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E. L. Mascall's Interpretation of the Thomistic Doctrine of Analogy in Relation to Charles Hartshorne's Doctrine of Analogy and Religious Language

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E. L. MASCALL'S INTERPRETATION
OF
THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

in relation to

CHARLES HARTSHORNE'S
DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

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by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

This paper proposes to examine the logic of analogy as a form of religious discourse in the writings of Eric Lionel Mascall and Charles Hartshorne. The problem is to exhibit the response of these men to the question: In what way and to what degree is discourse about God analogical?

Delimiting the Scope

A number of factors limit the scope of this study. First, the use of analogy as a theological method has a rich and intricate history.¹ Secondly, there is selective judgment in the decision to utilize the doctrine of analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas as representative of all theological analogy. Manifold interpretations of his doctrine alone have been penned and any portrayal of said doctrine is at best an approximation of a highly complex teaching. Thirdly, it will be assumed by the writer that there is a degree of familiarity with the anti-metaphysical bias of "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism" which stands as the backdrop of any study which attempts to deal with the question of theological discourse and its cognitive validity. For the sake of review some of the most basic theses of a dogmatic philosophical "empiricism" may be summarized as follows:

- a. The function of philosophy is logical analysis...philosophy has become the logical analysis of science through the syntactical analysis of scientific language.

- b. All cognitively significant (meaningful) discourse is divisible without remainder into analytic or synthetic propositions.
- c. Any proposition that purports to be factual or empirical has meaning only if it is possible in principle to describe a method for its verification.
- d. All metaphysical assertions, being neither analytic nor synthetic propositions are meaningless.
- e. There is a single language for all science; it is similar in form to the language of physics, and all synthetic propositions are reducible to elementary experiences expressible in this language.
- f. All normative assertions, whether positing moral, aesthetic, or religious values, are scientifically unverifiable, and are therefore to be classified as forms of non-cognitive discourse.²

Fourthly, selection from the writings of the men in question was functional.

This is particularly true in the case of E. L. Mascall who serves to illustrate the radically analogical position against which Hartshorne reacts and equally true in the case of Ian T. Ramsey who serves only as an illuminative parallel to Hartshorne's doctrine of analogy and religious language. Properly stated, then, this study will attempt to delineate the doctrine of analogy and religious language in the writings of Charles Hartshorne, Mascall and Ramsey serving as functional points of contrast and comparison respectively.

Purpose and Importance of this Study

The question of the validity of religious language in a secular age is one to which theology must definitively address itself. Linguistic analysis has hurled the charge of the impossibility and nonsensicality of theological assertions at the door of theology. Such a charge, unless defused, aims to detonate the core of the systematic enterprise. Analogy has been regarded as one method of defusing the analysts' bomb. If this is true, then it must be vitally central to the whole task of systematic

theology.³ Such statements as the one by W. S. Taylor that "analogy has been regarded as being of the greatest homiletic and pedagogic value in communicating the truth, but as of questionable value in apprehending the truth"⁴ deserve examination through comparison with those who speak with theological and philosophical eloquence on the matter. Such a study also has fringe benefits. Both John Macquarrie in his God-Talk⁵ and Schubert Ogden in his The Reality of God⁶ indicate that the issue of analogy is central in the writings of such theological giants as Barth and Bultmann. In short, if analogy is capable of establishing the validity of theological discourse, then it is of inestimable value to the systematician-apologete in his dialogue with the world.

One important aspect of this study may be the oblique way in which it demonstrates how the suppositions of a system determine the range of its flexibility and the degree of its insight. This may be tacitly seen in the degree to which the supernaturalism of Thomism necessitates its own peculiar doctrine of analogy, and the panentheism of Hartshorne logically entails its own type of teaching on analogy and religious language. It is hoped that both the subtlety and complexity of the relationship between suppositions and their derived effects will be perceived in these systems.

Methodology and Sources

The methodology of this study is designed to respond to the basic problematic question aforementioned by dealing with Mascall, as a representative of Thomism, and Ian T. Ramsey, as one to whom Hartshorne acknowledges his indebtedness, in relation to and in contrast and comparison with Charles Hartshorne. In so far as Hartshorne finds great argument with

classical Thomism and its doctrine of God which, he claims, forbids genuine analogy, Chapter II will briefly survey the general Thomistic doctrine of God as it substantiates the doctrine of analogy and then offer a brief view of Mascall's interpretation of the logic of analogy and his theory of knowledge which undergirds the same. This chapter will also point to some current misgivings concerning such a doctrine of analogy as cognitively valid. Chapter III will offer a brief explication of the "neoclassical" or "panentheistic" doctrine of God as the logical basis for understanding Hartshorne's statements on analogy and religious language in Chapter IV. Chapter IV will present those statements. Chapter V will offer an exposition of Ian T. Ramsey's views on religious language. This will be done on the recommendation by Hartshorne of the second chapter of Ramsey's Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, a work, incidentally, which Hartshorne views as germane to his own thinking. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the study and offers some tentative conclusions and critical questions.

Major sources used in the study include some of the writings of the men mentioned above. Specific attention, as can be seen in the bibliography, is given to the writings of Charles Hartshorne. None of the writers were read exhaustively. Rather, a representative sample was sought. The initial unfamiliarity with the nature of analogy necessitated widespread reading in the general area of analogy and religious language.

CHAPTER II

THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY: AN INTERPRETATION

The basis of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is found in the metaphysical presuppositions concerning the nature of God. For St. Thomas the question of ontology precedes that of epistemology. The five proofs for the existence of God establish his reality, only thereafter does the search for God's essence, for what he is, become operative. It is axiomatic that we do not confront God in the same manner in which we confront existent things. We know God only indirectly, obliquely. What can be known is his creative causality. Thus, St. Thomas asserts that by virtue of our awareness of effects, all of which imply a cause, we are led

to know of God that He exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. Hence we know His relationship with creatures, that is, He is the cause of all things; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way caused by them; and that His effects are removed from Him, not by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.⁷

As this first cause, God is simple,⁸ that is to say, He is not a body composed of matter and form.⁹ Rather, He is pure form.¹⁰ As pure form, there is no distinction between existence and essence, between that He is and what He is. Any rift between these two would place God in the category of caused things. His unity forbids placement in any genus. Similarly, it eschews contingency.

