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THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN NATURE AND DESTINY
IN RECENT PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
Department of Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Divinity

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN FROM AUGUSTINE TO FREUD

Reinhold Niebuhr, in a discussion of "Augustine's political realism," suggests that the Bishop of Hippo differed from the classical philosophers in that he held a Biblical, rather than a rationalistic, conception of human selfhood, with its ancillary conception of the seat of evil being in the self. Thus he describes Augustine as the first great "realist" in western history.¹

Niebuhr's theme throughout his extensive social and political writings is that any adequate social theory must begin with a realistic appraisal of human limitations and potentialities.² Herbert Butterfield, the British historian, is another eloquent voice of our time insisting that an unrealistic evaluation of man can result in illusory and dangerous social theory.³ The fact of human nature cannot be omitted from any discussion of human destiny.

¹Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), pp. 121-2.

²Ibid., pp. 1-14.

³Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons), 1950. Cf. also Butterfield's Christianity, Diplomacy and War (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953).

Carl Becker, in his classic analysis of the eighteenth-century Philosophers, shows that they professed an equal respect for the facts of human nature. David Hume wanted to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature and on these principles to base a reconstructed society. "The ideal method for the philosopher-historian," as Becker observes, "would thus be the comparative method, the strictly objective, inductive, scientific method".⁴

Nevertheless, the Philosophers of the eighteenth century did not employ this ideal method. Montesquieu made the bravest appearance of doing so, but he was criticized by Condorcet for being too enamored of the facts; he would have done better if he had not been "more occupied with finding the reasons for that which is than with seeking that which ought to be."⁵

The truth is that the Philosophers were not interested in establishing the rights suitable to man's nature on the facts of human experience, but were rather engaged in the nefarious enterprise of reconciling the facts of human nature with truths already, in some fashion, revealed to them. The eighteenth-century Philosophers, like the medieval Scholastics, held fast to a body of revealed knowledge, and they were

⁴Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), p. 100.

⁵Ibid., p. 101.

unable or unwilling to learn anything from history which could not be reconciled with their faith.⁶

In effect, they deduced human nature from human destiny. The faith by which they lived, and in the light of which they read their facts, is what Carl Becker has picturesquely called "The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers." The essential articles of the religion of the Enlightenment were four, as Becker enumerates them:

1. Man is not naturally depraved.
2. The end of life is life itself, the good life here on earth.
3. Man is capable, guided solely by reason and experience, of perfecting the good life on earth.
4. The first and essential condition of the good life is the freeing of men's minds from the bonds of ignorance and superstition, and of their bodies from the arbitrary oppression of social authorities.

With this creed the "constant and universal principles of human nature" must be in accord. Becker writes:

They know instinctively that "man in general" is natively good, easily enlightened, disposed to follow reason and common sense; generous and humane and tolerant, more easily led by persuasion than compelled by force.⁷

Becker quotes Priestley, "a quite sane and sound Englishman," in his essay on government:

Thus, whatever was the beginning of this world, the end will be glorious and paradisiacal, beyond what our imaginations can conceive. Extravagant as some may suppose these views to be, I think I could show them to be fairly suggested by the true theory of human nature,

⁶Ibid., p. 102.

⁷Ibid., pp. 102-3.

and to arise from the natural course of human affairs. But, for the present, I waive this subject, the contemplation of which always makes me happy.⁸

Diderot writes that "nature wills that man should be perfectible,"⁹ and this promise is the inspiration for activity.

With a realization of the dangers implicit in any generalization, we may say that the Enlightenment, in direct contradiction to its profession of realism, studied human destiny in order to learn human nature. The wish was father to the fact.

This approach was not only important for later philosophy (including the philosophy of science); it was also extremely influential in the subsequent history of social, political, and theological thought. The French Revolution was one of its products, as Burke cogently demonstrates.¹⁰ Herbert Spencer was surely another.¹¹ Liberal theology was yet another.

Here in America, for example, Calvinism, always the dominant tradition in American theology, was replaced in the nineteenth century by a liberal theology derived from German

⁸Ibid., p. 145.

⁹Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁰Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1934).

¹¹Herbert Spencer, Social Statics and Man versus the State (New York: D. Appleton & Co., c. 1915).

philosophical idealism: Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Lotze, Ritschl, Troeltsch. Though there were two poles in German idealism, the mystical, metaphysical tendency toward pantheism and the ethical, social tendency toward humanism or positivism, American theologians generally managed to resist the extremes and hold a fair balance. The product was the evangelical liberalism of such men as Horace Bushnell, George Angier Gordon, William Newton Clarke, and William Adams Brown, with the accent on the liberalism.¹²

H. Shelton Smith, in his recent book on Changing Conceptions of Original Sin, illustrates the tendency among theological heirs of the Enlightenment to base their understanding of human nature upon a prior conception of human destiny.

Theodore T. Munger was not much impressed by the human predicament. He was much more impressed with man's capacity to conquer the fleshly impulses and grow up in the divine love.¹³

Newman Smyth saw "unmistakable evidence of progress" in the history of mankind. There is a divinely determined evolu-

¹²Walter M. Horton, "Systematic Theology," Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Arnold S. Nash (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 105-11.

¹³H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original Sin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 168.

tionary movement in human affairs which is "infrustrable" and carries man on to new triumphs of creative and redeeming love.¹⁴

George Gordon's doctrine of human nature assumed a similar optimistic cast, deriving as it did from his convictions that man was divine in his essential nature and that "moral progress" was inevitable.¹⁵

Washington Gladden was strikingly optimistic on the basis of a belief that man's freedom is of such a nature that he can progressively eradicate evil tendencies and that man's good tendencies are more enduring than the evil ones which might beset him temporarily.¹⁶

Lyman Abbott was equally captivated by the notion of moral progress, and believed that God is steadily displacing the animal in man.¹⁷

George Harris had a firm faith in divine immanence and moral progress.¹⁸

William Newton Clarke believed that humanity "certainly is by nature a slowly rising race, with a native tendency to outgrow faults."¹⁹

¹⁴Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 173-4.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 176-7.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 192.

Not all these theologians are equally optimistic about man, but because of their faith in moral progress--or some similar doctrine--they tended, as Smith points out, "to magnify the growing goodness of man and to obscure the fundamental roots of human sinfulness."²⁰

"Moral progress" was the heavenly city of the nineteenth-century theologians.²¹

A world war, a depression, and another world war did much to shake the complacency of those who read man's nature from assumptions concerning his destiny. Theology was recalled by catastrophe to a serious reconsideration of the Christian doctrine of original sin. But long before the crashing events of 1914 a Viennese doctor named Sigmund Freud had begun to cast doubts upon the optimistic view of man held by the nineteenth century. Freud was a contemporary of the theologians cited above. But in distinction from them he firmly believed that no knowledge of man was available by insight, intuition, or revelation; knowledge, even knowledge of man himself, must proceed from empirical investigation. Freud wrote several books on the future of civilization; but they followed, they did not precede, a careful investigation

²⁰Ibid., p. 197.

²¹ Cf. also John Baillie, The Belief in Progress (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951).

of man and his nature. Freud reasserted the principle of realism; he studied the nature of man before he studied his destiny.

This paper will begin with Sigmund Freud and his attempt to analyze the human predicament without prior benefit of illusion. This is not to say that Freud had no illusions. The significance of the Freudian approach to man lies in its respect for the scientific method, a method ideally capable of weeding out illusion in the long run and of bringing to light the empirically verifiable facts.

The emphasis in this paper will be on the Neo-Freudians, the "psycho-sociologists" who made use of Freud's method and in the course of their investigations developed a concept of human nature radically different from his. The continuities will be stressed throughout, for this paper is intended to indicate the similarities and the differences between the "scientific" theory of human nature whose study Freud initiated and the traditional theory of Christianity.

What is the concept of human nature and destiny which has been developed by an integrated social science, in particular by psychologists, attempting to employ the insights of all the social sciences in a study of man? What is the significance of this concept for biblical anthropology?

In addition to Freud, four major writers will be considered. Karen Horney in many ways precipitated the basic break with Freud's "biologism." Erich Fromm tried more

specifically to relate the findings of psychoanalysis to man in society. David Riesman approached the same problem from the standpoint of a sociologist. Sebastian de Grazia began from that of a political scientist. Both have been trained in psychiatry.

An attempt will also be made to indicate the extent of psycho-sociology's acceptance in contemporary social science, by showing both its derivation and its influence.

Finally, this paper will try to relate the findings of psycho-sociology to the Christian understanding of man. The theology of Paul Tillich will be suggested as a possible bridge.

CHAPTER II

SIGMUND FREUD

Sigmund Freud did not share the optimism of the century in which he was born. The belief in the goodness of man which characterized his age was, to Freud, pure illusion. Man does not tend naturally toward the good. Rather, man has within himself an aggressive instinct, an instinct toward death, the existence of which both history and experience attest.¹

The evolution of culture is therefore not a process moving eternally upward and onward. Freud writes:

It must present to us the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instincts of life and the instincts of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of and so the evolution of civilization may be simply described as the struggle of the human species for existence.²

In the manner of Hobbes, Freud stresses the basic hostility between men. "Homo homini lupus; who has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history?"³

¹Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated from the German by W. J. Sprott (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., c. 1936), p. 142. Will be referred to hereafter as New Lectures.

²Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated from the German by Joan Riviere (New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, c. 1930), p. 102. Referred to hereafter as Civilization.

³Ibid., p. 85.

Freud denied that he was driven to this conclusion by any particular Weltanschauung, for the Weltanschauung of psychoanalysis is the Weltanschauung of science. Psychoanalysis has none of its own. "In reality psychoanalysis is a method of investigation, an impartial instrument like, say, the infinitesimal calculus."⁴

There is for Freud no other source of knowledge about the universe than the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations. No knowledge can be obtained from revelation, intuition, or inspiration.⁵ A Weltanschauung based on science has essentially negative characteristics: it "limits itself to truth and rejects illusions."⁶

Freud insists, of course, that science itself is no illusion. "No, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us."⁷

This dogmatic certainty about the non-illusory character of science can be questioned. But the point here is that Freud thoroughly accepted it. Hence he rejected any understanding of human destiny not based upon an adequate appraisal

⁴Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, translated from the German by W. D. Robson-Scott (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., c. 1928), p. 64. Referred to hereafter as Illusion.

⁵New Lectures, p. 217.

⁶Ibid., p. 243

⁷Illusion, p. 98.

of the empirically demonstrable facts of human nature. Whether or not Freud's understanding of human nature is correct, he did reverse the trend toward reasoning from man's destiny to his nature.

Karen Horney, the first of the Neo-Freudians to be treated in this paper, asserts that Freud's philosophy, which stemmed from his understanding of what man actually is, was pessimistic. "Ours," she writes, "with all its cognizance of the tragic element in neurosis, is an optimistic one."⁸

One of the tasks of this paper will be to indicate how the approach which made Freud a pessimist, the psychoanalytic approach to man and his problems, has made others, notably the psychosociologists, optimistic (or at least relatively optimistic).

What were the "facts" of human nature, as determined by science?

Freud was an instinct psychologist. He never terminated a discussion of human drives, institutions, or tendencies without an attempt to relate them to some fundamental biological instinct from which they ultimately draw their strength.

In the course of working out his own theory of instincts and human behavior, Freud eventually concluded that there were

⁸Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950), p. 378.

two major classes of instincts: the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts. Although he had earlier identified the ego-instincts with the urge toward self-preservation, his last formulation reverses this decision and explicitly equates the ego-instincts with the instincts toward death.⁹

From his study of repetition-compulsion, Freud developed the theory that an instinct is a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it toward the reinstatement of an earlier condition. Instincts are, in other words, the expression of the conservative nature of living beings.¹⁰

Organic development is therefore credited to external forces. The evolution of the earth has left an imprint on the development of its organisms. But the conservative organic instincts have absorbed every one of these enforced alterations and have stored them up for repetition. The instincts are not striving for change and progress, though this may be their superficial appearance. They are actually endeavoring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new. Ultimately, since the inanimate preceded the animate, the goal of all life is death. As external influences caused life to evolve farther and farther from its original state of death, living substance was compelled to take more complicated and

⁹Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, translated from the German by C. J. M. Hubback (London: International Psycho-Analytical Press, c. 1922), p. 54. Cf. also New Lectures, pp. 140-1.

¹⁰Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 44-6.

circuitous routes to its goal of death. The phenomena of life which we observe are nothing more than these circuitous routes toward death.¹¹

The sexual instincts are also conservative, in that they tend toward production of an earlier condition of living substance; but they are also life instincts, prolonging the journey throughout the course of which life presses toward death. But apart from the sexual instincts, there are no others having as their object a condition not yet attained. All others strive toward the reinstatement of an earlier condition.¹² Stated in another fashion, all non-sexual instincts are death instincts or "instincts of aggression."

Instincts have a source, and object, and an aim. Their source is always excitation within the body. Their object may be attained in the subject's own body, but is usually an outside object. The aim of the instincts is always to remove the excitation. In the course of its path from source to aim, an instinct becomes operative mentally.¹³

Were this process permitted to operate in the mechanical fashion which Freud describes, the complications which mar human existence would not set in. But there are forces tending to block the instinct from the realization of its aim.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 46-8.

¹²Ibid., pp. 49-51.

¹³New Lectures, pp. 132-3.

One is the super-ego. The super-ego is a split-off portion of the ego, an observing function separated from the rest of the ego in the course of the ego's normal development. One of the activities of this function is conviction and punishment.¹⁴ The super-ego represents the entire corpus of morality's demands. Conscience is a part of the super-ego.

Note that conscience is something within us; but it has not been in us from the beginning. It is not a "natural knowledge of the law," for example, divinely implanted at birth. Small children are in fact notoriously amoral. The role which the super-ego is to play later is taken at first by the parents, who grant proofs of affection or threaten punishment, loss of love, as the consequence of certain types of behavior. But later the external restrictions are introjected, so that the super-ego takes the place of the parental function. Then the super-ego becomes "not merely the legatee of parental authority," but "actually the heir of its body."¹⁵

Without going any further into the theoretical assumptions implicit in the concept of the super-ego, we pass on to Freud's idea of its activity. The super-ego is the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself,

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 84-6.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 89.

toward which it strives, and whose demands for ever-increasing perfection it is always endeavoring to fulfill.¹⁶ It complicates the tasks of the ego by giving it a third master to serve. The ego serves first of all the id, from which it has been modified by its proximity to the external world. But it serves also the external world, modifying the demands of the id in accord with the "reality-principle." To put it in another way, the ego has the task of finding ways for the id to satisfy its aims without contradicting the harsh facts of external reality. When a third master, the super-ego, is introduced, and the ego is now compelled to satisfy three conflicting sets of demands, those from the external world, the super-ego, and the id, the hard-pressed ego may develop anxiety.¹⁷

The id is amoral, the ego strives to be moral, the super-ego is hyper-moral. Since the id is the source of the instincts which the ego must accommodate and the super-ego tends often toward violent opposition to the libidinal id urges, the ego is in an uncomfortable position, buffeted by hostilities and open to varied dangers.¹⁸ This, for Freud, is the very root of anxiety.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 92-3.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 106. Cf. also Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, translated from the German by Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, c. 1927), pp. 82-5.

¹⁸Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 79-80.

Freud developed at least two theories of anxiety.¹⁹ But he never changed his essential conclusion that neurotic anxiety is always connected with the rendering unusable of a given quantity of libido.²⁰ Originally he had held that unsatisfied libido, that is, undischarged excitation, was transformed directly into anxiety. Later he modified his theory to make anxiety a cause of instinct repression. An instinct is repressed because of the belief that punishment will follow its gratification. Freud went even farther than this. He identified that which is feared. The small boy fears castration by his father as a consequence of his libidinal urge toward his mother. Girls, who can't have a fear of castration, fear instead the loss of love. The two factors have a common root: they are both ultimately fear of separation from the mother, a repetition of the original birth-anxiety.²¹

Psychoanalytic therapy according to Freud proceeds from an understanding of the two ways in which anxiety arises. It may be called forth as a signal of an earlier danger situation, that is, from fear of an emergence of a traumatic factor (birth-anxiety), or it may come directly from traumatic

¹⁹Compare Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety, translated from the German by Henry Alden Bunker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., c. 1936) and New Lectures, lecture XXV.

²⁰New Lectures, p. 115.

