

Concordia Seminary - Saint Louis

Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary

Master of Sacred Theology Thesis

Concordia Seminary Scholarship

1-1-1927

Reason and Christian Faith

Daniel Coyner

Concordia Seminary, St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholar.csl.edu/stm>



Part of the [Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Coyner, Daniel, "Reason and Christian Faith" (1927). *Master of Sacred Theology Thesis*. 591.
<https://scholar.csl.edu/stm/591>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Concordia Seminary Scholarship at Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Sacred Theology Thesis by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact seitzw@csl.edu.

REASON AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

A thesis

presented to the faculty of

Concordia Seminary,

St. Louis, Mo.,

by

Daniel Coyner

in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree

of

Master of Sacred Theology, 1927.

REASON AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

Table of Contents

| | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| I Reason..... | 1 |
| II Faith..... | 6 |
| III Statement of Relation..... | 11 |
| IV Historical..... | 23 |
| V Authority or Experience..... | 27 |
| VI Practical..... | 35 |

REASON AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

The attempt to present a somewhat different point of view is the only excuse that may be offered for another treatment of the relation of reason to Christian faith. The peculiarity of the following discussion will be its assumption that Christianity is the true religion. It is in no sense a study of the philosophy of religion, which begins, for purposes of argument, with the notion that all religions are of equal merit. Nor is it similar to the prefatory remarks on the relation of reason to religious truth which are commonly found in the books on the philosophy of religion in general. The relation of reason to the Christian religion must be radically different from its relation to religion as a whole.

This adoption of the Christian view may be said to entail a philosophic dualism of some sort. Christianity can hardly be thought of as consistent with any but a dualistic world order; although it may seem that the Berkeleian idealism may be brought within its scheme. But I doubt whether Christianity is assertive of any philosophical scheme. At least for purposes of this essay it will be enough to accept the so-called common-sense view of ontology and epistemology, which, by the way, seem to have characterized Christ's working basis in his ministry. Our position in psychology, however, we must of necessity define in the course of our argument.

I Reason

Since the term reason has been used to signify almost anything from the sense-life and instincts of the animals to the higher reaches of speculation and inference in man, we are required to offer some definition of our first concept.

Reason, then, in the wide sense, may be described as the human ability for apprehending truth. It may be thought of as that element in man which most obviously distinguishes him from an animal. (1) The evidences of reason in man are the most obvious differences between man and beast because the higher differences, which are asserted by revelatory authority, are less easily demonstrated. The evidences of reason, however, as a function of an independent spiritual being, form a large portion of the material of the proper study of psychology. The psychology which attempts to include the animals in its field is no longer a true psychology. So reason here is taken as the

(1) John Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Bk. II, ch. 11, p. 10.

sum of those intellectual elements which distinguish man from animal. Whether these be in turn distinguished in various ways, as Kant and Coleridge distinguish the Understanding and the Reason, is not of consequence for our present discussion. If the distinction between man and animal is thought to be unreal, because of some evolutionary bias, our appeal is not so much to the experimental evidence against evolution, although that is sufficient; but our appeal is rather to a sane psychology which assures us of the fundamental difference between man and animal however brought about.

Such a psychology is not popular to-day. Behaviorism, in the American school, and even the old traditional psychology are expressive of a tendency to get rid of the idea of the 'self' or 'controlling personality'. The one is an attempt to avoid the problem of the 'self' by excluding all but objective psychological data and referring these data to physiological processes; the other, or traditional psychology, while observing successive states of consciousness, often overlooked the fact that there must be some controlling center behind these states to give them continuity and meaning. (1)

Reason, then, must rest on a psychological basis of an independent, efficient spiritual self. If such a self or soul does not exist to marshal our sense impressions and inform our concepts, to be the agent of free choice and determination and the bearer of moral responsibility, then our study is not worth while - nor is it even possible. For without such a center of reference religion, or the relation of a human being to a supernatural power, means nothing. These consequences of contemporary psychology are not always recognized: their importance is lost sight of in throwing them off as problems of philosophy and metaphysics. But our subject, Reason and Christian faith, at least requires that we make all the postulates necessary to the bare existence of reason and faith; which we accordingly do, whether the proof for them lies in science or revelation.

The psychological world has been picking up its skirts at the idea of the self or soul as the focus of conscious activity; but a few words may again give the notion respectability. The conception has the virtue of giving consciousness a focal center, of making of it a unit. Much of the modern work in psychology has been just this: to show that man acts as a unit, as a single personality. This attempt is a reaction to the so-called faculty psychology of days past which made of man a triad of intellect, feeling, and will, and chopped all his thoughts and feelings and actions up into little sections referable to one

(1) Strickland, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p.33.

of these three elements of his make-up. This conception of man's nature is now thought to be fundamentally false, and rightly so. No cross-section of man's consciousness at any time will show such a tripartite division of faculties, with one of them active at one time to the exclusion of the rest. One of these elements may be stronger than the other in a given conscious state, but it by no means excludes the co-ordinate activity of the others. (1) It will be seen at once that for purposes of scientific analysis and description it will be most helpful to speak of the elements of consciousness through some such Gallic and artificial division, such as this of intellect, feeling, and will. But the distinction has value only for purposes of description and must be abandoned so soon as man is thought of as acting with reference to moral and religious values. Not that man acts as a unit only in reference to moral and religious matters. In all conscious moments the whole man may be thought of as active. But the truth that he acts with his whole nature in religious matters is of special significance for our discussion. Thus the modern notion of the fundamental unity of human personality presents again the familiar face of independent selves or souls.

Now the truth which, in our definition of reason, such selves are said to apprehend is not only religious truth but includes the whole of human experience. This is the sum total of human knowledge: all data that may be received by the human consciousness. Those impressions which come by way of the five senses and are capable of accurate examination, arrangement, and description lie within the field of science properly so-called. The principles according to which such arrangement and description are made are those of common logic: the principles of contradiction, of identity, of excluded middle, and of sufficient reason. Data that is not amenable to these principles is irrational. And to a certain degree reason is able, with regard to scientific data, to forecast the future and direct action, using the well-known methods of induction and deduction. In these methods there lies no absolute certainty, but merely a practical certainty. It is obvious since the work of Kant that the human mind adds something to the data of experience in this process, but whether or not such added material can account for the origin of religious truth is our next question. If the products of the mind can account for the content of religious knowledge, we shall have a strong presumption that such knowledge is subject to the usual laws of rational thought. If the content of religious knowledge cannot be so accounted for, the relation of reason to such extra-rational knowledge remains to be determined.

(1) J. B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p.27.

Natural theology has been somewhat short of breath since Kant's well-placed punch. The usual arguments dealing with the existence of God, the ontological, teleological, and cosmological arguments were much discredited by his searching criticism of the limitations of reason and of the validity of reasonable judgments in metaphysics. But notwithstanding his work the old arguments are not yet regarded as dead (1), and are even gaining strength at the present day. At the same time present-day theism is drumming up the moral and esthetic arguments (2) which Kant left untouched, or rather, which he greatly improved. (3) Added to this we have the witness of Scripture to the ability of the natural reason to discover God in the universe (Rom. 1, 18ff). But unfortunately these natural evidences of God have in the past seemed to carry little weight with the generality. The reason is doubtless to be found in this, that these arguments can generate only an intellectual conviction. The logic of the arguments may be unimpeachable and the conclusions just, but the elements of trust and volition which are necessary to give these conclusions religious value are lacking. Hence, although we freely recognize the possibility of natural religion and of a rational apology for religion, we do not think much of the argument for practical purposes. And since natural theology can lead only to the threshold, and cannot originate any of those doctrines which are characteristic of Christianity, these arguments have even less value for our discussion.

But there is still something to be said about the authority of reason in the field of natural theology. If reason were a perfect organ it might be allowed to have free play, in the belief that it would find nothing in nature that would contradict any of the revealed truth of Scripture. Indeed, the question as to whether or not reason should be allowed to contradict revealed truth is one which is yet to be settled and which we are reserving for future reference; but there is an angle to the case which is pertinent to our definition of reason at this time. The truth is that reason partakes of the general degradation of human faculties consequent on the fall (4). If reason were a perfect function, as we suppose it once was when man in his original state retained the image of his Creator, we should have no fear that any conclusion of natural reason would be in error. But its corrupt condition at the present time has very important consequences in its relation to revealed truth.

(1) W. R. Inge, Religion and Life, p. 20f.

(2) A. J. Balfour, Theism and Humanism.

(3) W. E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience. Hocking has developed a new species of the ontological argument.

(4) F. L. Patton, Fundamental Christianity, p. 114f.

So far we have considered reason as the general ability of a personality to apprehend truth(1). But it is not in this wide sense of the term reason that we wish to use the word in our later discussion. We would rather give it the narrower sense of the power of insight or the assumption by which we pronounce any form of thought or proposition to be reasonable or unreasonable(2). The use of reason as the faculty which applies the principles of logic and thus makes rational knowledge possible is to be taken for granted. A human being must use his reason in this sense in acquiring any kind of knowledge, religious or otherwise. But our special definition of reason now is, the assumption by which we pronounce a proposition reasonable or unreasonable, credible or incredible. It is also this specialized function of reason which is in question in our treatment of reason in its relation to Christian faith. Many have clouded the issue by failing to make this distinction. No one doubts the necessity of a rational organ and instrument for the reception of religious as well as of any other sort of information. Let us have this point understood and advance to the consideration of reason as a judgment and an assumption passed on propositions presented to it. We discover at once that such an assumption is really an attitude toward the proposition under question. The grounds of such an attitude may be intellectual or they may be partly affective and volitional. Experience indicates that they are often largely affective and volitional. If this is true, then our attitude of approval or disapproval is not alone and purely intellectual assent or approval, but is really an activity of the whole person in that it includes all the elements of intellect, feeling, and will. If, then, we find this to be true of reasonable judgments in the field of science, we shall find it to be more true of such judgments in the field of religion; and if it is true of religious belief in general, we shall find it to be most eminently true of Christian faith. In this we find a happy parallelism. Not only is a reasonable judgment a product of the whole personality but Christian faith, as we shall define it, is also an act of the whole personality. It should always be borne in mind, however, that when a proposition is said to be reasonable or unreasonable the basis of that judgment is chiefly intellectual. In this view reason is at a disadvantage with Christian faith from the outset, since faith has its bases more equally in the whole personality.

