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### The Application of the Lutheran Teaching Concerning the Just War to the Twentieth Century Counter-Insurgency Warfare

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THE APPLICATION OF THE LUTHERAN TEACHING CONCERNING  
THE JUST WAR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE

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A Thesis Presented to the Faculty  
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,  
Department of Systematic Theology  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Sacred Theology

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
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Frank Morgret

May 1985

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

. . . I see all holy Christendom so burdened by wars and hatreds, robberies and dissensions, that it is hard to name one little region, be it duchy or county, that enjoys good peace.<sup>1</sup>

These words written by Honore Bonet, probably in 1387, ring as true today as when he wrote them. Our century has given birth to the global war and the nuclear war. It has seen so-called conventional war achieve new heights of devastation, and it has witnessed the development of guerrilla warfare into conflicts of particularly unbridled savagery.

Can there be any rules in war? Or, to phrase the same question in other words, is some sort of morality possible on the battlefield? The horrors of nuclear and guerrilla war prompt many to answer this question with a firm, even vehement, "No!" Certainly the fact that millions of non-combatants are the targets for hundreds of nuclear-armed missiles lends credence to their denial. Moreover, the vivid picture of the summary execution of a guerrilla by a

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<sup>1</sup>Honore Bonet, The Tree of Battles, trans., G. W. Coopland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 79.

Vietnamese police chief<sup>2</sup> and the sickening stories of hurling some prisoners of war from a helicopter nine hundred or a thousand feet in the air so that the survivors might be interrogated more easily<sup>3</sup> speak vividly of the lack of morality on modern battlefields. Have we then reached the stage in the development of warfare where the conduct of war must be devoid of morality?

This thesis seeks to answer a portion of that question. Its attention is directed to the question of what moral precepts, if any, should guide the field commander in his conduct of anti-guerrilla operations.

This thesis approaches this question from the perspective of Lutheran ethics as well as from the Lutheran understanding of the appropriate place and task of civil government in God's rule of this world.

This thesis, then, stands clearly within the framework of Lutheran systematic theology. However, its findings are not limited thereby in their application. The rules of military conduct developed in the course of this investigation are applicable to all field commanders--regardless of their theological, philosophical, or political orientation--who

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<sup>2</sup>Robert Thompson, ed., War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945, (New York: Harmony Books, 1982), p. 192.

<sup>3</sup>Mark Barker, ed. Nam: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There, (New York: Berkley Books, 1983), p. 186.

seek a military victory over a foe fighting a guerrilla campaign against them.

In its opening chapters, the thesis will investigate the phenomenon of warfare. It will seek to show how warfare is related to geo-political considerations, and it will strive to show the relationship of grand strategy, strategy, tactics, and logistics in the conduct of warfare. No attempt will be made to provide a thorough explanation of any one of these fields; instead, an attempt will be made to provide enough rudimentary knowledge so that the reader will be able to grasp the practicality of ethical decisions discussed later.

The narrower subject of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare will also be discussed. The purpose here will be to give the reader a grasp of the unique nature of guerrilla warfare and of its strategic and tactical concepts.

Guerrilla warfare is aimed at a government in being. It is an attempt to bring about the eventual overthrow of that government, whether it be government by the army of an occupying foreign power or a domestic civil government lacking the approval of the guerrilla force. Consequently, counter-guerrilla warfare is waged by forces seeking to support and to maintain in place a government that they see to be the rightful governing body in that locality.

These factors underline the importance of examining the place of civil government in Lutheran thought. This

will be done by first providing a brief historical survey of theological theories of government prior to Martin Luther. Luther's teaching concerning civil government and the appropriate relationship between the church and the state as well as his teachings concerning the duties of the Christian citizen will be set forth on the basis of his own writings. Lutheran thought since Luther on these subjects will be explicated on the basis of the Lutheran Confessions and the writings of selected sixteenth and seventeenth century orthodox Lutheran theologians.

Having examined Lutheran thinking on the general subject of the appropriate function of government, attention will be focused specifically on warfare. Again, by means of an historical survey, the thesis will show the development of the three characteristic reactions to war among Christian theologians, reactions that are encapsulated in the concepts of pacifism, the crusade, and the just war. The just war teaching of Luther and of the orthodox Lutheran theologians will be examined in some detail.

The final chapter of the thesis will be devoted to an application of the just war teaching of Luther and of the orthodox Lutheran theologians to the problems of waging an effective counter-guerrilla campaign.

As will be seen, in times past--in fact, in times as recent as the era of the second world war--there have been rules of morality that have applied to battlefields and that



have been observed by combatants.<sup>4</sup> In the course of the development of this thesis, the shape and the substance of those rules from medieval times to the middle of the present century will be explored. The relationship, if any, between the rules actually in place and observed by combatants to those rules suggested by the theology of the Christian church will be examined.

The major task of this thesis will be to set forth clearly and in detail the idea of a just war that grows out of the Lutheran theology of church and state as that theology was developed from the time of the reformation to the close of the golden period of Lutheran orthodoxy. From this concept of a just war the thesis will then develop moral rules applicable to the conduct of those engaged in waging counter-guerrilla warfare, and it will seek to demonstrate the practicality and applicability of these rules.

Formulating theoretical rules for conduct on the battlefield is a task of no great intellectual accomplishment. It is a task that is performed all the time by people utterly ignorant of the demands of military leadership and devoid of any desire to acquire first-hand knowledge of the risks in the modern guerrilla warfare environment. Anyone

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<sup>4</sup>Farley Nowat mentions a truce arranged between German and Canadian infantry units fighting in the hamlet of San Maria di Scacciano, Italy, on the afternoon of 4 September 1944; see his The Regiment (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), pp. 217-18.

at all may pontificate concerning how a soldier should behave in battle. The task that requires careful investigation and diligent study is the task of providing the battlefield commander with moral rules and guidelines that will allow him, or better, will enable him to function effectively as a battlefield commander and military leader. This thesis is an attempt to perform this second task.

## CHAPTER II

### THE NATURE OF WARFARE

#### Grand Strategy

Carl von Clausewitz defined war as a duel conducted on an extensive scale in which each opponent, by means of violence, seeks to force the other to comply with his will.<sup>1</sup> However, war is never an isolated event. It arises out of and exists in the history of mankind as well as the history of the particular tribes, factions, or nations who are the combatants. Thus there is far more to the goals of the respective combatants than merely "winning the war."<sup>2</sup> In fact,

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<sup>1</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 3 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 1:3-4.

<sup>2</sup>Clausewitz, On War, 1:7-13, and 3:76-140 as well. See also Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 1-11; B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 15; Mao Tse Tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 80-81; Baron de Jomini, The Art of War (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1862; reprint ed., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, n.d.), pp. 12-13, which contains a simplified list of the political motives for going to war; Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1958), pp. 1-6; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 1-14, which contains an unusually good discussion of the various currents of national foreign and domestic policy that can affect military policy in times both of peace and of war.

the participants in a war have gone to war precisely to gain some political end or to prevent their opponent from gaining some political end. As Clausewitz concluded, "We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."<sup>3</sup>

The co-ordination and direction of the total resources of a political entity or a combine of political entities toward the attainment of the political object of a war is called "grand strategy."<sup>4</sup> Grand strategy employs other weapons besides fighting power, weapons that may fall entirely outside the purview of military action, weapons such as diplomatic pressure, appeal to the appropriate international tribunal, commercial boycott, and the like.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the peace it is hoped will follow the war and strives so to direct the war that the peace will assume the shape desired.<sup>6</sup> Goals established by grand strategy may, upon subsequent re-examination, be discovered to be unattainable. In this case, new goals

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<sup>3</sup>Clausewitz, On War, 1:23.

<sup>4</sup>Hart, Strategy, pp. 335-36.

<sup>5</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "Military Policy," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 18 vols. (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1968), 10:319. See also Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: The Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 28.

<sup>6</sup>Hart, Strategy, pp. 335-36. See also p. 150.

must then be established.<sup>7</sup> Hitler's failure to re-examine his situation and to set new goals after the British Army as well as portions of the French Army slipped from his grasp at Dunkirk in 1940 and his consequent utter defeat only underline the importance and the necessity of such a review.

In most states, the formulation of grand strategy does not lie in the hands of the military leaders. Because these are matters of national purpose, they generally are the concern of the highest deliberative authority in the land. Such is true, for instance, in the case of the United States, whose Constitution grants to the Congress the right "to declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; to raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years; to provide and maintain a Navy; to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States. . . ."<sup>8</sup>

A political entity does not practice grand strategy

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<sup>7</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 52.

<sup>8</sup>U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.

only in time of war. In times of peace, a state still seeks to obtain various political advantages. Thus, a political entity is continually practicing grand strategy, even in times of peace when it neither is involved in any international disputes nor contemplates any such involvement. The guidance of a nation's foreign policy is closely tied to the putting into action that nation's plans of grand strategy. However, this does not demand that foreign policy include hostilities or overt threat of military action.

#### Strategy

"Strategy is the art of comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."<sup>9</sup> It has also been defined as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."<sup>10</sup> Thus pure or military strategy deals with the carrying out of the military tasks assigned to the armed forces by the makers of grand strategy. Strategy determines and controls how the military goals of grand strategy will be achieved on the battlefield.

There is always the possibility for friction and poor management and poor leadership at those points in an organization where control passes from a higher level to a lower one. The subordinate level may tend to take too much control

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<sup>9</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 48.

<sup>10</sup>Hart, Strategy, p. 335.

to itself, thus forcing the hand of the superior and, in effect, controlling the decisions and policy the superior makes. On the other hand, the superior may so tightly control the subordinate that the latter will not have sufficient authority to perform the routine tasks of management and leadership. By maintaining too tight a control on his subordinate, the superior will be the actual manager at both his level and the level of his subordinate, and the subordinate will be relegated to becoming merely a messenger for his superior. The more important the tasks being controlled, the more critical the management and the less tolerable this friction becomes.

Military tasks generally deal with the very existence of a nation. When we consider the chain of command and responsibility from the top down, we see that control passes from the higher level of grand strategy to the subordinate level of strategy. It is not at all uncommon for difficulties to develop at this junction.

Henry E. Eccles has given some criteria to assist in establishing the boundary of command and responsibility between the grand strategist and the military strategist.<sup>11</sup> He pointed out that the military strategist should be experienced in the realm of military matters so that he will possess a knowledge of what is militarily possible and what

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<sup>11</sup>Eccles, Concepts, pp. 24-26.

is not. The man who has led troops in the field under fire is better able to render an unbiased judgment on a strategic plan than the scientist who is certain that his invention represents the greatest advance in the history of weaponry or the statesman whose patriotic pride has been wounded by the successes of the enemy.

Eccles also wrote, "A sense of personal responsibility for the outcome of a decision or a plan plays a vital part in its correct formulation."<sup>12</sup> It is obvious that a person exercises more care when his reputation or even his life is at stake in the outcome of the decision he is about to make. Thus it is well for the strategist to have a personal stake in the outcome of his strategic decisions. Since this is true, it is preferable to have strategic decisions made at as low a level of command as is commensurate with the knowledge, experience, and scope of command sufficient to accomplish the proposed task.

It is common practice to allow the commander of the army in the field to determine what strategic plans he will make in order to achieve the goals established for the military by the nation's grand strategy. If the field commander cannot formulate and carry out strategy that is in line with the goals of grand strategy, it is usual that he is removed and another commander is installed. An example of this

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 26.



occured when President Harry S. Truman removed General Douglas MacArthur from the command of the United Nations Forces in Korea in 1951.<sup>13</sup>

It has happened, however, that those in control of grand strategy fail to allow their subordinates sufficient latitude in the formulation of strategy. Such "over-control" can be dangerous for a number of reasons. The maker of grand strategy may have an exceedingly clear idea of the political goals being sought in the war but only a hazy understanding of the military means available and the military maneuvers suitable to achieving those goals as well as an ignorance of military matters in general. In such a case, his strategic commands will be the result of ignorance rather than knowledge. He may formulate his strategic considerations on the basis of an evaluation of the situation distorted by his distance from the scene of conflict and by his desire to achieve certain political goals; in such cases his strategic commands will be based upon faulty premises. Moreover, his subordinates will be inclined to carry out such orders with less than complete dedication and enthusiasm, for they will

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 295. For a professional soldiers record and evaluation of that episode, see Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 521-642. Much information of value is to be found in Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), pp. 382-545. An analysis from the point of view of the president is to be found in Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1973), pp. 503-20.

have had little or nothing to do with the formulation of those orders, and their superior military knowledge may well tell them that the orders simply are not feasible.

The retreat of the German armies from Russia in 1943-44 offers several interesting cases of over-controlling of military leaders by the political commander-in-chief. Hitler repeatedly ordered the generals of his armies in the east to stand and fight and under no circumstances to consider retreat. In many instances where these orders were obeyed, the German armies were entrapped, suffering staggering losses in men and material. In other cases, the military subordinates intentionally disobeyed Hitler's orders, withdrawing their armies to better positions chosen on their superior knowledge of strategy. Often on these occasions the attacks of the Russians were slowed or temporarily halted.<sup>14</sup>

#### Tactics

Tactics is "the immediate employment of specific forces

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<sup>14</sup>Hart, Strategy, pp. 293-99, 311-14. Information of value concerning this aspect of German operations in World War II is also to be found in J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, ed. John Terraine, 2 vols. (London: Granada Publishing, 1970), 2:503-529; Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 447-463; and Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (London: Futura Publications, 1972), pp. 242-71 and 311-328, 352-79. For a rather different evaluation, see P. N. Pospelov, ed. Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).

and weapons to attain the objectives of strategy.<sup>15</sup> Tactics is related to strategy as hammer is to hand. Strategy is expressed in terms of comprehensive control of a military situation; tactics is the immediate employment of force and weapons.<sup>16</sup>

The distinction between strategy and tactics is one that is poorly understood, and the designation of much of modern weaponry only clouds the issue further. A missile is a tactical weapon, regardless of its size and destructive power, because the exploding of a missile warhead is an immediate application of force in a limited area for a limited period of time. The employment of a missile is a part of tactics. The ultimate effect to be achieved by the employment of that weapon and others like it, coupled with the application of various other forms of force, is strategic. Eccles pointed out, "The size and power of any weapon should not be considered as the criteria that determines its proprietary right to 'strategy' or the term 'strategic.' Such semantic confusion inevitably leads to confused thinking."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 70.

<sup>16</sup>Eccles, Concepts, pp. 48-50. See also Clausewitz, On War, 1:86.

<sup>17</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 48. See also Clausewitz, On War, 1:94.

### Logistics

Logistics is "the bridge between the economy of the nation and the tactical operations of the combat forces."<sup>18</sup> It includes the design, development, and supply of weaponry to the fighting man as well as providing him with those items he may need for the support of life and for transporting him and his equipment to the battlefield. The drab, unglamorous science of logistics is a necessary part of strategic knowledge. "The practical application of a strategic concept consists of a group of specific tactical operations that must be preceded by logistical operations.<sup>19</sup>

The importance of logistics to the overall conduct of a war can be readily realized by recalling the War Between the States. The Confederacy would have been able to develop a viable strategy had she been able to solve her problems of logistics. Her armies displayed superior tactical skills, but her civil and military leaders were never able to give those armies the logistical support they required, and thus they were ultimately defeated.

### The Strategist

It is on the strategist that the main weight of waging war falls. It is he who selects the military means, draws up the plans, and controls, the operations so that the goals

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<sup>18</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 72.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

of grand strategy are attained. As he goes about these tasks, he draws upon the storehouse of his military knowledge so as to attain the desired results in the manner most advantageous to his side.

It is the paradox of modern military science that the strategist seeks to reduce the amount of actual combat to a minimum if, in fact, he is not able to do away with combat altogether.<sup>20</sup> However, if we remember that the strategist seeks the attainment of his appointed goals with the least possible cost to his own forces, it will then become obvious that if a victory can be won without a battle this is the goal of strategy.

In practice, the complete absence of combat in a war is rarely possible, but there have been some noteworthy instances where appropriate strategy and tactics reduced the amount of combat to a minimum. Recent examples include the German isolation of the Allied left wing in Belgium after Guderian's breakthrough in the center of the lines at Sedan in 1940,<sup>21</sup> and the surrounding and subsequent defeat of the

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<sup>20</sup>Hart, Strategy, pp. 337-38.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 338. For a first-hand account of this campaign that includes a careful explanation of the tactics of the campaign, see Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 89-117. Len Deighton provides a well written account of the entire campaign, including the diplomatic maneuvers prior to the beginning of hostilities as well as the invasions of Poland and Norway, thereby providing a valuable overall perspective in his Blitzkrieg (London: Granada Publishing, 1979). Walter Lord provides an eminently readable account of the subsequent evacuation in his The Miracle of Dunkirk (New York: The Viking Press, 1982).

Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula by the Israelis in the Six Day War of 1967.<sup>22</sup>

There are many different ideas concerning whether any abiding principles may be discerned from a study of military strategy. Some would tell us that a study of the history and theory of military strategy is a task made fruitless by the introduction of modern military hardware.<sup>23</sup> The late British military historian and strategist, B. H. Liddell Hart, would have and, in fact, often did strenuously debate such naysayers. From his extensive studies of military strategy, Hart formulated what he has called the strategy of the indirect approach.<sup>24</sup>

Speaking in the simplest terms, the strategy of the indirect approach dictates that the military commander should seek to control circumstances so that his opponent will be placed at such a great disadvantage militarily that battle will be for him disastrous.<sup>25</sup>

Hart's concept of the indirect approach differs radically from the prevailing theme of military strategy since the middle of the eighteenth century. Clausewitz, the great Prussian military genius, would have scorned the idea of the

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<sup>22</sup>W. J. Kotsch, "The Six-Day War of 1967," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1968, pp. 72-81.

<sup>23</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 24.

<sup>24</sup>Hart, Strategy, p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 339.

indirect approach. He was an ardent advocate of seeking battle as the means of coming to a military decision; his was a strategy characterized by directness.<sup>26</sup>

Hart does not claim originality for his idea of the strategy of the indirect approach. He cites authorities as ancient as the sixth century B. C. Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu,<sup>27</sup> to show that this is an ancient and accepted concept. Nor have all the great German military leaders eschewed the strategy of the indirect approach. Hart quoted Helmuth von Moltke, "A clever leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is compelled to attack us in them."<sup>28</sup> This statement provides a perfect example of the indirect approach; the enemy is attacked by being placed in a position such that they are compelled to

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 338. See also Clausewitz, On War, 1: 27-39. There, as elsewhere, Clausewitz explains, "We have only one means in War--the Battle."

<sup>27</sup>Hart, Strategy, p. 13. The idea of a strategy of indirect approach seems to have been a fairly common oriental approach to warfare as well as to single combat. As an example, Miyamoto Musashi, the early seventeenth century samurai, writes of breaking the rhythm of the opponent and of thereby compelling him to fight in the manner in which you wish him to fight. This idea of compelling your opponent to wage war on your terms and as you dictate rather than in the manner that would be advantageous to him is a major tenet of the strategy of the indirect approach. See Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, trans. Nihon Services Corporation (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 23-24; 50-51; 61-63.

<sup>28</sup>Hart, Strategy, p. 14.

assault our prepared positions or lose the battle--and perhaps the war--by default.

The object of the strategy of the indirect approach is to achieve strategic dislocation, that is, to place the enemy in a situation where a further continuation of that situation by his joining battle would be disastrous. Hart pointed out that this might be accomplished in a number of ways.<sup>29</sup> Thus, in a geographic or physical sense, an indirect approach might dislocate the distribution and organization of an enemy's armies by appearing in a location that requires the enemy to defend himself from a new direction.<sup>30</sup> Another such approach might threaten to fragment the enemy's forces and thus prepare the way for their piecemeal destruction. Or, a move might be made that would endanger the enemy's supplies or threaten to cut off his avenue of retreat. Any of these maneuvers would produce a physical dislocation of the enemy's forces and call upon him to realign his army or withdraw from the field entirely.

However, the strategy of the indirect approach contains a subtlety that is not apparent at first glance. The

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 339-40.

<sup>30</sup>The increased Viet Cong activity in Cambodia in late February and early March, 1970, appears to have been an example of an indirect approach of this nature. For descriptions of the events of that spring, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 602-10, and Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981), pp. 290-98.



strategy of the indirect approach is aimed at the will of the enemy, for it is this constituent of his fighting force which must be destroyed before victory will follow.<sup>31</sup> The retreats of the Russian armies in 1812 and 1941 show that vast amounts of territory may be surrendered while fighting force remains. The "punji stick," a piece of splintered bamboo smeared with human feces and driven into the bottom of a ditch or rice paddy or positioned in a puddle beside a trail, proves that wars can be waged with a bare minimum of logistic support. However, when the will to resist is broken, as was that of the Russian army in 1918, or the left wing of the allied forces in Belgium in 1940, resistance melts away.

The history of Canada provides an interesting example of this general rule. In the French and Indian War, General James Wolfe, commanding the British forces, resorted to every stratagem at his command in order to avoid a costly direct assault on the French forces in their fortifications at the Citadel in Quebec. All else failing, Wolfe discovered a path leading to the Plains of Abraham adjacent to the fortress, and he determined that if he must assault the fortress he would attack from that direction. Under cover of night, Wolfe landed his army, and by dawn the British force was drawn up in battle array on the Plains of Abraham, facing

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<sup>31</sup>Hart, Strategy, pp. 18-19, 24-25, 107-08; see also Eccles, Concepts, pp. 244-52, and Mao Tse Tung, "On Protracted War," in Selected Military Writings, p. 260.

the fortress. The French sallied forth from the Citadel to drive the British from their positions and were defeated in the subsequent battle. In retrospect, there seems to be no clear reason why the French had to come out and fight when they did, if, indeed, they needed to come out and give battle at all. It was already late in the year, and the French needed to withstand a siege of, at the most, a few weeks before weather and short provisions would have compelled Wolfe and his army to retire. However, the psychological shock of discovering the enemy where he had no business to be precipitated the French command into the hasty and desperate attack that was their undoing.<sup>32</sup>

Abraham's victory over the army of the four kings recorded for us in Scripture<sup>33</sup> is also an illustration of this concept. After Abraham's successful raid on the weakest part of the enemy's column, he was open to a devastating counter-attack from a force that must have greatly outnumbered his. However, the four kings were so psychologically shocked by the surprise and success of Abraham's small force that they considered discretion the better part of valour

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<sup>32</sup>See Hart, Strategy, pp. 107-108. For more detailed accounts of the campaign, see George W. Brown, Building the Canadian Nation 2 vols. (New York: Macfadden-Bartell Corp., 1968), 1:150-55; Gordon Donaldson, Battle for a Continent (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1973); and Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1913), 1:126-41.

