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Reason and All My Senses: Surveying the Post Enlightenment Frame of Reason through Contemporary Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology, and Cognitive Linguistics

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REASON AND ALL MY SENSES: SURVEYING THE POSTENLIGHTENMENT FRAME OF REASON THROUGH CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS WITH APPROPRIATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND PRACTICE

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To my beloved, Corinne, and our children Lydia, Henry, and Caroline
And my parents, Rodney and Nancy Lowe

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Growing up my grandfather had instilled in my father and our family this phrase, “The man that wins I the man that thinks he can.” This became our family motto of sorts, our rational frame. I can recall countless times throughout my childhood when this phrase was repeated to me. But it came with a realistic conviction: I could not win it all. Being born blind, having cataracts removed at the age of 6 months, initiated a lifetime of “you can’t do its.” I could not read until the 3rd grade, but Mrs. Hazel Midyett believed I could. I came in early and stayed after school to catch up. My vision disability meant I could not catch a ball, but I played sports to be a part of the team. No matter how much I tried, I would never win the Super Bowl. Ms. Vicki Lollar pushed me to play the trumpet, and when it was hard to read the music at a distance, enlarged my music so I could keep up and excel. Her command of the room is unparalleled. I became the last organ student of Mrs. Natalie Wehrman, who despite my uncoordinated technical abilities taught me to play the organ, and it remains my great joy, even though I will never win an organ competition or play Bach with any degree of proficiency. Mr. Frank Johnson made us write essays in high school Science class, and it was the only pre-college writing I ever did. The greatest academic compliment I have ever received, “Mr. Lowe, if I wanted to read the textbook, I would read the textbook. 100%.” But when other kids were getting their license at 16, I stayed home because I could not drive. I would never win the Indy 500. My “winning by thinking I can” was met with many no’s and setbacks, but also much success. There are no pity parties.

My college and seminary professors expanded my love of learning under the law in tremendous ways. Through this experience I continued to learn what I could do and how much was yet to be learned. My life experience to this point taught me I had to work hard and never expect any favors in life. On Call Day I sat in the chapel of Concordia Seminary, the culmination

of years of work, encouragement, and hopes for a win, resulted in "call pending." Along with others from my class, I did not receive a call. It was a large class and not driving made my assignment "difficult" for the Council of Presidents. This was a hard blow. The seminary instilled in me a world-class Christ-centered, Lutheran, Confessional Theology. Pastoral care, however, was formed in me by my childhood pastor, Rev. Gary Griffin, who took me on calls, had me work in the church office so I knew how everything ran, and, in the end, how to work smart. A humble servant, few pastors rival him.

The Lord provided. I received a call to the middle-of-nowhere, or at least you could see it from there, Trinity Lutheran Church, Blue Hill, Nebraska. Pastor James Witt, their former pastor, stayed on to serve as visitation pastor and my driver. Along with congregation members, we drove a 400-mile radius each month to visit shut-ins. So, much for not being able to pastor because I did not drive. The congregation generously let me take classes and never sacrificed my vacation time to do it. Likewise, my current congregation, Trinity Lutheran Church, Hawarden, Iowa gives me much encouragement and time to fulfill the requirements for this degree. To my congregations: your patience, kindness, and willingness to listen to me talk about this, means so much. I thank God for all of them daily and for God's mercy in giving me such wonderful people to serve.

To Dr. Joel Okamoto, my doctor father, your willingness to take me on and see this project through is a testament to Christian forbearance under the cross. I give thanks to God for your wisdom in seeing an idea through, and for enabling me to consider reason as God's gift. Thanks for our weekly meetings and countless hours of supervision to ensure this project was completed. Whatever credit comes from this project belongs to you. Lastly, thanks for making me work hard. I also wish to give thanks for Dr. Charles Arand and Dr. Robert Kolb for their God-given

wisdom, and for my readers, Dr. Kent Burreson, and Dr. Mark Rockenbach. Also, thanks for the staff in the Graduate School office over the years, Dr. Ruth McDonnell and Dr. Beth Hoeltke.

