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THE INFLUENCE OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER
ON THE "NEW HERMENEUTIC":
HEINRICH OTT'S USE OF HEIDEGGER.

A Research Paper Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
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by

James Marquardt

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years theology has experienced a renewal in the area of hermeneutics. This renaissance includes more than a stimulating interest in the principles of interpretation, a periodic revival similar to those that have come and gone in other theological fields. Hermeneutics has broken the boundaries in which it has been confined since the age of orthodoxy and assumed totally new proportions, even to the extent of becoming the focal point of theology for some theologians. To trace some of the philosophical influences behind and in this movement is the proposed task of this paper.

The disciplines of philosophy and theology have often, if not always, influenced one another. For whenever philosophy dealt with "ultimates", it was certain to enter the territory of theological thinking. And whenever theology sought to be a logos about God, it automatically dwelt in the domain of philosophy. Sometimes the two have had closer relations, for example, when philosophy offered and theology accepted the prestige of a solid, rationally grounded, stable system. One only need mention the Platonic orientation of Plotinus, St. Thomas' adaption of Aristotle or the rationalistic coloring of eighteenth century theology. Contemporary theology has likewise discovered a stimulating basis for its

germinal thinking in the fertile field of existentialism. In particular, the structure and terminology of Martin Heidegger's thought has been almost too readily adaptable to Biblical themes. His monumental work, Sein und Zeit (1927), with its ontological description of man (Dasein), has been explicitly accepted by Rudolf Bultmann as the most accurate characterization of man that philosophy has to offer. If the expressions of Sein und Zeit (Thrownness, Care, Dread, Destiny) are conducive to theology, even more so are the almost mystic-like Heideggerian images that have appeared since 1935.¹ These writings have become increasingly concerned with the function of language as a transmitter of Being to man.

Theologians have been quick to utilize Heidegger's insights in their new hermeneutical quest. Heinrich Ott in particular has proclaimed an affinity with the "later" Heidegger as he attempts a refounding of theology along the lines of hermeneutics. Other theologians, for example, Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, have likewise shown a favorable disposition toward Heidegger's thinking. However, their indebtedness is not as vocal as Ott's. For this reason, I propose to explicate Ott's approach and thereby indirectly show the influence Heidegger has had on the new hermeneutic as a whole. First, it must be noted that Ott's work is still in its initiatory stage. Having recently assumed the chair of his former professor Karl Barth at the age of 33, he has published only two major works: Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heidegger und der Weg der Theologie and Dogmatik und

Verkündigung (translated Theology and Preaching). These, plus Ott's few recent publications, with heaviest emphasis on Denken und Sein, comprise the source data for one major portion of the paper. The other block of material extensively covered is that group of Heidegger's later writings dealing specifically with his view of language and communication. All other materials quoted either helped form the introductory chapter or expressed salient criticisms and/or conclusions.

As stated, the paper's main task is one of explication, first Heidegger (chapter three) and then Ott (chapter four). These two chapters form the nucleus of the work. Chapter two offers a brief background survey and definition of the "new hermeneutic". Chapter five summarizes and draws the conclusion that the development of this "new hermeneutic" especially viewed through the thought of Heinrich Ott is toward an ontological hermeneutic dependent on and influenced by the thinking of the "later" Heidegger.

Before we proceed, a brief remark about Heidegger's terminology needs to be made. Any English rendering of Heidegger's thought--translation or commentary--confronts this problem. John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson, translators of Sein und Zeit put it this way.

As long as an author is using words in their ordinary ways, the translator should not have much trouble in showing what he is trying to say. But Heidegger is constantly using words in ways which are by no means ordinary, and a great part of his merit lies in the freshness and penetration which his very innovations reflect. He tends to discard much of the traditional

philosophical terminology, substituting an elaborate vocabulary of his own. He occasionally coins new expressions from older roots, and he takes full advantage of the ease with which the German language lends itself to the formation of new compounds.²

Examples of the above mentioned difficulty include such terms as existential/ existentiell, Dasein, Historie/ Geschichte, Geschick, Sein/ Seienden, Geworfenheit, Being-in-the-world and Gevierte to name but a few. To facilitate the reader's understanding, these terms will be further explained in footnotes whenever their appearance in the paper is not self explanatory.

CHAPTER II

THE "NEW HERMENEUTIC"

The "new hermeneutic"--a phrase constructed by James Robinson--has become one of the recent additions to the theologian's vocabulary. Robinson and John Cobb, colleagues and co-editors, have with the publication of the second volume of their series New Frontiers In Theology supplied the definition of this new term. Entitling their work The New Hermeneutic,¹ the editors have gathered the essays presented at the first Consultation on Hermeneutic assembled at Drew University in the spring of 1962. The book, like the Consultation, is to be an exploratory attempt at inter-continental dialogue, for the main essayists are two German theologians: Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs. Robinson has taken the emphases of these two men, along with those of Hans-Georg Gadamer,² to be the principal claims of the new hermeneutic. Robinson's procedure has been challenged by Carl Braaten in his recent article "How New Is The New Hermeneutic?"³ The question is well put, for the Fuchs-Ebeling-Gadamer (and whoever else this may include) hermeneutic acknowledges a definite historical ancestry. Familiarity with these origins is an indispensable prerequisite for understanding what is meant by the "new hermeneutic".

In its broadest definition, hermeneutic is a process of clarifying the unclear. Its etymological source is the Greek

word hermeneia, which in turn took shape and content from the Greek deity Hermes--herald of the gods. As herald, Hermes conveyed messages among the gods as well as translated divine thoughts and secrets to men. Correspondingly, the scope of hermeneia included the functions of "speech", "translation" and even "commentary". For our purposes though, the brief historical survey might begin with Luther, who, as Ebeling contends, retained the breadth and comprehensiveness of the Greek hermeneia through his Reformation byword "sola scriptura".⁴ In the years following, in the wake of the rise of Orthodoxy, "biblical theology" with its watchword "verbal inspiration" abandoned its viable hermeneutical heritage. Instead "biblical theology" equated scripture with the Word of God engendering both the split between sacred and profane hermeneutics and the separation between exegesis and hermeneutics. Form criticism, with its inclination toward scientific methodology, even further limited the scope of hermeneutics. Relegated to the role of a technical tool in the service of exegesis, hermeneutics was now restricted to a three-fold task: dealing with the text established by textual criticism, delving into the historical background of scriptures and treating pericopes as literary forms.⁵ Hermeneutics was sterile.

This lethargic confinement was shattered when Karl Barth published his Commentary on Romans (1918). Barth's thinking was not radically new; its legacy extended all the way back to Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) rejected the conception of her-

menetics commonly accepted in his day, i.e., "an aggregate of individual observations of a general and special nature".⁶ Instead of concentrating on "explanation" he focused on the problem of understanding or on the conditions of the possibility of understanding. Is it possible for understanding to bridge the gap between past and present? Schleiermacher contended that comprehension of a literary work produced in the past includes more than a treatment of external form (text, historical setting and literary analysis). Interpretation is the imaginative reproduction of the creative act by which the work was originally produced. Man can bridge this gap, can establish a rapport with past generations because human nature in general with its social life allows for a common, universal speech and understanding.

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)⁷ endorsed the central position to which Schleiermacher had elevated understanding and sought to objectify it in language. Language is the objective expression of man's inner workings. Language, then, is the bridge spanning the historical gap between the text and the exegete. The exegete through language can cut to the heart of the author's message because he too has had experiences similar to the ones linguistically objectified by the author. Bultmann presents Dilthey's method as follows:

"All individual distinctions are ultimately conditioned not by qualitative differences of persons from each other, but only by differences of degree in what goes on in their souls. But while in this the exegete, as it were, experimentally transposes his own quality of living into an historical milieu, on the basis of this he is able momentarily to emphasize and intensify some

of the processes of his own soul, and to let the others recede into the background, and so to induce in himself an imitation of a life which is not native to him." The conditioning of understanding "lies in the fact that nothing can appear in an unfamiliar, individual form of expression which was not also contained in the quality of living that comprehends it". And that can be interpreted in this way: "Exegesis is a work of personal art, and its most consummate execution is conditioned by the mental make-up of the exegete; and so it rests on affinity, intensified by a thoroughgoing communion with the author--by constant study." ⁸

The endowment which Schleiermacher and Dilthey bequeathed to hermeneutics was the extension of its scope. No longer bound to exegetical servitude, to the theoretical principles governing interpretation of historical documents, hermeneutics now proceeded to lay the foundation of an epistemology in the "event of language". No wonder Barth's Romans caused such reaction. Written when the orthodox view of hermeneutics still prevailed, the Preface to the first edition contained this statement.

