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**A Comparison of the Views of
Plato and Paul on the Immortality
of the Soul**

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Concordia Seminary

by

Oswald C. J. Hoffmann

**In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree**

of

Bachelor of Divinity

April

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Approved

V. H. Gardner

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Introduction

Of all the conflicts which Christianity passed through in the early stages of its history, that with philosophy seems to have been the most severe and the most far-reaching in its effects. Judaism was firm and self-reliant, because it was in a sense supernatural; Gentilism was pliable, because it was ignorant and weary of itself; but philosophy was obstinate, because, regarding religions as superstitions, it recognized no special merit in Christianity, and attempted to ridicule it out of existence when its unprepared defenders first announced it. With the representatives of the Epicurean, Stoic and New Academic schools, or with the cultured classes throughout the Roman Empire, Paul came into contact, and was required to defend his religion, not by an appeal to prophecy, as was his wont among the Jews, nor by merely showing the worthlessness of prevailing religions and the adequacy of the new religion, as he did to the Gentiles, but by a rational exposition of the truth, and a demonstration of the facts on which his religion rested. For such a conflict Paul was prepared; for he was familiar with the philosophical thought of the times, and was the man to preach to

Epicureans, Stoics, Platonists, or others wherever he found them.

The philosophical method, no less than philosophical thought (1) influenced Paul's manner of presentation, the traces of which are an exhibition in that wonderful sermon he preached at Athens. At Athens philosophy still dominated the public thought, and statues still graced the temples and adorned the buildings of the Areopagus, where Paul made his address. At Athens Paul was on Plato's ground and had to contend with him. At Lystra stones; at Ephesus "beasts"; at Athens philosophers.

Paul was prepared to discuss the same problems, the same hopes and fears, the same ideas which were the burden of philosophical thought. But he was also prepared to recover truth from philosophic uncertainty, and to assert it in transparent and divine forms. He offered a new religion in that it did what other religions, having the same ends in view, could not realize or accomplish. He offered a religion of truth.

(1) Cp. Bultmann, "Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die cynisch-stoische Diatribe" (Goettingen, 1910) and Norden, "Agnostos Theos" (Leipzig, 1913) discussed in Case, "Evolution of Early Christianity" (Chicago, 1914) p. 279.

Christianity is the only truth; it is more than a single province of truth. The province of Christianity is, in the very highest sense, the province of truth. But, we may ask, what is the relation of Christianity, as the truth of truths, to other truths, for example the truths established by a philosophical system. Do philosophy and Christianity agree in the discovery, explanation, and announcement of truth? Is there any relation whatever between them as systems of similar truths?

There certainly seems to be some relationship, for from Thales to the present time the great problems of creation, being, mind, and the future have engaged the most serious philosophical investigation, and at the same time they are involved in the most serious revelations of Christianity. In this respect the province of Christianity and the province of philosophy are one and the same. But in method of discovery, development, and presentation of truth the two systems are radically different. The difference between Christianity and philosophy is largely one of method. Out of the difference of method grows the difference of result.

It is precisely this difference of method that accounts for the failure of one and the success of the other. Respecting the greatest truths, philosophy has failed in its explanations and declarations, producing as

monuments of its incompetency the wretched and ghostly forms of materialism and agnosticism, while Christianity, pulsating with a divine energy, announces the sublimest doctrines with a faith born of knowledge, and a fullness that is the result only of revelation from God. Christianity, separated from other religions, is the religion of supernatural truth, made known, not by philosophic methods, nor by ordinary religious methods, but solely by revelation. The province of paganism is the province of superstition; the province of philosophy is the province of speculation; the province of Christianity is the province of revelation. This is its distinguishing feature; this it is that isolates it from philosophies and religions, notwithstanding their similarity of aim and other points of agreement; this it is that places Paul above Plato. As we study Paul, doors open before us whose hinges human hands have vainly endeavored to remove; he gives us a fore-glimpse of the eternal world, not one of whose gates stood ajar until the Son of God commanded them to be lifted up.

Let it be primarily observed that the revelation of the Scripture regarding the future life is authentic and to be accepted without dispute; second, it is free from superstition, such as haunts the old religions, and may, therefore, be taken in its fullness;

third, it is in harmony with itself, all the truths of Christianity mutually agreeing.

Although we may assert that because of revelation Paul was possessed of a greater certainty of immortality than Plato, let it not be said that he removed all mystery from that doctrine. Conceding authenticity, sufficiency, and harmony to the revelation of the Holy Scriptures, the eschatology of Christianity is under the limitations that belong to the whole system. Revelation is light; it is darkness also. The revelation of facts, such as atonement, regeneration, election, is incomplete and question-awakening; results not processes, facts not explanations, are revealed. Incarnation is a fact, but shrouded in mystery; miracle power is an exhibition in Christ, but explanation of it is not given; divine sovereignty and human responsibility are taught in the Scriptures without any attempt at reconciliation; that Christ can be divine and yet the subject of temptation is a fact also, but mysteriously perplexing to those who are troubled with the difficulty. These truths of revelation are declared as mysteries, never to be explained; they are to be known as unknowable, and they are revealed as such. As the working facts of Christianity, they are powerful and sufficient; as the mysteries of revelation, they are accepted, and the soul is silent in their presence.

In like manner the eschatology of the Scriptures, authentic and sufficient, is the region of light and darkness; the shadows of mystery fall upon us as we enter it. It is only a partial revelation of the facts, conditions, and state of the hereafter. For while revelation has stated the fact of immortality clearly and unmistakably, it has not defined the state as clearly as our searching curiosity should desire.

The foundation-truth of eschatology is the immortality of the soul. It is the problem that has confronted men of all ages. It is not enough that God's eternity be demonstrated or revealed; it is not enough that the angels are immortal; it must be shown that man is immortal. Will he live after he is dead? Is Cicero still a conscious being? Does Paul see, talk, remember, know? Is Luther only a memory in this world, or a person in the other world? What is the answer to such questions?

I propose to compare the answer of one of the greatest representatives of the field of pure philosophy, untouched by Christianity, with that of the greatest expounder of the revealed religion of Jesus Christ - Plato with Paul. Without attempting to give a complete statement of the doctrines of either, first I shall try to draw a distinction between their views on death and

its effect upon body and soul; second, their conceptions of judgment and the hereafter; third, their arguments for immortality; and fourth, the paths by which they point us to immortality.

Chapter I

DEATH AND ITS EFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOUL AND BODY

- - - - -

Plato.

If we compare Plato's and Paul's views on the immortality of the soul, we must first look to their basic conception of death and the effect it has on the relation of soul and body.

What idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body? Is the soul united with the body and still independent? Is the soul related to the body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Has the soul a life of its own apart from the body? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? Or is the opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union of the two in the "I" which is above them?

When we consider Plato's idea of the soul we must remember that, up to his time, all Greek philosophical thought on the subject had been materialistic. Plato was

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When we consider Plato's idea of the soul we must remember that, up to his time, all Greek philosophical ^{- cae} thought on the subject had been materialistic. Plato saw

that, assuming the soul to be material, its immortality was irreconcilable with such a doctrine. And, still more fatal to the belief in a continuance of personal identity after death was the theory put forward by Diogenes of Apollonia, that there is really no personal identity even in life - that consciousness is only maintained by a perpetual inhalation of the vital air in which all reason resides. The soul very literally left the body with the last breath, and had a poor chance of holding together afterwards, especially, as the wits observed, if a high wind happened to be blowing at the time.

It is this materialistic view that Plato takes up first in his most extensive treatise on the soul, the "Phaedo". There Cebes expresses the fear that ἐπειδὴν (ἢ ψυχὴν) ἀπαλλαγῆ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρεται τε καὶ ἀπολύεται, ἢ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὡς περ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ (Phaedo, 70 A) (1)

(1) The later Epicurean view. Cp. Lucretius III 443, 456, and 459: "Cum validis ventis altatem degere posse."

Plato's man consists of body and soul.

(ψυχὴν γὰρ τοῦ καὶ σῶμα καλούμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,

Crat. 399D) The body is composed of the four elements

fire, earth, air, and water. (χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς

οὐδὲν εἴ ποτε ὄρατὸν γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἀπτόν ἀνευ

τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ γῆς· οἶδεν

ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχόμενος συνιστάται

σῶμα ὁ θεὸς ἐποίει. Timaeus, 31 C). Simmias' difficulty

in the "Phaedo" is that the soul may be only the organization^{-ion}

of the material elements of the body, hot, cold, moist, and

dry (ὡςπερ ἐντεταμένοι τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ

συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ

ὕγραυ καὶ τοιούτω τινῶν; Phaedo, 86 B. Cp. Symp. 186D7;

Laws 889 B, 891 C).

Into this world of sense God placed a mind

because intelligent things are better than unintelligent,

and a soul because mind cannot exist apart from soul and

life. (λογισάμενος οὐδὲν εὗρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν

θεατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὄλον

ὄλου κάλλιον εἶσευδαί ποτε εἶργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς

ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ, Timaeus, 30 B; λείον

καὶ ὀμαλοῦν παρταχῆ τε ἐκ μέσου ἴσον καὶ ὄλον

καὶ τέλειον ἐκ τελέων σωμάτων σῶμα ἐποίησε, Timaeus

34 B) But the mind and soul of the world were created not

as our random human speech describes them here, but before

the body which they were to rule (τὴν δὲ δμὴ ψυχὴν

οὐχ ὡς νῦν ἵστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως
 ἐμνησανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἀν' ἀρχεσθαι πρεσβυτέραν ὑπὸ νεωτέρου
 ξυρέεξας εἶδεν.

. Timaeus

34 C). If this is true, then the soul cannot be the harmony of the various elements of the body as the Pythagoreans defined it. (1)

What then is the relation of soul and body?

A man uses his entire body but is a man really to be identified with his body? Now that which uses all other things, even a man's body, is his soul. The soul is the man, and everything else that is his is merely something he has or owns. A man, in fact, is a "soul using a body". (2)

This is the argument of Alcibiades I. Socrates asks Alcibiades: "Are a shoemaker and a cyther-player to be distinguished from the hands and eyes with which they work?" "Doesn't a man then use his entire body?" "Isn't that which is used to be distinguished from that which uses?" (Ἐτερον δ' ἢ τὸ τε χρώμενον καὶ ὧ χεῖρα). "Then is a man to be distinguished from his

(1) The entire argument against the Pythagorean conception is given, Phaedo, 92 - 96 B.

(2) This is the standing Academic definition of "man".

from his body?" Man, therefore, merely uses his body. But "what else is it that uses the body but the soul?" Is man "soul or body, or a combination of the two?" Since man is that which rules the body, the body cannot be called a part of man. Therefore man is soul. (*μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἀνθρώπου συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν*, Alcibiades I, 129 E - 130 C) (1)

The soul is to be entirely distinguished from the body (*ψυχὴν σώματος εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν*, Laws 959 A) One cannot predicate the same of the soul that he does of the body. The soul possesses absolute power, the body only a conditional power. The only thing that they have in common is that they are both things or realities (*ὄντα*). (*τὰ ὄντα εἶναι δύο, τὸ μὲν ψυχὴν τὸ δὲ σῶμα· καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερου· πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἄλλα καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέρων καὶ τρίτον ἄλλο οὐδὲν κοινόν*. Epinomis (?), Tennemann, ^{op.cit.} p. 457.)