St. Thomas established rigorous canons of knowledge which set limits both on the cognition of God and on attribution to Him. According

to Aristotle, Thomas's mentor, we derive the knowledge of an object through genus, differentia, accidents, or properties. By St. Thomas's very definition of God genus, differentia, and accidents are excluded as a means of knowing God's essence. Properties, however, can be applied to God in three ways. First, there are negative properties or attributes such as simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc. Secondly, there are the names which describe a relationship, such as First Cause. Finally, there is positive attribution, for example, "good," "wise," "loving," etc.¹¹

It is in the third category, the category of positive attribution, that Thomas makes the familiar distinctions between univocal, equivocal and analogical attribution. In Book I, chapters 30-34, of his Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas acknowledges that attributes which we abstract from the particularity of human finitude are applied to God and present in Him in the appropriately divine form.¹² It is to be remembered, however, that ultimately all properties are reducible in God to a simplicity that is the hallmark of His unity. In so far as God is He in whom essence and existence are united, His mode of being forces us to refine our speech about Him. Such caution about positive attribution drives us onto the path of negation. Such humble reticence demeans the possibility of applying human qualities in the same sense or univocally. Such predication would mean the transcription of God into an anthropomorphic super-man reminiscent of mythological heroism. On the other hand, since God is the source of all creaturely attributes, it is not admissible to treat those applied attributes equivocally, that is to say, in such totally different

senses that their only claim to commonality is the form and sound of the written or spoken word. Thomas cites the example of using the word "club" to refer to a weapon and to a group of people.¹³ The danger of such equivocation with respect to attributes applied to God is that it results in "metaphysical agnosticism,"¹⁴ a stark emptiness with respect to the content of our assertions about God.

The recognition of such a range for theological predication - from univocity to equivocity - establishes, as one writer has noted, logically disjunctive polarities by which to conceive the relationship of God and man. On the one hand, there is univocal identity, absolute likeness, immanence, pantheism; on the other hand, there is equivocal separation, dissimilarity, transcendence, atheism.¹⁵ Between the Scylla and Charybdis of such disjunctions the Thomistic doctrine of analogy winds its way as the via media. Ferre states the crisis and the solution this way:

There seems no escape. If univocal, then language falls into anthropomorphism and cannot be about God; if equivocal, then language bereft of its meaning leads to agnosticism and cannot for us be about God. But at this point it is the contention of a major theological tradition that between the univocal and the equivocal lies a third logically important employment of language which can provide theological discourse with a live alternative to both anthropomorphism and agnosticism. This "middle way" is the logic of analogy.¹⁶

This doctrine of the "middle way" spreads out diversely in many of St. Thomas's writings. The following presentations of various categories of analogy are meant to reflect a cautious judgment and reserve in selection. There have been a number of exhaustive treatments of this doctrine in St. Thomas, more than one of which notes that there is no uniform doctrine of analogy readily perceptible.¹⁷

In Book I, chapter 34, of Summa Contra Gentiles two types of analogy are distinguishable. These are the analogy of proportion or attribution and the analogy of proportionality.

The analogy of attribution is divided further into two classes, analogy duorum ad tertium and analogy unius ad alterum, the former being dependent on the latter. In the first of these, multiple entities are unified by a common attribute which refers to a third entity which the many (or the two) have as a common background or point of reference.¹⁸

As an example, Thomas refers to the one health, common to all, by which we are able to say that "an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign."¹⁹ The adjective, "healthy," then, can be applied to Florida as a place which brings about health or to the complexion of the person living there, but both cases have meaning only as that adjective applies fundamentally to the person as the third entity in which these diverse forms of the adjective find their common rootage. Here Mascall says, "It is he (the person) who is (in the scholastic sense) formally healthy and is the prime analogate."²⁰

As a mode of theological discourse, however, this first type is deficient in that there exists no third being antecedent or anterior to God and the creature to whom predicates can apply formally. Such a deficiency necessitates a more direct type of analogy, that of attribution-proportion unius ad alterum. In this case the prime analogate possesses characteristics in a "formal" manner, in the full univocal sense, while its analogate participates in the characteristic or attribute only relatively or in a derivative sense.²¹ Thus, an asymmetrical relationship obtains

between the two analogates. God, in order to insure the validity of religious discourse, ought to possess all characteristics formally in order that human attributes may be used analogously, albeit relatively. It is, however, a major contention of Mascall that there are limitations to this analogy of extrinsic attribution, the analogy unius ad alterum. Mascall calls to his aid the distinction in St. Thomas between the formal possession of attributes and virtual possession. The logic of the distinction is as follows:

Creatures are good (formally but finitely), God is the cause of them all and of all that they have, therefore the word "good" applied to God need not mean any more than that he is able to produce goodness.²²

This type of analogy, then, tells us little more than that God is the cause of finite phenomena, itself a suspicious analogy open to the criticism of cognitive invalidity (infra, pp. 14-15)

In so far as the analogy of attribution results in a skepticism with respect to formal knowledge of the properties of God, the analogy of proportionality is often utilized to counter the negative effects of that skepticism. This form of analogy serves as an antidote by asserting that any word which is applied to two entities is literally true of both, although the predicate will be understood in light of the mode or manner of being appropriate to the being in question. Thus the word "leg," for instance, can apply to that of a table or of a man, but only if we take note of the similarity of function designated by that word on the one hand and the general dissimilarity by virtue of their quite different modes of being on the other hand.²³ This type of analogy is not to be confused with metaphorical comparison. In metaphor a similarity

of effects between two entities does not necessitate that both possess the same formal characteristic as in this analogy. Thus, for example, a lion so designated the 'king of beasts' does not possess the formal characteristic of kingship even though we designate his dominating role as similar in effect.

Commonly, the analogy of proportionality takes on a "quasi-mathematical" form:

$$\frac{\text{attribute of } x}{\text{essence of } x} = \frac{\text{attribute of } y}{\text{essence of } y}$$

Here both x and y share a common attribute. Thus, we speak of the "life" of both an elephant and a cabbage, for example. Mascall warns, however, that the attribute shared is never shared equally, for, even though common attribution is present, the given attribute applied to x is actually determined by its own nature or essence, while that same attribute applied to y is moulded according to the essence or mode of being of y .²⁵ The attributes, then, while applied mutually, are really self-contained and indigenous to the nature of the items in question. Such an indigeneity of the attribute has led the scholastic to call this the analogy of intrinsic attribution.