The critical historical method of Biblical research has its validity. It points to the preparations for understanding that is never superfluous. But if I had to choose between it and the old doctrine of inspiration, I would decidedly lay hold of the latter. It has the greater, deeper, more important validity, for it points to the actual work of understanding, without which all preparation is useless. I am happy not to have to choose between the two. But my whole attention was directed to looking through the historical to the spirit of the Bible, which is the eternal spirit. ⁹

We now turn to Rudolf Bultmann and the contributing part he played in hermeneutics' expanding movement. As did Schleiermacher and Dilthey before him, Bultmann looked for the thing (Sache) in the text which linked author and interpreter. He did not find it in an understanding common to human nature as had his predecessors. Rather, the point of

contact was the meaningful relation that both author and interpreter have to the subject (Sache). Bultmann merely replaced one presupposition with another. Instead of presupposing a common understanding, Bultmann openly avowed that one goes to the text seeking answers to the questions of his existence. To this end the writer writes, the interpreter interprets, and both writer and interpreter find the common thing that answers their particular questions. Presuppositions are not to be scorned, though; in fact, hermeneutics determines with the greatest degree of accuracy precisely with what presuppositions the author/interpreter approaches the text.¹⁰ The subject content (Sache) becomes so important for Bultmann (it is larger than either author or interpreter) that language is even incapable of adequately transmitting it. Certain forms of language, e.g., mythology, are more defective than others, but these flaws only particularize and intensify language's inherent incompetence.

At this point, the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic" turns aside from the negative treatment language received at the hands of Bultmann to the counteracting, positive positions of Fuchs and Ebeling. These two theologians reinstated language's priority, not by disregarding the subject matter (Sache), but by revealing the subject matter's dependence on language. The language (Sprache) referred to by Fuchs and Ebeling is language in its most original form--language as action or as event. This language is a happening or a showing or a letting be seen.¹¹ Fuchs calls it a language

event (Sprachereignis), Ebeling a word event (Wortgeschehen).¹² Though the radical feature of this motion is that the impetus originates outside of man, it does not leave man in any way passive. Language event carries a demand that man cor-'respond'. The reason, says Robinson, is this.

The subject matter of which language speaks is primarily being. It is man's very nature to hearken to the call of being. "Man is is actually this relation of cor-'respond'-ence, and only this." In this way language is located at the center of man's nature, rather than being regarded primarily as an objectification of an otherwise authentic self-understanding. For man's nature is defined as linguistic, in that his role is to re-speak, to re-pond, to an-swer the call of being.¹³

Language is located at the center of man's nature, and language's location is being (Being). The apparent discrepancy¹⁴ is resolved when language is also seen as the gift of Being. Once the gift is received, man responds. Only in response does language assume the conversational form of speech and word to which we are normally accustomed. Even this human speech is directly related to Being, for it directs the hearer back to the horizons in which he can again hear language's original utterance. Stated theologically, the description might be as follows.

It is at this point that the term hermeneutic attains the specific profile characteristic of the new hermeneutic, as "faith's doctrine of language". "Being emerges from language, when language directs us into the dimension of our existence determinative for our life. Is that the 'meaning' of the word of God? Then hermeneutic in theology would indeed be nothing else than the 'doctrine of the word of God' (Ebeling), faith's doctrine of language. The reverse is also true: The theological doctrine of the word of God would be the question as to being in the horizon of Biblical language."¹⁵

The movement from Being through language to man and back again

has its historic dimensions since the recipient is always man. This averts a possible criticism of the language event--its transcendent, timeless communion with Being. But what happens to the historically conditioned biblical texts with which hermeneutics has traditionally dealt? How does the language event affect the historic Jesus? Robinson answers:

Perhaps nowhere more clearly than here does one hear the sense in which the "saving event" is a "language event", since language, when it is true language, is God's saving word. And perhaps nowhere more clearly than here does one hear the central role of language in a new theology that has its foci in the historic Jesus and hermeneutic. For the "historic Jesus" is heard not as "objective factuality", but as "word of address"; and "hermeneutic" is heard not as "understanding in a speechless profundity," but as "translation into language that speaks today". Thus hermeneutic is the method suited to the historic Jesus, and the historic Jesus is the material point of departure for a recovery of valid hermeneutic.¹⁶

The historic is taken into account, but the main emphasis still resides in language--the originative language event. This emphasis of Fuchs and Ebeling, Robinson takes to be the unique factor in the new hermeneutic, and for this reason he has re-introduced the singular "hermeneutic". The "new hermeneutic" signals the surpassing of Orthodoxy's confinement and the reinstatement of the comprehensiveness included in the original Greek hermeneia. Fuchs and Ebeling have chosen the theory of understanding and originative language as their primary concerns, and these elements, as we shall see in the analyses of Heidegger and Ott, have led the new hermeneutic to embrace what Michalson and Gadamer call an ontological

hermeneutic.¹⁷ We now turn to Heidegger to begin our analysis.

CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE AND HERMENEUTIC IN THE "LATER" HEIDEGGER

No matter where one meets Heidegger, he will soon encounter the dominating theme with which Heidegger constantly grapples--the overcoming of metaphysics. This is the project envisioned in the introductory paragraph of Sein und Zeit. Metaphysics has deprived the question of Being of any content and left it meaningless and superfluous. Plato was the culprit who sidetracked the genuine quest of the pre-Socratics away from Being itself and instead centered the search in beings. From Plato onwards the tradition of Western metaphysics never found its way back to the authentic inquiry. The extensive Grecian view of physis including the study of first causes or principles, shrunk to a concern with material objects. This standpoint underwent further confinement in the development of technē. Material entities became objectified as manipulatable tools. Thought became focused in beings, their description and practical use. Even the transcendent was conceived of in terms of being, either the summation of all beings (analogia entis) or that which being was not (via negativa). This fruitless methodology was carried to its limits in Hegel's equation of the rational with the real. One necessary step remained--Nietzsche's declaration that "God is dead", that a meta-

physics restricted to the examination of beings has no further contribution to make.

To escape metaphysics' traditional pitfall and to initiate a new approach to the Question of Being (i.e., to revitalize the freshness of the original, pre-Socratic one), Heidegger proposed to erect an ontology via the method of phenomenology. Phenomenology is a method employing description and finds its meaning in interpretation (hermeneutic). Through a process of elimination, Heidegger chose Dasein (man) as the only possible being whose description is capable of revealing something about Being.¹ The repercussions of this choice are important because

the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a "hermeneutic" in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends.²

Heidegger sought to discover Dasein's Existentials--ontology's counterpart to metaphysics' categories. These Existentials--Thrownness, Care, Speech (Rede) and many others--continue to maintain their validity even though Heidegger later admitted that his attempt to found an ontology along the lines of Sein und Zeit was inadequate; it lapsed back into metaphysical thinking; it was merely a step on the way.³

Even before this overt comment was made such commentators as DeWaelhens, Jean Wahl and Karl Löwith claimed that Heidegger had abandoned his projected work of destroying metaphysics and instead embraced a kind of poetic mysticism.^{3½}

So as not to be sidetracked by this controversy, we simply cite Langan's comment that it is possible to speak of a shift in accent in Heidegger's thought.⁴ There have been several possible interpretations of this shift: the deviation toward mysticism mentioned above or the turn from Nichts zum Sein as seen by Heinrich Ott.⁵ No interpretation is conclusive. But it is not difficult to isolate one major trend--Heidegger's attentiveness to Being and his increasing preoccupation with language as the link between Being and Dasein. On this latter shift in thought we now concentrate our attention.

The most engaging question which Heidegger raises is the relation which man (Dasein) has to Being. If ontic, everyday affairs lie closest to man's immediate interests while his ontological structures farthest, and if man's obsession with the ontic (beings) has incapacitated the metaphysical or ontological approach, what method or event or process is capable of vaulting us over these trivialities to the place where an authentic questioning of Being can be undertaken? Sein und Zeit pointed to one possible solution--acceptance of one's death. Much too briefly stated, the line of argument went something like this. Da-sein⁶ discovers himself "thrown" (Geworfen) into the world. This view of the past is also coupled with Understanding (Verstehen)--the ability to project into the future--and Discourse (Rede)--the ability to make the future and past present in words. Future, past and present, and in that

order, are the three prongs of Heideggerian temporality. These temporal aspects, however, are not of the same "value".⁷ The aspect of futurity stands out from the others in that the past and present are finally given their full meaning in terms of the future. The importance of the future comes about in this way. Dasein is the type of being for which Being is an issue for it because Dasein grasps itself in its wholeness. To do this it (Dasein) must be able to apprehend its limits, particularly its end. Dasein's ending limit is death--the one thing it cannot experience. The death of the Other can be experienced, but only as a Vorhandenheit⁸ or in an objective way. Experience of my own death is impossible because death means the impossibility of being any longer. Dasein's relationship to its death does not remain meaningless though, for the full existential import of death is an experiencing of Sein-zum-Tode (Being-towards-death). Being-towards-death makes Dasein primarily futurally oriented.

