

Concordia Seminary - Saint Louis

## Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary

---

Bachelor of Divinity

Concordia Seminary Scholarship

---

5-1-1927

### The Reformed Arguments Against the Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper Examined in the Light of the Main Modern Philosophical System since Locke

Walter C. Daib

Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, ir\_daibw@csl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholar.csl.edu/bdiv>



Part of the [Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons](#)

---

#### Recommended Citation

Daib, Walter C., "The Reformed Arguments Against the Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper Examined in the Light of the Main Modern Philosophical System since Locke" (1927). *Bachelor of Divinity*. 732.

<https://scholar.csl.edu/bdiv/732>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Concordia Seminary Scholarship at Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bachelor of Divinity by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact [seitzw@csl.edu](mailto:seitzw@csl.edu).

**Compiler's Note:**

**This is a copy of the original thesis submitted to the faculty.**

**Corrections have been made only where indicated by the author.**

**The original is to be found in the care of the Librarian.**

**The Reformed Arguments against the Real Presence of the  
Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper  
Examined in the Light of the Main  
Modern Philosophical System since  
Locke**

**A thesis**

**presented to the faculty of**

**Concordia Seminary**

**by**

**Walter G. Daib**

**in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree**

**of**

**BACHELOR OF DIVINITY**

**1927**

**The Reformed Arguments against the Real Presence of the  
Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper  
Examined in the Light of the Main  
Modern Philosophical System since  
Locke**

**Introduction.**

It has ever been the claim of Lutheran theologians that the theology of the Reformed section of the Christian church was based, not upon Scripture, but upon a reasonable interpretation of Scripture. In other words, to the Reformed theologian the Bible is not the norma normans, but rather the norma normata. Reason is his norma normans.

This claim of Lutheran theology has never been expressly denied by Reformed theologians, and, in fact, we find from the earliest beginnings of Reformed theology, statements which seem to support that view. Thus, for instance, in the Genevan Catechism, written by Calvin, the question: "Poterisne ratione demonstrare, nihil esse in ea re absurdi?" is answered: "Sans. Si mihi concessum fuerit, nihil Dominum instituisse, quod sit a ratione dissentaneum". (Niemyer, *Collectio Confessionum*, p.163.)

Modern Reformed theologians have expressed the same thought with more clarity and precision. Thus for instance, Charles Hodge in his Systematic Theology says: "The Bible never requires us to receive as true anything, which the constitution of our nature, given us by God himself, forces us to believe false or impossible". (II,390) A somewhat fuller development of this view is found in the authoritative Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review of the year 1845 (vol.XVII,392). From an article, entitled "The Connection between Philosophy and Revelation" we have culled the following:

"We have said that all natural phenomena, whether

physical or psychological are to be explained by philosophy, and not by the words of Scripture. But it is important to observe that there is a difference between the physical and psychological truths in the certainty of which they can be made to bear upon the interpretation of Scripture. There is generally more certainty in our knowledge of physical than of psychological truth. For instance, we know with absolute certainty, that the earth moves around the sun, and that the bread and wine in the eucharist are bread and wine; and of course, Scripture must be interpreted accordingly; for God never contradicts in revelation what he has said in nature; and it must be borne in mind, that in all physics all reasoning must end in submission to the senses. For the illusions of sense can only be corrected by evidence of the same sort, where one sense is brought to testify against itself."

The attentive reader will mark that the sentiments expressed in the foregoing quotation seem to be questionable from the standpoint of a conservative Biblical scholar. If the same line of reasoning were followed out to its bitter consequence, it would leave us without any supernatural facts in religion. But it is by a "happy" inconsistency that the Reformed theologians, at least those of the conservative school, have restricted reason as a norm of doctrine to the narrow sphere of Christology and the Sacraments. It is chiefly here that they have made use of the arguments from possibility and reasonability. It is these arguments from reason that we wish to examine.

We have divided our treatise into three sections. In the first

we shall consider the arguments from reason which are urged by Reformed theologians against the Real Presence in the Lord's Supper, and show upon what premises and suppositions these arguments are based. In the second section we shall sketch the epistemological investigations of modern philosophy since Locke, paying special attention to those results which have a direct bearing upon the premises and suppositions which are basic for the Reformed arguments.

### I. The Reformed Arguments and their Philosophical Basis.

In delineating the Reformed objections to the Lutheran doctrine that Christ's body and blood are really, though sacramentally and not locally present, in the bread and wine, it will be well to quote their objections, lest any charge of misrepresentation be lodged against our presentation.