The result of such analogy is the conclusion that there is no logical connection or equality in the sense of a basic similarity of the shared attribute. One student of analogy, T. W. Silkstone, has argued that this results from a misappropriation of the mathematical idiom which, when applied for use in theological discourse, yields the conclusion of equivocation.²⁶ In a mathematical proportion a knowledge-

yielding pattern is effected only when three of the four terms are given. Thus, in the proportion 2:3::4:6 knowledge of the left-hand terms allows for inference of the final term when one of the right-hand terms is known. The dilemma in using this type of analogy as a mode of theological discourse is that, strictly speaking, neither the attributes nor the essence of God can be known according to the Thomistic via negativa.²⁷ Thus, the use of human attributes to speak of God dissipates into equivocation in spite of the good intention of the analogy of proportionality. With no link between the right and left-hand sides of the analogy a "pseudo-equation,"²⁸ nonsensical by nature, results. It is as fruitful as saying 2:3::Apples: Oranges.²⁹

It is, however, the contention of Mascall that this chasm of equivocation can be crossed with the real relation implicit in the notion of First Cause. The bond between the isolated sides of the analogy of proportionality is furnished by an analogy of attribution (causality). He cites the scholastic philosopher Garrigou-Lagrange at this point:

In these equations two created terms are known directly, one uncreated term is known indirectly by way of causality and we infer the fourth term which is known indirectly in a positive manner as regards what is analogically common with creatures and in a negative and relative manner as regards its proper divine mode.³⁰

The creative act, then, places creation in a participatory relationship with the perfections of God albeit in a non-essential manner with regard to quidditive knowledge of Him. Mascall again looks to scholastic philosophy for this insight:

Analogous perfections are thus not pure relations. They are perfections which imply in the creature a composition of two

correlative elements, potentiality and act, but which in God are pure act. Our intelligence conceives that they are realized more fully according as they are purified of all potentiality; in God they exist therefore in the pure state. We thus see that there are not two unknowns in the proportionality set up by theology.³¹

The analogy of being, then, makes analogical predication possible. Creation, as effect-implying-cause, is rooted in the act of God by which He exists and stands as a pointer to the effulgent creativity of the Creator. All attributes participate in such power. So Mascall concludes:

The goodness of God is thus declared to be self-existent goodness, and, as such, identical not merely with God's essence but with the act by which God exists. Analogy does not enable us to conceive God's goodness as identical with his essence but to affirm it as identical with his existence.³²

Knowledge of God's essence, then, is never conceptual. Analogical knowledge is the only valid insight in that analogies of attribution and proportionality interlock to explain how predication about God has been going on all along.

In order to affirm the use of analogy Mascall develops a theory of apprehension which is designed to meet the "sensationalist" (strict positivist) position on divine knowledge. The author claims that there is an erroneous dichotomy in force when one asserts that the senses merely apprehend, while the intellect goes on to reason. Instead, the intellect is apprehensive. It apprehends not only truths but objects.³³ Mascall postulates a three-fold theory of apprehension: 1) the essence of perception is not sense awareness, but intellectual apprehension: "the intellect uses the sensible phenomenon as an objectum quo, through which it passes to the apprehension of objectum quod which is the intelligible trans-sensible being"; 2) the intelligible object is grasped through sensible phenomena, not deduced from

or constructed out of them; 3) an attitude of "involvement, contemplation, and penetration" is a prerequisite for penetration beneath the sensible phenomena to the "real intelligible things" supporting them.³⁴ It is on such a basis that Mascall is able to affirm that God as cause is perceived through created effects. This is not, however, to belittle the sense of God's mystery. The nature of man's apprehension of trans-sensible entities remains dim and obscure, yet perceptible nonetheless.³⁵ That very perceptibility is what makes analogy viable and valid. For, if analogical statements about God are possible, utilizing as they do words whose primary application is to finite beings apprehended through senses, then "there must be a certain affinity between God and finite things which is not excluded by the radical difference which we have seen to characterize their existential status."³⁶ Christian imagery, thought, and discourse, then, are anchored in two realms, both controlled by God: the natural world and the Church. As the effects allow perceptibility of the divine, so Christian imagery stands as a mode of apprehension in that

the image or the image-complex, like the word or the word-complex, is an objectum quo, by the entertainment and contemplation of which the mind is able to enter into intimate cognitive union with the reality of which it is a manifestation.³⁷

God gives great images to the Church, rooted in the natural world and fulfilled in Christ, so that

in our thought and speech about him as in all else, God does not destroy the powers of our nature but confirms them and validates them, even in the act by which he makes them the raw material of supernature and grace.³⁸

Criticism

The history of criticism of both the Thomistic doctrine of analogy and the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding it is varied and complex. In modern times the critiques of the proofs of God's existence devised by Immanuel Kant and David Hume have had long-range effects. In the arena of systematics Karl Barth's persistent refusal to admit the analogia entis as a basis for natural knowledge and speaking about God is monumental of stature in the post-Kantian era. Common to all criticisms, however, seems to be a general displeasure with a radically analogical theory of divine knowledge in so far as it is predicated on the notion of causation or creation. Dorothy Emmet summarizes many of the basic criticisms in these words:

There may yet be some fundamental relation or relations of finite actuality to absolute reality transcending it. But to describe this relation as that of things to a 'First Cause' will not do, unless more explicit recognition than we find in St. Thomas's Five Ways is given to the fact that the word 'cause' can here be only used analogically. And if the word 'cause' is here only used analogically, can it define the relation in virtue of which we draw analogies?³⁹

If one begins with the fundamental "theistic assumption that God is infinite," which forbids on the philosophical level any genuine "material mode" of speech about the properties of supernatural beings, then analogy must explicate analogy.⁴⁰ And thus Thomism, dealing as it does with the absolute uniqueness of God - that primary fact that God is "over against and above His creation" in a self-subsistent manner, unrelated in any explicit way, - cannot, despite the doctrine of analogy, rescue itself from the basic nihilism which broods along the negative way.⁴¹ In short, without some similitude in relationship, literally apprehensible as a common logos,

difficulty haunts the doctrine of analogy. Here McIntyre says:

We must firmly remember that all of our knowledge of God cannot be analogical; otherwise we would not know that it was so. We have to have non-analogical knowledge with which to compare analogical and by which to judge its accuracy. Here J. S. Mill's word becomes extremely relevant; theological inquiry must accept as its goal the reduction of the area of analogical affirmation...ultimately analogies establish themselves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or modern logic, or yet to the requirements of an anti-metaphysical metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community, and to the salvation of God's children.⁴²

CHAPTER III

THE NEOCLASSICAL DOCTRINE OF GOD

In Chapter II the tension between the possibility and impossibility of theological discourse was discussed. We saw that Thomas Aquinas asserted three kinds of attribution to God - negative, relational, and positive. We further discovered that attempts at positive attribution, applying human predicates to divinity, could be either univocal or equivocal, necessitating analogical predication. E. L. Mascall contended that the analogy of attribution or the relational attribution of First Cause is necessary in order to avoid the agnostic implications of the equivocal analogy of proportionality which contains isolated terms on either side of the proportion. He further concludes that both types of analogy must be retained in theological discourse, the analogy of attribution claiming a logical priority. A further contention of Mascall was that analogy is actually a mode of apprehension carried on by the intellect without which thought of God is impossible. We finally noted that the analogical notion of "creative causality" was held suspect by some, particularly in the Kantian tradition, as incapable of yielding literal knowledge of God.

Charles Hartshorne, philosopher of religion in the tradition of personalism and process philosophy,⁴³ takes as a point of departure the obeisance of this classical tradition to the Infinity of God. The via negativa is the fundamental error of that great tradition.⁴⁴ With the aid of a cursory overview of his doctrine of God, the metaphysical basis for his own doctrine of analogy and religious language, we shall investigate his assertion that the negative attributes of God - infinity, eternity, immutability, etc. - spell the demise of logical talk about God.

The judgment that the negative way of Thomism forbids true analogical discourse is predicated on Hartshorne's understanding of the Thomistic God as "absolute and totally exempt from relations to the creatures."⁴⁵

With regard to analogy he states of the Thomistic doctrine of God:

To say, we know, not God, but something to which we know that God is analogous, does not meet my argument. Analogy involves relation, thus: "We know there is Something to which the world is related as effect to cause." If the relation is in God, then he is relative. If it is in the world, then the world has relation* to-God, and since this is a complex which includes God, and since, God has, by hypothesis, only absolute being, the world must include this absolute being. Otherwise, what the world has is not relation-to-God, but relation-to, and nowhere, in the world or in God, is there any such relation as the analogy involves. So "the analogy of being" fails to provide an answer to the question, what do we know when we know God?"⁴⁶

God, then, must be literally related to the world; to assert otherwise, contends Hartshorne, is to claim the God is unknowable. In a qualified univocal sense God is temporal and spatial, dependent and complex, conscious and good, purposive and powerful. God is, however, more than His relations which obtain with the world. Hartshorne states that the "all" (the world) is in God, but not co-terminous with Him. Hartshorne disclaims pantheism. Rather, he holds to a doctrine of "di-polar theism" or "panentheism" which states that there is a unified polarity in God of finite and infinite, actual and potential, becoming and fixed being, contingent and necessary.⁴⁷ God is the Process-Itself, the process of actualization by which events become actual, pass on into actuality, the finite "pole" of God, forming a novel moment of that pole of God and, in turn, furnishing new data in the process, while together with such a pole the inherent possibility of future events. He states:

The inclusive principle [of actualization] is not something utterly mysterious to be called being, which is neither in contrast nor not in contrast to becoming, but process itself, with a face of "actuality" (in the literal sense, for there is here no other), viewed in one temporal direction, and of "potentiality;" viewed in the other, with an eternal factor of abstract being common to all such potentiality.⁴⁸

God, then, claims unique metaphysical status not, as in Thomism, because of what He is not, but because of what He is, namely, positive "all-relatedness." The negative side of God, His non-relatedness, is not to be conceived as sheer negativity, but rather as His omni-possibility.⁴⁹ The conjunction of these two facets is designated by Hartshorne as "modal coincidence," meaning that the necessarily all-inclusive must be one whose potentiality for change is co-extensive with the logically possible and that God "is the Whole in every categorial sense, all actuality in one individual actuality, and all possibility in one individual potentiality."⁵⁰ As the Whole, then, there is no being or principle save God alone which is the necessary ground of whatever exists or is even possible.

Hartshorne goes on to claim that God can be conceived as the "infinite personal existence or creative becoming" in the literal sense and that one can assert

God's independence of the actual world (in his abstract identity) without saying he is wholly external to it, and one can affirm his inclusion of the actual world (in his concrete existence) without denying that the world as actual is completely contingent and radically dependent on him as its sole necessary ground.⁵¹

As Supreme Person, God possesses a determinate "body" or the actual limitations of finitude as the process-up-to-now; but simultaneously he possesses the indeterminate freedom which is the freedom to harmonize all the indeterminate choices of creation or potentiality. Novelty, then,

is possible only in so far as the infinity of God is the totality of conceivable finite realities, the infinity of his possible finite roles.⁵² God is thus bound in a unique, all-encompassing way to what is, while free to become whatever might become. He is that web of interaction as the "universal individual," "the unity of a sequence of concrete states of consciousness each connected with the others in the most truly ideal way by omniscient memory and steadfastness of purpose."⁵³ God is literally structurally related to all beings in a universal manner and is relevant to all contexts. No longer can He afford to be conceived as the "causa sui" or self-derived being of classical metaphysics.⁵⁴ In short, rather than a blank substance requiring nothing but itself to exist or Being as atemporal absolute, God as the paradigmatic self is fully relational, social, and temporal, the ever-changing process whose immutability consists in the unique manner in which He integrates the distinct modes of past, present, and future.⁵⁵ In the following chapter we shall examine the import of such a doctrine for a theory of analogy and religious language.

CHAPTER IV

HARTSHORNE'S DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

In Chapter III a brief survey of Hartshorne's doctrine of God revealed his teaching that God is to be conceived as the eminent Self who is totally related as the ground of any and all relationships to a universe of nondivine beings. He is finite in so far as he contains all actuality, infinite in so far as he is the omnipossibility of all future and novel relationships. His environment is internal, that is to say, he can never be spatially and temporally defined locally or fragmentarily.⁵⁶ His absolute character consists in his all-relatedness, abstract in nature, which, while relative to all, is relative to no one thing externally and so is able to serve as the basis for any and all realities.