²¹Ibid., pp. 119-22. Compare The Problem of Anxiety, pp. 73, 83-4.

factors, as when the ego comes into contact with an excessive libidinal demand. To put it in another way, anxiety may be the direct effect of a traumatic factor, or it may be a signal that a traumatic factor threatens to recur. And Freud held that birth, as the original trauma, is the pattern and prototype for all subsequent attacks of anxiety.²²

This treatment of anxiety has led into theoretical niceties which actually go beyond the scope of this paper. But the discussion has been presented for two reasons. First of all, the concept of anxiety is an extremely important one for the psycho-sociologists, as will be seen below. Secondly, Freud's treatment of anxiety provides an excellent illustration of certain premises and operating assumptions which are to be criticized in detail and then rejected by the psycho-sociologists.²³ They include a biological orientation, a concentration upon sexual factors in neurosis, and a mechanistic-evolutionistic interpretation of human development that sees later developments as essentially repetitions of childhood experiences.

On the basis of his understanding of man, his biological-psychological-chemical nature, Freud constructs a fairly detailed theory of human destiny.

²²New Lectures, p. 130. Also The Problem of Anxiety, pp. 72-5.

²³Cf. especially Horney's examination of the Freudian premises in the next chapter.

What is the purpose of life? Freud's answer: apparently there is none. Perhaps there is not even the right to ask this question, for it presupposes a belief in the superiority of the human race, and Freud's biological view of man makes such a belief untenable.

Freud prefers to answer a less ambitious question: what does the behavior of men indicate the purpose of their lives to be? And this he can answer. Human behavior indicates that happiness is the goal of life. Man wishes to become happy and remain so, to eliminate pain and experience pleasure. The "pleasure-principle" which Freud finds operating especially in the id draws up the program of life's purpose and dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the beginning.

But the possibilities for happiness are limited from the outset by the human constitution. Happiness comes from the satisfaction of pent-up needs. It is by its nature a transitory experience; men are only able intensely to enjoy contrasts. Moreover, suffering comes from the body itself, from the outer world in which the person is forced to live, and from the necessary relations with other men. So humanity has reduced its demands for happiness, just as the pleasure-principle itself changes into the more accommodating reality-principle under the influence of the external environment.²⁴

²⁴Civilization, pp. 26-9.

Freud is completely non-evaluative in sketching the various means for the attainment of happiness. He suggests intoxication; the annihilation of instincts, as in Yogi; sublimation, such as the artist's "joy in creating"; living in a dream world, guided by illusion; or making love the center of all things and anticipating happiness from loving and being loved. But in all this, he concludes, there is no overruling recipe which suits all. Each one must find for himself the particular means by which he may achieve happiness.²⁵

It is immediately apparent that not all these routes are open to everyone. External reality imposes limitations upon each individual in his quest for happiness. Intoxicants may be too expensive, the individual may not be artistically inclined or he may not have the capacity for credulity which permits others to find happiness in a certain illusion. All this has been already implied. But there is one additional source of restraint upon man. That is culture, or civilization, with all its injunctions.

Culture is designed principally as a defense against nature. This is its raison d'être.²⁶ Man's self-esteem craves consolation, life and the universe must be rid of their terrors, and man's curiosity, pure and practical,

²⁵Ibid., p. 40.

²⁶Illusion, p. 26.

demand answers. Culture performs these tasks.²⁷ And it is religion which, traditionally, has been charged by culture with the primary responsibility. Men have invented religious ideas, "illusions," which persist to the extent that they satisfy the human craving for security and knowledge. The forces of nature are given the characteristics of the father, they are transformed into gods, in accord with an infantile and phylogenetic prototype. The gods exercise the terrors of nature, reconcile man to his fate, and make amends for the suffering and privation which communal life has imposed on man.²⁸

Freud believes that these three major chores of the gods are subject over time to a shift in emphasis. As men gradually come to recognize that natural phenomena develop of themselves from natural necessity, and that the gods themselves are subject to Destiny, their expectations concentrate on the third task: morality becomes the proper domain of the gods. The gods must adjust the defects and evils of culture. The rules of culture are simultaneously elevated to divine status and entrusted to the guardianship of the gods. What culture demands becomes the divine will.²⁹

²⁷Ibid., p. 28.

²⁸Ibid., p. 30.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 31-2.

And so a rich store of ideas is formed, with increasing projection of justice into the future as men keep looking for amelioration of their plight, and an eventual eschatological emphasis. At some point all the gods are united into one God, making possible an intimate child-father relationship. And the whole complex of ideas is prized as the most valuable possession of culture and its most precious gift to its adherents.³⁰

Communal life, as stated above, imposes suffering and privation upon man. Culture is a burden, for which man requires compensation. Why should this be? What is the nature of the restrictions which culture imposes? And if they are onerous, why does man not discard them?

The instinct of sexuality draws two people to each other and enables them to form a rudimentary community. But because man is by nature aggressive, two is company and three is a crowd. Culture, however, must create a larger sense of community than that shared by the libidinally attracted pair if collective life is to be possible, with any reasonable degree of security. So culture makes the high demand "Love your enemies" and "Love your neighbor as yourself." In order to enforce this demand, in order to appropriate the necessary libido (there is no love without withdrawal from the reservoir of libido), culture levies energy from sexuality. In its

³⁰Ibid., pp. 32-5.

effort to create a community wider than the original libidinally attracted pair, culture becomes antagonistic to sexuality. In Freud's own words, "it exacts a heavy toll of aim-inhibited libido in order to strengthen communities."³¹

Culture obeys an inner erotic impulse which bids it bind mankind into ever larger communities. But since it can do this only at the cost of instinct suppression--suppression, in fact, of that very instinct which lies at the root of culture's urge to create community--the process creates an ambivalence within man which is recognized as a sense of guilt. Culture can in these circumstances fulfill its task only by fomenting an ever-increasing sense of guilt. Hence "the price of progress in civilization is paid in forfeiting happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt."³²

Culture accomplishes much of its task through the super-ego, which it seeks to strengthen as its most valuable psychological possession.³³ The super-ego restricts man in his sexual urges, compels sublimation of the instincts which crave satisfaction, and creates community and culture.

Primitive man was better off in this respect, Freud reasons. He knew nothing of such restrictions upon his instincts. But he paid the price in a loss of security.³⁴

³¹Civilization, pp. 80-7.

³²Ibid., pp. 121-3.

³³Illusion, p. 18.

³⁴Civilization, pp. 91-2.

The real task lying before social scientists is to reduce the evil consequences of repression without giving up any security.

The most that can be hoped for is not very much. The burden of instinctual sacrifices can be diminished to the necessary minimum by rational examination, the instincts can be reconciled somewhat to the suppression which must remain, and they can be compensated for these.³⁵ Unfortunately, man's limited capacity for education sets limits to what can be done by such a cultural transformation. The majority which is presently hostile to culture can perhaps be reduced to a minority. Although this is probably all that men can realistically hope to accomplish, even this much is a great deal.³⁶ For the destructive, anti-social tendencies are present in all men, and in many are strong enough to determine their final behavior in society.³⁷

It has already been pointed out that culture, in the effort to secure obedience to its dictates, projects them into the will of God. At least, this has been the accepted practice thus far in human history. Religion has been the weapon of culture. But religion is an illusion. Religious ideas or dogmas are derived from human wishes. (Freud distinguishes carefully illusion and delusion. Delusion conflicts with reality. Illusion, which neither admits of

³⁵Illusion, p. 12.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 14-5.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 10-1.

proof nor disproof, is not refutable.) The measure of religion's strength is the strength of the wishes which caused its rise.³⁸

Freud calls religion the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity, like all neuroses, serving a purpose, namely, the allayment of anxiety. By accepting the universal neurosis the individual may spare himself the task of forming a personal neurosis.³⁹ But since religious dogmas are neurotic survivals, they will be abandoned with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth. And Freud believes that the time has come for a deliberate effort to replace these "consequences of repression" with the results of rational mental effort, as is done in the analytic treatment of neurotics. Perhaps, though Freud admits the possibility of wishful thinking here, this replacement of religious illusions by rational ideas will make the task of reconciling man to culture a little bit easier.⁴⁰

It might be possible that reason could function to create the morality necessary for the preservation of civilization if its development were not choked at an early age by thought prohibitions in the name of religion. Freud believed that the experiment of a non-religious education should at

³⁸Ibid., pp. 52-5.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 75-7.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 77-8.

least be tried. Should it fail, he would be willing to return to his earlier judgment: man is a creature of weak intelligence, governed by his instinctual wishes, and requiring religious dogma to keep him civilized.⁴¹

But the possible advantages to be gained outweigh any risks of failure. When man no longer suffers from the poison which he has imbibed from childhood, he will find himself in a difficult situation. He will discover his helplessness and his insignificant role in the universe. He will learn that he is not the center of creation and the object of a benevolent Providence's care. He will be like the child who has left the warm and comfortable home.

But is it not the destiny of childhood to be overcome? Man cannot remain a child forever. He must eventually undergo "education to reality." Sooner or later he must learn to live content and resigned to what is true and possible.⁴²

In the long run, nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction religion offers to both is only too palpable. Not even a purified, sublimated religion can permanently withstand the scrutiny of reason and experience. And if religion confines itself to belief in a higher, spiritual Being whose qualities are indefinable and whose intentions cannot be discerned, while it may be proof against

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 83-4.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 85-6.

the interference of science, it will also relinquish the interest of man.⁴³

The picture, then, is this. Religion has served its purpose of creating and sustaining community. It has also provided a universal neurosis which has saved men from individual and perhaps more serious neuroses. But religion is losing its hold on the minds of men, and eventually will be an illusion of the past. There are possible benefits in this, the benefits which accrue from the abandonment of any neurosis. And the retreat of religion just might make culture's civilizing task easier by permitting and necessitating a rational explanation of culture's laws, an explanation which will decrease the hostility which most men feel toward culture.

Freud suggests helping the inevitable. The abandonment of religion will take place as a process of growth, not by a pure act of the rational will. Our task is to further this development, like a sensible teacher.⁴⁴

⁴³Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 73-6.

CHAPTER III

KAREN HORNEY

It would be misleading to exaggerate the discontinuity between Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, and the psycho-sociological writers whom we shall examine next. Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, to give two examples, consider their interpretations psychoanalysis.

In the introduction to The Neurotic Personality of Our Time Horney raises the question: Is this still psychoanalysis? She answers that it depends on what one holds essential in psychoanalysis.

If one believes that it is constituted entirely by the sum total of theories propounded by Freud, then what is presented here is not psychoanalysis. If, however, one believes that the essentials of psychoanalysis lie in certain basic trends of thought concerning the role of unconscious processes and the ways in which they find expression, and in a form of therapeutic treatment that brings these processes to awareness, then what I present is psychoanalysis.¹

She argues that deference to Freud's gigantic achievements should show itself not in slavish imitation but in building on the foundations that he has laid, thus fulfilling the possibilities which psychoanalysis has for the future. Fundamentally, however, her interpretation does rest on Freudian ground. Her main gratitude goes to Freud, because

¹Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of our Time (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937), pp. lx-x. Referred to hereafter as Personality.

he has provided the foundation and the tools.²

The critical point of departure Horney sums up in the following words:

My conviction, expressed in a nutshell, is that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology.³

When attention is focused on the actual neurotic difficulties encountered, it is discovered that they are generated not only by incidental individual experiences, but also by specific cultural conditions.

When we realize the great import of cultural conditions on neuroses the biological and physiological conditions, which are considered by Freud to be their root, recede into the background.⁴

Freud assumed that the instinctual drives or object relationships frequent in any culture are biologically determined "human nature" or arise out of unalterable situations such as his biologically given "pregenital stages" or the Oedipus complex. Horney maintains that his consequent disregard of cultural factors led to false generalizations and blocked an understanding of the real forces which motivate our attitudes and actions.⁵

The reverse side of his biological orientation was a lack of sociological orientation. Thus he tended to attri-

²Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), pp. 7-8. Hereafter referred to as New Ways.

³Ibid., p. 8.

⁴Personality, p. viii.

⁵Ibid., pp. 20-1.

bute social phenomena primarily to psychic factors, and these, of course, primarily to biological factors. Freud did not see a culture as the result of a complex social process but primarily as the product of biological drives which are repressed or sublimated, with the result that reaction formations are built up against them. And the more complete the suppression, the higher the actual development.⁶

The attempt to correct Freud's sociological naivete is a distinguishing feature of what we have chosen to call psycho-sociology.

The development of a new concept of human nature and destiny will be seen more clearly after a summary of the particular Freudian premises which Horney rejects or at least calls into question.

Freud's biological orientation has already been discussed. It leads him, Horney believes, to regard psychic manifestations as the result of chemical-physiological forces; to regard psychic experiences and the sequence of their occurrence as determined almost exclusively by constitutional or hereditary factors; and to explain psychic differences between the sexes as the result of anatomical differences.

The second premise of Freud which she attacks is related to the first. The nineteenth century was little aware of cultural differences. As a child of his time Freud subscribed

⁶Ibid., pp. 282-3.

to the prevailing tendency to assign peculiarities of one's own culture to human nature in general. This ethnocentrism must be modified in the light of later anthropological investigations.

A third characteristic of Freud's approach is his explicit abstention from any moral evaluation. This attitude influenced certain theoretical considerations, such as the doctrine of the super-ego, as well as psychoanalytic therapy. Its role in the shaping of Freud's attitude toward life goals has been indicated above.

A fourth basis of Freud's thinking is his tendency to view psychic factors as pairs of opposites. This dualistic thinking, deeply ingrained in the philosophic mentality of the nineteenth century, shows throughout Freud's theoretical formulations. Each instinct theory he propounds, for example, tends to make the totality of psychic manifestations comprehensible under two rigidly contrasting groups of trends.

A final important characteristic, closely akin to the one just mentioned, is Freud's mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking. Evolutionistic thinking is the presupposition that things which exist today have developed out of previous stages. Mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking is a special form of evolutionistic thinking. It implies that present manifestations are not only conditioned by the past, but contain nothing except the past. Nothing really new is created in the process of development. What we see today is

only the old in a changed form. Thus Freud can recognize only quantitative changes; a change in quality would be inconsistent with his operating assumptions.⁷

Horney tries to escape the pitfalls which these assumptions place in the path of psychoanalysis by concentrating on "the actually existing conflicts and the neurotic's attempts to solve them, on the actually existing anxieties and the defenses he has built up against them."⁸ In a sense she accuses Freud of not being scientific enough, of letting his intuited theories mold the pattern of his facts. She attempts, in a more genuinely empirical fashion, to begin again on the basis of impressions gained in long psychoanalytical study of neuroses.⁹

Horney doubts whether a neurosis can be adequately defined. She offers instead a description. A neurosis is a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and defenses against these fears, and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies.¹⁰ This is a working description, containing a minimum of a priori, doctrinal assumptions, from which Horney attempts to chart "new ways in psychoanalysis."

A concept stressed throughout psychoanalytic writings and emphasized especially by Horney is one which she first

⁷New Ways, pp. 37-45

⁸Personality, p. vii.

⁹Ibid., p. x. Compare New Ways, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰Personality, pp. 28-9.

treats systematically in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time: the concept of anxiety. Freud had written extensively on anxiety, but there is a profound difference, as will be seen.

To review briefly, Freud had proposed two theories of anxiety. The first was that anxiety results from a repression of impulses, and this referred exclusively to the impulses of sexuality. Sexual energy prevented from discharge will produce physical tension which is transformed into anxiety. His second theory suggested that neurotic anxiety resulted from fear of those impulses of which the discovery or pursuit would incur an external danger. This interpretation referred not only to sexual impulses but also to those of aggression.

Horney calls for an integration of these theories. Anxiety, in her opinion, results not so much from a fear of our impulses as from a fear of repressed impulse. Furthermore, anxiety will result from impulses whose expression would incur an external danger only so long as an individual or social taboo resting on them renders them dangerous. The cultural attitude existing in America today, moreover, makes hostility rather than sexuality a specific source of anxiety. Finally, Horney differs from Freud in his assumption that anxiety is generated only in childhood, and that later occurrences are based on infantile reactions. An attitude may be generated in childhood, but it is not therefore an infantile

reaction. It is more likely a development than a repetition.¹¹

The distinction between fear and anxiety is a crucial one. There is one flaw in the traditional distinction: fear is justified by external events, while anxiety is a disproportionate reaction or even reaction to an imaginary danger. Her objection stems from the fact that to the neurotic the danger is always actual, and the decision as to whether a reaction is proportionate depends on the average knowledge existing in the culture. Fear of black cats, for example, is not neurotic in all cultures, but only in those which generally assume there is no relation between misfortune and feline perambulations, "non-superstitious" cultures. In a sense, then, fear and anxiety are both proportionate reactions to actual dangers; but in the case of fear the danger is a transparent, objective one, while in the case of anxiety it is hidden and subjective. The neurotic's anxiety concerns the situation as it appears to him, not as it appears to observers. Thus he cannot be argued out of his anxiety. The proper therapeutic task is to discover the meaning which certain situations have for him.¹²

It is possible to describe more completely the subjective factor which the neurotic fears.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 75-8.