The primacy of this future orientation can be further grasped by tracing the steps through which Dasein is made aware of his Being-towards-death. Care was discovered through anxiety which resulted from the nausee experienced in the un-authentic modes of being.⁹ Likewise, Being-towards-death is apprehended in the Call of conscience. Conscience's Call issues from the silent uncanniness experienced in Dasein's awareness of the meaning of death. The Call says nothing; it merely brings Dasein face to face with the "Nothing"--that

which death points to. Conscience and its Call have a positive aspect too. Not only does conscience confront Dasein with the Nothing; because it manifests itself as the Call of Care, conscience calls Dasein to "Resoluteness"; it calls Dasein forth into the Situation. In other words, "conscience suggests a note of awareness, the kind of awareness that is born of a steady gaze directed at things as they are".¹⁰ Authentic living is resolute acceptance of that which is--the Nothing revealed in death. This acceptance is included in the phrase "Being-towards-death". Dasein lives authentically when he orients his life as a Being-towards-death, when he interprets his past and present in terms of the future. This makes Dasein an Ek-sistent; he stands out of his past thrownness and immersion in the present "they" to resolutely accept his possibilities as Being-towards-death.

Sein und Zeit masterfully analyzes contemporary man encumbered with mass thinking and mores, yet possessing the potential possibility through Care, Conscience and Resolve to throw off these shackles. It is mainly these Heideggerian insights that have found ready acceptance, e.g., Binswanger in psychology or Bultmann in theology, despite Heidegger's claim that Sein und Zeit was to be much more than an anthropological description, that it was primarily an exploratory probe into the questioning of Being. Being-towards-death relates man to himself, but how is he related to Being? As Heidegger approached this question in the years after

Sein und Zeit, his stress on "Nothingness" was the first indication of a shift in accent. What Is Metaphysics (1929) and a later introduction to this essay, The Way Back Into The Ground Of Metaphysics,¹¹ poses THE question, "Why is there any being at all and not rather Nothing?"¹² A biased regard for beings occasioned metaphysics' downfall; man's vision was wretchedly curtailed. His salvation lay in transcending these ontic concerns--a transcendence into "Nothingness". Conscience's call to Resoluteness was really the call of Nothingness. In this call freedom inserted nothingness between Dasein and Seienden (beings) and allowed the Seienden to be seen for the first time for what they truly were--thingness. Nothingness accomplished this by revealing the boundaries and wholeness of man's situation.

It is thus (in Nothing) that I come to see that the presence of anything and everything before me is a united whole, as I also see that it is due to nothing other than my own finite horizon-projection. I see for the first time clearly, that the Seienden als Ganzen could not "be" without my Da-sein, and at the same time I realize that the apparent solidity of that "world" of things offers no lasting thing upon which I can depend as a protection from the dissolution of the world in death.¹³

The immediate inclination seems negative, but the overriding influence is positive (similar to the role "law" plays in the Christian life). Nothing is not a projection of Dasein's mind--a mental apprehension of the contrary of being. Nothing is Being itself. For this reason only can man experience it. Because Being is an issue for Dasein, so is Nothing an issue. "The nihilating (das Nichtende) in Being is the essence of what I call the Nothing. Because it thinks Being, thought

thinks Nothing."¹⁴

In Sein und Zeit the experience of Nothingness was closely bound up with the particular mood (Stimmung) Angst. Angst prompted the step into Nothing which in turn executed the Call of Conscience. Heidegger's later writings tend to shy away from this rather "subjective" (Dasein originating)¹⁵ link with Nothing. Man is "thrown" into a necessary relation with Nothing. Another perspective of Nothing is the Heilige. The Holy as an aspect of Being brings into focus at least three important Heideggerian concepts: Dasein's "wandering in need"; transcendence and openness for Being. Dasein is more than a being consciously moving towards his death. Dasein is a transcendental creature. Recall how authentic man pro-jected (to) his limiting horizons. Transcendence resembles this pro-ject with this exception-- now Being is the subject. "The preliminary definition of 'Being as the transcendens as such' expresses simply the way in which the essence of Being has so far been cleared for man."¹⁶ Being clears itself; it creates an openness for Being.

A knotty problem develops in man's relation to Being. Where does the impetus begin? Is Dasein dependent on Being? If so, in what way is he transcendent? Heidegger gives no clear answer; in fact, he does not raise the question. He merely portrays man as a wanderer. Again this calls to mind Dasein's dual structure: his "thrownness", his proneness to become lost in the "they" and his ec-static nature. Here

a shift in Heidegger is evident. Ex-sistence is no longer acceptance of Death--man's limiting horizons; ex-sistence portrays man emerging into the transcendent openness for Being.

Man is and is man insofar as he is the existing. He stands exposed to the openness of Being, an openness which is Being itself, that has projected the essence of man into "care". So thrown, man stands "in" the openness of Being. "World" is the clearing of Being, wherein man stands out from his thrown essence. "Being-in-the-World" names the essence of ex-sistence in relation to the cleared dimension out of which the "ex" of the ex-sistence essentially arises. Thought of from the point of view of ex-sistence, "world" is in a way transcendence within and for existence.¹⁷

A transcendence within the world signals that Being is somehow mysteriously¹⁸ separated from Dasein--that transcendence itself is no direct path to Being. Within the world man fluctuates between a concern for practical everyday affairs and an attentiveness to Being. As man becomes more and more immersed in the present, he experiences an immense vacuity which makes him aware of Being's absence. This constant and necessary oscillation between practical matters and the mystery of Being Heidegger calls a "wandering in need"¹⁹ A continual wandering would render Dasein's life a worthless one were it not that Being destines otherwise. What is openness for Being? The impetus seems to stem from Being itself. "Being clears itself for man in ecstatic projection. But this projection does not create Being."²⁰ Dasein's ex-sistence is Being's destiny.²¹ Of course, only as long as Dasein is, is there Being. That is, only if the clearing of Being is realized is Being conveyed to man. "That the 'Da' (Here), however, the clearing of Being itself

is realized, is the destination of Being itself. This is the destiny of the clearing."²² Man possesses one certainty; he is essentially only in his essence in which he is claimed by Being.²³ "Only from this claim 'has' he (man) found wherein his essence dwells. Only from this dwelling 'has' he 'language' as the home which preserves the ecstatic for his essence."²⁴

Dasein's ex-sistence, Being's destiny and thus man's destiny are all dependent on language. Openness for Being is embodied in language; language is the house of Being. Within the context of language, Heidegger introduces the important term Denken (Thought). Normally, Denken belongs to man. Heidegger, however, enlarges this common notion. Thought is of Being he claims. As subjective genitive this means that thought belongs to Being; as objective genitive thought listens to or heeds Being.²⁵ Thought must not be confused with theoretical or practical activity and behavior; it supercedes such operations in that it precedes them.

Thought is related to Being as the arriving. Thought is as thought in the advent of Being, is bound to Being as arrival. Being has already destined itself to thought. Being is as the destiny of thought.²⁶

Thinking assists the openness or clearing for Being by taking Being's unspoken word and shaping it into language. "Thus language is at once the house of being and the dwelling of human beings."²⁷ Again Heidegger warns against mistaking

language with the usual unity of sound-form, melody, rhythm and meaning. "The point is to think of the essence of language in its correspondence to Being, and what is more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling of man's essence."²⁸ Correspondence (entsprechen) implies a speaking (sprechen); language as originative thinking penetrates the silent, wordless uncanniness of Being, listens to this mute utterance and corresponds by incarnating this experience in language.²⁹ The Greek language is the classic example, for

in the Greek language what is said in it is at the same time in an excellent way what it is called. If we hear a Greek word with a Greek ear we follow its legein (its speaking), its direct presentation. What it presents is what lies immediately before us. Through the audible Greek word we are directly in the presence of the thing itself, not first in the presence of a mere word sign.³⁰

Furthermore, language is essential as conversation. That the gods have led us into conversation is the basis of the proposition that language is the supreme event of human existence. Yes, we have been a single conversation since the time when it "is time".³¹

One caution is to be noted. Being's uncanniness never permits exact translation into language. "Language is (both) the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself."³² Being's transparency in language is limited by the complex way in which language unfolds in the historical (Geschichtliche)³³ and is consummated in poetry. Language guarantees that man can exist historically in that previous thinkers have moulded their thinking in language. "To express over and over again the advent of Being, permanent and in its permanence waiting

for man, is the only matter for thought. That is why the essential thinkers always say the same thing."³⁴ Langan outlines the procedure in this manner.