Dr. John Wiley, professor of Systematic Theology at Drew Theological Seminary (Methodist Episcopal) in his *Systematic Theology* (I,58) urges the following against the Lutheran doctrine:

"The human nature assumed by the Logos in the incarnation remained human, with the attributes of the human. In itself it possessed the capacity for only such knowledge, power, and presence as is possible to the human. How, then, could it become omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent? The answer is, through the divine nature, with which it was united. But if this union answers for such results, either it must give to the finite attributes of the human nature the plenitude of the infinite, or invest that nature with the attributes of the infinite. Attributes of knowledge, power, and presence, such as we here contemplate, are concrete realities of being, not mere notions or names. There can be neither

knowledge, nor power, nor presence without the appropriate attribute of being. The being must answer for the character of the attribute, and the attribute must answer for all that is affirmed of it. Only a mind possessing the power of absolute knowledge can be omniscient. Omnipotence must have its ground in a will of absolute power. Omnipresence, such as the Lutheran Christology affirms of the human nature of Christ, is possible only with an infinite extension of being. Hence, either the finite attributes of the human nature assumed by the Logos must be lifted into the infinitude of the divine attributes, or the divine attributes must be invested in the human nature, which is intrinsically finite, and which in itself, even as the Lutheran Christology concedes, must ever remain finite."

"It is at this point that the doctrine encounters insuperable difficulties, even absolute impossibilities. There is no possibility that the human nature of Christ should possess the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, which the Lutheran Christology ascribes to it. It is properly regarded as an axiom that the finite has not a capacity for the infinite - 'Finitum non capax infiniti'. The principle is absolutely true in application to the points which we here make. The finite attributes of the human nature can neither be enlarged to the infinitude of the divine attributes, nor receive into themselves the plenitude of the divine. Neither can the finite nature of man receive the investment of these divine attributes. But there can be no omniscience without the attribute of absolute knowing; no omnipotence of being without a will of absolute power; no omnipresence

of being without an infinite extension. Here are the impossibilities which the Lutheran Christology encounters in the ascription of such attributes to the human nature of Christ."

In this line of argumentation against the Lutheran doctrine, we find that Dr. Wiley has based his whole argument on the two statements: 1. "Attributes of knowledge, power, and presence . . . are concrete realities, not mere notions or names." Dr. Wiley here assumes that the attributes of knowledge, power, and presence have an existence outside of the perceiving mind. Now the attribute "presence" is equivalent to the attribute of extension; the attribute "power" implies the idea of force, motion, cause and effect; and the attribute "knowledge" is based on the idea of understanding. He assumes that the attributes of extension, mobility, and the notions of cause and effect, and understanding can in no sense be separated from the objects in which they inhere.

His second statement is: "The being must answer for the character of the attribute, and the attribute must answer for all that is affirmed of it". He makes the assertion that attributes condition being. Again he assumes that an attribute is an essential part of an object, that the attributes are realities outside of the mind which perceives them.

Dr. Robert L. Dabney, professor at the Union Theological Seminary of Virginia (Presbyterian, South) says in his Systematic and Polemic Theology (p.808):

"The Lutheran exegesis . . . does not outrage the understanding so much by requiring us to believe that substance can be separated for all its accidents; for it professes to leave the substance of the bread untouched . . . .



But the rest of my arguments [against transubstantiation] apply against it, and need not be recapitulated."

The argument against transubstantiation, which he applies to the Lutheran doctrine, is found in the same work (p. 306) and reads as follows:

"Again, it is impossible for matter to be ubiquitous; but Christ's body must be so, if this doctrine be true. And it is vain to attempt an evasion of these two arguments from sense and reason by pleading a great and mysterious miracle. For God's omnipotence does not work the impossible and the natural contradiction."

Dr. Dabney in his argument states that it is impossible for matter to be ubiquitous. His statement is based upon two assumptions. First he assumes for matter an existence independent of the mind of the perceiving subject. He also accepts without proof the claim that ubiquity, i.e. infinite extension in space, has objective reality, is a quality which exists apart from any perception of that quality.

In an article on Transubstantiation, reprinted from the Princeton Theological Review in a collection of Theological Essays, edited by Patrick Fairbairn, (p. 366) we find the following strictures against the Lutheran doctrine of the Real Presence:

"The Lutherans who adopted the opinion that there was no change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, yet maintained that the real body and blood of Christ were present with these elements and were received by every communicant whether in the exercise of faith or not. And when urged in controversy with the Reformed with the consequence that this

rendered it necessary that the body of Christ should exist everywhere, they admitted the inference, and held the ubiquity of Christ's body; but this was to attribute to a finite and created nature one of the attributes of Deity. Therefore they adopted the absurd opinion, that, in consequence of the hypostatical union, divine attributes were actually communicated to the human nature of Christ. But another stubborn difficulty attended this hypothesis. It is the property of all bodies to exclude all other bodies from the space which they occupy; hence, if ubiquity be ascribed to Christ's body, it will exclude all other bodies from the universe. There was no method of obviating this objection, but by giving a new definition of body; and here was opened a field for abstruse speculation which occupied the learning and labours of men of the first order of intellect; and when they had completed their theory, it was impossible to say what was essential to body, or in what respect they who held a bodily presence of Christ differed from those who maintained that he was really but spiritually present."