What happens to the relation of body and soul at death?

Socrates' first principle is that it is not lawful for a man to end his life by violence. (Phaedo 61^c C) Though the philosopher would regard it as "criminal" to

(1) A similar argument is found in the "Euthydemus", 278 E - 282 D and 288 D - 292 E. For the idea that the true self is the soul cf. also Laws 959 A; Phaedo 115 C; Axiochus 365 E

put an end to his own life, yet the genuine "philosopher" is one who is ready and willing to die. (1) This may seem a paradox that a philosopher wishes to die and yet condemns all forms of suicide, but it is intelligible if we conceive of man as a "chattel" (κτήμα) of God, just as a slave is a "chattel" of his owner, and therefore has no right to dispose of his own life, as it does not belong to him. The secret doctrine that we are on ward and must not desert or try to escape is too deep or too high for Socrates. But he can understand that we are chattels of the gods and should await the bidding of our master

(τὸδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν τοῦς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦς ἀνθρώπους ἐν πῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι, Phaedo 62 B). Yet

in saying this we seem to be merely replacing one paradox by another. If we are "chattels of the gods" that means that we are under the "tendance" of good and wise owners who know what is best for us much better than we do ourselves. Death would seem to mean being released from this tendance and left to look after ourselves, says Cebe in the "Phaedo" (62 D). But Socrates points out that this argument is mistaken on one small point; it does not

(1) That is, he trusts that death is the entrance in a better state, but holds that we may not force the door; the Pythagorean origin of the absolute veto on suicide is indicated by the allusion to Philolaus. Phaedo 61 D.

understand the sense in which the philosopher uses the word "death", and that is what we must explain.

To put the matter quite simply, death, as every one understands, is the "release" of the soul from the body. (ἢ γούμενά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας, Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν).

Death consists in this that the body is by itself and the soul is by itself. (καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλαγεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι.)

Phaedo 64 C) Death is even termed a λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. (Phaedo, 67 D)

The body is frequently looked upon as the tomb of the soul. In the "Phaedo" Socrates states that the "lovers of knowledge are conscious that their souls, when philosophy receives them, are simply fastened and glued to their bodies, forced for this reason to look at reality just as if through the bars of a prison" (ἄναγκασομένην δὲ ὡσπερ δι' εἰρημοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα . Phaedo, 82 E). And in the "Gorgias" he expresses the same opinion: quoting a passage from Euripides: "'Who knows, if living is to die, dying is to live?' And perhaps we are not really dead; I already have heard this very thing from the

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wise men, that now we are dead, and the body is our tomb (τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα , Gorgias, 493 A)". In the "Cratylus" Socrates discusses the origin of the term σῶμα , and takes occasion to express the idea that the body is the prison or tomb of the soul: "For some say that the body (σῶμα) is the grave (σῆμα) of the soul, because it is buried in the present life (τελευτῶντος ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι) ;probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, because the soul is paying the penalty for the things it has done; but the body is an enclosure which may be compared to a prison in which the soul is incarcerated, or incorporated (σῶμα ἵνα σώσῃται, δεσμωτησίου εἰκόνα). Therefore it is as the name implies the keeper (σῶμα) of the soul until it shall pay what is due, and not even a letter has to be changed." (Crat. 400 C). We who are in the body are just like an oyster confined to his shell (σῶμα περιφέρωντες ὄστρεοῦ τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι, Phaedrus 250 C).

Now we can see that what the philosopher has been aiming at all his life long is just to make the soul, as completely as he can, independent of the fortunes of the body. Since death is merely the separation of soul and body (ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, Gorgias 524 B), it is something

which a philosopher, who dies to the body, every day he lives ought to welcome. Just before his death Socrates assures Crito that he is a man who "has really spent his life in philosophy has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to receive the greatest good" in the other world (Phaedo 63 E). He who laments at the prospect of death

is not a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body (*Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἀν' ἰσῆς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος.*)

Phaedo 68 B). In his pursuit of knowledge the philosopher finds the limitations of the body a hindrance to him in more ways than one, and is always doing his best to escape them. When the soul must search for the truth through the instrumentality of the body it is always

deceived (*ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῆ τι σκοπεῖν ἤλθον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ,* Phaedo, 65 B). For this reason the soul of the philosopher

despises his body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself (*Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*)

(*ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι,* Phaedo, 65 C). Having

all these considerations in mind, we may fairly take a "short cut" (ἀτραπός) to the conclusion that so long as we have the body with us it will always be a hindrance to the apprehension of "truth" (τὸ ἀληθές). If the body gets out of condition, our quest of "the real" (τὸ ὄν) is even more hindered. And if the soul wishes to free itself of these encumbrances it must free itself from the body (εἰ μέλλομεν ποτε καθάρως τι εἶσευθαι , ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῆ ψυχῇ ὑεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα , Phaedo, 66 D). It follows that only in death will the soul achieve what it desires, independence from its troublesome partner (καὶ τότε , ὡς ἔοικεν , ἡμῶν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμούμεν τε καὶ ὕαμεν ἔρασταὶ εἶναι , ὑρονήσεως , ἔπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν⁽¹⁾ Phaedo, 66 D). (1)

Who would not desire to be released from the prison-house of his appetites, and retire as anchorites into the world of pure thought ? (Phaedo, 82 E - 83 A). It is in order not to forfeit this release that philosophers abstain from sensual excess, for they alone know that every sensuous pleasure and pain rivets the soul to the body as with a nail (Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πράξει μάλιστα καταδέεται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος ; Πῶς δὲ ; Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥστε ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα⁽¹⁾ , Phaedo, 83 D). Their contemplation

(1) The argument for immortality taken from this distinction between body and soul will be carried out more fully in the chapter on the "Arguments for Immortality".

and the food of their thought is the true, the divine; and so living, and expecting in death the riddance from all mortal "miserics" and the return to their true home (1), they will await death without fear. For death is no evil, since if it is an eternal sleep, it will be even as one untroubled night, and a few of our days are as happy as that, and if it is a departure to a better world (αποδημησάσι, Apology 40 E; cp. Phaedo 117 C, μεταίκησις) (2), what happiness to hold converse there with the great spirits who have gone before. And besides they are not only happier in that world thanⁱⁿ this, they are immortal for all time, if indeed what is said is true (τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροι, εἰσὶν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἴσθη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσὶν, εἶπεο γὰρ τὰ δεχόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν, Apology 41 C). And if the "Apology" is not a true representa-^{-with-} tive of Socrates' actual speech before the jurors, certainly^{-ly} it clearly presents Plato's attitude toward death: "Wherefore,^{-from,} judges, be of good cheer about death (εὐέλπιδες εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον) and know this one truth - that no evil can happen to a good man, either alive or dead, nor are his affairs neglected by the gods....; but this is

(1) Doctrine of reminiscence. Cp. chapter on "Arguments for Immortality".

(2) Cp. Cicero, "Tusc." I, 12, "Sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitae".

evident to me, that to die and be released from things
^{would} ~~was~~ ^{surely} ^{best} for me (ὅτι ἤδη τεθνᾶναι καὶ
 ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἢν μοι, Apology, 41 D).

Paul.

Paul's doctrine of the future life differs basically from Plato's in that it includes a belief in the resurrection of the body. The immortality of the soul apart from the body, in the way in which it was taught by Plato, is an impossible conception for the Christian. Man's survival of death must imply the possession of a body. It is the man who is immortal, rather than ^{merely} his soul.

Plato's conception of happiness - the clog of the body being shaken off - yields the idea, which has passed into so much of our modern thinking, of an "immortality of the soul", of an imperishableness, of an inherent indestructibility. It will be seen as we advance that Paul's view is different from all of these. The soul, indeed, survives the body; but this disembodied state is never viewed as one of complete "life". For the Bible "immortality" is not merely the survival of the soul, the passing into "Sheol" or "Hades". This is not, in itself considered, "life" or happiness. The "immortality" that

Paul contemplates is an immortality of the whole person - body and soul together. The subject must now be considered more particularly in its different aspects.

In Paul's system man is represented as a unity. It is the possession of the soul which makes the body what it is. The body is God's work (*νῦν δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐπέτετο τὰ μέλη, ἐν ἑκάστῳ, αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καθὼς ἠθέλησεν* . 1 Cor. 12, 18.).

The chief terms to be considered in order to reach the general New Testament idea of human personality, are four: *ψυχή*, *πνεῦμα*, *καρδιά*, and *σάρξ* corresponding relatively to *נֶפֶשׁ*, *רוּחַ*, *לֵב*, *בָּשָׂר*. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that Paul's psychology is continuous with that of the Old Testament, because some scholars (1) have tended to exaggerate the Hellenistic influences, especially in regard to the Pauline contrast of the inner and the outer man. They interpret the contrast as dualism, though this is essentially untrue to the Hebrew basis of Pauline thought. It is, of course, true that the reproduction of the Hebrew psychological terms through their Greek equivalents gave easier access to the Hellenistic influences of the age. But the Greek terms of the New

(1) e.g. Holtzmann, Luedemann, Sokolowski, Zielinski.

Testament are filled with an essentially Hebrew content (f).

Ψυχή is a term very little used by Paul; we find him using the word thirteen times, and the word πνεῦμα 146 times. It is important to understand what he meant by them. In six passages ψυχή denotes life, and has no further signification (οἵτινες ὅτι ἐξ ἑαυτῶν τὸν ἐαυτῶν τράχηλον ὑπέθηκαν, Rom. 16, 4; (of Epaphroditus) προσδέχεσθε αὐτὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἔργον χριστοῦ μέχρι θανάτου ἤγγισεν παραβουλεύσας τῆ ψυχῆ, Phil 2, 30; Cp. 2 Cor. 1, 23; 1 Thess. 2, 18; 1 Cor. 15, 45; Rom. 11, 3.) On three occasions it is used to denote the individual (Thus, πάντα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερ εχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω, Rom. 13, 1.; καὶ στενοχωρία ἐπὶ πάντων ψυχῶν ἀνθρώπου τοῦ κατεχόμενου τὸ κακόν, Rom. 2, 9; cp. 2 Cor. 12, 15). Of the four instances with psychical content three denote "desire" (ποιοῦντες τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς, Eph. 6, 6; cp. Phil. 1, 27; Col. 3, 23) and one denotes simply the emotional side of one's consciousness (Αὐτοῖς δὲ ὁ θεὸς πᾶς εἰρήνης ἀγαθῶν ὑμῶν ὀλοτερεῖς, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ τῆς νείας).

(1) The two new terms, νοῦς and σουείδησις are really specializations from the psychological usage of ψυχή in the Old Testament and are not used with a Greek connotation.

