. 282.) Those who like to think that we can get along without this or that or the other doctrine should read the article on Cadman's "irreducible minimum" which *The Lutheran Church Herald* of Nov. 29, 1927, reprinted from *The Presbyterian*. It calls attention to an article by a physician discussing the "irreducible minimum" of the human body. Men had both arms and legs amputated and still lived. Others remained alive after the removal of the stomach or gall-bladder. Life persists after nose and eyes are gone. Yes, some parts of the brain may be cut away. Try this, said the doctor, on one individual, but before the irreducible minimum is reached the patient will be dead. "According to our Liberal brethren, men seem to be able to live without the inerrancy of Scriptures; therefore, lop that off. . . . And the Blood Atonement—many modern folk subsist comfortably enough without that outworn childish dogma: therefore, lop it off. . . . Of course, long before the 'irreducible minimum' is reached, the patient will be dead."

But we are not yet through with our examination of the fundamental principle of unionism.

TH. ENGELDER

(To be continued)

Huldreich Zwingli, the Father of Reformed Theology

I

Huldreich Zwingli (born January 1, 1484, died October 11, 1531) has often been called the forerunner of Calvin; but as Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, III:27, points out, Zwingli is the "real author of the Reformed confession and, together with Bucer, the founder of Reformed theology." It was Bucer who formed the connecting link between Zwingli and Calvin.

At the Colloquy at Marburg in 1529 Luther refused the hand of fellowship to Zwingli, saying, "You have a different spirit." From his broad view of Christianity Zwingli could well tolerate Luther's differences in teaching; but for Luther to tolerate Zwingli's deviations from the truth would have been on his part a betrayal of the Gospel of Christ. This is the intolerance of truth. Writing of the Marburg Colloquy, McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant*, p. 67, says: "It may seem that the controversy concerned only a minor matter and that the difference between the two reformers was of no such importance as to justify a break; but in reality the two men, as Luther himself clearly recognized, were of an altogether different spirit, and the disagreement touching the

Eucharist was only the symptom of a far deeper disagreement concerning the nature of Christianity and the way of salvation. Zwingli's Humanistic sympathies were alien to Luther, and his wider interpretation of the Gospel was contradictory of all he held most dear. From Zwingli's point of view the difference was of relatively little importance. It was easy for him to be tolerant in his treatment of Luther. But for Luther to tolerate Zwingli would have been to betray the very heart of his Gospel." Luther and Zwingli could not agree at Marburg because their theology was so radically different. In the following pages we shall try to show that there was a fundamental difference between Zwingli's theology—and this includes Reformed theology, for Reformed theology in all its ramifications is only a natural development of Zwingli's theology—and Lutheran theology.

In his *Commentary on True and False Religion* Zwingli defined religion as the relation between God and man. It includes two ends: one to whom it is directed, namely, God; the other, to whom it pertains, namely, man. (Zwingli's Werke, Vol. III: 155.)¹ When man fell into sin, he fled from the presence of God. Religion had its beginning when God recalled man to himself. "Piety or religion consists in this: God exhibits man to himself so that he recognizes his disobedience, treachery, and misery no less than Adam (did); as a result man despairs of himself. But God at the same time exhibits the fullness and riches of His goodness to man, so that, when he has despaired in himself, he nevertheless recognizes that his Creator and Father still has for him a certain and ready grace, so that he cannot under any condition be torn away from Him, whose grace he desires. Therefore this adhesion, by which man steadfastly trusts in God as the only Good . . . and associates with God as with a Father—that is piety, that is religion. . . . There we certainly find piety, where there is a striving to live according to the will of God." Since the source of life is in God, "true religion is only that which adheres solely and only to God, . . . and true piety requires that it hangs solely on the mouth of God and does not hear or accept the word of anyone but that of its Bridegroom" (III:175 f.). The Roman Catholic religion is a false religion; he who trusts in man's works, in the indulgences of Popes, in the intercession of saints, and in the prayers of monks and nuns deceives himself. Zwingli did not understand true religion to signify faith in the Gospel of Christ, that is, that God has once and for all in Christ Jesus forgiven all men their sins. In fact,