¹²Ibid., pp. 42-4.

In principle, any impulse has the potential power to provoke anxiety, provided that its discovery or pursuit would mean violation of other vital interests, and provided that it is sufficiently imperative.¹³ In fact, hostile impulses of various kinds form the main source from which neurotic anxiety springs.¹⁴ In addition, anxiety, when based on a feeling of being menaced, may provoke a reactive hostility in defense. If the reactive hostility in turn create anxiety, a vicious cycle is created.¹⁵

The connection between hostility and anxiety is best seen from an examination of the psychological consequences of repressing hostility. Repressing hostility means pretending that everything is all right and thus refraining from fighting when we ought to be fighting, or at least want to fight. The consequence is a feeling of defenselessness or the reinforcement of such a feeling already in existence.¹⁶

Furthermore, repressed animosity becomes dissociated and expanded. By its very dissociation it will in the course of time usually become intensified from outside sources.¹⁷

¹³Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 63

¹⁵Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 67-8.

At this point a second "pretense" often occurs. The individual projects his hostile impulses to the outside world. He pretends that the destructive impulses come not from him but from someone or something outside. The object of this projection takes on extremely formidable proportions, and the feeling of defenselessness is intensified.¹⁸

Horney concludes:

These processes brought about by repressed hostility result in the affect of anxiety. In fact, the repression generates exactly the state which is characteristic of anxiety; a feeling of defenselessness toward what is felt as an overpowering danger menacing from outside.¹⁹

The significance of this discussion for an understanding of Horney's concept of human nature and destiny is realized when still another concept is taken into account: the "basic anxiety."

From an examination of the childhood histories of great numbers of neurotic persons Horney finds that there is a common denominator in the environment. The basic evil is invariably a lack of genuine warmth and affection.²⁰ In combination with other, less important factors, a condition is created characterized by an insidiously increasing, all-pervading feeling of being lonely and helpless in a hostile world. This attitude is the nutritive soil out of which a definite neurosis may develop at any time. This attitude,

¹⁸Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 71.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 79-80.

because of the fundamental role which it plays in neuroses, Horney has called "the basic anxiety."²¹

This basic anxiety underlies all relationships to people.²² It may be roughly described as a feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy.²³ Although it concerns people, it may be entirely divested of its personal character and transformed into a feeling of helplessness before nature, political events, or even fate.²⁴

With incisive clarity Horney discusses the four major techniques by which a person tries to protect himself against the basic anxiety.²⁵ First of all securing affection may serve as a powerful protection against anxiety. The motto is: If you love me you will not hurt me.

Secondly, submissiveness may serve the same purpose. Here the motto is: If I give in, I shall not be hurt.

Thirdly, the person may try to protect himself by acquiring power. The motto in this case: If I have power, no one can hurt me.

²¹Ibid., p. 89.

²²Ibid., p. 90.

²³Ibid., p. 92.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 93-4.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 96-9.

The final means of protection is withdrawal. The motto: If I withdraw, nothing can hurt me.

These attempts, it should be noted, are prompted not by a wish to satisfy a desire for pleasure or happiness, but by a need for reassurance.

Any one of these devices can be effective. But the intense pursuit of one goal involves conflict with the environment. More frequently the individual employs several of these techniques, and then their intrinsically incompatible nature sets up conflicts which become the dynamic center of neuroses. The two attempts which most frequently clash are the striving for affection and the striving for power. A neurosis is brought about only if this conflict generates anxiety and if the attempts to allay anxiety lead in turn to defensive tendencies which, although equally imperative, are nevertheless incompatible with one another.²⁶

The neurotic need for affection is striking in its compulsiveness. The significance of being liked is grossly over-evaluated. Neurotic persons feel and behave as if their existence, happiness and security depended upon being liked.²⁷ But a vicious circle is established, beginning with the basic anxiety. There follows an excessive need for affection, a sense of rebuff if the demands are not felt to be

²⁶Ibid., pp. 100-1.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 115-6.

satisfied, reaction to the rebuff with intense hostility, need to repress the hostility because of fear of losing affection, the tension of a diffuse rage, increased anxiety, increased need for reassurance, and so on.²⁸

The aim and function of the strivings for power, prestige, and possession provide a useful illustration of what Horney is trying to describe. The striving for power is an attempt to gain reassurance against a sense of helplessness, and it generates hostility in the form of a tendency to domineer. The striving for prestige is a reassurance against humiliation, inciting a tendency to humiliate others. The striving for possession tries to reassure against destitution, and results in the tendency to deprive others. But note that all three are incompatible with the neurotic's fundamental need: to gain affection. Thus from the basic anxiety flow strivings which, while trying to check anxiety, only succeed in heightening it by compelling the individual toward tendencies incompatible with his fundamental goal.²⁹

It now becomes apparent why Horney is so sharply critical of Freud's "instinctivistic and genetic psychology." When the instinctivistic orientation is dropped, character trends are no longer explained as ultimate outcomes of instinctual drives, but the emphasis begins to

²⁸Ibid., pp. 137-8.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 186-7.

fall on life conditions molding the character. Then disturbances in human relationships become the crucial factor in the genesis of neuroses. A prevailing sociological orientation then takes the place of a prevailing anatomical-physiological one.³⁰

A discussion of what Freud called "narcissism" may serve to clarify and illustrate several points at issue, and indicate the goal toward which Horney is moving.

For Freud, narcissistic trends are derivatives of instinct. He furthermore looked upon narcissism as a reservoir which is depleted to the extent that the individual loves (that is, gives libido to) objects. Hence what we would call egocentricity is nothing more than the individual's attempt to conserve his store of love for himself.

Horney argues, in line with her general analysis, that narcissistic trends are not instinctive, but rather represent a neurotic attempt to cope with the self and others by way of self-inflation. A person with narcissistic trends is alienated from himself as well as others, and is incapable of loving himself or anyone else. Self-esteem and self-inflation are not identical. They are, in fact, mutually exclusive. A person clings to illusions about himself because he has lost himself.³¹

³⁰New Ways, p. 9.

³¹Ibid., pp. 99-100.

Narcissistic trends or self-inflation is again simply one way of coping with life under difficult circumstances, an attempt to alleviate the basic anxiety.³² Under favorable circumstances these trends can be overcome. But they may also be augmented by increasing unproductivity, development of excessive expectations of what the world owes one, and an increasing impairment of human relationships.³³ It can readily be seen that the three are interacting. The unproductive person is compelled to ignore his real self and concentrate on an idealized version of himself. In the light of this idealization, he conceives exaggerated notions of his worth and due. Failure of others to live up to his expectations provokes hostility, danger signals, anxiety. The anxiety results in further increased unproductivity. Another of the vicious circles has set in.

Freud had implied, on the basis of his postulated death instinct, that the task of psychoanalytical therapy was to set the patient free to express hostility. A person does not feel at ease until his death instinct has been satisfied. Horney concludes on the basis of her analysis that therapy's task is not to free these impulses for expression, but to understand their reasons and by removing underlying anxiety remove the necessity of having them.³⁴

³²Ibid., p. 92.

³³Ibid., pp. 94-7.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 131-2.

This is a conclusion to which Freud could never have come, because of his non-evaluative approach. Horney and the Neo-Freudians come to different conclusions because they are concerned for the moral problem, man's moral dilemma.

Not only does Horney take account of culture's crucial role in the formation of neuroses, she also criticizes the culture within which she writes because of the prevalence within it of factors engendering anxiety. Chief among these is the fact that western civilization is built on individual competitiveness. This causes social and economic insecurity. It provides a seed-bed for fears: fear of envy if you succeed, fear of contempt if you fail, fear of being abused, fear of wanting to push others aside.

It makes also for emotional isolation of the individual as a result of disturbances in interpersonal relationships and the accompanying lack of solidarity. The individual is thrust on his own and no longer feels protected. Tradition and religion have lost the strength which formerly enabled them to fill the gap. Furthermore, the competitive ideology says: Success is dependent upon personal efficiency. So if you fail to succeed, you are a personal failure. Finally, there is within western culture a conflict between the factually existing hostile tensions caused by the competitive ideology and the gospel of brotherly love which is inculcated from the very beginning of the individual's life.³⁵

³⁵Ibid., pp. 173-5.

The American culture displays other contradictory tendencies which underly typical neurotic conflicts (and explain the title of The Neurotic Personality of Our Time). Our needs are stimulated by militant advertising, but except for the very few these aroused needs are then frustrated by economic limitations. Still another conflict exists in our society's insistence that all men are free and the factual restrictions upon our freedom which circumstances impose.³⁶

It is necessary to review briefly. What has been established so far? A combination of adverse environmental factors--which an existing culture might unwittingly promote--produces disturbances in the child's relation to himself and others. The effect is basic anxiety, a feeling of helplessness before a potentially hostile and dangerous world. Basic anxiety makes it necessary to search for ways to cope with life safely. The ways chosen are those accessible under given conditions. These are neurotic trends and quickly acquire a compulsive character. Their hold is strengthened because they seem to be the only method of achieving satisfaction and safety.

But this safety is precarious. Anxiety ensues if the trends don't operate properly. They also make the individual rigid and necessitate further protective means for the allayment of new anxieties. Contradictory strivings enter upon

³⁶Personality, pp. 288-90.

the scene, one jeopardizing the other. The individual becomes alienated from himself according to the process described. Productivity and human relationships are impaired. The resulting character structure is the kernel of neuroses. It always contains these general characteristics: compulsory strivings, conflicting trends, a propensity to develop manifest anxiety, impairment in the relation to self and others, discrepancy between potentialities and actual attainments.³⁷

The goal which Horney sets before psychoanalysis flows from this analysis. It must help the patient to "regain his spontaneity, to find his measurements of value in himself, in short, to give him the courage to be himself."³⁸

Implicit in all of this is an understanding of human nature and destiny. It becomes explicit in Horney's last book before her death, Neurosis and Human Growth.

There are three major concepts of morality, she believes, resting upon three different interpretations of essential human nature.

The first is that man is by nature sinful or ridden by primitive instincts. Superimposed checks and controls cannot be relinquished. The goal of morality must be the taming of

³⁷New Ways, pp. 276-9.

³⁸Ibid., p. 305.

the statue naturae, not its development. This is Freud's position.

The second view holds that there is something good as well as something bad inherent in human nature. The moral task centers upon achieving victory of the good, as refined, directed, or reinforced by such elements as faith, reason, will, or grace. The emphasis is not exclusively upon suppressing evil. There is a positive program. Yet the positive program suggests the use of prohibitive and checking inner dictates.

The third view is the one which Horney herself accepts. Inherent in man are evolutionary constructive forces which urge him to realize his given potentialities. We cannot say that man is basically good, because such a statement implies an absolute knowledge of good and evil. We do know that man by his very nature and of his own accord strives toward self-realization. His set of values evolves from such striving. Apparently he cannot develop his full potentialities unless he is truthful to himself, active and productive, and related to others in a spirit of mutuality. He can grow, in the true sense, only if he assumes responsibility for himself.

Thus Horney arrives at a morality of evolution, in which the criteria for what we cultivate or reject lie in the question: Is a particular attitude or drive conducive or obstructive to human growth?

Psychoanalysis is concerned for the individual's knowledge of his true self. As previously mentioned, it wants

to help him find his measurements of value in himself. This is a legitimate task, because self-knowledge is the means of liberating the forces of spontaneous growth.³⁹

The neurotic process presented in her last book is, as Horney describes it,

a problem of the self. It is a process of abandoning the real self for an idealized one; of trying to actualize this pseudoself instead of our given human potentials; of a destructive warfare between the two selves; of allaying this warfare the best, or at any rate the only, way we can; and finally, through having our constructive forces mobilized by life or by therapy, of finding our real selves.⁴⁰

Freud was pessimistic. On the grounds of his premises, he was bound to have a pessimistic outlook on human nature. He did not have any clear vision of constructive forces in man. Where they existed, he denied their authentic character. Creativity and love, for example, were sublimated forms of libidinal drives. What Horney regards as a healthy striving toward self-realization was for Freud only an expression of narcissistic libido.⁴¹

She writes in conclusion, in a passage already cited:

Albert Schweitzer uses the terms "optimistic" and "pessimistic" in the sense of "world and life affirmation" and "world and life negation." Freud's philosophy, in this deep sense, is a pessimistic one. Ours, with all its cognizance of the tragic element in neurosis, is an optimistic one.⁴²

³⁹Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950), pp. 14-5.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 376.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 377-8.

⁴²Ibid., p. 378.

CHAPTER IV

ERICH FROMM

Erich Fromm did not publish any major psycho-sociological study in English until 1941. He had developed many of his ideas already when Horney was writing The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. She employs his essay included in Studien Ueber Autoritset und Familie, printed in 1936, in elaborating her own ideas.¹ In New Ways in Psychoanalysis she refers to his lectures and an as yet unpublished manuscript by Fromm.² It is therefore not strictly correct to say that Fromm elaborates and carries further the concepts enunciated by Horney. The task is more accurately described as a joint one. But because Fromm does employ many of the operating assumptions which we have seen used by Horney, and because he does carry his research and conclusions farther than Horney does in her last published work, we are justified in treating Fromm's investigations as a continuation of those discussed in the preceding section. There will be some repetition in this section, unavoidable if we are to appreciate Fromm's methodology, but the principal task here is to sketch the further development of psycho-sociology and its view of human nature and destiny.

¹Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (W. W. Norton & Co., 1937), pp. 248, 270.

²Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), pp. 29, 78, 263.

Fromm begins his analysis with an attempt to find an answer to the basic question: What is man? Freud, as we have seen, considered man a highly developed animal. The differences between men and the lower animals were, for Freud, quantitative and not qualitative. We have already noted his objection on a priori grounds to any effort to find some meaning or purpose in the human adventure beyond the meaning and purpose implicit in the fact that man is a pleasure-maximizing organism. Fromm differs sharply with Freud at this initial point.

It is first of all true that man, in respect to his body and his physiological functions, belongs to the animal kingdom. And the functioning of an animal is controlled by instincts, by specific action patterns which are in turn determined by inherited neurological structures. The animal "is lived" through biological laws of nature; it is part of nature and never transcends it. It has no conscience of a moral nature, no awareness of itself and of its existence, and no reason. Animals may have intelligence, which is the ability to manipulate data for practical results; but reason, the ability to penetrate the surface grasped by the senses and to understand the essence behind that surface, the animal does not possess.³

At a certain point of animal evolution, a unique break occurred. It happened when, in the evolutionary process,

³Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1955), p. 22. For the distinction between "intelligence" and "reason" see pp. 169-70.

action ceased to be determined primarily by instinct. When the animal began to transcend the purely passive role of the creature, man was born. A new species arose, transcending nature, and life became aware of itself.⁴

Man is an anomaly, a freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. Man is a creature--thrown into this world without his consent, subject to removal from it also without his consent. But man is also a creator. He can create life, a miraculous quality which he indeed shares with all other living beings, but with the difference that he alone is aware of being created and of being a creator. Man can create not only in the act of procreation, but also by planting seeds, by producing material objects, by creating art, by creating ideas, by loving other men. In the act of creation man raises himself beyond the passivity and accidentalness of his existence into the realm of purposefulness and freedom.⁵

What is the nature of this man, qualitatively distinguished from the mere animal? Fromm writes:

⁴Ibid., p. 23.

⁵Ibid., pp. 23-4, 37-8. On this central insight see also Fromm's other discussions: Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 58-9; Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1941), pp. 13-4; Man for Himself (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1947), p. 23.

The subject of the science of man is human nature. But this science does not start out with a full and adequate picture of what human nature is; a satisfactory definition of its subject matter is its aim, not its promise. Its method is to observe the reactions of man to various individual and social conditions and from observations of these reactions to make inferences about man's nature. Human nature can never be observed as such, but only in its specific manifestations in specific situations. It is a theoretical construction which can be inferred from empirical study of the behavior of man.⁶

From objects to the notion that there is any such thing as a fixed and unalterable human nature. There are certain factors in man's nature which are fixed and unchangeable. But human nature is more than the sum total of biologically determined drives. It is also the product of human evolution.⁷

Man is an entity charged with energy and structured in specific ways, which, while adapting itself, reacts in certain specific and ascertainable ways to external conditions. . . . Human evolution is rooted in man's adaptability and in certain indestructible qualities of his nature which compel him never to cease his search for conditions better adjusted to his intrinsic needs.⁸

In other words, the question "What is human nature?" cannot be answered without a prior knowledge of the environmental circumstances which shaped the evolution of man. And these circumstances may vary from one man to another. But at the same time, man is not infinitely malleable. He is "structured" in such a fashion that he reacts in a predictable manner to certain situations, and seeks conditions

⁶Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 23-4.

