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HISPANIDAD

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
Department of Historical Theology
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Divinity

by

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June 1951

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INTRODUCTION

Within the past twenty years a philosophy of world conquest known as Hispanidad has entered into the modern world, but its influence, and apparently passed on into the world of unfulfilled dreams. This philosophy developed in...

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INTRODUCTION

Within the past twenty years a philosophy of world conquest known as Hispanidad has entered into the modern world, had its influences, and apparently passed on into the world of unfulfilled dreams. This philosophy developed in modern Spain and reached its zenith while the Axis Nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan were on their road toward world conquest. With the defeat of these totalitarian nations by the Allied military forces in the Second World War, this philosophy lost its hopes of ever becoming a success in its present form under the existing world conditions. Had the Second World War been won by the Axis Nations, the story would be altogether a different one. As it is, Hispanidad is dead, except for memories which still linger in the hearts of some Spaniards and Roman Catholics.

Modern Spanish history, like all of Spanish history, is in reality church history or more specifically Roman Catholic Church history. To be a Spaniard is to be a Catholic. Few, if any, larger nations have been so closely connected with any church as the Spanish nation has been to the Catholic Church. This is not only true in modern times but has been down through the past centuries. Hence, in any consideration of Spanish history, the Roman Catholic Church plays a very important part, and this is especially true in a consideration of the philosophy of Hispanidad.

Spain was once one of the leading nations of the world, both in power and wealth, and glory and domain. Spain and Spaniards have never forgotten this and have always dreamed of that day when Spain would once again hold this position of mightiest of the nations. The

most modern of these philosophies by which Spain hoped once again to obtain this high position was that of Hispanidad. Could Hispanidad have been carried out, Spain would have been the greatest of nations and the Roman Catholic Church would have controlled the religious life of almost the entire world. Hispanidad was not a small thing; in the final analysis, it was a philosophy of world conquest. It was the result of a great deal of planning, effort, and financial support. It is difficult for persons in the United States, knowing a somewhat different type of Roman Catholic, to have any understanding of all the things involved in the concept of Hispanidad. It was so conceived that it could be successful in a small area or be expanded to include the entire world. Hispanidad was a monster which died after the defeat of the Axis Nations and with the formation of the United Nations, but it was that type of monster which will resurrect in a different form the first moment it has the opportunity. It was not defeated by arms; it was not destroyed; it was not a total success because it did not have the opportunity to be a success; it is dead but yet lives. This is because it was a hope; it was a dream; it was a religious philosophy.

It may never be determined fully what the exact goal of the advocates of Hispanidad was, and it is even more difficult to come to any definite conclusions after only such a short space of time since the movement was active. Still, even in this short period of time there are various opinions as to what Hispanidad hoped to accomplish and all of these stand on firm ground. There are some, especially among the Roman Catholics, who feel that Hispanidad was just a cultural movement by which Spain hoped to become closer to her former colonies. There

are others who believe it was an effort on the part of Spain to retake her former colonies and once again become a great Catholic Empire. And there are still others who believe there is enough evidence to prove that Hispanidad was just a tool of the Nazi Government by which Germany hoped to gain entrance into Latin America by using Spain, her language, her religion, customs, and traditions. Undoubtedly all of these conclusions were included in Hispanidad as will be shown in this consideration of that philosophy. So hidden under Hispanidad, which appeared to be just a harmless "good-neighbor policy" on the part of Spain toward her former colonies, especially those colonies in Latin America, was a plan of world conquest involving Franco's Spain, Hitler's Nazi Germany, and including the Roman Catholic Church. Spain and the Catholic Church realized that by carefully playing along and by doing very little themselves, they could make use of the Nazi war machine of the Second World War with the possibility of losing nothing if Germany was defeated and of gaining the world if Germany was victorious.

All of this may sound fantastic, but not to those who believed in Hispanidad. Had it gained the opportunity sought by its advocates through a victory by the Axis Nations, almost the entire world would have been changed back to something like that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries before the Reformation. This would be a world ruled by Spain and controlled by the Catholic Church. The philosophy of Hispanidad, although directed toward the conquest of the entire world, was more particularly directed toward the former colonies of Spain in the Western Hemisphere for the largest portion of Spain's

former empire was in Central and South America.

It is the purpose of this consideration of Hispanidad to trace: (1) the background of Spanish history which made it possible for a philosophy such as Hispanidad to gain a foothold; (2) the philosophy of the Falangists which was expressed in Hispanidad; (3) the relationship of Hispanidad with the Roman Catholic Church; (4) the purpose and goal of Hispanidad; (5) Hispanidad in action; and (6) the results and reactions to Hispanidad.

Spain was a barrier to imperialism in agriculture and the high mountains which put her geographically off from the rest of Europe. Spain that it could not develop in commerce, industry, or mining from the resources within its own borders. These factors forced a large emigration of the more energetic Spaniards from Spain to the Latin American continent and left only a relatively weak population in the mother country. This, in turn, with the effect of Spanish settlement of the continent, islands, and islands, and a large-scale emigration of Spaniards to the world, led to the loss of the Spanish empire and the fall of Spain into the hands of revolutionary forces from which she has never recovered. The nineteenth century was thus fulfilled when Spain lost her empire, suffered a century of civil wars, and had very different governments, monarchies, as well as the present

¹J. J. Fernandez, *Spain and Contemporary European History (1818-1911)* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920), pp. 67-8.

²C. J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1920), II, 375.

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIDAD

Since the days of the Catholic Reformation, Spain lived apart from the main currents of European life, taking pride in her isolation and glorious past, caring little whether she made any progress or not, and contributing very little to the political, social, or cultural life of Europe.¹ Spain, because of the poverty of its soil which was a barrier to improvement in agriculture and the high range of mountains which cut the peninsula off from the rest of Europe, found that it could not develop in commerce, industry, or wealth from the resources within its own borders. These factors forced a large emigration of the more energetic Spaniards from Spain to the Latin American colonies and left only a relatively small population in the mother country. This, together with the effort of Spanish statesmen of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries still to influence and rule in the world out of all relation to the resources and population of Spain, forced Spain into the class of second-rate powers from which she has never returned.² The nineteenth century saw this fulfilled when Spain lost her empire, suffered a series of civil wars, and had many different governments. Hispanidad, as well as the pre-

¹J. S. Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History (1815-1916) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), pp. 97-8.

²C. J. H. Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), II, 378.

sent form of government in Spain, was just the logical result of the previous century and a quarter. Hence in a consideration of Hispanidad, it is necessary to keep in mind the political, social, and religious uprisings which came to pass because of the conditions which existed in Spain from at least as far back as 1800.

The nineteenth century saw the intervention of the French during the era of Napoleon, which not only led to a long and costly war for independence but also served to crystallize in Spain the bitterly hostile factions of revolutionaries and reactionaries.³ The Constitution of 1812 became the Magna Charta of Spanish liberalism and its principles were constantly appealed to in the struggle for democracy which followed during the nineteenth century.⁴ Then in 1814 came the reign of the Spanish Bourbon, Ferdinand VII (1814-1833) who was remembered for his absolutism, his cruelty and cunning, and his loss of the bulk of the Spanish Empire in the New World.⁵ The movements for independence by the Spanish colonies were caused originally by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808 when the colonies, in an effort to remain loyal to the throne of Spain, revolted against the French conquerer. But as these movements progress they gradually changed from freedom from the foreign conquerer to total freedom from Spain which occurred after the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of

³Ibid.

⁴Schapiro, op. cit., p. 98.

⁵Hayes, op. cit., p. 378.

Ferdinand to the throne of Spain. So, by the early 1820's, Spain had lost much of her empire which previously had consisted of a vast territory in North America, all of Central America, most of the West Indies Islands, and all of South America except for Guiana and Portuguese Brazil.⁶

Immediately upon his restoration to the throne, Ferdinand VII set out to remove the reforms of the Constitution of 1812 by restoring the privileges of the nobles and the clergy, giving the Jesuits control of education, and reestablishing the Inquisition. Freedom of speech and of association were completely suppressed while thousands of liberals were either driven out of the country or sent to prison. Ferdinand relied upon the priests to keep the masses loyal more than upon the army and therefore granted favors to the church while he neglected the army. The Carbonari appeared, just as they had in Italy, and carried on a vigorous agitation against the Bourbon despotism. As a result, the mutinies which occurred in the army in 1820 became a signal for a popular uprising which demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1812. This, Ferdinand was forced to grant. Once again under this constitution, the king suppressed the Inquisition and many of the religious orders while granting freedom of speech and of association. As a reaction to this, the king secretly appealed to

⁶R. Flenley and W. H. Beech, World History, The Growth of Western Civilization (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1936), pp. 542, 545; Mary W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1945), pp. 291-2, 298.

other despots of Europe for help against the liberals while the Catholic clergy of Spain organized a counter-revolution among the peasantry to rescue the king from the power of the liberals. In 1823 a French army came to the rescue of Ferdinand. The liberals, who were a small minority, could offer little resistance and the king was once again restored to absolute power. Thousands of liberals were executed or imprisoned by political and religious inquisitions which were organized to find and prosecute the liberals. This despotic regime aroused every liberal element in the country and these groups now resorted to secret societies and conspiracies.⁷

When Ferdinand died in 1833, this struggle continued in the form of a dynastic conflict between the Carlists who supported Don Carlos, a pretender to the throne, and the Christinas who supported the queen mother, Christina, regent for the infant queen Isabella. Don Carlos attracted to his standard the reactionaries, clericals, and most of the combative elements from the northern mountain districts, while Christina won the liberals by granting a parliamentary constitution in 1837. Carlist uprisings constantly occurred during the following years keeping the country in a state of confusion. Finally in 1840, Don Carlos was put to flight and Queen Isabella was granted general recognition. In 1843, Isabella II began her long reign (1843-1868), a reign which was filled with scandal, incompetency, and corruption. She alienated the liberals in 1845 by revising the constitution in a conservative direction and by her constant attempt to rule as a despot

⁷Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 98-9, 376.

with a mere pretense of a parliament. Yet she failed to gain the support of the Carlist faction and there were repeated revolts and insurrections until the uprising which took place in 1868 finally forced Isabella to flee.⁸

This revolution ushered in a seven year period when no regular government existed and Spain was on the verge of anarchy. Yet out of this period came a new constitution, adopted in 1869, which granted individual liberties, religious toleration, and provided for a non-archial parliamentary regime. Now developed the difficulty of securing a king for the reestablished throne. The Carlists saw this as their chance to rise; a Catholic Hohenzollern became a candidate; but the choice of almost all but the clergy was Amadeo, the younger son of Victor Emmanuel of Italy. The clergy opposed him because he was the son of a king who had plundered the pope. Amadeo was crowned king and did reign from 1870 until 1873 when he abdicated because the opposition aroused by the clergy had become too great.⁹

In 1873 a republic was proclaimed in Spain, but the Republicans were even less successful than the Liberal Monarchists because this new minority rapidly split into two groups: those who favored a centralized state, and those who favored a federal republic as a result of influence from contemporary communism in France. Now followed a series of presidential dictators, all of whom held office only for a short period of time. In 1875 the republic was overthrown and a mon-

⁸Ibid., p. 376; Hayes, op. cit., pp. 379-80.

⁹Schapiro, op. cit., p. 376; Hayes, op. cit., pp. 379-80.

archy was reestablished.¹⁰

The new king was a Bourbon, Alphonso XII, the son of Isabella. Under him Spain had a new and happier era with a new constitution proclaimed in 1876, which established a popularly elected parliament and ministry. During his reign, law and order were restored, the last serious Carlist insurrection was suppressed in 1876, and in 1878 an insurrection which had been raging since 1868 in Cuba was terminated. This new king protected Roman Catholicism by allowing the Jesuits and other orders spread as they had never been able to do previously during that century.¹¹

In 1885, Alphonso XII died, leaving the throne to his posthumous son, Alphonso XIII (1886) under the regency of queen mother Maria Christina. The queen mother ruled until 1902 when her son came of age. It was by remaining loyal to the church and rotating the conservatives and liberals in office that she retained the throne. During her reign discontent spread in the remaining Spanish colonies as a result of the despotic and corrupt rule until uprisings finally took place in Cuba and the Philippines. After ten years of rebellion the Cubans submitted in 1898 when they received promises of reform, but since these promises were not kept they rebelled once again in 1895. General Weyler's methods of suppressing this rebellion caused such an uproar in the United States that a war developed between the United States and Spain in which Spain was badly defeated. By the Treaty of Paris

¹⁰ Schapiro, op. cit., p. 378; Hayes, op. cit., p. 380.

¹¹ Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 376-7; Hayes, op. cit., pp. 380-1.

(1898), Spain unconditionally renounced all rights of sovereignty over Cuba and Puerto Rico and ceded the Philippines and Guam to the United States and received twenty million dollars. The Spanish American War left Spain with only the Carolines and a few other islands (which she sold to Germany in 1899) out of her former huge empire.¹²

The reign of Alfonso XIII (1902-1915) saw the problem of the relationship between church and state once again come under serious consideration. Although almost unanimously Catholic, the Spanish people were growing in hostility toward the church they had given such unswerving devotion for so many centuries. There are several reasons for this change of attitude: the radical elements, republicans, socialists, and anarchists, blamed the church for the evils that afflicted Spain and as a result conducted an anti-clerical movement among the working people; and the increasing number of tax-free religious orders aroused the hostility of business elements who felt such conditions hurt the economic life of the country. In reality this feeling of anti-clericalism was just a protest against the government with which the church was allied.¹³ In 1903-1910, the "Fadlock Law" was passed which taxed industrial enterprise conducted by the orders, prohibited the establishment of any more Catholic religious houses without government sanction, recalled the Spanish ambassador from the Vatican, and formally legalized Protestant worship. Such reforms

¹²Hayes, op. cit., pp. 382-3; Schapiro, op. cit., p. 377; Williams, op. cit., pp. 384-90.

¹³Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 377-8.

forced the church to once again show its strength and by 1812 these measures were abandoned and the former conditions once again restored.¹⁴

During this period there was also a revival of imperialism. In 1912 the possessions Spain already had in Africa were enlarged by adding the northern coast of Morocco, the enclave of Ifni, and a considerable extension of Rio de Oro, all by agreement with France. This imperialism caused criticisms and protests from many Spaniards, some groups going so far as to hold anti-militaristic demonstrations. It was partially because of this anti-militaristic and anti-imperialistic feeling that Spain was able to keep out of the First World War.¹⁵

During the First World War Spain was neutral. This was a profitable policy from all points of view, for she sold supplies to both sides, suffered no collapse of currency, was not involved in post-war diplomacy, and had no problems of territory lost or gained. Still Spain was troubled by the same problems which she had the previous century: political corruption, illiteracy, lawlessness, and revolutionary plotting. In Spanish Morocco the Riff tribesmen were driving the Spanish armies to the coast and in Catalonia a separatist movement threatened the unity of the country. In order to avoid a violent revolution, a coup d'état was planned and in 1923, Primo de Rivera took control of the government with the consent of Alfonso XIII. A directorate, headed by a general, was established and governed the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 378; Hayes, op. cit., pp. 384-5.

¹⁵Hayes, op. cit., p. 385; Schapiro, op. cit., p. 379.

country by issuing decrees in the name of the king. The constitution was suspended, parliament was dissolved, and all opposition to the dictatorship was relentlessly suppressed. Reforms were put into effect at the expense of human freedom and independence which once again caused the Spanish people to become dissatisfied and restless.¹⁶

As a result of the failures of the dictatorship, for which the people felt the king was really to blame, the Spanish people also became anti-monarchist. A secret revolutionary movement started to spread rapidly throughout Spain. Finally in 1931, fanned by communist agitation, a tame revolution occurred in the municipal elections of Madrid forcing the king and government to flee. The provisional government drew up a new constitution which was approved by a popularly elected legislative body. Spain was declared a "democratic republic of workers of all classes," and her foreign policy was determined by that of the League of Nations. Its government consisted of a president, cabinet, and a single chamber parliament. This constitution of the Spanish Republic was the most advanced of all democratic constitutions.¹⁷

The drastic reform laws under this new republic were against the pillars of the old regime: the monarchy, the church, the army, and the aristocracy. Alfonso was declared guilty of high treason and

¹⁶Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 16; Schapiro, op. cit., p. 662.