1 Thess. 5, 23). The meaning here is surely plain. The apostle is not carefully describing man's psychological structure as threefold, but is expressing the hope that his converts may be preserved in the fullness of their personality.

St. Paul's use of ΠΝΕΥΜΑ seems more important. ^{- συνή}
 In the majority of instances he implies by it some Divine or supernatural influence. It is a cardinal principle of his theology that the Spirit of God, working through Christ, regenerates and sanctifies the believer. In this sense ΠΝΕΥΜΑ seems to be used in contrast with body as meaning the higher part of the believer (οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες ἄλλοι οὐ δύναται. αἱμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι, εἴτε πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, εἴ δὲ τις πνεῦμα χειρτοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, οὗτος οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, εἴ δὲ χειρτος, ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτιῶν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῶν διὰ δικαιοσύνης, Rom. 8, 8 - 10). But even in this classical passage where life according to the Spirit is contrasted ^{-ed} with the life of the flesh, and where it is stated that "those who are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom. 8, 8), there is no fundamental dualism of body and soul. For the idea of "flesh" is not identical with that of "body" (εἴ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἁγίου ἄτος τὸ Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἁγίος ἐκ νεκρῶν χειρτον ἁγίου ζωοποιήσει κκι τὰ

θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικούντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν,

Rom. 8, 11). Words like these must have fallen strangely

on Platonic ears, especially when Paul emphasized that

what was mortal was to be made immortal (ὅταν δὲ τὸ
ψῆμα τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀθανασία καὶ τὸ θνητὸν
τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀθανασία , 1 Cor. 15, 54).

Platonism did not fear death but it never said that

"death is swallowed up in victory." (1)

Scripture does acknowledge a dualism, which recognizes the separate existence of soul and body. The

body is spoken of as the "house on earth", the "taber-

nacle" or "tent" prepared for the occupant (οἶδαμεν γὰρ
ὅτι ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκηνώσεως
καταλυθῇ , 2 Cor. 5, 1).

Paul does not deny that the soul is separated by death from the body. Paul looks forward to death with joy because, although his soul will lie in an unclothed state (ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) yet it will be "at home with the Lord" (ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν κύριον , 2 Cor. 5, 8). In fact, while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord (ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ

(1) The bodily resurrection will be discussed more fully in the chapter on "Judgment and the Hereafter".

σώματι ἐκδηλούμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου, 2 Cor. 5, 6).

It is an object of desire to be "with Christ" in this state after death (τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν (ἔχω) εἰς τὸν ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι, πολλῶν γὰρ μᾶλλον ^{ἡρεσῶν} κρείττον τὸ δὲ ἐπιμένειν τῇ σαρκὶ ἀναγκαιότερον δι' ἡμᾶς, Phil. 1, 23. 24). (Cp. Rom. 7, 24: Τίς με λύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου;) The soul is, indeed, in an incomplete state till the resurrection. It "waits for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στενάζομεν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπεκδέχομαι, τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, Rom. 8, 23). But, its state, though incomplete, is still a happy one, for death does not destroy the soul's relation to God and to Christ. The eternal life in the soul in time blossoms in its fruition into the life and blessedness of eternity (εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα ^{νεκρὸν} νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην, Rom. 8, 10). But it must be borne in mind that when Paul yearns to die it is not because he is imbued with the Platonic desire to free the soul from the body. "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that would we be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life." (ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θέλομεν ἐκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἱκενδύσασθαι ἵνα καταποσθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ πῆς ζωῆς, 2 Cor. 5, 4)

Paul's great thesis when he arrived at Athens was the resurrection of the body. As we have noted, he would have had no difficulty in convincing the Platonists that the soul was immortal, but that the body would rise again was a doctrine entirely foreign, in fact, absolutely contrary to their conception of things. And this was the snag which Paul actually ran into on the Areopagus. The philosophers were able to follow him until he came to the resurrection of the dead; "and when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked: and others said, 'We will hear thee again of this matter'" (Acts 17, 32). Some suggest that the Platonists and Stoics were among the receptive, the Epicureans among those who flatly rejected Paul's teaching. I submit that, on the basis of the meager evidence presented, no consistent Platonist could have followed the Pauline conception of death and its effect on soul and body.

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Chapter II

THE ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY.

Plato.

In substance, what has gone before contains Socrates' vindication of his attitude in the face of death. But, as Simmias remarks in the "Phaedo", the whole vindication has tacitly assumed that there is an hereafter. Now most men find it very hard to believe that the soul is not "dispersed like smoke" when a man dies, and Simmias shares their difficulty. To complete his case Socrates must therefore satisfy us that the soul continues to be, and to be intelligent after the death of the "man". Accordingly he proceeds in the "Phaedo" to produce three considerations which point to that conclusion. It is not said that they are demonstrative. Simmias had asked only for *πίστις* (conviction), not for demonstration, and Socrates professes no more than to consider whether immortality is "likely" (*εἰκός*) or not.

The first proof offered is the apparent sophism that everything grows out of or is produced from its opposite (*ἐναντία*). If a thing "becomes bigger" it must first have been "smaller", if it becomes "hotter" it must have been cooler, if it

becomes "better" it must have been "worse", and so on. By this law of correspondence, then, death comes from life and life from death, and if the living came from the dead, the dead must be living in the other world. (Phaedo, 70 D - 72 DE) To this Cebes adds the suggestion that Socrates' favorite doctrine that all learning is reminiscence is a further confirmation. That doctrine, he says, with obvious reference to the "Meno" (81 C f.), is proved by the fact that skilfull questioning can elicit geometrical truth from those who have never been taught geometry. We are reminded by the imperfect copies in the world of sense of something that we have seen or known in another state of existence. And so, generalizing, as surely as pure ideas and pure ideals exist, so sure it is that our souls existed before they entered the bodies whose perceptions give us the imperfect approximation to the ideal (Phaedo, 72 E - 77 A). The combination of this argument with the preceding principle of the generation of opposites is supposed to prove the past as well as the future existence of the soul. The second part of the syllogism proves the pre-existence of the soul, the first premise proves - on the assumption that the alternate cycle of birth and death is endless - that the souls of the dead must continue to exist in

in order that men may continue to be born.

Simmias is particularly delighted with this argument precisely because, as he says, it proves the ante-natal existence of the soul. But, as he goes on to say after a moment's reflection, to prove that the soul "arose" before our birth is not to prove that it will survive death, and it is against the fear of

death that Socrates has to provide an antidote (*δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταψεύσει* - *Θαι* δὲ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι πῆν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμῶν οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν (Cebes), ὅτι, πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμῶν ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ. Εἰ μὲντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθνήσκωμεν ἐπὶ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ... ἀποδείξειναι τὸ πῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἤ, Phaedo, 77 AB). Thus what we may call Socrates' "logical" proof is not entirely satisfactory.

The second argument of the "Phaedo" goes much more to the root of the question, since it is based not on any current general philosophical formula, but on consideration of the intrinsic character of a soul.

Simmias had spoken of the possible "dissipation" of the soul at death (Phaedo, 77 B). Now what sort of

thing is liable to dissipation and what not? Obviously it is the composite and material thing which is more likely to perish than a simple, immaterial essence.

This suggests that we may recognize two types of objects, each type having a pair of characteristics - the invisible and immutable, and the visible and mutable (*ὥς μὲν οὖν,*

βούλει, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὄρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδές αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἐχόν, τὸ δὲ ὄρατόν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, Phaedo, 79 A).

Since it is agreed that we have a body and a soul (*ἢ δ' ὅς,*
ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; Phaedo, 79 A), it is evident that the

body can be seen, but the soul is invisible (*παντὶ τοῦτο (σῶμα) γε δῆλον, ὅτι πῶ ὄρατῶ τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὄρατόν εἶναι, ἢ οὐχ ὄρατόν; οὐχ ὄρατόν, Phaedo, 79 B).* This would indicate that

the soul itself belongs more truly to the type with which it is most at home, the immutable, whereas the body certainly belongs to the mutable.

And as said before (1), when the soul relies on the sense-organs in its investigation it finds the objects it is studying perpetually shifting, and loses

(1) Cp. Chapter 1 on "Death".

its own way (πλανᾶται) among them (ἢ ψυχῆ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁραῖν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως — τούτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι — τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλλιγίᾳ ὡς περ μενύουσα, ἄτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη, Phaedo, 79 C). But when it is considered by itself then it soars to the pure, the eternal, and the immortal (ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον, Phaedo, 79 C).

Again, in the partnership of soul and body, it is the soul which is rightly master and the body servant (ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεῖναι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπύσειν). Now it is for the divine to command and rule; for the mortal to serve and obey (καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἀρχεῖναι τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Phaedo, 80 A). (1)

(1) On the superiority of the soul over body cf. Laws, 959 B, 870 B, 697 B, 967 BD, also Alc. I 130 C.

This brings us at last to the point on which Socrates really means to insist, the "deiformity" or "kinship with God" of the soul. (1)

The soul, then, is relatively the permanent and divine thing in us, the body the merely human and mutable. (τῷ μὲν Νείῳ καὶ ἰθαγάτῳ καὶ νοσητῷ καὶ μονοειδέϊ καὶ ἰδιαλύτῳ καὶ εἰ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχῆ, τῷ δ' ἀνθρώπινῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἰνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδέϊ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον δὲ εἶναι σῶμα , Phaedo, 80 B) We should therefore expect the body to be relatively perishable, the soul to be either wholly imperishable or nearly so. (τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχόντων εἶθ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖτὸ παράπαν ἰδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγὺς τι τούτου , Phaedo, 80 B) And if, as we learn from the Egyptians, with favorable circumstances even a dead body may be preserved from corruption for ages, and there are parts of the body which seem all but indestructible (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν , ἰθάγάτ' ἔστιν , Phaedo 80 D), then what may we expect of the soul ? Much more should we expect that a soul which has made itself as far as possible independent of the mutable body, and has escaped by death to the divine and

invisible, will be lifted above mutability and corruption.

(1) In view of the standing Greek 'equation' of "immortal" (ἀθάνατος) with "divine" (θεῖος), the formal inference to the immortality of the soul follows as a matter of course.

(ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα , τὸ αἰδέσ , τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον , γενναῖον καὶ καθαρόν καὶ αἰδέσῃ , εἰς Ἄϊδου ὡς ἀληθῶς , παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν , οἱ , ἐν θεοῖς ἐδέλην , αὐτίκα καὶ τῆ ἑμῆ ψυχῇ ἰτέον (1) , αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλακτομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθύς διατεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλωνεν; Phaedo, 80 D). The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure, at parting, draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with the body and, itself invisible, departs to the invisible world - to the divine and immortal and rational; thither arriving, it lives in bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods. (ἐὰν μὲν καθ'αυτὴ ἀπαλλάττεται , μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα , ἕτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰδέσ ἀπέρχεται , τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον , οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι , πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβου καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη , ὡς περὶ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων , ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα ,

(1) Seems to indicate Socrates' personal conviction of immortality.