Despite all of the challenges and setbacks, it was the people whom God had given me in the beginning who have made the most difference in my life. My parents, Rodney and Nancy Lowe are the hardest working, most dedicated to win people I know. God gave them the gift of encouragement. No matter how down and dark I felt, and no matter how many times I wanted to quit, they encouraged me to move forward and accomplish what needs to be done. God has not given me words to express how grateful I am to Him for them. Without you, and my grandparents, Willard and Thelma Lowe, who not only passed on the gift of encouragement to believe I could do it, also gave me the best and highest treasure in all of creation, Jesus Christ, my Lord and Savior. Their insistence that I be baptized and catechized in the Christian faith forever changed my life-past, present, and future. I am who I am because God's gift of you all. All thanks and praise, honor and glory be to God, my Father!

Finally, to my beloved wife, Corinne, and our children: Lydia, Henry, and Caroline, you sacrificed the most to achieve this goal. Corinne, thank you for your steadfast confidence, for believing this was good for our family, and for making it happen by carrying the majority of the work at home during these years. Your faithful, forgiving love shines the light of Christ in my life daily. Lydia, Henry, and Caroline, I am grateful for all of you and am inspired everyday by your hard work and commitment to me and our family. In many ways, I know that you have sacrificed much for this to be completed, and for that I am sorry. I hope, though, it will serve as a model for life-long learning, and the testament to our family commitment to believe that with hard work, discipline, commitment, and "the good Lord making us able to" you can accomplish what you desire. Most importantly, I want you to know, that none of this is worth comparing to

the gift God gives you every day as His child. As He says, “Beloved, we are God’s children now” (1 John 3:7). Jesus is the one thing needful, all the rest of this will perish.

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Augsburg Confession
Ap	Apology of the Augsburg Confession
ELCA	Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Ep	Epitome of the Formula of Concord
FC	Formula of Concord
LC	Large Catechism
LCMS	The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod
LSB	*Lutheran Service Book*
LW	*Luther's Works*, American ed. 55 vols. Philadelphia: Fortress; St. Louis: Concordia, 1955–1986.
SA	Smalcald Articles
SC	Luther, Martin. *Luther's Small Catechism with Explanation*.
SD	Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord

ABSTRACT

Lowe, Joshua T. Reason and all My senses: Surveying the Post-Enlightenment Frame of Reason through Contemporary Theology, Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology, and Cognitive Linguistics with Appropriations for Christian Theology and Practice, Ph.D. diss., Concordia Seminary, 2024. 250 pp.

This dissertation argues that Christian theology and practice are aided and enriched by a more complete understanding of reason by surveying recent studies and views in theology, philosophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive linguistics. Since the Enlightenment, Christian theology has assumed widely the Enlightenment model of human reason as ideally acontextual, that is, free from constraints of contexts, and therefore universal, that is, applicable *in* all contexts. Recent developments from a variety of perspectives challenge this model of rationality. Some challenge the acontextualism of the Enlightenment understanding by showing how it arose from and depends on a context, and that context is always a feature of being rational. Others call into question the assumed anthropology of Enlightenment rationality. They show that reason is situated and guided according to desires, biases, intuitions, and metaphors. This dissertation surveys and summarizes a variety of these developments, analyzes their theological implications, assesses their impact for selected Christian practices, and illustrates their value with specific recommendations for thinking about and evaluating these selected Christian practices.

INTRODUCTION

"What does it mean to be human?" Human beings have asked this question about themselves many times. Human beings are curious, and so it is unsurprising that their curiosity leads them to questions, explorations, discoveries, and conclusions about themselves.

One reason that anthropological questions continue to be asked is to find a basic distinction between human beings and other animals. "What makes human beings unique among animals?" A common answer through the centuries has been that human's "reason." This is what Aristotle, for example, observed. Animals had life and perception, but humans had life, perception, and reason. Reason makes humans unique.

Why fix on "reason?" One explanation, because it has been easy to argue (at least until very recently), is *that* human beings have the capacity for reason, but other animals do not. Another and more compelling explanation is that so much good can be attributed to reason. Our reason is why there are art and architecture, politics and technology, wisdom and whimsy, mathematics and science. Even when we do not think about our reason, which is most of the time, we use reason, that is, we are rational beings.

