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The Norm and Rule of Doctrine in the Christian Church before the Reformation

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versiegelte Buch zu nehmen und dessen Siegel zu öffnen. Er, der Sohn Gottes, der zugleich das Lamm Gottes ist, dessen stellvertretendes Werk von Gott angenommen worden ist, ist der einzige, dem dieses Recht und diese Ehre zukommt.

Dies wird nun im folgenden erhärtet: Denn du wurdest geschildert. Damit ist das Hauptmoment im Erlösungswerke Christi, sein Opfertod, in den Mittelpunkt gerückt. Er ist nach den Worten des Propheten wie ein Lamm, das zur Schlachtbank geführt wird, Jes. 53, 7. Er hat sich selber Gotte geopfert, und er ist als das geduldige Schlachtlammlein geschlachtet und geopfert worden. Und durch dieses Opfer, das unser Hoherpriester für uns gebracht hat, indem er sich selbst in den Tod gab, hat er erkauft. Als Objekt ist zu ergänzen nicht „einige“, „gewisse“, sondern „Leute“, „Personen“ im allgemeinen. Diese hat der Heiland erkauft, ἠγόρασας. In Kap. 1, 5 steht λύσασθαι, womit die Tatsache der Loskaufung betont werden sollte. Das Verbum ἀγοράζειν wird in den Papyrusdokumenten fast regelmäßig gebraucht vom Kaufen der Sklaven. Damit ist angedeutet, daß Christus uns sich erkauft, daß er durch Erlegung des Lösegeldes seines Blutes uns zu seinem Eigentum gemacht hat. Aber damit ist zugleich ausgesagt, daß wir Gotte erkauft sind, daß wir durch die Erlösung, so durch Jesum Christum geschehen ist, Eigentum Gottes geworden sind. In der Gemeinschaft mit Christo stehen wir auch in der Gemeinschaft mit Gott. Der Kaufpreis ist bestimmt genannt als das Blut des Heilandes. Die Erlösung ist geschehen durch sein Blut. Christus hat sich alle Menschen erkauft (1 Kor. 6, 20; 7, 23; 2 Petr. 2, 1; 1 Tim. 2, 6), und allen Menschen wird die durch sein Blut geschehene Erlösung angeboten.

U n m e r k u n g. Hierher gehören auch als Beweisprüche Offenb. 7, 14 und 12, 11, weil die Ausdrücke ἐν τῷ αἵματι τοῦ ἀγίου, διὰ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ ἀγίου die ganze stellvertretende Genugtuung des Heilandes voraussetzen und darauf beruhen. Das Blut des Lammes hat stellvertretenderweise die Erlösung der Menschen erworben, und darum ist das Blut Christi das ausschlaggebende Moment in der Erlösungsgeschichte und in der Anwendung der Erlösung auf uns.

P. E. R.

The Norm and Rule of Doctrine in the Christian Church before the Reformation.

That the Gospel of Christ Crucified is contrary to all worldly wisdom is clearly affirmed by St. Paul in his First Letter to the Corinthians, 1, 18 ff. He therefore warned the Colossians: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ," 2, 8, and speaks of himself as "casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of

Christ," 2 Cor. 10, 8. In the Church of Christ the Word of God should be the only norm and rule of doctrine. Not reason, but God's Word should reign supreme. At first, however, the Christian Church had no written Word of God except the Old Testament and was therefore entirely dependent on the oral teachings of the apostles. But when the New Testament came into existence, these writings gradually supplanted the oral tradition as the norm and rule of Christian doctrine.

The apostles were rightly regarded as the inspired teachers of the Church; for Christ Himself had said that "through their word" men would believe on Him, John 17, 20. They themselves stated that the Spirit of Christ spoke through them, 1 Pet. 1, 11, 12; 2 Cor. 13, 3; and therefore they insisted upon an absolute submission to their word as the Word of God. But already at that time there were false prophets, who declared that they had received special revelations or pointed to some word or letter falsely attributed to St. Paul. Over against these pretended revelations or traditions or writings St. Paul referred not only to his genuine teaching, but also to his written word. "Hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word or our epistle," 2 Thess. 2, 15. Here he insists on submission not only to his oral word, but also to his written word; and in order that men might be able to distinguish his genuine writings from those which were spurious, he added his own signature to his letters, 2 Thess. 3, 17. Somewhat later, when he wrote to the Corinthians, he no longer referred to his oral word. Why not? Because in his absence the Corinthians could not absolutely be certain of his oral teaching. He therefore referred only to his written word and demanded their submission to this written word. "If a man think himself to be a prophet or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things *that I write unto you* are the commandments of the Lord. But if a man be ignorant, let him be ignorant," 1 Cor. 14, 37, 38. We see how the written word was gradually given the place of supreme authority. Now, when the authors were gone, when the living teachers were no longer at hand to correct the errorists, then the Church acknowledged the *written* word as the norm and rule of Christian doctrine. In a controversy the written word was decisive. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch († 107), writes: "For I heard some men saying: 'If I find it not in the charters [*ἀρχαίαις*, old writings], in the gospel, I do not believe.' And when I said to them: 'It is written,' they answered me: 'That is the question.'" ¹⁾

During the first millennium of the Christian era the greater part of the Christian Church employed human wisdom and learning primarily to prove the supremacy of the Christian faith and to gain

1) *Ad Philad.*, 8, 2.

acknowledgment for it in the world. Worldly wisdom was made subservient to the Christian faith. This is especially true of the West; in the East many of the theologians were inclined to philosophize. However, at the turn of the second millennium, when the Christian faith was universally accepted in the Western world (it being, as it were, laid down and fixed in the writings of the Church Fathers and the decrees of the church councils), men began to speculate concerning that faith and to employ reason, not in defense of the faith, but for the love and joy of speculating. By reason men sought to fathom the mysteries of the Christian religion. Yet another change took place towards the end of the thirteenth century. Instead of the former idealistic Augustinian speculation we have in this period an intellectualistic Aristotelian rationalism. This was due to the fact that the works of Aristotle had meanwhile become better known to the Western world, and in a very short time this pagan philosopher assumed a place of authority within the Christian Church; for his dialectical methods were employed by all the Schoolmen. On the basis of Aristotelian dialectics the separate doctrines were divided and subdivided, and this soon degenerated into hair-splitting arguments and a mere wrangling over words.