Phaedo, 80 E - 81 A)

The third and final argument of the "Phaedo" is an intricate affair, the result of the challenge of Simmias' analogy of the garment (1) to produce a definite and conclusive proof of the absolute imperishability and immortality of the individual soul. Plato was as well aware as we are that this cannot be done. But he was willing to make a show of proof by identifying the soul with the idea of life, which like other ideas comes and goes unchanged while the objects which it informs come into being and pass away. "A philosophical commentary on the entire passage would involve the theory of ideas, its relation to the Aristotelian logic, its bearing on the problem of the causation, including teleology or the theory of final causes and the Idea of Good." (2) In any case we have to note that much of the philosophical significance of the passage is independent of the validity of the proof of personal immortality, and, second, that Plato's literary art has so ingeniously complicated the question that to this day there is little agreement among commentators as to the precise description of the fallacy which most admit is present somewhere in

(1) Soul wears one garment after another (one body after another) until it finally perishes with the final garment.

(2) Shorey, "What Plato Said", p. 177.

the argument.

The net result of Socrates' theory of "forms" is that life is considered a necessary concomitant of the presence of a soul, as illness is of the presence of fever, or heat of the presence of fire (Phaedo, 105 C). The proof of the immortality of the soul that follows is an intricate argument that virtually identifies the individual soul with the imperishable idea of life. A soul always brings life with it to any body in which it is present (ἡ ψυχὴ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ κατάσχη, ζεῖ ἢ κεί ἐπ' ἐκείνο φέρουσα ζωὴν). Now there is an "opposite" to life, namely, death (πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον, ἢ οὐδέν; ἔστιν, ἔφη. τί; Θάνατος.). Hence we may say that a soul will never allow itself to be occupied by the opposite of the character it always carries with itself (Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ὧ αὐτῇ ἐπιφέρει ζεῖ, οὐ μὴ ποτε λείπεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ἠμολόγηται, Phaedo 105 D). That is, life may be essentially predicated of the soul and therefore death can never be predicated of it, an essential postulate of Socrates' theory of "forms". That which is entirely dissociated from death we call ἀθάρατον. And since death cannot be predicated of the soul, it is, in the literal sense of the word, "undying" (ἀθάρατος); that is, the phrase "a dead soul" would be a "contradictio in adiecto". So much,

declares Socrates, has now been demonstrated. (*τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδείχθαι φῶμεν* , Phaedo, 105 E)

Of course, Socrates acknowledges, this does not take us the whole of the way we wish to go. To prove that there is no such thing as a "dead soul", though there are dead bodies, does not prove that the soul continues to live after the body has died. His demonstration, on his own admission, leaves us with an alternative: since "dead" cannot be predicated of a soul, the soul must either be annihilated or must "retire" when the body dies. Socrates' faith is that the second member of the alternative is correct. Although if anyone should question the identification of the *ἀθάνατον* with the *ἀνώλεθρον* , another proof would be necessary (*ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου* , Phaedo, 106 D). But Socrates is not called upon to argue this fresh point, since his auditors at once assert their conviction that if what is is not imperishable, nothing can be supposed to be so (*σχολῆ γὰρ ἐν τι ἄλλο φθόραν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδίον ὄν φθόραν δέξεται*). Therefore the conclusion is: *Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθάνατου* , εἴ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι , ψυχὴ δὲ εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθος (Phaedo, 106 C). Thus, in the end, the imperishability of the soul is accepted as a consequence

of the standing conviction of all Greek religion that τὸ ἀθάνατον = τὸ Νεῖον = τὸ ἄφθαρτον. It is the soul's "divinity" which is, in the last resort, the ground for the hope of immortality, and the divinity of the soul is a postulate of a reasonable faith which the dialogue never attempts to demonstrate. It is one of those ὑποθέσεις which Socrates himself, in the last word on the value of his demonstration, says need further examination (καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἶσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον). And even though you pursue your study of the subject to the limit, you will finally arrive at a point where you must admit that further investigation is impossible (καὶ εἰ ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐχῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ὅσον δύνατον μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἀκολουθήσαι· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περὶ αὐτοῦ Phaedo, 107 B).

Another argument for immortality from the nature of the soul itself is to be found in the "Phaedrus" and the "Laws"; no mention of it is found in the "Phaedo".

(1) This argument is especially important since, while Plato presents the arguments of the "Phaedo" as not

(1) Various explanations have been offered for this ^{strange} omission in the "Phaedo". It has been suggested that the reason is that the argument is an invention of Plato's own and that he had not thought of it when he wrote the "Phaedo". Taylor, ^{Phaedo} "The Man and His Work" (p.184, n.1) suggests that, since the argument starts from the reality of motion, its premises would have been denied

absolutely probative to his own mind, this latter argument he does seem to find convincing and develops it at great length.

The proof turns on an analysis of the motion of κίνησις, motion or process (Laws, 893 B - 894 E). The soul is the self-moving and therefore takes precedence over that which is moved by another (Phaedrus, 245 - 246). Whatever classification of motions we adopt and with whatever state of things we begin, a first principle of motion is an indispensable postulate. And it is argued that causally communicated motion always presupposes spontaneous motion as its source (Laws, 894 C - 895 B). Now when we see anything which exhibits spontaneous, or internally initiated, motion, we call it "alive", ἔμψυχον; we say that there is a ψυχή in the thing. ψυχή, in fact, is the name which language gives to "the motion which can move itself" (τὸ αὐτὴν κινεῖν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥππερ τὸ ὄνομα εἰ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προιγαγορεύομεν, Laws, 896 A). The motion that moves itself is the "logos" and essence of the soul (ὡς δὴ ψυχὴ τὸ ὄνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ὄνθ' ἔντα, τὴν ^{ἐταυ}δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν ; Laws, 895 E).

by the Eleatic Euclides and Teophsian, and Socrates wished to base his reasoning on premises his company would admit.

Therefore the soul is the oldest existing thing (ψυχὴν
 ταῦτι δὲ καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν
 τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκείνων καὶ πέσειν
 ἅδ' τῶν ἐκείνων πάντως) since it is the cause for
 every change and motion (ἐπειδὴ μὲν ἀσπόμενον μεταβολῆς
 τε καὶ κινήσεως ἀπάντων εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον .

Laws, 896 A). The natural conclusion is that the soul
 is the oldest thing in existence, and hence existed long
 before it entered the body (ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων
 πρὸ τῆς ἐπιπέσεως , Laws 896 B; ψυχὴν μὲν ποτε ἔσαν
 γενέσθαι σώματος ἡμῶν , σώμα δὲ δίδωσθαι τοῦ καὶ
 ὄσσεσθαι ψυχῆς ἀρχόμενος , ἀρχόμενον καὶ πέσειν , Laws
 896 C). It follows that every soul is immortal (ψυχὴ πάντα
 ἀθάνατος , Phaedrus 145 C). For that which is

always in motion is immortal ("undying"). (τὸ γὰρ
 ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον , Phaedrus 145 C). "But that which
 moves and is moved by another (body) in ceasing to move
 ceases also to live (τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινουῦν καὶ ὑπὸ
 ἄλλου κινούμενον , παύσαν ἔχον κινήσεως , παύσαν
 ἔχει ζωῆς). But if the self-moving is immortal, he
 who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence
 of the soul will not be put to confusion. (ἀρχὴ δὲ
 ἀγέννητον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγέννητὸν ἐστὶ , καὶ ἀδιάφθορον
 αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι , Phaedrus 245 D; ἀθανάτου δὲ
 πεπρασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου , ψυχῆς

οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτὸν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυρὸν εἶπαι, Phaedrus 245 E). For the body which is moved from without is soulless (πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀψυχον), but that which is moved from within has a soul, and this is involved in the nature of the soul (ᾧ δὲ ἐνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἔξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὐσης φύσεως ψυχῆς, Phaedrus 245 E). But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then it must also be without beginning and immortal (ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν ἂν εἴη. Phaedrus 246 A).

One cannot help admiring the men of the Socratic circle who admitted limitations of their knowledge, yet, in the words of Simmias, considered anyone a weakling who does not test all the theories proposed to the uttermost, and either discover the truth, or, failing that, take the best and most plausible of human hypotheses as the raft on which to sail through the voyage of life. Unless - unless, he wistfully adds, we can find some "revelation" (a λόγος θεῖος, 85 D), some word of God which will more surely and safely bring us to the haven (δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ εἴ τι τούτων διαπαράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὔρεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν χοῦν βέλτιον πῶν ἀνθρώπων λόγων λαβούτα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοῦμενον,

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλευσάει τὸν
 βίον, εἴ μὴ τις δύρατο ἄσφαλτερον καὶ ἀκινδυν-
 ότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ἰσχύματος λόγου θεοῦ τινός,
 Διαπορευθῆναι, Phaedo 85 CD).

Paul.

In his argument for immortality Paul does not entangle himself with curious questions regarding the nature of the soul, the how of the resurrection. He consistently affirms for man a real [and] continuance of being, not an incorporeal immortality like that to which Greek thought looked, but a bodily immortality, a permanence of life in the integrity of man's entire nature.

For this reason, although Paul's argument is connected with other cardinal Pauline doctrines - grace, faith, redemption -, in the last analysis Paul bases his hope of immortality on the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. For the same One that raised up Christ from the dead can also raise us (εἴ δε τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἐγείρας ἐκ νεκρῶν χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ

σώματα ὑμῶν, Rom. 8, 11; εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ ἐχθρὸς
 τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς σὺν Ἰησοῦ ἐχθροί
 καὶ παραστήσει σὺν ὑμῖν , II Cor. 4, 14).