<sup>33</sup>Genesis 14:1-16.

and continued their retreat rather than mount a counter-attack.

Thus, the primary point of aim of any appropriate military strategy is the will of the enemy to resist. The sooner this will to resist can be broken, the sooner will the war be over and the peace begun. It is often true that a great number of enemy soldiers must be killed, a great portion of the enemy economic power destroyed or rendered useless, and a great amount of enemy territory occupied before this will to resist is broken. However, the strategist who shifts his over-all aim from breaking the will of the enemy to some secondary goal such as the destruction of the enemy's army is majoring in minors and may find himself in no little difficulty.

An illustrative example of this fact of military life is the comparison of the manner in which the Russians put down the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the manner in which they quelled the Czechoslovakian uprising of 1968. In Hungary, the Russian field commanders sought purely military victories over the students dug in on Castle Hill in Buda and the workers barricaded in the factories and refineries on the island of Csepel in the Danube just south of Budapest.<sup>34</sup> In Prague, the Russians avoided military action

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<sup>34</sup>For a carefully written account of the Hungarian Revolution, see James A. Michener, The Bridge at Andau (New York: Bantam Books, 1957).

whenever they could safely be avoided, seeking rather to make an impressive show of force.<sup>35</sup> In Hungary, there was continued military action for several weeks, resulting in widespread damage and serious casualties; as long as the fight raged, the Hungarians clung to the hope that they might win. On the other hand, the refusal of the Russians to be provoked into battle in Prague communicated to the Czechs and the Slovaks the utter hopelessness of their situation; the Russians were in such complete control that they could not be disturbed by provocations.

To bring about the dislocation of the enemy and their ultimate defeat, the strategic command has many resources at his disposal. Before he can consider what combination of these resources to employ he must first consider the nature of the enemy and the conditions under which he is to achieve the goals established for him by those in charge of grand strategy. Subsequently, the strategic commander establishes the purely military goals of his campaign.<sup>36</sup>

It is possible to establish differing military goals in the course of the task of realizing the goals that grand strategy has established for the military. Thus, if grand strategy would direct that a certain area be wrestled from

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<sup>35</sup>W. J. Kotsch, "The Tanks of August 1968," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1968, pp. 88-93.

<sup>36</sup>Eccles, Concepts, p. 18.

enemy occupation, frontal assault might be the only solution in one instance while a naval blockade of the harbors of the territory might be the best answer in another. And it is possible that both of these courses of action might be proposed as the correct strategy in the same situation.

Utilizing his experience, his knowledge of military history, his evaluation of his own resources and those of his enemy,<sup>37</sup> as well as his conception of what is allowable morally in the waging of war,<sup>38</sup> the strategic commander establishes strategic goals and prescribes the tactics and resources that will be used to achieve these goals.

Among the resources that the strategic commander may have at his disposal is the advantage of the terrain. The strategic commander may be able to position his forces in terrain which lends itself readily to defense or he may be able to place them along some easily defensible natural barrier such as a river, while his opponent may enjoy no such advantage. In the words of Colonel Eugene Stann,

Switzerland and Poland furnish clear examples. Switzerland has strong mountain barriers at its perimeter and has been able to continue as an independent state because access is extremely difficult. Relatively easy defense has allowed the Swiss nation to remain serene in the midst of epic struggles between France, Italy, and Germany. Poland, on the other hand, is historically a military pushover in spite of the fortitude of the Polish people, because her borders afford

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. 32-34.

excellent mobility and access on several sides.<sup>39</sup>

Another resource which the strategic commander must consider is the military hardware at his disposal. Assuredly, strategy is influenced by the availability and nature of weapons, but strategy should determine the choice of weapons and not weapons the choice of strategy.<sup>40</sup>

The resource which the strategic commander possesses which is most often overlooked by the person not acquainted with military leadership are the men who form the army the commander leads.<sup>41</sup> Overlooked as this resource may be, it is of the utmost importance. New weapons may be purchased or forged if the old ones are lost. New forms of warfare may be undertaken if no territory remains for the waging of conventional war. But once an army is lost, once the resource of manpower is gone, it takes years to replace, even if one considers only the biological factors involved.

However, there is more to the loss of an army than merely the biological loss. Those men who have been killed,

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<sup>39</sup>Eugene J. Stann, then Chief of Staff, U. S. Army Mobility Command, Warren, Michigan, "Remarks Concerning the Need for Strategic and Tactical Mobility," speech delivered at the Opening Dinner of the Fifteenth Annual Armed Forces Week, Detroit, Michigan, May 4, 1964.

<sup>40</sup>Eccles, Concept, p. 18.

<sup>41</sup>Compare General George S. Patton's comment, "Although wars may be fought with weapons, they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains the victory," quoted by Reginald Hargreaves in "Victory to the Stronger," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1969, p. 84.

wounded, or captured are brothers, fathers, and sons of those people who remain to carry on the fight. If their loss has been brought about by poor leadership, if the resource of manpower is squandered in ill-conceived military operations, the will of the nation to fight is destroyed.

Bearing this in mind, we see why the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940 was of such tremendous value to the British war effort. It was the army that had been saved, the men who would fight on the beaches, in the fields, and in the streets, if need be. Even more heartening for the British spirit, it was 224,000 brothers, fathers, and sons who returned from the battlefield to defend their own homes.

Conversely, at least some of the opposition in the United States to the involvement of U. S. forces in Vietnam may have stemmed from the feeling that the lives of American fighting men were being squandered without purpose.<sup>42</sup> The military leader who is inhumane or injudicious in the use of his human resources seldom prospers.

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<sup>42</sup>For a contemporary measure of this disaffection, see Ian Wright, "American's Army of Doubters," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 17 January 1970.

## CHAPTER III

### GUERRILLA STRATEGY

#### Introduction

The late B. H. Liddell Hart has written, "If you wish for peace, understand war--particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war."<sup>1</sup> Hart went on to explain that the current thermo-nuclear stalemate between the two greatest world powers has called for the development and use of other forms of conflict.<sup>2</sup>

The concept of guerrilla warfare has been in existence since antiquity. As Gerard Chaliand writes,

Guerrilla warfare has consistently been the choice of the weak who oppose the strong, for it enables them to avoid direct decisive confrontations and rely on harassment and surprise.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 373.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 375-382. Hart here provides a thoughtful investigation of the longterm results of provoking or supplying guerrillas in an insurrection or a revolutionary conflict. Gerard Chaliand provides a well written study of the historical, sociological, military, and political reasons why guerrilla warfare has become increasingly prevalent since World War II in Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 3-29. Douglas Hyde discusses the present condition of Communist guerrilla movements and their prospects for the future in The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), pp. 149-59.

<sup>3</sup>Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies, p. 1.



Biblical examples of guerrilla-type actions in ancient times include the attack of Abraham and his small force on the armies of the four kings mentioned in the previous chapter and Gideon's famous night attack on the Midianites recorded in the seventh chapter of Judges. Abimilech's ambush of the Schechemites recorded in the ninth chapter of Judges was also a typical guerrilla action.

The term "guerrilla" originated in Spain when the Spanish peasants took up arms against the armies of the French and conducted irregular warfare against them after the Spanish armies had been soundly defeated. While Spanish peasants fought the troops of Napoleon in Spain, Russian peasants conducted irregular warfare against Napoleon's army in Russia. In both cases, the French suffered severe losses. In both cases, the guerrilla campaigns contributed to Napoleon's subsequent defeat.<sup>4</sup>

Guerrilla warfare is no foreigner to our shores. The campaign of the British General Edward Braddock in the French and Indian War provides an outstanding example of how a column of regulars can be impeded, demoralized, and destroyed by guerrilla action.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Camille Rougeron, "The Historical Dimension of Guerrilla Warfare," in Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Gerard Chaliand, pp. 36-39.

<sup>5</sup>For an eyewitness account of this campaign, see Paul McClelland Angle, A New Continent and a New Nation (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1960), pp. 115-18.

The campaigns of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion in South Carolina during the Revolutionary War provide another example of successful guerrilla warfare. Marion set out to break the will of the Loyalist troops and thereby to greatly reduce the effectiveness of General Charles Cornwallis's troops in the southern colonies. Waging a very successful guerrilla war, Marion compelled Cornwallis to use his regular troops where before he had been able to rely on Loyalist militia. This, in turn, forced Cornwallis to concede control of most of the uplands and concentrate on maintaining his coastal lines of communication. This, in its turn, deprived Cornwallis of the forage that he needed to supply his troops and horses. As a result, he was compelled to withdraw northward. Perhaps the greatest harm was done to morale of his troops who were compelled to surrender control of large territories without having fought a major battle for them.<sup>6</sup>

During the War Between the States, the Confederate States employed guerrilla warfare in an attempt to disrupt the invasion of the southern heartlands.<sup>7</sup>

Guerrilla warfare has become a far more widespread

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<sup>6</sup>Ray Palmer Baker, War in the Revolution (Washington Depot, CT: Silver Mountain Press, 1976), pp. 182-83, 193-96, 213-15.

<sup>7</sup>For a contemporary account of one such action, see "Morgan's Guerrilla Raid Into Kentucky," Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 9 August 1862, p. 310.

phenomenon in the second half of the twentieth century than it has been ever before. Considered from either the point of view of the number of guerrilla conflicts being waged or from the point of view of the number of people engaged in guerrilla activity and counter-guerrilla activity, one must conclude that guerrilla warfare is a far more prominent feature of our times than it has been of any preceding era.

Several reasons have been suggested for this rise in guerrilla activity. Chaliand designates three historical factors that have worked together to produce the increased guerrilla activity of the second half of the twentieth century, but his list does not seem exhaustive.

The first factor that Chaliand cites is what he calls "the peasant question."<sup>8</sup> Chaliand had noted that wherever there has been vigorous guerrilla warfare directed against an invader, the one common factor in all the cases was that the warfare had been conducted by peasants.<sup>9</sup>

Camille Rougeron explains why this is so. He writes

Relations between a starving soldier and a peasant who will starve if he feeds him naturally tend to become tense. . . .

. . . Guerrilla warfare is the reaction of the peasant who is not paid when his cow or his wheat is taken from him. When the nation sounds a call to arms, he may be willing to risk his life and that of his children for the cause, without grumbling too much in the process; but there are limits to his forbearance. It is not just in the songs that he prefers his two

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<sup>8</sup>Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies, pp. 7-9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

reddaubed white oxen to his wife: he is willing to die defending them and will fight for them with an ardor that no patriotism can elicit.<sup>10</sup>

As Chaliand points out, it was Mao Tse-Tung who harnessed this peasant attitude into a revolutionary political and military force. Mao made it explicit that

. . . guerrilla warfare is a military tactic aimed at harassing an adversary, whereas revolutionary war is a military means whereby to overthrow a political regime.<sup>11</sup>

Mao applied Lenin's idea of a vanguard party leading the revolution to the masses of peasants in China. It was Mao (and, somewhat later, Ho Chi Minh) who realized the revolutionary potential of the peasant. In so doing, Mao gained the vast political support that a guerrilla movement must have to succeed.<sup>12</sup> The vast numbers of dedicated peasants provided a pool that could be politically organized to provide fighters, bearers, and the minimal logistic support that the guerrillas needed.

The second factor that Chaliand mentions is the dislocation brought about by World War II. The attempt of the Axis powers to secure world domination upset the equilibrium among the major powers and opened the way for a number of successful "people's revolutions."<sup>13</sup>

Chaliand's third factor is an outgrowth of his first

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<sup>10</sup>Rougeron, "Historical Dimension," pp. 38-39.

<sup>11</sup>Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 7-8.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 8

two. In the decade immediately following World War II, the Western colonial powers lost virtually their entire empires. As revolutionary movements developed in colonies, the former colonial powers, in most cases, resisted half-heartedly if at all. Not only were the resources of the colonial powers depleted by the global war they had just fought. It became more and more common for significant portions of the electorate in the colonial countries to decide that colonialism was per se a wrongful state. The people in the colonies no longer accepted the status of "colonials" for they saw it to be immoral, degrading, and iniquitous. Given this unstable situation, it was often the case that the first sign of a serious revolutionary movement prepared to wage guerrilla war for the cause of freedom was enough to cause the colonial power to relinquish its hold on the colony. Given the weakness of the old colonial powers, the costliness of waging war in the colony, and the unlikelihood of achieving any suitable military solution, granting colonies their independence was the only course of action that made sense.<sup>14</sup>

The rapid success of some of the colonial campaigns for independence encourage imitation among other colonies. What was not always seen clearly was that many of the colonies had not won guerrilla campaigns; instead they had won purely political campaigns for independence using the threat

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

of a guerrilla campaign as one of their major weapons.

Moreover, it is well to remember that no colony or ex-colony has won a guerrilla war against a major power who was willing to commit all of its military resources to carrying out an appropriate counter-guerrilla campaign. In fact, a dissident faction seeking to overthrow an established government with the will and the ability to devote itself to a wholehearted counter-insurgency campaign faces a very, very difficult task, for it is virtually certain that the dissidents will need to achieve complete military victory in order to achieve their political ends, and this is alien to the nature of guerrilla movements.

#### Revolutionary Strategy

As a matter of fact, revolutionary movements take up guerrilla warfare precisely because they see themselves as unable--at that time--to gain a complete military victory. Guerrilla warfare, properly conducted in appropriate circumstances, offers disproportionate rewards, measured against the effort put forth by the guerrillas. This is true because all too often the government in place seeks to deal with revolutionary guerrillas through the use of conventional military tactics and techniques. These are relatively ineffective against the guerrilla.<sup>15</sup> In addition,

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<sup>15</sup>Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," in The Guerrilla--And How to Fight Him, ed. T. N. Greene (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 25. See

guerrilla warfare is attractive to the revolutionary because it requires a far smaller investment in money and other resources than would a conventional war.<sup>16</sup>

The strategic goal of guerrilla warfare is to disrupt or prevent the control of an area and its population by the conventional forces and the law-enforcement agencies of the enemy.<sup>17</sup> Through the use of hit-and-run tactics and ambushes, the guerrillas hope to wear down their opponent physically and mentally as well as to discredit him as the ruling force in the area under contention.

In order for the political power using guerrilla warfare to become the legitimate government, the guerrilla war must progress gradually by steps (barring the assistance of some outside military force) to a conventional war where the guerrilla bands take on more and more the characteristics of

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also Hart, Strategy, p. 375; Rowland S. N. Mana, "Victory in Malaya," in Greene, The Guerrilla, p. 120; Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History 2 vols. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1975), 1:xiii-xiv; and Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-insurgency Era: U. S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 22-51.

<sup>16</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," in Greene, The Guerrilla, p. 10. See also Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's Army" in The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap, ed. Russell Stetler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 103-106.

<sup>17</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 7. See also his "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 153-57.

conventional army units until at least they form a conventional army in fact.<sup>18</sup> Ultimately, the guerrillas will establish various governmental bureaus as they achieve more complete control over the areas they occupy. They will begin to collect taxes and regulate commerce and education wherever and whenever possible. In so doing, they will be demonstrating to the populace at large that they and not their opponents are in fact the legitimate government of the area.<sup>19</sup>

Mao Tse-Tung is probably the most successful guerrilla leader of the twentieth century. He has written voluminally on the subject of people's war. He stresses the principle that the political organization of the populace must proceed hand in hand with the consolidation of guerrilla control over an area. He wrote

The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propoganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish, revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning, and the Red Army

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<sup>18</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Military Writings, pp. 244-48; "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Military Writings, pp. 269-73; and "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Military Writings, pp. 77-98. See also Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's Army," Military Art, pp. 103-106; and Ho Chi Minh, "Message to the Compatriots Throughout the Country on the Second Anniversary of Independence Day," in Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, ed. Bernard B. Fall (New York: The New American Library, 1968), pp. 173-76.

<sup>19</sup>E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: the Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," in Greene, The Guerrilla, p. 18.



loses the reason for its existence.<sup>20</sup>

In an interview with the British journalist, James Bertram, Mao said, "Another highly significant and distinctive feature of the Eighth Route Army is its political work. . . ."21

Guerrilla operations, then, are but a single step on the road to victory for the power that adopts this strategy. Moreover, guerrilla tactics are simply tactics, a technique for immediate application of armed force in the attempt to achieve some strategic gain. By themselves, without a guiding political grand strategy, guerrilla operations degenerate into simple terrorism and unbridled anarchy, into Thomas Hobbes's celebrated war ". . . of every man, against every man." As Hobbes himself notes, the results of living in such a condition is that the life of man becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."<sup>22</sup>

Students of guerrilla movements and critics of counter-insurgency warfare must keep clearly in mind that the insurgent forces do not seek to foment anarchy, however much this may appear to be the case. It is well to remind

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<sup>20</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" in Selected Works of Mao-Tse Tung, 4 vols. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 1:106.

<sup>21</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Interview with the British Journalist James Bertram, October 25, 1937," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 2:53.

<sup>22</sup>Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1962), p. 100.

oneself often that the goal of the insurgent is really a relatively simple one. He wishes to transfer the reins of government from the hands that currently hold them into his own.

Guerrilla activities are merely a tactic in this struggle, and upon careful examination it can be seen that they are essentially a defensive tactic as opposed to an offensive tactic. Well conducted guerrilla operations can stave off defeat virtually indefinitely. They can wear down an enemy to the point of utter collapse. However, in the end, a conventional military occupation of territory is necessary for complete victory and establishment of the revolutionary government.

#### Support of the Populace

Guerrilla operations require the acquiescence of, if not the active support of, the populace among whom they are being conducted. Mao Tse-Tung underscores the importance of this support when he writes:

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals a lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," pp. 6-7. Mao mentions this concept in other writings such as "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Military

Within certain limits, the guerrilla has time on his side as long as he can remain active, for each guerrilla action, no matter how insignificant from a purely military point of view, is another psychological blow against the strength and sovereignty of the established government. Each government official assassinated, each patrol ambushed, each police car bombed, every act of terrorism serve to tell the populace that their established, legitimate government is incapable of maintaining law and order and that it is weaker than the guerrilla forces seeking its overthrow (even when this is not the case in fact.) An exception to this general rule occurs when it becomes obvious over a period of

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Writings, pp. 113-14; "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," Selected Military Writings, pp. 172-73; and "On Protracted War," Selected Military Writings, pp. 260-61. "The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention" issued by Mao in a slightly different form on several occasions throughout the Chinese civil war and World War II show that the idea of close co-operation between the peasantry and the Red Army was more than merely a theory, as far as Mao was concerned. See Selected Military Writings, pp. 343-44. Ho Chi Minh echoes this principle of the necessity of popular support in such writings as his "Twelve Recommendations," Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 176-7, which served as general orders for the Viet Minh similar to the use of the "Three Main Rules and Eight Points" in the Chinese Red Army. This theme is also found in Ho's "Instructions Given at the Conference Reviewing the Second Le Hong Phong Military Campaign," Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 184-88; and his "teaching at the Meeting of Officers for the Preparation of the Military Campaign in the Northwest," Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 226-30. The tragic circumstances now existing in Northern Ireland display the vast amount of harm a guerrilla movement without widespread popular support can wreak to absolutely no positive end. Maria McGuire clearly displays the poverty of the I.R.A. strategy from personal experience in her book To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA (London: Macmillan London, 1973).

time that the guerrilla forces are so small in number and so lacking in popular support that they cannot progress beyond mere acts of terrorism.<sup>24</sup>

Guerrilla forces are capable of causing disruptions of government functions and services well out of proportion to their size and military power because the initiative is generally theirs completely. The guerrilla band chooses the time, place, and type of action to be fought, and it always plans to achieve overwhelming local superiority of force.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, guerrilla forces may be extremely effective by forcing their enemy into troop dispositions that are disastrous for him. If terrain and communications situations are suspicious, the enemy may be enticed into a series of deployments in which he becomes increasingly immobile and his supply lines increasingly tenuous. It was a successful campaign of just this nature that T. E. Lawrence and his Arab guerrilla army waged against the Turks in the Arabian theater of World War I. The Turks required their horses in order to retain the mobility necessary to fight Lawrence and his forces. However, the Turks took up positions so extended that Lawrence easily raided their supply line, preventing fodder for the horses and food for the

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<sup>24</sup>McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 138-57.

<sup>25</sup>Li Tso-Peng, Strategy: One Against Ten; Tactics: Ten Against One (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966, pp. 1-2.

soldiers from reaching the Turkish army. Hence, the Turks were helplessly bottled up in the string of forts they had constructed, reduced to killing their horses for their food.<sup>26</sup>

Depending upon the environment, logistics may or may not be a problem for the guerrilla. It is here that the support of the local population places a critical role. Guerrillas must eat. Often their food is purchased or stolen from the local population. However, the guerrilla must use extreme care in extorting or stealing food lest he dry up that sea of people in which he must swim.

Often supplies, weapons, medical facilities, and even trained personnel are supplied to the guerrilla band by a foreign nation in sympathy with their aims. If the friendly nation has a common border with the operational area of the guerrilla band, it may also provide the guerrillas with safe base areas that are relatively immune to attack.

In order to achieve their strategic goal of rendering the enemy government in place impotent, guerrillas will use a variety of tactics. However, one characteristic that is the hallmark of all guerrilla activities is that of mobility. Without mobility, the guerrilla force can be sought

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<sup>26</sup>T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 190-314.

out, pinned down, and destroyed.<sup>27</sup>

It is their mobility that allows guerrilla bands to undertake a wide variety of operations aimed at undermining the local government. Single acts of terrorism such as bombing or burning public buildings or market places may be resorted to when the guerrilla force is small and cannot afford any sort of confrontation with local law-enforcement officials and supporting troops. Larger guerrilla forces will be employed in ambushes and raids on minor military objectives.

Overwhelming local superiority will be the key to the success of these operations. The guerrilla force must always maintain the highest degree of watchfulness when it is in the combat zone. Through a network of informers and agents it will strive to keep well posted on the status of the enemy forces, their strength, and their intentions. The guerrilla force will strive to remain mobile, not allowing itself to be surrounded by the hostile state security forces. Tactically, then, the guerrilla force must always be on the offensive.<sup>28</sup>

In order to be effective, the guerrilla force must have a base area where it can store supplies, weapons, and

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<sup>27</sup>Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 23-24. See also Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber 1967), pp. 25-26.