1) Zwingli's complete works in German and Latin, by Schuler and Schulthess, Zurich, 1828—42, 8 vols., Suppl., 1861. In the 1829 edition of Vol. I the German writings between 1522 and 1524 are translated into Latin, and the pages are somewhat different from the edition of 1828.

as we shall learn later, Zwingli regarded the Gospel more or less as a "new law" and had a very poor conception of the atonement of Christ. Here we may add that Reformed theology is a true child of the so-called evangelical Renaissance of Northern Europe. Zwingli was a Humanist²⁾ and remained a Humanist until his dying day, for in his *Exposition of the Christian Faith*, written shortly before his death, he numbered among those "pious, wise, faithful, constant, valiant, virtuous men" who would be found in heaven "Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, the Catos, and the Scipios" (IV:65; cf. VI:1, 242; II, 69; VIII:179; VII:550), in short, he regarded those men as truly pious and religious and the heirs of eternal life who were not even Christians. McGiffert, *op. cit.*, p. 65, says: "Under Luther's influence Zwingli frequently asserted that salvation was through Christ alone, but the broader view was truer to his own way of thinking and was never abandoned by him. God, he taught, has revealed Himself not only through Christ but in many other ways. From the beginning He has been making His will known to men and has had His true worshippers and obedient children."

Many wise men have of themselves so "penetrated" the knowledge of God "that they did not doubt the existence of God" (III:155), for the knowledge of God's existence may be obtained through His revelation in nature, *i. e.*, in "the continual and perpetual operation of God and His disposition of all things" (III:156). Thus the heathen knew of the existence of God, and some of them—though these were very few—even recognized His unity. The "believers," however, have advanced beyond such natural knowledge of God, for they are "believers" inasmuch as "they believe in the existence of the one and only true and omnipotent God and trust in Him alone." This knowledge of God originates "through the power and grace of Him" in whom they believe, for "regarding the natural abilities of man there is no difference between the pious and the impious. . . . It is God's work alone that you believe in God and that you trust in Him." But "what God is"—that we cannot learn of ourselves, as little as a beetle can know

2) Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie* (the classic work on Zwingli's theology), Vol. I:46, says: "In his theological education and development Zwingli shows himself essentially dependent on Humanism and especially on Erasmus and must therefore be designated as an Erasmian in philosophy and theology." Cf. Vol. II:784 ff. Also Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (3d ed.), Vol. IV:356 f. Zwingli began to correspond with Erasmus soon after his graduation from Basel University, but Erasmus broke off all correspondence after the beginning of the Zwinglian Reformation. Later Zwingli came under the influence of Luther. Seeberg, *op. cit.*, IV:356 f.: "Zwingli's dependence upon Luther may without hesitation be asserted as a settled historical fact. . . . At the central point of his apprehension of religious truth, Zwingli is dependent upon Luther."

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what man is. It is presumption to even claim to know what God is "except from the Spirit of God Himself." (III:157). It is also deception and false religion to pretend to derive the knowledge of God from philosophy, *i. e.*, from Scholastic theology. The only source of such knowledge of God is found in the Bible; hence Zwingli adds, "We would learn what God is from His mouth, so that we may not be corrupted and made abominable in our studies." (III:158.)

All Christian doctrine, so Zwingli held, ought to be based on the inspired Word of God. Writing to the Bishop of Constance, he appealed to the Scriptures as the sole authority to determine the question of ceremonies (III:32), and in his sermon "On the Clarity and Certainty of the Word of God" he insisted that God's Word "can well be understood by men," not because of the "ability of the human intellect, but because of the light and Spirit of God, who so illuminates and breathes in His Word that the light of His opinion is seen in His light" (I:70). When Dr. Martin of Tuebingen accused Zwingli, saying: "You interpret the Scriptures thus according to your judgment, another interprets them another way; hence there must always be people who decide these things and declare the correct meaning of the Scriptures," Zwingli answered: "I do not understand the Scriptures differently from the way in which they are interpreted by means of the Spirit of God; there is no need of human judgment. . . . I do not wish to have or accept a man as judge of the Scriptures. . . . I shall do as the fathers, who also conquered by means of the Scriptures, not by means of human understanding. . . . The Scriptures interpreted the Scriptures, not the fathers the Scriptures. . . . The Scriptures are so much the same everywhere, the Spirit of God flows so abundantly, walks in them so joyfully, that every diligent reader, in so far as he approaches them with humble heart, will make his decisions by means of the Scriptures, taught by the Spirit of God, until he attains the truth." (I:150.) Zwingli also treated of this subject in his writing against Emsler published in 1524, but here he stated that the Church, *i. e.*, "not a gathering of all bishops, but the communion of saints, the communion of all believers" had the authority to "judge doctrine." This would seem to contradict his contention that Scripture is the sole authority to decide matters of faith, but Zwingli maintained that "he who is spiritual judges all things, but what or how to judge, he must hear. He who hears the Scriptures of the celestial Word explained in the Church judges that which he hears. But that which is heard is not the very word through which we become believers." (Zwingli taught that the Holy Spirit works faith immediately, *i. e.*, without means, as we shall learn later.) "If we would become believers through the hearing and reading of the