Essential thinking, on the other hand, pulls the Seienden from the darkness of night into the light of Being. Heidegger, as we have seen, emphasizes the originativeness in this, the act of interpretation. Far from being a passive process of objective impression, interpretation demands that Dasein radiate the light of new intelligence from his own resources, i.e., from out of the Nothing, to illumine the Wesen, capturing the new meaning that it discovers there in that house of language which Dasein has built to protect Being's revelation in time. Dasein gathers up from the past the light that other generations have brought to bear on the Seienden and thus, extending the range of previous insights, prolongs the tradition toward the future, which it thus builds-out existentially. So it is that das Sein kommt nach Hause.³⁵

History is a limiting factor in another way. As seen above, Being is the destiny of thought. Destiny limits by holding back. "The innermost essence of home is already the destiny of Providence, or as we now call it: History. Nevertheless, in the dispensation of Providence, the essence is not yet completely handed over. It is still being held back."³⁶ History restricts what is to be said about Being and how this is to be said by constantly considering "whether that which has-to-be-thought may be said, to what extent, at what moment in the history of Being, in what dialogue with it, and with what claim."³⁷

Poetry is the sphere in which originative thought, language and history coalesce. Its relation to history is expressed as follows. "Being as the destiny that destines truth remains concealed. But the world's destiny is proclaimed

in poetry without its becoming apparent at once as the history of Being."³⁸ Thinking and language are wed together with poetry in one of Heidegger's more familiar phrases, "The thinker pronounces Being; the poet names the Holy".³⁹ The poet names the Holy; he establishes the permanent by the word and in the word;⁴⁰ in this naming the poet comes into the proximity of the Homeland (openness for Being);⁴¹ he is cast out into the Between--between the gods and the people.⁴² Original thinking--fundamental poetizing--makes language possible. In naming the Holy the poet "grasps" the High One himself, i.e., causes the High One to appear in words.⁴³ In naming the Holy the poet also brings the Word to where past, present and future meet and thus transcends this man or this time. But the naming of the Holy does not reside completely with the poet. "The poetic word only acquires its power of naming when the gods themselves bring us to language. How do the gods speak? '....And signs to us from antiquity are the language of the gods.'⁴⁴ The speech of the poet is the intercepting of these signs, in order to pass them on to his own people."⁴⁵ Therefore the poet needs careful writers and thinkers whose own remembrance will help retain the elusive words of poetry in all their truth. For poetry is to result in a process of understanding that will enable each hearer to have a Homecoming in the manner appropriate for him.⁴⁶

Once this point has been reached, it takes little effort to recall the Existentials of Sein und Zeit, couple them

with the prominent place of language and the suggestive function of poetry and see in these expressions a very definite similarity to religious vocabulary. As usual, Heidegger's explicit pronouncements on this relationship are not precise. Heidegger has repeatedly maintained a neutrality in regard to value or religious judgments. His is to be solely a phenomenological description. "Therefore, with the existential determination of the essence of man nothing has yet been decided about the 'existence' or 'non-existence' of God, not about the possibility or impossibility of God."⁴⁷ In his The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics Heidegger depicts "Christian philosophy" as a round square and a misunderstanding. "Only epochs which no longer fully believe in the true greatness of the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if not a substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs and tastes of the time. For the original Christian faith philosophy is foolishness."⁴⁸ But the outcome is not quite so clear cut. A vague dependence of theology on philosophy emerges in the designation of the "Holy" as an aspect of Nothingness. Remembrance of the Poet introduces a seemingly synonymous symbol for the "Holy"--the "Gevierte". In this "place?" (situation?, encounter?) earth, heaven, divinities and mortals fuse into an unity which demands that we men "save", "receive", and "wait on" Being.⁴⁹ Or the relation is stated in these terms. Being is not god, yet is closer

to man than any other being, be it a rock, an animal, a machine, an angel or God.⁵⁰ The divine, however, is nearer to us than the strangeness of animals. And the divine (God) can only be encountered when one is in a right relation to Being.

Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy can the essence of divinity be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought and said what the word "God" is to signify. Or must we not first be able to understand and hear these words carefully if we as men, i.e., as existing beings, are to have the privilege of experiencing a relation of God to man? How, then, is the man of the present epoch even to be able to ask seriously and firmly whether God approaches or withdraws when man omits the primary step of thinking deeply in the one dimension where this question can be asked: that is, the dimension of the holy, which, even as dimension, remains closed unless the openness of Being is cleared and in its clearing is close to man. Perhaps the distinction of this age consists in the fact that the dimension of grace has been closed. Perhaps this is its unique dis-grace.⁵¹

One final topic demands closer attention before we discuss the theological implications Heinrich Ott reads into Heidegger. Again the aforementioned question must be asked. What is the origin of the impetus that instigates the language-event? What part does Being play? How much activity can be ascribed to man? The evidence is vague. In the first place, Dasein finds himself thrown (Geworfen) into the world in such a way that he naturally succumbs to the sterile thinking patterns of the "they" (Verfallen), at least to some degree. Fallen Dasein wanders about in need. But Dasein exists, he stands out from his position; he stands out in the

openness of Being. Man himself does not do the projecting, though. "What projects in the project is not man, but Being himself, which destines man to the existence which is the essence of Dasein. This destiny is realized as the clearing of Being."⁵² It is within this clearing, this nearness (Homeland) that "the decision, if any, is reached as to whether and how God and the gods deny themselves and the night remains, whether and how the day of the Holy dawns, whether and how in the rise of the Holy an appearance of God and the gods can start anew."⁵³ Man's activities seem limited to two responsibilities. He must somehow undergo a long, patient preparation of waiting or letting happen. And if the destiny of Being projects the advent of itself to man by addressing and claiming him through language, man corresponds by housing this encounter in language. Dasein is the Shepherd of Being.

Ours is a task of preparation and anticipation for an essential hören of what the true poet names and the originative thinker says. We are to hear and to preserve. It is not given to everyone to name the holy, but it is the duty of everyone in the absence of the God (i.e., in the epoch of de-ontologization, of Seinvergeessenheit), to listen as the poet names that Nähe (proximity) which remains ever fern (distant), the Being to which we ourselves are the way of access, but which we never fully discover.⁵⁴

CHAPTER IV

THE HERMENEUTIC OF HEINRICH OTT

Despite the claim of neutrality, the "later" Heidegger has bequeathed to theology a thought structure and phraseology ripe with possibilities. If through Bultmann Heidegger's demand for authentic self acceptance has influenced Biblical exegesis, does not his stress on and use of language offer an even more appropriate direction for theological hermeneutics? Chapter two briefly sketched a possible line of development. But now we would like to take the theologian who has most exclusively dealt with Heidegger--a systematician who views the nature of theology as a whole as hermeneutical¹--Heinrich Ott. Ott claims that Heidegger is not as neutral as he seems, that Heidegger does see in theology a capacity for genuine thinking distinct from science's inability to think.

I am quite aware that in his works Heidegger's position on Christian faith and theology is not unambiguous. Yet, in spite of the obscurities on this point that emerge when one surveys the complete work of Heidegger, I maintain that one can document unambiguously from Heidegger's writings the distinct thread of connection I seek to establish, the correspondence between Heidegger's thinking and the self-understanding of dogmatics. It cannot be denied that the aspect of importance to me has its basic lines set out in Heidegger's own work.²

This statement raises two important questions which the following chapter will attempt to answer: What is the relation of philosophy and theology? How has this relation

influenced Ott's hermeneutic? Neither can be answered with precise clarity. In the first place, Ott views the task of theology as necessarily flexible. He condemns as futile an obsession with particulars at the expense of the larger context. Or in line with Barth's plea, Ott resists Barthian scholasticism and instead discovers God's message as true though not final, as a message in need of genuine retraction, as a message that forms the presupposition of what has now to be thought out.³ In the second place, Ott's recent arrival as a major thinker in theological circles, his youth and as yet the small handful of publications⁴ reveal the continuing heavy influence of his teachers (Barth and Bultmann). Ott's thinking has yet to come into its own.

The Introduction to Ott's latest book, Theology and Preaching (1961), offers guidelines for answering our two questions. Paying his indebtedness to Bultmann for the insight, Ott here distinguishes between ontology and hermeneutics.

Rightly understood, hermeneutics and ontology are bound up with each other in the closest possible way. Hermeneutically we inquire into the specific modus loquendi, the mode of speaking (and therewith into the "whence") of the individual Biblical testimonies; ontologically we inquire into the specific modus essendi, the mode of being, of the reality to which they testify. We shall not succeed in achieving the break-through to the real man, unanimously postulated by Barth, Bonhoeffer and Bultmann, if we neglect these two, closely inter-connected questions.⁶

The modus loquendi obviously involves the question of hermeneutics. The ontological, inquiring as it does into the

mode of being, undertakes a relation to philosophy. For in order to break through to his "real" being, man must properly grasp his limiting horizons, where he stands in relation to them, how they affect him and vice versa. Ott points toward the theological-philosophical interaction in these words.