¹⁷Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 16; Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 662-4.

deprived of all his titles and possessions in Spain. The army was reduced in size and put under strict civil control. The landed aristocracy was hit hard by the agrarian reforms which radically transformed the land system in Spain. The lands were distributed to the peasants either in small individual farms or in large units to be worked cooperatively. Some landowners received compensation for their estates and in other cases it amounted to virtual confiscation. The anti-clerical provisions of the constitution were carried out in drastic laws against the Catholic Church. As a result riots broke out against the church, being instigated chiefly by anarchists and syndicalists. Many monasteries and churches were burned while priests and monks were murdered. The church now reacted with very strong opposition against the new republic fearing that this wave of anti-clericalism might lead to the abolition of Christianity in Spain.¹⁸

Conditions became even worse when as a result of the 1933 elections for parliament, the victory was for the Right and feelings between the Right and the Left became so intense that compromise was impossible. The Right, now controlling the government, suspended or disregarded the anti-clerical and land laws which had been in force. Soon the situation became so violent that orderly government was impossible. The revolutionary elements: anarchists, syndicalists, and communists, were so aroused by this change of policy that they started violent strikes, demonstrations, uprisings, the burning of churches,

¹⁸Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 18; Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 264-5.

and assassinations in such a growing number that these became almost daily occurrences. In 1936 parliament was dissolved with the object of ascertaining more clearly the will of the Spanish people. During this election, two coalitions appeared: the Popular Front composed of Left elements, Radical Republicans, Socialists and Communists; and the Right composed of Monarchists, Clericals, Fascists and Conservative Republicans. In the election the popular vote was almost equal, but the Popular Front or Left won the majority of seats in parliament.¹⁹

The Fascist groups, refusing to accept this rule by the Left, began a campaign of terrorism. This was met in turn by violence from the Left. The government was not able to suppress the actions of either side. Finally on July 17, 1936, the army in Spanish Morocco revolted under the command of General Francisco Franco and soon the entire country was involved in civil war. The followers of Franco, called "Rebels" fought the supporters of the government, called "Loyalists." Civil war raged in Spain with great fury. It was a conflict which was inspired not so much by political differences as by class and religious hatreds. The Loyalists, composed of Radical Republicans, Socialists, and Communists, shifted more to the Left, and received the support of Communist Russia. Franco's Rebels soon became Fascist openly and received the prompt support of Italy and Germany. So a struggle between Spaniards had grown until it involved Russians, Italians, Germans, and smaller groups from other nations.

¹⁹Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 19; Schapiro, op. cit., p. 865.

Italian Fascism was seeking more glory to quiet the home population and German Fascism needed a testing ground for its weapons which it was soon to use in the Second World War.²⁰

At first it appeared as if Franco's trained soldiers would win the war within six months, but the prompt organization of the Loyalist supporters slowed down this pace. The Loyalists soon received arms and soldiers from Russia as well as obtaining the support of international brigades which were of little practical importance but of great moral support. Franco received much assistance from Germany and Italy. The Spanish Civil War had become not only a military conflict and social struggle between reactionary and revolutionary forces, but a battleground for the clash of ideologies and international rivalry. On September 30, 1936, a rebel parliament made Franco dictator of Spain. Finally after thirty-two months of bloody conflict, Franco's forces had control of most of Spain and Franco, on April 7, 1939, proclaimed an edict ending the war.²¹

It was only from such an environment and background of war, discontent, poverty, injustice, and opposing ideologies that a philosophy such as Hispanidad could gain a foothold. Under Hispanidad such groups as the Catholic Church, the Fascists, the army, the aristocracy, and the common people could be united toward a common goal and could

²⁰Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 19; Sonapiro, op. cit., p. 866.

²¹Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 19; Sonapiro, op. cit., pp. 866-7.

forget about their differences and the terrible conditions they saw existing everywhere around them in Spain. In Hispanidad they saw a cure, found a cause, dreamed a future, and gloried in their past. Spain needed something to which it could cling and unite; Hispanidad became that thing.

Hispanidad was to receive the support, this support will continue the growth of the nation by: (1) showing the origin of the political party called the Falange, (2) developing the philosophy of the Falange, (3) showing the origin of Hispanidad, (4) showing the relationship between Hispanidad and the Catholic Church, and (5) showing the relationship between Hispanidad and the rest of Europe.

From the very beginning the Falange Española or the Spanish Phalanx was a Fascist group. Its founder was José Antonio Primo de Rivera. He and his friends issued a manifesto, called El Manifiesto (the first one-day number of which appeared on March 10, 1931), in which they published their ideas. The Falange was founded officially in Madrid on October 29, 1933. Although Fascist, its policy was a blend of the ideas of Fascism as was pointed out by José Antonio:

We are Fascists, because we find our origin in traditional principles; we are Fascist, because in national Fascism we find the synthesis of the Italian and German. But we are, above all, Spanish. The National Syndicalist State, Corporative and Totalitarian, is of Spanish type. It is not a thing from the Italian or German quarry. It is a Spanish creation.

On March 6, 1934, the Falange officially merged with the J.O.S. and

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISPANIDAD

Having pictured the background and main groups active in Spanish history from which Hispanidad was to receive its support, this chapter will continue the consideration of this philosophy by: (1) tracing the origin of the political party called the Falange, (2) developing the philosophy of the Falange, (3) tracing the origin of Hispanidad, (4) showing the relationship between Hispanidad and the Catholic Church, and (5) examining the relationship between Hispanidad and the Axis Nations.

From the very beginning the Falange Espanol or the Spanish Phalanx was a Fascist group. Its founder was Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. He and his friends issued a magazine, called El Fascio (the first and only number of which appeared on March 16, 1933), in which they publicized their ideas. The Phalanx was founded officially in Madrid on October 29, 1933. Although Fascist, its policy was a Spanish form of Fascism as was pointed out by Jose Antonio:

We are Fascists, because we find our origin in Mussolinian principles; we are Nazis, because in National Socialist doctrines vibrate our faith and doctrine. But we are, above all, Spaniards. The National Syndicalist State, corporative and totalitarian, is of Spanish type. It is not a block from the Italian or German quarry. It is a Spanish creation.¹

On March 4, 1934, the Phalanx officially merged with the J.O.N.-S.

¹H. R. Southworth, "The Spanish Phalanx and Latin America," Foreign Affairs, XVIII (October, 1939), 146.

(Juntos de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista) and became the Falange Española y de las J.O.N.-S. The J.O.N.-S. had been formed as the result of several previous mergers. Perhaps the origin of all these groups can be traced back to the appearance in Madrid of a little magazine called La Conquista del Estado (The Conquest of the State). It was published by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Ernesto Gimenez Caballero, who later collaborated with Jose Antonio in the short-lived El Fascio, and appeared one month before the founding of the Spanish Republic. This magazine made an appeal for the establishment of an empire, creation of a syndicalist structure for Spanish economy, preparations for a revolution, the use of terrorism, defense of the army's position and power, and opposition to all forms of regional autonomy.²

About the same time a young instructor at the University of Mannheim named Onesimo Redondo was building up another pro-Fascist group. His weekly paper, Libertad, appeared in 1931. It was in this publication that he published chapters from Hitler's Mein Kampf picturing Hitler as a new Charlemagne and the German Cross as the forerunner of the Latin Cross of Christ. He founded the Junta Castellana de Actuación Hispanica in 1931 around a sixteen point program calling for an imperial Spain, a purely Spanish government, and a syndical corporative organisation protected and regulated by the state. It was in November, 1931 that this group and the group around the La Conquista del Estado united to form the J.O.N.-S.³

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 148-9.

The program developed by the J.O.N.-S. called for a united Spain with the subordination of individuals and social groups to the needs of the state, centralization of power in Madrid, overthrow of the parliamentary regime, imperial expansion of Spain with immediate claims for Gibraltar and Tangier, and the creation of a National Syndicalist State which would entrust its highest political positions to men under forty.⁴

Of the two merging groups that formed the Falange or Phalanx before the Civil War, the J.O.N.-S. was the stronger and more aggressive. Still at the time of the outbreak of the military revolt over two years later, these groups were insignificant political blocs, numbering less than 600,000 members.⁵

The Falanx tried to blend the ideology of the Carlists and their own movement by adopting the Carlist Wars as the first of the "national movements," that of Franco being the third, and by claiming such extreme reactionaries as Cortes, Mella, and Pelayo as forerunners of their Spanish Fascism. In reality, except for their common hatred of democracy, these two systems of thought were very different. Still the one thing they both understood was that before Spain could acquire an empire again, she had to regain the "will to empire" which she had possessed in the sixteenth century. These two groups, the Carlists and Falangists, took the lead in instilling this spirit in the Spanish

⁴Ibid., p. 149.

⁵Ibid.

people once again.⁶

In the September, 1934 meeting of the National Council of the Spanish Falanx in Madrid, a twenty-seven point program was adopted. The first twenty-six points of this program were later taken over by Franco as his political policy and through edict number 255, issued on April 19, 1937, became law throughout Nationalist Spain. This document, which is of great importance to an understanding of present day Spain, points out that the Falangist objective is Fascist in domestic affairs and imperialistic in foreign policy.⁷ Franco at the time he adopted these points also took over the political party which advocated them and by the decree of August 4, 1937 established the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y Junta Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (Falange or Falanx) as the only legal and single political party of Spain.⁸ This political party became the main repository of all sorts of revolutionary forces. Hence Fascism in Spain was not merely a consequence of an unsuccessful war (the case of Germany) or an unsuccessful peace treaty (the case of Italy), but it was an outburst against nearly three centuries of humiliation.⁹

⁶T. J. Hamilton, "Spanish Dreams of Empire," Foreign Affairs, XXII (April, 1944), 462-3.

⁷Ibid.; Southworth, op. cit., p. 149.

⁸B. W. Diffie, "The Ideology of Hispanidad," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIII (October, 1943), 473-4; J. E. Kelly, "Spain's Role in South America," Catholic World, CLIV (March, 1942), 657; H. R. Southworth and W. R. Espy, "Franco in the Caribbean," Nation, CLI (November, 1940), 500.

⁹Hamilton, op. cit., p. 459; B. Oliver, "Franco Invades Latin America," American Mercury, LIV (April, 1942), 544.

The advocates of Hispanidad were the victors in the revolt against the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939, and became the official philosophers of the Falange Espanola and Hispanidad. Falange Espanola was the instrument of action and Hispanidad was the export product designed for Hispanic America and the world. The philosophy of the Falange is the key to Hispanidad and in order to understand the meaning of Hispanidad, one must first comprehend the culture which these men wanted to prevail in the world.¹⁰

Although this philosophy is deeply rooted in Spanish tradition, much of its modern formulation was borrowed from German and Italian totalitarianism. Its chief exponents were men who admired Hitler and Mussolini, such as: Jose Antonio, Onesimo Redondo, Priso de Rivera, Ferrano Suner, Ramiro de Maestu, Maria de Maestu, Sainz Rodriguez, Ernesto Giminez Caballero, Jose Maria Feman and Jose Femartin.¹¹

The ambition of these philosophers of the Falange was in no sense a limited one, neither was there less boldness in the intellectual concept with which they intended to accomplish it. Their goal was the domination of the world through both arms and intellect. This they sought to accomplish with a complete reinterpretation of history. Stated briefly, the following was their historical thesis as developed in their writings: The Middle Ages were the greatest period of man's spiritual and intellectual development because at that time there was

¹⁰Diffie, op. cit., pp. 458-9.

¹¹ibid.

"unity" in all Christendom. This was best represented in the Spanish Nation during the reign of Charles V who combined the physical force of Germany with the spiritual force of Spain in the Holy Roman Empire. This unity in Christendom was disrupted by the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, both of which were pagan influences. Spain, however, remained loyal to her faith and allowed neither of these pagan influences to gain any hold upon her. Because of this, Spain was in a position to reject all modernism because whatever was good in modernism had already been adopted as an integral part of her before the Renaissance.¹²

In order to defend such a philosophy, these philosophers of the Falange feel that it was necessary to denounce and point out the evils of the modern world. One such denunciation is found in Maria de Maeztu's Historia de la Cultura Europea, which may be considered as an authentic voice of Falangist thought:

We live in an insane world. To this insanity has contributed no little the fact that from the time of the Renaissance, and even more since the Cartesian philosophy of the seventeenth century, the triumph of relativism has slowly undermined the foundations of Truth. Relative truth, methodical doubt and philosophical skepticism have gained ground. The materialistic interpretation of history has won, and economic values have been elevated above spiritual values. . . (But) there is an absolute Truth above relative truth. There is a creative, living faith above the doubt that destroys and annihilates. There is a true knowledge that enables us to apprehend objective reality above fanciful opinions which embrace men in perennial sophism. No. Man is not the measure of all things. The assertion of Protagoras, vanquished in the Greece of Socrates, reappeared in the days of the Renaissance, of the Protestant Revolution, and of

¹²ibid., pp. 469-60.

the French Revolution. . . Because it was believed that man was the measure of all things he was able to cut himself away from his essential roots and place himself in the center of the world. During the Protestant Reformation he could subject revealed truth to the free examination of the individual conscience, and could, with the proponents of the French Revolution, deify reason . . . But man is not the measure of all things, because he is nothing but one thing among many and in his turn may be measured by a higher, transcendental measure which embraces everything. . . I do not know after all whether my thesis is sufficiently clear. It is nothing less than this: we live in an insane world. . . This war is not like former wars. . . The fight is not for territorial limits or national independence. . . Today they fight to impose one of another ideology. . . These are civil wars, social revolutions.¹³

The Falangist philosophers further developed this by teaching that men are not equal by nature. Because of this they are not fit for self-rule. They identify slavery with the Spanish Republic and its "absurd doctrine of equality," while liberty is identified with the Falange and its teachings. In general, the Falange and Hispanidad felt a contempt for the common people. This is shown in their attitude toward popular education which they felt was just another evil of the modern age. Few other impressions gathered from the reading of the literature of the Falange are so strongly impressed as their belief that the majority of human beings are the scum of the earth. Consider these statements taken from the writings of Maria de Maestu:

When we speak of the crisis of culture we see how, in effect, the excess of literary production is in a way responsible for that crisis. Culture, when diffused, loses its solidarity. And encyclopedic culture has produced an encyclopedic ignorance. The more people read the less they know. They learn more science and have less wisdom.

¹³ E. Riffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Maria de Maestu, Historia de la Cultura Europea, pp. 9-12), pp. 460-1.

The Modern Age has wished to popularize culture, spread it, in order to put it within the reach of the people. This is impossible. Culture cannot be popular. . . Culture loses its essential value when placed within the reach of the weak. . . The attempt to devitalize and enervate culture is a deliberate attack by inferior beings on the forces that have made man a thinking being. . .

It was believed that the eradication of illiteracy would signify the end of ignorance. Never has there been such a large number of people possessing such a large measure of knowledge. Nevertheless, this has not produced a greater sanity in the world. . . The excess of science has produced an ignorant humanity which aspires to a spiritual leveling. . . Science has not elevated the general level of culture; it has not produced a better man.

The only remedy for the destructive forces of democracy and equalitarianism is an hierarchical society. "God has created the people to work. . . the clergy for the ministration of the Faith. . . the nobility to assure virtue and administer justice."¹⁴

In order to build a New Spain along the lines of such Falangist philosophy, the liberal, democratic principles must be eradicated. One method of doing this was to discredit the men who represented such ideals in Spanish history. Such eighteenth century liberals as Aranda, Campomanes, and Jovellanos were subject to severe attack. All that the Constitution of 1812 represented was abhorred and Ferdinand VII who restored the old regime in 1814 became a hero. General Riego, who led the liberal revolt in 1820 was anathematized, as was every liberal of the nineteenth century. Joaquin Costa received the most abuse because his economic studies contrasted most sharply between the liberal and traditional forces in Spain.¹⁵

¹⁴Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Maria de Maestu, Historia de la Cultura Europea, pp. 22-5, 37-8, 57), pp. 464-5.