<sup>28</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 7.

ammunition, where it can rest and regroup in comparative security, and where it can train its members and plan operations. The guerrilla must be able to feel relatively safe when he is in his base area.<sup>29</sup>

### The Nature of the Guerrilla Soldier

Because the individual soldier is of greater relative importance in waging guerrilla warfare than in waging conventional warfare,<sup>30</sup> it is helpful to investigate the characteristics of the average guerrilla.

The ideal guerrilla is an exceptionally young man<sup>31</sup> deeply committed to a cause.<sup>32</sup> Royalist, capitalist, or communist, the guerrilla must feel that his case is just and

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<sup>29</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 8. See also Mao Tse-Tung, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in Selected Military Writings, p. 140-41, and "On Protracted War," pp. 220-22, as well as Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 30-31.

<sup>30</sup>Howard P. Simpson, "The Guerrilla and His World," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1969, pp. 42-53.

<sup>31</sup>Chaliand places the average age of active combatants in guerrilla bands in the 15-25 year age group, Guerrilla Strategies, p. 16. Photographs and television coverage of the current (1984) fighting in Lebanon bears this out. While it is difficult to tell from blurred newspaper photographs and glimpses on a television screen, the impression one gains is that a sizeable number of the irregular combatants in Lebanon are not yet fifteen years old.

<sup>32</sup>Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45. See also Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies, p. 12-14; Francois Sully, Age of the Guerrilla (New York: Avon Books, 1970), pp. 13-18; Douglas Hyde, The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 131-48; and Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp. 23-24.

that the sacrifices that he and his comrades in arms make are necessary.<sup>33</sup> Only a deep commitment to his cause will give the guerrilla the courage, perserverance, and determination that he needs to carry out his arduous routine, day in, day out, day after weary day. He must also have above average intelligence in order to enable him to use a wide variety of the tools of his trade, to evaluate military situations quickly and correctly, and to plan actions against the enemy.<sup>34</sup> The guerrilla also requires physical stamina<sup>35</sup> in order to be able to make the necessary marches and maneuvers, fight the necessary actions, and possibly even hold down a full time job as well as a cover for his clandestine activities.

Some of the equipment of conventional armies is lacking among guerrilla units, but this does not in any way detract from their effectiveness. The guerrilla has no heavy steel helmet, no body armor, no combat boots, no bulky pack. Yet these shortages are not a source of weakness for the guerrilla but rather a source of strength, for being without all of this heavy equipment gives the guerrilla a feeling of freeness or lightness that greatly contributes to his free-wheeling mobility.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid. See also Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 15-23.

<sup>35</sup>Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.



The Metamorphose of a Guerrilla Force

As guerrilla units grow in size, in number, and in power, their tactics become more and more the tactics of a conventional army. The units themselves also come more and more to resemble highly mobile contingents of regular forces.<sup>37</sup> This growth will pose a problem insofar as the area of operation for the unit is concerned. In those remote areas where the guerrilla unit would be most safe, there also will generally be few targets of military importance. On the other hand, in areas where there are more significant targets for the guerrilla force to attack, there will also generally be greater exposure and greater danger of the force being discovered.<sup>38</sup> The guerrilla leader must consider and balance these two factors in deciding where his group will operate most effectively.

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<sup>37</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War," pp. 244-5.

<sup>38</sup>Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 44.

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORIES OF COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

#### Introduction

Several strategies have been tried in combatting guerrilla warfare in this century. One of the most common and most popular but least successful techniques has been to increase the size of the police force to the maximum extent possible and then to establish these law enforcement officers in strong points throughout the territory where insurgency guerrilla warfare has begun. This strategy almost always fails, since the local police forces do not possess the necessary training, equipment, or authority to deal effectively with the subversive activities confronting them.<sup>1</sup> Left to conduct counter-insurgency warfare by themselves, police forces are almost always overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task they face.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>Many examples of this situation could be cited. The situation in Cuba in 1958 provides but one example. Numerous foreigners were kidnapped by the guerrillas, including the then-famous automobile racing world champion driver, Senor Juan Fangio. All of the victims were well treated and released unharmed. The guerrillas merely wished to demonstrate the total inability of the Batista government to maintain law and order. See Douglas Hyde, The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), p. 36.

Another unsuccessful counter-insurgency strategy has been the attempt to wage a conventional war against guerrilla forces.<sup>3</sup> Were the insurgents willing to cooperate with the counter-insurgency forces and likewise wage conventional war, this strategy might have some worth. However, if we remember that the insurgents have adopted guerrilla warfare because they cannot fight a conventional war and because they wish to overthrow the government in place, we see that the chances of their cooperating with their enemies in this way is quite small.

Conventional warfare is warfare of position. Conventional forces take and hold ground. The guerrilla, on the other hand, does not seek to hold ground (with the possible exception of his 'safe' bases). Instead he seeks to inflict injury on the forces opposing him and to render their control of the territory tenuous or impossible.

This being the case, the tendency of guerrilla forces is to disappear when large-scale conventional sweeps through their territory are made. A few moments' reflection will reveal that this is not at all difficult for the guerrilla to do.

First, it must be realized that it is virtually impossible to conceal the preparations for a conventional

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<sup>3</sup>Some military historians feel that this is one mistake made by the U. S. forces in Vietnam. See Francois Sully, Age of the Guerrilla (New York: Avon Books, 1968), pp. 168-72, and Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, p. 16.

military operation of even modest size. Most such operations involve a unit of at least battalion size, and it is profoundly difficult for over a thousand men to prepare to do anything in concert with one another without someone noticing the preparations.

Second, it must be realized that conventional military actions today advertise their presence. Thus a sweep through guerrilla-infested territory may aschew a preceeding artillery bombardment in order to achieve surprise, but surprise will be rarely achieved in fact. The sound of an approaching helicopter is distinctive and loud. So also are the sounds made by approaching armored vehicles. The guerrilla, well aware that his forces have neither helicopters nor tanks, is in no doubt concerning what is happening. Given this adequate if inadvertant warning, the guerrilla wraps his rifle in plastic, buries it, and then picks up his hoe. By the time the troops arrive, he is apparently merely another farmer hard at work earning an honest living. At the conclusion of the sweep, the guerrilla lays down his hoe, digs up and unwraps his rifle, and is back in the business of insurgency in less time than it takes to write about it.

Historically, major conventional sweeps have been failures insofar as harming guerrilla movements is concerned. What such sweeps have accomplished is to demonstrate to the local population that the government in

place is incapable of controlling guerrilla activity. Moreover, government-populace relations may deteriorate further if the troops employed in such laborious but fruitless maneuvers, frustrated at finding no guerrillas after weeks of training and preparation as well as of action, vent their anger and frustration in acts of indiscriminate violence against the inhabitants of a guerrilla-infested area under the guise of interrogation or of establishing law and order.<sup>4</sup>

Julian Paget writes,

An insurgency force, wherever it is fighting, cannot survive for long without certain essentials, which are:

- (a) The support of the local population.
- (b) Bases.
- (c) Mobility.
- (d) Supplies and information.
- (e) The will to win.<sup>5</sup>

Paget holds that the way to defeat an insurgency force is to deprive them of one or more of the essentials that they need for survival.<sup>6</sup> In many cases, if only one of these essentials is denied the insurgency force, they will rapidly become unable to continue operations.

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<sup>4</sup>For an example of an incident of this sort of gratuitous violence, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 26. Such incidents reveal a breakdown in morale and training, but they also reveal a far more important poverty in strategy.

<sup>5</sup>Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, p. 168.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 167-68.

Denial of the Support of the Local Population

Mao Tse-Tung spoke of the local population as the sea in which the guerrilla swims.<sup>7</sup> If the population can be turned against the insurgency movement this will reduce the guerrillas to the condition of fish out of water.

There are several ways in which this alienation can be achieved. Perhaps the most important aspect of this facet of counter-insurgency warfare is the removal of all legitimate complaints that the populace may have against the government in place. In cases where the local government has been corrupt or extraordinarily inefficient, the first task of the forces seeking to put down an insurgency force must be to establish fair and just government.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla--and How to Fight Him (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 6-7.

<sup>8</sup>Sully describes Ramon Magsaysay as using this technique as one of his first moves against the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines in 1950, Age of the Guerrilla, p. 99. On the other hand, one of the difficulties faced by those nations seeking to support South Vietnam in its struggle against the Vietcong and the conventional forces of North Vietnam was the fact that the various governments that came to power in South Vietnam from 1950 onward were corrupt to one degree or another. It was often the case that large segments of the population--sometimes even a majority--had legitimate complaints against the government in power. Under such conditions it was difficult or impossible to isolate the general populace from the insurgents and to prevent significant portions of the populace from providing aid to them, even if it was only the passive assistance of not reporting the guerrillas to the government authorities. See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 35, 253, 257, and 277. Paget ascribes the British promise of independence to Malaya as the removal of a source of alienation between the people of Malaya and

However, the establishment of good government by itself may not alienate the populace from the guerrilla movement. To understand the relationship that exists between a populace and the guerrillas operating within their numbers, we must take a closer look at the composition of the populace in regard to their sympathies for or against the insurgency movement.

Paget points out that the population in any country involved in insurgency warfare normally consists of people in each of four different categories. First, there are those who lend their active and willing support to the insurgency even though they are not actively involved in the guerrilla war. Second, there are those who actively and willingly support the government in place.

However, the most important factions in the population for the consideration of the counter-insurgency leader, according to Paget, are the third and the fourth groups he delineates. The third group are those people who provide support to the guerrillas when it is demanded out of fear of what may happen if they do not cooperate. The fourth group are those who escape intimidation but who, nonetheless, refuse to throw their active support either way, choosing instead to wait and see who wins and then to

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their colonial government that undercut the guerrillas promise of independence. See Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, p. 64.

support the winner.<sup>9</sup> (It is well to remember, at this point, that support of the losing side in a war of insurgency is almost invariably fraught with negative consequences and is quite often fatal. That being the case, it is easier to extend a charitable understanding toward those who wish to avoid siding with either contestant until there are clear indications concerning who will ultimately win.)

In regard to the first group, those who actively support the insurgency, action must be taken to identify these supporters and then to treat them in the same manner as those engaged in waging guerrilla warfare against the regime. To accomplish this, the government may have to pass new laws and will almost undoubtedly need to augment its police forces and provide them with special training.

In regard to the second group, those who actively support the government, the government must take every step to ensure their safety and freedom from coercion. Again, this task may necessitate the passing of special laws, especially laws pertaining to such things as curfews, the issuance and carrying of appropriate identification, and the restriction of normal movement within the country. Too, here again we see the need for more skilled police work and thus the need for more skilled policemen.

The third group presents certain problems, since their

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<sup>9</sup>Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, p. 168.



situation will usually remain unameliorated by police action alone; action by the other civil authorities as well as by the military will probably be required to deal with this portion of the population.

The third group, those who assist the guerrillas from fear, need simultaneously to be protected from guerrilla attacks and to be encouraged to do their duties as citizens of the government in power. It is simply unreasonable to expect a father whose daughter is a hostage of a guerrilla band to freely provide information concerning the size, location, and future plans of that band. That being the case, the government must often start its campaign to deny the guerrillas the support of the populace by military actions against the guerrillas aimed at breaking their constant access to the local population. If the military is capable of imposing a physical barrier between the guerrillas and the population, this will greatly support the task of winning back the disaffected.

However, it may also be necessary to take punitive action against the population in order to bring them into line. Such punitive steps as the imposition of a twenty-two hour a day curfew or collective fines for those communities shown to be supporting the insurgents may be indicated both as punishments and as actions confirming the belief that the government is still in control. However, since such steps tend to punish the innocent along with the guilty they

should be used with the finest discretion.<sup>10</sup>

While a knowledge of those measures that have been applied with success elsewhere is helpful to the person conducting counter-insurgency warfare, it will not do simply to apply in one situation a procedure that had worked well in another. Resettling a large portion of the population in newly constructed and well protected villages was one of the keys to the success in the fight against insurgents in Malaya; an attempt to carry out a similar programme in Vietnam was a virtually unmitigated disaster. In Malaya, those who were resettled were landless Chinese immigrants who had been eking out an existence farming at the edge of the jungle on plots "borrowed" from large plantations. The resettlement was carried out by an impeccably trained civil service and gave these immigrants the first real homes they had ever enjoyed since they were given title to their home and adjacent farmland over a period of time. In Vietnam, the peasants who were relocated were almost all landowners. The relocation was carried out by troops and government officials who were often corrupt and dishonest, stealing the possessions of those being relocated and demanding bribes before they would carry out their duty of moving the peasants' possessions.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 59-60; Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 231-2, 255-58

Most counter-insurgency commanders enter the fight with limited resources. One action that has helped alleviate this shortage and has also provided enhanced security for the populace has been the formation of militia home guard units. These units are drawn from the population, trained, and armed to provide security and protection for their own homes. Such units release military forces from static defensive duties and allow them to go over to the offensive against the guerrilla.<sup>12</sup>

#### Denial of Bases

The denial to the guerrilla forces of safe bases is often most difficult or even impossible, but where it can be accomplished it may well be the quickest method to destroy a guerrilla force. The guerrilla force that has no relatively safe location for training, storage of supplies, rest, treatment of casualties, and reorganization is the guerrilla force that is in serious danger.

As mentioned before, wide-scale conventional military sweeps through the area where the guerrillas are suspected of having their base are seldom effective. While supplies and installations that are not readily portable may be discovered and destroyed, the guerrilla is usually able to hide and thereby save anything that is of importance to the movement.

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<sup>12</sup>Paquet, pp. 66-67.

One military tactic that has been found to be highly effective against the guerrillas' base areas is precisely the sort of penetration and assault tactic used by the guerrilla himself. Regular forces who have been thoroughly and carefully trained in guerrilla tactics enter guerrilla-infested areas and wage guerrilla warfare against the guerrillas.<sup>13</sup> Such tactics have been devastatingly successful in destroying guerrilla base areas when teamed with air and sea units. Using radio communications, such units can call down bombs, rockets, artillery, and naval gunfire accurately on the base camp. The first notice that the guerrilla has that his base is no longer hidden is the explosion of the incoming ordnance in his midst.<sup>14</sup>

Even where aggressive guerrilla-type patrolling by the security forces fails to discover a base area, it can still be effective in denying a base to the guerrillas. As what had been a safe area for the guerrilla gradually becomes an area frequented by guerrilla-type patrols of the government security forces, it is only logical for the guerrilla to withdraw from this area. In so withdrawing, he will be required to move his base. Each such move denies

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<sup>13</sup>Surprisingly, such units in Vietnam sustained proportionately lower casualty rates than regular forces employed in conventional warfare against the guerrilla forces there. See Francis J. West, Jr., "Stingray '70", The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1969, pp. 27-27.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

him a base area temporarily, and each new base will be more removed from the guerrilla's proposed area of operations.

#### Denial of Mobility

Those tactics that hinder the guerrilla in his attempts to maintain a safe base area, namely the dispatching against him of small groups of soldiers trained in guerrilla tactics, will also tend to seriously disrupt his mobility. Ambushes by these forces will tend to make the guerrilla forces more cautious in their movements.

Other tactics will also assist the military in denying mobility to insurgency forces. The availability of a large tactical reserve force will allow a commander to throw overwhelming force against a guerrilla unit once contact is made, thereby maintaining contact, denying escape, and destroying the guerrilla force.<sup>15</sup>

Where terrain is favorable helicopters may be used to advantage to transport reserves to the area where contact with the guerrilla has been established. In addition, where the countryside is open and without vegetation that would supply cover to personnel attempting to cross it, the helicopter may be used to detect and cut off the movement of the guerrilla forces.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Paquet, Counter-Insurgent Campaigning, p. 172.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

Denial of Supplies and Information

The same measures that deny the guerrillas access to the local population in order to intimidate and coerce it into co-operation will, of course, prevent the guerrilla from receiving supplies from that population. Moreover, those tactics that will disrupt the guerrilla's freedom of movement will also disrupt his supply routes.

Under normal circumstances, it is extremely difficult to prevent the insurgency forces from obtaining rather detailed information concerning the strength, preparedness, and intentions of the security forces since one of the preparations that insurgents will make before beginning guerrilla warfare is the establishment of a network of spies and informers. The counter-insurgency forces can nullify this advantage by cordoning off the insurgents, thereby preventing their sources from providing them with information. The well developed intelligence system of the insurgents also dictates the need for far tighter security than is normally practiced at a military installation as well as the careful and intentional spreading of false information. The counter-insurgency force that deprives their adversary of rapid and accurate information has secured a major advantage.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 172-73.

Denial of the Will to Win

In guerrilla warfare, far more than in conventional warfare, the morale of the individual soldier is important. Mao Tse-Tung underlines this when he urges that the guerrilla be constantly encouraged by streams of propaganda from his officers and political teachers.<sup>18</sup>

If a continuous stream of encouragement serves to build up the morale of the guerrilla, a barrage of negative information can have the opposite effect. Spreading false reports of guerrilla losses will gain nothing; in fact, it may backfire when the guerrilla learns that his side has not suffered as the government has indicated. On the other hand, every effort should be made to see to it that every guerrilla is promptly and fully informed concerning each loss the insurgent forces suffered. The spreading of this information by government troops has been accomplished by using planes equipped with loudspeakers flying over suspected guerrilla hideouts, by means of pamphlets, and by means of sending guerrillas who have been captured back to their forces to provide firsthand reports of defeats to their comrades.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, letter to Comrade Lin Piao quoted from Renmin Ribao editorial, 1 August 1966, "The Whole Country Should Become a Great School of Mao Tse-Tung's Thought" in Chairman Mao Tse-Tung on People's War (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), pp. 33-35.

<sup>19</sup>Don B. Wyckoff, "Bloodless Weapon," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1969, pp. 64-69.

If this psychological warfare is combined with skilled, energetic, and persistent guerrilla actions by well trained soldiers against the guerrillas upon ground they consider theirs, the individual guerrilla will find himself in a very discouraging situation. He will be afraid to go home at night to visit his wife because some of his comrades have been ambushed on such trips. As food supplies dwindle because of the guerrillas' inability to contact outsiders and receive supplies from them, his hunger will become a constant demoralizing companion. If he cannot mount operations against government forces because they hold the initiative and patrol his area so strictly that he has become the hunted instead of the hunter, his will to continue the fight will be further eroded. Combine all of this with the news that the government in place has made concessions and granted privileges to a degree that nothing further is to be gained by continued fighting, and the average guerrilla, no matter how highly motivated he might have been when he took up arms, will find it profoundly difficult to continue the struggle.<sup>20</sup>

Psychological warfare techniques by themselves cannot defeat an insurgent force. However, coupled with sound military tactics and appropriate civil and police action, psychological warfare can be a powerful weapon against an insurgency force.

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<sup>20</sup>Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp. 173-74.



Co-operation and Co-ordination

A study of the various techniques to be employed to successfully defeat an insurgency movement reveals that action must be taken by several different branches of the government. In particular, it should be emphasized that counter-insurgency warfare is not merely military action against guerrillas. In fighting a counter-insurgency action it is very possible to win virtually all of the battles except the last one if the leader of the counter-insurgency force seeks a purely military victory over his opponent.

The military action of the government must be coordinated with suitable actions taken by the legislature, the police, the courts, various license-issuing bureaus and officials, and the militia. The campaign against the guerrilla must be waged not only in the field but also in the minds of the populace. In the final analysis, the government in place can overcome an insurgency force easily and efficiently only if the people it governs wish it to overcome that force.

## CHAPTER V

### THE BIBLICAL IDEA OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

#### Introduction

We have now examined the phenomenon of warfare and especially that of twentieth century counter-insurgency warfare. Throughout the history of mankind, we find attempts made to limit or ameliorate the harshness of war. The just war teaching of the theologians of classical Lutheran orthodoxy is one of these attempts.

Any attempt to explain the concept of the just war held by the seventeenth century theologians, made without taking into consideration the biblical idea of what civil government should be, is certain to fail. It is certain to fail because the theologians of the period of Lutheran orthodoxy considered themselves to be, above all else, biblical theologians.<sup>1</sup> While they could and did differ

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<sup>1</sup>"Orthodoxy is more than a mere attitude or spirit. The concrete feature of Lutheran orthodoxy is its doctrinal platform, a definite and permanent doctrinal position based on Scripture. . . ." writes Robert Prues, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), p. 30. Hagglund writes, "The method [employed by the orthodox Lutheran theologians] was quite different from the one used by dogmaticians today. It was not felt that theology had to be presented in a uniform way, by placing an emphasis on certain basic ideas. On the contrary, the dogmaticians of the 17th century believed that it was their task to reproduce the infinite richness of Biblical revelation." Bengt Hagglund, History of Theology

concerning how best to arrange and present what they taught, the orthodox Lutheran theologians agreed,

. . . we receive and embrace with our whole heart the Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the pure, clear fountain of Israel, which is the only true standard by which all teachers and doctrines are to be judged.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Preservation of God and Civil Government

The biblical teaching concerning civil government cannot be understood apart from an understanding of the temporality of this world. The biblical idea of civil government should be examined in the light of God's activity to keep this world in existence.

The Bible describes God not only as the creator of the cosmos but also as the Being who is continually active to preserve that cosmos in existence. Of Jesus Christ, God the Son, Paul wrote,

He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by Him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all

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(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), p. 303. Both Preus and Hagglund provide a much needed antidote to the popular misconception that the theology of the era of Lutheran orthodoxy was a recrudescence of some of the worst features of scholastic Aristotelianism. While the works of that era, like the works of any other, vary in quality, the fact remains that many of the orthodox Lutheran theologians produced works of great abiding merit.

<sup>2</sup>Formula of Concord, Thorough Declaration, Summary, para. 3.

things were created by Him and for Him. He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.<sup>3</sup>

The God of the Bible is not the "watchmaker" God of the deists who created all that there is, set it in motion in accordance with his magnificent laws, and then walked away to let it run out its course according to those immutable laws. He is rather a God who preserves the cosmos He has created.

Human reason can grasp, if only dimly, that God preserves His creation.<sup>4</sup> However, that the believer may be the more certain of this loving care of his God, the Scriptures teach this truth time and time again.

The Lord Jesus teaches in Mathew's gospel,

Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more important than food, and the body more important than clothes? Look at the birds of the air; they do not sow or reap or store away in barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not much more valuable than they? Who of you by worrying can add a single hour to his life?