Another point must be mentioned here. Before this time the Neo-Platonic Augustinian cognition theory was universally accepted. According to this theory, truth in man is a reflection of the truth in God. Reason, if illuminated by the grace of God, can to a certain extent fathom the mysteries of faith. Owing to the influence of Aristotle this theory was now rejected, and in its place it was taught that reason has the innate power without the infusion of grace to grasp some of the mysteries of faith. The supreme authority in doctrine is revelation. The theologian is not to prove revelation by reason; for this would be altogether impossible since revelation is above reason. Nevertheless the theologian should try to demonstrate that the doctrines of the Church are not impossible. The task of theology is therefore not to set forth the doctrines of the Bible, but to explain, harmonize, and demonstrate the doctrines of the Church to be reasonable. It was taken for granted that they were Scriptural. Thomas Aquinas had held that some divine truths, *e. g.*, that of the Holy Trinity, surpass human reason and cannot be demonstrated by reason, while others are comprehensible by reason, though only slowly and after a most laborious study. In later years the theologians taught that not a single Christian doctrine could be demonstrated by reason; some of them were even contrary to reason, and therefore all must be relegated to the sphere of faith. Yet these theologians did not therefore reject the Christian doctrines, but gladly submitted to the authority of the Church, declaring, "I believe what the Church believes." This continued until Martin Luther cast the "accursed

pagan" out of the temple of God and restored the Scriptures as the sole norm and rule of doctrine within the Church. Then theology again became the answer to the question, not, "Is it reasonable?" or, "What does the Church believe?" but, "What say the Scriptures?"

The Christian Church first came in conflict with human speculation in its encounter with Gnosticism. The Gnostics attempted to construct a religious philosophy on a Christian basis; but Gnosticism was less logical than speculative. Lipsius says: "Gnosticism was the first comprehensive attempt to construct a philosophy of Christianity; owing, however, to the immense reach of the speculative ideas which pressed themselves on the attention of the Gnostics, but with which they were wholly lacking in scientific ability to cope, this attempt ended only in mysticism, theosophy, mythology, in short, in a thoroughly unphilosophical system."²)

The Christian Church was successful in its encounter with the vagaries of Gnosticism. But soon the Platonic Logos doctrine gained a foothold within the Church and corrupted the Scriptural doctrine of the person of the Redeemer. It was this corruption of the Scriptural doctrine which caused the Christian Church to engage in the prolonged Trinitarian and Christological controversies.

The Platonic influence was first felt in Justin Martyr († 166), who embraced Christianity after wandering to and fro through the various philosophical schools of his day. Justin, whom Eusebius calls "a genuine defender of true philosophy," regarded Christianity as the highest philosophy. To him Christ was the embodiment of the preexistent, absolute, personal Reason, the Logos incarnate. Every man is a partaker of the divine Logos, and according to the measure of doing this he will apprehend the truth. Whatever is reasonable is therefore Christian, and therefore even the pagan philosophers who lived according to reason were Christians, even though they may have been regarded as atheists.

Clement of Alexandria († ca. 220) also wandered through Hellenic philosophy before he embraced the Christian faith. He, too, regarded Christianity as the highest philosophy, the true philosophy, and the whole of truth in contradistinction to the conceptions of the ante-Christian times, which he regarded as partial truth. The heathen philosophers were able to discover some elements of truth by the aid of the seed of the divine Logos implanted in every man. Human reason and philosophy therefore aid in advancing from faith (πίστις) to knowledge (γνώσις). Whoever seeks to attain the true knowledge without the aid of philosophy, dialectics, and the study of the natural sciences is like the man who expects to gather grapes without cultivating the grape-vine.

²) Quoted in Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy* (Morris-Porter ed.), Vol. I, p. 282.

Origen († 254), born of Christian parents, received at the hands of his father and of Clement a very thorough Christian education. At the age of eighteen years he assumed the office of president of the catechetical school at Alexandria, made vacant by the flight of Clement. To fill this important office, he studied not only the various heresies of his day, but also Greek philosophy; he even became a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism. Imbued with Greek philosophy, Origen now sought to reconcile Christianity and philosophy, and this led him into various speculations, which were later condemned by the Church as heretical.

In the East many of the theologians laid great emphasis on knowledge, and to them Christianity was merely the highest wisdom, the true and final philosophy; but in the West the theologians avoided speculation and dealt with practical things. In the East there was an inclination to philosophize, while in the West there was an aversion to all philosophical speculation.

Irenaeus (*ca.* 177), known mainly for his opposition to the Gnostic speculation, regarded the apostolic doctrine as handed down by the Church as the true *gnosis*. He writes: "It is therefore better and more profitable to belong to the simple and unlettered class and by means of love to attain to nearness to God than, by imagining ourselves learned and skilful, to be found [among those who are] blasphemous. . . . It is therefore better, as I have said, that one should have no knowledge whatever of any one reason why a single thing in creation has been made, but should believe in God and continue in His love than that, puffed up through knowledge of this kind, he should fall from that love which is the life of man and that he should search after no knowledge except Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was crucified for us, than that by subtle questions and hair-splitting expressions he should fall into impiety."³⁾

Tertullian († 220? 240?) regarded the philosophers as the "patriarchs of all heresy." Quoting Col. 2, 8, he continues: "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? what between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from the 'Porch of Solomon,' who was himself taught that 'the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.' Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel! With our faith we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides."⁴⁾ Again he says: "No man gets instruction from that which tends to destruction. No man receives illumination from a

3) *Adv. Haer.*, II, 26, 1.

4) *De Praescriptione Haereticorum*, 7.

quarter where all is darkness. Let our 'seeking' therefore be in that which is our own and from those who are our own and concerning that which is our own. That, only that, can become an object of inquiry without impairing the rule of faith." 5) Again: "The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed of it. And the Son of God dies; it is by all means to be believed because it is absurd (*ineptum*). And He was buried and rose again; the fact is certain because it is impossible." 6) In the last-quoted Statement Tertullian goes too far. The death and resurrection of Christ are to be believed, and that fact is certain not "because" it is absurd and impossible, but "even though" it may seem absurd and impossible to human reason.