Word, then all of us would be believers. We see that many hear and see . . . yet do not have faith. Therefore it is manifest that we become believers only through the word which the heavenly Father preaches into our hearts, whereby He illuminates us so that we understand, and draws us so that we follow. . . . They who are imbued with that word judge the word which is sounded in the assembly and excites the ears; but in the meantime the word of faith which is in the minds of the faithful is judged of no one, but by it the external word is judged. . . . Hence the believer does not judge himself but according to the understanding of the Holy Spirit." (III:131 f.) Zwingli has been rightly called (Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, I:146, 227) a representative of the modern *Ichtheologie*, for his subjectivism was the final authority in matters of faith. As we shall see later, "faith" compelled him to interpret the word "is" as "signifies" in the Words of Institution, and yet he complained, "As often as by the use of clear passages of Scripture they [the Anabaptists] are driven to the point of having to say, I yield, straightway they talk about the 'Spirit' and deny Scripture." (III:359.) Zwingli was a rationalist at heart in spite of the fact that he insisted that Scripture alone should be the judge in matters of faith and doctrine. Reformed theology does not consistently uphold the *sola Scriptura* principle. "The precious words regarding the eternal deity and true humanity of Jesus Christ must be accommodated by figures and tropes to the correct sense, which does not violate the faith." (II:II, 69.) "Tropes must be discerned through the light of faith." (III:606.) His own special property was, as Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:36, points out, the figure of *alloeosis* which he found in Plutarch (cf. III:525). This "interchange" was an exegetical *quid pro quo*, which permitted every arbitrariness in the interpretation of Scripture. He used it especially in his doctrine of the Lord's Supper and in his Christology (cf. III:525 ff.; II:II, 151 ff.), but also in his exegetical works (cf. V:50, 749, 750; VI:I, 715, 718, 752, etc.).

Zwingli designated the revelation of God as Law and Gospel, but in opposition to Luther, he did not stress their antithesis but rather their agreement. "The Law is the perpetual will of God" (IV:61, 102), and by the Law God is known as the "Lord and Governor of all things" (IV:107). Zwingli used the term "Gospel" both in a narrow and in a wide sense; in the former it refers to the salvation in Christ, to redemption and forgiveness of sin ("the sum and substance of the Gospel is that our Lord Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, has made known to us the will of His heavenly Father and has with His innocence released us from death and reconciled God," I:153; cf. I:179 f., 431), but in the latter sense it includes the Law. "The Gospel is everything that has been made

known by God to men in the Old and New Testaments by which they can be made certain of the grace and will of God." (I:76.) Zwingli says that in the "new law" God did not prescribe the Ceremonial Law of the Old Testament, much less the ceremonies of the Papists. That he here refers to the Gospel is clear from the context (I:311); hence the translation *novo testamento* in Leo Jud's Latin translation of 1535 (1829 edition of Vol. I:326) is not accurate. To the true worshipers of God the Law is a "Gospel, i. e., a glad tidings which makes known the will of God. . . . That the Law, which is holy and good and just, is not pleasing to us and does not gladden and make us happy is not because the Law has in its nature that which terrifies, oppresses, and depresses, but the sorrow is from our flesh. . . . Despair and hatred of God do not come from the action of the Law, but from the infirmity of the flesh, which cannot follow the Law" (I:308). All this is directed against the statement of Luther that the Law causes man to despair and hate God. In his *De providentia Dei*, written in 1530, Zwingli speaks of "certain people of our time . . . who have not spoken circumspectly of the Law, that it does nothing but terrify, damn, and lead to hell" (IV:103). One thing, therefore, is certain: Zwingli did not know the proper distinction between Law and Gospel, and therefore he also corrupted the Scriptural doctrine of justification by faith alone, as we shall point out later. In this respect most Reformed theologians have followed in Zwingli's footsteps.