(1) Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 539.

(2) C. C. Everett, *Essays*, p. 5f.

Faith

We have agreed that the total of man's powers may be expressed, for purposes of description, by the triad of intellect, feeling, and will. Of these we have seen that reason as the ability to apprehend truth is chiefly an intellectual faculty, and that reason as a judgment, although often colored by feeling and will, is also chiefly intellectual. But we have had no reason to go outside this description of human powers for an organ or a faculty to account for reason. Nor do we need to go outside this same description to account for Christian faith. Christian faith brings with itself into the human personality a special enlightenment, which we shall consider later; but there is no reason for affirming a separate and special organ to account for the phenomena of faith(1). Faith is an activity of man, of the human personality. It may, according to conservative theology, be the effect of the Holy Spirit working in the person, but the individual and personal nature of the act itself is not to be lost sight of. This is true although Christian faith has characteristics which distinguish it *toto coelo* from any other sort of faith or ordinary belief. For none of the activities is it found necessary to assert a special organ or faculty.(2)

If, however, faith is an activity of the human personality as we have described it, Christian faith must be distinguished from any other kind of belief. Christian faith stands at the head of an ascending scale of conscious attitudes, and yet has very marked characteristics of its own. Belief in general, which we think of as an affirmative attitude toward a proposition, has in it already the groundwork of Christian faith in this, that it includes the whole personality in its activity; and this it does in contrast to reason. Belief in any proposition, whether it be an historical account of a fight on the Great Wall of China or the latest newspaper account of the condition of the New York stock exchange, is an activity which includes the whole man. The proposition is not the conclusion to a scientific experiment in which the senses are active. The subject has probably never been to China, certainly not at the time of some ancient battle, nor can he see the stock exchange of New York; yet he believes these two accounts on the testimony of reputable authority. His own intellectual activity has been considerably reduced from its prominence in scientific work, and his feelings have come into corresponding prominence. Yet, such simple belief is largely intellectual, since, in the end, the grounds or trustworthiness of the testimony is open to examination. The subject is able to gain an intellectual assurance of the value of the historian and the newspaper.

(1) Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol.III,p.44.

(2) Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp.62.371.

There is also a loose use of the word faith as applied to the attitude of assent to propositions less susceptible of scientific demonstration. A scientist will say that he has faith in the law of gravitation or the Copernican system. He thinks it can be trusted. In the same way he is not able to define or to reduce to their originals force, motion, life, or matter, but he takes these entities on faith, as necessary to any further knowledge of the universe.

As we step into the religious cloud-land we leave behind the region of scientific experiment. The data of religious truth are presented, not to the senses, but to the mind, as abstract propositions. It is true that fetichism sets up concrete images which it invests with the dignity and attributes of deities. Experience of such beings and the purported effects of their influence on men (call them miracles or simply religious experience), are all data which the heathen faith lays hold of. But the very essence of religion, no matter under what form of image carried on or with what effect on the worshipper, is the attitude toward a supernatural being, coupled with some idea of service toward that being. The object of religious faith, then, is probably outside the experience of the senses. This fact throws so much more emphasis upon the emotional and volitional elements in the attitude of faith. It is apparent that we are working up to a definition of Christian faith which will find its chief features in the ideal proportion of activity in intellect, feeling, and will.

But before it will appear to what extent this ideal proportion is true of Christian faith and not of religious faith in general, it will be necessary to point out wherein these two differ. Religious faith we have defined as the attitude of assent to the existence of a supernatural being coupled with some confidence in his ability to assist the subject in the pursuit of desired ends. Christian faith is the adequate attitude of the sinner toward Christ and his substitutional work. The Christian conception differs from religious faith in general in that it describes a close intimacy between Christ and the believer. It is more of a relation of personal trust than we can find in any heathen religion. And the person of Christ is regarded as a perfect assurance of the attainment of those eternal ends which lie in his keeping.

Christian faith is especially fitted, then, to satisfy the full personality of man. Intellect, feeling, and will are constantly active. Notice how these elements find their natural effects in the traditional definition of faith as including knowledge, confidence, and assent. It is at once clear that one or the other element may dominate at any given moment of faith-consciousness, and yet faith considered as a whole certainly gives widest play to all the conscious activities of man - and perhaps to the subconscious also. It has ever been the study

of the Christian Church to find the proper proportion of these elements in Christian faith. The history of the Church has proved any extreme to be harmful, if not pathological. Too much intellect leads to rationalism; too much feeling to mysticism; and too much will or volition makes the believer fanatical. The endeavor to balance these elements perfectly seems to be largely lost sight of by modern religious psychology, or psychology of religious belief, which seems also to be hand in glove with modernism or the liberalistic movement within the Christian Church.

Since the days of Schleiermacher, when the intellectual phase of faith began to fall into disrepute, more and more stress has been laid upon the feelings and the will as the psychological bases of faith. This movement was coincident with the deteriorating effect of evolution and higher criticism in undermining the intellectual basis of faith by questioning the authoritative statement of that faith, the Bible. In the effort to save a faith that could be no longer intellectual, the 'feeling-background' of consciousness has been hastily set out, as an artillery corps sets out an artificial forest, as a safe retreat for faith. William James with his Will to Believe and a host of followers of the same ilk have tried to establish on the emotions and on the will what could no longer, according to their thinking, be established intellectually. The practical consequences on Christianity of such a gospel will be considered later.

But now let us return to a fuller consideration of the elements of Christian faith, to see if our definition is adequate and can account for the phenomena. The knowledge content of religious faith, as we have premised, rests upon the revelation of God, chiefly as given in the Holy Scriptures. In fact, the natural evidences for the existence of God may be considered superfluous to the person who is able to accept the authority of the Bible. His acceptance of that authority is, of course, not wholly intellectual. He may assure himself through a process of reasoning after the pattern: if there is a God in the heavens and if that God is able to reveal himself to men, as he must be if he is God, and if that God desires to reveal himself to men for their good, as he must desire if he be essentially good - and natural evidences are sufficient to prove him good, then it is reasonable to believe that God has given men an authoritative revelation of his will and grace. The conclusion here has often seemed too large for the premises, especially to the infidel. A man may also secure an intellectual assurance of some value of the divine origin of the Bible by the use of the higher and lower criticism, which, contrary to the opinion of modernism, is better able to defend the Bible to-day than it has ever been before. The non-intellective assurances, however, of the trustworthiness of the Bible as a norm of faith and practice are those

most prized by the believing Christian; and, to a large extent, they are such as can be appreciated only by a believing Christian. It is hard for an infidel to understand that a spiritual understanding of the content of Christian truth brings with it a conviction of its truth. There is a power in the word itself which wakens a subjective testimony to the truth of revelation. For these reasons, here only suggested, the Christian accepts his authority.

This done, however, his intellectual powers are engaged in the material of revelation so that he may gain the fullest possible understanding of Christian truth. At the same time his powers of thought are stimulated to draw corroborating evidence for his faith, as far as that may be done, from the evidences of natural theology, from the history of the Church and conversion, from prophecy and paleontology and miracle. At the same time it should be noted that a very vigorous faith is often founded on a minimum of knowledge. A former heathen, for instance, whose entire knowledge of Christianity and its purposes may be contained in his partial understanding of the Gospel of St. John, may have a most earnest and efficient faith. The child element is strong in Christianity, to such a degree that the unquestioning faith of childhood, with its intellectual activity limited to little more than logical apprehension, is made the ideal of Christian faith. Such simplicity of faith is of course no longer possible to a man who has attained the full use of his reasoning powers, nor is it fully satisfying to his curiosity. Yet it should be most forcibly stated that it is at all times possible for a Christian believer to subject his speculative reason to the authority of the word of God - reducing his ratiocination to the childlike function of logical apprehension of revealed truth.

But the most distinctive element in Christian faith is not knowledge, even though the objects of such knowledge are those found only in Christian revelation. The elements of trust and confidence are the heart of the matter. This attitude of trust is heightened in Christianity and made the very essence of true religion by being directed toward a person, the person of Christ. And in view of the unmerited benefits which the Christian hopes to receive from Christ as personal Savior, we may say that the ordinary emotions hailed in to account for the religious instinct are quite insufficient to account for the phenomena of Christian faith in its close attachment to Christ and in its conversion of the heart and life. The emotions of fear, awe, mystery, or love are all possible attitudes toward supernatural power, but the attitude of trusting a supernatural person for eternal ends as a Christian does Christ is unknown outside of

Christian faith. It is for this reason that the element of confidence and trust in Christian faith has for centuries been regarded as the characteristic and most essential part of the attitude toward Christ, sometimes, of course, to the neglect of intellect and will.