And why do you worry about clothes? See how the lilies of the field grow. They do not labor or spin. Yet I tell you that not even Solomon in all his splendor was dressed like one of these. If that is how God clothes the grass of the field, which is here today and tomorrow is thrown into the fire, will He not much more clothe you, O you of little faith? So do not worry,

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<sup>3</sup>Colossians 1:15-17. (All biblical quotations are taken from The Holy Bible, New International Version [Grand Rapids: Zondervan Bible Publishers, 1978], copyright 1978 by the New York International Bible Society.)

<sup>4</sup>Acts 14:17. It is perhaps worthy of note that the fact that men can grasp by the power of reason that God is a God who preserves His creation does not mean that men do in fact grasp this knowledge.

saying, 'What shall we eat?' or 'What shall we drink?' or 'What shall we wear?' For the pagans run after all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them.<sup>5</sup>

These words of the Lord remind us that God preserves not only the entire cosmos but also each entity within it individually. Thus, the Bible assures us that the most insignificant of items is sustained by God.<sup>6</sup>

God preserves the cosmos using processes and activities within that cosmos. However, the operation of the means that God uses in preserving creation should not be considered as coordinate with the activity of God but rather subordinate to it.<sup>7</sup>

God created a good cosmos,<sup>8</sup> but that good cosmos was soon good no more. Instead it was stained by the sin of God's foremost creature, man. Now there is no part of the creation that is free from the taint of sin.<sup>9</sup>

The continued presence of evil in the creation raises the question of whether and in what measure God concurs in that which is evil. Scripture is not silent in this regard. God, who is good,<sup>10</sup> abhors and prohibits that which is

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<sup>5</sup>Matthew 6:25-32.

<sup>6</sup>Matthew 10:29-31.

<sup>7</sup>Psalms 127:1, Acts 17:28, Matthew 5:45.

<sup>8</sup>Genesis 1:31.

<sup>9</sup>Psalms 14:1-3; Ecclesiastes 7:20; Romans 8:18-21.

<sup>10</sup>Matthew 19:17, Psalm 145:9, etc.

evil.<sup>11</sup> Yet evil actions occur. From the testimony of the Bible we may say that God concurs in these evil actions insofar as they are actions,<sup>12</sup> but does not concur in the evil of them.<sup>13</sup>

This cosmos which God created good and man rendered evil will not last forever. It is consigned to destruction.<sup>14</sup> and the date of that cataclism has already been set once and for all by God.<sup>15</sup> On that day, God Himself will destroy this cosmos that He created.<sup>16</sup> Until that final day, God preserves this cosmos for the sake of believers.<sup>17</sup>

One of the means that God uses to preserve His children in the world from harm is the civil government. Paul wrote of this fact when he urged that prayers be offered for civil authorities so that "we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Exodus 20:1-17, Deuteronomy 5:6-22, Deuteronomy 32:4, Psalm 92:15, Galatians 3:10, Deuteronomy 27:26.

<sup>12</sup>Acts 17:28.

<sup>13</sup>Psalm 5:4-6, James 1:13.

<sup>14</sup>2 Peter 3:7.

<sup>15</sup>Matthew 24:36, Mark 13:32.

<sup>16</sup>Psalm 102:25-26, Hebrews 1:10-12.

<sup>17</sup>Matthew 24:14, Romans 8:28.

<sup>18</sup>1 Timothy 2:2. Thus, to write that God being a God not of confusion and disorder but rather of peace has ordained civil government to promote peace and order falls a bit wide of the point. See P. F. Siegel, "Civil Government", pp. 508-521 in Theodore Laetsch, ed., The Abiding Word 3 vols. (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), vol. 1, especially p. 508.

Civil Government Established by God

The Bible teaches that God establishes civil government. Moreover, the Bible goes beyond teaching that God has ordained the idea of civil government to claim that God himself establishes particular governments.

Paul, writing to the Christians in Rome, spoke to both these points in a passage that has been cited often by those seeking to show the divine establishment of civil government. Paul wrote,

Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.<sup>19</sup>

It is well to note that Paul did not speak concerning the form of government. He said simply that the government in being, whether it be monarchy, republic, oligarchy, or whatever, is established by God. Thus, to see this verse as advocating one form of government in preference to another is to misinterpret it.

Paul said, further, that to rebel against the authority is to bring down judgment upon oneself. What he wrote here merely underlines Christ's own prohibition issued to Peter when Peter sought to resist the civil authorities by means of force in the Garden of Gethsemane.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Romans 13:1-2.

<sup>20</sup>Matthew 26:52.

Paul noted that the powers that be are ordained by God. By this he meant that not only is the general idea of civil government established by God, it is God who appoints the rulers who rule. This teaching is supported by Christ's own words to Pontius Pilate<sup>21</sup> as well as by the words of the Old Testament.<sup>22</sup>

### The Duties of Civil Government

The Bible assigns specific tasks and duties to the civil government. In reviewing what these tasks are, it is best to begin by delimiting them and stating those powers that the civil government does not have.

First, the civil government cannot legitimately compel disobedience to the Law of God.<sup>23</sup> Second, the civil government cannot legitimately interfere with those matters that are the duty of the Church. To be more specific, the civil government may not legitimately legislate concerning the preaching of the Gospel and the celebration of the sacraments. Defined another way, the civil government is to deal with temporal matters while the Church concerns herself with eternal matters.<sup>24</sup> This, then, is the correct understanding of the words of Jesus when He commands us to "Give

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<sup>21</sup>John 19:11.

<sup>22</sup>Exodus 3:10, 1 Samuel 9:16, 1 Kings 19:15, Daniel 2:21, etc.

<sup>23</sup>Acts 5:29.

<sup>24</sup>John 18:36.



to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's."<sup>25</sup>

Paul, urging that prayers be offered for those in authority, cited the duties given by God to civil government. Civil government is so to conduct its business that the Church "may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness."<sup>26</sup> It is the duty of the civil government so to rule that peace, tranquility, and good order are experienced within its jurisdiction. In the performance of these duties, the government is permitted to levy such taxes as may be necessary to provide the funds to pay its expenses.<sup>27</sup> This obligation to preserve peace and order includes the duty to protect its jurisdiction from the encroachment of foreign invaders. Moreover, in the defense of this peace and order, the civil government is authorized to use force, even deadly force.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Matthew 22:21.

<sup>26</sup>1 Timothy 2:2

<sup>27</sup>Romans 13:6-7.

<sup>28</sup>Romans 13:4.

## CHAPTER VI

### MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS FOR LUTHER'S THINKING CONCERNING THE TWO KINGDOMS OF GOD

#### Introduction

Martin Luther's thinking concerning the two kingdoms God, the kingdom of His left and of His right hand, is drawn from the biblical teaching concerning civil government. However, Luther's teaching was not developed in a vacuum. It did not spring, full grown, from his mind as Minerva came from the head of Zeus. Instead, it is the result of sober reflection upon the Word, reflection undertaken in the face of then present challenges and in the light of historical precedents.

Two of those precedents require at least a brief description, for they wielded a profound influence upon Luther's predecessors and many of his contemporaries. These two precedents are the idea of the two cities developed by Augustine and the idea of the two swords made most explicit by Peter Damian and Pope Boniface VIII.<sup>1</sup> If we cannot give either of these theories a careful explication in the light of each one's historical context, still a sketch of each position will provide a useful background against which to

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<sup>1</sup>Compare the evaluation of Karl Hertz, Two Kingdoms and One World (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), p. 18.

view Luther's position concerning the relation of the two kingdoms.

Augustine: Two Cities

In A.D. 395, Augustine was consecrated bishop of Hippo in North Africa. He held this post until his death in November 430. In addition to his duties as pastor of the cathedral in Hippo and administrative overseer of the other parishes in the diocese, Augustine was expected to spend a number of hours each day presiding as a judge in civil suits. He also supervised a monastery as well as a convent.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in his mature years, Augustine was a bishop of the church, primarily concerned with the care of the souls in his diocese. That being the case, we may say two things concerning his writings of this period. First these writings are not the result of the musings of a detached theoretician comfortably ensconced in a carefully insulated ivory tower; rather, these are the writings of a man who daily met, worked with, advised, preached to, loved, prayed for, and served all sorts and conditions of men. Second, these writings are not the result of what Augustine considered to be his primary task; their authorship was considered ancillary or, at best, supplemental, to Augustine's pastoral duties.

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<sup>2</sup>Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 189-202.

Paul Tillich ascribes Augustine's pessimistic view of man, at least in part, to his association with Manichaeism.<sup>3</sup> However, this seems doubtful for two reasons. First, one finds none of the dualism in Augustine that is so essential to Manichaeism. Second, one finds ample support for Augustine's pessimism in the Scriptures.

Certainly there is no denying that Augustine's view of man is pessimistic. However, in order to understand Augustine's views and the rationale for his pessimism, one needs a grasp of Augustine's ideas concerning the history of mankind and especially of his ideas concerning man's fall into sin.

Not all that Augustine writes concerning man is tinged with pessimism. To the contrary, when Augustine writes of the first people, Adam and Eve, he speaks of their initial condition in glowing terms. They were without sin, and, had they remained sinless, would have been immortal.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, had they never sinned, they would have experienced neither illness nor the weakness that comes with old age.<sup>5</sup>

Prior to the fall, people possessed true freedom, in the sense that they were able to refrain from sinning (posse)

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<sup>3</sup>Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 106-7; see also pp. 122-31.

<sup>4</sup>Augustine, The City of God, bk. 13, chap. 19.

<sup>5</sup>The City of God, bk. 13, chap. 20.

non peccare).<sup>6</sup> In addition, God created Adam and Eve with wills that were good,<sup>7</sup> that is they were inclined to carry out the will of God by means of a special gift of God's grace as well as a special gift of perseverance. These gifts did not compel Adam and Eve to choose that which is good, but it did assist them in their choosing the good.<sup>8</sup> Thus their bodies were entirely subject to their wills, and their wills to God's will.<sup>9</sup> Had Adam and Eve not fallen into sin but rather had continued to do the will of God, at length they would have been confirmed in their bliss and would have received what Augustine considered to be the greatest liberty, the inability to sin (non posse peccare).<sup>10</sup>

However, the fact is that the first persons on this earth fell into sin. In discussing this event, Augustine makes it painfully clear that he considers the fault for the fall of man into sin to lie entirely with man. Specifically, any blame for the original choice of evil instead of

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<sup>6</sup>Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 33.

<sup>7</sup>The City of God, bk. 14, chap. 11.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. See also On Rebuke and Grace, chaps. 32 and 34, as well as The City of God, bk. 14, chap. 17.

<sup>9</sup>Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and On the Baptism of Infants, bk. 2, chap. 36.

<sup>10</sup>On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 33. See also J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 361-66.

good must lie with the will of the first man.<sup>11</sup> The will of man was free and inclined toward goodness. Nevertheless, it had the possibility of choosing wrongfully, and this is in fact what it did.

In his desire to rebel against his natural master, God, and to be thereby his own master, we find the impetus and the essential character of man's first sin.<sup>12</sup> Pride lies at the root of the first (and of all subsequent) sin.<sup>13</sup>

The idea that sin originates in man's prideful substitution of himself in place of God as his master is closely related to Augustine's concept of evil being the privation of good. By choosing himself as his own master, man chooses less than the best, since to have God, the totally good, for one's master is better than to have one's fallible self.<sup>14</sup>

Augustine held that all people partake of the fall in virtue of their participation in and co-responsibility for Adam's wrongful choice.<sup>15</sup> Augustine wrote, "By the evil

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<sup>11</sup>Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 2, chap. 48.

<sup>12</sup>Kelly, Doctrines, pp. 361-62; Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, chap. 13.

<sup>13</sup>The City of God, bk. 14, chaps. 13-14.

<sup>14</sup>In this, Augustine shows far greater reliance on Plotinus than many are willing to admit. For a clear discussion of what Plotinus's theory of evil was and what it was not, see D. O'Brien, "Plotinus on Evil," Downside Review 87 (1969):68-110.

<sup>15</sup>Kelly, Doctrines, pp. 303-04.

will of that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from whom, therefore, they individually derived original sin."<sup>16</sup> Elsewhere, he wrote, ". . . all then sinned in Adam, when in his nature, by virtue of that innate power whereby he was able to produce them, they were all as yet the one Adam. . . ."<sup>17</sup> Augustine distinguished between the guilt of original sin and the evil effects of that sin, but he contended that all humanity (with the sole exception of Christ) must bear both the guilt and the evil effects of the fall. It is the guilt of the fall that the sacrament of baptism is instituted to remove.<sup>18</sup>

Augustine's concept of the evil effects of the fall covers a vast range of human ills and foibles. The most serious of these effects is that man has now been rendered incapable of refraining from sinning (non posse non peccare).<sup>19</sup> Thus, all men are evil and may appropriately be considered a massa perdita.<sup>20</sup> It is the vigour with which Augustine put forward the universal condemnation of all mankind that marks the advance of his theology beyond that of

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<sup>16</sup>On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 2, chap. 15.

<sup>17</sup>On the Merits and the Forgiveness of Sins and On the Baptism of Infants, bk. 3, chap. 14.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., Against Julian, bk. 6, chap. 14.

<sup>19</sup>Augustine, Concerning Man's Perfection in Righteousness, bk. 4, chap. 9.

<sup>20</sup>Augustine, Enchiridion, 27.

Ambrose, his teacher.<sup>21</sup> Augustine went so far as to contend that the virtues displayed by the heathen are "vile, deformed, and abominable,"<sup>22</sup> for where there is no true religion there can be no true virtue.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that man cannot refrain from sinning does not, however, destroy man's capacity for free choice (liberum arbitrium). Augustine wrote,

We do not say that by the sin of Adam free will perished out of the nature of men; but that it avails for sinning in men subjected to the devil; while it is not of avail for good and pious living, unless the will itself of man should be made free by God's grace, and assisted to every good movement of action, of speech, of thought.<sup>24</sup>

Augustine was thoroughly convinced that all men were evil and that no man could perform any virtuous act without the supernatural aid of God's grace. Moreover, only those predestined by God receive that grace necessary to perform truly virtuous works and to be saved. Those predestined to salvation, however, are but a minority of the people in the world.<sup>25</sup> All of the rest of mankind is condemned, as also the elect would be, had God not predestined them to

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<sup>21</sup>Reinhold Seeberg, Text-book of the History of Doctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1966), pp. 1, 343.

<sup>22</sup>The City of God, bk. 5, chap. 20.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 25.

<sup>24</sup>Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, bk. 2, chap. 9.

<sup>25</sup>Enchiridion, 97.



salvation.<sup>26</sup>

Augustine made a sharp distinction between the elect and the reprobate. The former are citizens of the City of God. The latter are citizens of the City of the World. He wrote,

. . . the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished, by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit.<sup>27</sup>

Augustine held that of those traits that are common to all men, saved and reprobate alike, one is the desire for peace. He wrote, "Who will not confess this with me, who marks man's affairs and the general form of nature? For joy and peace are desired alike by all men."<sup>28</sup>

Augustine went on to show that this desire for peace is universal by citing examples. The warrior wages war so that peace may follow. Victory is nothing else than the suppression of those who have resisted, and when victory is achieved peace surely follows. Even those who disturb the peace of the community in which they live do so not in order

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<sup>26</sup>The City of God, bk. 15, chap. 1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., bk. 14, chap. 1.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 12.

to destroy the peace but merely to alter it. The solitary rogue will seek a peaceful modus vivendi with those whom he cannot kill, and in his own home he will seek to live in peace with his wife and family. Even the barbarous and mythical Cacus, the monstrous son of Vulcan, who lived by robbery and slaughter, must desire peace when he retires to his cave after one of his forays of murder and stealing.<sup>29</sup> Thus the need for peace is not only a universal characteristic of all men; it is that "all-embracing common denominator of human needs that seek realization in social life."<sup>30</sup>

Those predestined to salvation who have received grace and, thereby, faith understand that "The peace of mortal man with immortal God is an orderly obedience unto His eternal law performed in faith."<sup>31</sup>

However, so long as they are in this world, the elect also partake of and support, insofar as they are able to do so in good conscience, the peace of this world.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, the elect understand that even this earthly peace, which consists in an orderly concord and obedience among its

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 12.

<sup>30</sup>Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 40.

<sup>31</sup>The City of God, bk. 19, chap. 14.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 17.

citizens<sup>33</sup> is a gift of their merciful God.<sup>34</sup> Thus it comes as no surprise to the elect that they can contribute to this earthly peace by living in orderly obedience under God's law.<sup>35</sup>

Augustine rejected Cicero's definition of a republic as an estate of the people,<sup>36</sup> arguing that a people such as Cicero describes has never existed. Cicero had described a people as "a multitude united in one consent of law and profit."<sup>37</sup> However, the concept of a consent of law must include the concept of justice, for where there is no justice there is nothing that may rightly be called law.<sup>38</sup> But there can be no justice where God does not receive the worship that is due Him and Him alone, and God receives that worship only in the City of God that is not of this world.<sup>39</sup>

Augustine did not reject the idea of an earthly state; he rejected merely Cicero's definition of such a state. Augustine proceeded to give his own definition of a people.

A people is a multitude of reasonable creatures conjoined in a general agreement of those things it respects.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 13.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 14.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 21.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 21; bk. 19, chap. 23.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 24.

This definition of a people corrects the defect found in Cicero's definition, for it substitutes the idea of "agreement regarding those things respected" for the idea of "consent regarding law" that necessarily includes the concept of justice.<sup>41</sup> With this correction, one then possesses a definition of the state that can be applied not only to Rome, the state then under discussion, but also to the Athenians, the Greeks in general, the Egyptians, and the Babylonians.<sup>42</sup> Thus Augustine intended that this definition be applicable to the earthly civil state in general.

Since most of the people in the world are reprobate rather than elect it must often be the case that in a given state the reprobate outnumber the elect, and it is always the case that the reprobate outnumber the elect among the people of this world. Since there can be no virtue where there is no true religion<sup>43</sup> states are often established in order to achieve peace and other earthly gains such as the happiness that comes from possession of material goods.<sup>44</sup> These states are devoid of justice, for justice is found in

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<sup>41</sup>John Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's 'City of God' (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1963), pp. 60-61.

<sup>42</sup>The City of God, bk. 19, chap. 24.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 25.

<sup>44</sup>Dino Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Augustine," in The Political Writings of St. Augustine, ed. Henry Paolucci (South Bend, IN: Regnery/Gateway), pp. 348-49.

the City of God alone. Thus Augustine characterizes them as nothing other than bands of robbers operating on a grand scale.<sup>45</sup>

The elect live among these robbers in that robber band that the robbers call a state. Even though the reprobate are the enemies of God, the elect still cooperate with them in their earthly government in order to live in that earthly peace that is but a pale image of the real thing. Living among the reprobate as pilgrims or wayfarers, the elect even pray for the temporal welfare and blessedness of the reprobate even as the children of Israel prayed for their Babylonian captors, for the elect understand that their temporal peace is inescapably intertwined with that of the reprobate.<sup>46</sup>

Augustine's pessimistic view of human nature can be seen to be reflected in his theory of political government. Perhaps it shines through most clearly in his characterization of earthly governments as robber bands, but his pessimism colors much more of Augustine's political thought, for example, his contention that one does not find true justice and true peace among earthly governments.

Thus Augustine is pessimistic not only concerning human nature; he is also pessimistic concerning the

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<sup>45</sup>The City of God, bk. 4, chap. 4.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 26.

capabilities of earthly governments. He denies to them the ability to achieve good except insofar as they are instruments of divine providence.<sup>47</sup>

However, despite his pessimism, Augustine enjoins obedience to the civil authorities upon the elect while they are in this world. He finds warrant for this injunction in the New Testament (for example, Romans 13:1-7). Moreover, Augustine's understanding of the pervasive providence of God impels him in this direction. Since rulers occupy their positions in virtue of that providential care.<sup>48</sup> Since God can and often does work His will even in the hearts of wicked men,<sup>49</sup> the elect person obeys his temporal ruler for the same sort of reasons he would obey any other manifestation of God's ordering of the universe.<sup>50</sup>

Augustine's theory laid the foundations for those theories of political theology that came after it in western medieval thought. If the theory of the two cities moved the Christian to act with justice toward his neighbor and with respect toward his ruler, still it promoted the idea of a pious withdrawal from the world. Moreover, as the idea of

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<sup>47</sup>James V. Schall, "Political Theory and Political Theology," Laval Theologique Philosophique 31 (February 1975):27.

<sup>48</sup>Brown, Society, pp. 29-30.

<sup>49</sup>On Grace and Free Will, chap. 42.

<sup>50</sup>Brown, Society, p. 30.

the organized church being the assembly of the elect in this world gained adherents so also grew the idea of the church as an organization outside of the control of earthly princes. The pinnacle of such thinking was reached during the papacy of Boniface VIII.

#### Boniface VIII and the Two Swords

We remember Boniface VIII not because he developed the theory of the two swords--it had been articulated two centuries before he became pope--but rather because he restated (or caused to be restated) the theory and attempted to enforce it during his papacy. Unfortunately for Boniface, his attempts were not universally well received, especially by Phillip IV of France, who was singularly uncongenial to the theory.

Benedetto Gaetani earned his doctorate in canon and civil law prior to entering the service of the curia about 1276. He was one of the curia's chief canon lawyers when the devout but incredibly naive Pietro di Murrhone became Pope Celestine V. His role in Celestine's subsequent unique resignation from the papacy is still hotly debated. What is known with certainty is that Gaetani was an advisor to Celestine. What is uncertain and disputed is the content of the advice he gave.

Whatever that advice may have been, Celestine resigned the papacy less than six months after his election. Ten

days later, Benedetto Gaetani became Pope Boniface VIII. Among his first acts, Boniface revoked "the extraordinary favours and privileges" that had been granted by Celestine, went from Naples to Rome to be crowned there thus removing the papal court from Neapolitan influence, and placed Celestine under arrest.<sup>51</sup>

It was Boniface's misfortune to become pope during a period of some of the most thorough change in the history of the western world. As Strayer describes it,

There is no doubt that the beginning of the change in the climate of opinion came in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. For once all of the indices agree-- there was a sharp break in politics and in economics, in thought and in the arts. Young men who witnessed the defeat of Manfred and the pious death of the crusading St. Louis were hardly more than middle-aged when Manfred's grandson reconquered Sicily from the papal champion, and St. Louis's grandson attacked a pope. Scholars who listened to the last lectures of Thomas Aquinas lived to hear his basic belief in the unity of all knowledge assailed. Sculptors who worked on the great cathedrals in the 1270's had to accept the change in fashion which substituted a pretty country girl with a baby for the majestic Virgin of the earlier period. Business men and land-owners saw mild prosperity and economic stability give place to stagnation and erratic fluctuations in the value of the currency.<sup>52</sup>

The pope who was attacked was Boniface; the attacker was Philip IV of France.