⁷Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 22.

⁸Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 23.

"better adjusted to his intrinsic needs."

Hence Fromm objects to ethical relativism, which emphasizes adjustment rather than a better or a worse. Because man is not perfectly pliable, but does have certain drives and needs whose satisfaction is essential for his welfare, value judgments can and must be made concerning human behavior, both individual and collective. Man must in fact become "for himself"; he must learn to serve his needs.⁹ Man must have ideals; they cannot be safely dismissed as mere rationalization of unconscious impulses. But not just any ideals. His ideals are to be judged with respect to their truth, to the extent to which they are conducive to the unfolding of man's powers and to the degree to which they are a real answer to man's need for equilibrium and harmony in his world.¹⁰ This criterion for the judgment of human ideals is the essential criterion of humanistic ethics. Man, his function, and his aim can be nothing else than that of any other being: to preserve himself and to persevere in his existence. And "preserving one's being" means to become that which one potentially is.¹¹ The title which Fromm has given to his "inquiry into the psychology of ethics" best summarizes man's proper aim: Man for Himself.

In our attempt to make clear Fromm's approach to the problem of human nature we have moved somewhat ahead of

⁹Ibid., pp: vii-x.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 50.

¹¹Ibid., p. 26.

our logical course of development. Let us now retrace our steps to examine "the human situation." We may take our cue from the preceding paragraph.

In all the world of nature, only man is capable of not becoming what he potentially is. This fact indicates that man's emergence from animal to rational being was not an unmixed blessing. Self-awareness, reason and imagination disrupt the harmony which characterizes animal existence. Man is, as has been previously stated, an anomaly and a freak of the universe. He is forced to cope with the task of solving an insoluble dichotomy, the dichotomy implicit in being both of nature and above nature. Human existence is consequently in a state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium. Man's life cannot be lived by repeating the pattern of his species; he must live. Man is the only animal that can be bored, that can feel evicted from paradise. Man is the only animal who finds his own existence a problem which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature; he must proceed to develop his reason until he becomes the master of nature, and of himself.¹²

Fromm finds an anxiety which is basic to the basic anxiety of Karen Horney. Thrown out of nature and yet a part of it, man becomes aware of himself, of his helplessness,

¹²Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 23-4.

and of his separateness. Each new step into his new human existence is frightening, for it means to give up a secure state for one which is new, one not yet mastered. Hence man is always subject to two conflicting tendencies: one to emerge from the womb, from the animal form of existence into a more human existence, from bondage to freedom; another, to return to the womb, to nature, to certainty and security.¹³

The parallel between the "birth of humanity" and the birth of each individual man is an obvious one. Fromm, in fact, draws many of his conclusions from a study of normal human development.

Before the child is born it is biologically one with the mother. Even after birth, the child remains functionally one with its mother for a considerable period. To the extent to which the individual has not yet completely severed the umbilical cord, speaking figuratively, he lacks freedom. But the unsevered ties give him a feeling of belonging, of being rooted somewhere, a sense of security. Fromm calls these "primary ties."¹⁴

As the child grows stronger physically, emotionally, and mentally, an organized and integrated structure develops, guided by the individual's reason and will. The child gradually becomes a separate personality, a 'self.'

¹³Ibid., pp. 24-7.

¹⁴Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 25.

But along with this growing strength, self-awareness, and freedom there develops a growing aloneness. The primary ties which offered security and basic unity with the world once broken, the child becomes aware of being an entity separate from all others. This separation from a world which, in comparison with one's own individual existence, is overwhelmingly strong and powerful, and often threatening and dangerous, creates a feeling of powerlessness and anxiety.

Impulses arise to give up one's individuality, to overcome the feeling of aloneness and powerlessness by completely submerging oneself in the world outside. But these impulses and the ties arising from them are not identical with the primary ties which have been cut in the process of growth. For just as the child can never return physically to the mother's womb, so the individual cannot reverse the process of individuation. As a result of the attempts to reverse the process, the individual unconsciously realizes that the price it pays is giving up strength and the integrity of the self. Thus the result of resubmission is the very opposite of what it was supposed to be: submission increases insecurity, and at the same time creates hostility and rebelliousness, which is the more frightening because it is directed against the very persons on whom the individual has made himself dependent.¹⁵

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 28-30.

Of these two conflicting tendencies, to emerge from that security which is bondage and to restore the primary ties, the progressive tendency has proved itself the stronger in the history of the individual and of the human race. Yet the phenomena of mental illness and the regression of the human race to positions apparently relinquished generations ago show the intense struggle which accompanies each new act of birth.¹⁶

Man's life, Fromm further argues, is determined by the inescapable alternative between regression and progression, between return to animal existence and arrival at human existence. Any attempt to return is painful and leads to death, either physiologically or mentally (insanity). Every step forward is frightening, too, but has this consolation. A point may eventually be reached where fear and doubt have only minor proportions.

Fromm goes so far as to conclude that aside from the physiologically nourished cravings, all essential human cravings are determined by this polarity. Man has to solve a problem, and even the most complete satisfaction of his instinctive needs does not solve his human problem: his most intense passions are rooted, not in his body, but in the very peculiarity of his existence.¹⁷

¹⁶Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 27.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 28.

In his earliest work, Escape from Freedom, Fromm has set up what he called "spontaneity" and "a productive relationship" as the alternative to submission as a way of avoiding the aloneness and anxiety which severance of the primary ties occasions. A spontaneous or productive relationship of man to nature connects the individual with the world without eliminating his individuality.¹⁸

He further develops this notion in Man for Himself. One can be productively related to the world by acting and by comprehending. Man produces things, and in the process gains mastery over nature. Man comprehends the world, through love and through reason, his power of reason enabling him to discover essences, his power of love enabling him to break barriers which separate people and to comprehend them. Neither reason or love is possible without the other. But they are expressions of different powers, the one of emotion, the other of thinking.¹⁹

Genuine love, productive love, is not dependent, possessive, or compulsive. But it is always characterized by care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. It is an activity, not a passion by which one is overcome, nor an affect, which one is "affected by."²⁰

¹⁸Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 30.

¹⁹Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 97.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 97-8.

In the process of productive thinking the thinker is motivated by his interest for the object; he is affected by it and reacts to it; he cares and responds. But productive thinking is also characterized by objectivity, by the respect the thinker has for his object, by his ability to see the object as it is and not as he wishes it to be.²¹

In his most recent book, The Sane Society, Fromm presents his theory in more detail and within a more systematized framework. He examines the needs and passions stemming from the existential situation of man.

Man is torn away from the primary union with nature. He must, in some fashion, reestablish ties if he is to overcome the aloneness and anxiety which individuation brings. This may be accomplished by submission to a person, a group, an institution, or even to God. Another possibility lies in the opposite direction: he may try to gain power over the world, to transcend his individual existence by domination. The first is masochism, the second sadism. But there is one passion which satisfies man's need to unite himself with the world, and to acquire at the same time a sense of integrity and individuality, and this is love. Love is defined as union with somebody or something outside oneself under condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's

²¹Ibid., p. 104.

own self.²² Failure to develop the capacity for love, or loss of this capacity once gained, results in narcissism. And narcissism is the essence of all severe psychic pathology. For the narcissistically inclined person there is only one reality, that of his own thought processes, feelings, and needs. It is the opposite pole to objectivity, reason, and love.²³

Another aspect of the human situation is man's creaturely condition, and his need to transcend this very state of the passive creature. Being endowed with reason and imagination, he cannot be content with a purely passive role. Man must create. (Illustrations have been cited above.) But if he is not capable of creating, man may attempt to transcend himself by destroying. Also in the act of destruction, man sets himself above life; he transcends himself as a creature.²⁴

Still another implication of the human situation is that man must find human roots to replace the natural roots from which he was severed in his emergence as man. He may satisfy this need by what Fromm calls "incest," refusal to leave the all-enveloping orbit of the mother. He may become fixated to the mother, or to a mother substitute: the family, the clan, the state, nation or church. The individual leans on them, feels rooted in them, has his sense of

²²Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 30-1.

²³Ibid., pp. 35-6.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 36-7.

identity as a part of them, and cannot live as an individual apart from them. The alternative to this is "brotherliness." Only when man can feel rooted in the experience of universal brotherliness will he have found a new, human form of rootedness, will he have transformed his world into a truly human home.²⁵

Man needs also to form a concept of himself, to be able to say and to feel: "I am I." Because he is not lived but lives, he must be able to sense himself as the subject of his actions. He may substitute for a truly individual sense of identity various formulae: "I am an American," "I am a Protestant," "I am a businessman." He may believe that inasmuch as he is not different, but is like the others, a "regular fellow," he can sense himself as I. He becomes, in the memorable title from Pirandello, "as you desire me." He develops a herd identity. All these are alternatives to the formation of a genuine sense of individuality.²⁶

Finally, the fact that man has reason and imagination leads to the necessity for orienting himself in the world intellectually. This need may be satisfied by means of an illusory orientation, one which man subsequently rationalizes, or by means of an orientation rationally determined. The alternatives here are rationality versus irrationality.²⁷

²⁵Ibid., pp. 38-41, 60.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 60-3.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 63-6.

Fromm is not excessively optimistic. The Sane Society opens with a sweeping indictment of Western culture, which has created a civilization of abundance, but has failed to help man find himself.²⁸ Escape from Freedom is fundamentally an analysis of the totalitarianisms which have arisen in the twentieth century to solve the problems of man by encouraging him, with frightening success, to lose himself, rather than find himself.²⁹ Man for Himself concludes with the suggestion that our period "is an end and a beginning, fraught with possibilities." We do have reason to be proud and to be hopeful, but the outcome is not automatic or preordained. The decision rests with man, with his courage to be himself and to be for himself.³⁰ All three of these books leave the impression that man may well fail.

Where is there hope of redemption? For Fromm, of course, salvation lies in man's ability to be "for himself," to be productively oriented, to love and live spontaneously. "The decision rests with man." But is there any help outside of man? Is there supernatural grace which can rescue man from his plight and enable him to be truly human? The question leads us into a discussion of religion and its role in the philosophy of Fromm.

For Fromm, religion is a human product and not the result of divine revelation. Religion offers no aid to man except

²⁸Ibid., pp. 3-21.

²⁹Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 207-39.

³⁰Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 250.

that which man has been able himself to inject into religion. The problem of religion is not the problem of God but the problem of man. Theology is anthropology. Religious formulations and religious symbols are attempts to give expression to certain kinds of human experience. These experiences, not divine intervention, are what matter.³¹

There is only one form of idolatry: the deification of things, of partial aspects of the world and man's submission to such things. True worship of God is an attitude in which man's life is devoted to the realization of the highest principles of life, those of love and reason, to the aim of becoming what he potentially is, a being made in the likeness of God. Even God can and has become an idol for many.³²

The solution to the dilemma of man? Fromm writes:

There is only one possible, productive solution for the relationship of individualized man with the world: his active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual.³³

Religion is only useful as a system of orientation and as a teacher of true ideals, ideals consistent with man's welfare. But if it is not humanistic religion, proceeding from an understanding of the human situation, it is false religion and dangerous.³⁴

³¹Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 113.

³²Ibid., pp. 118-9.

³³Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 36.

³⁴Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 47-50.

The question is not religion or not but which kind of religion, whether it is one furthering man's development, the unfolding of his specifically human powers, or one paralyzing them.³⁵

Not divine revelation or supernatural grace will redeem man, but only rational effort to understand his situation and to devise a culture and institutions compatible with his needs. Through heightened rationality alone can he grow into the full measure of man.

³⁵From, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 26.

involved the effort to relate social structure to individual structure, and to bring such psychoanalytic methods as the "depth interview" and interpretation of dreams and folk tales out of the consulting rooms and into the study of large-scale social systems. And, as it seems to me, this effort is part of a vast movement which may best be described by social anthropology, social psychology, and sociology.

David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Chicago, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER V

DAVID RIESMAN

David Riesman differs from the three writers previously discussed in that he is not, in the first instance, a psychiatrist. Riesman graduated from the Harvard Law School, taught law at the University of Buffalo after service as law clerk to Justice Brandeis and deputy assistant district attorney of New York County, and finally came to the University of Chicago as a professor of social science.

While he writes that much of what he has learned in the social sciences derives from his colleagues at the University of Chicago, he also emphasizes the importance of his training in psychoanalysis. He studied to a minor extent under Harry Stack Sullivan, the so-called founder of inter-personal psychiatry, and Ernest Schachtel; his study of psychoanalysis was primarily under Erich Fromm. "Much of my work," he explains in the introduction to his book of essays, Individualism Reconsidered, "is in the 'neo-Freudian' tradition of these analysts." It has

involved the effort to relate social structure to character structure, and to bring such psychoanalytic methods as the "depth interview" and interpretations of dreams and folk tales out of the consulting rooms and into the study of large-scale social systems. And, needless to say, this effort is part of a vast movement under way for several decades in social anthropology, social psychology, and sociology.¹

¹David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 11-2.

If we were to establish a continuum of psycho-sociology stretching from psychology informed by sociology to sociology informed by psychology, Morney might be roughly placed at one end of the continuum, Riesman at the other, and Fromm in the approximate middle. With Riesman, then, we move further into the sociological aspects and implications of psycho-sociology.

It is difficult to define with any precision, especially within a few introductory sentences, the direction of Riesman's thought. One reason for this is his abhorrence of dogmatism and his readiness, even eagerness, to suspend final judgment pending reexamination of his own subtle biases. He assumes that he has them.² He avoids, almost on principle, the dedicated position, fearing lest he become "a fanatic crusading against fanaticism." He writes:

Thus, there are issues on which I am a relativist and issues on which I am an absolutist and those in which I am in doubt as to what I am, or should be. Such moral experimentalism, while it has the perils I have already mentioned and others I know not of, is essential if we are to meet life flexibly, listening to the ancestor within and the friend without, but not bound to obey either.³

Perhaps an orientation to Riesman's thought will be provided by an examination of his remarks on Condorcet's Sketch of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Spirit, which Riesman calls

a great monument to faith in human power to shape human destiny. Condorcet refused to be dismayed either by

²See, for example, "Values in Context," *ibid.*, pp. 17-25.

³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

his own experience of human meanness and savagery or by his wide historical reading in the annals of cruelty and error. For he rested his hopes, not only on "observation of what man has heretofore been, and what he is at present," but also on his understanding of the potentialities of human nature.⁴

It has proved more difficult than Condorcet foresaw to develop these potentialities. The raw material of human nature is shaped by culture into the organized force of a particular character structure, which in turn creates a social structure. Since the social structure and the character structure tend to perpetuate each other, they are both relatively intractable to change. Though in America we are near Condorcet's dream of the conquest of poverty, his dream of the conquest of happiness seems ever more remote. Yet we ought not to sneer at him and other philosophers of the Enlightenment for lacking a sense of the human limitations on improvement. The sneer is unimaginative.

Condorcet's scientific, empirical method urges us to see precisely how recent changes in character structure, as well as in the conditions that gave rise to them, have helped to deny utopia. His philosophy then invites us to apply human reason and effort to the improvement of the human condition as thus understood.⁵

This explains The Lonely Crowd's subtitle: A Study of the Changing American Character.

Character Riesman defines as:

the more or less permanent socially and historically conditioned organization of an individual's drives and satisfactions -- the kind of "set" with which he approaches the world and people.

⁴Ibid., p. 99.

⁵Ibid.

"Social character" is that part of "character" which is shared among significant social groups and which, as most contemporary social scientists define it, is the product of the experience of these groups.⁶

Riesman quotes Erich Fromm in this context:

In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary for them to do. Outer force is replaced by inner compulsion, and by the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character traits.⁷

Such a mode of ensuring conformity is built into the child, and then either encouraged or frustrated in later adult experience. While no society is quite prescient enough to ensure that the mode of conformity it has inculcated will satisfy those subject to it in every stage of life, yet it is unlikely that societies and individuals can live without some "mode of conformity."⁸

The Lonely Crowd is largely a description and historical study of three modes of conformity or social characters. Riesman calls them tradition-direction, inner-direction, and other-direction. The characterological developments which he discusses are furthermore linked to certain population shifts in Western society since the Middle Ages. An adequate

⁶David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd, abridged by the authors (New York: Doubleday & Co. [Doubleday Anchor Books], c. 1953), p. 18.