So ist die Begegnung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie aus zwei Gründen unvermeidlich: 1. weil die Theologie selber zum möglichen philosophischen Denkinhalt geworden ist; 2. weil die Theologie im Verfolgen ihrer eigenen spezifischen Grundlagenforschung genötigt ist, sich auf das Feld philosophischer Fragestellungen zu begeben.⁷

Let it be noted that Ott does not indiscriminately merge the two. At several points the tasks are similar, but "der Unterschied zwischen dem philosophischen und dem theologischen Denken und Reden liegt, so sagten wir, darin, das das letztere sich auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes beruft".⁸

Ontology assists man (being) in penetrating his horizons (Sein) where experiencing his limits (Nothingness) he comes face to face with the only important Seinsfrage, "Why are there beings at all and not nothing?" Encounter with the uncanny silence of this Nothing establishes man as "thinking-man" (Denken), enables him to transcend the "they's" engrossing concern with beings and sustains his continued interest in the Seinsfrage. In other words, the way proceeds from being (Seienden-man and/or Bible texts) through Nothing (the Unthought) to Being (Revelation) and back to being again (Correspondence).⁹ Sounds Heideggerian, you say? Perhaps, but it is also Ott's way of theology. Though Nothingness

has a heavy negative ring which some have interpreted as the elimination^{of} all God talk,¹⁰ Ott reads a more positive note into this experience. "In dieser Erfahrung (des Nichts) kommt er (Mensch) faktisch vor Gott und die creatio e nihilo. Die Erfahrung des Nichts und in ihr die Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden ist ein Moment der Gottesbegegnung des die Welt denkenden, des philosophierenden Menschen."¹¹ But Ott wants to impart an even fuller content to the experience of Nothingness, which we remember from Heidegger is the Unthought aspect of Sein. "Hat nicht die Theologie ihr Ungedachtes in der Erfahrung des Glaubens, aus der sie herkommt und in die sie zurückführt?"¹² And to continue:

Das Sein Gottes bedeutet, so wie "sein" bis jetzt verstanden haben,¹³ ein Geschehen der Entbergung: dass Gott sich dem Denken entbirgt als der, der Er ist; das Er selber als ein Geschick das Denken trifft und sich ihm als zu-denkende Sache aufgibt, dass Er dem Denken als Anspruch begegnet und vom denkenden Menschen ein Entsprechen in Freiheit fordert. Das vom Sein Gottes "getroffene" Denken ist aber das Denken des Glaubens.¹⁴

Theology's attestation to man's mode of being begins when the faith-thinker is placed in the Unthought (the experience of faith itself) where he receives the gift of Revelation. The "conditions of the possibility of thinking" which Heidegger correlated with Sein and Nothingness, are for theology somehow bound up both with Revelation and with Faith. Via the Unthought, a thinking faith breaks through to Revelation (its limits) and back again to show man what he "really" is. And this thinking quite clearly crosses

philosophic lines--the philosophy of Heidegger, that is.

Just piercing into the Unthought of Revelation and listening to its muteness is not sufficient. Revelation demands of thinking man a cor-respondence in freedom. Correspondence takes place at the human level, is embodied in language and thus brings into play the modus loquendi.¹⁵ Ott has supplied another outline into which the material in this section can be channeled. His article "What Is Systematic Theology?" splits the motion of theology into a threefold division: exegesis, dogmatics and proclamation. Though the framework remains somewhat unwieldy, it allows us to see the basic movement of Ott's hermeneutics. Exegesis receives for Ott a philosophical flavor in two ways. First Ott appeals to Heidegger's phenomenological method summarized in Husserl's phrase "to the things themselves". Allowing things to show themselves for what they are tends to eliminate predetermined conclusions that often distort men's vision. Theology too, says Ott quoting Barth, must defend itself against the unhealthy pressures of alien influences. Theology too must heed the injunction of phenomenology and return to its own theological, not philosophical, foundations. Reformation theology has such a ready made principle at hand--"Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres".¹⁶ Are scriptures, then, the "thing itself" to which exegesis must return? Will scriptures "let happen" or "show" or "unbare" whatever theology has to offer? Yes and No. Yes, in that exegesis must always begin with the concrete text.

Previous hearers of revelation have (cor)-responded in language with just these words, though we do well to remember the historic conditioned presuppositions under which they labored. No, in that by themselves scriptures never offer a complete showing. They channel us to the place where revelation can be encountered. Scriptures are the phenomenal point of departure, but they are only part of a larger complex--the Word of God. They project us into a sphere in which revelation can be heard and integrated with our being in a way that takes on "real" meaning. This two-directional movement stamps on exegesis its second link with philosophy.

Zum Spezifischen der Theologie, nämlich zu ihrer Berufung auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes, gehört allerdings ihr gehorsames Hören auf konkrete Texte. Wenn sie daneben den philosophischen Wesenblick mit intergriert, so ist dies nichts Zusätzliches und Zufälliges, sondern es gehört mit zu ihrem Wesen. Denn in der Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes begegnet ihr ein Anspruch, welcher, aufs Ganze geht. Wenn sie diesen Ganzheitsanspruch ernst nehmen will, darf sie sich nicht in partikulären Räumen bewegen, sondern muss die Gesamtheit der jeweils zugänglichen Phänomene des Wirklichen mitbedenken, und zwar nicht gewaltsam, sondern so, wie die Phänomene selbst es erfordern, und d.h. eben: philosophisch.¹⁷

In so doing exegesis has broadened its scope to include dogmatics.

Dogmatics moves out beyond the individual text, unifies it with the total compass of theology and presents it to the preacher. "Hermeneutical arch" is one of Ott's symbolic descriptions of this process. The other retains the more traditional picture of the hermeneutical circle. At this level the differences between ontological and hermeneutical

functions are obliterated and the two merge into what Michalson calls an ontological hermeneutic.¹⁸ At the basis of this merger is Ott's absorbing concern with understanding and thinking. Faith must be unfolded in thinking; fides quaerens intellectum. Thinking or understanding must operate within a circle--a methodological or hermeneutical principle which Ott, adapting from Heidegger, defines in this way. "Wir verstehen darunter ein Vorgehen, bei dem eine Grösse durch eine andere und diese wiederum durch jene erläutere wider, A durch B und B durch A bzw. zwei Aspekte ein und derselben Sache einander wechselseitig erhellen."¹⁹ At one level this circle sends dogmatics back to the exegesis of particular passages. At another level it moves out to thinking to probe the conditions of the possibilities of understanding. The conditions underlying a faith impregnated understanding were the horizons of the Unthought in which Revelation speaks. To this sphere, are the believers led by dogmatics through the channel of concrete texts.

Wir haben nicht Paulus, Johannes und die Synoptiker, Jessaja und die Psalmen usw. "auslegen", indem wir genau "herausfinden", was sie mit jedem einzelnen Satz "gemeint" haben. (Dass man das bis zu einem gewissen Grade kann und auch soll, sei nicht bestritten!). Sondern wir haben vor allen mit ihnen ins Gespräch zu kommen, uns von ihnen ins Gegenteil zur gemeinsamen "Sache" der Offenbarung bringen zu lassen, damit auch wir auf Gottes Wort eine Antwort erteilen können (denn nur antwortend sind wir überhaupt in der Lage, wirklich zu hören!)--und dies alles darum, weil wir mit ihnen allen zusammen zur einen *communio sanctorum* gehören. Aus diesem ursprünglicheren Ansatz, dieser neuen Dimension der Hermeneutik, lässt sich dann darüber verhandeln, welches Recht und wieviel Wahrheit den

Ergebnissen der historisch-kritischen Exegese im Einzelnen zukommen mag.²⁰

Hermeneutics is no longer confined to the task of the modus loquendi. It now operates with a more original form of language than a pericope.²¹ On the one hand it must clarify as far as possible the mystic like language (poetry) that lets a hearing of revelation take place. On the other hand it must offer guidelines for man's response of incorporating the hearing into human speech--a conversation among the communion of saints.

Language's original movement with which hermeneutics is concerned and which is the foundation of all other types of communication--written words, speech, etc.--is best described by Ott in his latest article, "Das Problem des nicht-objektivierenden Denkens und Redens". Ott affirms the non-objective²² character of theological language by comparing it to three similar types of expression: poetry, political speech and philosophical language. Each has its unique task differing from the informational function of objective language. For example, poetry is an event in the hearing of which man is brought to a determined place, into the almighty, shattering silence of the Geheimnis. Words do not refer to specific objects; they do, but only in so far as they are the vehicles which bring the hearer to the Geheimnis.²³ In fact, words first speak to us.²⁴ Political speech likewise guides man to a place--a place of responsibility. And the philosopher's words, instead of informing or pointing

to particulars, direct man to an essential Wesenblick. Ott combines these traits as he sketches the operation of theological language. Theological thinking and speaking are also events bringing men to a place--the place of revelation or the Geheimnis Gottes. The place is further described as a place of freedom where man can obediently hear and witness (bezeugen) to the Word of God. Hearing is an event (Tun) evoking an "inner"/"outer" hearing called faith. Because man occupies a place in this shattering silence of God's Geheimnis, because he is set free to hear and witness and because as man he also occupies the house of language,²⁵ not only must he do dogmatics, he must also respond to God's revelation in proclamation. Ott would say, "dass in der kerygmatischen Rede ein Mensch jetzt und hier vor bestimmten andern Menschen das Wort Gottes verantwortet, indem er es ihnen zu-spricht, während die theologische Rede den Menschen und den Ort bringt, wo er die parrhesia zu solchem Verantworten gewinnt".²⁶

Proclamation (preaching) and exegesis form opposite ends of Ott's hermeneutical arch. The exegete approaches the text as the "thing itself", lets the text manifest its own content. Next, the exegete hands his discoveries over to the dogmatician; the dogmatician unifies this particular pericope within the whole context of theology and hands it back to the preacher. The process is much too crudely depicted, but it is sufficient for noting the curious change in Ott's thinking. Ott has said little about proclamation.