¹⁵Diffie, op. cit., pp. 465-6.

Of course, the Falange sought to Catholicize all of Spain and in order to achieve this must necessarily have anti-Semitism and anti-Freemasonry as important parts of its ideology. To be Spanish is to be anti-Semitic and anti-Freemason as is shown from the following statements by Falangist philosophers:

The total Catholicization of Spain cannot be achieved without a decided and opportune fight against the anti-Catholic sects: Freemasonry and Judaism. . . Freemasonry and Judaism are the two great and powerful enemies of the Fascisms, of the regeneration of Europe, and even more specifically of the regeneration of Spain in the sense of the total Catholicization we envision. Hitler is entirely right in his anti-Semitism to the death. Mussolini has perhaps done more for the greatness of Italy with his dissolution of Masonry than with any other measure whatever.¹⁶

A Jew continues to be a Jew even when he abjures his faith. It was for this reason precisely that we were obliged to establish the Inquisition. The fundamental characteristics of the Spaniards are, therefore, those that he owes to the fight against Moors and Jews. . .¹⁷

The philosophers of the Falange knew where they were going when they insisted upon a reversal of modern history making historical re-interpretation their most powerful weapon. (1) They wanted the Hispanic peoples to accept their thesis that the present world is evil. (2) They wanted them to accept their explanation of why it was evil. (3) They wanted to prescribe the remedies. They wanted to drum their thesis into the ears of their listeners until the subconscious began to accept it. The endless repetition of the same theme was also part

¹⁶Piffie, op. cit., (quoted from J. Fernandez, La Nueva, p. 322), p. 466.

¹⁷Piffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Ramiro de Maestu, Hispanidad, pp. 209-11), p. 466.

of their method. Feeling that the world profited nothing from the Enlightenment, they wrote such statements as the following:

What is happening today has its reason for being, its cause in the course of history. It is the fatal and inevitable result of a doctrine, of a philosophy, of a definition of man, of an interpretation of reality and life that came to the world on the decline of the Middle Ages, in the hours of the Renaissance, and which found its course and its development in the Protestant Reformation, in the Cromwellian Revolution in 1651 (sic), in the political revolution of the United States in 1776, in the philosophical-rationalist revolution in France in 1789, in the Industrial Revolution. . . in the Positivist theories of Auguste Comte, in Spencer's Darwinian evolution, and in Marx's economic interpretation of history.¹⁸

But if the eighteenth century inspired horror in the advocates of the Falange and Hispanidad, the nineteenth century was even more of a nightmare to them. This was the century of Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Herbert Spencer. Why they condemned Marx needs no explanation. Comte was hated because of his Positivism; Darwin, because his evolutionary theories ruled out the religious interpretation of the creation of man; Spencer, because social evolution removed all "eternal" values from the social structure, leaving man to manage his own affairs without supernatural aid. Hence it was the first task of the Falange to destroy these "false" philosophers and clear away modernism, democracy, liberalism, rationalism, Cartesian-Newtonian mathematics, the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance, thereby making room for the return of spirituality. Not until this was done could Spain expect to achieve her former greatness.¹⁹

¹⁸Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Maria de Maestu, Historia de la Cultura Europea, p. 14), pp. 466-7.

¹⁹W. S. Bristol, "Hispanidad in South America," Foreign Affairs, XXI (January, 1943), 314; Diffie, op. cit., p. 467.

What is written above was the negative and destructive side of Falangist philosophy, but they also had a positive program ready. Spain, according to Ramiro de Maestu, has only to accept as her object the "return to our Faith" - the Roman Catholic Church.²⁰ Catholicism therefore becomes the official positive policy of the Falange. Even General Franco claimed that his movement was inspired by the teachings of the Catholic Church.²¹

The Falange hailed the Inquisition as the true Catholic tradition stating that the Inquisition was "immensely popular during the centuries of its greatness, loved and respected by the ignorant and learned alike, whose unanimous religion it defended against foreign dangers."²² The Inquisition was reevaluated in the light of Catholic tradition. Philip II was hailed as the great defender of the faith and his intolerance received the highest approval.²³ The failure to eradicate Protestantism was attributed to the fact that "God wished that experiment to be made, perhaps so that it might be seen with all clarity that Protestantism leads to paganism."²⁴

²⁰Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Ramiro de Maestu, Hispanidad, pp. 297-300), p. 468.

²¹Diffie, op. cit., p. 468.

²²Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from A. Junco, Sangre de Hispania, p. 24), p. 469.

²³Hamilton, op. cit., p. 461.

²⁴Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Ramiro de Maestu, Hispanidad, pp. 195-6), p. 469.

In like manner the Falange claimed that Spain won her vast territorial empire because of her unique devotion to the Roman Catholic faith and then lost this territory because of the same devotion. Once again Philip II is supposed to have gallantly devoted his life and his empire to an unremitting struggle against heresy and frivolity of the Reformation and Renaissance. The bones of Spaniards are supposed to rest on every battlefield in Europe from struggles, not for their own empire, not for the rule of Spain over Europe, but for the Empire, the sole Empire, the arm of Rome, for the salvation of all Europe by the Catholic religious faith.²⁵

Because it is Catholic, Spain is opposed to all nations which are not Catholic, particularly to the Anglo-Saxon nations, which are Protestant. By the same token, Spain feels linked to all nations which are Catholic, particularly the nations in South and Central America. Thus Catholicism is the first positive requirement for Spain as advocated by the philosophers of the Falange and Hispanidad.²⁶ This is Catholicism as it was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and which Spain hoped to carry in a great missionary program to all the peoples of the world.²⁷

The second positive requirement of the philosophers of the Falange was Fascism. Here, the philosophers agreed with Hitler on five main

²⁵Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 460-1.

²⁶Diffie, op. cit., p. 469.

²⁷Bristol, op. cit., p. 314.

points: (1) anti-democratic, (2) anti-capitalistic, (3) anti-Communist, (4) anti-Semitic, and (5) anti-Masonic. The difference between these two forms of Fascism is that Spain, like Italy, was identified with Christian Fascism while Germany had pagan Fascism.²⁸ The philosophers of the "New Spain" worked out a complete philosophy which they saw as the essence of Spain. These Falangists held that Fascism was nothing new to Spain and that Italy and Germany had little to teach her. Pemartin sums up this philosophy of the Falangists as follows:

Here, then, is the solution of the Spanish problem; Fascism, Hegelian juridical absolutism, not only can and should be realized in Spain, but Spain is the only European nation where it belongs in an absolute sense. For our Fascism, our Hegelian juridical absolutism, must necessarily be based. . . on a traditional-Catholic historical reality, that is to say, founded on a transcendental truth. We have said before that in Spain we have the right to be more papist than the Pops; and in the same way we can be more fascist than Fascism itself, because our Fascism must be perfect, absolute. "Fascism is a religious concept," Mussolini has written, Spanish Fascism will be, then, the religion of Religion.

Spain was Fascist four centuries before they (Italy and Germany) were. In the sixteenth century when it was united, great, free and really Spain, the State and Nation identified with the Eternal Catholic Idea, Spain was the Model Nation, the Alma Mater of Christian and Western Civilization. . .

Consequently, if Spain is to be National and Fascist, the Spanish State must necessarily be Catholic.²⁹

This blending of Fascism and Catholicism is further explained in the writings of Gimenez Caballero as follows: "Fascism for Spain is not Fascism, but Ca-tho-li-ci-ty. To repeat, Catholicism."³⁰

²⁸Diffie, op. cit., pp. 466-70.

²⁹Diffie, op. cit., (quoted from J. Pemartin, Lo Nuevo, pp. 50, 55), p. 470.

³⁰Diffie, op. cit., p. 471.

These philosophers wanted to project the Spain of the past into the future because they believed Spain had a very definite future and goal. Spain's mission was to restore European civilization, that is, to once again bring Europe back to Catholicism. And this mission of Fascist-Catholic Spain did not end with Europe but it called for the Catholic regeneration of the world and the creation of the Imperial Espanola or the Empire of Hispanidad. To be Catholic and to be imperial became the official foreign policy of Spain. This philosophy was inherited from and formed by the political parties that brought the New Spain into existence. The J.O.N.-S. already in its early days of existence proclaimed such imperial expansion for Spain and this policy was passed on when the Falange became the only political party of Spain.³¹

As impossible as it may seem to outsiders, a German-Spanish union was also a very important part of Hispanidad. To the proponents of Hispanidad this was just historic logic. Germany was the model of the Falange during its formative period and every victory of Germany became the cause for rejoicing among the Spanish Falangists.³²

The redemption of the great oppressed peoples of the world is coming. The liberation of Spain will also come through national revolution. A united Germany will be the bastion of a revived Hispanidad. Just as Germany has recovered. . . National-Syndicalist Spain will restore the united empire of all nations of Spanish speech. . . Spain will renew her historical urge to convert barbarous peoples, and the German-Spanish alliance will place us at the head of the world.³³

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.; Southworth, op. cit., p. 148.

³³Duffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Onesimo Redondo), p. 471.

Under Charles V and Philip II, Spain became the head of an international ideal, a supernational. Gimenez Caballero expressed these thoughts as follows:

Spain was the national instrument of a universal ideal, represented in temporal matters by a "Caesar" and in the spiritual by a "God." A return to the "Caesar-God" union will restore Spain to its imperial status.

Today it is known that the reigns of Charles V and Philip II were epochs of magnificent thought, of science, of virtue and art, of tolerance and harmony, of Humanism and Theocracy.³⁴

Since Fascism was believed to be the new vigorous upsurge of the civilization of the future, this regeneration of Europe by the German-Spanish union was to be only the beginning. Spain felt, as the most important nation having Christian Fascism, that she had the glorious task of contributing more to the future of western civilization than any other Fascist nation.³⁵ In order to carry out its world mission, the imperial mission, the mission of Hispanidad, Spain first had to become a military state which was "the true being of Spain, which has been a military nation throughout its history."³⁶

This military state, this "sentinel on the wall of the city of God," would then carry out its mission, which was:

The collaboration with Christ and his Church in the Salvation of the world. There could be no higher destiny. For if we do not consider the Spanish nationality formed, more than any other, precisely to accomplish this centenary Catholic mission of de-

³⁴Tiffie, *op. cit.*, (Quoted from Gimenez Caballero, Genio de Espana, pp. 30-1, 230), p. 472.

³⁵Tiffie, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

³⁶Ibid., (Quoted from J. Pemartin, Lo Nuevo, p. 19), p. 472.

fense and extension of the City of God in the world, the concept of "Spain" vanishes for us.³⁷

The success of this mission depends very largely upon the success of the military forces of Germany. Hispanidad could become a victory for Spain only if Germany was victorious in her endeavors. Hence, every victory of Germany was in the eyes of the philosophers of the Falange, a victory for Fascist-Catholic Spain. As long as Germany was victorious, the policy of world expansion by Spain did not appear to be nearly as difficult to accomplish as it would appear at the present time. This would be accomplished by the German-Spanish Empire through which history would not only be repeated but would magnify itself. This new empire would eventually be ruled by Spain for even if Germany sought to dominate, she would fail because Spain had the stronger spiritual force. Just as "Greece by Rome conquered, conquered Rome," Hispanidad would prevail over Germany.³⁸ Spain would "be the strongest and principal Pillar of Christian, Mediterranean Latinity, vanquisher of the satanic revolution and of Bolshevism, and the Imperial Head of the Amphictiony of the Hispanic States of the Atlantic."³⁹

Hence, an integral part of the philosophy of the Falangists, which of course was also the policy of Franco, was imperialism. For their sources of imperial inspiration the Falangists went back to Ferdinand and Isabella. Ferdinand who sought expansion on the continent and

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Hamilton, op. cit., p. 463; Diffie, op. cit., p. 473.

³⁹ Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from J. P. Martin, Lo Nuevo, p. 328), p. 473.

Isabella who sent out Columbus. Some Fascist writers, such as Jose Maria Pemán, believed that Spain made a mistake when she concerned herself with European aggrandizement, regretting that she did not concentrate wholly upon her New World possessions. In order to show how it felt and what it stood for, the Falange borrowed the joint emblem of these Catholic Sovereigns, the yoke and arrows, as its symbol.⁴⁰

The Franco school of imperialism considered Charles V and his son Philip II, the principal architects of Spain's greatness. Charles because he was German Emperor as well as King of Spain and Philip because under him Spanish territories reached their greatest extent, embracing Portugal, the Low Countries, the Kingdom of Naples, and the vast territories of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in Africa, Asia, and North, South, and Central America.⁴¹

This concept of imperialism and empire is found in numerous speeches, articles, and books written in Spain during these years. Even the battle cry during the revolt against the Republic was "for Catholicism and the Empire." General Franco himself is one of the best witnesses to Spain's imperial ambitions. Speaking before a group of aviators, he promised that Spain's air force would constitute "the nucleus of steel that will build the empire to make Spain again a great nation." A few weeks later, speaking from the great Atlantic port and fortification, he said, "El Ferrol cannot turn its back on the ocean; in its arsenal we shall build the war machines that will

⁴⁰Hamilton, op. cit., p. 460.

⁴¹Ibid.

return to Spain her empire." General Franco also pointed the way directly toward a restoration of Spain's empire in America. At Cadiz, on April 19, 1939, he proclaimed, "You should recall those Conquistadores who spread throughout the world the faith and the will of the nation. We should have a will to empire. . . Our glory will reach the summit and the might of Spain will grow." On March 24, 1940, while visiting the Archivo de Indias in Seville, he wrote in the guest book: "Before the relics of our Empire, with the promise of another. Franco." When he was invested with the highest military distinction in Spain, he made a speech in which he asked that the Spaniards forget a life of comfort in order that Spain might achieve political unity with imperial objectives as its end. "For the battle is not yet over. We must bring about the unity of Spain, and once that unity is achieved, we must again spread through the world the unity of the Cross by means of our warriors."⁴²

This empire which Spain sought to establish once again would include "all the people who owe their civilization of being to the Hispanic peoples of the Peninsula. Hispanidad is a concept that embraces them all. . . Hispanidad inhabits no one land, but many and diverse lands."⁴³

Since Spain is a nation composed of many races and languages, the Falangists made no attempt to copy the Nazi racial approach to

⁴²Diffie, op. cit., pp. 474-5; Ouidio Gondi, "La Hispanidad in Hitler's Service," Free World, translated by Arthur W. Colton, III (June, 1942), 65.

⁴³Diffie, op. cit., (Quoted from Basilio de Maestu, Hispanidad, pp. 21-2) p. 475.

their philosophy of world supremacy. Their dogma of imperial Spain had a twofold aspect: (1) Spain was destined to rule an empire as the successor of the Roman Empire, for the Catholic Church was the successor of the Empire, and Most Catholic Spain, of all nations, possessing the best title to the assertion of the Church's temporal power. (2) Spain was entitled to a prominent place in the Teutonic world, because of the Goth and Vandal invaders of Spain, and the fact that Charles V, who was also Charles I of Spain, was the Holy Roman Emperor.⁴⁴

Because of the preposterousness of these claims, it might be supposed that the philosophers of the Falange gave voice to them only to divert the minds and stomachs of the Spanish people from the wretched conditions they experienced following the civil war. That was not true for the concept of a resurrected empire was the foundation upon which the Falangist program was built. The emphasis for this program was based upon the same points as followed by Germany and Italy: (1) the creation of a rabid nationalism in the youth so that they had a blind obedience to the State; (2) raising an increasing hue and cry for colonies both at home and abroad; and (3) persecution of the Jews after methods used by the National Socialists in Germany and elaborated upon by the Fascists in Italy.⁴⁵

These dreamers of empire became more confident and gave bolder expression to their hopes as the Civil War neared a successful con-

⁴⁴Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 403-4.