⁷Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁸Ibid., p. 20.

discussion of this link would carry us too far afield. It should be enough to state that Riesman finds three phases on any society's population curve: a period of high growth potential is followed by an era of transitional population growth which is in turn succeeded by a period of incipient population decline.⁹

The society of high growth potential develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their tendency to follow tradition; it is a society dependent on tradition-direction. The society of transitional population growth develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their tendency to acquire early in life an internalized set of goals: this society is dependent on inner-direction. Finally, the society of incipient population decline develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their tendency to be sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others: this society is dependent on other-direction.¹⁰

In a society characterized by tradition-direction the conformity of the individual is largely dictated by power relations that have existed for centuries with but little modification. The culture controls behavior minutely, and provides ritual, routine, and religion to occupy and to

⁹Ibid., pp. 21-4.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 23.

orient everyone. Little energy is expended in a search for new solutions of old problems.

This does not necessarily mean that the people are happy, for the society to whose traditions they are adjusted may be a miserable one, ridden with anxiety, sadism and disease. The point is rather that change is slowed down, and the social character comes as close as it ever does to looking like the matrix of the social forms themselves.¹¹

As a society moves into the period of transitional population growth, pressure on the society's ways calls forth a new slate of character structures. The society is characterized by increased personal mobility and an almost constant expansion. The greater choices which this society gives are handled by character types who can manage to live socially without strict and self-evident tradition-direction. These are the inner-directed types.

Their source of direction is "inner" in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized but nonetheless inescapably destined goals. Too many choices must be made in such a society to permit a code which can encompass them in advance. Consequently the problem of personal choice, solved in the earlier period by channeling choice through rigid social organization, is solved in the period of transitional growth by channeling

¹¹Ibid., pp. 26-7.

choice through a rigid though highly individualized character. The inner-directed person is not, strictly speaking, free from tradition. On the contrary, traditions limit his ends and inhibit his choice of means.

A new psychological mechanism is invented which Riesman calls a "psychological gyroscope." This instrument, once set by the parents and other authorities, keeps the inner-directed person "on course" even when tradition no longer dictates his moves.¹²

In the period of incipient population decline, people find themselves with material abundance and leisure besides. They pay for these benefits, however, by finding themselves in a centralized and bureaucratized society and in a world shrunken and agitated by the contact of nations, races, and cultures. The hard enduringness and enterprise of the inner-directed types are somewhat less necessary under these new conditions. Increasingly, other people are the problem, not the material environment. And as people mix more widely and become more sensitive to each other, the surviving traditions become still further attenuated. Gyroscopic control is no longer sufficiently flexible, and a new psychological mechanism is called for.

¹²Ibid., pp. 29-32.

What is common to all the other-directed people is that their contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual--either those known to him or those with whom he is indirectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass media of communication. This source is internalized in the sense that dependence on it for guidance in life is implanted early. But the goals toward which the other-directed person strives shift with that guidance: it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life. This mode of keeping in touch with others permits a close behavioral conformity not through drill in behavior itself but through an exceptional sensitivity to the actions and wishes of others.

While all people want and need to be liked by some of the people some of the time, the other-directed type makes this his chief source of direction and chief area of sensitivity.¹³

The tradition-directed type is shamed into appropriate behavior. When the inner-directed person gets off course he acquires a feeling of guilt. As against guilt and shame controls, though of course these survive, one prime psychological lever of the other-directed person is a diffuse

¹³Ibid., pp. 33-8.

anxiety. This control equipment, instead of being like a gyroscope, resembles radar.¹⁴

It is important to note that Riesman finds contemporary metropolitan America to be the best illustration--perhaps the only illustration so far--of a society in which other-direction is the dominant mode of ensuring conformity. Unless present trends are reversed, he assumes that the hegemony of other-direction in America is not far off.¹⁵ Thus while Riesman has drawn his concept of other-direction largely from Erich Fromm's discussion of the marketing orientation in Man for Himself,¹⁶ his emphasis on anxiety as an important psychological lever indicates a lineal connection with the theories of Karen Horney.¹⁷

The other-directed person seeks adjustment; he seeks to have the character he is supposed to have and the outer appurtenances that are supposed to go with it. If he fails to find adjustment, he becomes anomic.¹⁸ (Anomic is English coinage from Emile Durkheim's anomique meaning ruleless, un Governed.) Moreover, he may achieve utter conformity in behavior at so high a price as to lead to a character neurosis and anomie.¹⁹ But there is another possibility,

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 40-2.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁷David Riesman, Faces in the Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 348, 360.

¹⁸Riesman, Glazer, and Denney, The Lonely Crowd, p. 276.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 279.

in addition to adjustment and anomie; and that is autonomy. "At most," Riesman writes, "the other-directed man occasionally seeks to be autonomous."²⁰

While the similarity between Riesman's accent upon autonomy and Fromm's emphasis upon man for himself is an apparent one (Riesman has drawn freely upon Fromm's "productive orientation" for his concept of autonomy),²¹ the similarities cannot be stressed at the expense of a proper emphasis upon the differences separating the Riesman and Fromm analyses. The difference is not so much in analysis per se or in the concept of autonomy as in the approach toward a solution.

Fromm writes intensely, persuasively; the titles of the books discussed indicate the hortatory nature of his work. Riesman writes in a detached, resigned fashion, almost like a disinterested observer

When someone fails to become autonomous, we can very often see what blockages have stood in his way, but when someone succeeds in the overt setting in which others have failed, I myself have no ready explanation of this.²²

When people ask, as they sometimes do, how they can become autonomous, the answer cannot be put into words. .

Nevertheless, the other-directed person cannot proceed toward autonomy by any other route than that of self-awareness, which means in part verbal-metaphorical

²⁰Ibid., p. 276.

²¹Ibid., p. 301.

²²Ibid., p. 282.

self-awareness, with all its hazards. . . .

Consequently, the various exhortations that now call Americans back to earlier heritages of inner strength are of very ambiguous value to modern man. Modern man, all things considered, is likely to think too ill of himself as it is: he needs first of all to realize how difficult it is to find the right way, and how few of his stripe have been there before. The appearance of competence that the neotraditionalist preachers convey is simply disquieting to the Hamlets of our time who are aware that not only more problems but with them more feelings exist than the earlier inventories allowed.²³

Riesman concludes The Lonely Crowd:

But while I have said many things in this book of which I am unsure, of one thing I am sure: the enormous potentialities for diversity in nature's bounty and men's capacity to differentiate their experience can become valued by the individual himself, so that he will not be tempted and coerced into adjustment or, failing adjustment, into anomie. The idea that men are created free and equal is both true and misleading: men are created different; they lose their social freedom and their individual autonomy in seeking to become like each other.²⁴

From a series of elaborate conjectures, Riesman concludes that a polarization may be going on at the present time in society. While many people are losing their social and characterological defenses against the group, a few people are becoming more self-consciously autonomous than before. Though politically weak, this "saving remnant" is psychologically strong, and by its very existence it threatens the whole shaky mode of adaptation of the majority.

²³Faces in the Crowd, pp. 736-7.

²⁴The Lonely Crowd, p. 349.

Men do have some control over the fate by which their characters are made.

By showing how life can be lived with vitality and happiness even in a time of troubles, the autonomous people can become a social force, indeed a "saving remnant." By converting present helplessness into a condition of advance, they lay the groundwork for a new society, though, like Condorcet, they may not live to see it.²⁵

²⁵Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered, pp. 119-20.

CHAPTER VI

SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA

Socio-psychology, it would seem from the three preceding discussions, leads inevitably toward glorification of individuality, autonomy, willingness and ability to stand alone. But it is possible to draw another conclusion. Depending upon one's particular bias, it could be said either that some psycho-sociologists have gone one step farther or that they have failed to take the final and essential step. Riesman's deprecation of the neotraditionalist preachers, quoted above, is in part a rejection of the course which has been followed by Sebastian de Grazia.

De Grazia, like Riesman, is not primarily a psychiatrist. Until recently an assistant professor in the social sciences at the University of Chicago, he is now professor of political science at Georgetown University. But though De Grazia is in the first instance a political scientist, his books are drawn more from a study of psychoanalysis than of political science. His first book, The Political Community, was sub-titled "A Study of Anomie," after Durkheim once again, and drew its data principally from psychological studies. His second work, written as a sequel to The Political Community, is titled Errors of Psychotherapy and is, almost in its entirety, an examination of the premises and methodology of psychoanalysis and related forms of mental healing.

To return to the contrast pointed out in the first paragraph above, De Grazia stands in one sense at the opposite pole from Morney, Riesman, and Fromm, all of whom might be called defenders of individualism. De Grazia writes:

But the earth is parched with the aridity of the Individual. Never constant, always a sign of disorder, the notion of the individual has agitated the Western world since the deaths of Alexander and Aristotle. The world then, as now, wanted for men of station and purpose. Once more it needs the ideals of the Citizen, a man of duties and responsibilities, a man of position and significance, of religious and political beliefs, a man with status in the political community.¹

Taking his cue from Aristotle, "Man is a political animal," De Grazia writes:

Without the political community, a man is a nameless outcast. The state is the highest secular organization because like its counterpart, the religious community, it exists to protect man from his greatest fear -- isolation. If he lives in this fear, he can never rise to his fullest potentialities. It is rather ironic that in this age without a sense of community charges are often heard that the dignity of the individual is lost. Once the sense of community is regained, dignity again will envelop the individual.²

Note that De Grazia, like the other psycho-sociologists discussed, is concerned for the development of the individual and his potentialities. But he does not make the assumption that the individual can only develop his potentialities through autonomy, by divorcing himself from the community

¹Sebastian de Grazia, The Political Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. xi.

²Ibid., p. 190. Also Sebastian de Grazia, Errors of Psychotherapy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1952), pp. 234-5.

and then re-relating himself via a "productive orientation." For De Grazia, the community is the matrix within which alone the full development of the individual can take place. While Horney and Fromm both stress the need for an effective relationship of the individual to society, their primary concern is for the individual and his orientation. De Grazia is more concerned with society's organization and its ability to satisfy the individual's needs, with, one might say, society's relationship to the individual.

The difference here is not as subtle as the above remarks might indicate. There is a fundamental difference in attitude between the theories of De Grazia and, for example, Fromm, a difference that De Grazia's statement about the aridity of the individual brings out sharply. And the theoretical differences at this level stem in turn from differences at the level of each writer's understanding of human nature and human potentialities.

De Grazia realizes that the argument must be carried back to this point. Political science dare never forget that it rests upon the nature of man;³ it is not safe simply to assume that "everyone born alive is either a born individualist or a simple sort of democrat."⁴

However, discussion of the "doctrine of human nature" in De Grazia or any of the psycho-sociologists must beware

³De Grazia, Errors of Psychotherapy, p. 11.

⁴Ibid., p. 97.

of a pitfall. It will be recalled that Horney and Fromm were both antagonistic to the phrase "human nature." No doubt some of this hostility arose as a reaction against Freud's biological determinism. But be that as it may, Horney and Fromm are both unwilling to go any farther than the concession that man is "structured" in a certain fashion. They will not allow him a fixed and biologically given human nature.

It is superficially tempting for the orthodox Christian student of anthropology to deduce from certain conclusions of De Grazia that he holds to a doctrine of original sin. He does not, at least not in the sense that Christianity has historically defined it, something with which man is born. There is no evidence that De Grazia believes man to be born with any particular nature, pre-disposed to evil or good, or with a law "written in the heart." Although we are justified in speaking of human nature, we cannot interpret the phrase to mean something given hereditarily. Let De Grazia himself illustrate his meaning:

The helplessness of the human organism at birth and for some succeeding years is a biological fact with immense social importance. Because of it, all humans receive a number of like experiences. It would be a mistake to describe the effect of these experiences on the growing individual as the influence of heredity. . . . Rigorously speaking, the telltale signs of similar upbringing experiences are not attributable to heredity; yet, in seeming paradox, they almost inevitably appear because of the hereditary makeup of man. The feebleness of the human infant thus necessitates a number of uniform

cultural experiences.⁵

The uniformities of childhood experience include four important situations of anxiety in the early history of the human organism: absence of attendants, withdrawal of affection by attendants, discovery of the limitation of attendants, and partial abandonment by attendants. Each of these crises commences with a deterioration of the child's system of beliefs about the world and terminates with the acquisition of a new or revised set of beliefs. The child is presented early in life with the ideational content of political and religious beliefs, but he accepts them only after being confronted with the possibility of the loss of loving care and an orderly, gratifying world. Beliefs can perform their proper psychological function because they define the appropriate ways for obtaining protective assurance, and they indicate the superior powers who can provide that assurance. The need for a body of moral beliefs is thus, in De Grazia's view, fundamentally a need for assurance that critical situations of helplessness will not recur. Thus, belief-systems serve as protection against the anxiety of separation provoked by such situations.⁶

⁵De Grazia, The Political Community, p. 7.

⁶This is an all too brief summary of the thesis in The Political Community, a thesis upon which the later work, Errors of Psychotherapy, also rests in part. The complete discussion is contained in De Grazia, The Political Community, pp. 7-26.

It would appear from this that De Grazia is saying two things of interest to us: Firstly, man cannot live without moral beliefs; secondly, these moral beliefs are the creation of the community. Both these assertions are in fact primary tenets of De Grazia's creed. The Political Community is devoted to the task of proving the inevitability of these moral beliefs and showing what happens when they are weakened through inherent contradiction and mutual incompatibility.

Errors of Psychotherapy leaves no doubt as to the origin of moral beliefs: "No, morality is not inborn."⁷ Morality, differing from land to land and from age to age, represents "the community's efforts to reach a natural law on the just relations of men."⁸

De Grazia's critique of modern psychotherapy begins with the assertion that neurosis is nothing more or less than moral disorder.

It would seem that concrete modern evidence confirms what the scattered materials of history and ethnography could only suggest. The neurosis is a moral disorder. . . . The person who brings his case to the psychotherapist brings a problem that is causing him great suffering and one that for him involves moral conflict, conflict between right and wrong, good and bad, a conflict over "oughtness," over standards or ideals which he has and cannot by himself change.⁹

⁷De Grazia, Errors of Psychotherapy, p. 110.

⁸Ibid., p. 234.

⁹Ibid., pp. 40-1.

The person who consults the psychotherapist obviously suffers. He knows there is something wrong with him, which is causing him hardship, pain, and humiliation. This suffering the modern psychotherapist calls "anxiety." Anxiety, as Freud and Horney both agree, is the essential factor common to all neuroses.

But why is the person anxious? What is the object of this anxiety? De Grazia finds the answer in the feeling of guilt which the patient experiences, the guilt which Horney regarded as the crucial element in the dynamics of neuroses. The problem of the neurotic is suffering due to guilt. Thus, he concludes, every neurotic is actually tormented by a moral conflict, a conflict of right and wrong.¹⁰

It would follow from this, De Grazia reasons, that the cure of neurosis lies in a therapy which provides direction for the person tormented by conflict. And from a broad study of psychotherapy, as practiced from primitive tribes to modern Vienna, he concludes that the successful therapist does indeed give moral direction.¹¹

However, much of modern psychotherapy, and especially that which follows closely in the tradition of Freud, is

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 34-5.

¹¹Ibid. This conclusion is stated specifically on p. 103. The lengthy argument which De Grazia employs to refute the notion that modern psychotherapy is non-directive--that, in fact, any successful therapy has been non-directive--is found pp. 42-102.

unable, on doctrinal grounds, to acknowledge the moral disorder of neurosis or its converse, the moral order of health. Hence it was compelled to produce a therapy of toleration.¹² Rather than be evaluative, rather than admit that their task was to give moral direction, modern psychotherapists have preferred to let the patient think that whatever he wanted was right. They gave moral direction, in other words, but it was direction toward amorality. The patients emerged all with conflicting directives. Here, De Grazia maintains, lies the tragedy of modern psychotherapy. How can the collective effect of psychotherapy in the community be good when the moral directives which it gives clash with each other? A community is an organism and when its cells eat each other it dies.¹³ By sending individual patients out of the office not cured (for cure is today a mystery) but feeling happier, the total amount of moral confusion and conflict within the community is in no way diminished. "It is truly written that if the blind lead the blind both will fall into a ditch."¹⁴

If the psychotherapist has failed, who is left to "help the afflicted soul," to "bring him back into the community," to "offer him a place of light and refreshment?"

¹²Ibid., p. 160.

¹³Ibid., p. 155. See also the discussion of "The Four Walls of the Modern Healer," pp. 132-62.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 160.

Religion, perhaps?¹⁵ De Grazia examines the notion that this is the task of religion at great length.