The Resurrection of Jesus from the dead guarantees that
 all men, irrespective of condition or position, shall
 rise from the dead : ὡςπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ
 πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ
 πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται I Cor. 15, 22).(1)

Now that a man, even a solitary one, should
 have risen from the dead, if it could be established,
 would be a fact of transcendent importance for the
 human race; but it would mean far less than it means
 that Christ rose, for in the Christian creed Christ is
 more than man. The power flowing from Christ's Resurrection
 is vitally connected with the whole conception of His
 Person. Nor would it be a consolatory thought merely to
 be convinced that God died for us and rose again. The
 assurance that Paul derives from the Resurrection of
 Christ is that God carried our nature in victory over
 death. Our personality will survive the grave as Christ's
 survived. ("He took not on Him the nature of angels, but
 of the seed of Abraham", Heb. 2, 14 - 16). So these

(1) This passage must be taken physically, for it is the
 resurrection of the body that forms the theme of the
 entire fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians. Cp. also
 the previous verse: "For since by man came death, by ^{21/}
 man came also the resurrection of the dead." (I Cor. 15, 21)

"bodies of our humiliation shall be transformed into the likeness of the body of His glory" (ὅς μετασχηματίζει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ ^{σώματι} σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, Phil. 3, 21). For it is certain that Christ, once He had risen from the dead, did not die again (Χριστὸς ἔγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει); death no longer has any power over Him (θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει, Rom. 6, 9). It is this power of death which assures our own resurrection (ἐσχάτος ἐχθρὸς καταρχεῖται θάνατος, I Cor. 15, 26; σωτῆρα ἀπεκδέχομεθα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, ὅς μετασχηματίζει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν ^{τῆς} σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ θύνασαι αὐτὸν καὶ ὑποτάξει αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, Phil. 3, 21). Thus it is our Savior, Jesus Christ, who has abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel (τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, καταργήσαντος, μὲν τὸν θάνατον φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, II Tim. 1, 10). Remembering that Jesus Christ of the seed of David was raised from the dead, we shall also live with Him. (μνημόνευε Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἔγερθερμένον ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ.... εἰ γὰρ συναπεθάμεν, καὶ συζηήσομεν, II Tim. 2, 8.11; Cpp. Rom. 6, 8.9) In baptism we are risen with Him through

the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead (*συνταγέστες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνηγάγετε διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεσχείας τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν* ,

Col. 2, 12). In fact, Christ's Resurrection is made the basis for our entire sanctified life (*ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν. συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὡσπερ ἐγήρθη χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν, διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσομεν* ,

Rom. 6, 3.4) (1) For if we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be also in that of His Resurrection (*εἰ γὰρ σύμψυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἑσόμεθα* , Rom. 6, 5.).

This brings us to Paul's second argument for immortality - really not an argument, however, but rather an analogy. The body is compared to a seed. This argument approximates very closely Plato's first argument from the "opposites" : "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die" (*οὐ ζῶσιν οὐδὲ ἀναστάναι εἰ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ* , I Cor. 15, 36). "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is

(1) This is what Paul meant by the "power of the resurrection" (*τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως* , Phil. 3, 10).

sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption"

(οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ, I Cor. 15, 42).

^{One} The great difference between the philosophic and Christian arguments for immortality is one of method. The former roams in the realm of ideas, attempting to establish a logical basis for a hope of immortality. The latter depends on historical facts. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection derives its power from the triumph of the first great Easter Day. The fact that Christ rose from the dead had upon the early disciples a transforming effect which it is difficult to over-estimate. Their whole outlook upon life was changed when they were assured that their Master had conquered death. A glad and confident belief in the Easter victory was the foundation upon which the Christian Church was built. By Christ's resurrection hope and guess were converted into certainty. The world of idea was linked with the world of fact. History confirmed speculation; the unseen took concrete form in the seen.

And it was precisely this historical argument which Paul used to convince the doubting Corinthians that they would rise again: "Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen,

And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God that He raised up Christ, whom He raised not up, if so bet that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised..... If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept." (I Cor. 15, 12 - 16. 19. 20) The historical record is all that Paul needs to prove to himself that there is a blessed hereafter: "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with Him." (I Thess. 4, 14)

With these words Paul, in effect, makes the resurrection of our Lord the ground-work of all hope of immortality. And just this idea it was with which he pushed his way into the cultured thought of the East --- not the Messiahship, not atonement and justification through Jesus Christ, not even monotheism, but the resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. Philosophy demanded facts, arguments, logic, and Paul found no greater fact on which to build his logic than the Resurrection. (1) "He preached to them Jesus and the

(1) Cp. letters to the Corinthians and speech at Athens, two cities strongly tinctured by philosophic wisdom.

resurrection". (Acts 17, 18, Sermon on the Areopagus)

Chapter III

JUDGMENT AND THE RESURRECTION

Plato:

In spite of all his arguments, Plato's personal immortality is a faith or unfaith, a hope or despair that cannot be safely deduced from a man's philosophy or scientific opinions.

He contends that no rational man will affirm that our fancies of the world to come are literally true. But the point is he believes that there is something after death and something better for the good than for the bad (Republic, Book X, 616-617, Phaedrus 247-248). And if the soul is immortal, Plato believed that it is well to let the imagination exercise itself on the possibilities of its after-existence, even while recognizing that it is all a play of fancy. Socrates pictures the universe as he conceives it.

When death comes to a man, the mortal in him dies, as it appears, but the immortal goes on untouched

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He contends that no rational man will affirm that our fancies of the world to come are literally true. But the point is he believes that there is something after death and something better for the good than for the bad (*εὐελπίς εἶμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς*, Phaedo 63 C). And if the soul is immortal, Plato believes that it is well to let the imagination exercise itself on the possibilities of its after-existence, even while recognizing that it is all a play of fancy. Socrates pictures the universe as he conceives it.

When death comes to a man, the mortal in him dies, as it appears, but the immortal goes on untouched

and incorruptible, and escapes death (ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς εἴκειν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἄθνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἄπιόν, υπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ, Phaedo, 106 E). In the "Phaedo" this soul is led by its

"daemon" to the place of judgment. (τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἕκαστου δαίμων, Phaedo 107 D. Τούτων δ' οὕτω πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴ ἀψίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ δ' ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, Phaedo 113 D; ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀψικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, Rep. 614 C)

Under the older dispensation of Cronos and in the beginning of the reign of Zeus, the last judgment was held on the day of death when every man was still clothed with the body (Gorg. 523 F) begirt with possessions, and could summon troops of friends to testify in his behalf. The judges were dazzled by these externals, and their own vision was dimmed by the investiture of their own living bodies. (πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δ' ὄς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἡμψιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματα τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους οἱ οὖν δικάσται ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπερχόμενοι δικάβουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοῦς καὶ ὠτὰ καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προσιεκαλ-

υμμένοι Gorg., 523 CD) When the wardens of Hades and Islands of the Blessed complained that the wrong souls came to them respectively, Zeus bade Prometheus conceal from men foreknowledge of the day of death (πρωτον μὲν οὖν, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότης αὐτοῦς τὸν θάνατον, Gorg. 523 D). Second, the judges themselves must be naked (γυμνός), that is stripped of the body, in order that they may judge correctly.

(καὶ τὸν κριτῆν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξικίψης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τοῖς κόσμον, ἵνα δικάσῃ ἢ κρίσῃ, Gorg. 523 E; cp. Rep.

611 A - E; ἢ ψυχὴ γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος παρ' ἐκεῖνον (τὸν θεόν) ἀπέρχεται, Crat. 403 B)

Generally, the judges who exist independently in Pluto's kingdom, are three in number - Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus - and they are appointed to this office because they had acted justly on earth (Gorg. 523 E - 524 A). But the Mysteries added a fourth, Triptolemus, and Plato refers to all four as true judges in Hades (Apol. 41). Rhadamanthus judges souls from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe while Minos, as the oldest decides difficult case, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτέτη ἢ κριτῆς ἢ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (Gorg. 524 A).

When Er, the son of Armenius, came to life on the funeral pyre twelve days after his death, he had a wonderful story to tell. He said that he journeyed with a multitude to a weird place, where two openings side by side faced two mouths in the heavens (Rep. 614 C). Between them sat judges who after judgment fastened tablets before and behind on the just and unjust, and sent them by the right hand up to heaven or by the left hand down to hell

(τοὺς μὲν δίκαιους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περι-
 ἄψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ
 ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας
 καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπίσθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν
 ἐπραξάν, Rep. 614 C). The place of judgment is

described as a meadow in the other world from which various roads lead to the Islands of the Blessed and

to Tartarus (δικάζουσι ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἕξ ἧς φέρετον πρὸ ὄσῳ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακκάρων νήσους, ἢ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. Gorg. 524 A; cp. Rep.

614 E, εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα, the place at which the souls congregate after death).

As the corpse of a whipped slave still bears the welts of the lash, so the souls of the dead keep the stigmata of the misdeeds that have marred and

scarred and deformed them (ἔνδηλα πάντα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ , ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῆ τοῦ σώματος , τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα , ἀ' διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχει ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Gorg. 524 D). When such a soul comes before the judge he does not know that it is the soul of a tyrant, a great king, a potentate. (δεᾶται ἐκάστου τινὲς ψυχῶν, οὐκ εἰδώς ὅτου ἔστιν , ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου οὐ βασιλέως ἢ τυράστου Gorg. 524 E) He only knows that it is an evil soul (ἐπειδὴν ὁ Περδανόμαντις ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβη , ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὄφειεν οὐδέεν, οὐδ' ὅστις οὐδ' ἀντινων , ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις. Gorg. 526 B).

Those who have lived fairly good lives mount vehicles appointed for them and journey to the lake where they abide, undergoing purification for their sins and receiving rewards for their good deeds (καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν δόξῳσι μέσῳς βεβιωκέναι πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα , ἀναβάντες ἢ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀψικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἴκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι πῶν τε ἀδικημάτων δίδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται , εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκησε , τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται

κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος, Phaedo 113 D; ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ εἰς μακρόων κήσους ἀπιόντα οἴκετν ἐν πλάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἕκτὸς κακῶν, Gorg. 523 B).

But there is also a hereafter for the wicked.

The judges, recognizing the evil soul, attach to it a mark to distinguish the curable from the incurable, send it away to punishment in Tartarus (ἀπέπεμψεν, τοῦτῃ κατισθῶν, εἰς Τάρταρον ἐπισημηνάμενος, εἰδὲν τε ἰάσιμος εἰδὲν τε ἀνιάτος δοκῆ εἶναι; cp. Rep. 614 C: (τοὺς δίκαιούς) σημεῖα περιάψατος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους ἔχοντας ἐν τῷ ὀπίσθεν σημεῖα. Cp. Laws 959 B: τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀνάκατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοῦ ἄλλου ἀτιέναι δῶσοντα λόγον, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ Νασραλέον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ μάλα ψφραίν, Laws 959 B).

The incurable are hurled into Tartarus, from which they never issue forth, whether their sins have been sacrilegious or murderous or brazen transgression of the law (οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀγιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ νόμους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειρασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῦσα εἶπτε εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ὄθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. , Phaedo, 113 E;

In the Rep. they are called ἄνδρες ἄχρηστοι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἔμπεσούμενοι , 616 A)

The object of punishment is to benefit

(οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολλάσει τοὺς ἀδικουῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νόον ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὡς περὶ θεοῦ ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται. ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολλάσει οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται — οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθέν ἀγέννητον νέη — ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν ἵνα μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολλήσῃ, Prot. 524 B (1); προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὁρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἢ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται, Gorg.

529 B). But it is not possible to benefit incurable sinners

(1) A strong commentary on the idea that virtue can be taught. The past cannot be recalled, and only unreasoning, beastlike revenge would punish because a wrong has been done. The object of punishment is to better the wrongdoer and to deter others by his example, and this implies belief that virtue is in our power and can be acquired and taught. Plato applies the same principle to punishment in the hereafter.