There is much truth in William James' thesis in *The Will to Believe*, but its popularity just at this time is due to a misunderstanding of the results of science and higher criticism. Popular religion, believing without warrant that the old authoritative basis for faith had suffered deflation under scientific method, has scrambled hurriedly for a subjective assurance of a faith which could no longer be intellectual. It is thought that if such assurance may be found in the will it may be regarded as safe from the encroachments of scientific method. We shall have more to say of this later. But the kernel of truth in their position is this; that faith is an active quality. Christian faith not only means a change in attitude toward Christ but also a change in word and action toward the world in general. Nothing is more patent to the modern investigator, and there is perhaps no greater witness to the power of saving faith, than the revolution of heart and conduct in the converted man. And it stands within the very nature of faith that it should be volitional. The New Testament is full of injunctions to believe and to have faith in the salvation of the Savior. The suggestion is that a concentration of the will is necessary to such belief. One doesn't tell or command another to believe that the Amazon is the greatest river in the world. A man either believes it to be so or he does not; in either event his conduct will probably be the same. But the attitude toward a divine person is quite different. Here one may say with meaning: "believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," and he may expect that the subject will believe with heart, soul, and mind, viz., with the whole being. But in a practical way, the will is that part of man which God regards. As it is active in faith, regulating ends or ideals, directing deliberation and attention, controlling impulse and inhibition, determining choice and causing effort, the will is a most necessary element of Christian faith.(1)

Our definition of faith disregards any radical distinction between faith as an activity of man and faith as a body of religious truth. The two may safely be considered together in the relation of subject and object. Active faith in the individual, then, is the adequate attitude toward Christ, including knowledge, assent, and confidence in the full exercise of intellect, feeling, and will. "Religion deals with the whole man, and the whole man

(1) Note on freewill. The relation of the will to the regenerating Spirit of God is outside of our present discussion. Whether or not the power of God working faith in the unbelieving heart does not destroy the freedom of the human will is a question that very properly occurs to the mind, but we cannot deal with it here.

deals with religion." For this reason, too, the distinction that has been raised between knowledge and the content of Christian faith is false. It is true that Christian truth is not knowledge in the sense that it may be scientifically demonstrated, although pragmatic proof there is; but while scientific knowledge is mainly intellectual, Christian knowledge is the experience of the whole man. What lies beyond knowledge lies beyond faith; but the content of Christian faith, on the basis of authority, is known in a more complete and absolute manner than the assured results of the scientific laboratory.

III Statement of Relation

In its relation to Christian faith reason may, in the first place, be regarded as the instrument for the apprehension of the knowledge content of such faith. In this first section we shall speak of reason in the wide sense, of the ability to logically apprehend truth. In the next section we shall discuss reason and faith when reason is considered to be a simple judgment on the reasonableness of Christian truth.

Bacon divides the use of reason in religion into two phases, both of which are included in this first section: first, "in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon." But it will be noted that he does not speak of reason as itself originating "the mysteries of God."

Accordingly our first proposition is that reason cannot originate the material of a Christian creed. The closest approach to such a rational creed is to be found in the science and philosophy of theism. Here the approach is entirely ratiocinative. The arguments used are those which may be constructed on scientific evidences and logical induction from human experience. The propositions they claim to prove are, the existence of God, his attributes of omnipotence and wisdom, and his moral nature. Kant's work may or may not have been fatal to the first three of these arguments. But if these arguments are still valid - and the universal common-sense philosophy of men seems to credit them in spite of Kant's logic - yet we find that theism has ground out for us a God that is altogether inadequate for a Christian creed. His existence and omnipotence are alright, as also the fact that he has constituted us moral beings, but these are the things that are taken for granted in the Christian scheme. Christianity begins with these elements, using them merely as ballast for its distinctive doctrines of sin, redemption, just-

ification, and resurrection. A knowledge of sin as being a mortal offence against the will of God is unknown to heathen philosophy; no process of pure reasoning is going to produce the historical figure of Jesus with his substitutional death and the consequent doctrine of forgiveness of sins. We need go no further. Reason unaided by revelation could not originate these necessary objects of Christian faith. We have accordingly agreed to accept the Bible as the revelation of God. The content of this revelation is the material of Christian faith. It is upon this material that the logical processes of reason as the apprehending instrument are to work.

We do not here recognize the right of the reason to discredit one portion of the Bible while admitting another as authoritative. The theoretical proposition must remain true, that Scripture in its originals is infallible authority. If there is good reason to believe that some portion of the present text as we have it is not trustworthy, as, for example, the chronology of the Old Testament, reason will make the necessary accommodation. In no essential doctrine of Christianity, however, do variant readings or uncertainties of the text of Scripture cause serious trouble. The doctrinal content of Christian faith is clear enough to an honest scholarship. The question of questions is: will it be accepted in its evident meaning?

Now it is just with regard to this evident and single meaning of Scripture that reason is active as the instrument of Christian knowledge. Historical data, if clear, is easily admitted to the mind. If not clear, textual criticism makes comparison of texts, comparison with secular sources, and determines as nearly as possible the meaning of the original. If an historical point of Scripture appears to be contradicted by secular evidence or is denied by a prejudiced scholarship, the point can wait for further information before reason need pass a judgment. The activity of reason as the faculty of apprehension merely brings together all the material possible on the subject in logical order, applying the principles before mentioned, of contradiction, identity, excluded middle, and sufficient reason. On this basis it is safe to assert that no positively proved and demonstrated result of scientific research has contradicted or disproved the Bible on an historical point. Leaving out of consideration the possibility of an inaccurate record having been left by some secular authority, as for example, the incorrect reference to Jehu on the Black Obelisk of Shalmaneser V, the data of archeology, geology, and biology have all showed marked agreement with Biblical records. This is true even with regard to the creation and flood stories(1), which

(1) G. M. Price, The New Geology.

are part of the historical material of Scripture and therefore part of the content of Christian faith. A closer examination of the evidence on evolution will demonstrate the impossibility of scientific proof for the theory(1). Science has not advanced beyond Genesis chapter one. But reason as apprehending agent does precious service in bringing together the material for such an investigation.

The same principles which apply in historical data apply also to the doctrinal content of revelation. The unity of all knowledge is implied by that fact. And there is unity also within the body of Christian doctrine which is implied in the unity of revelation or its author. Again, the very existence of a revelation presupposes a rational nature to receive it. No one can ask that a man accept an evident contradiction: as that God is love, and God is not love. Such a contradiction is irrational. For a man to so deny his fundamental laws of thinking would lead to mental disruption and chaos. The doctrinal content of Christian faith is not irrational, for it does not offend against any of the laws of human logic, but it certainly cannot be demonstrated by scientific method. All that reason can hope to do with the more distinctive doctrines of Christianity, as the person of Christ, redemption, or resurrection, is to register them in the mind as supra-sensible material, from which, however, it may draw certain necessary inferences. This is the more true since we regard the divine author of the Bible as writing not only to the first generation which read the pages of the prophets and the evangelists, but to all ages. It would be instructive to know what some of these doctrinal and practical inferences may be.

There are in both the Old and the New Testament passages which refer deity to the Father, to the Son, and also to the Holy Spirit. There is in neither Testament a direct statement which, as an article from a creed, asserts the doctrine of the trinity. Yet it is a logical conclusion of undoubted merit, I believe, that Scripture teaches the doctrine of the trinity as confessed in the Nicene creed. Some person might object that this is an inference of no consequence, that we have really added nothing to our knowledge; and to a certain extent the objection is correct. Yet from the point of view of the Christian

(1) For full treatment of the question of evolution reference must be made to the standard texts on the subject, many of which, even of the pro-evolution variety, will indicate the uncertainty and lack of scientific demonstration behind the theory. The present state of mind of the evolutionist seems to be that he cannot prove his theory, but that he accepts it on 'faith' as the best method of accounting for the facts. If that be true, then the protagonist of creation is certainly at no disadvantage in the argument. See especially: O'Toole, The Case Against Evolution.

theologian this would not be an objection but a proof of correct inference. The principle followed is that nothing may be truly asserted in theology which is not taught in Scripture. The principle is the well-known syllogistic axiom that the terms of the conclusion must be contained in the premises.

Here, however, speculative reason steps in and suggests that a division or a trinity in the Godhead is contrary to our ideas of personality, and desires to change the doctrinal inference to conform to our philosophical predispositions. It is here that we call a halt and say that such a change cannot be allowed since the Scriptural statement is too plain. And if the Scriptural statement seems to disagree with our notions, either our notions are wrong or they are not applicable to the matter in hand. The latter is quite likely since we are dealing with God, who is by definition *sui generis*. Thus it is that Christian theology is not a speculative philosophy of religion, but a systematic and logical - granted the infallibility of Scripture - exposition of Bible doctrine. (1) The inferences drawn from Bible passages which are more truly inferences are of a practical nature. It follows from the assertion of the deity of Christ that his redemption is valid before God, and that his forgiveness of our sins is authoritative, and that he is the proper object of our prayers. It is a true and rational inference from the doctrine of justification before God by faith through grace, that the justified man will express his love and gratitude to a justifying God by deeds of charity to his fellowmen. This use of inference, then, is that which a minister of the church is continually using in the application of doctrine to daily life.

With this much clear, namely, that reason apprehends the content of Christian truth and derives therefrom only the necessary logical and practical inferences; we may now look for a moment at the so-called speculative function of reason. That such a function comes within our definition of reason in the wide sense cannot be doubted, since speculative reason purports to use perfectly logical processes in drawing its conclusions. However, the grounds for such conclusions, being often, if not generally metaphysical, do not stand in the same category with the evidences of natural religion. Such evidences, in so far as they are scientific, will not contradict revealed truth; but many conclusions of speculative reason may. Accordingly speculative reason is not concerned about the historical data of revelatory authority, but its relation to the doctrinal content of revelation is the first item for our attention.