Hartshorne contends that such relatedness is the key to a proper doctrine of analogy. He says:

It was held that while ordinary individuals interact, God's superiority is that he acts only (actus purus) and does not interact. Unfortunately, this destroys all analogy between God and creatures.⁵⁷

It is the paradigm of self or God as the Cosmic Interacting Whole which furnishes the basis for religious discourse. The dimension of totality is the key to understanding the religious definition of the word 'God'. It is in worship that such a dimension is perceived. Worship is the "integrating of all one's thoughts and purposes,"⁵⁸ a consciously unitary response to life. Such an integrity is possible only in correlation with the experience of the "cosmic or all-inclusive whole [as] an integrated

individual, the sole non-fragmentary individual."⁵⁹ In the injunctions for total response which are common to worship (for example, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with all thy soul and with all thy strength.") lies the implication that every response must, in fact, be a way of loving God. From this it follows that God must be related to every experience, for "if God is in all things, he is in our experiences and also in what we experience, and thus is in some fashion a universal datum of experience."⁶⁰ Thus, in much the same way as the word 'I' serves as the indicator of integrity for all human experiences of the self, so God stands as the integrity of all experience. In worship alone with its apodictic demand for unbroken, universal response is the presence of deity evoked as the basis of all reality. Language itself, as part of that total reality, exhibits the presence of deity. Thus, Hartshorne contends, 'God' is

not simply another word in our language but, if anything rational, a name for the principle back of every word in any possible language. He is not merely another topic to think about, but the all-pervasive medium of knowledge and things known, to recognize whom is a way of thinking about no matter whom.⁶¹

Hartshorne goes on to assert that any denial of God as this necessary, all-inclusive background of experience and language is an explicit acceptance of the contingent and the accidental as absolute. Rather, as the human self binds up its contingent properties in a unified whole and is the necessary ground of the possibility of contingency, God acts as Necessary First Cause, not in the sense of external creator, but as the logical possibility and matrix of accidental occurrences, as the existent who must exist, even if it is as the experience of the non-being

of anything. He is the "being which will be there no matter what else is there."⁶² As noted above, one cannot deny this without contending with the resulting capricious absurdity of conceiving the accidental as simply accidental.

Hartshorne wishes to distinguish this doctrine of necessity and causality from the Thomistic doctrine of First Cause as actus purus.

In no way is the necessary independent of the contingent. He says:

Thus, the first cause is not in every sense independent of other causes, but rather in its essence it depends upon (in the sense of necessitating or omnipotently requiring) the class of contingent beings as such, while in its accidents the necessary being (necessary only in essence and as to having some accidents or other) depends upon just what contingent beings in fact exist.⁶³

The necessary and the contingent, then, constitute one interdependent reality, the unity and wholeness of which is known in worship and spoken of in language. In such a scheme the word 'God' operates as the logical president over all contingent linguistic expressions in the same manner in which the word 'I' presides over contingent acts as the necessary possibility of their occurrence.⁶⁴

Linguistic analysis must take the notion of necessity seriously. The principle of verification, regarding as it does all existence as contingent, is actually is "impious in principle."⁶⁵ Rather, those concerned with the logic of theological statements should assay theological statements as belonging to the general class of metaphysical assertions which are not susceptible to the fragmentary metaphysic of positivism. It is only in such a stance that one will notice that in worship metaphysical statements take on a specificity of content which points to the way the variable details of contingent experience are woven into a constant structure and integrated sense of wholeness.⁶⁶

In an article, "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," Hartshorne delineates this intimate relationship between the necessary and the contingent (which is, of course, paralleled by all the polarities in God - infinite and finite, free and determined, possible and actual, becoming and fixed being). Here he notes that there are three categories of linguistic statements. First, there are ordinary factual statements, fragmentary in character, designated as partially restrictive of existential (contingent) possibilities. Secondly, there are completely restrictive statements, wholly negative, which express an impossible state of affairs such as "nothing exists." Such a statement is impossible because the verifying experience of it must exist. Finally, there are completely nonrestrictive statements which are universal, necessary and existential. He notes these assertions as follows:

Necessarily, something exists.
 Necessarily, experience occurs.
 Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs.
 Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of which are both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.
 Necessarily, divine or infallible experience, having fallible experience among its objects, occurs.⁶⁷

The necessity of such assertions rests in the inconceivability of their contraries, so that literal assertions about the divine entail "...the absence of any positive meaning for the denial of a statement or - the same thing - the failure of the statement to exclude any positive state of affairs."⁶⁸ Metaphysics cannot seek after any partially restrictive truth, as though God were an infinite fact, but rather seeks to explicate

what would be real about the world no matter what possibilities were actualized and which cannot be denied without self-contradiction. At this point Hartshorne explicitly works within the restraint of Popper's canon of conceivable falsifiability, that canon which states that verification in science is not as important as conceivable falsification.⁶⁹

Theological-metaphysical statements, then, seek to designate the common factors in all experience:

If 'information' means a description of what distinguishes one state of affairs from other conceivable states, then necessary statements are not informative; but if 'information' includes reference to the factor which all possible positive states of existence have in common, then necessary statements are informative.⁷⁰

Furthermore, such statements, drawn as they are from the all-inclusive process and interrelationship of the necessary and contingent, are capable of literal application, both in a qualified and strict sense, to deity. The emergence of a linguistic world or accident from that "indeterminate determinable potentiality for possible worlds," which is the same for Hartshorne as the "necessary," is capable of being literally denotative of deity in so far as the necessary is the recipient of the accidental and the supreme cause is also the supreme effect.⁷¹ Thus, while the attribution of a fixed aspect of reality to an aspect of the all-inclusive process is literally correct, it is infinitely far from a complete description of him. Attributions are literal in the qualified sense of being an actual portion of reality, but non-literal in their adequacy to do full justice to the Process-Itself.

Hartshorne combines the above insights into an explicit statement on religious language in an article entitled, "Three Strata of Meaning in Religious Discourse." The thetic statement of that article reads as follows:

God is symbolically ruler, but analogically conscious and loving, and literally both absolute (or necessary) in existence and relative (or contingent) in actuality - that is, in the concrete modes of His existence.⁷²

Religious language, then, operates on three levels: 1) the symbolic level; 2) the literal level; 3) the "problematic" or analogical level.