Throughout his works numerous references and allusions occur²⁷ but nothing of an extended nature. Even in his book Theology and Preaching, preaching is always discussed in conjunction with theology. Ott is not trying to belittle proclamation. It is the necessary correspondence to God's revelation. Proclamation is bound up with the communion of saints. In fact, dialogue among fellow men is more than a mere phenomenon; it is a basic structure of all existence.²⁸ Proclamation does possess some peculiarities which set it apart from other areas of theology. Whereas dogmatics encompasses the whole of theology in a unified and formal way, proclamation, catering to particular situation, is one-sided; stress is placed on the one aspect which fits the need. Yes, preaching is announced in a more personal and direct way, i.e., in a "kerygmatic-existential way".²⁹ It is only in the Postscript to his Theology and Preaching that Ott tells us what proclamation is; proclamation is "disclosure". Here lies the curious twist. To avoid being labeled a disciple of natural theology, Ott defines disclosure as a methodological concept "inspired by phenomenology and its maxim: 'Let us observe things themselves'". But no longer are "the things themselves" concrete Bible texts. The phenomena are now those disclosures of revelation and of the Unthought encountered by the believer in the complex situation described above. Disclosure says even more about proclamation. For what disclosure is not is demonstration--truth assertions claiming demonstrable accuracy.³¹ In other words, proclama-

tion assumes the form of non-objective speech, a form of language similar to poetry.

CHAPTER V

AN ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTIC

The summaries and conclusions of the past two chapters will now be presented. Martin Heidegger has been the predominant and guiding influence in the development of the "new hermeneutic". His Sein und Zeit hermeneutic--a return to Dasein along the lines of Husserl's phenomenology--sought to clarify the structures (Existentialia) of man's being. This analysis revealed that man is thrown (Geworfen) into his situation (Being-in-the-world). An additional human polarity is also revealed. Man is fallen--swallowed up in the "they" he concentrates his thinking on present trivialities; man is ex-sistent--he stands out futurally to accept his limiting factor, death. Acceptance of death and orienting one's life accordingly, says Heidegger, is authentic living. But Sein und Zeit claimed to be only a provisional experiment leading to the final task of analysing Being itself. Heidegger's later writings have leaned in this direction, and consequently his hermeneutic has sought to fulfill the second and extended task he assigned to it.¹ Ex-sistent is no longer referred to as standing out toward one's death. Man now ex-sists because he stands out in the light of Being. That which is in need of clarification is no longer Dasein but Being, and the corresponding hermeneutic is no longer ontic but ontological.² The change is evidenced by the prominent place given to language and within language

the position which poetry is accorded. Poetry soars above mundane existence and forms a mediating link between Dasein and Sein. A further indication of this ontological turn is signalled in Sein's domineering control as to where, when and how it communicates itself to man. This ontological shift, naturally conducive to theology, has stimulated and moulded the present thought of Heinrich Ott and become the characteristic mark of the "new hermeneutic". In what follows, this claim will be substantiated by marshalling the evidence presented in the past chapters and by taking into account some recent reactions to the Ott-Heidegger combination.

1 Ott has assigned to philosophy, and especially that of Martin Heidegger, a definite role in theology.

First, this is evidenced by the heavy value Ott places upon thinking (Denken). Ott's primary presupposition is that fides quaerens intellectum. Theology's task necessarily involves rational processes and formulations. Granted this, Ott attaches himself to Heidegger, for in Ott's estimation Heidegger is the "thinker of thinkers".³ Heidegger also questions metaphysics, its feasibility as a method for the quest of Being, an insight that makes him relevant for theology.⁴ Ott too has openly championed the overcoming of metaphysics in theology and gladly displays a portion of a letter sent to him by Heidegger upon the publication of Ott's Denken und Sein. Says Heidegger, "As long as

anthropological-cosmological conceptualizing of existentialism are not overcome and pushed to the side, theology will never enter into the freedom of saying what is entrusted to it".⁵ Second, Ott's relation to philosophy and Heidegger is openly proclaimed by him (Ott) on several occasions. Denken und Sein quotes several passages from Heidegger's Letter On Humanism and Identität und Differenz in which the author notes possible openings for a theological venture.⁶ What Is Systematic Theology? formulates this thesis: "With this, we return to Heidegger. I claim--and this is my tenth thesis--that the understanding of systematic theology developed here corresponds to the understanding of thinking and of language offered by Heidegger".⁷ In presenting the linguistic structures of poetry as preparation for developing the non-objective nature of theological language, Ott supports his presentation with a Heideggerian image.⁸ Finally, while contending against Bultmann and Fuchs and their understanding of the task of theology, Ott once more shores up his views by appealing to Heidegger.⁹

Ott's affinity with philosophy and Heidegger has not gone by unchallenged. From within the framework of theology, Ott's basic assumption--fides quaerens intellectum--must be granted. Theology as the logos about divine things is by definition rational and logical. Since faith comprises the relationship between God and man, and since the human side of this polarity should, to experience a more meaningful relationship, be informed by a knowledge of what the world and man are, philosophy is asked to provide such information.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Jonas claims that since Heidegger

has borrowed so much from theology,¹¹ while others have argued that Ott has done the same with philosophy, both philosophy and theology should examine the validity of these procedures. Approaching this same fault from another angle, Michalson and Jüngel have criticized the one-sidedness of Ott's relation. Heidegger's philosophy is valuable for its critical function in the service of contemporary theology. By itself it is not a theological expression. Therefore Ott's dialogue with Heidegger remains onesided.¹² Or the partiality is seen to reside in Ott's bias for Heidegger alone of all the philosophers. Theology is interested in understanding human thought, not just the thinking of one man.¹³ An additional censure is leveled by Jüngel at Ott for accepting a Heideggerian transcendental which is not Heideggerian. That is, recognizing Sein as the transcendental presupposition of thinking, Ott still remains within metaphysics, for thinking makes suppositions and these are metaphysical.¹⁸ After all this, Jonas proposes some guidelines for a worthwhile theology/philosophy dialogue. The philosophy most adequate for theology would be the one that best deals with being. Since theology can never wait for a philosophical concensus on this matter, the theologian may be guided in his choice by: the appeal of infinity, the lessons past liaisons with philosophy have taught, present needs, choosing the philosophy most helpful in discharging theology's task and the one least dangerous, least seductive, least alienating.¹⁵

2 Ott has espoused an ontological hermeneutic.

The most obvious proof of Ott's ontological outlook is his almost wholesale adoption of Heidegger--the philosopher who acknowledges the primacy of Being. Yet Ott's own writings offer us more precise corroboration. First and most telling is Ott's shift in viewing phenomenology. "The things themselves" in a more ontic, historic approach would have been concrete Bible texts and pericopes. At first for Ott they were. But Bible passages were merely provisional, preparatory steps designed to place us in the openness of revelation.¹⁶ "The things themselves" thus become revelation's utterances. Coming from the unthought secrecy of the Holy (Nothingness/ Sein), such phenomena are ontological and a hermeneutic designed to cope with them is similarly ontological. Ott's close conjunction between theology and preaching occasions the second piece of evidence. Preaching begins with texts and ends with people. If anything is ontic, it is preaching. After completing a book on preaching, all Ott can say is that preaching is "disclosure"--disclosure of the human situation. Does not this sound like the early Heidegger concerned with clarifying Dasein's Existentials? It does with one major exception. Heidegger's insights remained human; Dasein manifested its own structures. Ott's "disclosure" comes not from men.

That such disclosure succeeds....is something that lies under the will of God. It succeeds when He allows His light to shine upon us. But we begin to think under the presupposition that we have already seen the

light of God in His word, and that it will perhaps please Him to allow us by grace to see it more and more and ever afresh. Dominus illuminatio mea--et illuminatio mundi. The Lord is my light--and the light of the world! But it is just under this presupposition that our thinking is carried out. For this reason the methodological principle of "disclosure" belongs necessarily to the quest of fides quaerens intellectum.¹⁷

Ott's "disclosure" is ontological. A third sign of Ott's ontological propensity is the elevated position and non-objective form of language in his thinking. Language's action is twofold: the revealing action of the Holy and man's corresponding answer communicated among other men. Necessarily prior is the former--the house of Being in which the "inner"/"outer" continuum can be experienced.¹⁸ Like poetry such language is an event; it brings us to a place--the light of Being. Man hears and answers. In answering he must incorporate language (Sprache) into speech so that he can carry on a conversation (Gespräch) with fellow men (communion of saints). Once again the prominent concern is with the movement of the Holy to man, with the originative language event which gives rise to human communication--both ontological concerns. And this I submit is the distinguishing mark of the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic". Besides those ideas of Fuchs and Ebeling mentioned in chapter two¹⁹ I quote from the final pages of Robinson's introductory chapter.