⁴⁵L. Middleton, "Spain Demands Latin America," Living Age, CCCLIX (September, 1940), 12-4.

clusion and as the Falange network spreading Hispanidad began to spread throughout the Americas and the world. When Germany appeared successful in its war for expansion and empire, there were many in Spain who were positive that Hispanidad also would be successful.⁴⁶

So, in summing up the thoughts of the philosophers of the Falange, we see that Spain was turning her face back toward her own late Middle Ages. The Falangists refer to Spain during this period, which lasted into the seventeenth century, as a Theocracy. Under the guidance of these men, Spain sought to recreate the semi-theocratic state which reached its zenith under Charles V and Philip II, modernizing it with the techniques of Fascism.⁴⁷

Having viewed the philosophy of the Falangists, let us now continue our consideration of this religious-political philosophy by tracing the origin of Hispanidad. Although it had been a popular type of Hispanismo advocated by the Falange Espanola since 1931, it was in Ramiro de Maeztu's Hispanidad, which appeared in 1934, that the word "Hispanidad" came into wide usage for the first time. It, like Hispanismo, naturally was bitterly anti-Yankee and anti-Fan-American; but while Hispanismo took pride in its liberalism, Hispanidad differed. It became one of those words which meant different things to different people. Some saw Hispanidad as only a spirit and common heritage, while to others who understood the Fascist mind it was a plan of world

⁴⁶ Abel Flenn, Wind in the Olive Trees (New York: Boni and Gaer, 1946), p. 238.

⁴⁷ Diffie, op. cit., p. 457; Middleton, op. cit., p. 10.

conquest. While it may have started as a mere cultural movement, it very soon entered into the sphere of world politics.⁴⁸

Hispanidad was the instrument designed by the Falangists to make their dream of empire come true. Persons who disclaim the political ambitions of the Falange and their plans of empire need only read the announced plans of this party.⁴⁹ The program of the party, as adopted by Franco, was made of twenty-six points which really just amounted to a ten year plan for the industrialization of Spain, a labor charter granting workers vacations with pay and health insurance and subsidies to large families, and Hispanidad.⁵⁰ This charter of the Falange deals with Hispanidad especially in the third and fourth of these twenty-six points, as follows:

We have a will to empire. We affirm that the full history of Spain implies an empire. We demand for Spain a preeminent place in Europe. We will not put up with international isolation or with foreign interference. With regard to the Hispano-American countries, we aim at unification of culture, of economic interests and of power. Spain claims a preeminent place in all common tasks because of her position as the spiritual cradle of the Spanish world.

Our armed forces on land, on sea and in the air, must be as efficient and numerous as may be necessary to assure Spain's complete independence at all times and that world leadership is her due. We shall restore to the armies on land and sea, and in the air, all the dignity which they deserve, and following their ideal, we shall see to it that a military view of life shall shape Spanish existence.⁵¹

⁴⁸Bristol, op. cit., pp. 313-4; Riffle, op. cit., pp. 457-8, 473; Oliver, op. cit., pp. 544-5; Edwin Ryan, "Hispanismo" Yesterday and Today," Commonweal, XXXIII (March, 1941), 534-5.

⁴⁹Riffle, op. cit., p. 473.

⁵⁰"Spain: Unfinished Business," Fortune, XXXI (March, 1945), 148.

⁵¹Hamilton, op. cit., p. 463.

The mission of Hispanidad was to be carried out by every government official, soldier, and trade-union member in Franco's realm. This is shown by the oath taken by every member of each of these groups:

I pledge allegiance to God, Spain, Franco and our National Syndicalist Revolution; to serve my country above anything else, and to fight unhesitatingly for the material and spiritual reconquest of our Lost Empire, for the creation of a Spain United, Great and Free, which has been given us by the victorious sword of our glorious Caudillo.⁵²

This mission, once accomplished, "to extend, to expand our great Hispanic, Latin Christian culture and our political grand-mastership especially over those American countries of Hispanic-Iberian soul and language," would take the form of a Church-State government using Spain's former empire as a model.⁵³ Hispanidad, therefore, was the instrument whereby Falangism and Fascism was exported to the Spanish speaking people throughout the world in an effort to win them over to the cause of an awakened and expanding Spain.⁵⁴

In order to establish Hispanidad as such an instrument of action in an official manner, General Franco established the Consejo de la Hispanidad (Council of Hispanidad) on November 2, 1940, with the announced aim of taking the place of the Council of the Indies in the former empire of Spain. Its creation fixed one of the important milestones in Hispanic history. Looking backward the Consejo appeared to

⁵²Oliver, op. cit., p. 544.

⁵³Giffie, op. cit., pp. 473, 477-8.

⁵⁴"Spain: Unfinished Business," Fortune, XXXI (March, 1945), 148.

be a product of a long historical process and looking forward as the hope for the fulfillment of the dream of an empire.⁵⁵

On January 7, 1941, this Council of Hispanidad began to take actual form with the appointment of seventy-four Spaniards as its initial members. It was composed of top leaders of the Falange and Franco's government. It included the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serrano Suner, as president; the holders of various governmental positions in Spain and certain major diplomatic posts in Latin America; important officials of the Falange; a few military officers; prominent intellectuals; and representatives of the Roman Catholic Church.⁵⁶

There was also a very definite relationship between Hispanidad and the Roman Catholic Church which should be shown in this consideration of the philosophy of Hispanidad. One of the questions in the catechism of the youth groups of the Falangist party was: "What is your watchword?" The answer given was: "El Imperio hacia Dios" (the Empire which turns to God). To this party was officially entrusted "an Imperial and Catholic mission." In the preamble to a decree creating the "Grand Imperial Order of the Red Arrows," General Franco lamented that Spain had for so long lost her "imperial mission and destiny" and summoned his followers to set out upon their "Imperial and Catholic way."⁵⁷

⁵⁵Diffie, op. cit., p. 457; Hamilton, op. cit., p. 457.

⁵⁶Bristol, op. cit., p. 312; Flenn, op. cit., pp. 241-2; Ryan, op. cit., p. 535.

⁵⁷E. A. Peers, "Spain's Dream of Empire," Spectator, CLXV (August, 1940), 216.

Church support of Hispanidad was unofficial in most cases, although its support was the most important of all. This support can be shown by noting the position of the church of Spain in other matters; usually it took the same position as that of the Falange. It strongly condemned communism, socialism, Marxism, anarchism, and during the civil war in Spain, republicanism. Democracy was frequently attacked by church organs, seldom being defended, while totalitarianism was frequently supported and defended. The entire movement of Hispanidad was based on religious fanaticism so deeply and emotionally Spanish that few North American Catholics can understand it. In fact the clerical adherents of this crusading race mysticism were bitter about the apathy of North American priests toward this movement.⁵⁸

During the civil war, most of the higher Spanish Catholic clergy gave wholehearted support to the Nationalist Rebels under General Franco. The Cardinal primate of Spain and other leading Catholics of Spain regarded the struggle as a crusade, picturing the Nationalists as the saviors of Christianity. The Vatican, however, while it vehemently condemned the persecution of the church in Loyalist Spain, maintained formal connections with the Madrid government until 1939, and avoided all association with the authoritarian principles of General Franco.⁵⁹

The unique traditions of Spanish Catholicism and the situation

⁵⁸ Diffie, *op. cit.*, p. 460; Max Glaser, "Clerical Fascism in Latin America," *New Republic*, CVI (February, 1942), 232; Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

⁵⁹ *Fascism in Action* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 194.

in which the church found itself under the Republic, determined its stand during the civil war. For centuries Spain had been an intensely Catholic country. The clergy dominated education. The Catholic Church was the greatest single property owner and was closely linked with the Spanish State. Until recent years it had been a decisive factor in politics. The leaders of the church had frequently been famous warriors and statesmen as well as priests. New recruits for the priesthood, drawn from the lower and middle classes, were instilled with this aristocratic, political, and nationalistic heritage. But with the coming of the Republic in 1931, the traditional position of the church was upset. Catholicism was disestablished and subjected to rigorous anti-clerical measures; some physical attacks on the clergy and church property took place, and the Jesuits were banished. The Catholic hierarchy, nevertheless, accepted the Republic, stating in the collective declaration of the bishops on December 20, 1931, that:

The Church has never failed to inculcate the respect and obedience due to constituted power, even in those cases where its holders and representatives have abused it.⁶⁰

After the election victory of the left coalition government in February, 1936, the sporadic attacks of the early Republican period flared into a wave of violence against the church. During the first four months of the new government, church property was confiscated and the clergy was subjected to indignities and violence. The very existence of the Spanish Catholic Church seemed to be threatened.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 195.

When the Nationalist revolution broke out in July, the church no longer supported the declaration of December 20, 1931, but upheld the rebellion. Moreover, it opposed the Loyalist side as composed of atheists, communists, and anarchists who were seeking the destruction of the Catholic Church and looked upon Franco as a good Catholic.⁶¹

Spanish Catholicism emerged from the civil war once again restored to its traditional position of political influence and subsidized to the extent of some \$5,400,000 annually. The Jesuit orders, which had been expelled by the Republic, were permitted to return and were granted increased rights and privileges. Free-Masonry was suppressed. New Spanish laws were drawn up in conformity with Catholic precepts of morality. Franco really had to reestablish the Catholic Church, returning both its lands and a measure of its power, because the Church had supported his war and in order to remain in power he very definitely needed the continued support of the Church.⁶² Pope Pius XII indicated the extent of the Catholic resurgence when at the presentation of the new Spanish Ambassador to the Holy See in April 1943, he stated:

We have seen the Church rise out of smoking ruins to infuse the Christian spirit into your laws, your institutions and all the manifestations of official life.⁶³

The strength and position of Catholicism in Spain is shown again in the fact that the few Spanish Protestants and English Evangelical

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.; Lloyd Mallon, "Franco's Role in War and Peace," Current History, V (October, 1943), 136.

⁶³ Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 136.

missions in the peninsula did not receive the same support from the government nor experience the same religious revival. It was known in 1944 that Protestantism was being systematically rooted out of the national life of Spain, and there had been instances of the direct persecution of non-Catholics.⁶⁴

Basically Fascism and Christianity are incompatible, but both Fascism and Spanish Catholicism wanted to make use of the strength and resources of the other to achieve their own special missions. As long as they were seeking a very closely related goal of world empire, they could work together very successfully. Once the Falange felt that Church support was not absolutely necessary as during the Second World War, the Falange launched press attacks against individual clergymen, barred Vatican criticism of Germany and curbed Catholic action. This situation became serious enough to move some Catholic bishops to issue warnings against the State. However, realizing that church support is very essential, Falangists for the most part proclaimed their Catholicity and in return the Spanish Catholic Church steadfastly supported the State.⁶⁵

Relations between Catholicism and Fascism in Spain were strictly in contrast to those between Catholicism and Fascism in Germany. Although Hitler signed a Concordat and nominally remained a Roman Catholic, he did not need the Church of Rome in order to rule Germany. This, of course, was not true in the case of Franco. The Fascists of

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 190.

⁶⁵Ibid.

the Spanish Falange knew that they could not reach their goal without the assistance of the Church. In like manner, Catholicism in Germany certainly did not need Fascism. It was the religion of a minority, but was in no danger of losing its political power. During the early years of Nazi rule the persecution of the Catholic Church made excellent propaganda and when the Concordat was signed, the Church still continued to draw a steady benefit from its status as a minority under duress. The contrary was true in Spain for Spain had been considered by the Catholic Church as a fief of a thousand years' standing which the Church could not afford to lose. Hence as the policy of German Catholicism was to submit to secular power and grow stronger under persecution, the policy of Spanish Catholicism was to preserve its power by persecuting others.⁶⁶

These, then, were the Siamese twins of Spanish policy: Fascism and Catholicism, a monster whose parts separated from one another would probably cause one or both to cease functioning in Spain. It is necessary to realize this inseparability, and at the same time the frantic struggle of each of these bodies to win power over the other without destroying their joint existence. Spanish Catholicism and Spanish Fascism had become inseparable and together were the strongest forces in the Spanish State.⁶⁷

The one point in its original twenty-seven points where the Falange proclaimed the right for lay-education, which was against

⁶⁶Arturo Bares, "Spanish Catholicism," New Statesman and Nation, XXI (March, 1941), 266.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 266-7.

the Catholic Church, became the one point which was rejected by General Franco when he made this party the official political party of Spain. He accepted all the other points and issued in place of that one a decree on September 30, 1942 stating that the educational traditions of Spain's Golden Age would be restored in all universities and schools and that all their courses and culture would be Catholic in spirit under the direction of an approved chaplain who would daily offer mass and conduct religious functions. Franco felt that education must be rooted in religion and Spanish Catholic tradition and that the supreme and sole moral and educational authority in the Spanish State must be the Church.⁶⁵

This Catholicism was, of course, a special and Spanish type of Catholicism. Spanish Catholicism does not mean subjection to Rome, but stood for the virtual independence of the Spanish Church from Rome. This was not necessary because both Charles V and Philip II had been excommunicated by the Pope. In fact Spanish imperialism at times came close to what might be called anti-papal and anti-clerical. Even if Franco restored the full state subsidy to the Catholic Church and provided for religious instruction in all government schools, he at times was at odds with the Vatican, the Archbishop of Seville, the Archbishop of Tarragona, and others. Yet in all important disputes, Franco had to give way and the Church was victorious. It was felt that if the Fascist regime ever became firmly established in Spain,

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 267; Michael Kenny, "Hispanidad," Catholic World, CLVII (September, 1943), 602.

it would be a more dangerous enemy to the Church than the Republic. The last of the twenty-six points of the Falange, the charter of the Franco regime, gives a hint as to what an enemy such a state could be to the Catholic Church:

Our movement will incorporate the Catholic spirit - of glorious tradition and predominant in Spain - in the national reconstruction. The Church and the State will arrange a Concordat defining their respective spheres. But the State will not permit any interference of activity which might lower its dignity or the national integrity.⁷⁰

Hence there was a continual struggle between the Catholic Church and the Falange-Fascists. The purely Catholic group wanted to maintain the authoritarian, totalitarian state it helped create by the civil war, trying to preserve the remnants of feudalism for the Church. The Falange-Fascists demanded a Falangist State in which they would have absolute and supreme power, and a society formed by the "National-Syndicalist revolution." While they wanted to take the collaboration of the Church for granted, they also wanted to be independent of its tutelage. Still there remained the one important point which held militant Spanish Catholicism firmly to militant Falange. That was the ambition for an imperial Spain, a cultural and spiritual empire, especially in Latin America. This imperialism the Church was to support; it supported it with action.⁷¹

This empire eagerly sought by both the Falange and the Church, which was in reality the philosophy of Hispanidad, would form a bloc

⁷⁰Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 461-2.

⁷¹Barea, op. cit., p. 267; Siscoen, op. cit., p. 232; Mallan, op. cit., p. 136.

of Hispanic states which would work to establish "Hispanic ideals" throughout the rest of the world. This spreading of the doctrines of the Spanish Fascist and the Spanish Catholic, according to Jose Pemartin, would come to pass as follows: "Spain and the other Latin nations of Europe must Catholicize the rest of Europe, while South America has the mission of converting the United States to Catholicism." This would be Hispanidad in action.⁷²

Now this philosophy of Hispanidad, through which both the Falange-Fascists and the Roman Catholic Church hoped to have their goals fulfilled, could only be a success in the form advocated if the Axis Nations were victorious in the Second World War. Hispanidad could only be an instrument of action as long as it had the support of the totalitarian nations and only so long as these nations appeared to have the power of the world within their grasp. Once Germany and Italy had been defeated, Spain by itself once again would be only a second-rate power exercising little world influence which it could support by any sizeable show of arms. Spain by itself could not carry Hispanidad to its desired results. Hence it is readily seen that Hispanidad was important only during those years that the Axis Nations, especially Nazi Germany, were leaders among the nations of the world. Therefore it is the object of this section to show the close relationship between Hispanidad and the Axis Nations. This will bring forth some very interesting conclusions, the most important being that it makes the Catholic Church of Spain an instrument of Hitler, but only

⁷²Bristol, op. cit., p. 513.

because the Church once again saw this as a means of furthering its own power and achieving its desired goal.