When Augustine had read Cicero's *Hortensius*, he was filled with a burning desire to know the truth. First he joined the Manicheans, who promised a rational religion; but among them he found only irrationalities. In his growing despair of ever finding the truth he was inclined to surrender to the Academicians, who contended that man could not be certain of any truth; for man lacked every criterion of truth. But Augustine was shocked by such crass skepticism. "I was not so insane as to fancy that not even this [seven and three are ten] could be comprehended." 7) Augustine did not doubt that seven and three are ten, but he would not accept anything else as true which he could not demonstrate in the same manner.

Before Augustine accepted the Christian faith and was baptized, he came under the influence of Neo-Platonism, and under this influence he developed his cognition theory. He held that knowledge is obtained not only through the senses, but also by intuition, by looking within oneself. "Be unwilling to go without, in thyself return; truth lives in the inner man." 8) Looking within himself, man finds that truth which is a reflection of the eternal truth; for even as the light of the sun causes our eyes to be able to see certain things, so God causes intellectual realities to become clear to our intelligence. Augustine rejected the Platonic teaching that the human soul acquired its knowledge through a recollection of ideas beheld in a pre-existent state. He held that knowledge is attained through illumination from the divine Light. It is God, "the intelligible Light, in whom and from whom and through whom all things intelligibly shine which anywhere intelligibly shine." 9) Again he writes: "Now listen, so far as the present time requires, while from that similitude of sensible things I now teach also something concerning God. Namely, God is intelligible, not sensible; intelligible also are those demonstrations of the schools; nevertheless they differ very widely. For as the earth is

5) *De Praescr. Haer.*, 12.8) *De Vera Rel.*, 72.6) *De Carne Christi*, 5.9) *Solit.*, I, 3.7) *Conf. VI*, 4, 6.

visible, so is light; but the earth, unless illuminated by light, cannot be seen. Therefore those things also which are taught in the schools, which no one who understands them doubts in the least to be absolutely true, we must believe to be incapable of being understood unless they are illuminated by somewhat else, as it were, a sun of their own. Therefore, as in this visible sun we may observe three things: that it is, that it shines, that it illuminates, so in that God, most far withdrawn, whom thou wouldst fain apprehend, there are three things: that He is, that He is apprehended, and that He makes other things to be apprehended."¹⁰ Truth, then, is to be found in man. If God illuminates the soul, it can apprehend that truth. This illumination theory Augustine had learned in the school of Neo-Platonism.

The truth which Augustine would seek is the knowledge of God and of himself. "What wouldst thou know? All these things which I have prayed for. Sum them up in brief. God and the soul, that is what I desire to know. Nothing more? Nothing whatever."¹¹ But God has willed "that not any but the pure shall know the truth,"¹² and therefore no one can find God "unless he has been made pure."¹³ "The soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive the light and to rest in it when it is perceived."¹⁴ This is another Neo-Platonic factor, that only the pure can apprehend the truth. — But how could Augustine reconcile this thought with Christianity, according to which man in his present condition is sinful? Here the necessity of revelation is introduced. Man, being sinful, is in need of a divine aid, and this divine aid is found in revelation. "Since we are too weak to search out the truth by mere reason and therefore need the authority of Holy Scripture, I began to believe God would never have given such surpassing authority to those Scriptures throughout the whole world except that He wished to be believed through them and to be sought by their means."¹⁵

Those, then, who "are weak should be encouraged to the utmost to enter the citadel of authority in order that, when they have been safely placed there, the conflict necessary for their defense may be maintained with the most strenuous use of reason."¹⁶ Augustine did not regard faith and reason as contradictory, but always as cooperating towards a common end, the attainment of truth. "No one doubts that we are impelled to the acquisition of knowledge by a double impulse, of authority and of reason."¹⁷ Faith is not to be credulity. "No one believes anything unless he has before thought it worthy of belief."¹⁸ Reason is therefore never "wholly lacking faith, because

10) *Op. cit.*, I, 15.

11) *Op. cit.*, I, 7.

12) *Op. cit.*, I, 2.

13) *Op. cit.*, I, 3.

14) *De Doctrina Chr.*, I, 10, 10.

15) *Conf. VI*, 4, 8.

16) *Ep. 118*, V, 32.

17) *Contra Acad.*, III, 20, 43.

18) *De Praed. Sanct.*, II, 5.

it belongs to it to consider to whom faith should be given." 19) In spite of the fact that Augustine continually spoke of the authority of Scripture, he was nevertheless inclined to rationalism.

God, condescending to our weakness, has given to man His revelation, and being given by Him, it is sufficient authority upon which our faith may securely rest, even though we may not be able to comprehend it fully with our reason. Faith therefore precedes reason and prepares the way for reason. "We ought to believe before we understand." 20) "A certain faith is in some way the starting-point of our knowledge." 21) "The light shines in darkness, and if the darkness comprehended it not, let them [those who are in darkness] first be illuminated by the gift of God that they may be believers; and let them begin to be light in comparison with unbelievers; and when this foundation has been laid, let them look up and see what they believe that at some time they may be able to see." 22) Here we have the germ of the later medieval speculation. First believe on the authority of Scripture and then seek to understand and apprehend that which is believed.

For Augustine the Scriptures are "established upon the supreme and heavenly pinnacle of authority" and should be read "without questioning the trustworthiness of its statements." 23) "To these canonical Scriptures alone I am bound to yield such implicit subjection as to follow their teaching without admitting the slightest suspicion that in them any mistake or any misstatement to mislead could find a place." 24) Augustine would "owe unhesitating assent to nothing but the canonical Scriptures"; 25) for from whatever has been written in other books "a man is at liberty to withhold his belief unless there is some clear demonstration or some canonical authority to show that the doctrine or statement either must or may be true. But in consequence of the distinctive peculiarity of the sacred writings we are bound to accept as true whatever the canon shows to have been said by even one prophet or apostle or evangelist." 26) Augustine protests against a subjective dealing with the Scriptures, which "makes every man's mind the judge of what in each scripture he is to approve or disapprove." This, he says, "is not to be subject to Scripture in matters of faith, but to make Scripture subject to you. Instead of making the high authority of Scripture the reason of approval, every man makes his approval the reason for thinking a passage is correct." 27) Augustine's principle regarding the authority of the Scriptures was correct, but in practise he himself was not

19) *De Vera. Rel.*, 24, 45.

20) *De Trin.*, VIII, 5, 8.

21) *Op. cit.*, IX, 1, 1.