But he discovers that Roman Catholicism as well as Protestantism has increasingly deemphasized confession and absolution (the Romanists here in America under the influence of Protestant relativism). Confession and absolution, or the act of forgiveness, restores the individual to the community against which he has sinned. It is a truthful therapy, recognizing the moral nature of the person's problem, and it builds moral unity while a therapy of toleration only corrupts morality.¹⁶ But the willingness of clergymen to drink knowledge from the streams of "scientific" psychotherapy and their refusal to recognize and hold on to the genuine elements in their own traditional healing method has made modern religion a cold house. "Healing is dead in the modern church. It had no peace to offer the strife-torn soul. The doors of the temple are closed."¹⁷

The clergymen's standard objection, according to De Grazia, has been that they had no right. God speaks directly to each man, without the necessity of a mediating

¹⁵Ibid., p. 162.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 179-80.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 187.

priest. By what authority, then, can we use confession and absolution?

Here De Grazia makes explicit what has previously been implicit. Because the community is the source of moral beliefs, because it is against the community that the immoral person sins, therefore forgiveness "is the unique possession of the community with its moral structure. Return unto me, it says, and I will return unto you."¹⁸ The right to forgive is hence a right which the community bestows upon its healers.

If the priest or the minister takes the attitude, then, that the individual's conscience should reign supreme, the individual cannot be helped. And the priest or minister is abdicating. De Grazia writes:

God's silence has often been a trial to men. To circumvent it, however, by saying Christus pro me or God is mine, is in me, and is known to me alone, does not open up your ears to heaven. The result is a poor pretense at private hobnobbing with God, an only-child religion that hopes to woo God into a folie a deux. You run about this earth, whispering and listening, and though the voice is there it is not there for you. In the end you crawl back to secular psychotherapy. . .

All psychotherapy is evidence against the doctrine that man needs no provision for moral guidance. The doctrine is certainly not true Protestantism. Luther considered himself a churchman by the grace of God. That was his vocation. He was called to minister and to teach, to give selfless service to mankind, to mediate between God and man for his fellow men.¹⁹

The doctrine of moral independence is not a doctrine of the Reformers, but of the Enlightenment with its secular

¹⁸Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 198-99.

individualism. In a telling passage De Grazia comments:

Having come to life with the proclamation of an absolute reliance on divine forgiveness, Protestantism finds that without men of the stature and confidence of the Reformers it cannot continue to proclaim this forgiveness.²⁰

Again:

The priest, the minister is needed. And right now he is needed to say to men that this is true, certain, and without falsehood -- God does not lie when He gives His promise of forgiveness. This is as good news as it was in the days of the Redeemer.²¹

De Grazia concludes sadly:

Leave the clergyman to bemoan his outcast state. He had the knowledge but he had not the love. He therefore lost the authority to heal and now can be left to keep his museum piece, the church, in faithful repair. It is among the psychotherapists that one finds in rare instances a willingness to forgive.²²

What are the steps, then, which psychotherapy ought to follow: First of all, it must recognize the moral nature of the neurotic problem. Then attention must be fixed on a speedy solution; for unresolved moral tension leads to neurosis, and neurosis if not tended leads to the formation of a new and private system of morality which is psychosis. Psychosis removes the guilt and the conflict, it makes the person happier, but it also alienates him from the community so that "the soul cankers."²³

Therapy must therefore proceed with an end in view. This is the second step. It must find a standard by which

²⁰Ibid., p. 200.

²¹Ibid., p. 203.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., pp. 205-6.

it can judge the desirability of the change which it works in individual men. It cannot make the concrete man over into this ideal man, but it can help him a few steps closer.²⁴ And the one unbreakable law would be that no technique could be applied that might in the short or long run violate this ideal of character.²⁵

At this point in his argument De Grazia sketches a little drama. Does someone argue that the counselling which De Grazia suggests is nothing more than confession, that the healing is only absolution, that the "ideal character" is nothing but the imitation of a Christ, that, in short, this is not psychotherapy but religion? He is correct.

Take each school of psychotherapy separately; it is a redemptive system, designed to relieve guilt. Take them together; they are a snarled mass of conflicting moral teachings. Take them separately, tune them together like the strings of a lute, harmonize their knowledge and ideals; they become a religion.²⁶

Finally, in fashioning their ideal of man, the psychotherapists must not neglect "the law that cannot be violated." Community is the natural order of man. An Ideal of man must place him in community with other men.²⁷ This is the third

²⁴Ibid., p. 207.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 212-3.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 214-5.

²⁷Ibid., p. 215.

and last requirement of an improved psychotherapy. And it carries the psychotherapist into an area for which he is not trained.²⁸

Those responsible for knowledge of the connectedness of things within the community and the ordering of them toward the highest good are the statesman and the theologian. . . . The communities they represent, the political and religious communities or the great community, take in all of man's life. Theirs is the task of raising and holding before men's eyes the vision of the ideal community. Only they have the tradition and the training to do this. Theirs is the duty.²⁹

Simple toleration is not enough. "One passion must be judged wrong and the other right, according to the ideals of the community."³⁰

Yet the mastering of nature is hard. Man is a desiring creature, and it is necessary to provide in the community the means whereby some relief can be offered. This is where the flexible remedy of forgiveness steps forth.

Forgiveness in psychotherapy, in the curing of souls, allows authority to judge and yet reconsider that judgment without imperiling the moral standards of the community. Men are not infallible. But authority does not have to be infallible to be authority. Because his remedies are and must be earth-born, man must say loud and clear, "Right and wrong," and add soft and clear, "Forgiveness."³¹

²⁸Ibid., p. 217.

²⁹Ibid., p. 218.

³⁰Ibid., p. 224.

³¹Ibid., pp. 224-5

De Grazia writes in the Coda of Errors of Psychotherapy that there are in the world fundamental principles of goodness or justice. Man, the half-perceiving, half-creating being, tries to learn these principles. All his science is bent toward their discovery. Those who are thought to know the natural law best are invested with the authority of the community.

Built into man is this institution--community. The natural love of the good in every man is its product. Moral rules change but the moral call is unchangeable and insists always on the realissimum--Men were born to be together. If God's finger had made its furrows in rock when He gave His law, He would have used those letters or the older ones: God is your father and all ye are brethren. "You can, if you will, call this institution divine. In community the objective and subjective aspects of religion coalesce."³²

There are those who like to point out that every man's religion is like a family with God as the father. They think that this proves religion to be nothing more than a projection of the family. It has never occurred to them that the projection could be a divine projection writ small onto man's institutions. Community is stamped on man's soul.³³

De Grazia's writing often takes on a mystical fervor. As a result it is sometimes difficult to appreciate just

³²Ibid., pp. 234-5.

³³Ibid., p. 235.

what he has actually been saying. It is even more difficult to set down, by means of direct quotation or paragraph summaries, the gist of his argument. A resume such as this omits a good deal and consequently leaves room for faulty inferences. The most glaring omission of this section is its almost total disregard of the closely reasoned and thoroughly documented argument of The Political Community. A summary and restatement is therefore especially required, in which an attempt will be made to place in order and perspective the theories of De Grazia which make him relevant to this study, and to make explicit certain of his basic assumptions.

In The Political Community, De Grazia employs throughout the term ruler (always italicized). He defines ruler as "the entity, tangible or intangible, which members of a community believe able to control those aspects of the environment necessary for the commonweal."³⁴ The concept of ruler resolves the apparent inconsistency in De Grazia when he speaks without distinguishing, of the commonweal, the will of God, and moral beliefs.

The rulers have as their duty the regulation of the environment. The ruled have in turn the obligation to obey the law which the rulers establish.³⁵ The baby's bottle,

³⁴De Grazia, The Political Community, p. 22.

³⁵Ibid., p. 87.

protection from foreign invasion, and favorable weather for the crops are all features of the environment which the rulers must regulate. Hence parents, kings, and God are all rulers, at various stages of life and to a varying extent within these stages. Since the protection afforded by parents, secular government, and divine Providence is all of a piece, their authority is likewise one. And the laws which they promulgate must be a unity. The law to which they demand obedience is the basic law of the father: love your brothers--whether the father is biological parent, a king, or God. This primary law is the law of community, a law which the child learns along with the first affection it receives and which is constantly reinforced by all subsequent experience. This is but another approach to the dictum quoted earlier: community is written on man's soul.

The Political Community concerns itself primarily with what happens when belief breaks down, when faith in the rulers is lost, or when the directives which they give contradict each other. The consequence is anomie.³⁶

Errors of Psychotherapy is concerned with another problem: the difficulties which man experiences in obeying the laws laid down by the rulers and the cure for the dilemma in which he consequently finds himself.

But in both books, De Grazia plays upon the theme that the family, the political community, and the religious com-

³⁶Ibid., passim, especially pp. 47-76.

munity are all one community, one but a magnification or a small-scale version of another. There is but one community, and that is ultimately the community of which God is the father and in which all men are brothers.

Sin is a transgression of the community's laws. Sin provokes the anxiety of guilt in the same fashion as flouting of parental authority occasions anxiety in the small child completely dependent upon his parents.

The individual who has within himself a moral conflict (an incipient neurosis, for neurosis is moral disorder) needs moral guidance. He needs to be told by reliable and informed authorities what is right and what is wrong. If he transgresses the law, he realizes that he has alienated himself from the community. He requires restoration. And this forgiveness supplies. The absolution can be pronounced by anyone able to speak in the name of the community.

De Grazia writes:

The theologian is right. Why not admit it? More than anything else, the world needs love. These several hundred pages have shown that unless a human being is welcomed to this world with love, he might as well have been stillborn; that unless the widening horizon continues to assure him of this love, he will not grow; and unless the religious and political beliefs which secure this love are left unfouled, he will wander through life in a maze.⁵⁷

This is the conclusion to which De Grazia comes after lengthy and detailed study of situations where the individual has not been welcomed with love and where the political and

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 187

religious beliefs have not been left "unfouled."

There is a huge difference between Sebastian De Grazia and Erich Fromm. But this area of disagreement must not be permitted to conceal the fact that their analysis of the human situation is strikingly similar. On the nature and the destiny of man they show more agreement than disagreement, though their final conclusions may seem diametrically opposed. Fromm calls upon the individual to redeem himself and to establish a productive orientation toward himself, nature and his fellow men. De Grazia calls upon the community to redeem man and to make possible for him a productive relationship toward himself, nature, and his fellow man. But both have discerned the same fundamental needs in man and both are concerned for his redemption. Their disagreement is principally in the area of means; on the nature and destiny of man they are in basic agreement.

The disagreement with Riesman is sharper in the area of application. While Riesman wants man eventually to transcend tradition-direction, inner-direction, and other-direction, De Grazia has no such hope or even desire. While Riesman looks for the formation of a social character which will avoid anomie not by adjustment but by autonomy, De Grazia holds that only by adjustment can anomie be avoided. De Grazia therefore wants the community's laws to be laws to which the individual can adjust without inner conflict. But adjust he must!

But again we must not emphasize the differences at the expense of the similarities. Riesman and De Grazia use the same analysis of man; they agree on the human plight. And even in their respective solutions they are not too far apart if we recall that Riesman looks in the foreseeable future only toward the formation of a "saving remnant" while De Grazia grants the necessity of rulers, of community healers, of statesmen and theologians who will create and not just bow to the community's laws.

It should be noted that Riesman does not want autonomy for pure rebellion's sake. He objects to the fact that men, in adjusting, are constricting themselves in a fashion which will not permit the development of their full potentialities. They are adjusting to an irrational dictator.

De Grazia argues in The Political Community that the directions which society is giving today are also restricting the development of man into the full measure of healthy and whole humanity.

It could be argued that the difference between Riesman and De Grazia is one of optimism and pessimism. Riesman believes that individual man should rise above the irrational and stultifying direction of the community. De Grazia does not think he can, that if the community fails to provide laws consistent with the nature of man and the human enterprise, only anomie can result.

But we could also turn it around and argue that De Grazia is the optimist while Riesman is the pessimist. After all, it is Riesman who sees no immediate possibility for a change in society and therefore directs his argument to the individual. At the very least, save thyself. While De Grazia sees no chance for the individual apart from society's regeneration, he does hold out hope for such a regeneration. It is surely a sign of optimism to direct an argument at society as a whole and to urge that the entire "community" save itself by a drastic reversal of policy and attitude.

Following an episode's disciple of Freud, wrote in 1931:

The counterpart of the Freudian method of explanation is a detailed elaboration of man's shadow-side even as his power has been carried out before. It is the most effective antidote imaginably to all idealistic illusions about the nature of man. . . . but I believe that there are not a few among the converts of the method of explanation who have no illusions as to man's shadow-side, and who object to a blunted portrayal of man from the shadow-side alone. After all, the essential thing is not the shadow, but the body which casts it.

They noted that about one-third of his cases were

suffering from an clinically detectable psychosis.

But from the unconsciousness and emptiness of their lives. It seems to me that . . . this may well be described as the general psychosis of our time.

Robert Jung, *Man and Environment* (1932), translated from the German by W. J. G. and G. T. Lewis (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., [Harvard Univ.], ca. 1933), pp. 40-1.

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CHAPTER VII

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The significance of psycho-sociology today and the influence which its theories have had will be better estimated if an attempt is first made to place them within the historical continuity of social and psychological science.

In the first place, the conviction that man is more than the sum total of his instinctual drives and that a purely instinctive-genetic psychology is inadequate did not arise overnight in psychoanalysis. It surely did not spring full-blown from the brow of Karen Horney.

Carl Jung, an apostate disciple of Freud, wrote in 1933:

The end-product of the Freudian method of explanation is a detailed elaboration of man's shadow-side such as had never been carried out before. It is the most effective antidote imaginable to all idealistic illusions about the nature of man, . . . but I maintain that there are not a few among the opponents of the method of explanation who have no illusion as to man's shadow-side, and who object to a biased portrayal of man from the shadow-side alone. After all, the essential thing is not the shadow, but the body which casts it.¹

Jung noted that about one-third of his cases were suffering from no clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and emptiness of their lives. It seems to me that . . . this can well be described as the general neurosis of our time.²

¹Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, translated from the German by W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. [Harvest Book], c. 1933), pp. 40-1.

²Ibid., p. 61.

People are searching for meaning in their individual lives.

To be a particle in a mass has meaning and charm only for the man who has not yet advanced to that stage, but none for the man who has experienced it to satiety. The importance of individual life may always be denied by the "educator" whose pride it is to breed mass-men. But any other person will sooner or later be driven to find this meaning for himself.³

In a critical comparison of his views with those of Freud, Jung writes:

We moderns are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit; we must experience it anew for ourselves. It is the only way in which we can break the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological events.⁴

Freud allowed his vision to be colored by the glasses of pathology. But the psychotherapist

must never allow himself to forget that the ailing mind is a human mind, and that, for all its ailments, it shares in the whole of the psychic life of man.⁵

In a direct attack on Freudian biologism, Jung has criticized sharply the tendency to account for everything on physical grounds, for it leads to a "psychology without the psyche."⁶ Medicine has too long gone on the assumption that the illness should be treated and not the sick person. Psychiatrists must turn their attention from the visible disease and direct it upon the man as a whole. A thorough cure can only result from a treatment of the personality as a whole.⁷

³Ibid., p. 68.

⁴Ibid., p. 122.

⁵Ibid., p. 123.

⁶Ibid., pp. 173-80.

⁷Ibid., p. 192.

Otto Rank was another leading Freudian who finally left the ranks of orthodoxy to develop insights of his own. He is credited with making one of the first serious attempts to interrelate psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology and to use a "culture-and-personality" approach to psychological and psychotherapeutic problems.⁸ His biographer credits him with the development of an integrative approach to personality and behavior in relation to the social-cultural environment, developed from the psychoanalytic viewpoint, that was not improved until Karen Horney.⁹

Theodor Reik's study of masochism was an independent approach to the insight which Fromm attained with his concept of ambissia, though Reik lacked the fundamental unifying concept which Fromm had discovered.¹⁰

The most important single predecessor of the Neo-Freudians was undoubtedly Harry Stack Sullivan, already mentioned as the father of inter-personal psychiatry. He had seen very early that progress in psychiatry would only come with the recognition that psychiatry is the study of processes that involve or go on between people. "The field of psychiatry is the field of inter-personal relations,"

⁸Fay B. Karpf, The Psychology and Psychotherapy of Otto Rank (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), p. v.

⁹Ibid., pp. 77, 81, 91.

¹⁰Theodor Reik, Masochism in Modern Man (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941), pp. 427-33.

and a personality "can never be isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his being."¹¹

Sullivan saw that the self came into being as a dynamism to preserve the feeling of security, and was built largely of personal symbolic elements learned in contact with other significant people.¹² Hence the psychiatrist must contemplate the social order not merely as it sets the limits within which the patient's interpersonal relations may succeed, but "rather as the mediate source from which spring his problems which are themselves signs of difficulties in the social order."¹³ In fact, Sullivan virtually identified psychiatry and social psychology by defining psychiatry as the study of interpersonal relations.¹⁴

Anticipating Horney, he saw clearly that recurring congeries of tensions almost unique to man arise from the impact of people; that the felt component is anxiety; and that action which relieves any of these tensions is ex-

¹¹Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (Washington: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, c. 1947), pp. 4-5.