The first stratum deals with material predications concerning deity. Since God, the Integral Whole, cannot be compared with the part, literal application of designations like "rock," "shepherd," "fountain," etc. are not possible. As mentioned previously (supra, p. 22), Hartshorne feels that the dilemma of positivism with its bewitchment over the particular has lost divinity in fragmentariness (not all-encompassing, integral finitude) and placed him in the class of partially restrictive statements.⁷³

The second stratum deals with the formal predicates applicable to deity. Here we deal with metaphysical attributes such as "eternal," "immutable," "impassive." While negative in appearance, these are actually the abstract principles of the concrete identity of the divine (supra, p. 18, footnote 51). Like those attributes of the human self, God's attributes are abstract expressions of a concrete web of experience and, therefore, are positive in content, though negative in form. These particular formal attributes are radically unlike human ones, however, in their comprehensiveness. They are meant to

define that sense of his eminence or perfection which is indeed statically complete, an absolute maximum. But, because they are in themselves nothing more than abstractions, they are far from constituting the whole of his perfection which is something unimaginably concrete: the ever new synthesis into his own everlasting and all-embracing life of all that has been or ever shall be.⁷⁴

In summary, these formal attributions are positive because concrete and, in the terms of the article previously mentioned, "existential." They are literal because they conceptualize according to the canon of literalness, the principle of all or none, of necessary truth or falsity. Thus, they are literal (nonrestrictive) and positive expressions of the universal character of God because he is the all-inclusive participant (as supreme necessary cause), on the one hand, and all-inclusive relatum (as supreme contingent effect), on the other hand. Both poles are literally true and attributable, because as finitude he embraces all factuality of the process-up-to-now, while as infinitude he is able in his mode of potentiality to embrace all actual worlds which may come to be through the contingent acts of creatures.

By way of excursus it is useful to note that Hartshorne has found argument with Paul Tillich's doctrine of a "super-theistic God" who is alleged to transcend both poles, thereby rendering di-polar statements non-literal.⁷⁵ Tillich, who actually applies the analogy duorum ad tertium to God as the third entity to which finity and infinity, being and becoming are related, is guilty, claims Hartshorne, of rendering all theological discourse innocuous by claiming it is only "symbolic" of deity. He charges:

Is it not the case that Tillich's arguments for his more radically symbolic view are themselves at best symbolic, unable to meet logical tests? True, Tillich seems at times to argue from Being-Itself, which he says is to be taken literally. But how can it so be taken, when our experience, itself a process, discloses only processes and what can be abstracted therefrom? A "being" which is neither any process nor any datal constituent of process, but something simpliciter more inclusive than all process - this cannot, it seems, have literal meaning, for nothing of the sort appears in experiencing. At best, "being" in this sense seems a reference to traditional metaphysics, by faith taken as a symbol of what no experience could exhibit.⁷⁶

Thus, the desire to place God outside the categories of experience places Tillich in the classical stream with St. Thomas who deemed the character of God so beyond human categories that we can only say what He is not. To repeat, however, the claim of Hartshorne: in the strictly formal sense we can know the logical meaning of the modal polarities of God which speak of his all-inclusiveness and which coincide in him.

The third stratum of religious discourse builds on the foregoing understanding. If God is formally describable as ideally, eminently, and universally relative, then non-formal descriptions need not be in logical contradiction to the formal. Rather, the non-formal are applicable to deity in degrees. Here Hartshorne speaks in terms of psychical attributes. Since, as he says, "all functions are God-functions,"⁷⁷ and the real infinity of God consists in his all-inclusiveness and the omnipotentiality to be so, religious phrases such as "God loves," "God wills," "God knows" are capable of literal acceptance when translated into the form of "all-loving," "all-willing," "all-knowing." As noted earlier, Hartshorne roots the literal knowledge and applicability of these psychical concepts in the setting of worship where one gains a "religious intuition" of the comprehensive character of the word "all," and, hence,

an intuition of God Himself as the Wholeness of reality. The unconditional demands for total sympathy and care for all reality reflect the all-encompassing care, sympathy and feeling which he bears for the whole creation. Thus, psychical concepts such as feeling, memory, sympathy are not really applied analogically to God from creaturely experience. Rather, the reverse is true. In worship comes the realization of the literal, universal sense of such concepts and this basic religious insight allows the affirmation that "analogical concepts apply literally to deity and analogically to creatures."⁷⁸

Hartshorne deems this stratum "problematic" precisely because human awareness of and participation in psychical realities is limited. Hartshorne urges that we replace the negative theology with a positive and literal awareness of the formal properties of deity and affirm a new "negative anthropology."

We see that the term "know" in the human case turns out to have a rather indefinite meaning. In the divine case, the matter is simple: God, as infallible, has absolutely conclusive evidence concerning all truths, so that if knowledge is possession of perfect evidence as to the state of affairs, then God simply knows - period. No such plain definition will work for human knowledge. In this sense, it is the theistic use only of psychical conceptions which has literal meaning, a meaning from which all other meanings are derived by qualification, diminution or negation. So, instead of the old "negative theology," one might propose a new "negative anthropology."⁷⁹

We are, claims Hartshorne, to exploit the "intuition which we have of God [in worship]." For, the "awareness of God furnishes a criterion for the weakness of man."⁸⁰ The divine-human contrast stands at the basis of all human thought and speaking. The problematic nature of

language at this level is the task of defining the exact scope and limits of relational reference for each resemblance to deity and to the intuition of him. It is clear in any case that the participation of human qualities in the divine standard or logos is not to be denied without destroying the very possibility of analogy. For example, if God is Father (all-caring, all-loving) he cannot be at the same time unfatherly in essentia on the pretext that "similarity to a father in such respects would be 'anthropomorphic' or univocal."⁸¹ This insistence on forbidding God positive and literal contents, even in such abstractions as immutability, eternity and the like, inevitably exposes the theological use of analogy to the charges of vagueness, inappropriateness and self-contradiction.⁸²

An all too negative theology made God the great emptiness, and an all too negative anthropology made the creatures also empty. I suggest that nothing is only nothing, that the divine attributes, are positive, and the creatures' qualities are between these and nothing.⁸³

CHAPTER V

IAN T. RAMSEY: AN EXCURSUS

In Chapter IV it was noted that Charles Hartshorne rooted the linguistic meaning of the word 'God' in the religious experience of worship. There one learns of integrity by encountering the demands of total response placed upon the believer. There the primal awareness of the all-inclusiveness of God is most intense. Hartshorne acknowledges that such an insight parallels some of the investigations of Ian T. Ramsey.⁸⁴ For that reason it may prove profitable to examine a portion of the writings of Ramsey on religious language.