22) *Op. cit.*, XV, 27, 49.

23) *Ep. 82*, II, 5.

24) *Ep. 82*, III, 24.

25) *De Nat. et Grat.*, LXI, 71.

26) *Contra Faust. Man.*, XI, 5.

27) *Op. cit.*, XXXII, 19.

always true to this principle. Thus, for example, after giving various interpretations of 1 Tim. 2, 4, he finally writes: "We may interpret it in any other way we please, so long as we are not compelled to believe that the omnipotent God has willed anything to be done which was not done."²⁸⁾

The supreme authority which Augustine thus accords to the Scriptures is due to their apostolicity. "The truth of the divine Scriptures has been received into the canonical summit of authority for this reason, that they are commended for the building up of our faith, not by anybody you please, but by the apostles themselves."²⁹⁾ "What Scripture can ever possess weight of authority if the gospels, if the apostolic Scriptures, do not possess it? Of what book can it ever be certain whose it is if it be uncertain whether those Scriptures are the apostles' which are declared and held to be the writings of the apostles by the Church propagated from those very apostles and manifested with so great conspicuousness through all nations?"³⁰⁾ The chief witness of the apostolicity of the Scriptures is therefore the Church. Hence Augustine says: "I indeed would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Catholic Church moved me."³¹⁾

When Augustine closed his eyes in death (430 A. D.), the barbarian and pagan Germans were invading the Roman Empire and gradually destroyed not only the imperial power of Rome, but also the ancient Roman civilization. When their work of destruction was completed, dark night settled over Western Europe. The great mass of the laity, including the nobility, could neither read nor write; for learning was confined to the clergy and to the monks, who, though they did not produce anything new of themselves, deserve the everlasting gratitude of posterity for having preserved the inheritance of the past.

It was during the pontificate of Gregory the Great († 604) that Rome began to send the monks, her missionaries, far and wide to what is now known as England, France, and Germany, so that by the end of the eighth century most of Western Europe (all but Scandinavia) had become nominally Christian. Gregory, though he commended the study of the liberal arts as useful and necessary for the proper understanding of the Scriptures, delighted in the miraculous and made the fear of hell and not the love of God the dominant element of his theology. Imbued with this Gregorian theology, the monks threatened their hearers with the punishment of hell and purgatory and told them that salvation was to be found only within the Catholic Church; for only those who had been baptized and whose guilt had been removed through the instrumentality of the

28) *Ench.*, 103.

29) *Ep.* 82, II, 7.

30) *Contra Faust. Man.*, XXXIII, 6.

31) *Contra Ep. Man. Fund.*, V, 7.

Church, could ever hope to attain salvation. The newly converted heathens did not ask for reasons. They simply accepted the Christian faith on the authority of the Church, which was backed by the many astounding "miracles" of that day.

The typical works of the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries are the *commentaries* on the Scriptures, consisting mainly of excerpts from the Church Fathers, especially from Augustine and Gregory. From the seventh century we have the three books of *Sentences* by Isidore of Seville († 636), a compendium of theology drawn mainly from the writings of Augustine and Gregory. These books remained the text-book of theology for five centuries until the time of Peter Lombard. *Commentaries* worthy of mention are those by the Venerable Bede († 804), Alcuin († 804), Rabanus Maurus († 856), and Walafrid Strabo († 849). The method employed in these commentaries is vividly described by Alcuin in a prefatory epistle to his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. "Devoutly searching the pantries of the Holy Fathers, I let you taste whatever I have been able to find in them. Nor did I deem it fitting to cull the blossoms from any meadows of my own, but with a humble heart and head bowed low to search through the flowering fields of many Fathers and thus safely satisfy your pious pleasure. First of all I seek the suffrage of St. Augustine, who labored with such zeal upon this gospel; then I draw something from the tracts of the most holy Doctor St. Ambrose; nor have I neglected the homilies of Father Gregory, the Pope, or those of the blessed Bede, nor in fact, the works of others of the holy Fathers. I have cited their interpretations as I found them, preferring to use their meanings and their words to trusting to my own presumption."

Augustine had recognized dialectics as a proper tool of theology. This tool was not altogether lost, for some of the logical writings of Aristotle were translated and commented on by Boethius († 525), and these works of Boethius remained the text-book of the logical discipline until the twelfth century.

Dialectics seems to have flourished under the Venerable Bede and in the Palace School of Charlemagne under Alcuin, and from there it was introduced into the various cloister and cathedral schools then in existence. From a friend of Alcuin we have a treatise discussing first by "reason" and then by "authority" the question "whether or not nothing is something positive." The greatest dialectician of his age was Scotus Erigena († 877). In his view true philosophy was identical with true religion, both having the same divine source. In case of collision between authority and reason he would give preference to reason; for "authority proceeds from true reason, but true reason never from authority. For all authority which is not approved by reason seems weak; but true reason, since

it is established in its own strength and is immutable need be strengthened by no authority." 32) Rabanus Maurus, the bitter persecutor of Gottschalk, says: "The philosophers, especially the Platonists, if perchance they have spoken truths accordant with our faith, are not to be shunned, but their truths should be appropriated as from unjust possessors." 33) Rabanus speaks of dialectics as the *disciplina disciplinarum* and says: "It teaches how to teach and how to learn. . . . The clergy ought to know this noble art and have its laws in common meditation, so that subtly they may discern the wiles of heretics and confute their poisoned saying with the conclusions of syllogism." 34) But as yet few dared to apply the principles and art of dialectics to theology. This was first done in the controversy on the Lord's Supper by Berengar († 1088), who, though he mainly relied on, and appealed to, the Church Fathers also argued from reason. His chief opponent, Lanfranc († 1049), declared in his book against Berengar: "Where it concerns a mystery of faith, rather hear holy authority than dialectic reason." 35) But because dialectic theology soon became popular, he was also compelled to use this "tool" in defense of the doctrine of the Church, and thus he prepared the way for Scholasticism.