¹²Ibid., p. 21.

¹³Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁴Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, edited by H. S. Perry and M. L. Gawel (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953), pp. 367-8. Sullivan had developed these ideas some years before their first orderly presentation in Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, as the essays reprinted in The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry establish.

perienced as continued or enhanced self-respect or self-esteem.¹⁵

His critique of Freud's concept of narcissism allies him with Fromm, and he calls Fromm's theories on selfishness and self-love, as elaborated in an article in Psychiatry in 1939, "a view sympathetic to my position."¹⁶

Particularly with his concept of "significant others" Sullivan previewed Riesman, and his own writings discuss what Riesman was later to call the transition from inner-direction to other-direction.¹⁷

Leonard S. Cottrell and Nelson N. Foote, in appraising Sullivan's contributions to social psychology, contend that he exemplified the new concern of the scientific spirit with the purposive and value aspects of human social life. No social scientist was more acutely aware of the crisis of values in American society, "though no doubt people like Erich Fromm and David Riesman equal his appreciation."¹⁸

So far, however, we have only considered one side of the picture: the movement of psychology toward a serious consideration of cultural factors.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 370.

¹⁶Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 63.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 95-6.

¹⁸Patrick Mullahy, editor, The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), p. 201.

Harold Lasswell, present-day dean of American political scientists, has been pursuing the connection between political science and psychiatry since before 1930.¹⁹ His researches antedated the Horney-Fromm school of psychoanalysis and paralleled the refined Freudianism of Rank, Reik, and Franz Alexander.²⁰ In recent years he has employed the insights of Neo-Freudian analysis.²¹

Frederick L. Schuman is another eminent political scientist who has devoted many years of study to an exploration of the connection between psychiatry and political science.²² Schuman contends that a contemporary theory of political behavior must be built around the discoveries of Horney, Riesman, and De Grazia. He is particularly warm in his approbation of De Grazia.²³

¹⁹Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Whittlesey House, division of McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935); Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948).

²⁰Franz Alexander, Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality (New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1935).

²¹Cf., for example, Lasswell's discussion of social-anxiety, Power and Personality, pp. 161-4.

²²Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933).

²³The views of Professor Schuman were learned largely from personal conversation and classroom lectures. They may be inferred from his review of De Grazia's Errors of Psychotherapy, printed under the title "The Cure of Souls" New Republic, February 23, 1953, pp. 20-1

The significance of the contributions made by cultural anthropology must not be ignored. Ruth Benedict was one of the first to view culture as an integrated whole and to apply to groups the psychological concepts usually reserved for individuals. She stressed the function of culture and the impossibility of inter-cultural comparisons.²⁴

Ralph Linton, in discussing the "cultural background of personality," states that society and culture exist to satisfy the physical and psychic needs of individuals, and these needs are much on a par. The most outstanding psychic need is that for emotional response from other individuals. Whether it is inborn or learned, it must be satisfied or the individual "suffers from feelings of loneliness and isolation which are almost as acute as though no one were present."²⁵

While Freud posited instincts to account for human reactions, Linton asserts that we now know many of these reactions to be the result of cultural conditioning.²⁶ Rather than nature versus nurture, the new formula must be nature plus or minus nurture.²⁷

²⁴Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc. [Mentor Book], c. 1934).

²⁵Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1945), pp. 6-8.

²⁶Ibid., p. 126.

²⁷Ibid., p. 133.

Linton looks forward to a science of human behavior which will synthesize the findings of psychoanalysis, sociology, and anthropology.²⁸

But while the proponents of "cultural relativism" have contributed to the formulation of the theories under discussion, the influence has not been all one way. Henry W. Brosin finds that the Neo-Freudians (he mentions Horney, Fromm, and Kardiner) have been highly influential, in turn, in anthropological circles.²⁹

Among sociologists, in addition to the school of Riesman, Geoffrey Gorer has pioneered in the work of studying "national character" through a sociological group-analysis.³⁰ His findings can be fitted within the framework of Horney's over-all theory and anticipate in many ways Riesman's study of other-direction.³¹

This survey is all too brief, but it may serve to indicate a trend still going on in those sciences which deal

²⁸Ibid., p. 5.

²⁹Franz Alexander and Helen Ross, editors, Dynamic Psychiatry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 536. Consult also Abram Kardiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). The best illustration of this statement is found in the volume edited by Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, Personality in Nature, Society and Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).

³⁰Geoffrey Gorer, The American People (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948).

³¹Ibid., cf. especially pp. 55-6.

with man and his institutions. Increasingly it is being recognized that culture and its products are attempts to satisfy human needs. These needs are not only physical, but also psychic. Man does have imperative psychic needs, needs which arise from the "humanness" of man. Though there is no clear agreement on whether they are inborn or inculcated immediately after birth, it is agreed that they always exist and that they must be satisfied. Since man's needs shape cultural institutions, and since these cultural institutions influence in turn the peculiar direction which man's attempts to satisfy these needs will take, and since man's attempts to satisfy his needs within an existing cultural framework may at times involve an inherent conflict with those needs themselves--therefore it is only through an integrated study of man that progress can be made toward an understanding and amelioration of the human predicament.

While many anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists do not accept the analysis of man which this paper has sketched, they are almost all ready to concede the truth of the preceding paragraph and the necessity of a methodology similar to that used by the psycho-sociologists under discussion. As far as the writer has been able to discern, opposition to the theories of Erich Fromm, to use but one example, comes not from those who disagree with his conclusions on the basis of other evidence but from those who believe that he is on the right track but has pushed his conclusions beyond the evidence available so far.

CHAPTER VIII

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY AND BIBLICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE "COURAGE TO BE" OF PAUL TILLICH

Implicit and often explicit in the writings of Horney, Fromm, Riesman, and De Grazia is an understanding of human nature and a concept of human destiny (or "the future of man," if a less meta-physical term is preferred). To what extent does their anthropology agree with the Biblical anthropology? What are the important parallels between their understanding of man and the Christian understanding of man? Can psycho-sociology make any significant contribution to the Christian understanding of man? What are the inadequacies in the understanding of the psycho-sociologists which Christianity can correct?

We must begin with Freud. David Riesman points out that in the continuing campaign of organized religious thought against organized scientific thought Freud is today frequently thrown into the fray on the side of the campaigners. Riesman finds four themes in Freud which help to explain the paradox of his adoption by a certain kind of orthodoxy: the allegation that Freud has dethroned reason and crowned irrationality and mystique; the emphasis on anxiety in Freud's writings; his pessimism about man's fate; and his concept of original sin.¹

¹David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p. 392.

I believe that Christian thinkers err when they try to enlist Freud for these reasons. In the first place, his dethronement of reason is not the dethronement which many of the devout have long craved. It is reason identified with science which has been the real focus of the Christian attack against reason. And Freud, as has been pointed out in some detail, firmly believed that science and only science was not illusory. The only truth available to man is that which he acquires by rational investigation in accord with scientific procedure. Freud did not "crown" irrationality and mystique; he only pointed up the influence which it does happen to enjoy. But he wanted rationality to replace irrationality; this was the goal of his therapy. And for that matter, Christianity surely has no stake in the triumph of the Freudian id.

It is true that Freud, especially in his later writings, stressed the concept of anxiety. But Freudian anxiety which has as its prototype the trauma of birth and which derives basically from sexual instinct (libido) is only distantly related to the anxiety that Kierkegaard discusses.

Freud was certainly pessimistic about man's fate. This pessimism is closely connected with the fourth theme mentioned by Riesman, Freud's concept of original sin. It is true that Freud was largely free of the sentimental illusions about man which characterized his generation and that his observations of man as he is instead of man as he wishes he

were present striking confirmation of the Biblical thesis concerning original sin. But again we must beware. The Bible does not assign original sin to man's body. Neo-Platonism, with its deprecation of the body and its exaltation of "disembodied spirit," might find Freud congenial. But Christianity, which insists upon the unity of man, the originally perfect creation of God, which speaks of the eternal Word that became flesh, and which confesses its belief in the resurrection of the body cannot find in Freud an ally. Freud's aggressive instinct is not original sin because he bases it upon an alleged instinct toward conservatism inherent in organic matter. Man's sin is not in his body but is--in some fashion--within his total being.

It is at this point that Christianity must make a sharp and fundamental break with Freud. His entire theory of man is founded upon a conception of man as instinct-ridden animal that cannot be reconciled with any concept of human freedom or guilt. Christianity insists upon both.

The pessimism of Freud about human potentialities must not keep us from seeing that the more optimistic Neo-Freudians may actually be closer to a Christian anthropology.

Any systematized approach to the next portion of our discussion will have the fault of covering up some important facts. But an unsystematized comparison of Neo-Freudian and Biblical anthropology may hide the forest in the trees. For the sake of a meaningful comparison, therefore, we have chosen to carry on this discussion under three main headings.

Man as man will be treated first. The "human predicament" as seen by Horney and Fromm will be compared with the human predicament as witnessed to by the Bible.

Man in community will be the second major heading. The more sociologically oriented analyses of Riesman and De Grazia will be used to compare the Neo-Freudian and the Christian understandings of man among men. In this second area especially, but also to some extent in the first, the problem of "redemption" will be treated.

Finally, it will be necessary to weave the two major topics together in an effort to construct a total picture and arrive at useful generalizations. It is here that we shall turn to certain insights of Paul Tillich.

What is it that keeps man from being completely at home in the universe? Why is there neurosis and psychosis, conflict and unhappiness, suffering and boredom?

Both Horney and Fromm believe that it is possible for man to be happy. They both assume that he can grow into the full measure of man, and that if he does, he will not be tormented by neurosis, conflict, and boredom. Then why doesn't he? The answer is found for both of them in the nature of man and in certain consequences of this nature.

Horney speaks of "basic anxiety." Fromm talks about the creature-creator ambivalence. Both are discussing essentially the same thing.

Horney holds that basic anxiety develops from a number of causes, but that the most important single cause is a

lack of security. The child, early in life, discovers its nearly total dependence upon forces outside itself, over which it has only a very limited control. Concerned for the satisfaction of its needs and simultaneously aware that the satisfaction of these needs depends upon something other than the self, the child searches frantically for means by which it can remove the sense of helplessness and aloneness which ensues. If it fails to find these means, or, finding them, discovers at a later date that they are not performing up to expectation, the child falls back into anxiety.

This basic anxiety is the substratum upon which the person builds as he matures. His every thought and action is tempered and conditioned by his ceaseless search for techniques by which he can gain reassurance and protect himself against the basic anxiety. He craves power, he submits desperately, he flees situations of conflict, he strives compulsively to gain affection. All of these devices, which may be mutually contradictory, are necessary because the individual does not feel within himself that he belongs, that he is loved, and that his life has meaning for itself.

Fromm finds a qualitative difference between man and the lower animals in man's unique ability to transcend creatureliness. Man has emerged from the protecting cradle of nature into the domain of freedom, just as the individual child emerges from the womb and from the all-embracing maternal care into the world of responsible adult decision. Expelled from nature, man must find his own way. He may

choose not to. He may prefer to flee back to the womb. He may seek absorption rather than freedom. Instead of finding his own place on the basis of his individuality, man becomes terrified. Driven by anxiety he tries to protect himself, to give himself identity and meaning by becoming a part rather than a meaningful whole. Sadism is the attempt to alleviate anxiety by "incorporating" others; masochism is the attempt to do the same thing by permitting others to "incorporate" oneself. Symbiosis, a comprehensive term covering both sadism and masochism, is not ultimately the answer. As a man cannot, no matter how hard he tries, return physically to the womb, so he cannot return to the all-consoling and all-protecting embrace of nature. Any attempt to submerge his individuality cannot in the long run succeed, and when the attempt has failed man will be more subject than before to anxiety and despair.

As has been mentioned previously, Fromm finds an anxiety basic to the basic anxiety of Horney. She holds that basic anxiety develops as the result of the earliest life experience. Fromm roots it in the very condition of man.

Does Christianity know anything of such a basic anxiety? In the story of the Fall, the man who had been created in the image of God, who enjoyed perfect communication with God, after his disobedience hid himself from the eyes of God. When God calls, Adam replies: "I heard Thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself."²

²Gen. 3:10.

While the theology of these early chapters in Genesis has long been a part of the Christian understanding--St. Paul, in Romans, discusses it in detail--there is a great deal of often ignored anthropology here also. The human predicament is dramatically portrayed in the story of the Fall. The nakedness of Adam seems almost to symbolize the inadequacy which he feels; he is unworthy now to stand before God; he now flees that presence in which he had formerly basked. He is unsure of himself, helpless, alone. He does not know how to deal with the forces which control his destiny. His hiding is an unsuccessful attempt to allay this basic anxiety.

As a consequence of their disobedience the primal parents are expelled from the Garden of Eden. Here is the expulsion from nature of which Fromm speaks. It is a consequence of man's disobedience, though, and not of his freedom. Formerly man was at one with nature and with nature's God. Now he is separated from God. As a result he is separated from nature also. The natural process of childbirth will occur in sorrow and pain. The ground will bring forth thorns and thistles.³ Man, because of his disobedience, is compelled to reorient himself entirely to that universe of which he was formerly a harmonious part.

The story of Cain and Abel relates an early attempt to do just this. Conscious of their separation from God, Cain

³Gen. 3:16-9.

and Abel brought propitiatory sacrifices. Abel was "accepted"; Cain felt that he was not. Therefore he killed his brother. He tried to gain acceptance by domination, to establish himself by the "incorporation" of Abel, if we may use Fromm's terminology. But he did not succeed. Security cannot be gained by depriving others, for man is his brother's keeper. He must attain security for himself. "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?"⁴ So Cain is driven out from the community of man; he becomes a fugitive and a vagabond. He loses, by his wrongful attempt to gain security, even that measure of security which he had.⁵

The Decalogue is a significant commentary on human nature if we are willing to understand the Moral Law as something more than the arbitrary house-rules of a capricious God. Man in his aloneness, beset by a feeling of insecurity, unable to reconcile himself to God, makes himself idols. He tries to allay his anxiety by the service of something less than God. But this is no answer, for God is a jealous God. No orientation short of orientation to Him can be a true and effective restoration.⁶

The prohibitions and injunctions of the second table are a commentary on man's attempts to allay his anxiety by

⁴Gen. 4:7.

⁵Gen. 4:14.

⁶Ex. 20:3-5.

rebellion against that order to which he is by creative order committed. He seeks self-enhancement by murder, theft, deceit. He attempts to bury his anxiety in sensual fulfillment. But he is told that even the desire to enhance his own position by appropriation of that which is rightfully another's is wrong. It is not only contrary to the divine law; it is contrary to the divine order.⁷

The book of Job is almost throughout a description of the human predicament:

Then Job answered and said,
 Even to day is my complaint bitter: my stroke is
 heavier than my groaning.
 Oh that I knew where I might find him! that I might
 come even to his seat!
 I would order my cause before him, and fill my mouth
 with arguments.
 I would know the words which he would answer me, and
 understand what he would say unto me.
 Will he plead against me with his great power? No;
 but he would put strength in me.
 There the righteous might dispute with him; so should
 I be delivered for ever from my judge.
 Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and back-
 ward, but I cannot perceive him.
 On the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot
 behold him: he hideth himself on the right hand,
 that I cannot see him;
 But he knoweth the way that I take: when he hath tried
 me, I shall come forth as gold.
 My foot hath held his steps, his way have I kept, and
 not declined.
 Neither have I gone back from the commandment of his
 lips; I have esteemed the words of his mouth more than
 my necessary food.
 But he is in one mind, and who can turn him? and what
 his soul desireth, even that he doeth.
 For he performeth the thing that is appointed for me:
 and many such things are with him.
 Therefore am I troubled at his presence: when I con-
 sider, I am afraid of him.

For God maketh my heart soft, and the Almighty
troubleth me:
Because I was not cut off before the darkness,
neither hath he covered the darkness from my face.⁸

Man separate from God can only fear God, for he cannot know and understand that God is merciful and loving for him. The Angst der Kreatur which Job so vividly describes is the common anxiety of man apart from God and unable to understand the meaning of his existence. Man's desperate attempt to justify his position over against God is a foolishness born of despair.