Ramsey begins, as did Hartshorne, in that realm which he characterizes as a "characteristically religious situation." These are situations in which something "odd" occurs and men become aware that they are more than any of their public behavior.⁸⁵ At such a point "the ice breaks," "the light dawns," "the penny drops."⁸⁶ In short, one is overcome by a flash of insight. This experience, however, is not merely subjective. Such a situation has an "objective" character in so far as it is rooted in empirical language and reality. When empirical phrases are "strained" to their limits they evoke discernment and "depth" emerges.⁸⁷ It so happens that in this process theological language will arrive at certain tautological functionaries which are to act as "key words," the "ultimates of explanation."⁸⁸ Remembering Hartshorne, the tautological is, of course, the necessary. It resides beyond strict object language. Put otherwise, our conclusion is that for the religious man "God" is a key word, an irreducible posit, an ultimate of explanation ex-

pressive of the kind of commitment he professes. It is to be talked about in terms of the object language over which it presides, but only when this object language is qualified; in which case this qualified object-language becomes also currency for that odd discernment with which religious commitment, when it is not bigotry or fanaticism, will necessarily be associated.⁸⁹

Object-language is qualified in several ways for religious use.

The first method is that of negative theology. Negative theology must describe God obliquely at the cost of positive knowledge and literal conceptualization. As it stands it has value as an evocative meditative technique,⁹⁰ in which nay-saying leads to an awareness of the effulgence of God. Secondly, there is the way of contrasting words like unity, simplicity, perfection with their opposites. The very logical tension created inevitably evokes commitment.⁹¹ Finally, the third method distinguishes the "model-qualifier" technique. Qualification refines the model until commitment occurs. The concept or model of "cause," for example, is qualified with "first," until the primacy of divinity is discerned in commitment. All words, if suitably molded and qualified, will function religiously, that is to say, will evoke discernment-commitment. In an observation again similar to Hartshorne Ramsey claims that God can be seen in all the words of His creation, if logically qualified (supra, p. 21, footnote 61).⁹²

Theologically, the word 'God' functions and behaves in much the same way the word 'I' does. From the assertions "I exist" and "God exists" nothing strictly verifiable can be deduced, yet both function as the presupposition of personal existence and speaking, on the one hand, and scientific, cosmic existence and discourse, on the other hand. Finally,

religious language is grounded in the personal...the personal is not only a category which is never wholly reducible to scientific terms, but...interlocks with all the diverse languages of science to unite them as a common presupposition.⁹³

God, then, is that invariant "which is anchored objectively in a disclosure situation, when that situation involves the whole universe."⁹⁴

And in all cases it is in worship that one must seek the plotting, mapping and qualificational arousal of theological phrases:

Here then is a method by which not only are problems overcome, but where at every point we ploy and map our theological phrases with reference to a characteristically religious situation - one of worship, wonder, awe. Without such an empirical anchorage all our theological thinking is in vain, and where there is controversy and argument we are to look for their resolution where they are fulfilled: in worship.⁹⁵

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter I

This chapter states the problem in the form of the question: In what way and to what degree is discourse about God analogical? The proposal is made to examine the writings of three men in order to draw a tentative conclusion. These men are E. L. Mascall, a neo-Thomist philosopher, Charles Hartshorne, a philosopher of religion who builds on the insights of process philosophy, and Ian T. Ramsey. The first and third of these three are to be understood in relation to Charles Hartshorne.

Chapter II

This study deals cursorily with the Thomistic doctrine of God in so far as it necessitates a doctrine of analogy. God, whose essence is unknowable, can be spoken of negatively, relationally, or positively. In the application of positive attributes to God discourse about Him tends toward one of two polar extremities - univocity or equivocity. Univocity is suspect of immanentism (pantheism, anthropomorphism); equivocity yields a radical separation of God and the creature in spite of mutual attribution, that is to say, words mutually applied do not have a meaningful point of common reference in experiential reality.

The doctrine of analogy acts as a "middle way" between such extremes. Two types of analogy are generally recognized, although interpretations of them are complex. These are the analogy of attribution and the analogy

of proportionality. Both these analogies fail to offer a literal, formal knowledge of God. Analogy of attribution affirms no more than that God is able to cause the effects spoken of in language; analogy of proportionality offers no literal knowledge of either the third or fourth term on the right side of a proportion comparing the creature (and his mode of being) and God (and his mode of being). Mascall affirms that the equivocation which results from the absence of a third-term knowledge can be overcome through the postulation of an analogy of attribution or "creative causality", God's existential relation with the world, which, in turn, interlocks with the analogy of proportionality to explain how talk about God has been possible all along. Such an affirmation is based upon a theory of religious cognition which recognizes that things, truth and trans-sensible reality are all known by the intellect through sensible phenomena as the medium of cognition. Thus, the substantial is grasped through the accidental; the relationship between cause and effect is interdependent.

This chapter concludes with a short perusal of some more general criticisms which a radical doctrine of analogy has had to endure. Citations from Dorothy Emmet and John McIntyre as representative samples revealed that some literal or essential knowledge of God's basic character was necessary before analogical speaking is able to claim validity.

Chapter III

This study surveys briefly the "neoclassical" or "panentheistic" doctrine of God as the basis of a doctrine of analogy and religious

language. The study proffers Hartshorne's doctrine of "di-polar theism" which states that finitude and infinitude, actuality and potentiality, necessity and contingency are supremely present as the polarities of Process-Itself. God's nature is seen to be social in nature and, therefore, personal and interactive in the eminent sense. God is universally related to all finitude and, therefore, is supremely abstract and supremely concrete. He is also both determined by the acts of creatures which comprise his finitude and yet free in his omnipotentiality to accept and harmonize whatever world may come to be.