The writer of this article urges a new argument, at least in form, if not in substance, when he says: "It is the property of all bodies to exclude all other bodies from the space they occupy". But when we reduce the statement to a syllogism, we find in the major premise the axiom that matter is impenetrable, which still remains to be proved. Before the argument can have validity, it must be shown that the attribute of impenetrability is never and in no circumstances something subjective, something to which the perceiving subject has given existence.

Dr. Charles Hodge, perhaps the greatest Reformed theologian in America, says in his Systematic Theology (II, 390):

"The properties or attributes of a substance constitute its essence, so that if they be removed and other of a different nature are added to them, the substance itself is changed. If you take rationality from mind, it ceases to be mind. If you add rationality to matter, it ceases to be matter. If you made that extended, which is in itself incapable of extension, the identity of the thing is lost."

A further elaboration of the same argument is found in the same work (II, 417):

"It is a fatal objection to the doctrine under consideration that it involves the physical impossibility that attributes are separable from the substances of which they are a manifestation. This is the same kind of impossibility as action without something acting; or motion without something moving... If Christ's body is everywhere present, then it is the substance of that body, and not the essence of God that is omnipresent. The Lutheran doctrine, however, is that the essential attributes or properties of the two natures remain unchanged after the hypostatical union. The properties of the divine essence do not become properties of the human. Then the humanity of Christ has the attributes of his divinity without its essence, and yet these attributes or properties do not inhere in his human substance."

If we reduce the first argument that "the properties or attributes of a substance constitute its essence", we find that it will read: "A substance is the sum of its attributes". The second argument: "Attributes are inseparable from the substances of which they are a manifestation" can be reduced to the bare form: "An attribute is an essential part of a substance". Dr. Hodge himself states the assumption which underlies both of these statements, when he says: "The attributes...inhere in...substance".

Dr. A. A. Hodge, successor to his father, Charles Hodge, in the chair of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, states his objections to the Lutheran doctrine in his Outlines of Theology (p. 385) as follows:

"We reject the Lutheran view, because, ... Fourth, it involves the fallacy of conceiving of properties as separable from the substances of which they are active powers, and thus is open to the same criticism as the doctrine of transubstantiation.

His strictures against the doctrine of transubstantiation, which he also applies to the Lutheran doctrine are found in the same work (p. 386) and read as follows:

"But this doctrine [of transubstantiation] contradicts the principle of reason, 1. with respect to the nature of Christ's body, by supposing that although it is material, it may be, without division, wholly present in heaven, and at many dif-

ferent places on earth at the same time, 2. in maintaining that the body and blood of Christ are present in the sacrament, yet without any of their sensible qualities.<sup>2</sup>

The argument that properties are inseparable from the substance of which they are active powers is but a restatement of the familiar argument that attributes are an essential part of a substance. It is based on the same assumption that attributes inhere in matter. Hodge's second argument, that matter cannot without division be completely present in heaven, and at many different places on earth at the same time, is based on the assumption that matter has form and extension in space as an essential part of its being. The third argument is the converse of the first, in stating that attributes are a sine qua non of a substance, and is again based on the assumption that attributes have an existence apart from the mind which perceives them.

But Dr. A. A. Hodge states his assumption in still clearer language when he says that properties are the active powers of the substance. He here assumes a causal connection between substance and attribute, and this goes much deeper into the fundamental philosophical doctrine underlying his objection. He assumes a necessary connection between substance and attribute.

Dr. William G. Shedd, professor of Systematic Theology at Union Theological Seminary, says in his Dogmatic Theology (II, 568):

"But the glorified body of Christ, though a spiritual body... has form and is extended in space . . . But one and the same form cannot occupy two or more spaces at one and the same moment."

Dr. Shedd obligingly gives us his assumptions, while stating his argument against the Lutheran doctrine. His statement, that one and the same form cannot occupy two or more spaces at one and the same moment is based on the assumption that form and extension in space are attributes of matter which inhere in the substance apart from the perceiving subject.

It will be well now to summarize the various assumptions which are basic for the Reformed arguments. They are based on the following presuppositions:

1. The attributes of extension, mobility, impenetrability or solidity, and form exist apart from any perceiving subject.
2. The idea of substance has a counterpart in reality.
3. The idea of cause is objectively valid.

To sum up, the validity of the Reformed arguments against the Lutheran position on the Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper is contingent upon the validity of the attributes of extension, mobility, impenetrability, and form as existing independently of any perceiving agency; and upon the objective validity of the ideas of matter and cause.

## II. Modern Philosophical Investigations in Epistemology and their Results.

Up to the time of Locke (1632-1704) philosophy had concerned itself primarily with the problem of being (ontology) and had hurriedly passed over the problem of knowledge (epistemology), which after all is basic for any metaphysical speculation. It was Locke who first examined the development of human knowledge and the forms and presuppositions which it has at its disposal. In tracing the development of epistemological investigations we shall only take cognizance of such phases as touch directly the problem with which we are concerned, namely the validity of the various attributes and of the ideas of substance and cause.