This emphasis upon analyzing the possibility of interpretation as it in fact takes place, and thus upon the analysis of what is, is designated by Gadamer as an "ontological turn in hermeneutic". "This ontological turn in hermeneutic signifies its elimination as a doctrine of a special art or method. It makes the theory of understanding into a central philosophical problematic."...Word is "selfless", and what the Biblical author is talking about transcends his self-understanding. What language has to say must be sought

in terms of its subject matter, so that the word "disappears" into what it has to say. To be sure, what the word has to say does not lie outside language as understood by the new hermeneutic--a point made by Heidegger and conceded by Gadamer. Yet it is this dialectic between language and its subject matter (Sprache and Sache) rather than that between mythological language and the existential self-understanding it objectifies, which designates the point at which the hermeneutical discussion in Germany now stands.²⁰

Opposition to Ott's degree of non-objectifying language has likewise appeared. The most penetrating remarks are those of Hans Jonas. Non-objectifying language does occur in the Psalmists, prophets and prayers, he agrees. But the theologian's task, bound up with theoretical discourse, is likewise bound up with objective language. Its task is to recognize the inadequate language but to keep this necessary inadequacy transparent for what is to be indicated by it. For myth taken literally is crudest objectification; and myth taken allegorically is sophisticated objectification; but myth taken symbolically is the glass through which we see darkly.²¹

Therefore, taking all these considerations into account, with Carl Michalson I also claim that for Ott two things remain: "(1) an interpretation in which being and not human existence is the horizon for hermeneutical interrogation; and (2) a deduction of the relevant questions to which being will reveal its secrets in the exegetical moment...Ott now proposes to develop theological hermeneutic as an ontological enterprise".²² Ott's project is largely a result of his dependency on and agreement with Martin Heidegger.

Mention should be made of several remaining problems that, though lying outside the scope of this paper, are relevant for further discussions. First are the criticisms of Jonas, Jüngel and Michalson mentioned above. Second is the suppression of the historical objected to by Michalson in his article "Theology As Ontology And As History". Third is the relation, reaction and influence Ott has to his great teachers Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. Finally one must come face to face with the provocative interpretation with which Langan concludes his work on Heidegger. Heidegger's final analysis cannot comport with a Christian outlook. For the Christian the end (telos) is a transcendental Other outside human temporality. For Heidegger authenticity is Dasein accepting his finitude in which Being unfolds itself (though never completely).²³ Because of his failure to deal adequately with the Other, Heidegger's

"mystery" turns out to hide no incomprehensibly rich other, but only our own limits; the Heilige turns out to hold no real gift, but is rather an expression of our finite "not yet"; the "grace of Being" turns out to be no real gift, for it is drawn inexplicably from our own resources. Aletheia itself finally fails to be an end and motive force, to become an historical sign of our incompleteness.²⁴

Heidegger's apparent rapport with theology might not be so beneficial after all.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹I have arbitrarily chosen the date which is assigned to Heidegger's Kehre (turn) by Heinrich Ott in his Denken und Sein.

²John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson, "Translator's Preface," from Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. 13.

CHAPTER II

¹James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., editors. The New Hermeneutic. Vol. II of New Frontiers In Theology (Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963). Hereafter referred to as Hermeneutic.

²Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960).

³Carl E. Braaten, "How New Is The New Hermeneutic?" Theology Today, XXII (July 1965), 218-235.

⁴Gehard Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith. Translated from the German by James W. Leitch. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), pp. 306 ff. Other articles in this book which supplied material for the discussion below are: "The Significance of the Critical Historical Method for Church and Theology in Protestantism," pp. 17-61; "The Meaning of 'Biblical Theology,'" pp. 79-97; "The 'Non-religious Interpretation of Biblical Concepts,'" pp. 98-161.

⁵James Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," Hermeneutic, pp. 17-18.

⁶Ibid., p. 19. Other material dealing with Schleiermacher are: Braaten, "How New Is The New Hermeneutic?," p.221; Gadamer, pp.172ff.; Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," pp. 316 ff.; Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), pp. 96ff.

⁷Besides the references in the footnote above, cf., Gadamer, pp. 205ff.

⁸Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," Essays: Philosophical and Theological, Translated from the German by James C.G. Grieg (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), p. 238.

⁹Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," p. 22.

¹⁰Bultmann, pp. 240-243.

¹¹Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," p. 54.

¹²Ibid., p. 57.

¹³Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁴Cf., Heidegger's distinction between man (Dasein) and Being, Infra, chap. iii, pp. 19 ff.

¹⁵Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," p. 55.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁷Cf., chap. v, pp. 44ff.

CHAPTER III

¹Dasein is ontologically prior to any other ontic being because Dasein is the only entity whose Being is an issue for it. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Translated from the German by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. H68.

²Ibid., p. H37.

³Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine Of Truth, With A Letter On Humanism," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. III, Translated from the German by John Barlow and Edgar Lohner, Edited by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 278-80. Hereafter referred to as "Letter On Humanism-".

^{3 $\frac{1}{2}$} Langan describes the mysticism which these commentators ascribe to Heidegger as "a poetical expression of the dark, unfathomable, irrational presence of the mass of Seienden, the kind of presentation which only Dionysiac terms can express". Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press [Paperback edition], 1961), p. 13.

⁴Langan, p. 236.

⁵Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie (Switzerland: Evangelischer Verlag AG. Zollikon, 1959), p. 73. Hereafter referred to as Denken.

⁶Heidegger often uses the hyphenated form to emphasize the There (Da). "There" is never conceived of spatially; Being-there means being-in-the-world or residing in the openness of Being. A closely correlated concept is the Heideggerian hyphenated term ex-sist or ec-stasy. Man ex-sists in that he stands out. The nature of this standing out plays an important role in Heidegger's shift in accent. Cf., Infra, chap. iii, pp. 19 ff., especially p. 20, n. 21.

⁷Heidegger would never condone a treatment of future, past, and present in terms of value.

⁸Heidegger distinguishes between Vorhanden and Zuhanden. The former designates the mere presence or bare facticity of material entities. Their presence is felt by man when as obstacles they obstruct man's projects. Zuhanden, recognized prior to Vorhanden, are those objects which man uses, which he relates to in Care. Thus a hammer is first discovered in its utility--for pounding nails; man seizes it with this concern in mind. Only later does he view it in its bare presence as mere object.

⁹Man's first intimations of Care were outlined in the above footnote. But the full complexity of this relation is only completely recognized when men, swallowed up in the "they", satisfied to comply with the superficial thinking of the masses, content with the traditional though sterile ways of metaphysics, experience a satiety similar to Kierkegaard's "boredom".

¹⁰Langan, p. 35.

¹¹Walter Kaufmann, editor, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company [Meridian Books], 1962), p. 206.

¹²Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p. 220.

¹³Langan, p. 93.

¹⁴Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 299.

¹⁵Though the existential (Existentiale) moods described in Sein und Zeit are not synonymous with the irrational urges of popular, superficial existentialism, they are viewed as structures of Dasein. Heidegger examines subjectivity in relation to the complex subject/object problem, likewise a viable problem for theologians. Descartes was responsible for the definite bifurcation of subject and object which has come to dominate the scientific approach (Der Satz vom Grund). In Kant und der Problem der Metaphysik Heidegger establishes that objectivity is a result of man's necessary finitude. In conjunction with this necessity, man also possesses a freedom in that he is a futurally oriented creature. The past (usually considered objective) only has meaning for man in so far as he utilizes it in the present to project towards the future. Bultmann's theological expression of this is as follows. "Is objectivity in interpretation possible? If objective is understood in terms of natural science--No. But the subjective approach that is subjective in that it goes to a text to find there possibilities for its own being--this approach is the most objective." Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," Essays: Philosophical and Theological, Translated from the German by James C. G. Grieg (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), p. 256.

¹⁶Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 285.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 293.

¹⁸Cf., next paragraph.

¹⁹Langan, p. 137.

²⁰Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 285.

²¹As ex-sistent, man stands out in the truth of Being. "The sentence (The 'essence of being-there' (Dasein) lies in its existence.) says rather: man is essentially such that he is 'Here' (Da), i.e., within the clearing of Being. This 'Being' of the Here, and only this, has the basic trait of ex-sistence: i.e. it stands outside itself within the truth of Being....Essence...is the ec-static nature of 'being-there'. Insofar as he ex-sists, man endures the 'being-there' by taking the There as the clearing of Being within his 'care'. The Dasein itself, however, is essentially the 'thrown' (geworfene). It is essentially in the cast (Wurf) of Being, a destiny that destines, projects a destiny." Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," pp. 278-279.