The Falangists openly announced that Spain's greatness would be achieved as a result of Hitler's New Order, in which, incidentally, they imagined Spain as Germany's worthy partner instead of effeminate Italy. This collaboration with Nazi Germany was fully accepted by Spanish Catholics, although the Russo-German pact brought qualms to some. To others even this pact appeared, in the light of Spanish propaganda, to be a clever subterfuge by which Germany would keep Russia in bounds and prevent a more dangerous alliance between atheist Russia and heretical England.⁷³ The Catholic Church in Spain felt that the relations of the Church with the government of Germany were more congenial for the success of her program than relations would have been in a democracy such as the United States. The Spanish Catholic Church has long regarded democracies, the United States, and Pan-Americanism as its chief enemies, especially because they worked against what it sought to achieve in Latin America.⁷⁴

It was believed in this country, both by the diplomats and English Catholics, that Spanish Catholics because they were both Spanish and Catholic, must have been averse to Nazi paganism. In reality, just the opposite appears to have been the case. The two facts, that Hitler was a Roman Catholic who frequently spoke in a religious vein and that the Vatican had concluded a Concordat with Nazi Germany, were enough

⁷³Barea, op. cit., pp. 267-8.

⁷⁴Cisneros, op. cit., p. 232.

to satisfy the conscience of the average Spanish Catholic. The closing of convents and Catholic schools in Germany did not materially differ from the closing of convents or the expulsion of the Jesuits under one or the other of Spain's own Catholic kings. The Catholics persecuted in Poland and the priests sent to concentration camps may have deserved their fate at the hands of the conqueror as in the case of the Basque priests. The Spanish press and propaganda continually spread reports about the flourishing Catholic life in Germany. In the autumn of 1940, the newspaper Alcazar went so far in its glowing description of Catholic prosperity in Germany that the Vatican Radio found it necessary to protest against the exaggeration. But to the Spanish people, who were used to such conflicts between the government and the Church in Rome, this meant little and the praise of German Catholic life continued.⁷⁵

All the forces in Spain, including the Church, saw in Germany an efficient, crafty machine, capable of conquering and organizing the world. If Spain wanted to realize its spiritual, cultural, and materialistic conquest of the world, it had to be united with and have the power and backing of Nazi Germany.⁷⁶ Another reason why Spain readily sought companionship with the Axis Powers was because of their common enemies. It had been the three great democracies, France, England, and the United States, which had, either together or in turn, torn apart the empire of Charles V and Philip II. Antonio Ravar summed up these feelings in the following statement taken from his book El In-

⁷⁵Barca, op. cit., p. 266.

⁷⁶Hallan, op. cit., p. 138.

perio de Espana:

We recognize that our enemies of today are also those of yesterday; those who, after seeing us fallen, after destroying us as a world power and making us lose the dimensions of an empire, and after taking away from us, as a result of our exhaustion, all our determination and our will and our faith in the destinies of Spain, hold out to us the false head of a tourist's curiosity.⁷⁷

With such statements the alignments of the Second World War became clear. Germany was to be supported, to a great extent through the action of Hispanidad by Fascist Spain. This was to be a war of democracies against the Fascists, a war of opposing ideologies. Spain supported the side of Germany and the Axis Nations because she regarded England as the eternal enemy, France as an "ill-smelling and infectious hovel," while reserving the choicest denunciation for the United States. In the Voz de Espana of December 7, 1936, San Sebastian belittled the United States as follows:

With a cynicism that breaks all world records (What a great happiness for the land of records), the United States of America, through the voice of that man they call the First Citizen of the World, have constituted themselves the defenders of the moral values of the Occident. Risum tenentis amici: The country of divorce, of Lynch Law, of the Four Hundred sects, of the universities where a doctorate of philosophy may be bought for a bagatelle, of the country whose national monuments had to be torn down at the end of twenty years because they were about to fall down, the country of the gangsters, of the thieving mayors, of the odious distinction of race, the country of birth control, the country of the protection of dogs and the persecution of the Negroes. Is this the country that can defend the culture and values of the Occident? Of which Occident?⁷⁸

On the reverse side of the Hispanidad medal was the admiration of the totalitarian nations, especially Germany. El Correo Espanol ex-

⁷⁷Hamilton, op. cit., p. 460.

⁷⁸Diffie, op. cit., pp. 461-2.

claimed on October 15, 1933:

Oh, Germany. Our sister in the best of Spanish destinies, the imperial destiny. . . In the days of your triumph in the face of all the secret societies we applauded, not with the clenched fist of the Free Masons, but with our hands open, our arms raised while we shouted in the stentorian tones of brothers: Heil Hitler.⁷⁹

Spanish Catholicism along with the Spanish Falangists warily supported the totalitarian nations which were so violently anti-United States and who fought the idea of hemisphere solidarity as advocated by the United States. Hence the Falange and the Church in Latin America through the use of Hispanidad more or less openly did Hitler's work and were able to enter into many areas where Hitler's agents never would have been able to make contact.⁸⁰

After the outbreak of the Second World War and as the active American participation in the conflict began to appear more probable, Franco's policy of cooperation with the Axis Powers assumed a more subtle form. It is very interesting to remember that it was at this time, November, 1940, that the Council of Hispanidad was created. This council was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the publicized purpose of improving cultural relations between Spain and her former colonies. In reality, it appears that Hispanidad's real purpose was to be a distributor of Falangist and Spanish expansionist doctrines, much of which came from the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin, which were aimed at disrupting the growing influence of the United States among its southern neighbors and substituting the prin-

⁷⁹Duffie, op. cit., pp. 462-3.

⁸⁰Gissen, op. cit., p. 232; Oliver, op. cit., p. 548.

ciples of Hispanidad for those embodied in the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan-American Union.⁸¹

Spain not only saw Germany as a power which she could use to further her own imperial ambitions, but Germany also wisely saw in Spain an instrument which she could use to gain her goals. It is felt by many that Germany realized this long before Spain had any thoughts along such lines and therefore supported Franco, supported the imperialist dreams in Spanish minds, and even went so far as to be responsible for the creation of the Consejo de la Hispanidad.⁸² Possibly Hermann Goering's remark that "Spain is the key question for the two continents," gives a hint to what the military masters of Germany were thinking.⁸³ It is well known that Germany, through the use of the Spanish Press, did her utmost both to arouse Spanish ambitions and to create new ones, undoubtedly so that she would be able to use Spain for her own purposes. An example of such a statement published by a Nazi publicist and quoted by the Spanish Press is the following: "The new Europe will need a greater Spain to be the partner of the Axis Powers, for together the three States will have to fulfill their new mission."⁸⁴

It is very interesting to note how close Franco came to entering the Second World War on the Axis side. It appears that almost every-

⁸¹Plenn, op. cit., pp. 232, 240-1.

⁸²David Efron, "Latin America and the Fascist "Holy Alliance," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCIV (July, 1939), 20; Gondi, op. cit., p. 62; Oliver, op. cit., p. 548.

⁸³Plenn, op. cit., pp. 239-40.

⁸⁴Peers, op. cit., p. 217.

thing concerning his declaration of war had been settled during his interview with Hitler in October, 1940, but the thing which prevented an open declaration of war was the interference of Mussolini, who also sought Casa Blanca and Gibraltar which were part of the empire which Franco wanted to reestablish. This revised division of the spoils made Franco dissatisfied and he therefore contented himself with pro-Axis "non-belligerency," which of course included the use of Spain as a Nazi espionage base and as a channel for the importation of vital raw materials. In reality, Spain did have claims against France, England, and the United States which might have been publicized as grounds for war supporting the Axis side. Franco was not interested in entering the war unless he was positive that the Axis Powers would be victorious and that Spain would receive rich territorial rewards. Hence it is not entirely true to say that Franco was "playing Hitler's game" during the Second World War either in Latin America or anywhere else in the world. Franco, the Falangists, and the Spanish Catholics were playing their own game which frequently meant working in very close harmony with Germany and German agents. Such close harmony was developed in the spreading of the doctrines of Hispanidad. Franco's only hopes for an empire were built upon the hope of catching some of the crumbs which fell from Hitler's table. Spain by itself just did not have the necessary resources to act independently with any hope of success. Even the reevaluation of history as taught in Hispanidad needed the support of arms and armies, Hitler's arms and armies. If Franco could have been sure that the democracies would lose the war,

he would have instantly entered the conflict.⁸⁵

Spain sought to remain on very friendly terms with Germany at all costs, hoping that in the event of an Axis victory she could claim her share of the reward. In order to remain on such friendly terms, Spain stated that she had no territorial claims in Europe and when France collapsed she did not press her former demands to the Basque provinces of France or the French territory bordering on Catalonia. Even greater self-restraint was shown in allowing Andorra to remain under joint Spanish-French control after the fall of France. Spain did not press these claims because she hoped to receive much richer and larger rewards later and did not want to do anything which would offend Germany.⁸⁶

It remains very hard at the present time to prove exactly how closely related Hispanidad was to the military leaders in Berlin, but there is little doubt that there was some connection. Regardless, Hispanidad was of such a nature that it was able to work in very close harmony with Germany and, in fact, needed the success of Germany to achieve its ultimate aims. It was the penetration of Hispanidad in Latin America which more than any other single factor as far as the United States was concerned which marked Franco's most outstanding service to the Axis Powers during the Second World War.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 458, 466-7; Feare, op. cit., p. 216.

⁸⁶ Hamilton, op. cit., p. 464.

⁸⁷ Pienn, op. cit., p. 231.

CHAPTER III

HISPANIDAD IN ACTION

Having discussed the background necessary for the development of a philosophy such as Hispanidad and the philosophy itself, this chapter deals with the crux of Hispanidad, which is Hispanidad in action. Unless it was misrepresented by its advocates, Hispanidad was Roman Catholic Fascism, the official foreign policy of the Falange Espanola, and was designed to reunite the Hispanic peoples around the concepts of privilege, hierarchy, autocracy, and intolerance. In order to realize how much strength this movement possessed, it becomes necessary to trace its purpose, goal, and the activities of its adherents throughout the world, especially in Latin America. Since this chapter deals with Hispanidad in action, most of this activity had to occur during the years when the totalitarian nations were most successful in their effort toward world supremacy.¹

In Arriba, the central organ of the Falange, there appeared an article about the same time the Hispanidad Council was created which clearly pointed out that this philosophy had a very definite purpose which it sought to carry out:

The concept of Hispanidad has been lost in the rubbish of romantic follies. Before the creation of the Falange, Spanish Americanism, as a national concept, was simply a theory cultivated by a small group of intellectuals. Tomorrow the warships of Mexico and Peru, the airplanes of Chile, Argentina, or Spain,

¹B. W. Diddle, "The Ideology of Hispanidad," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIII (October, 1943), 478.

the cannon of the Center, the South, or the North, will defend one great Empire, with a single great destiny. Then in the green fields of the future, twenty peoples will be free, proudly free in the glory of their material and spiritual fertility.²

Miguel Grau continues these thoughts in his article published in the February, 1937 issue of Vo:

For the America of our culture, our faith, and our blood, we wish more than just living together, more than friendship. We desire unity: unity of mind, unity of economy, and unity of power. We desire to put an end to "Monroeism," in order to put in its place our affirmation: "The Spanish world for the Spanish."³

Hence under the guise of what was sometimes considered a romantic crusade, the Falange meant business through Hispanidad. Behind Hispanidad there was money, weapons, and, most important, support by political allies in high places in all the Spanish nations of the world.⁴ Three main groups were found in these nations who supported Hispanidad: the conservative propertied classes, a large number of intellectuals, and strong elements of the Catholic Church. The propertied class saw Hispanidad as a philosophy that would protect them because its strong stand against communism, socialism, and democracy endeared it to those who saw these as threats to their position and interests. The intellectual support of Hispanidad is more difficult to understand, less logical, but they were a group also interested in preserving their position over the large masses of people and were very

²Ouidio Gondi, "La Hispanidad in Hitler's Service," Free World, translated by Arthur N. Colton, III (June, 1942), 63.

³R. H. Southworth, "The Spanish Falangx and Latin America," Foreign Affairs, XVIII (October, 1939), 150.

⁴Bryce Oliver, "Franco Invades Latin America," American Mercury, LIV (April, 1942), 545-6.

influential in the spreading of this ideology. Of course, it was supported by elements of the Roman Catholic Church because it furthered their interests.⁵

Regardless of its political disguises and despite the cloak of piety thrown over its activities by clerical support, the directing forces of Hispanidad were in the Foreign Office in Madrid which undoubtedly operated in close harmony with the Foreign Office of Germany.⁶ This activity resulted in a very definite program of indoctrinating with Spanish culture those lands and areas which had once formed part of Spain's empire with a view toward closer political cooperation between them and their mother country.⁷

Spain operated somewhat differently from the other totalitarian nations which sought empires, for it was mostly in those areas where Spain had formerly ruled that she focused her attention and carried on her activities. Spain wanted an empire which she believed was rightly hers. During the summer of 1940, after Franco had successfully completed his overthrow of the Loyalist government and while the Axis Nations were very successfully waging their war for world conquest, gangs of Fascists roamed the streets of Madrid shouting claims to Gibraltar and the Franco government put up posters laying claim not only to South and Central America, Cuba, and the Philippines,

⁵Diffie, op. cit., pp. 479-80.

⁶Oliver, op. cit., p. 546.

⁷Edwin Ryan, "Hispanismo" Yesterday and Today," Commonweal, XXXIII (March, 1941), 535.

but to the Louisiana Purchase and such states as California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. In those exuberant days these Fascist gangs stoned both the British and American embassies, the Fascist newspapers made daily attacks upon the allies and the democracies, and either Franco or his brother-in-law, Serrano Suner, the Foreign Minister, delivered a weekly speech attacking the allies while threatening that Spain might enter the war at any moment. In this crude form, Hispanidad was set into motion in the manner advocated by the Fascist-Franco government. It is always interesting to remember how quickly such conditions changed once Hitler's war machine tasted defeat and the allies moved forward to victory.⁸

Although Spain wanted all of her former empire back, this was impossible. To be quite fair, she did not seek Philip's former holdings in Italy, some areas in Africa, or any of the Netherlands. Undoubtedly this was because of the conviction that neither Hitler nor the Duce were disposed to give any of their conquests away. Regardless of their philosophy of Hispanidad, Spain at times had to be realistic about not only what could be safely taken but what she could say she wanted.⁹ Some of the more outspoken Fascists wanted to take over all of northwest Africa, but the official presentation of Spain's demands, published in the summer of 1941 by the Falange's Institute of Political Studies, was relatively moderate. It demanded Gibraltar,

⁸T. J. Hamilton, "Spanish Dreams of Empire," Foreign Affairs, XXII (April, 1944), 468.

⁹Lamar Middleton, "Spain Demands Latin America," Living Age, CCCLIX (September, 1940), 10-1.

Tangier, all of French Morocco, most of Algeria, plus a broad strip of desert from the southern reaches of Algeria to the Atlantic below Rio de Oro. Altogether these Spanish claims amounted to an area of land about the same size as that of the United States. This would have given Spain the northwest corner of Africa from which she could control the sea and air routes through the Mediterranean and from western Europe to Latin America. Such demands show Hispanidad in its true light as a philosophy seeking the conquest of land.¹⁰

Of all the demands made by Spain for the restoration of her former empire, probably the most justifiable was that concerning Gibraltar. Unfortunately for Spain the Second World War probably made England less disposed than ever to give up this fortress. It was only through the possession of Gibraltar that the positions in the Mediterranean area were supplied during the war. During 1940 and 1941, Spain made an incessant clamor for Gibraltar. Even Franco referred to the "bequest of Gibraltar and the vision of Africa" in a speech, adding that after four hundred years Spain still had an "eternal obligation." He was alluding to the testament of Queen Isabel, who at the time of her death in 1504 ordered her daughter and son-in-law, Joan and Philip, as well as their heirs to the Spanish throne, always to keep as part of the royal patrimony "the city of Gibraltar with all that pertains to it, and neither to give it away nor alienate it from the crown." Not until 1783 was this command disregarded when Gibraltar, first captured

¹⁰ibid., p. 11; Hamilton, op. cit., p. 466.

by the British in 1704, was permanently ceded to England. Although Franco made the recovery of Gibraltar a primary aim of Spain's foreign policy, Spain made no effort to take the Rock by military force during the Second World War and to this day it remains a British possession.¹¹

Spanish demands for territory across the Straits in Africa were slightly more successful. Spain showed very little interest in Africa before she lost her empire. By then she was hampered by the possessions of England and France. Finally she did acquire rights to Spanish Morocco but spent many years trying to conquer the Riffi and continually met with defeat from these tribes. It was because of his fighting these Riffi tribes that Franco won his reputation. Franco, as well as his generals, was an Africanist and ever since the civil war began had pressed plans for an empire in Africa.¹²

Taking advantage of the impending collapse of France, Franco occupied the international city of Tangier on June 14, 1940 and took over the administration of that city. The European Powers granted Franco this right on the pretext of a threat from Mussolini. Franco then, in violation of his agreement, went ahead and virtually liquidated all the international governmental machinery in Tangier, and although not formally annexing this international zone of about 225 square miles made it subject to the laws of Spanish Morocco. Incidentally this was the first and only positive step taken by Spain and Franco

¹¹ Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 464-5; E. A. Peers, "Spain's Dream of Empire," Spectator, CLXV (August, 1940), 217.