(οἱ δ' ἐν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσουσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνάγκη γίνονται, ἐκ τούτων τὸ παράδειγμα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίανται οὐδέν). They are doomed to eternal suffering

(κειθεῖσα δέ, αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δίκαιότησια ἐλθούσα δίκην ἐκτίουσιν, Phaedrus,

249 A). The incurables serve only as examples and

warnings to others (ἄλλοι δέ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ ὑοβερώτατα πάντα πάσχοντας τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παράδειγμα ἀνητημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἄϊδου ἐν τῷ θεσμοποιηθῆναι τοῖς αἰὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀψικνουμένοις νόματα καὶ νομίσματα

Gorg. 525 C). However, in the "Laws" Plato seems to

approve the teaching of the Mysteries that after death

a man is punished for crimes committed in this life (τῶν τοιούτων τίσιν ἐν Ἄϊδου γίγνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἀψικνομένοις δεῦρο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν δίκην ἐκτίσαι, τὴν τοῦ πανόρους ἔπει-
 λυτὸς ἔδρασαν, ὑπ' ἄλλου τοιαύτη μοῖρα τελευτᾶται τὸν τότε βίον, Laws, 870 DE). Most of the princes are

princes and potentates, less happy in this than the

poor and the powerless who lack the opportunity to

commit great and irremedial crimes. Even Homer

recognized that fact when he pictured the great kings as suffering punishment in Hades and the poor Thersites, although an evil person, was not considered incurable.

There is the possibility that powerful men can be righteous, but they are few (ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι). (Gorg. 525 D - 526 A; cp. Euthyd. 281 C)

Curable sinners are healed in the end, but only after a long and painful sojourn in Tartarus, (εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὤψελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην δίδόντες ὑπὸ Νεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι, οἳ δὲ ἐν ἰάσιμα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμάτωσιν ὅμως δὲ εἰς ἀληθειῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου, Gorg. 525 B). Those whose sins are great, but not incurable, must needs be cast into Tartarus, but after a year the wave spues them forth, those guilty of manslaughter to Cocytus, those who have wronged their parents to Pyriphlegethon (οἳ δ' ἐν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλη δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτη κέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον παρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπὸ θεῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνου τοιοῦτῃ τινὶ ἄλλῃ τροπῇ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, seq., Phaedo 11 BE + 114 A).

And when they come to the Acherusian Lake, they cry out and supplicate their victims to pardon them and come to

the lake and receive them (cp. Laws, 869 AB). If they win grace, they bome forth and find surcease from their pain (καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν , ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν); if not, they are swept back into Tartarus and must return year after year till the souls whom they have wronged relent. (εἴ δ' ἐμὴ , φέρονται ἀδύσῃς εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον κακείνων πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς , καὶ τὰυτὰ πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον πύονται , πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὐς ἠδίκησαν , Phaedo 114 B)

Plato's whole theory of the hereafter is built up on the assumption that penalties and rewards are tenfold, assuming the space of human life to be one hundred years. (ὅσα πώποτε τινεὶ ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι , ὑπὲρ πάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει , ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις . Τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην , ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου , ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοισιν , Rep. 615 A)

That explains why Ardiaeus the Great is regarded as an incurable soul. When Er the son of Armenius was exploring Hades, he heard someone ask for Ardiaeus, who had been a wicked tyrant a thousand years before. No chance of his coming here, was the reply. (οὐκ ἔκει , οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο , Rep. 615 D) For if he

was rejected after completing the thousand year cycle, he was certainly incurable. And Er relates that among their chief terrors was this, that, when on the journey back souls incurable or insufficiently purged of guilt (they were mostly tyrants and great malefactors) approached the mouth, it bellowed and thereupon savage men of fiery aspect laid hold on them and bore them away. And there he saw this Ariæ^dus and others, mostly tyrants, whom they bound hand and foot and carded on thorns by the wayside, proclaiming the cause to all that passed by, and into what pit of Tartarus they were to be hurled. And everyone trembled lest he hear the voice, and they came forth gladly when it was silent.

Plato's hell, therefore, is depicted in the main as a purgatory for the not wholly depraved. A few incurables are detained there permanently as a warning to others, but these are chiefly "supermen" of the Napoleonic type. Ordinary human weakness is regarded as "curable". (1)

(1) The Roman Catholic idea of purgatory is Platonic but not entirely. Cp. such passages as Laws 905 D -906 D and Rep. 365 A, where prayers and incense are referred to scornfully in this connection. For the Roman Catholic "limbus infantæ" cp. Rep. 615 C, where special provisions are made for infants that died as soon as born.

But Plato also has a heaven. Aristides "the just" is instanced as an example of a man who filled high office nobly and went "straight to heaven" (Gorg. 526 B). Those who are judged to have lived exceptionally holy lives are delivered from the prison-house of this world and sent to dwell aloft in the habitations of the pure in the earthly paradise. (οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιώειν, οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῆ ἔλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλακτομένη ὡσπερ δερμῶνται-οίων ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καλύτερὴν οἴκησιν ἀγικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκισόμενοι, Phaedo 114 B) And of these,

those who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live without bodies (1) for all time to come in even fairer habitations, which words and time fail him to describe. (τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παρόντα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκῆσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀγικνοῦνται, ἅς οὔτε εἰς οὐδὲν εἰρηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι, Phaedo 114 C)

Plato's conception of judgment and retribution

(1) Unaffected by the doctrine of metempsychosis.

is closely connected with that of metempsychosis. It will be in place to refer briefly to this notion in explanation of Plato's utter contempt for the body, and his apparent deification of the soul. (1)

After the required cycle has been completed for purification in the hereafter, the souls are summoned before Lachesis (Rep. 617 D). They are addressed: "Souls that live for a day, now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own. Let him to whom falls first lot first select a life to which he cleave of necessity. The blame is in your choice; God is blameless." So saying, the lots were flung out among the congregated souls, relates Er. (617 E)

He says that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. It was a strange, pitiful and ridiculous spectacle (*ἔλθειν τὴν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοῖαν καὶ θυμασίαν*, Rep. 620 A). He saw the soul that had been Orpheus² selecting the life of a swan. From hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born by a woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out

(1) For entire doctrine of incarnation cp. Phaedo 81 E - 82 B, 107 E, 113 A; Phaedr. 248 - 49; Meno 81 FC; Timaeus 42 A+D, 91 D; Laws 872 E, 903 D, and perhaps 904 D.

that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and from the memory of its former toils having attained surcease of ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business, and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and said when it saw it that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly.

(Rep. 620 CD)

But when, to make a long story short, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshaled and went before Lachesis. And she sent with each as the guardian of his life the fulfiller of his choice, the genius that he had chosen. This divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under the turning of her spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice, and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos to make the web of destiny irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of necessity. And after he had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the plain of oblivion, through a terrible and stifling heat; and there they camped at eventide by the river of forgetfulness, whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all

required to drink a measure of water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars. (Rep. 620 D - 621 B; cp. Phaedr. 245 - 249 C)

Thus, judgment took place at the end of life, when the soul was rewarded, or punished in places of correction. At the end of a thousand years the soul chose a new body, human or animal, and was born on earth to undergo further reprobation there, and to be rewarded or punished once more at death. Benn was certainly correct when he wrote: "It was not merely the immortality, it was the eternity of the soul that Plato taught." (1)

(1) Benn, "The Greek Philosophers", p. 240

(1) This is essentially a Senecan conception. Cp. Seneca's American Academy at Rome (1925), M. E. Giles, "The Sleep of Death."

(2) Cp. chapter on "Death and the Religion of Soul and Body"

(3) Cp. Letter on a letter to Seneca, in Seneca's Letters to Lucilius, just after the explanation of the soul's journey.

Paul.

It has been established that Paul taught a separation of soul and body at death. The soul wings its way into the other world, and it is assumed that the lifeless corpse is disposed of. The question then arises, "What was Paul's teaching regarding the state of the soul after death?"

Some have supposed that Paul taught a kind of "soul-sleep" on the basis of such passages as I Cor. 15, 6 (ΤΙΝΕΣ ΔΕ ἘΚΟΙΜῆΘΗΣΑΝ) and I Cor. 11, 30 (καὶ κοιμῶνται ἰκανοί)⁽³⁾. However, this is the usual expression employed in the Scriptures to describe the death of saints under the image of sleep (I Cor. 15,51; I Thess. 4, 14; 5, 10). (1) It denotes 1) the calmness and peace with which they die, like sinking into a gentle sleep; 2) the hope of a resurrection, as we sink to sleep with the expectation of awaking again. And yet, in spite of the fact that the soul exists in a blessed state after death⁽²⁾, yet its life is not complete. For death ends only when the soul is reunited with the body. ("When this corruptible will

(1) This is essentially a Semitic conception. Cp. Report of American Academy at Rome (1933), M.B.Ogle, "The Sleep of Death."

(2) Cp. chapter on "Death and the Relation of Soul and Body"

(3) Cp. Luther, in a letter to Ansdorf: *de animabus suis non patitur habere, quod tibi respondeam. Proclive mihi est concedere illis in eam securitatem, quoniam animas dormire ac usque ad iudicii diem vivere, ubi sunt. In quam securitatem me trahit verbum scripturae: dormiunt cum patribus suis* (quoted in Kern, "Die Christliche Eschatologie", p. 46)

will put on incorruptibility and this mortal will put on immortality, then will come to pass the word which is written, 'Death is swallowed up in victory'." I Cor. 15, 54)

It is Christ's Parousia which will signal the resurrection of the dead and the entrance into life eternal. At Christ's Parousia the dead in Christ will rise first (οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον, I Thess. 4, 16) and the living will be caught up to meet the Lord in the air (ἔπειτα ἡμεῖς οἱ ὄντες οἱ περιλειπούμενοι ἅμα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀρραβησόμεθα ἐν νεφέλαις εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ κυρίου εἰς ἄερα, I Thess. 4, 17). All shall be transformed (πάντες οὐ κοιμηθήσόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγθήσόμεθα).

The resurrection body will be a body like to Christ's own (ὃς μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, Phil. 3, 21) - incorruptible (οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ, I Cor. 15, 42), glorious (σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ, I Cor. 15, 43), powerful (σπείρεται ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δυνάμει, I Cor. 15, 43), spiritual (σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν, I Cor. 15, 44), immortal (Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν

καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν, ὅταν
 δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀψυχοσίαν καὶ
 τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀθανασίαν, τότε
 γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος κατεπόνη ὁ θάνατος εἰς
 γῆκος, I Cor. 15, 53. 54).