Chapter IV

This chapter indicates how the all-relatedness of God is brought to bear in a doctrine of analogy and religious language. The Self, being universal in its relations, acts as the universal datum of experience, of which linguistic experience claims importance. It is in the setting of worship that linguistic experience is best utilized for religious discourse. In that setting the dimension of totality directs the worshipper to perceive that God is implicit in all dimensions of experience in much the same way the word 'I' functions as common to all experience of the human self. This awareness is a realization through the religious intuition of the all-encompassing nature of God of the necessity of experience, the absence of which is impossible and which serves as the cohesive factor to which the word 'God' is applicable. All language is to be seen in the light of that necessity. For that reason theological statements fall into the same class as metaphysical statements. Such

assertions take seriously both the completely nonrestrictive (necessary) and existential (contingent) aspects of Reality as Process. This is another way of saying that the accidental is dependent upon the necessary.

Three classes of theological assertion are noted in Hartshorne's writing: symbolic, literal and analogical. Symbolical statements are classed so because they deal with a fragmentary portion of reality inadequate for description of the Whole. Literal religious discourse is based on those abstract principles which summarize the infinite (as temporal magnitude) concrete identity of the Process-Itself. They include negatively formulated attributes, but are nonetheless formally positive and literal in so far as they are universals rooted in a concrete reality. Analogical concepts are based on the literal intuition of divinity available in the religious experience of all-relatedness. Such concepts are literally applicable to deity according to the nature of the intuition and are analogically applicable to creatures according to the degree to which they are able to approximate the activity of God. Thus, Hartshorne suggests a negative anthropology in which one is capable of only dimly perceiving the way in which man loves, knows, feels, etc., while fully capable in the religious intuition of the divine of perceiving the way in which God carries out psychical activities, namely, totally. All psychical experience, then, must claim degrees of diminution in comparison with the intensity and universality of the divine standard.

Chapter V

In his own explication of religious language Charles Hartshorne in-

timates awareness of the writings of Ian T. Ramsey. This chapter aims to draw on that intimation by treating Ian T. Ramsey as an illuminative parallel. Ramsey, like Hartshorne, finds that empirical phrases take on religious significance in a "characteristically religious situation." Words and verifiable experience are pushed to a logical limit, after which something "odd" occurs and "discernment" is evoked. At the basis of such discernment are "key words" which stand at the apex of experience as "ultimates of explanation." These words go beyond the objective as the very matrix of its occurrence.

All language must be qualified through negation, contrast, or qualification in order to function religiously. Such a process yields commitment wherein 'God' functions, like 'I', as the fundamentum of cosmic experience, tautological, unverifiable, yet unfalsifiable and therefore present in all forms of experience as the presupposition of its possibility and meaning. Such an awareness of the Necessary occurs pre-eminently in the setting of worship.

Concluding Remarks

The initial query concerning the manner in and the degree to which discourse about God is analogical may now be answered in several ways. First, the alternative of E. L. Mascall is to claim an analogical epistemology in which all awareness of God is indirect and analogical, although valid. This might be designated mitigated equivocation - mitigated because knowledge and discourse does in fact occur, equivocation because of the reticence to admit full and literal conceptualization and

discourse about the divine. Secondly, the option of Charles Hartshorne is to stress that analogy is possible only on the basis of literal apprehension. Such a literal apprehension is available, and here he receives support from Ian T. Ramsey, in the situation of worship. In so far as all reality is a continuum-in-process the very disjunction between the world and God implicit in the theism of Thomas is avoided by Hartshorne and analogy is allegedly restored to a status of logical respectability by literally basing analogy on experience of the divine as all-related. The position of both Hartshorne and Ramsey might be designated as reasonable or qualified univocity - reasonable and qualified because discourse about God participates in the logical class of metaphysically universal and necessary statements, univocity because the status of the empirical world and empirical language as a polar reality of God (his accidental nature) is not to be derogated.

These respective positions of mitigated equivocity, on the one hand, and reasonable univocity, on the other hand, tend to result in essentially different ways of formulating the question of divine knowledge and referential religious language. The Thomistic position tends to ask, "How can that which is essentially beyond all experience be legitimately conceptualized and spoken of as personal?" Expectedly, it tends to respond, as did Mascall, with an analogical epistemology inherent in its suppositions. The neoclassical position of Hartshorne phrases the question rather, "In what manner can the supremely relative Self be appropriately conceived and spoken of in an absolute manner?" It responds in kind with a theory of religious language that is based on the manner in which the word 'I' is used in human experience.

In both cases there are difficulties. First, in the case of Mascall it is held dubious by some that phenomenal reality can really act as an indicator of the divine without some formal knowledge which may serve as a standard of comparison. Those who tend to disagree with Mascall's position would ask whether such an insistence on the radically analogical nature of knowledge and speaking of the divine may tend to degenerate into a pious form of projection, a kind of pseudo-analogy which knows in the fullest sense no ground of predication but casts some form of intra-experiential relation, for example, "cause," on to a transcendent real which is strictly unknowable? Those who agree would most likely respond that one may not project except upon something and that the very projected image when magnified according to the infinite extension of the divine indeed furnishes the awareness. Secondly, the reasonable univocity of Hartshorne may possibly be more radically analogical than seems apparent at first glance. Although he is attempting to derive a non-analogical metaphysic, is not his very model dependent on his selection of that reality which is to serve analogously, namely, the self? Furthermore, what is the validity of basing a literal knowledge of God upon a religious intuition available in worship? Again, how does one relate to a formal aspect of divinity? How does Hartshorne's theory of completely nonrestrictive statements hold up under the critique of Collingwood, Carnap and others who would contend that universals of being merely represent the limiting case of the abstractive process? Would such a criticism tend to destroy the infinite pole of Hartshorne's God and reinstate the supremacy of the contingent as the necessary.⁹⁶ Is it possible that deference to the necessary in order to establish the possibility of the possible

is an act of faith? Have not the radical empiricists gotten on quite well with the brute fact of contingency?

Such are the questions which this study has generated. In the intricate search for establishing a valid human basis for the perception of the divine one pauses to wonder with McIntyre whether that phenomenological emergence of God in unhiddenness and disclosure of Himself must not serve as that literal standard by which we speak of and praise Him.

The philosophers have helped us to see that analogies must be carefully scrutinised for positive and negative content, and graded accordingly. But ultimately analogies establish themselves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or modern logic, or yet to the requirements of an anti-metaphysical metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community, and to the salvation of God's children.⁹⁷

FOOTNOTES

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