The Christian theological reflection takes God and all of His creation to be within its purview. Therefore, Christian theology naturally is concerned about reason: What reason is; what reason is for; what it means to be rational in view of God the Creator. This theological tradition has said much about reason and its use through the centuries, both for and against. Probably the most well-known form of this discussion has been the relationship between faith and reason. For example, Thomas Aquinas is often upheld as the champion of arguing for the close relationship between faith and reason.[1] But the Lutheran tradition in which I stand has been known for its

[1] For example, see Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Edward Bullough (New

attacks on reason. Martin Luther "call[ed] reason a 'whore' or a 'prostitute,' refers to it as 'Frau Hulda,' and ironically addresses it as 'Madam Reason.'"[2] Nevertheless, whatever stand one takes on reason, it is an essential feature of human existence, including its religious life, and so a proper understanding of it is always important.

A key feature of the Western intellectual scene since the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries has been the importance it has placed on reason. The Enlightenment believed that reason freed humans to be moral without the undue influence of religion, history, and tradition. Freedom from these constraints implied that the ideal operation of reason is from the constraints of context and applies universally. This in turn meant than humans could reason as free, autonomous beings. This freedom made humans believe they could make decisions that were logical, even mathematically precise, without any hinderance whatsoever. All of this centralized the mind as the most important aspect of human existence.

This understanding of reason has influenced Christian theology and practice in important ways. However, this influence has not always been positive or constructive, nor has it been fully recognized.

The Enlightenment's view of reason—its frame of reason—has had its critics almost from the first. These criticisms have become both more prominent and more varied since the end of the 19th century, and especially in the closing decades of the 20th century.

This dissertation will consider how the Enlightenment's frame of reason has been challenged and refuted by philosophy and the contemporary sciences, and how different, post-

York, Dorset Press, 1948), 37–55.

[2] Paul Althaus, *The Theology of Martin Luther*, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 69–70. "Frau Hulda" was a pre-Christian mother goddess who is still known today especially through one of the Grimms' fairy tales.

Enlightenment frame of reason has been emerging. It will survey and summarize a variety of these developments, analyze their theological implications, and assess their impact for selected Christian practices.

What is Reason?

"Reason" is a word used in several senses, but often without distinguishing them. For example, this is what Luther did, according to Paul Althaus. "Luther speaks of 'reason' without defining it and without differentiating its various manifestations and possibilities."[3] We find Luther, as observed earlier, calling reason a "whore" and a "prostitute." But we also see that Luther's Small Catechism, among the most important and influential of all his writings, speaking of "reason" as one of the gifts of God the Father for which "I owe it to God to thank and praise, serve and obey him."[4] So, it is important at the outset to define "reason."

"Reason" as it will be used throughout this dissertation is defined as the *deliberation about the means to achieve ends*. This sense of reason is ancient (often attributed to Aristotle), and it still serves well and is generally accepted. It is important, however, to stress that reason is about means, not ends. As Bertrand Russell put the matter, "'Reason' has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends."[5] Russell went so far as to call those who think that reason also determines ends, and not simply means, "opponents of reason."[6] Philosopher Bryan Magee illustrated this distinction when he countered claims of so-called "irrationalists"

[3] Althaus, *Theology of Martin Luther*, 64.

[4] Small Catechism II.2 in Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, eds., *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 354.

[5] Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), 8.

[6] Russell, *Human Society*, 8.

like Marxists. They insisted that "reason" did not determine our ends, and that therefore there is no such thing as rational decision making. Magee agreed that reason did not determine ends, but this did not mean that reason played no part in reaching all kinds of ends.