St. Paul declared that the resurrection body will
 be spiritual, but the contrast which he has in mind is
 between σῶμα ψυχικόν and σῶμα πνευματικόν (I Cor.
 15, 44). This contrast is not between a body consisting
 of matter and a pure spirit but between a body dominated
 by ψυχή and the same body subjected to πνεῦμα. (1)
 He says that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom
 of God nor can the corruptible inherit incorruption
 (θάνατος καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομηῖσαι οὐ
 δύναται, οὐδὲ ἢ φθορὰ τὴν ἀψυχοσίαν κληρονομεῖ,
 I Cor. 15, 50). But this obviously means by their own
 power, for he adds that our bodies will be changed and
 that the dead will be raised incorruptible (οἱ νεκροὶ
 ἐξεθνήσκονται ἀφθαρτοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀλλαγησόμεθα,
 I Cor. 15, 52). This corruptible will put on incorruption
 (τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀψυχοσίαν, καὶ τὸ
 θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀθανασίαν, I Cor. 15, 54). A
 distinction between this resurrection and a purely

(1) Cp. pp. 14. 15.

spiritual survival is clearly implied in certain places (ζωοποιήσει τὰ ὑπνῆτα σώματα ὑμῶν , Rom. 8, 11; ἔς μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν , Phil 3, 21; cp. I Thess. 4, 13 - 17).

If the resurrection were spiritual, the wicked would not rise, as it is declared that they will. They are raised, however, not to glory, but for judgment (ἀνάστασιν μέλλεν ἴδεσθαι δίκαιων τε καὶ ἀδίκων , Acts 24, 15). The same truth is implied in all passages on the last judgment.

The judgment at the Parousia is described as the judgment of God (τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ , Rom 2, 3; cp. Rom. 14, 11; 3, 19), of Christ (χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ , τοῦ μέλλοντος κρίνειν ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς , II Tim. 4, 1; 2 Cor. 5, 10), of God through Christ (κρίνει ὁ θεὸς διὰ χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ , Rom. 2, 16). It will be a righteous judgment, discovering the secrets of all hearts, giving to every man according to his works (τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἔστιν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν , Rom. 2, 2; (θεὸς) ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ , Rom. 2, 3; κρίνει ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων , Rom. 2, 16; ἔνδειγμα τῆς δικαίας κρίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ , II Thess. 1, 5; ὁ δίκαιος κρίτης , II Tim. 4, 8). The judgment will be universal, that is, it will include both the quick and the dead (κρίνειν ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς , II Tim. 4, 1;

cp. Acts 17, 31). The issues of this judgment are declared with remarkable frequency and variety of statement; they are described as "eternal" (ἀιώνιος), a term which in the Pauline Epistles is essentially, and in most applications, one of duration (cp. Rom. 16, 26; II Cor. 5, 1). This part of the doctrine of the final judgment is summed up fairly well in Paul's sermon on the Areopagus (ἔστιν ἡμέραν ἐν ἣ ἔμελλει κρῖνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἐν ἧσδε ᾧ ὡρίσθη πίστιν παροσχῶν τῶσιν ἀνασπῆσας αὐτὸν ἐκ γερουσιῶν, Acts 17, 31).

In Paul's portrayal of the effect of the judgment, the lot of the unrighteous has a subordinate place but is described as "wrath" (Rom. 2, 5), "the wrath to come" (I Thess. 1, 10), "death" (Rom. 2, 8), "punishment" (Rom. 6, 21), "destruction" (II Thess. 1, 9), "eternal destruction from the face of the Lord" (Phil. 3, 19). This punishment is eternal (δίκην τίνουσιν ὀλεθρον αἰώνιον, II Thess. 1, 9).

The lot of the righteous is a salvation "with eternal glory", a "prize", a "crown", an "inheritance", a "manifestation", a "reign", a "life" with Christ, "eternal life", "the life which is life indeed" (Rom. 2, 7; 5, 9.21; 6, 8. 23; I Cor. 9, 25; Gal. 5, 6; 6, 8; Phil. 3, 14; Col. 1, 12; 3, 24; I Tim. 1, 16; 6, 12. 16; II Tim. 2, 1. 10;

4, 8; Tit. 1, 2).

The condition of the blessed in their state of immortality is one of unspeakable felicity of both soul and body forever. There are, indeed, degrees of glory - this is carefully and consistently taught (I Cor. 3, 10 - 15; 15, 41; Phil. 3, 10 - 14; II Tim. 4, 7). But the condition as a whole is one of perfect satisfaction, holiness and blessedness (Rom. 2, 7. 10). The blessedness of this eternal state includes such elements as 1) restoration to God's image and likeness to Christ (I Cor. 15, 49; II Cor. 3, 18; Eph. 4, 24; Col. 3, 10); 2) perfect holiness (II Cor. 7, 1; Phil. 1, 6); 3) the unveiled vision of God's glory (*βλέπομεν γὰρ ὅτι δι' ἑσώπτου ἐν ἀνίχηματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*, I Cor. 13, 12).

It is thought by some that Paul departs from the general view of the New Testament in teaching the intervention of a millennial period between two distinct resurrections. But this idea, which is otherwise alien to St. Paul's writings, turns upon the particular interpretation of a single passage (I Cor. 15, 22 - 24) in which the immediate question is not one of succession or chronological order, and in which nothing is said of any other resurrection than that of those who are Christ's.

(2) Cp. G. Fung, art. "Immortality", etc.

The Pauline epistles have also been supposed to contain a definite doctrine of the intermediate state, with activities of grace in it. The doctrine of a purgatory, or some provision for the purgation of souls in the other world, has been ascribed to the great paragraph, I Cor. 3, 12 - 15 (1), in which, however, the "day" in question is that of the judgment, and the action referred to is that of testing (δοκιμάσει), not purifying. The doctrine of a middle state, with a descent of Christ implying the extension of grace and opportunity, is supposed to be contained, in particular, in Rom. 10, 5 - 10. But the main idea there is the accessibility of the "Word of faith", the nearness and attainability of the righteousness of God, and the words say nothing of a Hades-ministry of Christ, nothing of the world of the dead, beyond the fact that Christ entered it and was raised from it.

Now when we compare the basic conceptions of Paul and Plato we note that both taught a judgment in the hereafter, both believed that the righteous would be happy, and the wicked punished. However, Paul would not admit of a purgatory in the world, a fundamental idea in Plato's system. And when we examine the details

(1) Cp. G. Runze, art. "Immortality", Cath. Ency. V, p. 460.

of resurrection, judgment, blessed immortality, the results give the lie to any assertion that Paul was indebted to Plato for his views on the hereafter.

Chapter 17

THE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING
IMMORTALITY

Plato.

In the "Apology" Plato never explicitly states twice over (24 D and 30 A) with great emphasis that the purpose of his mission was to get men "to care for their soul" (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς) and to make it as good as they can. He insisted that the soul was a man's true self and demanded his best care (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) (1), "not only for the time of this life, but for all time." In fact, this idea is based entirely on the immortality of the soul (ψυχή ἀθάνατος, ἡ ψυχή δὲ οὐκ ἐσθλὴν οὐδὲ κακὴν γίνεσθαι οὐδέ τι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἔχειν, καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐσθλὴν οὐδὲ κακὴν γίνεσθαι οὐδέ τι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἔχειν, καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐσθλὴν οὐδὲ κακὴν γίνεσθαι οὐδέ τι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἔχειν).

(1) For ἐπιμελεῖσθαι used with a similar sense see Plato, Apol. 31B, 30C; Crito 61A; Euthyph. 5E; Lysis 206A; 187A; Prot. 325C, 328E; 327D, 332E; Gorg. 462D; Phaedo 115B; Rep. 500D; Tim. 18B; Laws 803D, 807A.

Chapter IV

THE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING
BLESSED IMMORTALITY.

Plato.

In the "Apology" Plato makes Socrates state twice over (24 D and 30 A) with great emphasis that the purpose of his mission was to get men "to care for their soul" (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς) and to make it as good as they can. He insisted that the soul was a man's true self and demanded his best care (ἐπιμέλεια) (1), "not only for the time of this life, but for all time." In fact, this idea is based entirely on the immortality of the soul (εἶπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος , ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον , ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν , ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός , — καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξασεν εἶναι εἶτις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει , Phaedo 107 G.

(1) For ἐπιμέλεια used with a similar moral significance of Apol. 31B, 36C; Crito 51A; Euthyph. 2D; Laches 179A; 187A; Prat. 325C, 326E; 327D, 328E; Gorg. 515BC; Phaedo 115B; Rep. 556C; Tim. 18B; Laws 807CD, 847A. cf.
Phaedo

Cr. Meno 81 B: φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τότε μὲν τελευτᾶν, δὲ δὴ ἀποθνήσκουσιν καλοῦσι, τότε δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἀπόλλυσθαι. δ' οὐδέποτε δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὀσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον).

The "tendance of the soul" involves this, that it is kept unspotted from the world, in order that it may be presented clean and pure to the judge of the other world (σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφαινοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν) .. and to accomplish that purpose, Socrates strives to live as well as he can, and to die in the same way (τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ὄντι καὶ, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκουσιν, Gorg. 526 D)

The true "tendance" of the soul, however, is the acquisition of wisdom. The true "tendance" of any creature consists in providing it with its appropriate food and "exercise" (κινήσεις), and the "exercise" appropriate to the rational soul is thus "the thoughts and revolutions of the whole". The rule of healthy living for the soul is that this divine thing in us should "think thoughts immortal and divine". (Timaeus 90 A - D)

The true philosopher sees clearly that to

obtain wisdom one must make the soul independent of the body as far as possible (τοῦ τοιούτου (τοῦ ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου) οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφροτάνα αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν γετρωφύται, Phaedo 64 E; Ἰηλός ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μέλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφροόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, Phaedo 65 A; cp. Rep. 611 A - E). While we are in the body, we make the nearest approach to our supreme good, wisdom, just in proportion as we accomplish the concentration of the soul on herself and the detachment of her attention from the body, waiting patiently until God sees fit to complete the deliverance for us. (ἕως ἀπὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφρομένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκατῶς οὐ ἐπιφροῦμεν, Phaedo 66 B; εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθροῶς τι εἶδεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ νεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶματα· καὶ τότε ὡς εἴκεν ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιφροῦμέν τε καὶ φρομεν ἐφασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ζῶσι δὲ οὐ, Phaedo 66 DE; καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἀν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς εἴκεν, ἔχρητάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἶδεσθαι, ἐὰν ὅτι μέλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ

καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἀν' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς
ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς,

Phaedo 67 A).

Plato's conception of virtue is closely tied up with that of wisdom. The so-called virtue of the lovers of the body is merely a balancing of pleasures and pain against one another. The decent () keep their lusts in hand because they think they will get more pleasure by doing so than by giving way. (1) But the truth is that real virtue is not a business of exchanging pleasures and pain against one another. Wisdom is the true "coin of the realm" (ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν.... φρόνησις) for which everything else must be exchanged, and it is only when accompanied by it that ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, and δικαιοσύνη become real virtues (ἀληθινῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως , Phaedo 69 B).