¹² Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 465-6.

toward the fulfillment of their imperial ambitions as advocated in their philosophy of Hispanidad.¹³ The exuberance of the rejoicing all over Spain on June 15th and 16th suggested that the demonstrators believed that this occupation was equivalent to a conquest and as such it was announced by the Spanish press. In Madrid and other large cities, crowds marched through the streets and held mass meetings to the cry of "Tangier for Spain." The Spanish Minister in Tangier was reported to have said that he supposed the Spanish legation would not bear that name much longer. On June 16th, the Diario Vasco remarked as it announced a public meeting, "Our glorious leader has won the war for us and is now going to win us an Empire."¹⁴

Although Spain was deeply concerned with the establishment of an empire in Africa, the advocates of the philosophy of Hispanidad did their greatest work and expected the most cooperation from the countries of her former empire in South and Central America. Hispanidad was directed in its fullest extent towards these countries. Spain, in its own right and quite apart from its Nazi-Fascist backers, had great influence in Hispanic America. A similar relationship existed between Portugal and Brazil. These mother countries had a far greater cultural importance toward their former colonies than England had toward the United States. In Spain some forty institutes were now estab-

¹³Ibid., pp. 458, 459; Lloyd Mallan, "Franco's Role in War and Peace," Current History, V (October, 1943), 137; Peerd, op. cit., p. 216.

¹⁴Peerd, op. cit., p. 216.

lished which were concerned with cultural relations with the western countries. Spain regarded the Spanish-speaking American republics as her business.¹⁵

Although it was more than a century and a quarter ago that the Spanish-speaking countries of South and Central America made themselves independent of their Iberian overlords, nevertheless, down to the present day the mark and mould of Spain remains. Spain persists everywhere: in the atmosphere, in the language, in the customs and habits of thought, in the codes of conduct and ethics, in the Church, the plaza, and the architecture. In some areas the image of Spain may appear dim, but it never completely fades from the picture; whereas in other areas it is hard to realize that a person is not in Spain itself.¹⁶ Spain and Hispanic America have always been very conscious of one another. In this connection, Julian Mario Rubio, president of the University of Valladolid, wrote in an article appearing in the March, 1939 issue of the Franco magazine Spain:

Nationalist Spain is bound to Latin America by a triple bond - the past, the present, and the future. . . It is immortal Hispanicism. It is Spain of the past once again placed on the route to mission in Latin America. Nationalist Spain does not take a single step without considering the motherland and Latin America simultaneously; because we want to triumph and conquer in our war, in order to share the victory with our brothers across the Atlantic, and if necessary, to give it to them so that they may be saved.¹⁷

¹⁵Carleton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938), p. 160; Middleton, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁶H. A. Phillips, "The Heritage of Spain in South America," Travel, LXXXIII (March, 1945), 5-6.

¹⁷David Efron, "Latin America and the Fascist 'Holy Alliance'," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCIV (July, 1939), pp. 20-1.

There were three ties which bound Spanish Americans to Spain: language, race, and religion. These three incidently are exactly the differences that separated Spanish America from the English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon, protestant United States. The Spanish Falanz worked with ease among a people whose language, religion, and upper class culture were purely a Spanish product.¹⁸ Every book, magazine, and newspaper leaving Spain for Latin America carried the call of the Falangist motherland and advocated Hispanidad. The superior appeal of Falangist propaganda, written in Spanish by Spaniards from a Spanish point of view, as compared with that from Germany, Italy, or the United States cannot be overemphasized. One of the very striking cases where this common language showed its importance was in Argentina in May, 1939 when it was decreed that all foreign organizations have their names, statutes, and by-laws printed in Spanish which, of course, was no penalty for the Falange organization.¹⁹

Francisco agents in Latin America, being members of the Spanish race, speaking the Spanish language, worshipping in the Spanish Catholic faith, with a militaristic Spanish motherland behind them, had in Hispanidad and Falangism a doctrine that undoubtedly possessed attractions for many Latin Americans. This was particularly true among the ruling classes and cliques. Apparently as a result of Franco's victory in

¹⁸H. R. Southworth and W. E. Espy, "Franco in the Caribbean," Nation, CLII (November, 1940), 500.

¹⁹Southworth, op. cit., p. 152.

Spain, which was a victory against democracy also, these groups felt that by adopting Falangist slogans and methods they could give their power a new lease on life and stem the tide of democracy in their own countries.²⁰

Spain used every possible device to tell the people of Latin America that they were not merely Bolivians, Peruvians, Chileans, etc., but also members of the mystic body of Hispanidad. In this campaign, the Falangist counted very heavily upon the support of the Catholic Church which was dominant throughout Hispanic America as it was in Spain. The political influence of the Church in Latin America was tremendous. Even the best of the Good-Neighbor experts in the United States hastily conceded the reactionary role of the Church and then turned to less embarrassing affairs in Latin America. Yet it would be useless to discuss politics in the Latin American countries if the activities of the Church were ignored.²¹

The cooperation of the churchmen with the Falangists became an established fact in Latin America with many members of the clergy acting as though they were Falangist agents. In publications and through various public functions participated in by the priests and church dignitaries, the average Catholic was made aware of his Church's political preference. For example, a routine part of the procedure at uniformed Falangist meetings was the field mass dedicated to the union.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 151.

²¹ Ibid., p. 152; Max Gissen, "Clerical Fascism in Latin America," New Republic, CVI (February, 1942), 282.

of the fascist organization and the political church. Prominent among churchmen who taught the principles of Hispanidad were Jesuit Father Julio Vertiz in Mexico, the Archbishop of the Province of Salta in Argentina, Father Mora in Columbia, the Rector of the University of Santo Tomas in Manila, and Silvestre Sancho. They spread the concept of Hispanidad from the point of view approved by the Council of Hispanidad and its agents. Realizing the importance of such service by the Church, the Franco government sent missionary fathers to Mexico, Cuba, Central America, Columbia, and Venezuela.²² The Dominicans, Franciscans, and other missionary and teaching orders, as well as the Jesuits, carried Hispanidad throughout Latin America taking it directly to the native tribes. This teaching of Hispanidad was possible because of the close relationship already described in Chapter II between the Church and Hispanidad. From the very beginning of Spanish rule in Latin America, Catholicism went hand in glove with Spain. The Viceroy carried out the administrative duties, but the Church ruled the people. Catholicism in Latin America was more than a religion; the Church was a culture. Because of these conditions it can be easily understood why the Church was able to spread Hispanidad and why the Franco government did everything it could to support the Church.²³

The close relationship between the Falange and the Church was once again shown from the fact that the Falange operated directly

²²Gissen, op. cit., p. 233; Gondi, op. cit., p. 64.

²³Michael Kenny, "Hispanidad," Catholic World, CLVII (September, 1943), 600; Phillips, op. cit., p. 7.

from the Foreign Ministry in Madrid whereas the work of Spain's foreign religious missions was directed from this identical ministry. Within this ministry was created a Superior Council of Spanish Missions Abroad with members representing all the Spanish missionary orders. When this council was established, Arriba, the chief Falangist newspaper in Spain, felt it was an important step in creating a feeling of unity throughout the former Spanish empire. How important Fascist Spain considered this council may be judged by the budget of the Foreign Ministry which during the fiscal year of 1941-1942 provided 150,000 pesetas for Spanish Religious Missions Abroad out of gratefulness for "the significant work being done by the religious missions of all orders and the fruitful consequences derived from that work for Spanish (Fascist) action and influence abroad." This in reality was the Church working openly with Spain's money to further the cause of both Spain and the Church.²⁴

The church support of fascist, anti-democratic movements was but one side of the story. The other was the persistent demand on the part of the church that good-will programs, such as that of the United States, be left to Catholic efforts. Those who accepted the philosophy of Hispanidad thought of it as standing for Catholicism as against the Protestantism of the United States and the Protestant missionary activity in South America.²⁵

To become more Hispanic and more Catholic implied quite as con-

²⁴Gissen, op. cit., p. 232.

²⁵Ibid., p. 233; W. B. Bristol, "Hispanidad in South America," Foreign Affairs, XXI (January, 1943), 321.

plete reversal of historical trends for Hispanic America as for Europe. Latin America had travelled a long way on the road to liberalism and turning back was not easy. Just as the philosophers of Hispanidad had demanded that Europe cleanse itself of the evils which arose out of the Renaissance, they asserted that Latin America had to do likewise. First, they wanted a reinterpretation of Hispanic-American history. Holding that the colonial period was superior to the modern, Hispanidad regarded independence as a tragedy, not as a triumph. As the Mexican, Guzman Valdivia, remarked:

Spain gave us our life; but this life miscarried from the beginning. What could have been an uninterrupted and free progress became decline and slavery. The tragedy of Spain was our tragedy. The disintegration of the greatest empire. . . threw a shadow over the metropolis and cast the colonies into absolute darkness. . . The liberty taught us is false. . . Democracy is false. . . it is necessary to tear out all, absolutely all, the principles by which we are accustomed to regulate our existence. . . We have a mission to accomplish: the reintegration of ourselves into Hispanic life. We have but one destiny: THE DESTINY OF HISPANIDAD.²⁶

The success of Hispanidad depended upon the restoration of the traditional values. Latin America had to be shown liberalism in its true light, as the destroyer of the Hispanic tradition. Those who held to tradition were the true sons of Hispanic America. The greatest evils came from those who introduced liberalism: Hidalgo, Morales, Marias, Guerrero, and worst of all, Benito Juarez of Mexico. The heroes were Iturbide, Aleman, Santa Ana, Maximilian, Miramon, and Porfirio Diaz. Chile was called upon to condemn Manuel Salas, O'Higgins, Man-

²⁶Giffie, *op. cit.*, (quoted from Guzman Valdivia, Destino de Mexico, pp. 62-3, 199), p. 477.

uel Bilbao, and the liberal and democratic parties. Argentina's May Revolution was anathematized, with Mariano, Moreno, and Bernardino Rivadavia cast as villains. Alberdi was condemned and Sarmiento portrayed as an enemy of Argentina for advocating immigration and popular education. The dictator Rosas was exalted. Similar conclusions were sponsored in all the other Latin American nations by the Hispanidad agents. The Hispanic nations had to realize that what they needed most, their guide for the future, was found in their own past.²⁷

Numerically the overseas Falange was not too impressive. Nevertheless, the Falangist propaganda made great strides and since it was built upon the emotion of racial pride, it appealed strongly to the aristocracy, to the cultured religious mystics, and infiltrated into small but exceedingly influential circles in the Spanish nations.²⁸ The Falangists followed this growth by establishing provincial chiefs for every Latin American country. Because of the identity of language, religion, family connections and similarity of traditions, these groups were in a position to exercise tremendous influence on entire local and central governments, as well as on the people, in Latin America, the Philippines, the United States Territory of Puerto Rico, and even certain portions of continental United States.²⁹

The real importance of Hispanidad first came to the attention of

²⁷Giffie, op. cit., p. 477.

²⁸Oliver, op. cit., p. 545.

²⁹Abel Flann, Wind in the Olive Trees (New York: Boni and Gaer, 1946), p. 252.

United States observers who were attending the Havana Conference in July, 1940. They were startled out of their Monroe Doctrine complacency when the Argentine delegate maneuvered the United States into accepting serious restrictions on a declaration of hemisphere solidarity. The following November the Consejo de Hispanidad was created in Madrid and began its work of uniting the activities of all the individual Falangist organizations in Latin America. All Latin Americans who were Spaniards or who still had relatives in Spain were invited to join these organizations, or else, and incidently there were four million Spaniards in Latin America at that time. In subsequent raids in Cuba, Mexico, and Panama, it was disclosed that some 250 Falange branches had been established on this side of the Atlantic prior to the formation of the Council of Hispanidad, including 70 in Cuba, 57 in Argentina, 35 in Chile, and 4 in the Philippines. Franco had sent out numerous agents even before he had successfully concluded the Spanish Civil War to contact local reactionary groups in order to obtain their support. In Puerto Rico our State Department discovered that the Falange had given impetus to an independence movement which illogically pledged allegiance to Spain.³⁰

After the creation of the Council of Hispanidad, the Falangist activities in Latin America assumed a new aspect. One of the first moves made by the Council was to invite about twenty Spanish Americans who had shown the most interest in the concept of Hispanidad to Spain.

³⁰Beals, op. cit., pp. 111-2; Oliver, op. cit., pp. 546-7.

From Spain well-known Falangist were sent to Latin America, either on official missions, like the one for the Pizarro Centenary in Peru, or in a private capacity, as in the case of Jose Maria Peman's visit to Argentina and Uruguay. The Franco government used for its purposes individuals of widely different types, sending a poet to Argentina, an adventurer to Cuba, an uncultivated immigrant to Mexico, and even making use of the international "fixer" Juan Marsh.³¹ The cardinal rule followed by these men in spreading the propaganda of Hispanidad among resident Spaniards was contained in the words of Sanchez Mazas, who was the first director of the Falangist activities abroad: "Create division among Spaniards hostile to the Falange. Give the greatest possible active political aid to the national fascist organizations of the country where you are." The Falangist propaganda for Spaniards was passed by word of mouth or distributed in printed form. Among the instructions circulated by the Falange Exterior in 1939 was one as follows: "Where there are no official falangist groups, they must be created by one means or another, and their connection must be hidden under the name of Hearths of Spain, Houses of Spain, or some similar name, in those countries whose governments are not inclined to tolerate official Falange activity."³²

Hispanidad developed many media of expression throughout Hispanic America. Some of these have been mentioned; others are worth noting.

³¹Bristol, op. cit., p. 312; Gondi, op. cit., pp. 62-3, 65; Oliver, op. cit., p. 549.

³²Gondi, op. cit., p. 62.

In Mexico, the weekly, La Racion, carried regular articles attacking liberalism and democracy, upholding what might be described as anti-United States ideology. Lecture, a semi-monthly review, was more subtle but carried the same thing. El Sinarquista and Orden, official organs of the Sinarquista movement expressed the same contempt for liberalism and democracy. Abside also gave its support; and not the least important of the Mexican periodicals working for Hispanidad were Omega and El Hombre Libre, two of the most prominent Roman Catholic papers.³³

Colombia, also, had a strong contingent of Hispanidad advocates. America Espanola, published by G. Porras Trecoenis in Barranquilla, was one of the foremost. More widely read was the influential daily, El Siglo, official organ of the Conservative Party and edited by the party's leader, Laureano Gomez. Its pages were filled with anti-United States, anti-liberal, and pro-Hispanidad sentiment. Other publications in Colombia which favored the Falange and Hispanidad were La Tradicion, Medellin; Falange, Barranquilla; and more important, the Revista Javeriana, organ of the Pontificia Universidad Catolica Javeriana of Bogota.³⁴

Argentina had perhaps the largest contingent of Pro Falangist publications. Among these were: Arriba, El Pampero, Clarínada, Los Principios, and the Catholic paper, Criterio. Most, if not all the countries of Latin America, had such pro-Hispanidad publications, as:

³³Duffie, op. cit., p. 481.

³⁴Ibid.