### 1. Locke

Locke began his epistemological studies by investigating the origin of the idea of substance. He discovered that the idea of substance is in reality a combination of attributes and properties which we attribute to the object itself. Curiously enough, however, we conceive the substance itself to be something different from the qualities, namely that which supports them. We have no idea at all of pure substance, but only a supposition of a something, we know not what, that bears qualities.. He says (Essay on Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 23, Section 2.):

"The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot

exist simpliciter, without something to support them, we call that support substantia; which according to the true import of the word is, in plain English, standing under, or upholding."

But how about the qualities themselves. Is our idea of attributes valid. Locke answers the question by dividing attributes into primary qualities, such as extension, figure, mobility, and solidity, which "are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be". Secondary qualities, he says, are "such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us... as colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth". The attributes of extension, form, mobility, and solidity are, according to Locke, in the substance, regardless of a perceiving mind. The secondary qualities, however, do not exist in the substance, but only when we perceive them.

Locke, then, has established that substance is an unknown something, which supports partly inherent qualities, partly attributes which the perceiving mind adds to the concept.

## 2. Berkeley.

George Berkeley (1685-1753), pious bishop of the Anglican Church in Ireland, carried further the epistemological investigations begun by Locke, and attacked especially two points in the system of Locke, besides giving the impulse to further investigation in this field.

Berkeley's first point of attack was Locke's distinction between primary qualities, which inhere in substance, independently of per-



ception, and secondary qualities, which exist in the mind that perceives them. Berkeley argued that it is impossible to separate the primary qualities of extension, form, solidity, and mobility from the secondary qualities of color, sound, and taste. It is impossible to have an idea of extension without at the same time giving it some secondary quality of color, sound, or taste. We may therefore justly conclude that if the secondary qualities exist only in the mind, then also the primary qualities, which can be perceived only in connection with the secondary qualities, exist only in the mind that perceives them.

The second feature of Locke's system which Berkeley attacked was Locke's idea of substance as a material and unthinking substratum in which qualities inhere. His argument against this part of Locke's system was a corollary of his proof that qualities exist only by perception, and in perceiving subjects. It is therefore a contradiction to place the existence of a quality in an unperceiving thing, such as this material unthinking substratum is said to be. He adds an additional argument against an inferred but material substratum for qualities. Just as it is useless to go outside of the mind for the qualities themselves, so it is also unnecessary to go outside of the mind for the cause of those qualities as perceived by us.

It is in this connection that Berkeley also incidentally investigated the validity of the idea of cause. He says, it is absurd to make one thing the cause of another, since all we can perceive with our senses is a constant succession of one event upon the other, and never the power or agency which produces such an effect. (Principles of Human Knowledge, Section 32.)

According to the system of Berkeley, qualities do not exist without a perceiving subject, and the idea of an unperceiving, material support or substance, as well as the idea of an inherent necessary connection between two events is invalid.

### 3. Hume.

David Hume (1711-1766), last of the great English critical philosophers, accepted the conclusions of Berkeley with regard to the subjectivity of the ideas of substance and quality. Hume set for himself the task of investigating the idea of cause, which, as we have seen, Berkeley had already touched in passing.

Hume divides all the objects of human reason or enquiry into two kinds, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. The former, he says, "are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". (Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I. Rand, p. 314.) All reasoning, however, concerning the latter seems to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. "By means of that relation alone" he says, "we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses." (op. cit. p. 314) But how do we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect, The knowledge of cause and effect "arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other". (op. cit. p. 315) For he says:

"No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact".

Not satisfied with this result of his investigation, Hume carries on his inquiry still further and asks the question: "What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?". He answers the question negatively when he says (op. cit. Sec. IV, Part II, 320):

"Even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding".

Experience gives us a knowledge of cause and effect for a perceived and past event only, but the mind certainly infers that also in the future a similar object will produce a similar effect. But the basis of this inference is not a chain of reasoning, for we would then be able to produce it by introspection. Hence, then, arises this idea of a necessary connection between two events, Hume says (op. cit. Sec. VII, Part II, p. 329):

"The mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and believes that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection."

As a result of the investigations of Hume, we arrive at the conclusion that the idea of cause and effect, or of necessary connection is not valid, that is, in matters of fact or perceived objects the law of cause and effect does not operate with absolute certainty, since the connection between cause and effect is a result of a mental habit.

## 4. Kant.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the greatest of modern philosophers, attacked the problems which here concern us from an altogether different angle. He himself explains the difference between his system and those of his predecessors in the words:

"The thesis of all true idealists, from the Eleatics down to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in the following statement: All knowledge acquired through the senses and experience is a mere illusion, and the truth exists only in the ideas furnished by pure understanding and reason. The principle that governs and determines the whole of my idealism is, on the contrary, that any knowledge of things that proceeds from pure understanding or reason is a mere illusion, and that truth is found in experience alone." (Quoted from Janet and Seailles' History of the Problems of Philosophy, I, 119).