The essence of sin is selfishness as opposed to the love of God (III:167, 204, 631; IV:4) and must be taken in a twofold sense: first as the disease which we have contracted from the author of our race and by which we are addicted to self-love; secondly, as that which is done contrary to the Law. (III:203 f.) Zwingli spoke sharply of the corruption of man due to original sin, but he himself did not have the true Scriptural doctrine, as we see from his controversy with the Baptists.

As Ritschl, *op. cit.*, III:39, points out, Zwingli's teaching regarding original sin changed after 1525. In his book entitled *Baptism, Rebaptism, and Infant Baptism* he declared: "original sin is nothing else than the infirmity [received] from Adam. That you may understand what we mean by infirmity, note that we understand by the term 'infirmity' a defect which a person has from his birth without his fault and accidentally. . . . Original sin is a recession, a decrease or offense of our first ordained nature, even as in a storm or hail all vines are so destroyed that they no longer have their former nature. . . . But original sin is not a damnable sin in so far as a man is born of believing parents." (II:I, 287.) "Children have no blemish or spot" (II:I, 283), and the "guilt of Adam cannot con-

damn the children, yet there clings to them that infirmity from which, when the Law is known to us, sin arises" (II:1, 292).

Does original sin damn? Salvation and damnation are matters which depend wholly "on the divine judgment of election and rejection; hence all those who have treated of this question have manifestly drawn their conclusions somewhat incautiously inasmuch as they sometimes damned all the uncircumcised and unbaptized children and sometimes also all the adults" (III:632). Salvation does not depend on works but on the election of God; and if salvation is given to them who are elect of God, then we judge blindly, for election is hidden from us. Neither was circumcision a sign which proved either salvation or damnation, nor did Christ say that he who was not baptized would be damned. "This proof we have brought to show the heaven-high error of those—even if they have not only great but also old names" (the last is directed against Augustine)—"who adjudge eternal damnation not only to unbaptized children but also to all so-called heathen." (III:633.) Zwingli in this connection quotes Seneca to show that this "very holy man" had faith in God. "Who, I ask, has written this faith in the heart of this man? Let no one think that this tends to the evacuation of Christ as some" (he means Luther) "accuse us; rather it increases His glory. Through Christ all must approach who come to God." Children born of Christian parents are in the same "condition as those born of Abraham" (III:637), but the children of Abraham were not subject to damnation because of original sin. "Jacob was loved before he was born; therefore original sin could not damn him. Likewise Jeremiah and John and others." God made a covenant with Abraham and promised to be a God unto him and to his seed, and because of this promise God can no longer damn his seed because of original sin; and what is said of the seed according to the promise must also be understood of us "who are born of Christian parents," for we are the "children of promise" (III:638). That the children of Christian parents are not damned because of original sin is not to be ascribed to parental holiness but to their "election of God" (III:639). Zwingli would not enter on the question whether Christ restored the whole race or only the communion of saints, but he insisted that Christ restored as much as Adam injured. If a person believes that Gentile children are saved through Christ, this does not detract from the glory of Christ; hence also adults who show through their works that the Law of God is written in their heart ought to be numbered with the circumcised. But if it be objected that to ascribe good works to heathen is to break down faith and to return to work-righteousness, Zwingli would answer that good works presuppose faith. Whoever does not have faith does not do the

works of faith; but "religion, piety, godliness, and holiness are not bound to signs, although it is proper that those who have been taught do not remain away from the signs but thus give proof that their names have been inscribed and that they belong to the unity of the Church." Zwingli finally insists that all those who are not capable of understanding the Law are "in a state of innocence" (III:641).

In his denial of the Scriptural doctrine of original sin Zwingli showed a certain kinship with Catholicism. Zwingli does not teach an imputation of Adam's guilt, even as he does not teach an imputation of Christ's righteousness.