²²Ibid., p. 285.

²³Ibid., p. 277.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 272.

²⁶Ibid., p. 301.

²⁷Ibid., p. 300.

²⁸Ibid., p. 283.

²⁹Langan, pp. 101-102. Martin Heidegger, What Is Philosophy, Translated from the German and with an Introduction by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New York : Twayne Publishers Inc., 1958), p. 75.

³⁰Heidegger, What Is Philosophy, p. 45.

³¹Martin Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Existence and Being, With an introduction and analysis by Werner Bröck, Translated by Douglas Scott, R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company [A Gateway Edition], 1949), pp. 277-280.

³²Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 279.

³³German distinguishes between Historie and Geschichte. The former is a formal, theoretical approach; the latter is human time, e.g., Bergson's "duration" or what we might translate "destiny".

³⁴Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 301.

³⁵Langan, p. 118.

³⁶Heidegger, "Remembrance of the Poet," Existence and Being, pp. 244-245.

³⁷Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," pp. 301-302.

³⁸Ibid., p. 287.

³⁹Langan, p. 118.

⁴⁰Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," pp. 280-281.

⁴¹Heidegger, "Remembrance of the Poet," p. 261.

⁴²Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," pp. 288-289.

⁴³Heidegger, "Remembrance of the Poet," p. 263. Because poets grasp the High One, Heidegger maintains that there is basically "one poem" upon which all poetry depends and which poetry expresses in various ways.

⁴⁴This quotation is from Hölderlin's poem "Remembrance," IV, 135.

⁴⁵Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," p. 287.

⁴⁶Heidegger, "Remembrance of the Poet," pp. 268-269.

⁴⁷Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 293.

⁴⁸Martin Heidegger, "The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 223.

⁴⁹Langan, pp. 120-125.

⁵⁰Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 282. Some commentators have insisted from this passage that Heidegger characterizes God as a being.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 294.

⁵²Heidegger, "Letter On Humanism," p. 285.

⁵³Ibid.; p. 286.

⁵⁴Langan, p. 129.

CHAPTER IV

¹Heinrich Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology," The Later Heidegger and Theology, Vol. I of New Frontiers in Theology, James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., editors (Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 78.

²Ibid., p. 106, n. 13.

³Heinrich Ott, Theology and Preaching, Translated from the German by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), p. 10.

⁴"Das Problem des nicht-objectivierenden Denkens und Redens in der Theologie," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (November 1964); "What Is Systematic Theology?" The Later Heidegger and Theology. The first was one of the major papers read at the Second Consultation on Hermeneutics held at Drew University, April 9-11, 1964. His other publications are not of much help for our concerns. "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und die Ontologie der Geschichte," Theologische Studien 62 (1961), 3-34; "Sententiae magistri

Hugonis Pausiensis: Auszüge aus der exegetischen Arbeit Hugos," Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale XXVII (1960), 29-41; Eschatologie: Versuch eines dogmatischen Grundrisses (Evangelischer Verlag AG. Zollikon, 1958); "Romans 1:19ff. als dogmatischen Problem," Theologische Zeitschrift, Basel XV (1959), 40-50. This is not a complete listing.

⁵Here we should also include Heidegger. Barth was so impressed with his pupil Ott that he assigned to him a thesis on Bultmann. Ott studied and lived with Bultmann for a year where he indirectly had to come under the influence of Heidegger.

⁶Ott, Theology and Preaching, pp. 13-14.

⁷Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie (Switzerland: Evangelischer Verlag AG. Zollikon, 1959), p. 15. Hereafter referred to as Denken.

⁸Heinrich Ott, "Das Problem des nicht-objektivierenden Denkens und Redens," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LXI (1964), p. 348. Hereafter referred to as "Das Problem".

⁹Cf., the next paragraph for a more complete explanation of these terms.

¹⁰The position of Herman Diem. Ott, Denken, p. 18.

¹¹Ott, Denken, p. 86.

¹²Ibid., p. 112.

¹³Ibid., p. 135. "Das Sein is eigentlich ein Geschehen der Entbergung, der Lichtung, der Offenbarung."

¹⁴Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁵"Damit erscheint die Sprache, das menschliche Wort, als eine Funktion der geschickhaften Relation von Sein und Denken. Das Denken hört auf das Geheiss des Seins und findet darauf, auf die Anrede dieser 'lautlosen Stimme', seine Antwort. Diese Antwort ist die Sprache, das Wort. In ihm kommt die 'Wahrheit des Seins', eben das Sich-Erschliessen, die Entbergung, 'zur Sprache'. Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁷Ott, "Das Problem," p. 348.

¹⁸Carl Michalson, "Theology as Ontology and as History," The Later Heidegger and Theology, p. 144.

¹⁹Ott, Denken, p. 50.

²⁰Ibid., p. 190.

²¹"So gewinnen wir die rechte Hermeneutik für alles historische und theologische Verstehen, indem wir uns auf die Möglichkeit des Sprechkönnens und Verstehenkönnens von Sprache, auf des ursprüngliche Wesen der Sprache besinnen." Ibid., p. 31.

²²Objective language is the signification-information scheme used by science.

²³Ott, "Das Problem," p. 336.

²⁴In the hearing of poetry words affect an "inner"/"outer" continuum. That is, man can only speak of the forest (reference here is to a specific element in the poem Ott is analyzing) if the forest first speaks to him. For support Ott appeals to Heidegger's Dasein standing-in the "light of Being" and dwelling in the house of Being--language. Ibid., p. 335.

²⁵Cf., previous footnote.

²⁶Ott, "Das Problem," p. 350.

²⁷Supra, chap. iv, p. 36.

²⁸Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?," p. 96.

²⁹Ott, Theology and Preaching, p. 47.

³⁰Ibid., p. 155.

³¹Ibid., p. 154.

CHAPTER V

¹Supra, chap. iii, p. 14.

²Following the suggestion of the translators' (Mcquarrie and Robinson) explanatory footnote, I distinguish ontic/ontological in this way. "Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them." Being and Time, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. H11n. Throughout the remainder of the conclusion I have attempted to show Heidegger's, Ott's and the "new hermeneutic's" propensity toward the ontological, recognizing, however, that there is never a clear line of demarcation between the two.

³Because Heidegger so penetratingly demands a critical approach to all thinking--the meaning of Denkens des Denkens--he is given a partnership in Ott's dialogue with philosophy. For theology too must constantly review its Grundsätzlich--its relation between faith and thinking. Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie (Switzerland: Evangelischer Verlag AG, Zollikon, 1959), p. 40. Hereafter referred to as Denken.

⁴James Robinson, and John B. Cobb, Jr., editors, The Later Heidegger and Theology, Vol. 1 of New Frontiers In Theology (Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 44.

⁵Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁶Ott, Denken, pp. 139, 149.

⁷Heinrich Ott, "What Is Systematic Theology?," The Later Heidegger and Theology, p. 106.

⁸Supra, chap. iv, p. 35, n. 24.

⁹"If on the contrary we take seriously Heidegger's conception of thought, then we attain without difficulty an understanding of theology which sees it as a process of thinking from the heart of experience; more particularly, from the existential encounter which is the life of faith, thinking which is itself encounter, in short 'a thinking out of faith'. Hence we might adduce Heidegger as the crowning philosophical witness for our thesis concerning the continuity of preaching and dogmatics (cf. my book, Denken und Sein)." Heinrich Ott, Theology and Preaching, Translated from the German by Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 21-22, n. 1.

¹⁰Hans Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology," The Review of Metaphysics XVIII (December 1964), p. 210.

¹¹Heidegger lends partial credence to Jonas' criticism in the following statement quoted by Robinson. "The term 'hermeneutics' was familiar to me from my studies in theology. At that time, I was especially stimulated by the question of the relation between the word of the Holy Scripture and theological speculative thought. It was, if you will, the same relation, namely between language and being, only hidden and inaccessible to me." James Robinson, "Basic Shifts in German Theology," Interpretation, XVI (January 1962), p. 94.

¹²Eberhard Jüngel, "Der Schritt zurück: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Heidegger-Deutung Heinrich Otts," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVIII (1961), p. 110.

¹³Michalson, p. 160.

¹⁴Jüngel, p. 110.

¹⁵Jonas, pp. 210-11.

¹⁶Supra, chap. iv, p. 35, n. 24.

¹⁷Ott, Theology and Preaching, p. 156.

¹⁸Supra, chap. iv, p. 35, n. 24. Though this is the third reference to this particular passage, it is not a hapax legomenon. Many similar statements can be found in Denken und Sein, but there it is not always clear when Ott is explicating and when he is also in agreement. The footnote in "Das Problem" obviates this lack of clarity.

¹⁹Supra, chap. ii, pp. 9ff.

²⁰James Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," The Later Heidegger and Theology, pp. 76-77.

²¹Jonas, pp. 230-233.

²²Michalson, pp. 143-144.

²³Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press [Paperback Edition], 1961), p.212.

²⁴Ibid., p. 231.

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