The difference between Kant and the English critical philosophers lies in their method. The English school analysed our ideas, percepts, and concepts, while Kant goes a step farther and analyses the faculty of knowledge and its activity in experience. When we analyse experience or sensibility, we find that it is composed of elements from two sources, one from the faculty of knowledge itself, (which Kant calls form) the other from external sensation, (which Kant calls matter). That which is constant and universal in our experience is form, while that which changes and varies is matter. Since this form gives to sensation its order and relation, it cannot itself be sensation, but must be capable of being considered by itself, apart from sensation. What then is the form of perception?

If we wish to isolate the form of our perception in our experience, we must abstract all contributions of the understanding, such as substance, force, divisibility, and all that is due to sensation, as solidity, color, and so on. What remains, namely space and time belongs to the subjective constitution of the mind, apart from which these forms cannot be predicated of anything whatever. (Transcendental Aesthetic, Sec. I).

Space, or extension is, accordingly, not an empirical concept, which has been derived from external experiences, as Berkeley and Hume had taught. Kant says:

"For I could not be conscious that certain of my sensations are relative to something outside of me, that is, to something in a different part of space from that in which I myself am; nor could I be conscious of them as outside of and beside one another, were I not at the same time conscious that they not only are different in content, but are in different places. The consciousness of space is, therefore, necessarily presupposed in external perception. No experience of the external relations of sensible things could yield the idea of space, because without the consciousness of space there would be no external experience whatever." (Transcendental Aesthetic, Sec. I. Rand, p.389)

What then is space, Kant answers:

"Space is in no sense a property of things-in-themselves, nor is it a relation of things-in-themselves to one another... Space is nothing but the form of all the phenomena of outer sense. It is the subjective condition without which no external perception is possible. .... We, therefore, affirm the empirical

reality of space, as regards all possible external experience; but we also maintain its transcendental ideality, or in other words, we hold that space is nothing at all, if its limitation to possible experience is ignored, and it is treated as a necessary condition of things-in-themselves." (Transcendental Aesthetic, Rand, 385).

Just as Kant had analysed sensibility, experience, and perception in his Transcendental Aesthetic, so he now proceeds to analyse the understanding, or the concept-making and judging faculty of the mind in his Transcendental Logic. He finds that after abstracting all the material furnished by sensibility from a judgment of the understanding, we have twelve forms of understanding, which he calls categories. They are a priori principles through which the understanding operates. They are: 1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. Reality. 5. Negation. 6. Limitation. 7. Inherence and Subsistence. 8. Causality and Dependence. 9. Community. 10. Possibility-Impossibility. 11. Existence-Non-existence. 12. Necessity-Contingency. There are what Kant calls pure conceptions. Into them no sensibility enters. Because these conceptions are a priori elements of the understanding, (Verknuepfungsbegriffe) by them alone the understanding is able to order the complex content of perception into concepts.

But these categories are limited in their application to the perceptions. Kant says:

"But there is a very seductive and deceptive tendency to employ that pure knowledge of understanding and those principles

by themselves, and to apply them even beyond the limits of experience. Only in experience, however, can any matter or object be found to which the pure conceptions of understanding may be applied. There is thus a danger that understanding, with a mere show of rationality, may make a material use of its purely formal principles, and pass judgments upon all objects without distinction, whether they be given to us or not, and perhaps even although they cannot be given to us at all. That which is merely a canon for the criticism of understanding in its empirical use, is misused, when it is supposed to be an organon that may be employed universally and without restriction." (Transcendental Logic, Paragraph 4, Rand, p. 391.)

The result of Kant's examination of the epistemological problems which touch our field can be summarized as follows:

Space (extension and form or figure) is a form of perception which finds a valid application only to things given to the mind by sensation.

Substance is a category of relation (Inherence and Subsistence) and is thus a form of understanding, which has validity only when applied to things given to the mind by perception or sensibility.

Cause is another category of relation (Causality and Dependence) which is used correctly only when applied within the limits of experience.

Impenetrability (Transcendental Aesthetic, Rand, p. 381) is due to sensation and has no validity except when determined by the forms of perception, space and time.

Mobility (succession in space), being a result of a combination of the two forms of perception, space and time, has validity only when applied to phenomena, and cannot be correctly applied to things-in themselves.

### 5. Herbart.

John Friederich Herbart (1776-1841) was a disciple of Kant who developed the Kantian notions on the realistic side and did much to stem the tide of Absolute Idealism which swept through philosophical circles after Kant's death as a result of the influence of Schelling, Hegel, and Fichte. As a realist, one would expect him to develop a doctrine of substance and attributes which would fit in with the philosophical basis of the Reformed arguments. But not so.

He begins, like all critical philosophers, with an examination of the phenomena which we immediately perceive in the form of properties, which at first sight seem to inhere in substance. But substance is not the ultimate essence, but it is in turn composed of certain elements, which Herbart calls Reals (Reals). What we call matter in ordinary speech, i.e. an extended substance in which qualities inhere, does not exist in Herbartian philosophy. Matter is an immaterial and unextended something, which receives the primary qualities of extension, mobility, and space occupation from the relation which the elemental Reals hold toward one another. Space, time, and motion are the expression in abstract of these relations. ('Allgemeine Metaphysik, Paragraph 328, Werke, Vol. IV, 381.f.)