Our statement is that the conclusions of speculative reason are characterized by metaphysical proof, which, if not supported by revelation, cannot be final. Further, such metaphysical con-

(1) Hibbert Journal, Jan. '27, p.252f.

clusions of speculative reason as contain something logically incompatible with revealed truth cannot be admitted, since revelatory authority must be given precedence over any figment of the mind. It is granted here that there may be speculations in the realm of religious truth, but outside revelation, which in no way interfere with revealed doctrine. Such, for example, are some of the scholastic arguments about the abilities and ministrations of the angels. In contrast with such harmless and perhaps useless ratiocinations are speculations which in some way seem to infringe upon the domain of revealed truth. The idea that there may be another and a greater God above the God of this universe, and even a conceivable series of Gods, every one greater than the former, strikes one as opposed to the spirit of revelation, the first commandment of which is that of exclusive worship of the One God. The suggestion that God has also created other worlds with other races of men, demanding perhaps other redemptive acts on the part of the Son of God, seems to be contrary to the geocentric idea of the universe found in the Bible. The doctrine that the souls of men of the present generation are come from a previous state of existence, perhaps conscious existence, which doctrine is closely related to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, seems to be radically at variance with the Scriptural assumption of individual personality on earth and with the Scriptural alternatives of eternal life of spiritual death after earthly existence. Such speculations, then, would seem to be generally of a character to lead the investigator away from a close Biblical basis. At the same time it may be well to grant a certain value to speculative reasoning in so far as it may help to clarify our ideas of Scriptural doctrine. It may help to outline the possibilities with regard to the doctrine of God, say, and to place them before the mind. The mind may then pare off those foreign accretions which have no warrant in Scripture, leaving only those attributes of that understanding of God which the Bible permits. In this way it is conceivable that the result would be a clearer knowledge of God than that which had not been the result of such a process. It is perhaps true also that a speculative theodicy can give satisfaction to a curious mind without intruding upon revelation. We might suggest in this connection the rather complete discussion of the origin of evil which many have found necessary or valuable: which explains that a world of freewill and moral choice is the best of all possible world's - in which, however, the introduction of evil is inescapable. It is worth noting also that the speculative reason in this capacity has (1) not been very highly regarded among conservative Christian theol-

(1) Eucken, *The Problem of Human Life*, p.13.

ogians, probably because of its small practical value. For the so-called 'unregenerate' or the infidel the arguments advanced carry only intellectual conviction, and the true believer does not need the extra prop for his faith.

In the matter of Christian conduct the speculative reason might conceivably have wider range than in doctrine, since theoretically it might be said that anything is allowed which is not forbidden by Christian principles of morality or which is not logically contradictory to their spirit. As a practical fact, however, the speculative reason in ethics turns into the deductive processes which are necessary for the application of the principles of the moral law and Christian charity. And in this activity what is more than mere logical deduction is supplied by the function of conscience. But it should be said that 'the obedience of faith' described by St. James is accompanied by the most satisfying Christian liberty in matters of conduct.

But it is perhaps in the great current rip between the body of systematized doctrine and systematized speculative reason that most of the flotsam and jetsam of doubt and uncertainty are to be found. How are the great philosophical systems related to Christian theology, and can any one of them be harmonized with Christian theology? The question is a big one, but a few general ideas will be enough to show what is the underlying epistemological and ontological basis for theology. No system of materialistic monism will fill the bill. An idealistic monism might do so if care is taken to conform the relation of spirit to whatever answers for body in the scheme - to conform statements of this relation to the rather pronounced dualistic point of view of the Bible. More satisfying would be an honest dualism and a common-sense statement of human experience as being a true impression of objective reality. Still one man says he can preserve his faith in the Bible intact and be a Berkeleian idealist. Another says that personalism is not a hindrance but a help to him in his life of faith. Yet another good Christian may be a Kantian or an Hegelian in philosophic creed. By whatever logical gymnastics such men are able to reconcile some very apparent inconsistencies, it is evident that they do so for all practical purposes. Some, of course, may be able to keep their philosophic and religious creeds in two separate bunkers, the one to satisfy speculative reason for this life, the other to get to heaven on. Any attempt to bring them together, however, ought reasonably to begin with a predisposition in favor of Christian theology as based on revealed authority, for reason cannot speak with authority in the realm of metaphysics, while revelation is the official guidebook for that sphere. It is apparent that in the two departments the same principles do not always apply. The personality of God, for instance, and his

relation to his Son are not to be judged by the parallel of human personality and fatherhood - although such parallels may be the best means of presenting these theological truths to our reason. It is clear that anthropomorphism and human parallels are necessary in speaking of God and his relations to men, if we are to understand such a revelation. It is conceivable that a truer account of the same things would transcend the possibilities of human language, as St. Paul suggests in reference to his ecstasy. If, then, beings of a superhuman order are not to be judged by the same principles and forced into human categories, a wise philosophy will recognize the supremacy of revelation in the metaphysical department.

On the other hand such a wise and disciplined philosophy may render yeoman's service to theology in confuting the rationalistic theologian who wants to speculate on a philosophical basis. Such work will bring no constructive or conclusive evidence, perhaps, for Scripture doctrine, but will act merely as a defensive agent. (1) Thus it may be said that in themselves there is no necessary contradiction between philosophy and theology because a truly reasonable philosophy will admit its limitations as compared with revelation. So that the use of speculative reason in its relation to Christian faith is strictly an instrumental one.

So much for reason considered as the faculty for logical apprehension in its relation to the content of faith; but perhaps a more elusive study yet is the same relation when reason is considered as a simple rational judgment, a declaration on a given proposition that it is reasonable or unreasonable. It would be well at the outset to call attention to the common way of speaking about the reasonableness of a religious proposition. One says that he feels that this or that doctrine is unreasonable or otherwise. But whence this feeling? If the judgment were purely intellectual we would be safe in saying that there is no feeling connected with it. The fact is that as the content of religious truth becomes more and more remote from experience the mind exercises its logical function merely in apprehending such truth and becomes less and less able to offer a purely intellectual judgment on the material. The material may be thought of as different in quality, ascending from a region of human experience to the region of the infinite where reason can offer no empirical judgment. The original intellectual judgment then begins to be colored by feeling and prejudice and subjective wishes, until, if the development be carried far enough, we should have

(1) Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation*, p. 736ff.

the threefold basis of faith itself in intellect, feeling, and will. The practical value of pointing out the large admixture of feeling often found in judgments on religious truth is seen when we consider the position of the atheistic or agnostic critic. Such a man may protest that he is offering a cold, intellective judgment on the reasonableness of the matter before him, and he may honestly believe that he is doing so; but the subtle and even unconscious influence of the feeling background of consciousness is nevertheless at work, and it is especially strong when, as before suggested, the material is above human experience.

But if we think of all extraneous elements as being refined from the intellective judgment, what is the relation of that judgment to Christian faith? Of such we may say that it has no authority over the objects of faith as contained in revelation.

The first objection to be offered is that reason is here declaring against itself, that it is passing judgment on itself. And to suppose that reason is capable of passing judgment on itself is to assume its authority on the very question we want to solve. Now this is a very cute argument, and it would be fatal if we were speaking of reason in the general field of knowledge. But the objection overlooks the transcendent nature of religious knowledge. Why should not the reason declare itself without authority in the field beyond human experience? The student of astronomy declares himself altogether unable to offer a judgment on a problem in the science of agriculture. It is outside his experience. Is not this one of Kant's main theses in his famous Critique? Thus the relative and finite reason declares itself incapable of judging the absolute and the infinite.

Well, this is a matter to be proved. Is the religious knowledge of Christian faith infinite and absolute? And if so, can reason judge only the finite and the relative? The extreme statement of this position is the agnostic. God is unknowable: "for a consciousness of the Infinite necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it implies the recognition by limitation and difference (which are the forms of thought) of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent."⁽¹⁾ The inconsistency of this statement is seen when it is asserted by the same party that we believe in the existence of the Absolute and bow in awe before it. It is clearly incorrect to say that all knowledge is relative and yet that we know the existence of the Absolute. The very recognition of the relative entails the recognition of the Absolute to which these things are relative. If consciousness were purely relative it could not at the same

(1) John Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.

time be conscious of its relativity. The logical conclusion of this extreme statement of agnosticism is atheism. We must know something about a God before we can worship him. To bow before a blank negation of thought is impossible. We say, then, that reason in the sense of power of apprehension is able to receive revealed truth with regard to God, and that this forms the knowledge basis of Christian faith. But we say further that the principles according to which this knowledge is received into the mind are the logical ones of earthly or relative experience, and that we are not able to offer a judgment as to the reasonableness of such knowledge on the basis of these relative principles. Our proposition is not that reason cannot assimilate religious knowledge but that reason as a judgment has no authority over such knowledge. There are revealed truths, of course, which appear not to agree with our ways of thinking and surely do not agree with our experience: the atonement, the trinity, the incarnation. But who are the witnesses who speak for each. God speaks for one, having given us revelatory authority. He has disarmed criticism by the presupposition that such revelation will contain things which are above reasonable judgment. Now the content of this revelation does not make the same impression or arouse the same conviction of truth in all men. This divergence argues that the difference is in man, either that the faculty (or faculties) appealed to in man is not the common one ~~common~~ one of reason, since there are different reactions in different men; or that the divergence is in the reason itself, which fails to give the same judgment in all cases on the same matter. If the latter be true, as I think we shall all admit, then reason is a variant in which no confidence is to be placed. This agrees perfectly also with the Biblical doctrine of the corruption of human powers in the fall. And yet, even though reason as judgment had not been affected by any such declension and were still able to offer an unbiassed judgment, yet I say that such a judgment must be rendered upon the empirical basis of human experience and would consequently be incomplete or wrong. Since, then, we have nothing in the realm of human experience with which to compare truths of revelation, such truths are no proper subjects of a reasonable judgment. In this view the content of religious knowledge is not irrational but non-rational or supra-rational.