Since the Fall man is nothing but flesh. "Flesh is unprofitable, cannot do anything of itself, cannot produce the good; and since we are nothing but one flesh, it follows that we by nature can do nothing which is good and right, as little as Adam; all our affections are inclined to evil." (I:545.) Since the Fall "man's mind is bad, and his disposition is evil from the beginning of his life" (III:169). Zwingli did not originally deny free will, but owing to the influence of his doctrine of divine providence he later denied all human free will and human merit. "By the providence of God are abolished at once both free will and merit, for since it determines all things, what are our parts that we should be able to think anything as done by ourselves? And since all works are from Him, how shall we merit anything?" (III:283.)

"God is the eternal power of all good and an unchangeable activity." (I:277.) He is the "principal cause and perfecter of every work," for as the "first moving cause" He "works in us all things; we do not operate except in so far as we are instruments through which God operates" (I:278). Hence the believer regards himself merely as an "instrument and organ through which God works" (I:276). McGiffert, *op. cit.*, p. 68, says that Zwingli "thought of the Deity in much more abstract terms than Luther. God was less a personal Father than the Creator and Ruler of the world, and the attributes which Zwingli ascribed to Him were those of traditional theology, omnipotence and omniscience occupying a chief place. This is particularly manifest in connection with his doctrine of predestination, which finds its most elaborate and systematic expression in his *De providentia Dei*. His acceptance of the doctrine was due primarily to his desire to undermine all dependence upon human merit in connection with salvation; but having accepted it, he worked over his doctrine of God in its light and reached a metaphysical determination of the most extreme type, which became controlling in all his theological teaching. Luther went as far as he in his assertion of the inability of man and the absolute control of God, but he did not make God's omnipotence the center of his system, as Zwingli did."

Zwingli defined divine providence as "the perpetual and unchangeable government and administration of the affairs of the universe" (IV:84). God's government is so absolute that Zwingli would deny all secondary causes. Secondary causes are merely "instruments through which the present divine power operates" (IV:96). In man there is an "eternal warfare in which mind and body mutually oppose each other" (IV:99 f.). But why did God place man in this miserable condition that he can have no peace in himself? Zwingli answers that the potter has the right to fashion the clay into such vessels as he wills (IV:101). And why must the spirit suffer eternal punishment since it is overcome and oppressed by the flesh? Because it has sinned against the Law. (IV:102.) (It is in this connection that Zwingli polemicizes against Luther and others who maintained that the Law terrifies, damns, and abandons us to wrath.) But why did God give the Law although everything is performed according to divine providence? The giving of the Law and the revelation of His will was not superfluous, for thereby God teaches man that He is the Lord and Governor of all things. To rule by divine providence and to teach through Law are not two works, for providence gives the Law so that through the Law it may govern mankind. (IV:107.)

"Since the Law is given to man, he sins whenever he acts contrary to the Law, although he is, lives, and acts in no wise except in God, by God, and through God. But because God works through *man*, the sin belongs to man and not to God. . . . One and the same crime, say adultery or homicide, is therefore, in so far as it is the work of God as its author, mover, and instigator, no trespass; but in so far as it is the work of man, it is a trespass and crime. For God is not bound by any Law; man, however, is even damned by the Law. For whatever God does, He does freely without any criminal desire, hence also without sin. (IV:112.)

Zwingli defines predestination as "the free determination of the divine will concerning those who are to be made blessed" (IV:113). In election God manifests His goodness, for He could have left also the elect in "unbelief" (VI:11, 118), and it is election which really saves, not the atonement of Christ and not faith in Christ. These are both something secondary, as we shall see later. The atonement is only the object of the faith of the elect, *i. e.*, some of the elect (for Zwingli held that even some of the heathen, who had never even heard of the atonement, would be saved), and serves as a means so that, trusting in Christ, the elect obtain the hope of eternal salvation. When salvation is ascribed to faith in Christ, this is only because faith is a certain sign, or symbol, of election. "Faith itself does not save, if we would speak accurately, but it is a sign of salvation and election. The drawing of the Father and

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the operation of the Holy Spirit saves and justifies, but faith is the sign of all the elect." (VI:1, 340.)