## 6. Schopenhauer.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), continued the epistemological investigations along the lines laid down by Kant. He did much to simplify and clarify Kant's system and made further discoveries in this field. His chief merit lies in his reduction of the multiplicity of Kant's forms of knowledge (time and space as forms of perception and the twelve categories as forms of understanding) to a unity in the principle of sufficient reason.

This principle may be stated in the words: "Nothing exists without its reason for being" - "Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit". This principle lies a priori in our consciousness. It expresses in its most general form the relations between the ideas which go to make up the world. As these relations fall into four different classes, so also the principle of sufficient reason has a four-fold form. Only two of these forms are of value to us in our present study, and these we shall now take up seriatim.

The first form in which the principle of sufficient reason appears is the law of causality, or the principle of sufficient reason of becoming. This form of the principle is applicable to the ideas of perception, which are referable to some sensation of our bodies, and which are capable of being perceived under the forms of space and time. But these two forms have no meaning when kept distinct, for it is only by means of a union of the two through the law of causality that co-existence, and consequently, permanence of objects is possible. Matter, then, being the possibility of co-existence and of permanence, is the union of space and time; matter is causality, and nothing more. The existence of matter is therefore entirely relative, according to

a relation which is valid only within its limits, as in the case of space and time. Also such unalterable characteristics of matter as space-occupation, impenetrability, extension, infinite divisibility, persistence, mobility are dependent upon the derivation of the essential nature of matter from the forms of knowledge of which we are a priori conscious and therefore valid only within these limits. (World as Will and Idea, Section 4; Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Section 21.) The law of causality also, being conditioned by the understanding, can only be applied to changes which take place in the phenomenal world. Schopenhauer says concerning the misuse of the law of causality (Fourfold Root, Section 24):

Man begeht einen solchen misuse of the law of causality, so oft man das Gesetz der Kausalität auf etwas Anderes, als auf Veränderungen, in der uns empirisch gegebenen, materiellen Welt anwendet, z.B. auf die Naturkräfte, vermöge welcher solche Veränderungen überhaupt erst möglich sind; oder auf die Materie, an der sie vorgehn; oder auf das Weltganze, als welchem dazu ein absolut objektives, nicht durch unsern Intellekt bedingtes Dasein beigelegt werden muss; auch noch sonst auf mancherlei Weise. Ich verweise hier auf das in der "Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" Band 2, Kap. 4, S. 42 fg. (3. Aufl. II, 46, fg.) darüber Gesagte. Der Ursprung solches Missbrauchs ist allemal, teils, dass man den Begriff der Ursache, wie unzählige andere in der Metaphysik und Moral, viel zu weit fasst; teils, dass man vergisst, dass das Gesetz der Kausalität zwar eine Voraussetzung ist, die wir mit auf die Welt bringen, und welche die Anschauung der Dinge ausser uns möglich macht, dass wir jedoch eben deshalb nicht

berechtigt sind, einen solchen, aus der Vorrichtung unsere Erkenntnisvoraussetzungen entspringenden Grundsatz auch ausserdem und unabhängig von Letzterem als die fuer sich bestehende, ewige Ordnung der Welt und alles Existirenden geltend zu machen."

The second form of the principle of sufficient reason applies to those ideas which are outside of perception, i.e. general concepts. In this form it is the principle of the sufficient reason of knowing, i.e. it expresses the ground of a judgment. The principle of the sufficient reason of knowing in relation to judgments is fourfold, i.e. the grounds, upon which the truth of a judgment depends, are of four kinds. A judgment which has as its ground another judgment is a logical truth; that which has its ground in sense perception is a material truth; that which has its ground in the forms of pure sensibility (space, time, and causality) and of the understanding (the principle of sufficient reason, etc.) as conditions of all possible experience is a synthetical a priori judgment. Finally, the four laws of thought (1. A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates. 2. A subject cannot at one time have a given predicate affirmed and denied of it. 3. Of two contradictory opposed predicates one must belong to every subject. 4. Truth is the relation of a judgment to something outside it, as its sufficient ground.) may be the ground of a judgment, in which case it possesses metalogical truth. These four classes of judgments, being all phases of the principle of the sufficient reason of knowing, possess validity only with regard to the phenomenal world of idea.

Just so, the whole principle of sufficient reason is applicable only within the limits of all possible experiences. Schopenhauer says (World as Will and Idea, Section 7, p. 41, Haldane and Kemp):

"The principle of sufficient reason is not, as all scholastic philosophy maintains, a veritas aeterna, that is to say, it does not possess an unconditioned validity before, outside of, and above the world. It is relative and conditioned, and valid only in the sphere of phenomena, and thus it may appear as the necessary nexus of space and time, or as the law of causality, or as the law of the ground of knowledge. The inner nature of the world, the thing-in-itself can never be found by the guidance of this principle, for all that it leads to will be found to be dependent and relative and merely phenomenal, not the thing-in-itself."