Arriba Espana, Havana; Amanecer, Santo Domingo; Arriba Espana, La Paz; Arriba Espana, Panama; Avance, San Juan, Puerto Rico; Arriba Espana, Ecuador; Unidad, Lima; Jerarquia, Bogota; Cara al Sol, Ponce, Puerto Rico; Arriba, Sullana, Peru; Cara al Sol, New York; and Unidad, Mexico. Still other newspapers and reviews throughout Latin America printed pro-Falange, pro-Hispanidad, anti-liberal, and anti-democratic materials without devoting themselves exclusively to this propaganda.³⁵

Argentina, Franco's "fellow-neutral" during the Second World War, served as the principal link between the Axis Nations and the Falangist network in the Americas. The reactionary and fascist-minded government of Argentina willingly became the hemisphere sounding-board and relay-point for Hispanidad and other Axis inspired propaganda coming from Madrid. In Buenos Aires, an organization known as the "Organizing Committee for the First Congress of Hispanic-American Culture" was established for coordinating Axis and Falange propaganda and Hispanidad activities under the sponsorship of the Argentine Government with the support of wealthy Spaniards and prominent representatives of the Church, the political bureaucracies, and landowning and other pro-Axis minded groups in most of the Latin American countries. A steady stream of Falangist propaganda poured into Franco headquarters in Argentina which was sent from there to all the countries of Latin America, even into Mexico, the only one of these nations which never recognized Franco's regime.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., pp. 481-2.

³⁶Flenn, op. cit., pp. 253-4.

The propaganda in Argentina was very intense. In no other South American country did Franco carry on his activities so boldly. Jose Coll, a rich industrialist, was the official head of the Falange, and his organization received preferred attention from the Instituto Ibero-Americano of Berlin and the Consejo de Hispanidad of Madrid. The majority of the printed propaganda distributed in Argentina and Uruguay was manufactured in Berlin in German printing houses. Only about twenty per cent of the propaganda came directly from Spain or was printed in Buenos Aires. That which was printed in Buenos Aires was subsidized by the German Embassy.³⁷

Uruguay, Guatemala, Salvador, and Nicaragua, all ruled by tyrants, as well as other Latin American nations, not only allowed propaganda to pass freely, but hastened to help Franco's revolution and do everything they could to support his cause. During the civil war, Brazil sent congratulations to him and refused to allow Spanish government vessels to enter their harbors. In some of the countries the Madrid legations became foci of Franco spy-rings and cached ammunition to aid the Franco cause. Many of these nations bought arms in the United States which they intended to ship to Franco and provided him with the information which aided him to capture supply vessels of the Spanish government, while they continued to maintain relations with the Spanish government. In these same countries everything was done which would interfere with the cause of the Loyalists. As soon as it was possible all these

³⁷Gondi, op. cit., p. 68.

countries except Mexico recognized the government of Franco.³⁸

In Argentina, interest in the idea of forming a bloc of the Hispanic nations for political, cultural, and economic purposes was found among some of the extreme nationalists, certain of the Catholic clergy, and a few lay Catholics outside strictly nationalist circles. The real interest in Hispanidad was limited to two or three of the most Catholic of these groups. These groups were composed of young intellectuals who came from well-to-do or rather aristocratic families. Their interest in Hispanidad was in connection with their strong opposition to liberalism, democracy, Masonry, Jewry, and British and North American imperialism. In their admiration of the former empire they always kept in mind the old Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata by which they would annex the countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.³⁹ Although it is a well known fact that the Argentine Administration was always on the closest relations with Franco Spain, it is difficult to say to what extent it had any real interest in Hispanidad as a political concept as taught by the Falangists.⁴⁰

The headquarters of the Falange in the Caribbean area was Cuba with its more than seventy Falangist organizations. Persons inquiring for facts about the Falange throughout the Caribbean area were referred by Franco diplomats to Arriba Espana, the official Phalanx publication

³⁸Beals, op. cit., p. 164.

³⁹Bristol, op. cit., p. 317.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 318.

at Havana. Falangist agents responsible to the Havana headquarters were found functioning as far away as New York. From December, 1938, until July, 1940, the time of the Havana Conference, the Phalanx was banned in Cuba. Throughout this period the Phalanx still maintained its headquarters in Havana with armed, uniformed members guarding its doors. Cuban anti-fascists reported it as an open secret that these Blue Shirts were undergoing constant military training behind monastery walls.⁴¹

The Phalanx in Cuba, which was composed of about fifty thousand members, made many members of persons who ordinarily would have nothing to do with their organization by means of a nominally humanitarian body called Auxilio Social, or Social Aid, which had 127,000 persons as pledged contributors. The income of the Auxilio Social in Cuba ran as high as \$150,000 a month, but what percentage of this went for charity, propaganda, or to repair war damage in Spain is unknown. Through this organization a mailing list was created which was bombarded with propaganda from the Spanish, German, and Italian legations.⁴²

The Phalanx was intent on reminding the Cubans of their Spanish heritage and of Franco's interest in their welfare. In this endeavor it was responsible for the education of some of the Cuban children, sponsored visits to Spain, and shipped Franco propaganda to Cuba continually. During the summer of 1940, the agents of Franco compiled with local aid a huge catalogue containing the names, birthplaces,

⁴¹Southworth and Espy, op. cit., pp. 500-1.

⁴²Ibid.

finances, and politics of all Spaniards on the island. This data was required by the Franco government apparently for a blackmail racket based on a technique made notorious by the Nazis. Cubans who were anti-fascist were warned to change their politics if they did not want their relatives in Spain to suffer. Similar pressure on New World business men and on men with property in the old country brought the Falanx a considerable flow of contributions.⁴³

During the summer of 1940, the news came out that in the residence of General Riestra, Consul General in Cuba for Franco as well as Cuban chief of the Falange, a carbon copy of a requisition upon the Franco government for military equipment for five thousand men, five bombers, three armed vessels, and anti-aircraft, was found.⁴⁴

In Colombia, certain important elements among the Conservatives, who formed the chief party of opposition to the liberal administration, were active proponents of a Catholic, anti-liberal, anti-United States, Hispanidad, closely in tune with the Franco concept. Connected with Laureano Gomez, the leader of the Conservative Party, was a group of young Conservatives far to the Right who styled themselves the Academia Caro and gave much attention to Hispanidad in the review which they published, entitled Revista Colombiana, which showed great interest in Maestu and Falangist Spain.⁴⁵

⁴³Ibid., p. 501.

⁴⁴Oliver, op. cit., p. 546; Flenn, op. cit., p. 244.

⁴⁵Bristol, op. cit., p. 319.

The interest taken in Hispanidad in Peru showed certain characteristics different from those of the movement as it existed in the other Latin American countries. There the movement did not stem from Maestu nor his writings, but went back somewhat further and represented to a considerable extent a reaction against the leftist and Indianist current rather than against liberalism. The Indianist movement sought to exalt the Indian and his civilization while denouncing Spain's colonial policy in America, seeking in this manner to justify the effort to advance the political and social conditions of the Indians in Peru at the expense of the ruling white class. The Peruvian supporters of Hispanidad, who were whites belonging to the social aristocracy, were anti-liberal, but they used the anti-liberal teachings of Hispanidad to counter the assertions and claims of the Indianists more than to attack liberalism as such. This group sought to justify the continuance of white supremacy by exalting Spain's contributions to Peruvian civilization and picturing her activity during the colonial period in a very favorable light. Although they were persons of considerable social, intellectual and political influence in Lima, the highest governmental authorities did not support their cause with equal interest.⁴⁶

When the Peruvian government invited the Spanish delegation to visit Peru for the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of the Amazon, their aim was not to promote Hispanidad, but rather to gain Spanish support for Peru's claims in her boundary

⁴⁶Bristol, op. cit., pp. 319-20.

conflict with Ecuador.⁴⁷

Spain's great interest in making Peru an active part of the Hispanidad bloc is shown by the sending of two vessels, laden with arms, ammunition, and men to some remote port in the southern coastal province of Tacna, Peru. The principal cargo of one of the ships was airplanes and parts which had been used by the Germans in the Spanish Civil War. Some of this material may have found its way over the border into Chile.⁴⁸

In Uruguay, Luis Alberto de Herrera, who was the leader of the chief party of opposition to the administration, did some talking in favor of Hispanidad, but of a rather vague type. He invoked it especially when he was opposing cooperation with the United States and calling attention to Yankee imperialism as he did when attacking the idea of North American cooperation in the establishment of bases in Uruguay. One section of Herrera's party, which was headed by Heber, showed interest in a more clear-cut concept of Hispanidad directly in harmony with the wishes of the Franco regime and so did a small number of extreme nationalists and a number of the Catholic political party in Uruguay. Still those who supported Hispanidad in its true sense remained a definite minority.⁴⁹

Regardless of the number of supporters which it had, the agents of Hispanidad continued their activities. Even when the Nazi diplomat

⁴⁷Bristol, op. cit., p. 320.

⁴⁸Oliver, op. cit., pp. 548-9.

⁴⁹Bristol, op. cit., p. 320.

was obliged to leave his post in Montevideo, this did not interfere with the continued efforts of the totalitarian powers for agents of the Spanish Phalanx took his place and continued his subversive activities.⁵⁰

In Paraguay, Hispanidad did not gain a similar position of importance as it did in neighboring Argentina. A few groups drew some inspiration from the Spanish Falangism and favored a government for Paraguay somewhat on the order of the Franco regime in Spain. However, the nationalists in Asuncion drew their chief inspiration from the traditions of Paraguay itself during the period prior to 1870.⁵¹

The activity of the Falangists in Puerto Rico, the United States possession on the edge of the Caribbean, considering its importance for the defense system of the United States, was remarkable. It was considered so important by the United States that a new Military Department was established there in 1939. Yet the Phalanx remained so strong that Congressman J. Parnell Thomas of the Dies Committee made the following comment concerning this organization: "It is my personal opinion that if the National Socialist Party of Germany is attempting to make inroad in Puerto Rico it is through this organization." This organization in Puerto Rico was registered with our State Department as the agent of a foreign principal giving its essential purposes as aids to distressed Spaniards, the creation of an "impartial" state of

⁵⁰J. A. Vayo, "The Fate of Latin America," Nation, CLII (March, 1941), 344.

⁵¹Bristol, op. cit., pp. 320-1.

mind among Puerto Ricans toward Spain, and the development of commerce between Spain and the United States. Of course, its actual objective, the return of Puerto Rico to Spanish ownership, went unmentioned.⁵²

Of the five thousand Spaniards in Puerto Rico, most of them were members of the Falange, although the number publicly avowing their affiliation did fall off as the international situation grew more tense. The headquarters were at San Juan, with local chapters at Ponce, Mayaguez, and Caguas. It was continually reported that San Juan served as a clearing house for North American hand grenades and ammunition going to Franco under the label of "Pottery - Czechoslovakia." Despite the poverty of the island and in disregard of the United States embargo, this island continually furnished war material for Franco during the civil war. The upper class of Spanish and American society in Puerto Rico was one hundred per cent pro-Franco during the war. But even more startling than the members or activities of the Falange members was the official toleration of these activities by American officialdom. This cordiality toward the Falange displayed by the United States military and civil officials had its counterpart in the attitude of the Catholic Church. This island was divided into two bishoprics with both dioceses directly responsible to the Holy See. Monsignor Willinger had a Franco coat of arms upheld by angels painted on his chapel during the war, and both men made a habit of

⁵²Southworth and Espy, op. cit., p. 502.

blessing Franco rallies, at which blue coated Falanx members were the most conspicuous attendants. Many of the island's priests were Spaniards and wore their Falanx insignia over their cassocks.⁵³

Although the Falanx Abroad was composed principally of Spaniards, a citizen of another country occasionally rose to a position of leadership. In Puerto Rico there was an example of this in the American citizen Alfonso Miranda Esteve, who became provisional head of the Falanx on this island.⁵⁴

In Mexico there was a movement similar in many ways to Hispanidad. This was the reactionary Sinarquista movement, which in reality was sponsored by the Falange and was a Mexican version of the Christian Front. The leader of this movement was Salvador Abascal. The Sinarquista movement waged a continuous anti-democratic, anti-American, and anti-Allied campaign which made dangerous headway during the Second World War along the Rio Grande and among the Spanish-speaking war workers in the Southwest and other sections of the United States. This movement even received the support from some of the Catholic Churches in the United States. The Rev. Jerome P. Holland writing in the November 8, 1941 issue of the Tablet, the organ of the Brooklyn diocese, assured American Catholics that the Sinarquista movement "may be described as a movement of the Right deeply rooted in Catholic spirituality and philosophy, recognizing the evils from which modern

⁵³Ibid., pp. 502-3.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 500.

society is suffering and proposing practical remedies. . ." The remedy, of course, was fascism, preferably clerical; but the important fact to note here was the open support of a movement dedicated to the destruction of democracy and filled with hatred for the United States. Other support for this movement came from the News Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the influential Jesuit weekly in El Paso, Texas, Revista Catolica.⁵⁵

In an effort to put the philosophy into a more forceful position, military supplies were sent to Mexico in Spanish vessels. Three of these ships were able to reach a port in Guatemala where they were met by Nazi and Franco agents who had their cargoes transhipped to the State of Chiapas, Mexico, near the Guatemalan border where German interests were substantial. These three vessels, as well as the two which landed in southern Peru, reputedly were filled with army officers serving Franco's government and were deployed throughout Mexico, Central and South America to participate in the Falangist crusade.⁵⁶

The Philippine Islands, having been a part of Spain's former empire, also came within the territory sought to be regained by the advocates of Hispanidad. In 1939, the newspaper Arriba Espana in Madrid gave the Falangist belief concerning these islands in an article flaying President Roosevelt for his exploitation of the Philippines:

We should not be surprised that, where Spaniards have fallen (in the Philippines), there are still seeds that may become trees amid the ruins of the Empire. The Spanish world

⁵⁵Glissen, op. cit., p. 233; Plenn, op. cit., p. 234.

⁵⁶Oliver, op. cit., pp. 548-9.

is afoot, and, marching forward, it greets the Philippine Islands as the vanguard of our unity and of our destiny under Malayan skies.⁵⁷

The Falangist penetration in these islands became of great material aid to the Japanese in their capture of Manila and their arrest and persecution of Americans and pro-Allied natives.⁵⁸ Allan Chase in his book "Falange" has revealed the role that Jose del Castano, Spanish consul-general in Manila and head of the Falange in the Philippines, played in the collapse of the civilian defense system there.⁵⁹ Franco himself showed Spain's position when he sent a message of congratulations to the head of the Japanese puppet government in the Philippines.⁶⁰

The Phalanx also was active inside the borders of the United States, especially in areas where large Spanish-speaking groups were found. Certain elements within the Catholic Church were very active in carrying out this propaganda and blessing Fascist-Falange movements in the countries south of us. Included in this was the increasing demand for greater Catholic participation in the good-neighbor programs of the United States.⁶¹ The Falange preached its gospel of Hispanidad through three publications printed in this country, Spain and Cors al Sol, which were monthlies, and Espana Nueva, a weekly. The

⁵⁷Middleton, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵⁸Plenn, op. cit., p. 232.

⁵⁹Allan Chase, Falange: The Axis' Secret Army in the Americas (New York: Futnam Co., 1943).

⁶⁰Hamilton, op. cit., p. 458.

⁶¹Gissen, op. cit., p. 232.

monthlies were published by the Spanish Library of Information in New York and edited by the Falangist Javier Gayton de Arjola, who was also director of this library. Spain was published in English and an interesting item connected with this publication was the large number of contributors with striking Irish names. Almost all of the Spanish export and import houses in this country were invited to advertize in these organs and did so obediently, which was similar to the conditions which existed in Cuba and Mexico. In order to complete its coverage, the Franco government subsidized nightly broadcasts to the United States of Falangist philosophy via Radio National Salamanca, Station EAQ Madrid and Transradio Aranjuez.⁶²

As a conclusion to this chapter concerning Hispanidad in action, it might be well to point out that under all the grandiloquent Falangist talk of spiritual and cultural empire, the Axis and Spain had vast military preparations in the Latin American countries. In Brazil alone, it has been estimated that the Axis could have mobilized a force in excess of 500,000 men, all fully equipped with war materials; this was aside from the large Japanese contingent in the State of Sao Paulo. The same estimates place about 250,000 potential armed men in Argentina, 32,000 in Chile, 10,000 in Paraguay, and from 2,000 to 5,000 each in Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Uruguay. North of the Panama Canal, there were at least 15,000 disciplined Nazis, the majority of them in Guatemala and Costa Rica. Mexico was

⁶²Middleton, op. cit., pp. 13-4.

believed to have a potential force of 15,000 Nazis, under experienced officers who had served in European campaigns.⁶³

If the Axis Nations had been more successful during the Second World War, so that Spain would have joined them in actual military conflict, there is little doubt but what Hispanidad would have really been in action, the military action of reuniting Spain's former empire. As it was, Hispanidad as a philosophy of action died with the defeat of the military forces of the Axis Nations, especially with the defeat of Nazi Germany.