Today we tend to see the various disputes between princes and ecclesiastical authorities that occurred so often

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<sup>51</sup>The Catholic Encyclopedia, 12 vol. s.v. "Boniface VIII," by Thomas Destrinch.

<sup>52</sup>Joseph R. Strayer, Western Europe in the Middle Ages (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 189-90.



in the late middle ages in terms of disputes between church and state. This vision is less than precise. We are fairer to the personalities involved and better able to comprehend the theories involved if we consider these disputes as contests for power and authority between the individuals involved. There were no nation states in the middle ages such as we know now, and the Roman church was not then the well-managed ecclesiastical organization we see today.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, Innocent III greatly enhanced the power of the papacy through his administrative ability, his knowledge of canon and civil law, and his willingness to use the ecclesiastical and civil weapons available to him to impose his will upon various princes of Europe. At the beginning of the fourteenth century Boniface--blind to the changes in the times--failed utterly in his attempt to emulate Innocent. However that failure produced the clearest statement of the theory of the two swords.

The election of Celestine V had been no accident. It was a compromise achieved by a weary and near-desperate college of cardinals only after two years of debate and political infighting. Celestine's election was a symptom (as well as a cause) of the crumbling of the power of the Roman church. The college of cardinals had become so divided that in two years of deliberation no reasonable candidate had been able to gain a majority of votes and thus the

papacy. The election of the elderly hermit did nothing to correct this situation.

Boniface sought to correct this, as well as several other, political problems using the techniques of firmness and forcefulness used by Innocent III a century earlier. However, Boniface was apparently unable to comprehend that the environment in which he labored was far different from that in which Innocent had worked. Boniface had to deal with sovereigns far more powerful than those encountered by Innocent. He was at the helm of a ship awash in a degree of factional strife such as was unthinkable in Innocent's day. If Boniface had an excellent command of canon and civil law, this knowledge was negated by his ignorance concerning which way the wind was blowing. In his dispute with Philip IV concerning how ecclesiastical income in France should be dispersed, Boniface overextended himself. In that over-extension we find his downfall but we also find the clearest publication of the theory of the two swords.

Philip was engaged in a war with England. Then, as now, wars were expensive. Boniface wished the war to cease, probably for a variety of reasons including his desires to enhance the position of the papacy and to increase the income of the papal treasuries.<sup>53</sup> Then too, as now, higher taxes usually meant lower contributions. In addition, the

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<sup>53</sup>C. B. Previte-Orton, Outlines of Medieval History (Cambridge: The University Press, 1929), p. 351.

civil ruler could lay taxes on church properties when an officer of the church held the property in virtue of a civil office he might hold conjointly.

If these legitimate reductions in papal income hurt Boniface, he was more than stung when Philip imposed taxes upon properties of the churches well above the accepted customary feudal levies. In addition, the other combatant, Edward I of England, was also attempting to collect a direct tax from the clergy in his realm to finance his part in the war.

Boniface responded to these threats to papal income and, as he saw it, to papal power with the bull, Clericis Laicos. One may get a taste of Boniface's style from the opening words of the bull.

Boniface Bishop, servant of the servants of God, for the perpetual record of the matter. That laymen have been very hostile to the clergy antiquity relates; and it is clearly proved by the experiences of the present time.<sup>54</sup>

Clericis Laicos went on to forbid in the strongest language possible the taxation of ecclesiastical properties and persons. It threatened excommunication for those who attempted to impose or collect such taxes and deposition as well as excommunication for those who paid such taxes. In addition, the lands where such transactions might take place

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<sup>54</sup>Clericis Laicos, in Henry Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 157-59.

were to be placed under the interdict.<sup>55</sup>

Clericis laicos did not explicitly publish the doctrine of the two swords. It merely implied it. If the pope could direct monarchs in fiscal matters, as Boniface claimed in Clericis Laicos that he could, then obviously the pope exercised temporal power over civil authorities.

Clericis laicos did not have the result that Boniface desired. Philip banned further payments to Rome by the churches in France. Edward outlawed the clergy until they paid his tax. Both were upheld by their subjects in these actions.

Boniface was compelled to retreat rapidly and that for two reasons. First, reduced income from England and France was preferable to no income at all, and Boniface needed income desperately. Second, Boniface had injured, insulted, and infuriated the powerful Colonna family. He needed military aid from Philip to remove this threat to the power of his office as well as to his personal safety. That being the case, Boniface relented about a year after publishing Clericis laicos and agreed that taxation of clerics was permitted.

However, Boniface was not finished asserting the power and privilege of the papacy. Edward I wished to add Scotland to his realm by conquest. Boniface sought to restore

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

peace by declaring Scotland to be a papal fief and then summoning Edward to Rome to justify his attack. Edward, with the vigorous support of his parliament, declined, stating that the king of England was not accustomed to submit his policies and person to the judgment of a foreign court.

Meanwhile, Boniface managed simultaneously to alienate Edward's customary foe, the far more dangerous Philip of France.

Boniface was not reconciled to Philip's policy of providing aid and comfort to the Colonna family and especially to those members of it who had shown resistance to his election and to his papal policies. For his part, Philip was displeased by the conduct of the pope in reprimanding him in regard to his conduct in his regal office. Too, Philip found objectionable remarks made by the Bishop of Pamiers, the papal legate, expressing his dissatisfaction with Philip's rule. Accused of making treasonable speeches and of inciting rebellion, the bishop was arrested, tried, and found guilty.

The bull Unam sanctam capped the exchange of letters, ambassadors, and pronouncements that ensued. It was this bull, probably written by Aegidius Colonna<sup>56</sup> that was the

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<sup>56</sup>Here we have one of those curiosities that makes the study of medieval history fun. Aegidius Colonna was a member of the same Colonna family that Boniface was seeking to destroy. He was a trusted advisor on canon law to the pope who was the best canon lawyer to occupy the chair of Peter. What motivated Aegidius to write the bull that established

document that set forth the doctrine of the two swords with the greatest force and clarity. It read, in part,

. . . we learn from the words of the Gospel that in this Church and in her power are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the apostles said, 'Behold, here' (that is, in the Church, since it was the apostles who spoke) 'are two swords'--the Lord did not reply, 'It is too much,' but 'It is enough.' Truly, he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter, misunderstands the words of the Lord, 'Put up thy sword into the sheath.' Both are in the power of the Church, the spiritual sword and the material. But the latter is to be used for the Church, the former by her; the former by the priest, the latter by kings and captains but at the will and by the permission of the priest. The one sword, then, should be under the other, and temporal authority subject to spiritual. For when the apostle says, 'there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God' they would not be so ordained were not one sword made subject to the other. . .

Thus, concerning the Church and her power, is the prophecy of Jeremiah fulfilled, 'See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms,' etc. If, therefore, the earthly power err, it shall be judged

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the absolute power of the pope over all men, including those who were seeking to shelter his family from the wrath of the pope? Conventional wisdom has it that Aegidius deserted his family in their hour of need and was a loyal son of the church. That simply will not wash for two reasons. First, Aegidius was assisted in achieving his place of ecclesiastical prominence by his relatives in the college of cardinals, and Aegidius never broke off relations with his family. Such behavior would be inexplicable if Aegidius had in fact turned his back on his family when he entered orders. Second, in order for this theory to be convincing it must be conceded that Aegidius was so lacking in intelligence as to believe that Philip would roll over and play dead once a strongly worded papal bull was waved in his face. Neither Aegidius's writing nor his conduct hint at any such gross stupidity. To the contrary, Aegidius comes down to us as an exceptionally smart churchman. There is another explanation for Aegidius's writing Unam sanctam that wears far better. Aegidius was well aware of Boniface's designs on the Colonna family and did what was necessary to thwart them. He thus composed Unam sanctam in the most inflammatory language possible, trusting that it would incite Philip to set in motion events similar to those that actually occurred.

by the spiritual power; and if a lesser power err, it shall be judged by a greater. But if the supreme power err, it can only be judged by God, not by man; for the testimony of the apostle is 'The spiritual man judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man.' For this authority, although given to a man and exercised by a man, is not human, but rather divine, given at God's mouth to Peter and established on a rock for him and his successors in Him whom he confessed, the Lord saying to Peter himself, 'Whatsoever thou shalt bind,' etc. Whoever therefore resists this power thus ordained of God, resists the ordinance of God. . . . Furthermore we declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.<sup>57</sup>

The message of Unam sanctam is loud and clear. The pope is the supreme ruler of all mankind. He possesses absolute power in spiritual matters over all others. This spiritual power he exercises through the Roman church. He also possesses absolute temporal power over all men. This power is directly applied by kings and captains, but it may be used by them only under the authority of the pope. The person who rejects the absolute sovereignty of the pope in all matters spiritual and temporal is damned.

Thus was the theory of Augustine twisted, augmented, and stretched into something he would never have accepted. What had been the spiritual community of the City of God now was a very physical community with the pope as her absolute ruler. It was against the background of this medieval heritage that Luther would propound his doctrine of the two kingdoms.

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<sup>57</sup>Unam sanctam in Bettenson, Documents, pp. 160-61.

## CHAPTER VII

### LUTHER'S TEACHING CONCERNING THE TWO KINGDOMS

#### Introduction

In a sense, one may say that Martin Luther's teaching concerning the two kingdoms represents a development and a correction of the medieval teachings concerning the two cities and the two swords. We could then describe Luther's teaching in terms of his correction of Augustine's idea of the state and his correction of Boniface VIII's idea of the church.

Certainly it is true that Luther's teaching does correct these errors. However, this is not the best way to approach Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms, if only because this is not the way Luther himself understood what he was doing. It is well to be cognizant of the precedents Luther had in view when he developed his theory. However, it must also be remembered that Luther was an exegetical theologian. Thus, for Luther, sound doctrine was to be drawn from the Scriptures and from no other source.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Martin Luther, First Lectures on the Psalms, II, in the American Edition of Luther's Works, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, and Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1955- ), 11:327; et permulti alia. The American Edition is hereafter abbreviated "LW" and is cited by volume and page number. One of the best readily available discussions concerning Luther's attitude toward the Scriptures remains M. Reu, Luther and the Scriptures (Columbus, OH: Wartburg Press, 1944) also reprinted in The Springfielder, vol. 24, no. 2.



Luther's Discovery of the Two Rules

Luther found two rules or reigns presented in the Bible. One is a rule of love, a rule demanding that we love the Lord God with all our heart, mind, and soul, and that we love our neighbor as we love ourselves. For Luther, this radical rule of love is both unalterable and unfulfillable. Commenting on Matthew 5:19, Luther wrote,

"I will make them [i.e., "these commandments"] very strong," He says. Not only will I not abolish them. But if any preacher relaxes or ignores the tiniest part, he should know that he is no preacher of Mine, but is damned and excluded from the kingdom of heaven.<sup>2</sup>

Having thus established the rule of love, Luther then went on to excoriate those who had attempted to make this rule fulfillable by diluting it, diluting it through the substitution of human standards for divine.<sup>3</sup>

Having established the unalterability of the rule, Luther went on to point to the fact that no one can fulfill the demands of that rule. He wrote,

I shall not go into the question now of how the law is to be fulfilled so that no iota or dot of it is lost, though at the same time we teach that no man can fulfill it. I have said that here Christ is not talking primarily about life, but about doctrine. He is not dealing with the great chief doctrine of what He is and what He gave us. We cannot be justified or saved through the teaching of the Law, which only brings us to the knowledge of ourselves, the knowledge that by our own ability we cannot properly fulfill an iota of it. Once we have become Christian through Baptism and faith, we do as we can. Still we can never take our stand before God on

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<sup>2</sup>Luther, "The Sermon on the Mount," LW, 21:71.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 2:71-72.

this basis, but we must always creep to Christ. He has fulfilled it all purely and perfectly, and He gives Himself to us, together with His fulfillment. Through Him we can take our stand before God, and the Law cannot incriminate or condemn us. So it is true that all must be accomplished and fulfilled even to the smallest dot, but only through this one Man.<sup>4</sup>

Luther understood that the rule of love, as it is given to us in Scripture, is a rule that no one can keep. We Christians "do as much as we can," but we still fall far short of the perfection that the rule of love demands. We attempt to follow the rule of love by attempting always to deal with our neighbor in love and charity. Yet, because the sinful flesh is still with us, we fall far short of what the rule of love demands.

But if the Christian is to be governed by the rule of love, what is he to do when the peace of his community is threatened either from without or from within? Must the Christian stand idly by and merely watch as a robber deprives his neighbor of his property, stand there idly because it would be unloving to use force in resisting the predations of the robber? Must the Christian allow invading foreign armies to enter his community and to destroy its peace, prosperity, and welfare, because it would be unloving to use force to resist the invader? If the Christian is to be governed always and unalterably by the rule of love, is he then forbidden to undertake those tasks of

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 21:72-73.

governing that require the use of force or the directing of others to use force?

Luther understood that fallen man is far removed from what God had intended him to be. Though the unalterable rule of love applies to all, there are in fact none who can obey it. The believer is hindered by his sinful flesh so that he fails to keep the rule of love. The unbeliever is the slave of sin and of his sinful flesh, and thus he too continually transgresses the rule of love. Therefore God has provided another rule, a rule of compulsion and of law. God has provided this rule of compulsion and of law so that evil can in some part be restrained and thus people survive upon this earth. Luther wrote,

There are few true believers, and still fewer who live a Christian life, who do not resist evil and indeed themselves do no evil. For this reason God has provided for them [i.e., for the sinners] a different government beyond the Christian estate and kingdom of God. He has subjected them to the sword so that, even though they would like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if they do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with success and impunity. In the same way a savage wild beast is bound with chains and ropes so that it cannot bite and tear as it would normally do, even though it would like to; whereas a tame and gentle animal needs no restraint, but is harmless despite the lack of chains and ropes.<sup>5</sup>

Luther added,

If this were not so, men would devour one another, seeing that the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is scarcely a single true Christian.

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<sup>5</sup>Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed," LW, 45:90.

No one could support wife and child, feed himself, and serve God. The world would be reduced to chaos.<sup>6</sup>

Luther was not misled concerning either the saving power of the Gospel or the depravity of man. Natural man, having turned his back on God in sinfulness, also has turned his back on love. The natural man usually is not motivated by words of kindness and love. To attempt to do so is as foolish as turning the wolf loose in the sheep fold, admonishing all to live together in harmony.<sup>7</sup> Instead, the natural man must be restrained by means of the rule of compulsion and law.

Luther taught that God has established the rule of love to govern the conduct of one individual toward another. However, no individual follows the rule of love. Therefore, it is necessary that God establish the rule of compulsion and law in order to protect persons the one from the other.

However, this rule of compulsion and law is not to be enforced by each individual in his own right over against the rest of the world. This would result in chaos, anarchy, and desolation. The rule of compulsion and law is to be exercised by those whom God has commissioned to exercise it.

#### Luther's Teaching Concerning the Orders

Luther taught that God has organized this world into orders. Luther had a functional view of an order. He tended to define each order in terms of its duties and

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 45:91.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 45:92.

responsibilities to the neighbor.<sup>8</sup> Luther found the duties of each order to be set forth in the Scriptures. Moreover, the duties an individual had in virtue of his membership is love toward all men.

Luther was aware of this tension between the duties of a given person as person and that person's duties as a member of an order. He wrote,

. . . we must distinguish between an occupation and the man who holds it, between a work and the man who does it. An occupation or a work can be good and right in itself and yet be bad and wrong if the man who does the work is evil or wrong or does not do his work properly.<sup>9</sup>

Luther went on to give an example of what he meant.

He wrote,

The occupation of a judge is a valuable divine office. This is true both of the office of the trial judge who declares the verdict [Mundrichter] and the executioner who carries out the sentence [Faust- or Scharfrichter] But when the office is assumed by one to whom it has not been committed or when one who holds it rightly uses it to gain riches or popularity, then it is no longer right or good. The married state is precious and godly, but there are many rascals and scoundrels in it. It is the same way with the profession or work of the soldier; in itself it is right and godly, but we must see to it that the persons who are in this profession and who do the work are the right kind of persons, that is, godly and upright, as we shall hear.<sup>10</sup>

In the distinction that he made between the office and the individual, Luther solved a problem that had plagued and

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<sup>8</sup>See, for example, the "Table of Duties" Luther drew up for the Small Catechism.

<sup>9</sup>Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW, 46:94.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

distorted political theory since the time of Augustine. The Christian, according to Augustine, is a citizen of the City of God. As such, he is merely a visitor here, a pilgrim on his way through this life to his home with God. Luther did not dispute this. However, Augustine went further to hold that government was a feature of the City of this World, that is, of the mass of perdition among whom the elect live. Thus the redeemed was viewed as being, by virtue of his redemption, a foreigner to the affairs of state. This Luther denied. Luther claimed that civil government was composed of orders established by God. This being the case, the Christian was in no way a foreigner to civil government, so long as he exercised the office in the manner that fulfilled the purpose for which God had established it. For Luther, a man is no more sullied by being a good soldier than he is sullied by being a good husband.

#### Civil Government as Divine Orders

Luther saw civil government as consisting of orders established in this world by God. In commenting on 1 Peter 2:13, he wrote,

We do not owe the government obedience for its own sake, says St. Peter, but for the sake of God, whose children we are. This must induce us to be obedient, not the thought that our obedience is a meritorious deed. For what I do for God's sake, this I must do without recompense and to serve Him. Therefore I must be willing to do for nothing everything His heart desires. But why should one be subject to the government for God's sake? Because it is God's will that malefactors be punished and that benefactors be protected, in

order that in this way unity may remain in the world. Therefore we should further external peace. God wants us to do this. For since we are not all believers, but the great majority are unbelievers, God has regulated and ordained matters this way in order that people of the world might not devour one another. The government should wield the sword and restrain the wicked if they do not want to have peace. They have to obey. This He accomplishes through the government, so that in this way the world is ruled well everywhere.<sup>11</sup>

The Christian acknowledges that civil government consists of orders ordained and established by God. Therefore the Christian serves and obeys his government in order to serve and obey his God. Does this apply to the unbeliever? Is he to be urged to obey the government because it is the pious thing to do? No. Rather, the unbeliever is to obey the government because it is the reasonable thing to do.

Luther wrote,

. . . it is not the law of the fist but the law of the head that must rule--not force but wisdom and reason--among the wicked as well as among the good.<sup>12</sup>

In his "Proposal on the Existing Order" Luther made a similar statement. He wrote,

This recent turmoil [i.e. the Peasant Wars] has taught us a good lesson, since we see well enough what kind of rubbish appears before our eyes when we do not see to it that the feelings of the common man are satisfied and harmonized to the extent that this is possible. Thus it is necessary that he be handled not only with force--as is now the case--but also with reason. For force alone without reason cannot last and only serves to keep the subjects in a state of eternal hatred over

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<sup>11</sup>Luther, "Sermons on the First Epistle of St. Peter," LW, 30:74.

<sup>12</sup>Luther, "A Sermon on Keeping Children in School," LW, 46:239.

against their governing authorities, as all history points out to us.<sup>13</sup>

Sheer force alone will not suffice for the civil government. It must be force administered in a logical and reasonable manner. A knowledge of the revealed Law is not necessary, but a reasonable administration of the Law as it is written in the heart of each man in the natural knowledge of the Law is necessary for the right administration of a civil government. Luther wrote,

God gives us rational ability so that we can master physical affairs, educate our children, administer the household, etc. Scripture is here unnecessary, for God has distributed this rational ability among all nations. It is, therefore, not necessary that He send down a word from heaven.<sup>14</sup>

#### The Two Kingdoms

When we examine what Luther has said concerning the two modes of existing or interacting, we take care to bring together all the strands of his thought. If we do not, we shall be guilty of presenting a distorted or adumbrated version of Luther's teaching.

We have seen that Luther held that each individual in this world is to interact with all other people in two ways. In one mode of conduct, the individual acts according to his

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<sup>13</sup>Luther, "A Proposal on the Existing Order," trans. Louis Reith, in Two Kingdoms and One World, ed., Karl Hertz (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), p. 56.

<sup>14</sup>Luther, "Sermons on Exodus," trans. Louis Reith, in Hertz, Two Kingdoms, p. 58.



position among the orders God has established to govern this world. According to the rules of the order or orders he occupies, the person rationally deals with those about him in his official capacity.

Note, too, that one may belong to more than one order at any given time. Thus the headsman may also be a father. In his capacity as father he has the right and duty to spank his child. In his capacity as headsman he has the right and duty to behead a convicted murderer. However, this headaman/father has neither the right nor the duty to spank the murderer or to behead his child. The duties of the orders are specific to the order and do not inhere to the occupant of that order when he acts in a capacity other than the duties of that order.

In the world as it now exists the orders are necessary because of the sinful nature of man. Were all people to act under the rule of love, the various orders of the world as we now know them would be unnecessary. No police, no armies, no courts, no headsmen would be necessary, for all would love one another as they loved themselves, and their every action toward the neighbor would be governed by the rule of universal love.

However, the world as it now exists is not a world of love but rather a world of sin and evil. Thus the orders are "emergency repairs," temporary and temporal adjustments established by God in and for this dying, sinful world to

preserve some degree of order until the end comes. The orders, therefore, are not, so to speak, the proper will of God but are rather the will of God as it has been mediated by the human condition, by the circumstances of this world, the will of God as it applies now, in time, to us who are fallen and do not live according to God's loving will. This will governs the outward and physical aspects of man's relationship to man and to the other objects of his environment. Reason and logic hold sway here. This is the kingdom of God's left hand.

The temptation exists to stop at this point, but were we to do so we would falsify Luther and turn his teaching into an unscriptural formalism and legalism.

Luther never exempted anyone from the rule of love. This is the rule that governs relationships in the kingdom of God's right hand, the kingdom that is ruled by God's proper rule, since God is love. In this kingdom, truth is now perceived by faith rather than by sight or logic, but that which we now believe we shall, in the eschaton, see. The rule of love is eternally and universally applicable. Moreover, this rule of love is now universally rejected. No one, according to Luther, has followed the rule of love that applies in the kingdom of the right hand, no one, that is, but Jesus Christ Himself. Jesus Christ, true God begotten of the Father from eternity, and true Man, born of the blessed virgin Mary, has fulfilled the rule of love. He has

fulfilled the Law for all men. Those who, by the power of the Holy Ghost operative in Word and Baptism, believe that Jesus is their Savior, who believe that He fulfilled the Law for them and then suffered and died to pay the penalty for the sins of a fallen mankind--those who believe in Jesus Christ are saved and are thereby citizens of the kingdom of God's right hand, living therein under the rule of love.