To summarize Schopenhauer's doctrine then:

Matter or substance is mere action within the limits of time and space, i.e. the phenomenal world.

Cause, understood in the sense of the principle of sufficient reason of becoming is an a priori construction of the mind, which has validity only within the limits of all possible experience.

Impenetrability is an unalterable characteristic of matter, of which we are as much conscious a priori as of substance and matter itself.

Mobility, being succession of time in space, is valid only in the world of idea.

Laws of Thought (Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason) have validity only in the world

of phenomena and under no circumstances with regard to anything outside of it.

### 7. Later Philosophy.

To set down in detail the theories of all the later philosophers since Schopenhauer until now would be a needless repetition of already familiar concepts of substance, space, time, motion, etc. There are mainly two trends of thought in philosophy since that time. Either it is Idealistic, due to the influence of Hegel (Green, Bradley, Bouanquet, Royce, McTaggart, Howison, Hooking, Pringle-Pattison) or Realistic (Bertrand Russell, Ferry, Holt, Spaulding). The idealistic view holds mainly to the notion of substance with which we became familiar in our study of Berkeley and Hume; while the realistic view holds that the sense data of actual perception are the only true facts, and the "thing" is the entire class of its appearance, including not only those appearances that are actually sense data, but the sensibilia, or possible sense data, which represent the appearances that would arise were a certain kind of observer in a certain relation to the object. This latter view is not so very different from that of Herbart and can be considered at the same time with his in relating them to the Reformed arguments.

### III. Conclusions.

We have now sketched both the Reformed arguments against the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper and the more recent epistemological investigations and their results. The attentive reader will now be in a position to form his own conclusions on the basis of the material offered. But it might be well to formulate and summarize these conclusions into a definite form. In doing so, we shall consider each basic philosophical conception separately and apply to it the results of the philosophical investigations.

#### 1. Attributes.

The philosophical basis of the Reformed argument from the nature of attributes may perhaps be best stated in the form given to this basis by Dr. Charles Hodge, who says: "Attributes inhere in substance". The attributes of extension, mobility, impenetrability, and form are, according to this view outside of a thinking and perceiving subject.

But as we have seen, Berkeley and Hume showed that also these so-called primary qualities and attributes of matter, such as extension, mobility, impenetrability, and form exist only by reason of their being perceived. Their esse is in percipi, to express it in the words of Berkeley; their being lies in being perceived. They therefore possess no objective reality, a view shared by practically all modern idealists from Hegel to Royce. And the results of their investigations of Kant and Schopenhauer strengthen this view. They have shown that space and time, and therefore also the attributes of

extension, impenetrability, form (space-occupation), and mobility (succession of time in space) are only the necessary conditions of all possible phenomena. According to the view of Herbart, these attributes are relations between the various Reals, but he by no means denies the possibility of their existence without these relations. We see then, that the first argument of the Reformed is based upon a philosophical conception which has long been abandoned, and which has never again been revived since the days of Berkeley.

## 2. Matter or substance.

The philosophical basis for the argument of the Reformed from the nature of substance may again be put in the words of Dr. Charles Hodge: "The attributes of a substance constitute its essence", or in other words, substance is an unthinking, material substratum in which qualities inhere.

It was this philosophical doctrine of substance that aroused Berkeley to an investigation, in which he showed that such a substance is impossible, since a quality could inhere only in a perceiving subject, and that it was totally unnecessary to go outside of the mind for the cause of qualities perceived by us. Kant showed his fundamental agreement with this view by making Inherence and Subsistence (upon which the concept substance is based) a category of relation, which, as an a priori element of the understanding, has validity only within the limits of all possible experience. Schopenhauer also makes the concept of substance valid only within the limits of experience when he makes the existence of matter dependent upon the

forms of sensibility (space, time, and the law of causality). The argument of the Reformed is based upon a philosophical doctrine of substance which either denies to the idea of substance all validity (Berkeley, Hume, and all modern Idealists), or at least limits it to the world of phenomena (Kant, Schopenhauer), or defines it in such a way that the Reformed argument loses its force (Herbart, modern Neo-Realists). Since in the argument in question the substance of Christ's body is admittedly outside of, and beyond the world of phenomena, any and every inference drawn from the nature of substance in empirical reality is invalid.

### 3. Cause.

As we have pointed out in the consideration of the statement of Dr. A. A. Hodge that attributes are active powers of a substance, there is still a more fundamental philosophical basis for the Reformed arguments than those previously considered. It is the idea of cause, of necessary connection, and the principle of sufficient reason in general. At the basis of every Reformed argument against the Real Presence we find the principle of sufficient reason in some form or other. The most common form is that stated by Dr. A. A. Hodge in the words: "Properties are not separable from the substances of which they are active powers". Here a causal relation or necessary connection is assumed between substance and attribute.