CHAPTER IV

THE REACTIONS TO AND RESULTS OF HISPANIDAD

It is the purpose of this final chapter on the philosophy of Hispanidad, always bearing in mind its background, purpose, and most important, its actions, to try to establish the reactions to and the results of Hispanidad. These reactions, of course, will fall into two different opposing positions, those favoring Hispanidad and those opposing its principles and actions. In this consideration the element of time also becomes a matter of great importance. Since Hispanidad could only be successful in its fullest extent if the Axis Nations were victorious, the reactions to the philosophy of Hispanidad therefore have to be divided again: its most promising period in the years when the Axis Nations were successful and its losing ground once the Allied military forces began their series of victories. In this chapter the attempt will be made to show the reactions to Hispanidad, especially among the Latin American Nations, always remembering the relationship between Hispanidad and the military success of the Axis Nations.

From the very beginning of this movement there were evidences of violent opposition as well as the very strong support of the Church, the aristocracy, and the intellectuals. In previous chapters those supporting this movement were discussed in connection with its philosophy and its actions with little thought given to those who opposed it. An example of the latter comes from one of the believers in the

older liberal Hispanismo, F. Carmona Menclares who declared:

Hispanidad is part of the Nazi concept of the world. It was broadcast over America with the aid of the Theocratic-Fascist regime imposed on Spain by the recent civil war. . Hispanidad is the reconquest of Ibero-America for Spain. Not just any Spain, but for Theocratic-Falangist Spain. . It is a spiritual reconquest in principle, and material reconquest when international conditions are right. Spain declares herself an Empire and demands her ex-Empire. Hispanidad represents a retrogression to the status quo ante 1800, at least. But Hispanidad is something more than Fascism: it is Spanish Fascism for Ibero-American Fascists. Yes. Hispanidad, Creole Fascism: such it is, whether we like it or not. . In other words, in addition to despotism, cruelty, stupidity, bullying, hunger, terror, desperation, etc., Hispanidad is something else. . It is Theocracy. It has been imposed by a cynical, ambitious and belligerent Church in the name of political Catholicism. It is with reason that Spanish history. . may be interpreted as a fight of the State to constitute itself in opposition to the Roman Church. . It is apparent at a glance that Hispanidad projected from the Iberian Peninsula the premise introduced introduced there by the triumph of Fascism. Nothing succeeds like success. And what triumphed in Spain is trying now, wrapped in sheep's clothing of Hispanidad, to slip into American political life. From this comes our definition. Hispanidad is Fascism seasoned to the Creole taste.¹

The Spanish immigrants in the New World exerted a considerable and constant influence in binding the New World with the Old. The promise of a Franco victory in Spain during the Spanish Civil War promoted a dictatorial reaction throughout Hispanic America, just as the submission of Portugal to Nazi influence had its effects on Brazil. Among these immigrants there were two groups during the civil war, one group supporting Franco and hence Hispanidad while the other supported the Loyalists. It is interesting to note that the immigrants who found material success, as many did in the South American countries,

¹B. W. Diffie, "The Ideology of Hispanidad," (Quoted from F. Carmona Menclares, "Hispanismo y Hispanidad," Cuadernos americanos, III (Mayo-Junio, 1942), 43-55.), Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIII (October, 1943), 478.

most generally supported Franco, whereas those immigrants who remained poor, as was usually the case in the United States, remained loyal to the Loyalist side. In New York there was a large Spanish colony made up largely of poor people, who went so far as to go without the necessities of life in order to send funds and hospital supplies back to aid the struggle of the Loyalists. In the South American countries where many of the immigrants became wealthy merchants, bankers, and landowners, these influential persons used their large economic power to swing official support, already very disposed, more decidedly to Franco. Spaniards in these countries who felt otherwise were terrorized into silence, frequently with the help of the various governments.²

During the Spanish Civil War and immediately after there existed at least one organization of the Falange, made up mostly of resident Spaniards, in each Latin American country. But after that conflict these organizations gradually ceased their activities, at least under the name of Falange. In some cases they were succeeded by organizations of pro-Fascist Spaniards under different names such as the Funacion Espanola in Montevideo, the Casa de Espana in Buenos Aires, the Hogar Espanol in Sao Paulo, and the Circulo de Accion Espanola in Santiago de Chile. The first two of these came to an end early in 1942 while the effectiveness of the group in Chile decreased. This decline in activity occurred for various reasons. In the first place, the interest and enthusiasm among the Falangists themselves naturally sagged

²Carlton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938), p. 160; Edwin Ryan, "Hispanismo Yesterday and Today," Commonweal, XXXIII (March, 1941), 535-6.

somewhat after the fighting in the Spanish Civil War was over. The political atmosphere in Latin America became less favorable to Falangist ideas after the outbreak of the Second World War. The severe treatment of the Spanish Republicans by Franco's government since the end of the civil war and the continual talk of empire tended to alienate certain areas in the Latin American countries. One of the chief factors which turned South American hearts against Franco was his apparent entering into the Axis orbit.³

The clearly political idea of Hispanidad as it was promoted by the Franco regime, or the related concepts of Hispanidad having religious import, were accepted and promoted in South America by only relatively small groups of intellectuals, generally zealous Catholics. In this type of Hispanidad, there was little popular or general interest, and therefore it did not win a large numerical following in Latin America. Even so, as a result of their intellectual ability, good social position, or significant political influence, these small groups were a great deal more important in their influence than their numbers would indicate.⁴

The Catholic Church was a very influential organization in forming reactions to Hispanidad. Those persons who saw Hispanidad as a cultural, spiritual movement frequently did so because of its relation-

³W. B. Bristol, "Hispanidad in South America," Foreign Affairs, XXI (January, 1943), 314; J. I. B. McCulloch, "Influences from Overseas," Survey Graphic, XXX (March, 1941), 112; "The Shape of Things," Nation, CLXX (July, 1939), 13.

⁴Bristol, op. cit., pp. 316-7, 321.

ship to the Church of which they were members.⁵ Unobserved by most people was the strengthening of ties between the South American Republics and the Vatican during 1940 which could have had a very definite relation to Hispanidad if the Axis war machine would have continued on the road of victory.⁶ Fortunately, the social and political goals of the reactionary arm of the Catholic Church were by no means always those of the great masses of sincere Catholics. Although the most powerful political forces within the Church were anti-democratic, the people did not always follow their church leaders, as was shown in one election in Chile when the Catholic voters defeated the clerical favorite.⁷ Franco was wise when he acted as a friend to the Church. The linking of the Church with a political cause is not a new trick for Spanish or Spanish-American politicians for it was a known fact that by having the Church support a cause or even appear to give it support gives that cause a much better chance for victory.⁸ That was undoubtedly the reason why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid launched a Superior Council of Spanish Religious Missions

⁵Alfonso Junco, "The United States and Hispanidad," Commonweal, XXXIV (June, 1941), 152-3; L. V. Vila, "Hispanidad," Commonweal, XXXIV (July, 1941), 326.

⁶Arturo Barea, "Spanish Catholicism," New Statesman and Nation, XXI (March, 1941), 267.

⁷Max Gissen, "Clerical Fascism in Latin America," New Republic, CVI (February, 1942), 232.

⁸Ryan, op. cit., p. 535.

Abroad which Falangist spokesmen regarded as a step toward spreading what they called "Spanish unity." Under this program it was estimated that some eight thousand pro-Franco clerics reached Central America and the Caribbean countries during 1940 alone. It was from such priests as these that the great masses of common people in Latin American countries received their guidance in Hispanicism.⁹

On the whole the political conditions in South America were not favorable for the propagation of Hispanidad in political terms at the time that the Falange tried to spread its doctrines. In the few years following the Spanish Civil War as the Allied forces began their struggle against the Axis, Pan-Americanism and democracy, not Pan-Hispanism and fascism, slowly became the political watchwords of the day. As this came to pass the regime of General Franco found itself ever farther from the goals sought through Hispanidad.¹⁰

Among South American leaders there were several outstanding men who supported Franco and his cause believing that it would improve conditions in Spain, but who then withdrew their support when they discovered that Franco did not live up to their expectations. One of these was the Uruguayan statesman Pedro Manini y Rios who in September, 1936, reacting against the outrages to persons and property which had occurred in Spain under the Republic, along with other Uruguayans, signed a telegram of support for Franco's cause on the understanding that the revolution was to establish a constitutional government along

⁹Bryce Oliver, "Franco Invades Latin America," American Mercury, LIV (April, 1942), 548.

¹⁰Bristol, op. cit., p. 321

democratic lines. However, on January 18, 1942, he publicly withdrew his approval of the Franco regime and denounced it for its dictatorial character, its persecutions and violent reprisals against Republicans, and its incredible claims taught in Hispanidad to restore its hegemony over what was once the empire of Charles V.¹¹

Once the United States entered the Second World War, the growing opposition to the Falange was shown in many countries of Latin America. The Falangist organization in Montevideo was dissolved by the Uruguayan government in January, 1942. In Lima, the Peruvian government suppressed a Falangist periodical called Unidad which had been published there since 1938. In this same country, the Spanish delegation invited to visit Peru for the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of the Amazon had its program shortened, its activities made less public, and it departed from Peru at the beginning of January, 1942, instead of remaining at least another month as originally planned. The government of Peru felt it could not afford to strike a note of discord in the policy of hemisphere cooperation and was embarrassed by having as its guests an official delegation from a totalitarian country with strong sympathies for Germany and Italy. In Buenos Aires, the Falangist organization dissolved itself voluntarily. In June, 1942 the Ecuadorian government cancelled a contract under which the Franco regime had sent a pedagogical mission to their country.¹²

¹¹Ibid., p. 315.

¹²Ibid., pp. 315, 320.

Although all the nations of the Latin American world except Mexico had recognized the Franco government, very definite precautions now were taken by most of them to prevent the Falange and other foreign agents from carrying out their known intentions of stimulating unrest within their borders. The Latin American resentment over the spread of Falangist activities under the guise of the apparently legitimate Hispanidad program became stimulated by the presence of thousands of Spanish Republican exiles, including many of Spain's most prominent intellectual and professional leaders, in Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Chile, and the other American Republics. Through the rapid counter-moves of the Allies to "neutralize" the Americas as a potential major war theatre, a sizeable number of Falangist agents were taken by the United States, other Allies, and the Latin American countries. From the press and radio of nearly all the Latin American countries came a chorus of complaints and protests over the presence and operations of Franco's official and unofficial representatives within their borders. The Peruvian national radio was outstanding in declaring that there was "an absolute divergence" between Latin American and Falangist Spain's policies. This rising wave of anti-Franco feeling spread throughout Latin America in 1943 by a new surge of unfavorable publicity in connection with the fresh arrests of Falangist agents in Cuba and other American Republics as well as in the United States Territory of Puerto Rico.¹³

¹³Abel Flenn, Wind in the Olive Trees (New York: Boni and Gaer, 1946), pp. 243-6.

By the end of 1944 the movement for a hemisphere-wide break with the Franco government became apparent. Finally on January 23, 1945, apparently without informing any other American Republic of its intention, Guatemala declared: "The relations between the democratic government of Guatemala and the totalitarian Spanish regime are now broken." Guatemala had broken the ice by being the first American Republic to break diplomatic relations with Franco. Other Latin American nations were soon to follow. The Cuban Congress by unanimous vote asked the president of that country to break relations with Franco Spain.¹⁴

This break with the Latin American countries as well as the retreats and defeats of the Axis armies had a very definite effect upon the Franco government and its philosophy of Hispanidad. Franco and his advisors on foreign affairs began to talk of Spain, not as the head and spinal column of the Spanish-speaking world, but as a "sister" nation that deserved to share in the benefits of the Good-Neighbor policy of the Western Hemisphere. There were even rumors in Madrid that Franco was trying to get Spain admitted to the Pan-American Union.¹⁵

The militia of the Falange was dissolved soon after the Allied armies began to make progress on the road to Rome. Although it appeared as if Franco had cast off the Falange, it is still possible that he, realizing that the Rightists are only biding their time until Don Juan

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 245-6.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 244.

can be put on the throne, may fall back upon the Falange and its Hispanidad principles for support. But with Hitler powerless to help Franco the actual seizure of foreign territory by Spain seems to be beyond the realm of possibility. Whether the accent continues on fascism or on the extreme conservatism of a traditional Spanish pattern, the Franco regime lost whatever opportunity it had to win back its empire in Latin America or to form a new one in Africa and being practical soldiers, the ministers of the Spanish government realized this. Even if the United States would have remained out of the picture, the Spanish Navy was outmatched by the navies of Brazil, Argentina, or Chile and if an expedition of Spanish forces could have been landed in Latin America, the hostile armies, populace, and territory would have been overwhelming. The people of Spain, exhausted in every possible way by their own civil war, could not have supported such a venture or even had any sentiment for reconquest considering what it would have cost.¹⁶

Even though its territorial aspirations as taught in the philosophy of Hispanidad were defeated, Spanish imperialism remains a dangerous force in the world. There is the danger that in the event the world becomes one of reaction as the result of the Second World War, or if there was just a reactionary western Europe, a reactionary Spain would probably have her opportunity for leadership in a new age of Ketter-
nism. Regardless of what the future brings, Spain expected to obtain

¹⁶P. J. Hamilton, "Spanish Dreams of Empire," Foreign Affairs, XXII (April, 1944), 468-9; J. E. Kelly, "Spain's Role in South America," Catholic World, CLIV (March, 1942), 160.

a good reward from the Allies in the post-war settlements of the Second World War. Spain feels that she deserves this because of her so-called neutrality during the Second World War.¹⁷ Even as recently as early 1950, Franco was threatening to turn to Stalin and Communist Russia if the United States did not provide the necessary funds to keep the Falangist state functioning.¹⁸

Although world conditions have changed in many ways since the Second World War and the setting is far less propitious for international fascism, the foreign policy of Spain has remained much the same as it has since Franco took control of the country. The objectives of its foreign policy remain: (1) to oust communism and to fight it wherever it may be encountered; (2) to acquire living space; (3) to secure control over Morocco, Gibraltar, and North Africa; (4) to unify Spain and the Spanish people; (5) to spread the concept of the cultural unity of the Spanish race in the terms of Hispanidad; and (6) to develop a new order for Spain.¹⁹

As a conclusion to this presentation of the philosophy of Hispanidad, it is difficult to say whether Hispanidad is dead or not. Just because it did not have the opportunity to assert itself in the political field among the Latin American countries, does not mean the Catholic Church is going to allow it to vanish. Even if the average Span-

¹⁷Hamilton, op. cit., p. 468.

¹⁸"The Shape of Things," Nation, CLIX (February, 1950), pp. 118-9.

¹⁹Fascism in Action (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 41-2, 55.

ish-American has no thought of unity with Spain, that thought cannot be ruled out of the visions of the politicians of Spain if the opportunity would ever present itself. Just because it has become difficult for Hispanidad to continue to function as a political concept, does not mean it will cease as a cultural or spiritual concept. Those who are Protestants and who believe in democratic principles sincerely hope that Hispanidad is dead and never experiences a resurrection. Indeed, the world can be grateful that conditions in the world were such during the past two decades that Hispanidad was unable to fulfill its ultimate aims. If it had been totally successful, we would be living in a fascist, Catholic, Spanish world today similar in many ways to the world during the fifteenth century.

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