We have said that much of the knowledge content of Christian faith gained through revelation is above reason. Is this a tenable position? Our expression is that reason is not able to declare judgment on the doctrines in question because it cannot be supposed to understand all the divine considerations which made them necessary. Such doctrines can be part of our knowledge

without being subject to the ordinary test of reasonableness. They come like royal visitors whom we admit at once without the usual password because their royal authority is greater than that of the officer who put us on guard. Such doctrines are not above, in the sense of contrary to, all reason, but are only above the human limitations of reason. We are not to be understood here as saying that these doctrines may be reasonable to God, who may have a different standard or kind of reason than ours. God's rationality must be the same in kind as our own, in the sense that reason consists not in methods and processes but in rational contents. For the Supreme Reason may well be intuitive and immediate in distinction from the discursiveness of human reason. Thus, qualitatively human reason and the Supreme Reason must be the same, else the community and universality of intelligence would be lost. But quantitatively the two are different. If the human reason had at its command an understanding of the causes and implications which lie behind this or that doctrine, it would doubtless render the same judgment that God renders; but a knowledge of these causes and implications human reason does not have and perhaps cannot attain under its present limitations. Hence its judgments in such matters cannot be final.

The objections to this position are the following. If knowledge is distinguished quantitatively, where shall we draw the line? How shall we know whether a certain doctrine or statement is above reason or whether it is amenable to reasonable judgment? Is it by finding it insoluble for human reason that we refer it to the higher realm? or is there an ascertainable line of demarcation between the two which our reason cannot cross? If questions are to be referred to a higher realm simply because they have so far proved insoluble, then all unsolved problems might be regarded as above reason and insoluble. But if there is an absolute definable limit for human reason, it may be objected that the very defining of that limit posits the power of reason to transcend that limit. We answer that there is of course no absolutely definable limit for human reason, for human reason is the same in kind with the Supreme. Human reason may scout all questions presented to it, using what means it may to bring them into conformity with its way of thinking, to make them reasonable. Experience proves also that such study has not been fruitless, but that many a doctrine of the Bible which had at one time been a stumbling-block to a rational mind has been perfectly harmonized in view of wider knowledge and experience. If, however, such a doctrine cannot finally be harmonized with human experience, there is no contradiction in reason in referring it to a higher realm on the basis of authoritative revelation. This position not only preserves the progressiveness of

religious knowledge, but preserves human reason intact; for it is perfectly reasonable to rest on revelation what reason is admittedly unable to judge.

Of those items of revelation which are above reason it is not said that we are incapable of rationally apprehending them, but only that, once apprehended, our present knowledge and experience does not permit us to declare them reasonable or unreasonable. And why should all knowledge be amenable to the judgment of human reason? Are there not truths which to comprehend would make us equal with or greater than God himself? Yet, although we can have no perfect comprehension of the being of God, we can surely through types and analogies in revelation have such an understanding of his nature as to make religion intellectually possible. The incarnation of Christ was not only a condescension of God to the physically human but a condescension to human intelligence. In him we see a perfect image of the Father in a form which we perhaps cannot comprehend but which we can at least experience. And in the attitude of trust toward this divine-human personality faith finds its exercise. We understand and know enough of Christ to establish this religious relation of trust between us. It is not perfect knowledge, of course, but it is knowledge sufficient for our purposes. Nor is our choice limited to the alternatives of complete ignorance of Christ or perfect understanding of him. Our knowledge of essentially incomprehensible things may be partial, as revelation is partial, and yet be sufficient for faith.

This brings us again to the matter of revelatory authority in its relation to faith. And we find that faith is not immediate or intuitive in the sense that it is dependent on no objective basis. Faith is mediate on the testimony of revelation, and in this objective testimony lies its assurance and conviction of truth. Christian faith can get along without the judgment of reason. It does not seek to justify itself philosophically and psychologically. It does not depend upon reasonableness or philosophic tenability for its assurance. Neither does it seek in the intellect or in the feelings or in the will for justification of its beliefs. I do not mean that faith could not establish itself psychologically, even in the face of intellectual disapproval. For faith takes in the whole man and finds in the large feeling background and in the will to believe reasons enough for an unreasonable faith. But Christian faith does not seek or value such subjective justification. Such faith appeals rather to the objective person, deeds, and promises in the testimony. It is proper to say that it trusts the persons, deeds, and promises themselves rather than the Book in which they are recorded; and yet the two go together, the one is the testimony for the other.

But does not the trustworthiness of the testimony itself have to be established by a rational process or by a reasonable Biblical criticism before it can be of any value or hold its authority? The answer is that it may have such rational justification, but that the testimony is not dependent upon it. Reason may do yeoman's service by scouting, not the content, but the credentials of revelation; but even this service is superfluous in view of the inherent power of revelation to convince while it informs. The very statement of truths of revealed religion carries conviction of their truth. An enlightened view of the excellencies of God's person and grace means immediate assurance of their truth: as when a person perceives the sunlight, he never asks if the sun is really there. This is introducing the supernatural. Nobody claims that every man who reads the Bible gets the same impression of value in its words. The enlightenment we speak of is the sine qua non of such assurance. These truths are properly perceived only by the spiritually minded(1), only by those who discern spiritually. Our warrant for appealing to this exclusive enlightenment as a prerequisite for the assurance of Christian faith we find in the whole history of the Church, where we find examples without number of men who walk no longer by sight but by faith. Our conclusion is that the testimony carries its own justification.

The assurance effected by the power in the word of revelation is not only a conviction of the trustworthiness of the Book, but lies at the same time in a dynamic attitude toward the Person of the revelation, Christ. The attitude toward the Book and the attitude toward the Person are not to be divorced. Under the power in the word of revelation one is testimony to the other. The practical result is that if you were to ask a man what the effect on his faith in Christ would be if all critics would disprove the authenticity of the Bible, that man would probably say that he had known Christ for so many years as companion and spiritual helper that there must be something wrong with the critics. Likewise, if the historicity of Jesus were to be seriously questioned, such a man would probably say that the promises of redemption and forgiveness contained in revelation were so surely his own and so surely answered the crying need stirred up by the same Book, that there must be something wrong with the historical investigation. It is to be noted that in this double retreat of Christian faith, its objects, Christ or the testimony, are both very real and objective things, so that one may get the maximum of intellectual assurance in an attitude toward them that is essentially a matter of trust.

Another short note on the relation of the fall to all this

(1) Hibbert Journal, Jan. '27, p.374.

discussion might be in order. There could be no contradiction between revelation and human reason ideally considered or as reason was before the fall. - It is not said that reason of that sort was able to comprehend God, but its processes and judgments would have been in perfect conformity to the truth. With fallen reason, on the other hand, apparent contradictions are not only possible but common. The result has been that reason "has often taken the wrong side in debate, and has tried to make 'the worse appear the better reason'. More than once it has been the leader in an insurrection against the government of God.... It has been trammelled by prejudice, blinded by foregone conclusions, and dominated by pride." It has discredited itself by its very extravagancies.

Our acceptance remains, then, that reason as the power of apprehension, interpretation, and arrangement is to be used merely in this instrumental capacity upon the data of Christian truth. And when thought of as a reasonable judgment, it has no authority over the data of revelation.

IV Historical

While the modern psychologist is quite ready to grant the complex nature of what he would perhaps call modern Christian faith, he is not ready to agree that faith in the true God has at all ages of the world's history been structurally the same. He is not ready to grant such a proposition because it will not dovetail with his preconceived notion of the evolutionary development of religion, by which rising man is viewed as gradually working out his idea of God, somewhat as he developed the idea of the state and his attitude toward the state. The process would have been a progress of powers inherent in man, from primitive credulity, to rationalism, and then to the religion of the feeling background. (1) The savage days would be characterized by the religion of primitive credulity, which is paralleled in the credulity of the child; rationalism would be seen in the religion of the Middle Ages and through to Darwin and the scientific revival of the nineteenth century, which is paralleled in the youthful period of adolescence; and finally the present is regarded as the age of the religion of the feeling background, when assurance of the existence and meaning of God is referred to the needs and yearnings of the whole man with a minimum of intellectual content. Now, without attempting anything like a complete refutation of this position, it may be possible in a few words to take the wind out of its sails.

(1) Pratt, The Religious Consciousness.

While it is true that revelation is in this sense progressive, that St. Paul knew more about the dispensational order of God than did Moses, yet it is also true that at no period of the world's history were men without a very considerable knowledge of God and his purposes menward. When we observe that Adam lived almost until the time of Noah, we cannot conceive how there could have been any lack of testimony to the true God in antediluvian days. Then with the reinforcement of the flood catastrophe the traditions of the true God must have passed down with almost irresistible force to the time of Moses, as men saw about them everywhere the still moist evidences of the divine anger. And with Moses the new revelation begins. Nor do we find in this revelation that these early men were unacquainted with the Deity. On the contrary, there is an immediacy in their contact and a depth to their religious experiences with which ours suffers by comparison. Few men would dare to say, if they have read their Bibles attentively, that they have a better or a deeper understanding of God than Moses or Elijah or David. The argument that the intellectual element was very weak in primitive religion does not hold true in fact. Nor is it true that scepticism was an abnormality. If there is anything that Biblical history indicates clearly it is the perversity of human nature in falling away from true religion. Witness the laughter of Sarah at the promise and Hezekiah demanding a sign.. And this, we take it, is nothing more than the spirit of apostasy which works since the fall, and works so very subtly through fallen reason. We discover that true faith and apostasy had the same characteristics in ancient history as they have to-day.