But already Berkeley had pointed out that the causal connection had being only by being perceived. Hume went further. He showed that a necessary connection between objects has no absolute certainty, since it is based on a mental habit. Kant made cause one of the



twelve categories of the understanding which can only be used correctly within possible experiences. Schopenhauer agreed by limiting the use of the law of causality to the empirically given, material world. The argument of the Reformed, then, from the absence of the so-called effect (visible presence with all qualities of the body) to the absence of the so-called cause (substance of the body of Christ) is based upon an antiquated philosophical view of cause and effect as an eternal verity, which is applicable in both time and eternity.

But the epistemological investigations in regard to cause have still another bearing on the basis of the Reformed argument. The favorite expressions of the Reformed when treating the Lutheran doctrine of the Real Presence are: "Contradiction", "absurd", "contradicts the principle of reason", and so on. They glory in having the laws of thought (Contradiction, Identity, Excluded Middle, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason) in their favor, and we can afford to admit this claim. But as we have pointed out in our treatment of Schopenhauer, especially in the section concerning the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, these laws of thought are valid only within the limits of the phenomenal world, and again their argument falls to the ground, for the subject of their argument is admittedly not in the world, but above and outside of it.

We have seen that the philosophical basis of the Reformed arguments against the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper, from the most superficial, that based upon the nature of attributes, to the most fundamental, that based on the laws of thought, is not in conformity with the best philosophical thought

of the two preceding centuries. What conclusions do we draw from that fact?

We do not mean to claim on the basis of our conclusions that the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ can be positively conceived or understood by any finite human mind which is bound by reason of its innate constitution to the forms of its understanding and the laws of its own thought. But we do claim on the basis of our investigation that this fact does not render the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper impossible, or exclude the possibility of the Real Presence of Christ's body and blood in a different mode than the phenomenal, and that is all the Lutheran doctrine teaches.

In conclusion we wish to quote from a translation of J. F. Platt's (Tubingen) treatise De Deitate Christi, which appeared with such high recommendation in the Reformed Biblical Repository and Princeton Review. (V. 160.f.) The argumentation herein brought to bear on the doctrine of the Deity of Christ, can with equal force be applied to the Lutheran doctrine of the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper. The quotation reads as follows:

"And we freely admit that neither the connexion, nor the difference between the persons in the Godhead can be conceived of, positively; in other words, they can be known neither by intuition, nor by analogy. But we deny that it follows from these premises, that our doctrine of the relation between the Father and Son, resting as it does upon such high authority is irrational or absurd. To set down as false or absurd, whatever we can form no definite conception of (See Ulrich's Institut. Log.

et Metaphys. p. 302. ff) is as if a man born blind should denounce as impossible or false the description of a painting, merely because he could form no image in his own mind of the object. To deny the possibility of relations except those which exist among external objects of such as may be inferred from them, evinces but a slight acquaintance with philosophy, and a lamentable ignorance or want of recollection, with respect to the limits of human understanding. The truth is, that from our partial knowledge which we have, even of things subject to the cognizance of our internal and external senses, we have no right to conclude that the only relations of which they are capable are such as exist between external objects."

**F I N I S.**

### **Bibliography**

**Biblical Repository and Princeton Review**  
(Vols. V, XVII, XX)

**Collectio Confessionum**

**Hiemeyer**

**Theological Essays**

**Fairbairn**

**Dogmatic Theology**

**Shedd**

**Systematic Theology, 2 volumes**

**Hodge, Charles**

**Systematic Theology**

**Hiley**

**Systematic and Polemic Theology**

**Dabney**

**Outlines of Theology**

**Hodge, A. A.**

**The Conservative Reformation and  
its Theology**

**Krauth**

<b>Essay concerning Human Understanding</b> Fraser's Edition, 2 volumes	<b>Locke</b>
<b>Principles of Human Knowledge</b>	<b>Berkeley</b>
<b>Enquiry concerning Human Understanding</b>	<b>Hume</b>
<b>World as Will and Idea</b> Haldane and Kemp's Translation. 3 volumes.	<b>Schopenhauer</b>
<b>Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde</b>	<b>Schopenhauer</b>
<b>Philosophische Werke</b> Hartensetin, Editor, Vols. 1-4.	<b>Herbart</b>
<b>Modern Classical Philosophers</b>	<b>Rand</b>
<b>Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 19th Century</b>	<b>Morell</b>
<b>History of Modern Philosophy</b> 2 volumes	<b>Hoeffding</b>
<b>Critique of Pure Reason</b>	<b>Kant</b>
<b>English and American Philosophy since 1800</b>	<b>Rogers</b>
<b>History of Philosophy, Vol. II.</b>	<b>Ueberweg</b>
<b>History of Philosophy</b>	<b>Weber and Ferry</b>
<b>History of Philosophy</b>	<b>Windelband</b>
<b>Persistent Problems of Philosophy</b>	<b>Calkins</b>
<b>History of the Problems of Philosophy</b> 2 volumes	<b>Janet and Seailles</b>