Dialectic theology brought with it a period of rationalism; for the "dialectic professors" ridiculed the simple Christian faith and claimed that only that could be believed which could be proved by reason. The first apologete to meet these "dialectic professors" solely on the ground of reason was Anselm of Canterbury († 1109), pupil of Lanfranc and rightly called the father of Scholasticism. Anselm is best known as the author of *Cur Deus Homo?*, which was written in order "by argument alone to satisfy not only Jews, but pagans also." 36)

According to Anselm the Christian faith is something fixed and certain. To seek by reason to sustain and strengthen the Christian faith is like trying to prop up Mount Olympus with pegs and ropes. "No Christian dare question whether it be true what the universal Church believes with the heart and confesses with the mouth, and he must unquestioningly hold fast to that faith. But loving it and living accordingly, let him in all humility seek to fathom its depths. If he can understand it, let him thank God; if not, . . . let him bow his head and worship." 37) A Christian should seek to fathom the depths of the Christian faith and thus advance from faith to knowledge. "As the right order demands that we first receive into ourselves, believing, the mysteries of Christianity before subjecting them to speculative examination, so it seems to me the part of negligence if

32) *De Div. Nat.*, I, 71.33) *De Cler. Inst.*, III, 26.34) *Op. cit.*, III, 20.35) Quoted in Hasse, *Anselm von Canterbury*, Vol. II, p. 28.36) *Cur Deus Homo?* II, 22.37) *De Fide Trin.*, 2.

after having become confirmed in the faith, we do not endeavor to understand what we have believed."³⁸⁾

Anselm was not satisfied with merely searching the "pantries" of the Church Fathers, but would "try (although what should be enough has been said by the holy Fathers on the subject) to show forth to those who are seeking that which God may deign to disclose to me."³⁹⁾ Anselm desired to experience the happiness and joy of knowing and understanding what he believed. "Come now, manikin, flee thy occupations for a little and hide from the confusion of thy cares. . . . Now, O Lord, my God, teach my heart where and how to seek Thee, where and how to find Thee. . . . I make no attempt, Lord, to penetrate Thy depths, for my intellect has no such reach; but I desire to understand some measure of Thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. I do not seek to know in order that I may believe; but I believe that I may know. For I believe this also, that, unless I shall have believed, I shall not understand."⁴⁰⁾ The same thought is expressed through *Boso*. "But I do ask this . . . not with the purpose of confirming me in the faith, but that you may gladden me by the logical proof of its truth to my intellect."⁴¹⁾

But Anselm would not only experience the joy of understanding but also desired to give reason for his faith. "They inquire, not that they may through reason be led to faith, but that they may be edified by the insight of those who do believe, and that they may, as far as they can, be always ready to give an effectual answer to any one who asks for a reason of the faith that is in us."⁴²⁾ The same thought is expressed through *Boso*. "It is fair that, whilst we are seeking to investigate the ground of our faith, we should bring forward the objections of those who will on no account give their adhesion to that same faith without some reason for it. For although that same reason is sought by them because they do not, but by us because we do believe; yet what we all seek is one and the same thing; and should you say anything in your answers which sacred authority should seem to contradict, may I be allowed to bring it forward, so that you may explain that this opposition does not exist?"⁴³⁾

Anselm would employ reason for a twofold purpose: a) to fathom the depths of faith and thus advance from faith to knowledge, b) to give reason for his faith and thereby refute or convince the unbeliever. Reason is not to be employed to confirm the faith; for faith is founded on the authority of the Church. This tendency, which seeks to fathom and penetrate the Christian faith by reason and which seeks to prove that this Christian faith is reasonable, is the peculiar trait of Scholasticism and betrays its speculative and rationalistic

38) *Ep. II*, 71.

39) *Op. cit.*, I, 1.

40) *Prosligion*, I.

41) *Cur Deus Homo?* II, 15.

42) *Op. cit.*, I, 1.

43) *Op. cit.*, I, 2.

character. Both these tendencies are still combined in Anselm; but later they branched out into two different schools. In all this, however, reason is still the handmaiden of faith. When a conflict between faith and reason arises, the latter must give way. "For of this I am sure, that, if I say anything which Holy Scripture undoubtedly contradicts, it is false; nor will I hold to it when I am once aware thereof." 44)

Harris 45) has well summed up these thoughts when he writes: "Faith is thus everywhere presupposed, and theology lays down the norms and limits of philosophical speculation. But within its restricted sphere, reason exercises an important threefold function, its business being to attain a rational understanding of the truths of the faith, to coordinate the various provinces of particular dogmas, and to solve the problems raised by the difficulties of the revelation and to defend it against the objections of those outside the Christian fold. This conception of Anselm is noteworthy because it forms a well-marked state in the development of the two branches of speculation. Philosophy is still inextricably bound up with theology, but reason has begun to assert its independent claims. Not only had it sought to establish a proof of a strictly philosophical nature for the existence of God in the celebrated ontological argument, but also to explore once more the hidden mysteries of the faith, the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so forth."

The theology from the days of Anselm to the Reformation is, as a rule, designated as Scholasticism. Scholasticism consists briefly in dialectically working over the doctrines received from the Church Fathers. We may distinguish four different stages of intellectual history during the Middle Ages. First there is a digesting of the food taken from the "pantries" of the Church Fathers. This period is represented by the *Scriptural commentaries*. Then followed a more logical and methodical appropriation of their theology as we find it in the *Books of Sentences*. Following this we have the golden age of Scholasticism, which not only reexpressed the inherited doctrines, but added thereto with the help of Aristotle's dialectics, as exhibited by the *Summa Theologiae*. Finally there is a period of decline, in which all manner of useless questions were dialectically treated and which resulted in a reaction, placing authority above reason. In this period we have the *commentaries* on the *Sentences*.

The man who closely followed in the footsteps of Anselm in applying the art of dialectics to theology was the "great lover," Peter Abelard († 1142). Abelard opposed the "pseudodialecticians" of his day, who claimed that "not because God said anything is it believed, but because it has been proved to be so is it accepted." 46) But his

44) *Op. cit.*, I, 18.

45) Harris, *Duns Scotus*, Vol. I, 45.