> The important truth which irrationalists have grasped is that the objects of human activity are not determined by reason but by our physical and emotional needs. We need first to satisfy our appetites for food, drink and sex, then to be clothed and housed and kept warm; we want companionship, love, comfort, recreation, excitement, adventure; we need outlets for our destructive instincts such as aggression, jealousy and the will to power; and we are subject to fears and uncertainties. These and other irrational forces determine our wants and needs. And in accordance with our wants and needs, so we act.
>
> All this is true. But the irrationalist errs in supposing that this conflicts with the principle of rationality. For rationality is not about the purposes of actions, it is about the relationship of means to those purposes. Of course, we do not eat because we have reasoned things out and decided to eat: we eat because of a basic physical and instinctual need. But miracles of reasoning and planning go into *meeting* that need. Even primitive peoples sow in the spring so that they shall harvest six months later, so that in turn they and their animals shall eat during the following winter. This behavior is rational in a high degree: it means repressing the natural desire to take it easy now, and working instead, yet not for any immediate gain but so as to eat next year. It is based entirely on reasoning from past experience. And when we come to consider the feeding of a modern community, say a city like London, our imagination is baffled by the complexity and sophistication of the reasoning involved.
>
> This example illustrates what happens in every aspect of life, great or small. If I want to know the date I do not look at my watch; equally, if I want to know the time I do not look in my diary. If I want to eat I do not put food in my ears; if I want to wash my ears I do not put soap in my mouth. People who do behave like this are either babies or, as we sometimes put it, have 'lost their reason'. They are unable to look after themselves, and if they are not cared for by someone else they quickly die. Rationality—the appropriate relation of means to ends—is successful living.[7]

In light of Russell, Magee, and many others, the question that this dissertation seeks to take up might be restated as, "How should Christians understand the deliberations that human beings make about the means to reach ends?"

[7] Bryan Magee, *New Radicalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 18–19.

Christianity's Response: Foundationalist Rationalism

To answer this question, understanding the historical context of Christianity's understanding and use of reason since the Enlightenment is needed.

The first step is to explain how reason fits into modern history. "Reason" has become a key feature of the "modern social imaginary," to use a term made current by philosopher Charles Taylor.[8] The point of referring to a "social imaginary" is to emphasize that "reason" has an importance that is largely assumed, not argued for. A "social imaginary," according to Taylor, "mean[s] something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode."[9] A social imaginary is not a theory which one learns; it is something more informal, more pervasive, and harder to detect or to move beyond. According to Taylor, a social imaginary consists "of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations."[10]

The word "imaginary" is deliberate and essential to understanding the concept, especially to distinguish a "social imaginary" from a "theory." Taylor explains:

> There are important differences between social imaginary and social theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people "imagine" their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.[11]

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[8] Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004).

[9] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 23.

[10] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 23.

[11] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 23.

As a feature of the modern social imaginary, what I have already called the Enlightenment "frame of reason" does not have to be argued for. Instead, it is taken for granted.

Now that we see how reason matters socially, we should see how it emerged. It arose out of what Taylor called "the progress of disenchantment, the eclipse of the world of magic forces and spirits."[12] This was a result of the reform of church and society in Europe. The Reformation was a vital part of the reform. It not only challenged practices like the adoration of relics, but, even more centrally to Christian lives, it drastically reimagined the use and benefit of the sacraments. The Lutheran Reformation in particular directly challenged the idea that sacraments worked *ex opere operato*. As Robert Kolb and Charles Arand explain,

> Luther was born in a world that had held on to some elements of ancient German religious practice. This world of medieval presuppositions retained aspects of traditional pagan religious belief that words have magical powers. Many regarded certain words and phrases as magical formulas through which they could manipulate divine power. This point of view survived Christianization and embedded itself even within the practice of the church. Many German peasants, probably Luther's kinfolk among them, regarded the words of the Mass, for instance, as working automatically, mechanically, or magically—*ex opere operato* is the theological term—to dispense God's favor or power on those who attended the most enchanted moment of the medieval week, the recital of the canon of the Mass. Luther rejected elements of medieval piety that employed certain phrases from the Bible or pious usage in such a magical way.[13]

However, these developments also affected social order. The Reformation provoked challenges to the two fundamental institutions of authority in medieval Europe: the Church and the state. It prompted, as philosopher Jeffrey Stout put it, "the flight from authority." The theological challenge mounted by Reformers like Luther undermined the unquestioned authority of the Church. The subsequent religious wars and realignments of the 16th and 17th centuries

[12] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 49. Taylor later pursued this development and its consequences in greater detail in his book Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007).