Thus it is that the Gospel, the message that God loved the world so that He sacrificed His Son for the sins of the world, holds sway in the kingdom of the right hand, while in its turn the kingdom of the left hand is ruled by compulsion and law. In the kingdom of the right hand the Gospel is received by faith. In the kingdom of the left hand, the Law is acknowledged by reason. The person who is a member of the kingdom of the right hand, insofar as he is a member of that kingdom, needs no law to show him what to do. He does that which is right, since, insofar as he is a member of the kingdom of the right hand, he is motivated by love. However, no one in this world is entirely ruled by love. No one in this world lives entirely in the kingdom of the right hand. Therefore, even those who are Christians need law and compulsion insofar as they are still members of the kingdom of the left hand, that is, insofar as they are still subject to the temptations of Satan, the world, and their sinful flesh.

The kingdom of the left hand, ruled by compulsion and

law, exists because none of us loves as he should. It exists because, were it not to exist, men would devour one another, and this world would soon be reduced to chaos and ruin. It exists, in short, for the peace of this world and for the welfare of those living in this world. It is within the framework of the kingdom of the left hand that one best understands Luther's teaching concerning civil government. Moreover, it is also within this setting that one can best comprehend Luther's teaching concerning the just war.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THEOLOGICAL TEACHINGS CONCERNING PARTICIPATION IN WARFARE

#### Introduction

Christianity has long been divided concerning the question of whether it is permissible for a Christian to participate in warfare. In general, three basic views have been put forward in answer to this question; namely pacifism, the just war teaching, and the idea of the crusade or the holy war. Pacifism prohibits the Christian from participating in any sort of warfare as a combatant. The just war teaching sets forth certain conditions which must be fulfilled if the participation of the Christian as a combatant in a conflict is to be justifiable. The crusade idea places the authority for waging war directly in the hands of the church. As Roland H. Bainton pointed out,

Pacifism is thus often associated with withdrawal, the just war with qualified participation, and the crusade with the dominance of the church over the world.<sup>1</sup>

It would seem likely that all three of these views have been present in the church in varying degrees, certainly since late in the first century of the Christian era.

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<sup>1</sup>Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), p. 15.

Pacifiam

Pacifiam has been proposed as the appropriate response of Christians to military service as a combatant since very early in the history of the church. Some denominations, for example, the Society of Friends and the Mennonites, espouse pacifiam as the official teaching of the denomination. These denominations are often referred to as the "Peace Churches." However, pacifists are also to be found in virtually every Christian denomination.

The pacifist places little confidence in the political processes of this world. In general, his response to worldly society is one of withdrawal. The withdrawal may be merely the refusal to take part as a combatant in warfare, or it may extend to a refusal to take any part in the political process or even to a removal from the world into a colony composed of those holding like beliefs.<sup>2</sup>

It has been claimed that pacifiam was the view held universally in the church prior to the end of the first century.<sup>3</sup> However, a careful review of the scant literature available to us from that period tends to refute this theory.

As Adolf Harnack has pointed out, statements that

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 14. See also C. John Cadoux, The Early Christian Attitude to War (London: Headly Bros., 1919), p. 17, pp. 49-160.

pacifism was the universally held teaching of the Christian church of the first century are based upon extrapolations backward from subsequent statements or upon arguments from silence.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, such statements overlook the deep offense that would have been offered by the use of military metaphors by the apostles and the apostolic fathers in urging Christians to live lives of steadfast Christian duty.<sup>5</sup>

Bainton quotes the words of Celsus that have been used by some<sup>6</sup> to defend the idea that it was customary for Christians at that time (ca. A.D. 170) to avoid military service. Celsus is alleged to have written,

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<sup>4</sup>Adolf Harnack, Militia Christi, trans. David Gracie (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), pp. 65-66.

<sup>5</sup>Thus, for instance, Ignatius, in his letter to Polycarp, uses military metaphors, writing, "Give satisfaction to Him in whose ranks you serve and from whom you get your pay. Let none of you prove a deserter" (6:2). Just how out of place such words would have been in a pacifist church where military service was considered to be per se immoral can be imagined by transferring the metaphor from one of military service to one of prostitution. We would find advice to "Get out there and score for your Great Pimp, etc." entirely unacceptable in any context. Moreover, while Ignatius writes repeatedly concerning the fact that he is a prisoner condemned to martyrdom, he does not condemn the profession of those who have brought him into this condition. It is true that he describes his escort of soldiers as "ten leopards," but his condemnation is of their private conduct, not of their profession (Romans 5:1). Polycarp urges prayers for the authorities who have condemned him (Philippians 12:3). However, the context prevents this exhortation from being interpreted as either support or condemnation of service as a military or civil official.

<sup>6</sup>Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius (London: S. P. C. K., 1965), p. 1.

If all men were to do the same as you, there would be nothing to prevent the king from being left in utter solitude and desertion and the forces of the empire would fall into the hands of the wildest and most lawless barbarians.<sup>7</sup>

As Bainton notes, if Celsus thought that all Christians were pacifists, he erred. At the very time that Celsus and Origen engaged in their controversy, we find that Christians were serving in the Thundering Legion under Marcus Aurelius.<sup>8</sup>

There have been those who have found considerable support in the writings of Tertullian for the theory that the Christian church was universally pacifistic in the first two centuries.<sup>9</sup> However, it would seem that these writings will not bear this load. First, it is well to note that the witness of Tertullian is not uniform. In his Apology, Tertullian notes, without censure, that Christians were serving in the army.<sup>10</sup> We find strong condemnation of military service in Tertullian's later writings, but these come from the period after he had espoused the Montanist heresy. Therefore, these writings should not be taken as indicative of

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<sup>7</sup>Bainton, Attitudes, p. 68. It is best to note that all that we know concerning Celsus's comments comes from Origen's response to it, Contra Celsum. While we may not doubt Origen's accuracy in quotation, it is permitted to suggest that he, like all other critics, has been selective in quoting passages.

<sup>8</sup>Bainton, Attitudes, p. 68.

<sup>9</sup>E.g., Cadoux, Attitude, pp. 106-119.

<sup>10</sup>Tertullian, Apology, 32.



the position of the Christian church but rather as indicative of the position of the Montanists in the regard.

At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that there is some indication that at the close of the second century there were a large number of pacifists numbered among the Christians. Origen's remarks to the effect that Christians would not fight under the emperor support this contention.<sup>11</sup> It should, however, be remembered that it was often the duty of the soldier, as proof of his loyalty, to make a sacrifice to the emperor. This idolatry would have been totally unacceptable to a Christian. Thus, it is safe to assume that many Christians refused to enter military service in the Roman legions not because they were pacifists but because they were not idolators.

An examination of those Biblical texts used by Christian pacifists to support their theory shows that they rely rather heavily on texts from the Sermon on the Mount.<sup>12</sup> A Lutheran theologian would point out that they confuse precepts from the rule of love with those in the rule of compulsion and force.<sup>13</sup> Many theologians who would not accept

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<sup>11</sup>Origen, Contra Celsum, VIII, 73.

<sup>12</sup>"Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth" (Matt. 5:5). "Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God" (Matt. 5:9). "Resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Matt. 5:39).

<sup>13</sup>Martin Luther has written concerning the impropriety and inadvisability of this practice, "If anyone attempts to

the Lutheran terminology or the Lutheran distinction between the two rules would still agree that pacifists use these verses without giving due regard to the context and thereby misinterpret them. Lutheran theologians might also notice that this interpretation of these passages reduces God's radical rule of love to the obedience to a carefully circumscribed set of commands, thereby violating the statement of the Lord when He preached the Sermon on the Mount concerning the unalterable character of these very commandments.<sup>14</sup>

#### The Just War Theory

The theory of the just war antedates the birth of the Christian church.<sup>15</sup> It would seem that the theory was first developed by the Greeks and later expanded by the Romans.

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rule the world by the gospel and to abolish all temporal law and sword on the plea that all are baptized and Christian, and that, according to the gospel, there shall be among them no law or sword--or need for either--pray tell me, friend, what would he be doing? He would be loosing the ropes and chains of the savage wild beasts and letting them bite and mangle everyone, meanwhile insisting that they were harmless, tame, and gentle creatures; but I would have the proof in my wounds." "On Temporal Authority," in the American Edition of Luther's Works, 55 vols. ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955- ), 45:91.

<sup>14</sup>Matt. 5:17-20.

<sup>15</sup>Bainton, Attitudes, pp. 17-43. I am deeply indebted to the late Dr. Bainton for his advice that I take a careful look at the classical Greek and Roman roots of the just war theory. This advice, as well as his encouragement in this project, have been invaluable.

Thus the theologians of the early Christian church had this heritage upon which to draw.

Apparently, Aristotle was the first to use the term "just war."<sup>16</sup> He wrote,

And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.<sup>17</sup>

Aristotle was what we would call today a natural law theorist. In his scheme of natural law, some men were equipped and destined by their very nature to rule and administer. These were the Hellenes. The rest of mankind was destined, by and large, to slavery. Thus when the Greek army invaded a foreign land, took its wealth, and enslaved its people, the army was only doing what came naturally, and that war was called just. Aristotle wrote,

Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves.<sup>18</sup>

When we examine Aristotle's definition, we find it at the same time too narrow and too broad to suit us. It is

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<sup>16</sup>Bainton, Attitudes, p. 39.

<sup>17</sup>Aristotle, Politics, I, 1256b, 23-26.

<sup>18</sup>Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1333b, 37-133.

too narrow from the point of view that only Hellenes may wage a just war. It is too broad in that it allows and, in fact, enjoins aggressive war for the purpose of national enrichment.<sup>19</sup>

However, we must not charge Aristotle with having a bellicose spirit and seeing in war a panacea for all sorts of national ills. Aristotle was well aware that the practice of waging needless wars often led to a national deterioration, and he condemned such a policy.<sup>20</sup> Rather, as we have seen, Aristotle considered war as a means to an end and never as an end in itself.

Aristotle's concept of the just war was a moral as opposed to a legal concept.<sup>21</sup> Thus, in practice, it was difficult to distinguish a just war from a merely successful one. There were no laws governing the conduct of war, and there was no tribunal where a charge of violating the customs concerning the just war could be tried. However, despite these shortcomings, Aristotle's ideas carried great influence upon those who came after him.

Rome made a significant contribution to just war theory by developing a much more fully articulated conception of just causes for waging a war. Comparing the causes

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1334a, 7-8.

<sup>21</sup>Frederick Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 4.

of war to the remedies possible to an individual upon the breach of a contract, the Romans determined that every just war must be the occasion for the wronged state to seek compensation and redress, acting both as the judge and as the advocate in its own cause.<sup>22</sup> That being the case, Cicero could hold that no war was just unless it was waged to recover lost goods. In the category of goods Cicero included anything for which satisfaction might be demanded, whether it be territory, other property, or incorporeal rights. Thus, Cicero could logically teach that warfare was not a vengeful exercise in violence, but to the contrary, a pious exercise of justice, occasioned by the misconduct of the enemy.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to clarifying the idea that a proper declaration of war must be issued for the subsequent conflict to be justified. This process of declaration of war included a demand upon the foreign power to redress the wrong that had been suffered by the Romans. If, after thirty-three days, this demand was not met, the fetial priests would issue the formal declaration of war when so authorized by the senate and the Roman people. This process meant that the just war was also a religious war. If the war was prosecuted in accordance with the proclamation of the fetial

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<sup>22</sup>Russell, Just War, pp. 4-5.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

priests, the war was considered to be a bellum pium, a pious or a dutiful war.<sup>24</sup> Tenny Frank, discussing this practice, has written,

Every general handbook on international law begins with a chapter describing the remarkable institution of the Roman Fetial college, a semireligious, semipolitical board which from time immemorial supervised the rites peculiar to the swearing of treaties and declaration of war, and which formed as it were a court of first instance in such questions of international disputes as the proper treatment of envoys and the execution of extradition. Polybius, the first foreign student of Roman statecraft, quickly noticed this institution as unique (xiii.3 and frag. 157); Hugo Grotius, the father of modern international law, pointed it out as a worthy example for his degenerate day, and many are the students of history who, like Bossuet, Maine, Mommsen, and Bryce, have remarked upon its high significance. The most noteworthy point in the practices of the fetial board is doubtless the assumption, which underlay every treaty as well as every declaration of war, that peace was the normal international status and that war was justified only on the score of an unjust act, as, for instance, the breach of a treaty, a direct invasion, or the aiding of one's enemies. Such is surely the implication of the formulae used at the opening of a war, as in the following, preserved by Livy (i. 32. 7-10): "Hear me, Jupiter, I call you to witness that that nation is unjust and does not duly practice righteousness," and again "if I unjustly or impiously demand that the afore-said offenders be surrendered then permit me not to return to my country."<sup>25</sup>

In addition, for a war to be just, it was to be conducted using justifiable means. Frederick Russell comments, "For Cicero, wars should be won by virtue and courage rather than by base, infamous or treacherous means."<sup>26</sup> Thus faith

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>25</sup>Tenny Frank, "The Import of the Fetial Institution," Classical Philology 7 (July 1922):335.

<sup>26</sup>Russell, Just War, p. 6.

was to be observed with the enemy in such matters as truces and safe conducts. In theory, at least, war was to be waged against combatants, and those who had taken no part in resisting the armies of Rome were to be spared. In addition, mercy was to be shown in victory.<sup>27</sup>

Augustine amalgamated the Greek and Roman teachings concerning the just war with the information he gathered from the Christian Scriptures. That he did so skillfully and persuasively is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that his concepts of the just war are, by and large, those which have served large segments of Christendom in the millennium and a half since he wrote them as a basis for discussion concerning the justice and the rectitude of participation in warfare.

It is well to note at this point that we find nothing in the writings of Augustine that would be considered as being militaristic or as glorifying either military service or warfare. Augustine's remarks concerning war are at the very least always sober, and they are often clearly sorrowful. His own experiences as well as the experiences of others who lived contemporaneously with him during the decline of the western Roman world would have allowed him to evaluate quite accurately the glory, or the lack of it, to be found in warfare. From the comments concerning war found

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

in his own writings, we may conclude that his knowledge of the conduct of warfare confirmed his pessimistic view of mankind.

War, Augustine believed, was to be waged in order that peace might prevail.<sup>28</sup> Thus, in a letter to Boniface, then governor of Africa, he wrote,

Your will ought to hold fast to peace with war as the result of necessity, that God may free you from the necessity and preserve you in peace. Peace is not sought for the purpose of stirring up war, but war is waged for the purpose of securing peace. Be, then, a peacemaker even while you make war, that by your victory you may lead those whom you defeat to know the desirability of peace.<sup>29</sup>

Another possible object of a just war might be to vindicate justice, but Augustine felt that this object might often be so difficult to achieve that a war might be fought for it in vain. Cicero had said that wars might be waged justly in pursuit of a nation's safety or of its honor. Augustine pointed out that in the case of the Saguntines these two objects conflicted one with the other. Thus, while the Saguntines preserved their honor by going to war, they did so only at the cost of their very existence as a free nation.<sup>30</sup>

Augustine wrote,

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<sup>28</sup>Augustine, Contra Faustum, 22, 75.

<sup>29</sup>Augustine, Letter 189.

<sup>30</sup>Augustine, The City of God, 22, 6.



Let it be necessity, not choice, that kills your warring enemy. Just as violence is meted out to him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due him who is defeated and captured, especially when no disturbance of peace is to be feared.<sup>31</sup>

In light of this advice, we can see that Augustine felt that war was to be waged without taking pleasure in the trials and the sufferings of the defeated foe. Rather than fight from motives of hatred, anger, and vengeance, a just war was to be waged in a disposition of Christian love, according to Augustine. Thus Augustine could write,

If the earthly state observes those Christian teachings, even war will not be waged without kindness, and it will be easier for a society whose peace is based on piety and justice to take thought for the conquered.<sup>32</sup>

Augustine believed that the appropriate inner attitude of Christian love would reveal itself in the way in which the war was conducted. Augustine would seem to have adopted the rules of classical Roman antiquity in this regard. Faith was to be kept with the enemy insofar as treaties, truces, and safe conducts were concerned. There was to be no wanton violence, looting, or massacre. Atrocities were forbidden, although it would seem that ambush was allowed.<sup>33</sup>

Augustine further held that for a war to be just it must be undertaken under correct auspices, that is, it was to be waged only with the authority of the sovereign. In

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<sup>31</sup>Augustine, Letter 189.

<sup>32</sup>Augustine, Letter 138.

<sup>33</sup>Bainton, Attitudes p. 58.

his thought in this regard, Augustine followed the lead of Ambrose in dividing all Christendom into two classes. Those in public authority may take human life in support of the common peace. However, the private citizen may not exercise violence, since for him to do so would be to give way to ignoble emotions of revenge or anger. Thus the Christian soldier, acting in his capacity as a soldier, must kill in warfare with as much skill and efficiency as he can muster; acting, however, in his capacity as a private person, he may not use violence, even in defence of his own life.<sup>34</sup> The clergy and those in religious orders were forbidden to take any part as a combatant in war.<sup>35</sup>

In point of fact, it is probably this last limitation, coupled with his dependence on Cicero and his very pessimistic view of the vast majority of mankind as a massa perdita that laid Augustine's theory of a just war open to abuse.

We know that Augustine was familiar with the writings of Cicero, for not only does he use the ideas of the Roman statesman but he also in places quotes his very words.<sup>36</sup> Cicero, in his writings, discusses fetial law.<sup>37</sup> It, therefore, seems extremely unlikely that Augustine was not familiar

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<sup>34</sup>Bainton, Attitudes, pp. 97-98.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>E.g., The City of God, 22, 6, refers to Cicero, The Republic 3, 23.

<sup>37</sup>E.g., De Officiis, 1, 35-56.

with fetial law and custom.

In Augustine's view, it was the task of the civil government to uphold and protect the church. Moreover, it was the task of the church to advise the government in those matters where the work of the government affected the welfare of the church. Augustine came to hold this view all the more strongly as he fought against the Donatists, a schismatic sect who often resorted to violence in their disputes with the Catholics. Therefore, Augustine could write openly to Donatus, the proconsul, concerning the fact that by means of his civil power and authority, which, of course, include the application of violence and force if need be, he has come to defend the church against her enemies.<sup>38</sup>

From here it was but a short step to the concept of the state waging war on the authority of God Himself, directed and guided in this by the church. Augustine found numerous examples of just this sort of war in the history of Israel recorded in the Old Testament, forgetting or perhaps never realizing that the people of God in the Old Testament were not completely analogous with the church of God in the New Testament.<sup>39</sup>

In Augustine we find the first well-rounded statement of the Christian concept of the just war. However, here too

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<sup>38</sup>Augustine, Letter 100.

<sup>39</sup>Russell, Just War, pp. 22-23.

we find the first seeds of the idea that would be developed into the idea of the crusade later in the middle ages. It is this imprecision in the thought of Augustine that contributed to the situation Russell describes when he writes,

In the Middle Ages the distinction between holy war, crusade and just war were difficult to draw in theory and were glossed over by those concerned to justify a particular war. In the heat of combat and controversy, belligerents forsook the more restrained just war for the holy war. At the moment a just war was deemed necessary, it easily became a holy war that pursued the supreme goals of the belligerents.<sup>40</sup>

There were a number of medieval theologians who wrote concerning the concept of a just war in the millennium following the death of Augustine. Of these we might mention Isadore of Seville, Pope Nicholas I, and Gratian.<sup>41</sup> However, it was Thomas Aquinas, writing some eight centuries after Augustine, who next made a notable contribution to the Christian teaching concerning the just war. We find his contribution contained in two of his writings, the Summa Theologica and the De Regno, Ad Regem Cypri.

In the Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae, Quaestio XL, Thomas dealt with four questions concerning the participation of a Christian as a combatant in war. Introducing the discussion, he wrote,

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<sup>40</sup>Russell, Just War, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup>For a brief but careful summary of the contributions of these theologians, see Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius, pp. 12-20.

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?<sup>42</sup>

Concerning the first question regarding whether waging war is ever licit, Thomas discusses first the objections that had been raised to the idea, as was the custom in the method of presentation commonly used at that time. Stating the first and most important objection to waging war, Thomas wrote,

It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not to be inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by our Lord with punishment according to Matthew xxvi. 52: All that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Therefore all wars are unlawful.<sup>43</sup>

In discussing this first and broadest objection, Thomas cited Augustine to the effect that had war been prohibited, those soldiers who sought advice of the Lord and of the Apostles, as recorded in the Gospels, would have been counselled to changed their profession. In fact, however, this did not happen. Instead they were advised to be content with their salary earned as soldiers.<sup>44</sup>

Thomas then continued,

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<sup>42</sup>Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa IIae, Q. XL.

<sup>43</sup>Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa IIae, Q. XL, 1.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

. . . in order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover, it is not the business of a private individual to summon together people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil; so, too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. . . .<sup>45</sup>

Here we see that Thomas has established Scriptural and logical support for one of the factors that he felt must be present if the waging of a war was to be justified. He clearly felt that for a war to be just it must be undertaken under an appropriate authority.

Thomas continued,

Second, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.<sup>46</sup>

Here Thomas makes it quite clear that there must be a just cause for going to war. While he does not go into the detail one finds in other authors, it may be assumed that, being cognizant of the writings of his predecessors, he felt that this point had been adequately discussed.

Thomas concluded his answer, writing,

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. . . . For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention.<sup>47</sup>

Thomas expanded on the idea he expressed here in his reply to the third objection, writing, "Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace."<sup>48</sup>

In summary, we can see that Thomas taught that for participation in a war as a combatant to be justified, the war must be under the auspices of the sovereign, it must have been begun for a justifiable cause, and it must be waged with a rightful intention, namely that a good peace may ensue.

All of this seems quite clear and straightforward, and it would seem that we can claim that Thomas taught a simple, pure just war theory. This would be true were it not for other political writings of Thomas that must be examined in this regard. In one of these writings, Thomas deals with the question we have yet to investigate, namely the question of what relationship Thomas saw to exist between the pope and the sovereign.