46) *Introd. ad Theol.*, II, 3.

own rationalistic tendency is exposed in the words: "Now, it so happened that I applied myself first to lecturing on the fundamentals of our faith by the analogy of human reason and composed a certain tract of theology, of Unity and the Holy Trinity; for our scholars were asking for human and philosophical reason and demanded rather what could be understood than what could be stated, saying indeed that the utterances of words were superfluous which the intelligence did not follow, nor could anything be believed unless it had first been understood, and that it was ridiculous for any one to preach to others what neither he himself nor they whom he taught could comprehend with their intellect." 47) Aptly has Taylor remarked: "Here one has the plain reversal. We must first understand in order to believe. Doubtless the demands of Abelard's students to have the principles of the Christian faith explained that they might be understood and accepted rationally echoed the master's imperative intellectual need." 48)

Abelard is best known as the author of *Sic et Non*, in which he placed the contradictory assertions of the Church Fathers side by side. He declared that these contradictions might only be apparent or due to the evil designs of forgers or to the inaccuracy of the copyists. Only that which is contained in the Scriptures is without exception free from error; but the writings of the Church Fathers are to be read "not with the necessity of believing, but with the liberty of judging." The key to knowledge is inquiry. "Wherefore we decided to collect the diverse statements of the holy Fathers as they might occur to our memory, thus raising an issue from their apparent repugnancy, which might incite the young lecturers to search out the truth of the matter and render them sharper for the investigation; for the first key to wisdom is called interrogation, diligent and unceasing. . . . By doubting we are led to inquiry, and from inquiry we perceive the truth." 49)

The great opponent of Abelard was Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153). Bernard, though himself inclined to mysticism, was thoroughly opposed to all human speculation. "This is my philosophy, and it is the loftiest in the world: to know Jesus, and Him crucified." 50) He wrote to Pope Innocent III: "We have in France an old teacher turned into a new theologian, who in his early days amused himself with dialectics and now gives utterance to wild imaginations upon Holy Scripture. . . . I know not what there is in heaven above and in the earth beneath which he deigns to confess ignorance of; he raises his eyes to heaven and searches the deep things of God and then, returning to us, brings back unspeakable

47) *Hist. Cal.*, 9.

48) Taylor, *Medieval Mind* (3d Amer. ed.), Vol. I, 45.

49) *Prot.*, *Sic et Non*.

50) *In Cant. Serm.*, XLIII, 4.

words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter, while he presumptuously prepares to give reason for everything, even of those things which are above reason; he presumes against reason and against faith. For what is more against faith than to be unwilling to believe what reason cannot attain?"⁵¹)

Abelard's method was employed by his pupil, the *Magister Sententiarum*, Peter Lombard († 1164), whose *Quatuor Libri Sententiarum* became the text-book of dogmatic study during the following ages. In this book we find a great number of citations from the Church Fathers. Questions are raised, authorities are cited for and against, and a conclusion is reached by a dialectic treatment. In the Catholic Church the authority of the Lombard is second only to that of the great Thomas Aquinas.

Up until the close of the twelfth century the Western world was acquainted with Aristotle only through the translation of Boethius. However, towards the first quarter of the thirteenth century nearly all the commentaries on all the works of Aristotle by the Arabian philosophers had been translated into Latin, and thus the whole of Aristotelian philosophy became better known to the Scholastics. A short time later Aristotle was translated directly from the Greek text.

The translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *Psychology*, and *Ethics* led to a renewed interest in the study of philosophy. At first Aristotle's books on natural philosophy were forbidden by the ecclesiastical authorities. In 1209 a provincial council held in Paris declared "neither the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy nor commentaries on the same should be read at Paris either publicly or secretly." But in 1255 the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris officially placed all the works of Aristotle on the list of subjects to be studied, and in a short time Aristotle was universally regarded as the *praecursor Christi in naturalibus*.

The zenith of Scholasticism was reached in Alexander of Hales, his pupil Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, and his pupil and later fellow-professor, the "Prince of Scholastics," Thomas Aquinas. The last two were Dominicans, the former a Franciscan. The order of the Franciscans (after Francis of Assisi, † 1245) and the order of Dominicans (after Dominic, † 1215) were founded in 1209 and 1215, respectively. Neither of the two orders was founded in order to promote learning, but both produced eminent scholars.

The founder of high-Scholasticism was Alexander of Hales († 1245), the author of the unfinished *Summa Universae Theologiae*, which Roger Bacon ridiculed as "being more than the weight of one horse." Alexander was the first to use the entire philosophy of Aristotle, and not only did he produce a commentary on the *Sen-*

51) *Tract. de Err. Abael.*, I, 1; cf. *Sermon on Cant.*, 30, 1. 2.

iences of Peter Lombard, but he added problem upon problem. The separate doctrines were subdivided more and more on the basis of Aristotelian dialectics.

According to Alexander the object of theological inquiry is the inherited faith of the Church as laid down in the Scriptures and in the symbols of the Church. Alexander distinguished between a *fides acquisita*, or *informata*, and a *fides formata*, the former being acquired by being convinced through authority or reason, the latter being infused through illumination by the grace of God, unaided by outward authority or reason. Man accepts the doctrine as true because of authority or reason (*fides acquisita*) and is thereby disposed for the inner certainty (*fides formata*), which compels the will to assent.

The same view was held by Bonaventura († 1274). Faith is the starting-point. But the mysteries of faith become perfectly intelligible only through the light of supernatural grace, which enables the mind to comprehend rationally what it believes. He writes in his *Prologus to the Breviloquium*: "The source lies not in human investigation, but in divine revelation, which flows from the Father of Lights, . . . from whom through His Son Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit flows in us; and through the Holy Spirit, bestowing, as He wills, gifts on each, faith is given, and through faith Christ dwells in our hearts. This is the knowledge of Jesus Christ, from which, as from a source, comes the certitude and understanding of the whole Scriptures. Wherefore it is impossible that any one should advance in their knowledge unless he first has Christ infused in him." To the mind thus illuminated by the gift of faith it can be demonstrated that certain mysteries of revelation are necessary. Thus, for example, it can be shown that the number of persons in the Trinity must of necessity be three, "neither more nor less."⁵²

In Alexander and in Bonaventura we have the old Augustinian illumination theory, only worked out according to the Aristotelian categories. It remained the cognition theory of the Franciscans until Duns Scotus. In this view, reason is still regarded as the hand-maiden of faith and employed to make the mysteries of faith intelligible. However, in opposition to this speculative and idealistic Augustinian-Franciscan school there arose an intellectualistic and rationalistic Aristotelian-Dominican school in which faith and reason gradually separated.