The contemplation of this ideal prompts Socrates to give utterance to the truth at which the mysteries hint: "Many are the thyrsus-bearers but few are the real βάκχοι " (Phaedo 69 B). The philosopher

(1) Plato reserved a special place in hell for this class; a mild fate was held in store for those who practised the "popular goodness" and justice without "philosophy." (Phaedo 82 B)

is the only type of man who makes it his business to accomplish this purgation and concentration and so to win spiritual independence. (Phaedo 66 A). That is why we may call his life a "rehearsal of death", since it is a continuous struggle on the part of the philosopher to free himself from the body. (Phaedo 66 C - 68 B). For the body and its appetites are perpetual impediments to the higher activities of the soul, which they clog with loves, desires, fears, and phantoms. (Phaedo 66 C)

The philosophers only will return to the gods (*Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ*). They alone truly love wisdom, and desire to be free from the impediments which the body puts in the way of its acquisition (Phaedo 114 C). They only control their appetites and instincts for these reasons and not from fear of waste, as the lovers of wealth, or fear disgrace, as the lovers of honor. (*οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παρὰ δόξαι αὐτῶν αὐτοῦς, οὐτι οἴκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν,*

, Phaedo 82 C).

Philosophy which releases them from the prison-house of the appetites, teaches them that, as even the poets say, all the reports of the senses are full of deception

(παρὰ λαβούσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη, ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἢ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὠτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, Phaedo 83 A). It is in order

not to forfeit this release that the philosopher

abstains from sensual excess as much as he can. (ταύτη οὖν τῇ λύσει· οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, Phaedo 83 B).

So the philosopher has no reason to fear death.

Let every man be of good cheer who in his life has disdained the lower pleasures as alien to his real self and productive of more harm than good, and who has arrayed his soul not with external decorations, but with the ornaments that belong to it, sobriety, righteousness, courage, freedom, and truth. (ἀλλὰ τούτων δη' ἕνεκα

διασεεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἀνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἄλλοτριῶς τε ὄντας καὶ πλέον βλάτερον ἡγησάμενος

ἀπερχάσσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἰσοπούδασέ
 τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτριῶ ἀλλὰ
 τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη
 καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, Phaedo

114 DE) Such a man may await without fear his passage

to that unseen world, when fate calls him (οὕτω

περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἅϊδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος
 ὅταν ἢ εἰμαρμένη κληῖ, Phaedo 115 A).

For death itself no man but a thoughtless
 coward fears. The really dreadful thing is unrighteousness,
 to go down to the house of death with a soul corrupted

and marred by evil deeds (αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποδνήσκειν

οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ πάντᾳ πᾶσιν

ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν

φοβεῖται πολλῶν. γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν

ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅϊδου ἀψικέσθαι πάντων ἐσχατον

κακῶν ἐστίν, Gorg. 522 E). Righteousness, real

righteousness, which makes itself felt even in private

life is that which profits a man in the end. It is that

which will make him not seem, but be, good, and will

keep him safe on the day of judgment (Socrates has

just finished saying that he leads as good a life as

he can to appear before the judge, and adds: οὐκ ἔχετε

ἀποδείξει, ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον εἶναι ἢ τοῦτον,

ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε γαίνεται συμφέρον, ἀλλ' ἐν

ποσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδοῖ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγανθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, (Gorg. 527 B).

Finally Socrates placed his hope of immortality on a certain kind of faith. After relating the myth of Er he says to Glaucon: "The myth was saved and was not lost, and it will save us if we believe it (ἡμᾶς ἀν σώσειεν, ἀν πεινώμεθα αὐτῷ), and we shall safely cross the river Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted. But if we are guided by me, we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring every evil and every good, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom (δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως) in every way, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods, both during our sojourn here and when we receive (righteousness with wisdom's) reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, which I discussed, we shall fare well". (Rep. 621 CD)

Paul.

Now if Plato taught that the way to immortality is that of δικαιοσύνη, we must say that Paul taught the same thing. And yet Paul's δικαιοσύνη has an entirely different content than Plato's. Plato's righteousness is the result of wisdom which comes only after persistent application to philosophy (δικαιοσύνη μετὰ φρονησεώς). Paul's righteousness excludes all personal application of piety (δικαιοσύνην χωρὶς ἔργων, Rom. 2, 6); it is the righteousness of faith (δικαιοσύνη τῆς πίστεως, Rom. 4, 11). "We had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God who raiseth the dead." (αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἄποκείμενον τοῦ θανάτου ἐσχήκαμεν ἵνα μὴ πεποιθότες ὦμεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ τῷ ἐγείροντι τοὺς νεκρούς, I Cor. 1, 9)

The "eternal life" which runs through all of Paul's work, is not something attainable through the efforts of a man to learn wisdom, in Plato's sense. Eternal life is mediated by Christ (εἰ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ ὄντες καταλλάγημεν τῷ θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ

υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, πολλῶ μᾶλλον καταλλαγέντες
 θωπυρόμενα ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, Rom. 5, 10).

It is "in Christ Jesus" (ὁμοίως λογίζεσθε ἑαυτοῖς
 εἶναι νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ
 ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, Rom. 6, 11). It is the gift of God
 (τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος ἐν
 Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, Rom. 6, 23). It is
 also mediated and imparted to us through the Spirit
 (ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν
 Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς
 ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, Rom. 8, 2; τὸ δὲ
 φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη, Rom. 2, 6).

The Spirit is life because of righteousness (τὸ δὲ
 πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην, Rom. 8, 10).

Eternal life may be apprehended already in
 this life (ἀγωνίζου τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα τῆς πίστεως,
 ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς, I Tim. 6, 12). It is
 brought to light through Jesus Christ and His Gospel
 (τοῦ σωτηῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, καταργήσαντος
 μὲν τὸν θάνατον φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ
 ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, II Tim. 1, 10;
 λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες, Phil. 2, 16). Eternal life
 comes through faith in Jesus Christ (πιστεύειν ἐπὶ
 αὐτῷ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, I Tim. 1, 16).

Thus it is that those who trust in the righteousness of Christ themselves have a conquering power over sin and death (εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν διὰ τοῦ ἐνός, πολλῶ μᾶλλον οἱ τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύουσιν διὰ τοῦ ἐνός Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. Ἄρα οὖν ὡς δι' ἐνός παραπτώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς κατάκριμα, αὕτως καὶ δι' ἐνός δικαιώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς..... ἵνα ὡσπερ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν, Rom. 5, 17. 18. 21). Paul

maintains that only after we have been made free from sin, and become servants of God, can we have fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ. (νυνὶ δὲ ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας δουλωθέντες δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν ὑμῶν εἰς ἁγιασμόν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωὴν αἰώνιον. τὰ γὰρ ὄψωνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ Rom. 6, 22. 23) It is in this sense that eternal life is called the reward of those

who by patience and well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality (τοῖς μὲν κατ' ὑπομονὴν ἔχου ἀγαθοῦ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ζητοῦσιν, ζωὴν αἰώνιον, Rom. 2, 7).

Although eternal life is a present possession and hope (ἴνα δικαίωθέντες τῇ ἐκείνου χάριτι κληρονομοὶ γεννηθῶμεν κατ' ἐλπίδα ζωῆς αἰωνίου, Tit. 3, 7; ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ζωῆς αἰωνίου, ἣν ἀπηγγείλατο ὁ ἀψευδὴς θεὸς πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνων, Tit. 1, 2), it will be received in all its fulness only in the hereafter. (II Cor. 5, 4; Rom. 2, 7)

A comparison of Plato's and Paul's teaching on the way to immortality reveals again the great difference between the natural religion and the revealed religion. One looks for immortality in the achievements of man, the other looks for it in the open sepulchre. Paul asserted that all faith in the occurrences, teachings, life, and death of Christ is vain, a self-deceiving hope, a misery-producing thought, unless He vacated the tomb on the third day. And it was to this dead and living Lord that he pledged his life, "for none of us lives to himself, and no man dies to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live, therefore, or die, we are the Lord's. For to this end Christ both died and rose, and revived,

that He might be Lord both of the dead and living" (Rom. 14, 7 - 9). And with his faith centered in the Risen Savior Paul was convinced that salvation, a blessed immortality was his: "If thou shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." For that is the true righteousness which culminates in eternal life (ἔδν πιστεύσης ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου ὅτι ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν, σωθήσῃ· καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην, Rom. 10, 9. 10).

Conclusion

Certain citizens of Thessalonica, in describing the effect of apostolic preaching said to the rulers that it had "turned the world upside down" (Acts 17, 6); a more accurate concession to the radical power of Christianity never was rendered. Certainly no world could have been more upset by the agitating, overturning, and magnetic elements of the new religion than that of the Platonic circle. The glory of Christianity was light, it was leaven, it was salt, and it was more. It was fire, it was a hammer, it was wind, it was resurrection. And Platonism and similar systems were swept away before it.

In Christianity's doctrinal character lay its secret propelling force. Paul's dogmatic Christianity, or the religion of revealed truth, was a primary necessity. The Christian religion without revealed truths would be like astronomy without stars, botany without plants, and geology without rocks.

And if the apostles and Christian fathers urged with vehement interest the consideration of the great truths of resurrection, immortality, and judgment, it was

because the philosophic conceptions gave supreme evidence that such knowledge was to be acquired only by revelation. With faith in immortality, Plato and the other philosophers loaded it with a mythology quite as dreary as superstition had ever invested it (1). The doctrines of the pre-existence of souls, of transmigration, of incarnation, of Tartarus, and of the abode of the gods surrendered to the clearer teachings of immortality, resurrection, final judgment, and ultimate heaven and hell, as they fell from Christ and those who went forth as heralds of the truth.

The doctrine of immortality, dimly apprehended, did not go begging for support in Plato's writings. It was questioned, analyzed, suspected, but certainly not rejected. A judgment-seat, judges, degrees of suffering, heaven and hell - these general principles of Plato's immortality testify to the power of his reason and to his judicious eclecticism exercised over the mass of tradition which was available.

But any comparison of the details of their doctrine will give the lie to the opinion so freely expressed by certain students of comparative religion

(1) This is not to be censured too severely in Plato, since mythology was as much the set form of religious expression at that time as Bible history is for us today, if we would draw a comparison.

that Paul is indebted to Greek philosophy, and especially to Plato, for much of his eschatology. (1)

If there is any conclusion to which a comparison of Plato and Paul would lead us, it is this - as the religion of truth and life Christianity is without a rival. As a religion of truth it opens doors hitherto closed to the unsandled feet of sages; it reveals God as Plato never apprehended Him; it points back to the beginning, and its last rays carry one to the end and beyond. A truth-religion it is.

As a religion of life all men need it, for all are dead in trespasses and sin. Its words sound in every cavern of despair, and its flower of hope blooms over the door of every sepulchre. My words, says the Savior, "are spirit and life".

"Christianity is the real of the soul."

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(1) Cp. Prof. Draper: "Christianity was essentially a Greek religion", quoted by Mendenhall, "Plato and Paul", p. 340.

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