There is no difficulty in determining Thomas's thinking on this subject. We read in De Regno,

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

Thus, in order that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom [i.e., the church] has been entrusted not to earthly kings but to priests, and most of all to the chief priest, the successor of St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the Christian People are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.<sup>49</sup>

If this is not clear enough Thomas has provided us with an exposition of the logic underlying this view and thereby also underlying his teaching concerning the absolute supremacy of the pope. He wrote,

Because the priesthood of the gentiles and the whole worship of their gods existed merely for the acquisition of temporal goods (which were all ordained to the common good of the multitude, whose care devolved upon the king), the priests of the gentiles were properly subject to the kings. Similarly, since in the old law earthly goods were promised to the religious people (not indeed by demons but by the true God), the priests of the old law, we read, were also subject to the kings. But in the new law, there is a higher priesthood by which men are guided to heavenly goods. Consequently, in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests.<sup>50</sup>

Here again we meet a just law theory that is prone to slip from the idea of a just war to that of a crusade. It is not at all difficult to imagine what would have happened were the pope to have told the sovereign to commence hostilities against an enemy of the church. It is not at all difficult to imagine for this is, in fact, precisely what did happen to begin the crusades.

However, we must not think that this particular

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<sup>49</sup>Thomas Aquinas, De Regno, 110.

<sup>50</sup>Thomas Aquinas, De Regno, 111.



problem is a problem that possesses merely historical significance. Churchmen of the twentieth century resemble their predecessors of the medieval era in a number of ways. One of these ways is the weakness both have had for speaking concerning matters that are not the appropriate concern of the church. Crusades did not cease with the close of the medieval era.

### The Crusade

As noted above, the idea of the crusade comes about when the organized church takes a directing role in the waging of a war. No longer is participation in the war merely permitted or encouraged. It is now actively aided and abetted by the church, and the church also takes an active role in attempting to determine the grand strategy to be followed in waging the war.

If we are to deal fairly with the idea of the crusade as well as with those who first put the idea forward in the middle ages, we must bear in mind some of the problems in the troubled history of that period.

With the beginning of the decline of the empire and the onset of the barbarian invasions, medieval man was compelled more and more to look to his own resources. With the Hun in the next village and the smoke of his fires flavoring the air, one probably would not be inclined to send an emissary to distant Rome to inquire if she could

turn from her other distractions long enough to send several powerful legions to assist in the fight. The vastness of her frontiers that had once been one of her sources of strength now was the source of one of Rome's weaknesses, for now her forces were spread so thinly that she could seldom muster sufficient force anywhere in the empire.

If the Hun was in the next village, one was faced with a situation he was compelled to handle using only locally available resources. Thus was feudalism born, and thus did it flourish.

Under such emergency conditions, hierarchical organizations tended to disintegrate or, at best, to be honored in name alone. The stalwart few defending a minor castle often held out better prospects for safety than those allegedly mighty legions of Rome beyond the Alps.

As order and organization was again gradually restored in Europe, it was an order quite different from that which had disintegrated under the assaults of the barbarians. While it can be said that the Roman empire never disappeared during this period, the men who now claimed the crown were barbarians, and their administration, while avowedly Roman and a conscious imitation of the empire of old, contained many practices that were barbarian in origin.

That being the case, as we study the rise of the crusade we do well to remember that the western world then did not have the sharply delineated government that we see

today. The organized church of western Europe of the tenth through fourteenth centuries was not the smooth organization the Roman church is today. Neither organization then existed in the sharply-drawn distinction over against the other that is the case today. The western European who had time to ponder such things did not see the constituency of the prince. Both prince and bishop served and ruled one single people, for virtually everyone--Jews and heretics excepted--was a member of the church. Thus, when the people went to war, the church went to war, for the people were the church. It is in this fact that we find the roots of the practice still followed in Great Britain and in Canada of the battle standards of various combat organizations being kept in the cathedral of the see where the organization was raised.

Into this amorphous and often chaotic situation came the teaching of Augustine that, as we have seen, failed to provide the theoretical basis for a sharp boundary separating the just war idea from the idea of a crusade. If we keep all of this in mind, we shall not be at all surprised to find that the crusade idea grew vigorously in this climate.

The crusade idea takes its name from the crusade movement of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In 1094, Emperor Alexius Comnenus of the Byzantines sent envoys to a council of the Roman church being held at Piacenza. These

envoys urgently requested military aid from the west to assist them in their struggle against the Turks. It was also pointed out at that time to Pope Urban II that the incursions of the Turks threatened not only the Byzantines but also the Europeans.<sup>51</sup>

Apparently, at first, Urban intended to send only a small expeditionary force in order to assure Alexis of his good will and to examine the situation, as well as to aid in the battle against the Turk. However, as time went by, Urban's evaluation of the appropriate response in this situation altered drastically. By November 1095, Urban had a far grander intervention in mind than dispatching of a small group of knights, and he hesitated no longer in making his views known. Speaking in his native French to a synod of the church at Clermont to a congregation composed primarily of Frenchmen, Urban said,

O race of Franks, we learn that in some of your provinces no one can venture on the road by day or by night without injury or attack by highwaymen, and no one is secure even at home. Let us then re-enact the law of our ancestors known as the Truce of God. And now that you are obligated to succour your brethren in the East, menaced by an accursed race, utterly alienated from God. The Holy Sepulchre of our Lord is polluted by the filthiness of an unclean nation. Recall the greatness of Charlemagne. O most valient soldiers, descendants of invincible ancestors, do not be degenerate. Let all hatred depart from among you, all quarrels end, all wars cease. Start upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre to

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<sup>51</sup>Marshall W. Baldwin, The Medieval Church (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 100.

wrest that land from the wicked race and subject it to yourselves.<sup>52</sup>

Connected with this call to arms was the announcement of a plenary indulgence for all who heeded the call and went on the crusade.

In Urban's speech we see examples of several key characteristics that serve to differentiate a crusade from a just war. First, under the crusade idea, the church attempts to instigate the war as opposed to merely approving limited participation in it. Second, the church assumes a role of command insofar as the conduct of the war is concerned. Third, the enemy is described as being damned. Fourth, the war is described as the will of God. Fifth, the war is fought to gain some advantage for the church as opposed to a purely political advantage for the government involved. Sixth, those who take up arms and participate are promised some spiritual blessing or advantage.

Of course not all of these marks have been clearly evident in every proposal for a crusade. However, when these marks are evident, they serve as evidence that the organized church, or a portion of it, has stepped over the boundary between the kingdom of the right hand and the

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<sup>52</sup>Urban II, speech at the Council of Clermont, 1095, in Roland Bainton, ed., The Medieval Church (Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand and Co., 1962), p. 118.

kingdom of the left and is engaged in an attempt to assume authority in that kingdom of compulsion and law. That, of course, is never the task of the church qua church.

CHAPTER IX  
THE JUST WAR TEACHING OF  
MARTIN LUTHER

Martin Luther understood, on the basis of Scripture,<sup>1</sup> that the institution of civil government is established by God. He wrote,

We do not owe the government obedience for its own sake, says St. Peter, but for the sake of God, whose children we are. This must induce us to be obedient not the thought that our obedience is a meritorious deed.<sup>2</sup>

Luther held that this obedience owed to the civil government included military service. In regard to this particular type of obedience to government he wrote,

Thus, when the government, by virtue of its office, calls citizens into military service in order to maintain peace and ward off harm, obedience is shown to God. For the Lord tells us (Rom. 13:1): "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities."<sup>3</sup>

However, Luther was by no means naive concerning the nature and results of warfare. Well aware of the terrible price exacted by armed conflict, Luther wrote, "It is a known fact also that wars at the present time are of such a

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<sup>1</sup>E.g., Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2:13-17.

<sup>2</sup>Martin Luther, Sermons on the First Epistle of St. Peter, in the American Edition of Luther's Works, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955- ), 30:74. Hereafter referred to as "LW."

<sup>3</sup>Luther, Lectures on Genesis, LW, 2:272.

character as to make former wars appear as mere child's play.<sup>4</sup>

Luther set forth a just war theory that represents an important development of the theory held by his predecessors. While there seems to have been differences of opinion in medieval times concerning whether the participation of both sides in a war could be justified, there is no such confusion in Luther's writings. Insofar as he was concerned, at least one party to the conflict must be in the wrong and their participation thereby unjustifiable. That being the case, Luther wrote,

Because the whole world is engrossed in ambition and is profoundly wise, there is no place for love; jealousies, dissensions and wars abound everywhere. Even though you do what Abram did for Lot and yield your right, yet peace cannot be maintained, not even if you bear wrongs and disregard them.<sup>5</sup>

He added,

And this is the reason why Moses gives such a careful description of this war, namely that we may see the reign of the devil and of reason. God wants governments to exist; He wants evildoers to be condemned and the godly defended. But Satan corrupts the hearts so that the authorities degenerate into tyrants. Then follows wars and uprisings, the punishment of sins. These

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<sup>4</sup>Martin Luther, "Sermon on the Gospel for the Second Sunday in Advent," in John Nicholas Lenker, ed., Sermons of Martin Luther (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), p. 74. See also Luther's Lectures on Genesis, LW, 2:142 and 368-69; Lectures on Isaiah, LW, 16:134 and 284; Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, LW, 24:14 and 315; "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW, 46:78 and 96; and "Ten Sermons on the Catechism," LW, 51:175.

<sup>5</sup>Luther, Lectures on Genesis, LW, 2:338.



affect the godly too, as we shall hear now about Lot. But the Lord knows how to rescue the righteous man in the evil day.<sup>6</sup>

Luther's concept of the two kingdoms, each governed by its appropriate rule, enabled him to avoid the blurring of his just war theory into the idea of a crusade. Inasmuch as the kingdom of the right hand is ruled by love, it is entirely inappropriate that it should wield the sword.

Luther wrote,

If the banner of Emperor Charles or a prince is in the field, then let everyone run boldly and gladly to the banner to which his allegiance is sworn. . . . But if the banner of a bishop, cardinal, or pope is there, then run the other way.<sup>7</sup>

In fact, when the Emperor threatened to destroy the Lutheran church by force of arms, Luther wrote that the Lutheran princes even then did not have a just cause to wage a war of rebellion against their lord, the Emperor, in defense of the true faith. In the place of armed resistance, Luther recommended,

One should proceed as follows: If His Imperial Majesty proceeds against us then no sovereign or lord is to protect us against His Majesty; rather, he is to leave territory and people standing open to the Emperor, as belonging to him, and commend the matter to God. No one is to ask his sovereign or lord to do otherwise. But everyone is then to stand for himself and confess his faith by offering his body and life, and not to drag the sovereign into danger or burden him by seeking protection; rather he should let the Emperor deal with his

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<sup>6</sup>Luther, Lectures on Genesis, LW, 2:369.

<sup>7</sup>Martin Luther, "Admonition to Peace, A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia," LW, 46:17-43.

subjects as the Emperor wishes, as long as he is Emperor.<sup>8</sup>

We would do well to make careful note of the line of argument in this letter, inasmuch as Luther did subsequently agree that the princes could justifiably wage war against the Emperor. The question to which Luther here addressed himself was the question of whether the princes and electors should fight against the Emperor in the case that the Emperor sought to proceed against the Lutherans in their lands by force and violence. Luther says that war in this case is unjustifiable, for the princes' subjects are also the Emperor's subjects, and the Emperor is not answerable to his subordinates for his conduct toward his own subjects.

Later that same year, Luther wrote again, this time stating that the princes and electors could justifiably wage a war of rebellion against the Emperor should the Emperor move against the Lutherans by force. In a letter he himself delivered to the councilors of Saxony,<sup>9</sup> Luther wrote,

A piece of paper has been presented to us from which we see what the Doctors of Law are concluding regarding the question: In what situations may one resist the governing authority? If, then, [this issue] has been and [since] we certainly are in those situations in which (as [the legal experts] demonstrate) one may resist the governing authority, and [since] we have always taught that as long as the gospel does not go contrary to secular law one is to let secular law be effective, valid, and competent [in those matters it is able to

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<sup>8</sup>Martin Luther to Elector John of Wittenberg, 6 March 1530, LW, 49:278.

<sup>9</sup>LW, 49:429.

handle], we therefore are unable to oppose [anyone with arguments taken from] Scripture, if in this instance it is necessary to fight back, even if the Emperor himself [attacks us], or whoever else may do so in his name.<sup>10</sup>

Luther concluded this letter,

That until now we have taught absolutely not to resist the governing authority was due to the fact that we did not know that the governing authority's law itself grants [the right of armed resistance]; we have, of course, always diligently taught the [this] law must be obeyed.<sup>11</sup>

Legal experts had prepared a brief concerning what we would call constitutional law and had presented this brief to the Wittenberg theologians. The brief argued that the actions of the Emperor in religious matters were circumscribed by writs handed down by a general council. Thus, by the law of the empire, the Emperor was forbidden to begin a religious war against anyone without the approval of a council. The Lutherans had appealed to a council in regard to their being allowed to worship as their consciences dictated. No council had yet decided against them. Therefore, for Charles to move against them by force would be to violate the very laws by which he held his office.

There is no small amount of debate concerning whether this argument validly reflects the constitutional theory of the Holy Roman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century. Be that as it may, what is important for our

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<sup>10</sup>Martin Luther to the Electoral Saxony Government, about 27 October 1530, in LW, 49:432.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

purposes is that Luther thought that it did. That being the case, Luther could hold that a war against the Emperor would rather be a war waged against a tyrannical aggressor. In this case, the princes would be fighting in support of the empire against a rebel Emperor.

This evaluation disagrees somewhat with the evaluation of Lowell Green who writes that Luther

had conceded the right to resist solely on the basis of the legal code, but that in his opinion resistance still lacked support from the theological point of view. The princes could still resist only as membra corporis politici and not as membra corporis Christi et corporis ecclesiastici (Christians and churchmen).<sup>12</sup>

In fact, the brief moved the entire argument into a different arena. Previously, the argument concerned whether a Christian, qua Christian, had the right to resist his duly ordained civil ruler. Luther's answer to this question was and remained an unqualified "No." The brief, however, shifted discussion of resistance to the Emperor from a discussion of this question to discussion of the question, "May the princes and electors wage war on the Emperor in defense of the Empire?" It is to this question that Luther gives a "yes."

As Green points out, this was not the last time Luther felt called upon to discuss the question of resistance to authority. Green writes,

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<sup>12</sup>Lowell Green, "Resistance to Authority and Luther," The Lutheran Quarterly 6 (November 1954):345.

. . . Luther, together with Justus Jonas and Martin Bucer, signed a statement prepared by Melancton to the effect that the German electors and princes were in duty bound to arm themselves that they might protect their subjects in the event that the higher authority should attempt to compel them to return to "idolatry and forbidden divine worship." Just as a father is obligated to protect his family from murder, so were the princes bound to protect their citizens even if Charles V should march against them with arms, for murder is murder, even when committed by an unjust emperor.<sup>13</sup>

Here again we are looking at a subtly different situation from one of simple rebellion against constituted civil authority. In this case, the pope had directed the Emperor to wage a war of extermination against the Lutherans. Thus the pope would be the supreme commander in this contemplated war. Luther denied the pope civil authority over German territory. Therefore, one could justifiably, and should, resist an attack instigated by the pope against their lands and peoples.

Here we see clearly that Luther would have nothing to do with a crusade. When what would in effect have been a crusade was urged in defense of the Lutherans, Luther forbade it. When one was urged against the Lutherans, Luther encouraged resistance to it. Luther was able to make this sharply drawn distinction because of his clear idea of the two kingdoms and of the rules applicable in each.

Luther held that for participation in a war to be justifiable that participation must be under the auspices of

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<sup>13</sup>Green, "Resistance," p. 345.

someone who had the authority to wage war, that is, the supreme civil authority. The pope is not a civil authority. Therefore, a war waged under his command could not be just. Similarly, a war waged solely at the instigation of the church could not be just either.

It is important to note at this point that John Calvin differs from Luther. Where Luther taught that it was the chief duty of the civil ruler to preserve the peace, Calvin had another idea. He wrote,

The duty of magistrates, its nature, as described by the word of God, and the things in which it consists, I will here indicate in passing. That it extends to both tables of the law, did Scripture not teach, we might learn from profane writers; for no man has discoursed of the duty of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the common weal, without beginning with religion and divine worship. Thus all have confessed that no polity can be successfully established unless piety be its first care, and that those laws are absurd which disregard the rights of God, and consult only for men. Seeing then that among philosophers religion holds the first place, and that the same thing has always been observed with the universal consent of nations, Christian princes and magistrates may be ashamed of their heartlessness if they make it not their care.<sup>14</sup>

For Calvin, the chief duty of the state is to ensure that God be worshipped aright. That being the case, it is included among the duties of the state that it protect the church against her foes.

Here again we have a flaw in theory that allows the possibility of a crusade. If the state exists to support

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<sup>14</sup>John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964), book IV, chap. 20, sec. 9.

the church, then certainly the church is the best judge of when that support is needed. Thus the church may tell the state that a war is necessary and may further direct how that war is to be carried out. When the church directs the civil government concerning the waging of a war, the war is a crusade.

Luther also held that in order for participation in a war to be justifiable there must be a just cause. He wrote,

No war is just, even if it is a war between equals, unless one has such a good reason for fighting and such a good conscience that he can say, "My neighbor compels and forces me to fight, though I would rather avoid it."<sup>15</sup>

Insofar as Luther was concerned, the cause for going to war needed to be more than merely just. It must also be sufficiently grave so that the condition of the prince's realm after the war is fought will be better than had no war been fought at all. Luther wrote,

Therefore, right or wrong is never a sufficient cause indiscriminately to punish or make war. It is a sufficient cause to punish within bounds and without destroying the other. The lord or ruler must always look to what will profit the whole mass of his subjects rather than any one portion. That householder will never grow rich who, because someone has plucked a

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<sup>15</sup>Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW, 46:121. See also, Luther, Lectures on Deuteronomy, LW, 9:232; Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, LW, 21:39; "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed," LW, 45:124; "Trade and Usury," LW 45:279.

feather from his goose, flings the whole goose after him.<sup>16</sup>

Luther felt that a ruler's cause was not just unless he had first exhausted all peaceful means of resolving the dispute before beginning a war. He wrote,

Still it is not right for a prince to make up his mind to go to war against his neighbor, even though, I say, he has a just cause and his neighbor is in the wrong. The command is: "Blessed are the peacemakers." Therefore anyone who claims to be a Christian and a child of God, not only does not start war or unrest; but also he gives help and counsel on the side of peace wherever he can, even though there may have been a just and adequate cause for going to war. It is sad enough if one has tried everything and nothing helps, and then he has to defend himself, to protect his land and people. Therefore not "Christians" but "children of the devil" is the name of those quarrelsome young noblemen who immediately draw and unsheathe their sword on account of one word.<sup>17</sup>

Luther was also concerned that a war be conducted using only justifiable means. In his commentary on Deuteronomy he cited God's rule that Israel was to use no fruit trees in their siegeworks. Then he wrote,

He [God] wants this people to be civil and not barbarous, and to wage war, not to devastate a land which has not sinned but to sweep away the godless. He stirs their sensibility and feeling of civility beautifully when He says (v. 9): "Because it is wood, and not a man, it cannot harm you." Nevertheless, because they are wild men and almost beasts, armies despoil everything with sword and fire. Certainly He who wanted a nation so self-controlled that they would spare trees never would have permitted them to rage against women and

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<sup>16</sup>Luther, Commentary on the Magnificat, LW, 21:338.

<sup>17</sup>Luther, Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, LW, 21:40.



girls in debauchery, lust, and other violence after conquering the enemy, as it happens nowadays in our barbarity.<sup>18</sup>

We can see that Luther was aware that those who were authorized by their office to wage war often did so using unjustifiable means. Thus he wrote,

There are some who abuse this office [of soldier] and strike and kill people needlessly, simply because they want to. But that is the fault of the persons, not of the office, for where is there an office or a work or anything else so good that self-willed, wicked people do not abuse it? They are like mad physicians who would needlessly amputate a healthy hand just because they wanted to. Indeed, they themselves are a part of that universal lack of peace which must be prevented by just wars and the sword and forced into peace. It always happens and always has happened that those who begin war unnecessarily are beaten. Ultimately, they cannot escape God's judgment and sword. In the end God's justice finds them and strikes, as happened to the peasants in the revolt.<sup>19</sup>

Luther concluded, ". . . the abuse does not affect the office."<sup>20</sup>

In his teaching concerning the just war, Luther followed the medieval precedent of requiring an appropriate authority, just cause, and just means. He clarified the teaching by pointing out that only one side in the war could be said to be waging a just war. For our purposes, it may be well to note that he also taught that wars occurred in which the participation of neither side was justifiable.

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<sup>18</sup>Luther, Lectures on Deuteronomy, LW, 9:204.

<sup>19</sup>Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW, 46:97.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

Luther also wrote concerning the case where the subject is required to fight in an unjust war. In this case the subject must disobey the command of his prince for "it is no one's duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires the right) rather than men. . . ."21 However, the subject must be certain that the war is unjust. In the case where the subject is uncertain and is unable to obtain sufficient information to make an informed decision, he is to fight for his prince and he may do so with a clear conscience.22

However, Luther's most valuable contribution to just war theory lies not in his clarifying of certain blurred medieval distinctions but in his establishing clear bounds for the duty and the authority of the civil magistrate so that one who followed his theory could clearly distinguish between the just war and the crusade.

The Lutheran Confessions say little concerning the nature and content of the just war theory. They do, however, endorse it. Thus, we read in the Augsburg Confession,

Of Civil Affairs they [the Lutheran theologians] teach that lawful civil ordinances are good works of God and that it is right for Christians to bear civil office, to sit as judges, to judge matters by the Imperial and other existing laws, to award just punishments, to engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers, to make legal contracts, to hold property, to make oath when required by the magistrates, to marry a wife, to be given in marriage.

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21Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed," LW, 45:125.

22Ibid., p. 126.

They condemn the Anabaptists who forbid these civil offices to the Christian.<sup>23</sup>

In discussing the appropriate remembrance of the saints, the Augustana again mentions the conduct of warfare. Here, it is interesting that the confession implicitly rejects the crusade idea, stating

Of the Worship of Saints they teach that the memory of the saints may be set before us, that we may follow their faith and good works, according to our calling, as the Emperor may follow the example of David in making war to drive away the Turk from his country. For both are kings.<sup>24</sup>

What is of interest here for our purposes is the reason given for the Emperor to emulate David and drive the Turks from the Empire. "For both are kings," we are told. No mention is made of the heathen character of the worship of the Turks or of the need of the true faith to be protected from the infidel. It is the country (patria) that is to be defended, not the church.