Albertus Magnus († 1280) had with tireless energy and massive learning reproduced the whole Aristotelian philosophy and had removed to a great extent the Platonism and Neo-Platonism which it acquired in its transmission through the Arabian commentators. On this foundation Thomas Aquinas († 1274) built up a system which was the most perfect accommodation possible between ecclesiastical

⁵²) Sent. I, dist. II, art. I, q. 3.

orthodoxy and Aristotelian philosophy. Aquinas sought to reexpress the inherited faith of the Church in such a manner as to attain a purely intellectualistic and rationalistic knowledge of that faith.

The speculative trend attached to the former cognition theories completely disappeared in Thomas Aquinas. According to Augustine man finds in himself that truth which is a reflection of the eternal truth. As the light of the sun causes our eyes to be able to see certain things, so God causes intellectual verities to become known to our intelligence. This theory was rejected by Aquinas. He writes: "Wherefore some held that this intellect (the higher intellect, God), substantially separate, is the active intellect which, by lighting up the phantasms, as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. . . . Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from the particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now, no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein. . . . Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul." 53) According to Aquinas the human soul itself has the innate power to abstract from the sense perceptions particular forms, which the active intellect transforms into intelligible species. "We must assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible by the abstraction of the species from material conditions." 54)

Following in the footsteps of Albertus Magnus, Aquinas distinguished between philosophy and theology, between "philosophical science" and "sacred doctrine." Of the two, theology is supreme, and it has the duty to judge all other sciences. "It has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatever in other sciences is found contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false." 55)

By reason man is able to learn some things about God, but the Trinity and some other Christian doctrines cannot be demonstrated by reason. "Certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance, that God is three and one, while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance, that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason. . . . Accordingly some

53) *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 4.

55) *Op. cit.*, I, q. 1, a. 5.

54) *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 3.

divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason." 56) But those divine truths which may be attained by human reason can be attained only after a most laborious study"; hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God; for the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time. . . . Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith, so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error." 57) Divine revelation is therefore necessary "in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and surely." 58)

The highest authority is Scripture. Arguments based "on reason are the weakest." But theology also makes "use of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason. . . . Sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments, but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may be properly used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors." 59)

The duty of theology is not to prove the articles of faith by reason. "This doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith. . . . If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only by answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against the faith cannot be demonstrated, but are difficulties that can be answered." 60)

Revelation is not contrary to reason. Even though the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, "nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled into human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. . . . The knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God Himself is the Author of our nature. Therefore the divine Wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently whatever is contrary to these principles is contrary to the divine Wisdom, wherefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be

56) *Summa contra Gent.*, I, c. 3.59) *Op. cit.*, I, q. 1, a. 8.57) *Op. cit.*, I, c. 4.60) *Op. cit.*, I, q. 1, a. 8.58) *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 1.

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contrary to our natural knowledge." 61) And this is the aim and object of the *Summa Theologiae*, namely, to prove "that those things which are represented in the faith are not impossible." 62) Aquinas, though he distinguished between theology and philosophy, would by the intricate method of dialectics show that the doctrine of the Church is reasonable, and thereby he again brought faith and reason under the same roof.

The great opponent of Thomas Aquinas was the Franciscan Duns Scotus († 1306), and after his time the theologians were divided into Thomists and Scotists. In Duns Scotus dialectics reached the point of highest development. "No man ever drove either constructive logic or the subtleties of critical distinctions closer to the limit of human comprehension or human patience than Duns Scotus. And here lies the trouble with him. The endless ramifications and refinements of his dialectics, his devious processes of conclusion, make his work a *reductio ad absurdum* of scholastic ways of reasoning. Logically, critically, the argumentation is inerrant. It never wanders aimlessly, but, winding and circling, at last reaches a conclusion from some point unforeseen. Would you run a course with this master of syllogism? If you enter his lists, you are lost. The right way to attack him is to stand without and laugh. That is what was done afterwards, when whoever cared for such reasonings was called a dunce, after the name of the most subtle of medieval metaphysicians." 63)

Even as Aquinas, so Duns Scotus rejected the older Augustinian illumination theory. "Scotus merely expresses more clearly what Thomas had conveyed in terms of Augustinian terminology. . . . The active intellect itself is the guarantor of our certitude." 64) Duns Scotus also distinguished between theology and philosophy. Theology is based on divine revelation, which is the only certain and binding authority. Arguments based on philosophical reasoning and on the statements of the doctors of the Church are only "probable." Reason is to prove that the articles of faith are not impossible.

Those truths which are necessary for our salvation are found in Scripture. "The sacred Scriptures sufficiently contain the doctrine necessary to the pilgrim." 65) Nevertheless the authority of the Roman Church is supreme. "Nothing is to be held as of the substance of the faith except that which can be expressly derived from Scripture or which is expressly declared by Scripture or plainly determined by the Church." 66) Duns Scotus severely criticized not only the contemporary theologians, but even Augustine and Aristotle.

61) *Summa contra Gent.*, I, c. 7.65) *Sent., Pröl.*, q. 2. 14.62) *Summa Theol.*, II, II, q. 1, a. 5.66) *Sent.*, IV, d. 6, q. 9. 14.63) Taylor, *Medieval Mind* (3d Amer. ed.), Vol. II, p. 544.64) Harris, *Duns Scotus*, Vol. I, p. 198.

He would bow only before the authority of the Church. To cite but one example. Since the days of the Lombard it had been held that through Baptism a sacramental character is imprinted on the recipient. Duns severely criticized the very idea of a sacramental character; for neither reason nor authority demand it and only a passage from Pope Innocent III can be cited in its favor. And yet the teaching of the Church must be upheld. "One must believe regarding the Sacraments of the Church as the Romish Church believes. But the Romish Church seems to believe that in Baptism a character is impressed upon the soul." He then cites the passage from Innocent and continues: "Therefore, because of the sole authority of the Church, as much as is concerned for the present, we must hold that a character is impressed."⁶⁵ We have here that churchly positivism so prevalent in later Scholasticism.

Aquinas had held that the Trinity could not be demonstrated by reason. To this Duns Scotus added that it was also true of divine omnipotence and the immortality of the soul. Thereby he separated faith and reason more and more, and this finally gave the death-blow to Scholasticism.

In 1346 Pope Clement VI wrote reprovingly to the University of Paris: "Most theologians do not trouble themselves about the text of Holy Scripture, about the actual words of their principal witnesses, about the expositions of the saints and doctors, *i. e.*, concerning the sources from which real theology is taken, a fact which is bitterly to be deplored. . . . In place of this they entangle themselves in philosophical questions and in disputes, which merely pander to their cleverness in doubtful interpretations, dangerous doctrines, and the rest."⁶⁷ Truly a sad state of affairs!