Is not destruction to the wicked? and a strange
punishment to the workers of iniquity?
Doth not he see my ways, and count all my steps?
If I have walked with vanity, or if my foot hath
hasted to deceit;
Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may
know mine integrity.⁹

Man without God has no identity. He is a meaningless glob of protoplasm. Kierkegaard, writing within a Christian context, has perceived this clearly. He speaks of

having lost one's self -- not by evaporation in the infinite, but by being entirely finitized, by having become, instead of a self, a number, just one man more, one more repetition of this everlasting Einerlei.¹⁰

The possibility of having the "sickness unto death" Kierkegaard considers man's advantage over the beast. To be sharply observant of this sickness constitutes the

⁸Job 23:1-17.

⁹Job 31:3-6.

¹⁰Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, translated from the Danish by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday & Co. [Doubleday Anchor Book], c. 1954), p. 166.

Christian's advantage over the natural man. And to be healed of this sickness is the Christian's bliss.¹¹

Kierkegaard agrees with Fromm that despair, the ultimate anxiety, is a unique prerogative of man, setting him above all other creation. And Kierkegaard discovered this by means of his Christian understanding of the human predicament. It is given to the Christian to know the "sickness unto death." He arrived at a conclusion which scientific psychiatry was not to reach for another hundred years.

But we have not said enough when we have pointed out the plight in which man stands as he faces God. For in a sense he does not face God alone. He stands in a community of man; he visualizes himself within this community; and it as a social being that he gazes upon his plight.

Riesman concedes the necessity under which society stands of regulating the conduct of its members. But he has stressed the compulsion which the member of society feels to conform to the dictates of his society. The tradition-directed person feels shame, the inner-directed person guilt, the other-directed person anxiety when he fails to heed the commands of his culture. Riesman would not deny the necessity or the positive value of conformity. Social life is impossible without some degree of adherence by mutual agreement to a minimum body of cultural dicta.

¹¹Ibid., p. 148.

But man goes beyond that minimum. He obeys compulsively. He is incapable of a calm and objective analysis of culture's directions. Because he cannot conceive of himself apart from groups, because he has no real self, he believes that disobedience is a form of suicide. Unless man is autonomous, disobedience is suicide. If a man is nothing but a "role," then he vanishes the instant he ceases to play that role.

De Grazia, even more than Riesman, has emphasized the dependence of man upon the "beliefs" which the culture inculcates. He learns that there are certain laws, that obedience to these laws guarantees security and protection, and that disobedience means ostracism. It means outer darkness, where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.

For De Grazia, the dictates of society and the dictates of God are essentially one. God has placed men in community, and He demands of them first of all that they obey the laws of community. "Love thy brother" is the moral law which every man receives, from parents, from secular rulers, and from God. When man disobeys this law of community, he senses his expulsion from the community. He is helpless and alone, entangled in anomie, until he has been readmitted.

It is important to note that the conformity which Riesman describes is not in any way related to Christian love. The other-directed person, in particular, because of his extreme sensitivity to the desires of others, can be easily confused with an ideal Christian type. But all

these types of conformity which Riesman describes are motivated ultimately by fear. And Christian love is not the product of fear. Whoever loves because he is afraid of the consequences if he does not love is not practicing Christian love. "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear: because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love."¹²

The Christian is spontaneous in his love, autonomous, not compulsive. He relates himself to his fellow man not according to the dictates of a legal code, but according to a new law which is no law at all but a mode of being: Love.

Riesman does not really discuss redemption. His saving remnant is a pious hope and his attitude is one of resignation. He observes and describes man's attempt to find himself in society but holds out no new means by which that integration can be accomplished.

De Grazia holds that man's estrangement from the community is a result of his transgression against the community's laws. Therefore he can be restored, he can be redeemed, by forgiveness. The individual must cleanse himself by catharsis, confession, and then receive the community's absolution and restoration.

"If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteous-

¹²I John 4:18.

ness."¹³ Christianity has long recognized--and De Grazia points this out--the individual's need for confession and absolution. When the close identification which De Grazia makes between God and the community is appreciated, the parallels between his conception of man in community and the Christian conception are more clearly seen. And this identification is not a difficult one to understand. "And this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also."¹⁴ There is an indissoluble bond among men whose severance implies separation also from God.

The understanding of man set forth by Horney, Fromm, Riesman, and De Grazia touches the Christian understanding most clearly at this one point: Man is alone and he can't stand it. Horney wants him to grow to the full measure of man, fulfilling his potentialities, and thus overcome his anxiety by being--a term is difficult to find--fruitful, growing, expansive. Fromm wants man to understand and appreciate his true self and to be for himself, and this implies a productive orientation toward the world. The productive orientation casteth out fear.

Riesman emphasizes autonomy and the ability to transcend the irrational dictates of society, to serve the interests of one's unique individuality. The autonomous individual, by definition, has conquered anxiety. De Grazia more explicitly recognizes the difficulties with which man finds

¹³I John 1:19.

¹⁴I John 4:21.

himself beset. His anxiety leads him to "sin," to find security by wrongful means. Therefore he requires forgiveness and restoration if he is not to drift into anomie. For De Grazia, autonomy is not a real possibility.

On one very significant point, De Grazia has seen the human situation more clearly than any of the other three. He has admitted that man cannot redeem himself. A better knowledge of the self, which Horney and Fromm would have the individual obtain, is not necessarily the cure. For the better the individual learns to know himself, the more clearly he perceives that there is something wrong. Neither Horney nor Fromm has considered the possibility that man may not have within himself the ability to develop his full potential, or that the development of man according to his inherent needs may lead to a deformed and not a perfect humanity.

Reinhold Niebuhr has, I believe, pierced to the ethical error in this sort of thinking. Fromm has argued that self-regard is only harmful when frustrated, that men must therefore seek their own happiness in accord with an understanding of their real interests; and then they will love others as a "Phenomenon of abundance." Fromm is correct in arguing that authoritarian religion interferes by "commanding" love. Love is indeed not a simple command to be obeyed. But Fromm has not seen that the security of the self is furnished by the love of others, not its own efforts at security. And like all human desires, the

desire for security is indeterminate.¹⁵

Horney, Fromm, and Riesman deny, of course, any concept of original sin. Hence they see no need for outside intervention. But De Grazia has done more than perceive man's need for a saving hand extended from outside himself. He also insists that the saving hand must be extended through the community of men. God's forgiveness cannot be received directly from an abstraction called God; it must be mediated. His description of the man who seeks God within the cubicle of his private consciousness is a graphic description of the modern liberal Protestant. He thinks of sin only as a wrong against the self. There is very little consciousness of a higher law against which he offends.

De Grazia could have gone one step further. He could have pointed out that forgiveness must come ultimately from the supreme Ruler, for it is He who placed man in the world and it is He to whom man is ultimately responsible. He sometimes implies as much, with his identification of community and divine order. But he does not clearly state that the lost, erring man needs assurance from God Himself that he is forgiven, that he is reconciled. The Heavenly Father, the Ruler of the highest community to which man belongs, must purge man if he is to be clean.

The drama of the Cross cannot, of course, be made perfectly rational and intelligible by this sort of analysis.

¹⁵Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 139.

The Cross is and will always remain a stumbling block to purely rational inquiry. Nonetheless we see the dim outline of a divine necessity in the Atonement. God becomes a Man, He shares the common lot of humanity, and God takes upon Himself the burden of human sinfulness. Jesus Christ can be the High Priest who forgives sins, He can be the Propitiator between God and men, because He has borne the weight of human sin. Through Jesus Christ God can now speak to men the word of divine forgiveness which they so desperately crave.

Man wants to be accepted. God freely accepts man through the reconciliation effected on the Cross. And the language which He speaks is the language known to man, for it is spoken through God Incarnate, the Word of God become our Brother. Man wants love, for only through the love of others does he find security. But he needs "indeterminate" love, love such as only God can give. And this God has given on the Cross. "We love," St. John writes, "because He first loved us."¹⁶

Paul Tillich, in The Courage to Be, has written an ontology of anxiety that embraces the entire Neo-Freudian analysis of the human situation and goes beyond it at critical points. Tillich perceives three types of anxiety according to the three directions in which nonbeing threatens man's being. It threatens his ontic, spiritual, and moral self-affirmation. Man's awareness of this three-

¹⁶I John 4:19. (Nestle text.)

fold threat is anxiety appearing in the form of the anxiety of fate and death, the anxiety of meaninglessness, and the anxiety of guilt and condemnation.

In all three forms anxiety is existential in the sense that it belongs to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of mind as in neurotic (and psychotic) anxiety.¹⁷

The "courage to be" which Horney, Fromm and Riesman advocate Tillich would call the "courage to be as oneself and the courage to be as a part."¹⁸ (The other-directed type of Riesman has only the courage to be as a part.) Being as a part points to the fact that self-affirmation necessarily includes the affirmation of oneself as participant. It is not the same thing as the lack of courage shown in the desire to live under the protection of a larger whole. (Fromm's escape from freedom and the whole concept of symbiosis may be recalled.) It in fact includes the courage to be as oneself.¹⁹

But participation always demands a measure of conformity and adjustment; hence the courage to be as a part is always a threat to the individual self. The danger of the loss of the self therefore elicits a protest against the several forms of the courage to be as a part. The courage to be as oneself which this protest occasions is itself threatened in turn by the loss of the rest of the world.²⁰

¹⁷Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 41.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 89-90.

²⁰Ibid., p. 112.

This suggests a possible limit to the courage to be as oneself, a limit which Horney, Fromm, and Riesman have not clearly recognized. Radical Existentialism, as Tillich points out, must assert that the self which affirms the self is whatever it makes of itself. This is all it can say, because anything more would restrict the absolute freedom of the self.²¹

But only God is a se, from Himself, or absolute freedom. Man, on the other hand, is finite. He is given to himself as what he is. He has received his being and with it the structure of his being. Hence man can affirm himself only if he affirms

not an empty shell, a mere possibility, but the structure of being in which he finds himself before action and non-action. Finite freedom has a definite structure, and if the self tries to trespass on this structure it ends in the loss of itself.²²

Tillich suggests that a dialectical self-destruction of the courage to be as oneself (for the reasons outlined above) has happened on a world-wide scale in the totalitarian reaction of the twentieth century against the revolutionary Existentialism of the nineteenth century.

The Existentialist protest against dehumanization and objectivation, together with its courage to be as oneself, have turned into the most elaborate and oppressive forms of collectivism that have appeared in history.²³

²¹Ibid., p. 151.

²²Ibid., p. 152.

²³Ibid., pp. 152-3.

Hence Tillich does not believe in the solution offered by Horney and Fromm. The courage to be as a part and the courage to be as oneself, if carried through radically, lead respectively to the loss of the world in Existentialism and the loss of the self in collectivism.²⁴

But Tillich asks a question. Is there a courage to be which unites both forms by transcending them?

Courage is always threatened by nonbeing. Therefore it needs the power of being, a power transcending the nonbeing which is experienced in the anxiety of fate and death, which is present in the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, which is effective in the anxiety of guilt and condemnation.

The courage which takes this threefold anxiety into itself must be rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and the power of one's world. Neither self-affirmation as a part nor self-affirmation as oneself is beyond the manifold threat of nonbeing.²⁵

Hence Tillich concludes that every courage to be has an open or a hidden religious root. For religion is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself. Though covered, denied, or deeply hidden, the religious root is never completely absent.²⁶

In mysticism, the individual self strives for a participation in the ground of being which approaches identification.²⁷ The limit of the mystical situation is the state

²⁴Ibid., pp. 153-5.

²⁵Ibid., p. 155.

²⁶Ibid., p. 156.

²⁷Ibid., p. 157.

of emptiness of being and meaning which the mystics have at times described. In these moments the courage to be is reduced to the acceptance of even this state as a means to something beyond it. As long as the absence of the power of being is felt as despair, the power of being is expressing itself through despair. To experience this and to endure it is the courage to be of the mystic in the state of emptiness. To some extent, Tillich holds, this mystic striving for union with reality has shaped large sections of mankind--even though it has done so in modified form.²⁸

But the mystic experience is not our real concern here. Luther derived his courage to be from an experience in which the mystical element was present, but also much more: from the person-to-person encounter with God.²⁹ In Luther, Tillich holds, the courage of confidence reached its highest point in the history of Christian thought.³⁰ In spite of all the negativities which he encountered, in spite of the anxiety which dominated that period, Luther derived the power of self-affirmation from his unshakeable confidence in God and the personal encounter with Him.³¹ This courage transcends both the courage to be as oneself and the courage to

²⁸Ibid., p. 159.

²⁹Ibid., p. 160.

³⁰Ibid., p. 161.

³¹Ibid., p. 160.

be as part; it is threatened neither by the loss of the world nor by the loss of oneself.³²

In the center of this courage of confidence stands the courage to accept acceptance in spite of the consciousness of guilt. It is rooted in the personal, total, and immediate certainty of divine forgiveness. There is, in fact, no form of man's courage to be, according to Tillich, in which there is not some belief in forgiveness. The courage to be has as its necessary part "the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable."³³ This, says Tillich, is the real meaning of the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith.

Tillich notes that psychotherapy, in its fight against the anxiety of guilt, has given to the idea of acceptance that significance which the Reformation assigned to phrases like "the forgiveness of sins" or "justification by faith."³⁴

But this is not acceptance of oneself by oneself, nor is it the Existentialist courage to be as oneself.

It is the paradoxical act in which one is accepted by that which infinitely transcends one's individual self. It is in the experience of the Reformers the acceptance of the unacceptable sinner into judging and transforming communion with God.³⁵

³²Ibid., p. 163.

³³Ibid., p. 164.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 165.

We shall let the words of Tillich summarize this discussion:

The courage to be in this respect is the courage to accept the forgiveness of sins, not as an abstract assertion but as the fundamental experience in the encounter with God. Self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of guilt and condemnation presupposes participation in something which transcends the self. In the communion of healing, for example the psycho-analytic situation, the patient participates in the healing power of the helper by whom he is accepted although he feels himself unacceptable. The healer, in this relationship, does not stand for himself as an individual but represents the objective power of acceptance and self-affirmation. This objective power works through the healer in the patient. Of course, it must be embodied in a person who can realize guilt, who can judge, and who can accept in spite of the judgment. Acceptance by something which is less than personal could never overcome personal self-rejection. A wall to which I confess cannot forgive me. No self-acceptance is possible if one is not accepted in a person-to-person relation. But even if one is personally accepted it needs a self-transcending courage to accept this acceptance, it needs the courage of confidence. For being accepted does not mean that guilt is denied. The healing helper who tried to convince his patient that he was not really guilty would do him a great disservice. He would prevent him from taking his guilt into his self-affirmation. He may help him to transform displaced, neurotic guilt feelings into genuine ones which are, so to speak, put on the right place, but he cannot tell him that there is no guilt in him. He accepts the patient into his communion without condemning anything and without covering up anything.

Here, however, is the point where the religious "acceptance as being accepted" transcends medical healing. Religion asks for the ultimate source of the power which heals by accepting the unacceptable, it asks for God. The acceptance by God, his forgiving or justifying act, is the only and ultimate source of a courage to be which is able to take the anxiety of guilt and condemnation into itself. For the ultimate power of self-affirmation can only be the power of being-itself. Everything less than this, one's own or anybody else's finite power of being, cannot overcome the radical, infinite threat of nonbeing which is experienced in the despair of self-condemnation. This is why the courage of confidence, as it is expressed in

a man like Luther, emphasizes unceasingly exclusive trust in God and rejects any other foundation for courage to be, not only as insufficient but as driving him into more guilt and deeper anxiety. The immense liberation brought to the people of the 16th century by the message of the Reformers and the creation of their indomitable courage to accept acceptance was due to the sola fide doctrine, namely to the message that the courage of confidence is conditioned not by anything finite but solely by that which is unconditional itself and which we experience as unconditional in a person-to-person encounter.³⁶

The psycho-sociologists whom we have studied have indeed presented a vivid and coherent picture of man. Their conception of human nature is strikingly similar to the Scriptural conception of man. But there is no healing, as De Grazia points out, in any therapy which fails to take cognizance of the moral nature of man's dilemma. Horney, Fromm, and Riesman are not fully and at all times aware of man's need to be accepted before he can accept himself. Hence their conception of human destiny, their delineation of the possible, is both inadequate and overly optimistic. De Grazia himself does not see clearly the necessity of divine acceptance as the ultimate source of "a courage to be which is able to take the anxiety of guilt and condemnation into itself." It is sometimes difficult to discern the precise level on which De Grazia sees man's moral problem being resolved.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 165-7.

In so far, then, as psycho-sociology is genuinely empirical, it furnishes a useful commentary upon and elaboration of the human predicament. But the bias of "scientism" which it has inherited from Freud prevents it from recognizing that salvation can only be found in the "divine-human encounter."

Christianity corrects psycho-sociology by insisting that "God commendeth His love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us."³⁷

Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ:
By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.³⁸

³⁷Rom. 5:8.

³⁸Rom. 5:1-2.

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