The waging of war is mentioned in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession in connection with the controversy concerning what was accounted to be a good work in the sight of God. The confession states

David's labors, in waging wars and in his home government, are holy works, are true sacrifices, are contests of God, defending the people who had the Word of God

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<sup>23</sup>The Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI, pars. 1, 2.

<sup>24</sup>The Augsburg Confession, Art. XXI, par. 1.

against the devil in order that the knowledge of God might not be entirely extinguished on earth.<sup>25</sup>

Once more the idea involved here, as can be seen from the context,<sup>26</sup> is that David served God not by taking on some special and extraordinary task but by fulfilling the duties of the office to which God had called him, the office of the king of Israel, the magistrate responsible for the military defense of the nation.

The Apology further upholds the teaching of the just war when it mentions war as a form of public redress commanded by God.<sup>27</sup> Implicit in this statement is the idea that a war is not to be begun without a just cause.

A reading of the Luthran Confessions shows that the just war concept was generally accepted by both the Lutherans and their opponents. Therefore, we find few statements explaining or clarifying the theory, for it was not a point of contention. What was a point of difference was that between the Anabaptists and the Lutherans, mentioned in the Augsburg Confession. Here the Anabaptists did not argue with the Lutherans concerning the appropriate form for a just war theory. The Anabaptists were pacifists and denied

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<sup>25</sup>The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. III, par. 70.

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, pars. 71 and 72.

<sup>27</sup>The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI, par. 59.

the Christian any legitimate participation in any sort of warfare. The Lutherans, of course, spoke out against this error.

## CHAPTER X

### LUTHER'S JUST WAR TEACHING AS REFLECTED IN THE THOUGHT OF LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY

The theology of the era of Lutheran orthodoxy is only now beginning to emerge from a half century of eclipse in the shadow of monumental unfounded and unjust criticism. It is still fashionable in some circles to speak of "dead orthodoxy," but in recent times more attention is being given to such theologians as Martin Chemnitz and John Gerhard, with the result that the true worth of their thinking is again being realized.

The theologians of this era have been described as being out of touch with the needs of the Christian layperson.<sup>1</sup> However, a more accurate evaluation is that given by Bengt Hägglund who writes,

With respect to its versatile comprehension of theological material and the breadth of its knowledge of the Bible, Lutheran orthodoxy marks the high point in the entire history of theology. And it was not only contemporary tradition or the next preceding tradition which provided the material for the great Lutheran doctrinal expositions of the 17th century, but to an even greater extent it was the Bible and patristic sources.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), p. 79.

<sup>2</sup>Bengt Hägglund, History of Theology, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), p. 303.

The barrier between this work and the modern theologian is, in most cases, the Latin language. With the work of translators proceeding apace, this barrier is being in part surmounted. However, even a modest knowledge of Latin opens this vast storehouse to today's theologian.

It is generally reckoned that the era of classical Lutheran orthodoxy can be said to have extended from about 1580 to about 1720. There is no doubt that the orthodox Lutheran theologians of this period taught a just war theory. Martin Chemnitz,<sup>3</sup> Leonard Hutter,<sup>4</sup> John Gerhard,<sup>5</sup> Abraham Calov,<sup>6</sup> John Adam Scherzer,<sup>7</sup> John Andrew Quenstedt<sup>8</sup> John William Baier,<sup>9</sup> Frederick Bechmann,<sup>10</sup> John

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<sup>3</sup>Martin Chemnitz, Locorum Theologicorum (Wittenberg: Impensis Clementis Bergeri & Zachariae Schureni Bibliopolarum, 1615), Part II, pp. 126-29.

<sup>4</sup>Leonard Hutter, Loci Communes Theologici (Wittenberg: Typis & Impensis Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii & Johannis Seelfischii, 1661), pp. 960-61.

<sup>5</sup>John Gerhard, Locorum Theologicorum 22 vols. (Tubingen: Sumtibus Jo. Georgii Cottae, 1776), 14:238-305.

<sup>6</sup>Abraham Calov, Systematis Locorum Theologicorum (Wittenberg: Excudebat Johannes Wilkius, 1677), pp. 176-80.

<sup>7</sup>John Adam Scherzer, Systema Theologiae, XXX Definitionibus Absolutum (Leipzig & Frankfurt: Sumptibus Joh. Christoph. Tarnovi, 1601), p. 734.

<sup>8</sup>John Adam Quenstedt, Theologia Didactio-Polemica (Wittenberg: Mattaei Henckelii, 1685), Part IV, pp. 429-32.

<sup>9</sup>John William Baier, Compendium Theologiae Positivae 3 vols. (St. Louis: Luth. Concordia-Verlag., 1873), 3:739.

<sup>10</sup>Frederick Bechmann, Annotationes Uberiores in Compendium Theologicum Leonardi Hutteri (Frankfurt & Leipzig: Sumtibus Henrici Christophori Crokeri Bibliopol, 1703), pp. 908-12

George Walch,<sup>11</sup> John Benedict Carpzov,<sup>12</sup> and David Hollaz<sup>13</sup> all wrote in favor of the just war teaching.

The statements of these theologians concerning the just war differed with the times and with the purpose of their writing. Thus while Walch<sup>14</sup> and Carpzov<sup>15</sup> merely say that the position taken by the Lutherans in their confessions permits Christians to take part in just wars, others, such as John Gerhard, provide an extended examination of the teaching concerning the just war as well as responses to some of the objections that have been raised against the teaching.<sup>16</sup>

Basically, the teaching of the just war espoused by the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy established three conditions that must be fulfilled before participation in a war could be considered just. These were the same three conditions that had been established by Martin Luther, namely, that the war must be undertaken under the command of an

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<sup>11</sup>John George Walch, Introductio in Libros Ecclesiae Lutheranae Symbolicos (Jena: Sumtu Vidvae Meyer, 1732), p. 896.

<sup>12</sup>John Benedict Carpzov, Isagoge in Libros Ecclesiarum Lutheranae Symbolicos (Leipzig: Impensis Davidis Fleisherii, 1699), p. 463.

<sup>13</sup>David Hollaz, Examinis Theologici Acromatici 3 vols. (Rostock & Leipzig: Johann Heinr. Russwormium, Bibl., 1725), 2:890-91.

<sup>14</sup>John Walch, Introductio, p. 896.

<sup>15</sup>John Carpzov, Isagoge, p. 463.

<sup>16</sup>John Gerhard, Locorum, 14:238-305.



appropriate authority, that it must have a just cause, and that it must be waged in a just manner. Of course these theologians expressed this teaching in different ways and in different contexts. Some established more than three conditions, but when their lists are examined carefully it can be seen that their teaching could as well be encompassed in the three conditions mentioned.

As an example, we read in Quenstedt,

Disting. inter bellum iustum et legitimum, et quod non nisi urgente necessitate suscipitur; et bellum iniustum, illegitimum, et quod nullam urgente necessitate vicino alicui Principi movetur, non de hoc, sed illo sermo est. Illud autem bellum censetur naturam licitum et iustum in quo hae tres adsunt conditiones; 1. Legitima autoritas indicendi bellum, 2. Iusta causa, 3. Recta intentio. Ut ita legitimum bellum set ac iustum, quod a legitimo Magistratu iustis de causis ad pacem Reipubl. susceptam, cum iustitiam et aequitate, adhibitam omni moderatione administratur.<sup>17</sup>

It must be understood that the general outline of this just war theory was widely held in the seventeenth century. Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist considered to be the father of modern international law, completed his classic, The Rights of War and Peace, in 1625. A brief reflection on the history of that period will give one a correct estimate of the importance of Grotius's work. The medieval order of international law supported at least in part by a universal Roman church had now collapsed. The need for a new system to establish some limits to the brutality of war

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<sup>17</sup>Quenstedt, Theologia, p. 429.

was being demonstrated by the campaigns of the Thirty Years War, even as Grotius wrote.

Grotius is generally considered to have established six criteria for determining whether or not a given war is just. These criteria were:

1. The resulting condition after the war should be better than had no war been fought.<sup>18</sup>

2. The war should be made by the sovereign power of the state involved.<sup>19</sup>

3. The war must be accompanied by the prerequisite formalities such as a declaration that a state of war exists between the states involved.<sup>20</sup>

4. The war must be motivated by a just cause, as, for example, self defense, indemnity, or punishment for a serious wrong committed by the other state.<sup>21</sup>

5. All peaceful means of settlement must be exhausted before hostilities are begun.<sup>22</sup>

6. The war must be fought using just means, including but not limited to the protection of the rights of non-combatants and the observation of good faith with the

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<sup>18</sup>Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), pp. 17, 281.

<sup>19</sup>Grotius, War, pp. 57, 60, 321.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 57, 317.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 75, 77-80, 229-30, 268-70.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 276, 280, 318.

enemy in matters such as truces, safe-conducts, and the like.<sup>23</sup>

A brief examination of Grotius's six points will reveal that they are simply an expansion and explanation of the three points that were used by Lutheran theologians in their exposition of the just war theory. Points two, four, and six are explicit statements of the three points held by the Lutheran theologians. Point one has already been mentioned in the previous chapter as an indicator of whether there is a just and sufficient cause for going to war. Points three and five concern themselves with what conduct is appropriate and acceptable between combatants in war and might justifiably be subsumed under the rule that for a war to be just it must be fought using justifiable means.

Grotius wrote The Rights of War and Peace as a jurist, although he also on occasion wrote theological works of a distinctly Arminian flavor. Thus The Rights of War and Peace deals more with the practical and the legal issues arising from warfare. Grotius went into greater detail than the Lutheran theologians in describing what conduct was allowed and what was prohibited in the waging of a just war. He went to some pains to describe in detail those who should not be made the victims of war, such as women, children,

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 292-93, 302-304, 311-14, 333, 337, 353, 360-62, 364, 366, 381, 385, 403.

noncombatant men, prisoners, and neutrals.<sup>24</sup> He was careful to delineate those causes that were just (self-defense, indemnity, and punishment) and those that were unjust (resentment, fear of impending aggression on the part of the adversary, mere apprehension, covetousness, and the desire to enslave).<sup>25</sup> He also set forth requirements concerning the manner in which a war could be waged so as to result in the least amount of damage and hardship, thereby expanding on the idea that a just war is fought in a just manner.<sup>26</sup>

The just war theory of the Lutheran orthodox theologians benefitted from the sharply delineated concept of the office of the civil magistrate that they had received from Luther. With Luther, they understood that the civil authority dealt with the external actions of man and not with spiritual matters. Thus, Gerhard could write,

Through the political magistrate, [God] preserves peace and outward tranquility, administers civil justice, and protects our property, reputation, and persons.<sup>27</sup>

It is true that the orthodox Lutheran theologians spoke of the civil government as being instituted for the

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 326, 337, 353, 361-62.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-79, 81-82, 229-30.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 292-93.

<sup>27</sup>Gerhard, Locorum, 13:226, quoted in Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 617.

welfare of the Christian church, but we need only to examine what they have written in this regard to see the distinction between their view and that of John Calvin and those who followed his thinking in this regard. Thus, for example, Gerhard wrote,

The magistracy has been established by God, no less than the [pastoral] ministry, for the collection, preservation and extension of the Church, inasmuch as by means of it both outward discipline and public peace and tranquility are preserved, without which the ministry of the Church could not readily perform its duty, and the collection and extension of the Church could scarcely have a place, 1 Tim. 2:2.<sup>28</sup>

The Lutheran theologians did not believe that the civil government existed for the direct preservation and protection of the organizational church. As Gerhard has written, the duty of the civil government was to protect and promote the public peace. By simple definition, the public peace was a peace involving the entire public, not merely the church. The Lutheran theologians believed that when the civil government promoted the public peace, the Church was able to get on with her task. Thus the Lutherans did not believe that it was the task of the magistrate to take the church's part against her enemies. They expected him merely to promote peace, order, and good government. He was not to fight wars on behalf of the church, but he was to defend the entire nation, church and heathen alike, when justice so demanded.

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<sup>28</sup>Gerhard, Locorum, 13:225, quoted in Schmid, Theology, p. 618.

## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSIONS

Lutherans from the time of Luther to the present have concerned themselves with the question of how the believing child of God is to conduct himself in this sinful world. As a part of this larger problem, Lutherans have dealt with the issue of whether and under what conditions a Christian may take the part of a combatant in warfare.

The literature of the first century and a half of Lutheranism is surprisingly unanimous in its opinion on this subject. Luther and the Lutheran theologians of the era of Lutheran orthodoxy taught that the Christian citizen is commanded by God to be an obedient subject except when the civil ruler commanded disobedience to God. This obedience to the civil ruler includes serving as a combatant in just wars. Only in the case where the citizen knows the war to be unjust is he excused from participation in the war. In the research conducted for this thesis, no Lutheran theologian was discovered who taught other than a just war theory.

The just war teaching propounded by the Lutheran theologians is very similar to that propounded by other scholars. In particular, it is similar to that proposed by the great

seventeenth century jurist, Hugo Grotius. However, the Lutherans had an advantage that was peculiar to their teaching. Their very sharply delineated conception of the authority and responsibilities of the civil magistrate prevented them from straying from the path of the just war teaching into that of the crusade.

While weapons change, mankind does not. In addition, the will to win and the men who form the armies that take up arms are more important to the military goals of a political entity than the possession of sophisticated military hardware.

The teaching concerning the just war deals with the conduct of men engaged in combat with one another in a war as opposed to the specifications of the weapons they wield. Because this teaching was a correct application of the article of faith concerning the duties of the magistrate and the duties of the Christian citizen when it was formulated by Luther and those orthodox theologians who followed him, it is correct today also. Thus, it is applicable to wars fought now, for wars are still fought by men, regardless of the changes in weaponry.

Through years of study, the British strategist and military historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, concluded that the best and most consistently fruitful military strategy is what he denominated the strategy of the indirect approach.

The object of the strategy of the indirect approach is

to place the enemy in such a position that further resistance on the part of his forces is, and can be seen to be, disastrous. This strategy correctly takes into account a human factor in warfare that has often been overlooked, namely that the enemy's will to resist must be broken before there can be a cessation of hostilities. The easiest way to break the will of the enemy to continue the fight is to place him in a situation wherein it is clearly obvious that surrender is far preferable to the continuation of hostilities.

Guerrilla warfare is a means to certain goals of grand strategy, as are all other forms of warfare. Guerrilla warfare seems to fit particularly well the thermo-nuclear sitz im leben of the last two decades of the twentieth century. Where the goals of the superpowers conflict one with the other, it seems reasonable to conclude that we shall see more guerrilla wars, barring any unforeseeable shift in the balance of world power or any unforeseeable developments in military technology or tactics.

The same ethical rules apply in waging war against an enemy who is conducting guerrilla warfare as apply in any other armed conflict. Therefore, if the legitimate governing authority has a justifiable cause in waging its war against the guerrilla forces, it may employ all allowable means of force to defeat them. Moreover, the just war teaching does not demand a gradual escalation in the amount



of force which is exerted against the guerrillas. As a matter of fact, the just war theory may militate against such gradual escalation if it would seem that this would merely prolong the struggle and thereby result in more harm being done to both warring parties and to noncombatants caught up in the effects of the struggle.

The fact that the guerrilla is an irregular soldier greatly compounds the difficulty of waging war against him. Not everyone in Vietnam in the 1960's who wore black pajamas, for example, was a member of the Viet Cong, even if this was often the characteristic dress of the guerrillas.

Remembering the rule calling for war to be waged in a just manner by avoiding unnecessary injury, suffering, and hardship among noncombatants, the tactical leader fighting a counter-insurgency war must exercise extra care to direct his force solely against the enemy, even when the enemy is difficult to find and intentionally blends in with the civilian population.

It can often be the case that it is impossible to pick the guerrillas out from among the population. In such a situation, the tactical commander in the field must ensure that his troops do not take out their frustrations at being unable to find the enemy on the innocent populace. To permit such action will not only violate the rules of the just war teaching; it will also violate simple common sense. Mistreating the civilian population will discourage them

from cooperating with the counter-insurgency forces and, at the same time, tend to encourage at least covert cooperation with the guerrilla forces.

When it is impossible to extract the guerrillas from among the populace, then the strategy of the counter-insurgency war should include programs designed to win the populace away from the guerrillas. Such a strategy should include a very careful study of the goals that the guerrillas have established in order to bring their movement some degree of popular support. Often the guerrilla forces have been very accurate in pinpointing wrongs that afflict the community. If this is the case and there are genuine problems in the administration of the government in place, these must be corrected promptly and visibly. As long as there is corruption or prejudice prevalent in the government, the guerrilla movement will have a ready supply of discontent upon which to feed and to ferment revolt.

However, history teaches that a counter-guerrilla war is as rarely won by economic and administrative measures alone as it is won by military measures alone. The two must go hand in hand. Thus, in order to alleviate the suffering of those not directly involved in combat but who are victims for guerrilla terrorism and to alleviate that suffering as rapidly as possible, it behooves the established government to move against the guerrilla forces with the best military means at their disposal.

There seems to be a distinct possibility that the most effective means of fighting a counter-guerrilla war may be among the least sophisticated. Carpet-bombing with tons of thousand pound bombs may reduce a vast number of trees to splinters and create water-filled craters where once rice paddies flourished, but it will not kill any guerrillas unless they are in the area where the bombs land.

Experience tends to indicate that a much more effective way of dealing with guerrillas may involve waiting a week or more until a single guerrilla walks into an ambush. Such a tactic may be far less spectacular and dramatic than tons of bombs raining destruction out of the sky, but in the long run, there are clear indications that it may be faster and more effective.

It is quite clear that the real war to be waged in fighting against a guerrilla force is the war that is waged for the minds of the guerrillas. In a counter-guerrilla war, as in no other, the psychological battle for the mind of the individual soldier is of tremendous importance.

Each guerrilla is usually a portion of a small team with a distinct tactical role to play in that team. If one guerrilla defects and surrenders, he leaves a hole in his team that must be filled, but he does far more harm than merely that. By his defection, he has cast a vote for the established government with his feet, and, in so doing, he has inflicted invisible psychological wounds on all of the

other members of that team.

Adhering strictly to just means in the prosecution of a counter-guerrilla war will enhance the prospects that guerrillas will surrender. Torture and mistreatment of prisoners thus are both outside the conduct considered justifiable by a just war teaching and are also impractical.

Nations generally expect that their military leaders will be men of honor, meriting the respect and the obedience of their subordinates. In the free world, certainly, military leadership rests upon a foundation of respect for the one issuing the orders, and the cornerstone of that foundation of respect is the adherence of the leader to strict ethical standards. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cotton of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, has written,

I would like . . . to underscore the fact that we consider the ethical dimensions of the military profession to be central to the training and broader socialization of officers in the Canadian Forces. This is brought out, I would suggest, in the motto of the Royal Military College, "Truth, Duty, Valour," which is very much a part of the reality of College life. These moral precepts are not the only ones applicable to the military profession and leadership, but they are decidedly central to it, and they imply moral qualities of honesty, integrity, loyalty, obedience, and concern. We believe these qualities to be of fundamental importance, and stress them in training and education.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cotton to Frank Morgret, 15 April 1982.

It is only appropriate that I acknowledge here the valuable assistance I received from Colonel Cotton of the Royal Military College, Kingston; Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Wenkler, U.S.A.F., Head of the Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts, U.S. Air Force Academy; and Captain J. B. Kramer, U.S.N., Dean of Academics, U.S. Naval War College, Newport,

Colonel Cotton continues,

Although it is very difficult to establish the exact relationship empirically between moral qualities and leader effectiveness, it is generally accepted in the western military tradition that they are inextricably linked. All major discussions of the topic have stressed this. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Ultimately, there is a very utilitarian reason why morality is so fundamental to military leadership. It is fundamental to military leadership for precisely the same reason it is fundamental to pastoral leadership. For a man to be followed he must be trusted by those he would lead. As Colonel Cotton has written,

. . . I see the leader-follower relationship as necessarily based on trust and reciprocal confidence. The evidence and opinion in the literature suggests very strongly that the officer must build a relationship

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Rhode Island.

Commander Ray D. Hunter, R.N., executive officer of Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Devon, England, deserves a special word of appreciation. Between the time that I wrote asking for information concerning the leadership training at the Royal Naval College and Commander Hunter's receipt of my letter he, along with the rest of the senior officers of the Royal Navy, were catapulted into the planning and execution of Operation Corporate by the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands. That Commander Hunter found time to provide me with assistance under these circumstances provides but another example of the unflappability for which the Royal Navy has been justly famous ever since its victory over the Armada.

The contributions of all of these gentlemen to my research, as well as their interest in my project and their encouragement, have been instrumental in its successful completion.

<sup>2</sup>Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton to Frank Morgret,  
15 April 1982.

founded on trust and integrity if the cohesion so necessary to military effectiveness is to be created.<sup>3</sup>

It would be a display of almost incredible naivete were one to suggest that wars are conducted entirely and always according to the rules established by the Lutheran teaching concerning the just war. In fact, there are those who would go so far as to question whether any rules may be made to apply in warfare. To that question the answer is a most unequivocal "Yes."

The existence of the various international protocols and conventions regulating the rules of war<sup>4</sup> testifies to the fact that war still has not descended to the level of totally unregulated violence. Lest one should say that the mere existence of rules does not speak to their enforcement, the remarks of Major M. J. Samuelson, Royal Marines, are instructive. Writing concerning the lessons learned by the Royal Marines in their operations in the Falklands, Major Samuelson states

On the administrative side, we had been unprepared for the scale of the prisoner of war problem and--although we are confident that we kept on the right side of the Geneva convention--a general teach-in on the laws of armed conflict has been well received.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>An excellent compilation of the various treaties governing the rules of conflict is to be found in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

<sup>5</sup>M. J. Samuelson, "Royal Marines and the 'Corporate' Experience," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1984):153.

The morality displayed by a country in waging war reflects the morality of that country in its other pursuits. Ultimately, the morality of her military officers cannot rise all that much higher than the morality of the rest of her citizens. Simply to lash out at the immorality of some incidents involving military officers is to deal with a symptom but to leave the basic disease untouched. The waging of a just war requires just means of conflict, and these just means will be those exercised by moral leadership. Unless a society is capable of producing men of high moral character to lead her armies, she cannot wage war justly.

The traditional Lutheran teaching that a war is just if it is undertaken by the appropriate authority with a legitimate cause and subsequently waged using justifiable means can be validly applied to counter-guerrilla warfare in the twentieth century. It provides a sound guide for determining the morality of the conduct of such a war.

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