The characteristic of apostasy to which we particularly refer is the wilful disregard of higher evidences and the indulgence in idolatrous worship. Late researches would seem to indicate a sort of common origin for the apostate religions, whether in India or China or Egypt. However that may be, apostasy in these countries is alike in its recognition of a Supreme Unity which is God above all polytheistic improvisations, and yet alike in its wilful disregard of this Being and perverse worship of the makeshifts.(1) On the other hand true religion has in all ages rested its faith on testimony, whether of the patriarchs or of the Law and the Prophets, and this testimony has at the same time proved its only safeguard from the prejudiced attacks of rationalizing apostasy.

We may note the same influences in New Testament times. In the conflict of the fresh evangel of Christ with the pagan world of philosophy and mystery religions we see only another phase of

(1) Theo. Graebner, Some Heathen Parallels to Romans 1, 18ff. Theological Quarterly, Vol.X.

the battle that began with Eve and the serpent. But under the stress of such New Testament conditions it will be of value for us to know something of the psychological basis which Christianity set up for its fight with heathenism, on which basis, of course, we are bound to stand to-day.

The psychological point of view of the Bible is radically different from that of modern science. While modern psychology looks at man as part of the field of natural science, the Bible is interested in man chiefly as he is a religious being. The states of consciousness with which it has to do are, accordingly, those which relate to his origin from and present attitude toward Deity. Thus while the psychology of the Bible, and especially of the New Testament, might conceivably be of little interest to the ordinary scientific investigator, to the religious man it cannot fail of the greatest value; for it is an unanalytical expression of the actual experiences of the greatest religious minds under inspiration. But behold and see that the psychology of the New Testament is fundamentally as sound and modern (we might have said, as sound though modern) as one could wish. I refer to the view which places all of the faith-life in the activity of the 'heart' as the center and inclusive whole of the personality.

There are other psychological terms used in the New Testament. The 'soul' is the bearer of the individual life. While generally regarded as lower than the 'spirit', it is at times spoken of as equal to it. The 'spirit' on the other hand is that element in man which is especially active in his relations with Deity, although this term may also be used to express as much as 'soul' or 'person' simply. (1) The 'flesh' is more than material substance; it is matter united with life as its medium of manifestation. The 'heart', finally, is everywhere in the Bible spoken of as the "meeting place of all man's powers of mind and the starting point of all his activities." (2) It is the most constant psychological term in Scripture, since it is used in this sense from the very beginning. It is regarded as the center of the cognitive and reflective powers (3), as the source of will and conation (4), and as the seat of the emotions (5).

(1) The question of dichotomy vs. trichotomy has no bearing on our discussion.

(2) M. Scott Fletcher, The Psychology of the New Testament, p. 76.

(3) Luke 2, 19, 35, 51. (4) Acts 7, 39; 11, 23. (5) I Pet. 1, 22.
 Mat. 13, 15. Heb. 3, 8, 15. Jas. 3, 14.
 I Cor. 2, 9. II Cor. 9, 7. Jn. 14, 1-27.
 Rom. 1, 21. Rev. 17, 17. Rom. 1, 24; 2, 5.
 Mk. 3, 5; 6, 52. II Thes. 3, 5.
 Phil. 4, 7.

But the happy fact is, that wherever faith is mentioned it is made a matter of the 'heart' or of some term which is its equivalent.(1) This binding of all the elements of Christian faith avoids most adroitly the difficulties of the old faculty psychology now so generally discredited and puts the Bible in the front rank of psychological progress. The sane psychology of the present day most remarkably supports the psychological language of the Bible.

Not only does our psychology fit in very well with the Scriptural point of view, but the attitude of the New Testament toward reason is that which we have outlined above. It is natural that this should appear more especially in the writings of Paul, for he was chafing every day with the philosophies of the age, and he himself knew something of the current systems. At the same time, how little Paul's theology is indebted to contemporary thought may well be inferred from his position over against these very philosophies. In any number of ways we can see that Paul was a logician in the apprehension and arrangement of Scriptural truth. It was ever his custom to reason with prospective converts out of the Scriptures; so that the use of reason as the logical instrument of apprehension is surely in conformity with his view.(2) But his warnings against a false philosophy are very explicit. "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ."(Col.2,8) I do not take Paul to mean here that philosophy is in itself or necessarily opposed to faith in Christ, but that it may easily become so and in life is often found so. The error then would be in the application of earthly experience or the "tradition of men" and the earthly principles or "the rudiments of the world" to that knowledge which by revelation is above experience and scientific principles. Such a false science can easily rob faith of its proper basis by a false application of principles.(3) When it comes to a show-down between revelation and such inordinate reason, which claims the right of judgment in religious matters, Paul says that Christians walk no longer after the flesh but after faith and are able to cast down "imageries and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God"; and he admonishes them to bring "into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."(II Cor.2,10) This means not only that all the material of human experience is to be worked in to substantiate faith in Christ, but that in case of a disagreement between reason and faith, the judgment of reason must defer to the authority of revelation.

(1) Rom.10,9.10.

Acts 8,37;11,23;16,13.14.

Heb.10,22.

Mk.11,23.

II Cor.3,15.

(2) Acts 17,2;18,4.19;24,25.

(3) I Tim.6,20.

No one can say that the lines were not clearly drawn. Paul perfectly comprehended the philosophical difficulties of his theology: in the doctrines of the person of Christ, of predestination, and in justification by faith made possible by substitution. And he foresaw controversy within the Church and even survived to see its first beginnings. The contest began at once. Christian faith limited the speculative reason and held infallible revelation to be above the reasonable judgment. Such propositions pagan philosophy could not accept without a struggle. This struggle was protracted through gnosticism and Arianism and other abnormalities as well as through the well-intentioned scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Luther shifted the problem from the Church to the individual, where, in Protestant thought, it has ever since remained; but his position is open to the dangers which have since proved real, rationalism and personal experience. We are still dancing in the wake of rationalism, and now a fearful subjectivism is looking for peace and safety from scientific investigation where such peace and safety cannot be found, namely in a deeper subjectivism. The only safety from such a ruinous investigation lies in the authority of an objective revelation. But this is the modern Problem which shall next engage our attention.

V

The Present-day Problem: Authority or Experience

Is Christian faith fugitive before modern science? or is there a resting place and a safe corner where the hunted hare may lie secure? From the earliest times the Church, or portions of it, have held fast to "the form of sound words" or "the oracles of God" as the impregnable fortress of truth. The higher criticism of the last decades has pursued its 'scientific' way with such aggressiveness that many of the Church's defenders have capitulated and are now seeking an exile's refuge in some other haven besides the rock of Holy Scripture. The immediate alternative of natural religion, while in itself inadequate, was made almost untenable by Kant and his followers in the evolutionary philosophy of religion. The search began for an enchanted mesa where religious spirits might retreat secure from scientific investigation of any kind. Modern seekers have followed the clue to this mesa given by Schleiermacher, until to-day they are ready to chart this plateau of faith in the regions of the emotions and of the feeling background. We cannot ground our faith on historical accounts, they have said, for these are too easily attacked by the investigator. Nor can we ground our faith on a

rational account of God and the universe, for these are too completely run over and devitalized by philosophy and psychology. But if we can get off somewhere in the region of feeling where neither psychological investigation nor philosophy can reach us we shall save our souls alive. So they forsook the counsel of the Book and Nature without and turned to the feeling within and called it experience. And we now have religious experience as the impalpable and perhaps ineffable substance and assurance of true faith.

It shall be our duty in this section to determine whether this desertion of authority was not unwarranted flight, like the flight of the Syrian army that heard a great noise; and also whether the new retreat of experience is really so safe and esoteric as many would have us believe.

All reasoning must finally rest on authority of some kind. The sciences are all built up on unproveable postulates which are nevertheless necessary as a working basis. All philosophizing must at last rest on the assumption that something in experience is real and our logical processes necessary and trustworthy. It would not be asking too much, then, to assume that Christian faith also must rest ultimately on authority of some kind. And if ultimately, why not immediately? But when we consider the further truth that it is the very nature of much of the content of faith to be invisible and above experience it becomes imperative that faith must rest on the authority of testimony rather than on experiment and investigation. If faith rested on philosophical grounds, it would be unprotected from rationalism. If it rested on feeling, it might rove unchecked in mysticism. An objective testimony is just what is needed to steady these forces and give them intellectual ballast against the winds of feeling and the currents of speculation. Christian faith no longer rests on subjective emotion but on an objective revelation.

Doubtless everyone would hail such a solution as a consummation devoutly to be wished; but the objection is barking close behind: are we not bound to use reason to prove the authority of revelation? We have answered this question before and have said that it may do so only in a negative way. Reason appealed to may show that reason must hold the big stick over the data of revealed religion, and it may show some very good reasons why nothing but a revelation will fill our religious needs as has this Book with its truly miraculous history of prophecy, promise, and fulfilment. But whether such an intellectual conviction is alone powerful enough to make the Bible authoritative for the individual, in the sense that he will stake his eternal welfare on it; this is a larger order. I doubt it. I think rather that he must depend upon the power working through

the revelation for his conviction. This power will offer an assurance which the unbeliever cannot understand, and which the believer does not need to understand, because his assurance is strong enough without argumentative support. If the appeal to the supernatural seems to be a cowardly retreat here, I think we need to point only to the history of the Church.