In Duns Scotus reason and faith, philosophy and theology, threatened to part company. The breach was made final by the so-called Nominalists. Following in the footsteps of Scotus in criticizing unsparingly all traditional belief, we find the Franciscan William of Ockham (†1347) and the last of the Scholastics, Gabriel Biel (†1495). According to Ockham cognition is only through "intuitive knowledge"; *i. e.*, by experience man learns whether a thing is so or not. Ockham therefore held that no theological doctrine could be demonstrated by reason and that all must be relegated to the sphere of faith. Thereby the breach made by Duns Scotus in the old scholastic unity of theology and philosophy was made irreparable. The province of both lies in a different sphere. Sorley says that at the time of Ockham "the separation between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, was made complete. Ockham admitted that there are probably arguments for the existence of God, but maintained the

⁶⁷) Quoted in Grisar, *Martin Luther* (Lamond transl.), Vol. I, p. 134.

final thesis that whatever transcends experience belongs to faith. In this way he broke with Scotism as well as with Thomism on a fundamental question." 68)

However, Ockham was not willing to surrender the traditional doctrine, even though it was based on faith and not on reason. "This is also my faith, since this is the Catholic faith. For whatever the Roman Church explicitly believes, this alone and nothing else, either explicitly or implicitly, I believe." 69) Catholic are only those doctrines which are based on Scripture. "Therefore the Christian is not by the necessity of salvation to believe, nor is he to believe what is neither contained in the Bible nor can be inferred by necessary and manifest consequence alone from things contained in the Bible." 70) But though Ockham and his followers theoretically upheld *sola Scriptura*, they did not carry out this principle in practise. Ockham would not accept the traditional doctrine of original sin "if there were not the authority of the saints." 71) Again he writes: "Although it is expressly set forth in the canonical Scriptures that the body of Christ is to be offered to the faithful under the species of bread, yet that the substance of the bread is really converted or transubstantiated into the body of Christ is not found expressed in the canon of the Bible; but this doctrine is believed to have been divinely revealed to the holy Fathers or to have been proved from passages of the Bible by a diligent and skilful examination; and therefore I shall cite passages of the holy Fathers to prove this truth." 72) In a controversy the word of the Roman Pontiff is supreme. "It is therefore obvious that, when there may be a controversy among theologians as to whether it may agree or disagree with the Christian faith, it must be referred to the Supreme Pontiff." 73) Ockham's sword was sharp and keen in the conflict with his opponents, but it was blunted as soon as it met the authority of the Church. "Although I shall say nothing assertatively except that which the Roman Church teaches, I am prepared in all things to hold in check my inclination by virtue of the authority of the same Church and also to believe with the heart and to confess with the lips the universal truths which the Roman Church expounds or will expound." 74) "I am unwilling by virtue of the dictum of any one of the plebs to hold in check my intellect and to affirm something contrary to a dictate of reason, unless the Roman Church may teach this view must be held; for the authority of the Roman Church is greater than the whole capacity of human genus." 75)

It is indeed surprising that these men who applied reason so

68) Quoted in Birch's ed. of Ockham, *De Sacra. Alt.*, p. XXVI.

69) *Op. cit.*, c. 1.

70) *Dial.*, p. 411.

71) *Sent.*, II, d. 26, U.

72) *De Sacra. Alt.*, c. III.

73) *Op. cit.*, c. XXXVI.

74) *Op. cit.*, c. 16.

75) *Op. cit.*, c. 36.

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sharply against the traditional doctrine of the Church were yet at all times willing to submit themselves to the authority of the Church. How had the mighty fallen! Scholasticism, which sought to prove that Christianity was reasonable, ended with the dictum, "I believe as the Church believes."⁷⁶ Then came Luther to lead men back from scholastic speculation and rationalism, back from the authority of the Church, to faith founded solely on the revelation of God.

Morrison, III.

THEO. DIERKS.

Dispositionen über die erste von der Synodalkonferenz
angenommene Evangelienreihe.

Einundzwanzigster Sonntag nach Trinitatis.

Mark. 10, 46—52.

Jesus befand sich auf seiner letzten Reise nach Jerusalem, Mark. 10, 32; 11, 1. Bei seinem Durchzug durch Jericho fanden die Blindenheilungen statt. Die Berichte der drei Evangelisten bringen nicht alle dieselben Einzelheiten; jedoch haben wir es nicht mit einem Widerspruch zu tun. (Stöckhardt, Bibl. Gesch. d. N. T., S. 280.) Markus berichtet über die Heilung des blinden Bartimäus. Eine wichtige Rolle bei dieser Heilung spielte das Wort:

„Sei getrost, stehe auf! Er rufet dir.“

1. Dieses Wort erweckte Hoffnung.
2. Dieses Wort führte zur Heilung.
3. Dieses Wort erweckte Nachfolge Jesu.

1.

Der blinde Bartimäus saß in seinem Elend am Wege und bettelte. Er hatte bemerkt, daß viel Volks vorüberging, Luk. 18, 36, und sich wohl erkundigt, was das zu bedeuten habe. Er meinte wohl, daß eine solch große Menge ihn mit manch einer freundlichen Gabe bedenken würde. Die Auskunft, daß Jesus vorübergehe, erweckte in ihm solche Hoffnung, daß er laut schrie: „Jesus, du Sohn Davids, erbarm dich mein!“ Jetzt war der große Augenblick seines Lebens gekommen. Bis-her war sein Elend derart gewesen, daß weder er selbst noch andere ihn davon befreien konnten. Niemand konnte ihn von der Blindheit heilen. Er durfte auch keinen Anspruch auf Heilung machen. Er hatte so etwas nicht verdient. Selbst jetzt mußte Hilfe aus Erbarmen kommen, B. 47.

Genau so steht es mit allen Menschen von Natur. Sie liegen in geistlicher Blindheit, 1 Kor. 2, 14. Sie können Jesum nicht als ihren Heiland „sehen“, ja überhaupt nichts vom Geist Gottes vernehmen. Weder der Mensch selbst noch andere Menschen vermögen ihn von dieser

76) Biel, *Expos. Can. Miss. Lect.*, 12 B.