"Election is attributed only to those who are to be saved; but those who are to be lost are not said to be elected, although the divine will has also determined concerning them, but for repelling, rejecting, and repudiating them, by which they may become examples of justice." (IV:115.) Such election is according to the free will of God and is not dependent on any other cause, and the reward promised to works is to be ascribed only to divine goodness (IV:116 f.), as we see from the example of faith. Zwingli defines faith as "the true and constant thing given to man by God, as the only right object of hope, by which he certainly and firmly trusts in the invisible God. Hence it is *πληροφορία*, that is, a manifest, full, and firm knowledge of God and hope in Him." Such faith is "given to those who are elect and ordained to eternal life, but so that election precedes faith and faith as a symbol follows." Where the divine determination or ordination to life is decreed, there men are called not by a general vocation but by that vocation in which "the Spirit rouses the ear of the elect" (IV:121). Justification is the same as remission of sins, and according to Christ and the Apostles there is no forgiveness or justification except "of faith. But they who have faith are the heirs of eternal life" (IV:122). Referring to the heathen, Zwingli adds that "nothing hinders that God should choose to Himself also from the heathen such as reverence Him and respect Him, and who after death are joined to Him, for the election of God is free" (IV:123). Zwingli concludes that, when children of Christians die in infancy, it is a "sign of divine election and vocation to the glory of the blessed" (IV:126); but those "who are reprobated and repudiated of God, do not die in this state of innocency" (IV:127). Election alone saves; it works everything good in man, and only on the basis of a firm and immovable election can we be sure of our salvation (IV:140, 143).

Zwingli's determinism controlled his whole theology. He did not, like Luther, conceive of God as the loving Father revealed in Christ Jesus but as the "eternally existent operation and activity" (I:276) and the "first cause" (I:278). Those who ascribe anything to themselves are damned. It is true, God works also through such, but God would make of them "instruments of wrath, i. e., damnation, to manifest His justice" (I:276). According to Luther, God could not be known except through Christ, and all knowledge of Him apart from Christ is vain and useless. Zwingli, however, maintained that the "knowledge of God in His own nature precedes the knowledge of Christ" (III:180). Since Zwingli numbered some "pious" heathen among the elect, he ascribed to them a faith in God, i. e., a knowledge of God and trust in Him,

which he regarded as the same as coming to God through Christ, for those who "do the works of the Law written in their hearts come to God alone through Christ" (III:634). Of course, those who hear of Christ and His work must believe in Him and His work if they would come to God through Him. But according to Zwingli true piety and religion does not consist in trusting solely in the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, but in knowing and trusting in God as the source of all good and in obeying His Law. Since divine election is the real basis and ground of salvation, and inasmuch as the whole Christian life is altogether dependent on election, therefore the work of Christ as well as faith in Christ is something secondary. To Zwingli everything was subordinate to the eternal and immutable predestination of God.

Morrison, III.

(To be concluded)

THEO. DIERKS

Luther: A Blessing to the English

VIII. Luther's New Testament in English

The Reformed Abraham Scultetus says in his *Annals*: "Students from all nations came to Wittenberg to hear Luther and Melancthon. As they came in sight of the town, they returned thanks to God with clasped hands, for from Wittenberg, as hitherto from Jerusalem, the light of evangelical truth had spread to the uttermost parts of the earth." And so the historian Green calls Wittenberg "the little town which had suddenly become the sacred city of the Reformation."

"Guilelmus Daltici ex Anglia 27 Maij 1524" — William Tyndale, likely the first Englishman to register at the University of Wittenberg.

"Guilhelmus Roy ex Londino" registered on June 10, 1525, — Tyndale's helper, one of the "German Lutherans" of Cambridge.

Tyndale translated the New Testament from the Greek but always had an eye on Luther's German Testament of September, 1522.

He took his work to Koeln to have it printed by Quentel. John Cochlaeus, whom the papists call "the scourge of Luther," heard some printers in their cups remark: "All England would soon be Lutheran, the King and the Cardinal of England willy nilly." He invited several of them to his lodgings, plied them with wine, and one of them in confidential talk revealed the secret. Two Englishmen, learned in languages, who sometime had been at Wittenberg, had translated the Lutheran New Testament into the English language. Three thousand copies were in press as far as the letter K