Now to make the Church the interpreter of this revelation, in effect the authority itself, is also an inadmissible doctrine. To say that one believes what the Church believes is intellectual prostitution. Nor can a man truly be said to believe that which he has not actually apprehended with his own powers. The individual is not responsible for the objects and the nature of his own faith, as the very nature of faith would imply; and it is up to him to perform what study and investigation is necessary to lay a cognitive foundation for his own faith. At the same time each individual of the present day is much indebted to the Church for preserving and bringing the revelation of God to him. We may sum our position thus: "your reason to read the message, the Church to bring the message, but the Bible is the message."

Opposed to the authority of the Bible we have 'experience'. Experience has become prominent in religion as the result of the retirement of reason and intellect. Since Kant the intellect has gone about like Cain gaining less and less credit among men. The movement has shown itself within the life of the Church by the disappearance of creeds and confessions, in truncated liturgies, and in the general scorn of symbolism and ceremony in architecture and service. Philosophically the movement seems to have its basis in pragmatism: that is true in religion which works. The tendency has developed a pragmatic approach to the problem of the existence of God in Prof. Hocking's book on *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. In this work the existence of God is demonstrated by the effects of his existence as found in experience: human experience itself is said to be impossible without working with the idea of God. (1) This pragmatic definition of religious truth has a habit of being very negative because this experience is by its own confession ineffable. Take this as a sample: "Vital truth - I say it with boldness and confidence - cannot be apprehended by the intellect." (2) He is bold because he is quite sure that the whole modernist world will agree with him. He goes on: "It is not discoverable by our reasoning faculties be they never so acute, nor can it be

(1) 'Experience' with Prof. Hocking is not specifically religious experience but human experience in general. Nor does he prove from such experience a distinctly Christian God, but only the God of traditional natural theology.

(2) Hibbert Journal, Jan. '27, p.357.

shut up in any form of words, however subtly contrived. It belongs to another sphere." The drift toward mysticism is already clear, I suppose. The issue is plainly set against creed or authority of any objective kind. Subjective experience is to be the test: that is to be true for the individual which serves his purposes and satisfies his religious instincts.

It is perhaps just as well to point out here that this theory of truth cuts about as close to the roots of knowledge as one can well come without bringing down the whole tree. If truth of any sort is to be made a mere matter of subjectivity, the search for truth, in philosophy, in religion, is a delusion and a snare. The answer of the experience-Christian is, of course, that religious truth is of a different kind: that he has made religious truth a matter of experience just in order to get it away from scientific investigation. Whether the ruse has helped him at all, we shall see later.

Meanwhile we shall understand experience in religion to mean those phenomena of consciousness which seem to satisfy the individual religious instincts. Those propositions of religion are to be true for me which I can feel in my own self. The value of the Christian religion for me must lie in its repeatable experiences. It might be interesting to find out what limitation this rule will place upon the content of Christian faith.

The conservative idea of the content of Christian faith has been a dual one of history and doctrine. Now we ask, how many of the historical propositions of Christian history make the proper appeal to experience? Can one living to-day experience the resurrection of Christ or his birth? Can he experience the creation, or the flood, or the exodus, or the giving of the Law on Sinai? We hear the indignant answer: Of course not! No one expects that the historical data of the Christian religion are to be verified by personal experience. To which we very heartlessly reply, that since the doctrinal propositions of Christianity are so inextricably bound up in the same book with the historical data, if one falls the other falls with it. And if the historical data seem to be undermined by close research, doctrine is at once placed in jeopardy and there is no safe retreat.

But can the doctrines of Christianity be experienced? Can one experience, that is, feel in his own personality, the death of Christ, the substitutional nature of that death? Can he experience the justification of God by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to himself? Obviously he cannot. But is there nothing in Christianity which one may experience or feel subjectively? Assuredly there is. Christianity would be no religion without the subjective element. The converted Christian discovers a love of God in his heart and faith in his promises of the forgiveness of sin and future bliss; and in this faith he

receives the sustaining presence of God's spirit through life. But these subjective experiences do not stand alone: they depend for their validity upon the objective facts of Christianity mentioned before, namely, Christ's substitutional death and God's imputation of his righteousness. And these facts are not made truth by the subjective response which they arouse in man's consciousness, but they depend upon the objective revelation of the Bible. We conclude that an experience, in the modern sense, of the cardinal truths of Christianity is impossible. The experience-Christian, however, might not claim that these more distinctive doctrines of Christianity are repeatable in experience. I submit, then, that even that modicum of doctrine which he has left in his apologetic creed, namely, the persistence of personality after death or the immortality of the soul, and the indwelling of divinity in Christ, is itself not repeatable in modern experience. For the first, the persistence of personality after death can hope for no experimental verification in life; for the second, no amount of 'divine' feeling in one's own experience could prove the divinity (rather say deity) of Christ.

Perhaps it may seem that we have been hacking away at the unimportant suckers of 'experience-religion' and have avoided the main stem. We admit some difficulty in dealing with it simply because of its variety and individual reference. The man himself must be the one to decide what religious experiences he can have and what not. We are liable to such an objection now. Does not a very representative body of experience-Christians assert that Christianity is not a doctrine but a life?

Very well, if Christianity is to be made a life of feeling it will be heir to all the ills and ailments to which a hyper-emotional Christianity has been subject since the first century. We have here the same old immediacy of communion with God and the same old subjectivity of experience. And as in mysticism every new revelation and experience was valid for the individual, so in experience-religion, there will be almost as many sorts of religion as there are kinds of experience - subject, of course, to certain underlying limitations.⁽¹⁾ But we may as well give up all hope of having any sort of unity of Christian truth. Christian truth will become anything the individual wishes to make it - on the basis of that experience which has proved satisfactory to himself. More than this: mysticism is historically a close relative of fanaticism. The controlling and guiding reins of intellect are missing. The result has been the burning of heretics and witches, which at first blush seems to be a comic eventuality, but which time might prove a hideous reality. Not that we shall again burn heretics in the old fashion; the new

(1) Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience.

intolerance seems more likely to take on the nature of a scornful persecution of conservative Christianity. Behold what an obedient child experience-Christianity has turned out to be. All of this means, of course, that experience-Christianity can no longer be called true Christianity.

Perhaps an unexpected consequence of the recent emphasis on experience, to the discredit of thought, is the attitude now developing toward archeological and Biblical scholarship. Who could have foreseen that liberal theology would become smugly satisfied with its own historical conclusions about Christianity and its magic wand of 'experience' and sit back contemptuous of modern scholarship? Yet this is exactly what is happening. It is the conservative scholar who is the true progressive of the twentieth century.

These unfortunate consequences are to be noted as the result of the application of the principle of experience to Christianity as a life. We might pursue the matter into the ethical field as well and find some very startling things to say about the effects of experience-Christianity on morality at home and in the mission fields. But let us give attention to but one more question: has experience-Christianity made a successful psychological get-away? It was hoped that by referring religious truth to subjective experience the enervating effects of psychological analysis would be avoided. If we may take Prof. Leuba's word for it, the retreat has been into the very den of the lion. "Contemporary Protestant Christianity grounds its beliefs solely upon so-called 'inner experience', which, it is claimed, leads directly or through 'faith' to a knowledge of God, without the mediation of science or metaphysics. From these Protestant Christianity would divorce itself, for the metaphysical arguments no longer seem reliable, and science undermines rather than supports the historical beliefs of the historical religions. But to say that religion is based solely upon 'inner', 'immediate' experience, really means that theology is a branch of psychological science.(1) So that the claim that religious experience is inaccessible to science rests upon a misunderstanding and a confusion: the nature of religious experience is misunderstood, and the God of metaphysics is confused with the God of the religions."(2) We should like to make some modification of Prof. Leuba's first statements here, but he is surely correct when he says that experience is grist for the psychological mill. If the fundamental truths of religion are either given immediately in inner experience or deduced from it, then the validity of such truths hangs in the balance of psychological investigation. If the phenomena of the religious life consist in concepts and

(1) Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p.65.

(2) Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion, p.276.

emotions of the natural order they are part of the material of psychological science. Thus it would seem that experience-Christianity is not more free from science and psychology than when it was yet in the supposedly unprotected position of authoritative Christianity.

Our further discussion will aim to show that Christianity as dependent on authority is no unprotected position, but is the strongest, as it is the only possible position for Christian faith to adopt.

In passing, however, we ought to note that the position of authority is superior to that of experience from a psychological point of view. We have observed that experience places extraordinary emphasis on the feelings, to the exclusion of thought. Authority, as found in an objective revelation, gives full scope to all the elements of the human consciousness, intellect, feeling, and will. The intellect is perhaps not fully satisfied with the quantity of material which revelation gives about God and man's relation to him, but that is because human curiosity is by nature insatiable. It is certain that the intellect can have from revelation a more satisfying meal for its digestion than experience can offer. As for the will, about which there might be some question, we have no doubt indicated sufficiently its activity in our definition of faith. But if it should be objected that there we dealt chiefly with the activity of the will as carrying faith into effect, it may be well to mention Hebrews 11 in this connection, in which faith is spoken of, not only as the conviction of things hoped for, but also as the persuasion of things not seen (according to our translation of the passage). The persuasion here is significant of the appeal to the will in the very act of faith. Knowledge, assent, and confidence are not to be thought of as following one another in the act of faith: they are jointly active. All this is made possible by the objective reference of Christian faith in revelation.

And here, too, Christian faith succeeds in doing what experience fails to do, that is, it escapes the blighting effects of psychological investigation. It escapes by not placing its confidence in the subjective experience at all, but on the objective revelation. It is a retreat to the Book. But the retreat is a retreat to the first line trenches, a retirement, if we may so speak, to an aggressive position.

This aggressive position has been very well maintained in spite of the hasty flight of experience-Christianity before the attack of historical criticism and evolutionary science. The flight was unnecessary. There has been a false alarm. Many supposed enemies have become friends, some in the most extraordinary manner. To instance only Sir William Ramsay and Prof. Barton in the archeological field is enough. Men who began with

preconceived notions about the trustworthiness of the New Testament books have become conservative scholars on the grounds of their work with the spade. Prof. Harnack, too, has done some very surprising things in overturning his former views in favor of later conservative opinions. In this he may be regarded as characteristic of the modern trend of scholarship, which is definitely toward a firm reestablishment of the historical bases of Christianity in the New Testament books. The historical infallibility of these books is easier to maintain to-day than at any time since the first century, with the gratuitous evidences of nineteen centuries of Christian history thrown in. The same is true of the alleged conflict of science with Bible data, notably creation. The conservative view is making great capital at present out of the played-out confusion of evolutionary theories. And if there is any outstanding result of modern psychological study, it is this, that a mechanistic psychology cannot give an adequate description of psychic data. These are mere assertions, surely; we can give them no further support here. But they point the way where one must look for the increasing prestige of the Christian revelation.

So much for the historical and scientific data of the Bible; the doctrine or theological content, on the other hand, we have elsewhere indicated to be beyond the scope of scientific investigation. And our discussion of the relation of reason to the content of revelation has shown the inadmissability of reasonable judgments of the ordinary logical variety in this department.

In closing this section on the comparative merits of authority and revelation it is in place to speak of the unifying influence of authority within organized Christianity, and finally of the supernatural power within such authority to give the seal of assurance to faith. When we speak of unity within the Christian Church we speak of a comparative unity. Denominational divisions and yet other divisions within denominations have given as much trouble to the Church as they have given delight to adverse critics. But the question of importance is: how much greater would have been the division and confusion, the causes working for such division remaining, if the authority of the Bible had been absent. We think, too, in this connection of the inner unity of all true believers irrespective of denominational lines. Such a subtle, incommunicable unity would be unthinkable without the basic reference of the Bible. It is significant that the modern movement away from the authority of the Bible is a movement away from Christian unity.

Of the natural power latent in Christian revelation little need be added to what has been said before. Faith and the conviction of the truth of the objects of faith come at the same moment. The believer says simply: "Whereas I was blind, now I see." He has said this ever since the blind man was healed by

the Master's word; and the same word has given the power through history to support the martyrs and sustain the saints.

We may close our treatment of the modern problem here. The experience-Christian has had no opportunity, he might say, of showing what his subjective element might do in the course of history. But if we have cataloged the phenomenon correctly under mysticism and have indicated the failure of its intended escape from both authority and psychological analysis, we have perhaps given a fair idea of what it may be expected to do. We certainly do not believe that the Christianity of the future should be a religion of feeling; and if it should eventually be that, it would no longer be true Christianity, but apostasy.

VI Practical

It is now to be hoped that we have so tempered and sharpened our sword that it may rightly divide the word of truth. Like a boy with a coveted toy we are eager to try it out. We shall observe a few of the objections which speculative reason has stuffed out, like straw men, to question the consistency of revelation. A few points in connection with the Godhead and the Atonement will suffice.

Christianity wants more in its God than cold omnipotence or even moral justice. It demands the warmth and fellowship of a merciful and gracious God. Of such a merciful God philosophy is often sceptical. He can't be found in nature, "red in tooth and claw", nor does he appear in the development of social organisation. Where, philosophy may ask, do you get the notion that God must be merciful, unless perhaps out of your own feeling that such a God would be the most pleasant sort to have? If God happens to be essentially good, the probability is that he is also so transcendent as to be incapable of any such attitude toward human beings as that of mercy. To this line of reasoning the Christian theologian replies that he is thoroughly aware of the shortsightedness of natural theology here, and that he therefore refers the mercy of God to revelation. There he not only finds an account of the demonstration of divine mercy in Christ, but he finds also a history of the fall of the human race into sin which helps him to answer for the natural evidences of evil in the world. And why is the mind unable to discover a merciful God in itself or in the universe? Because both it and the universe are groping in the ways of sin as in Egyptian darkness. One must have the saving ray of revelation to discover in human experience the lines and features of God's mercy.

But why, the philosopher asks, must Christianity be so sure of personality in God? How can a personal God be unlimited and unchangeable? Does not the very nature of personality, after

the human analogy, imply limitations in relation to other personalities? When God created the world did he not suffer limitation and change by this action and the new relation? How can God think and will and feel, after the analogy of personality, without suffering change in his consciousness? But perhaps more imperative than these is the question: does not God in his relation to men as Redeemer undergo a change and a limitation which does not comport with the notion of an infinite and immutable Deity? The degree of plausibility in these questions comes from the necessity we are under of thinking of God after human parallels. This is another way of stating that the human mind is unable to cope with deity directly and must depend upon revelation. But when revelation discloses something not in accord with the human analogy, the apparent inconsistency lies in a comparison that is not essential, but only auxiliary to our understanding of truth beyond experience. God's personality is not a human personality, however helpful the comparison may be in the exercise of worship and prayer. Thus we may say that reason is here unable to pass a judgment in the field beyond experience, where God's chart alone is safe.

Again, how can there be two natures in Christ? If two natures are joined must there not be a double consciousness? And if these two consciousnesses were merged, must they not certainly modify each other - to the great embarrassment of the doctrine of the immutability of the divine nature? We know that these objections are correct according to all human analogy. We are the more sure of it because philosophy and pagan religion of all ages have been trying to get at some satisfactory union of the divine with the human, but have always come to grief on these snags. Our answer here is just as before. The human analogy does not apply. Reason cannot render judgment on that basis. Moreover the very audacity of the teaching of the dual nature of Christ, with the communication of attributes, as without human analogy, is in itself a proof for the divinity of the revelation. The conception is of superhuman origin.

With regard to the atonement there are three points which we shall notice. (a) The world has been lately impressed by the work of science in expanding the dimensions of the universe. In both directions, through the observatory to the stars and through the laboratory to the electron, the world of objective reality has seemed to unfold almost to infinity. That the Creator and Preserver of this immensity and this multiplicity should regard the low estate of earthborn humanity is almost too much to believe. If men have had the misfortune to fall into sin, it is hardly conceivable that the Infinite should bother his head over the matter, much less suffer death! (b) Even if he should be concerned over this trifle of humanity, how is it possible that infinite justice should accept a substitutional atone-

ment? Must not perfect justice insist that a man suffer for his own sins? How can we then think of God the Father as permitting the substitution of Christ? Philosophy would say that the Father could not do so and yet preserve his reputation for supreme justice. But somehow a Christian feels, and he has revelation to back him up, that, logically or illogically, infinite mercy is mightier than infinite justice. (c) It is even more difficult for reason to approve of the idea that Christ's work wipes out even the theoretical guilt of the sin chalked up against humanity. To imagine that men are forgiven is perhaps not so hard, but how can divine justice ever forget the stain of guilt that still attaches to their former character? Our intellectual difficulties here merely illustrate the superhuman nature of the attributes we deal with. We feel that if such things could be true they must be true of a mercy and a justice more transcendent than man can possibly conceive. If they can be true they must be worshipped and adored - and not condemned by an earth-bound reason.

The subordination of reason to revelation illustrated by these features of speculative reason does not necessarily produce intellectual anemia. On the contrary, the point of view of Bible-based Christian faith should be most stimulating to intellectual attainment. It holds no branch of real scientific investigation to be useless. Moreover, it gives point and purpose to every kind of natural and historical research, as activities which may enrich the life of faith. The very fact that reason's limitations are so quickly and easily recognized is an incentive to use its powers to the utmost. The limitation is also a goal. Thus faith becomes a stimulant to reason. What happier solution could we reach? Instead of faith following weakly her master reason, reason is made the loyal servant of faith.

3/17/27

Bibliography

- Bacon...The Advancement of Learning
Baillie...The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul
Baker,A.E...How To Understand Philosophy
Balfour...Theism and Humanism
" The Foundations of Belief
Bowne...Philosophy of Theism
Caird...An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
Calvin...Institutes
Clark...An Outline of Christian Theology
Coleridge...Aids to Reflection
Cутten...The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity
Descartes...Works, Veitch Edition
Dimond...The Psychology of the Methodist Revival
Everett,C.C...Essays
Fairbairn...The Philosophy of the Christian Religion
" The Place of Christ in Modern Theology
Fisher,G.P...Faith and Rationalism
Fletcher...The Psychology of the New Testament
Hobbes,..Works, Molesworth Edition
Hocking...The Meaning of God in Human Experience
Hodge...Systematic Theology
Hume...Works, Selby-Bigge Edition
Inge...Religion and Life
" Twelve Modern Apostles
" Christianity and Mysticism
" Outspoken Essays
James, William...Varieties of Religious Experience
" The Will to Believe
Keyser...Contending for the Faith
Krauth...The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology
Kuyper...The Work of the Holy Spirit
Lane...Evolution and Christian Faith
Leibnitz...Works, Duncan Edition
Leuba...A Psychological Study of Religion
Locke...Essay on Human Understanding
Machen...What is Faith?
McConnell...Is God Limited?
McNabb...Oxford Conferences on Faith
Mullins...Why is Christianity True?
O'Toole...The Case Against Evolution
Patton...Fundamental Christianity
Pratt...The Psychology of Religious Belief
" The Religious Consciousness
" Matter and Spirit
Price...The New Geology
Roback...Behaviorism and Psychology
Santayana...Character and Opinion in the United States
" Winds of Doctrine
" Life of Reason
Schmid...Doctrinal Theology of the Lutheran Church
Shedd...Dogmatic Theology
Sheldon...System of Christian Doctrine
Strickland...Psychology of Religious Experience
" Foundations of Christian Belief