[13] Robert Kolb and Charles A. Arand, *The Genius of Luther's Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 132.

undermined the corresponding theological basis for civil authority, too. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids the Congress from establishing a religion for the nation, reflects these realignments because it provides for both the individual's free exercise of religion and the ongoing disestablishment of religion from the state. This flight from authority, then, explains well the contours of modern life and thought. Stout explains: "The unifying historical theme is this: that modern thought was born in a crisis of authority, took shape in flight from authority, and aspired from the start to autonomy from all traditional influence whatsoever; that the quest for autonomy was also an attempt to deny the historical reality of having been influenced by tradition; and that this quest therefore had to fail."[14] The conclusion that this quest had to fail runs ahead of the story being told right now, but in fact this dissertation traces out some specific ways in which this failure came about.

Returning to the historical outline, the flight from authority led to the quest for autonomy. In civil politics, the quest for autonomy led to democratic social orders, in which individual persons had the right to participate in governing. Modern history, especially in the 20th century, shows how often this has *not* worked out, but it is clear that democracy in many societies is taken for granted as a legitimate form of government. It has become part of the modern social imaginary, just as the "divine right of kings" has no place in it. In place of the one Holy Church, however, matters of authority are messier. This can be seen by comparing the number of contrasts. In civil politics, there is only one important modern contrast: between democracy and authoritarianism. But in matters traditionally associated with the Church, there are several: religion and philosophy; religion and science; Christianity and the world religions; theism and

[14] Jeffrey Stout, *The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 2–3.

atheism. Part of this is certainly because "religion" has become fully a matter of autonomy. In the case of societies, one cannot privately govern. There must be some institutions that define and sustain societies, even if only provisionally. But an individual can be religious or not religious and can belong to a religious community or not.

What has remained necessary, however, is how to determine what is good, true, and right. When there is no agreement about these things, conflict is always a threat. This is what happened in the religious wars, and their devastations prompted a search for ways that did not depend on the Church or a particular tradition or institution. It prompted, even demanded, a search for "foundations." In other words, there was the demand for "some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge"; and if not, "intellectual and moral chaos" would ensue.[15]

In other words, what arose was "foundationalism." Theologian Rodney Clapp offers a convenient explanation of the usual meaning of foundationalism: "By 'foundationalism' I mean what has been called 'the pervasive Western philosophical doctrine that in a rational noetic structure every non-basic belief must be ultimately accepted on the basis of a cultural and universally compelling beliefs or realities, themselves in need of no support.'"[16] Foundationalism framed decision making and rational judgment as "mathematical." This means that reasoning is calculable, precise in that it could be defined and qualified, and universal in that it was objective and accessed by all. Foundationalism "is characterized by mathematical certainty, individualism and acontextualism: its truths aim to be indubitable and precise, along the lines of the geometric or scientific proof, and they are supposedly available to rationally able, well intended individuals

[15] Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 18.

[16] Rodney Clapp, "How Firm a Foundation: Can Evangelicals Be Nonfoundationalists?" in *The Nature of Confession: Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation*, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 82. Clapp quotes Richard R. Topping, "The Anti-Foundationalist Challenge to Evangelical Apologetics," *Evangelical Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (1991): 45.

quite apart from any particular tradition or social context."[17]

René Descartes is often credited as the pioneer of foundationalism.[18] He changed the philosophical endeavor by insisting that all knowledge rests on the foundation of certainty. "Descartes sought to put philosophy on a new footing, especially by borrowing from mathematics and by building thought from clear and distinct foundations. The modern insistence on certainty takes mathematics to be the pattern of all certainty and a model for all knowledge."[19] Knowledge then claims to be "justified true belief" because one can now appeal to rationality itself "as enshrined in the canons of rationality"[20] itself. Mathematical certainty in rationality itself framed what this dissertation calls "Foundationalist Rationalism."

It is important to recognize that the foundationalism associated with Descartes, including Foundationalist Rationalism, matters not only for the assumptions, positions, and methods it works with, but also because it has become the default position for Western philosophy and theology. For example, Jeffrey Stout does not only refers to Descartes as "the father" of foundationalism, but he sets up foundationalism as the defining motif in modern philosophy: "Either we are foundationalists, and thus stand in the tradition called Cartesian, or else we define ourselves as against all that."[21] Western philosophy, which has also often been aligned with theology since Descartes, has not necessarily been foundationalist. But foundationalism, including Foundationalist Rationalism, became the pervasive context of Western thinking,

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[17] Clapp, "How Firm a Foundation," 83.

[18] See Clapp, "How Firm a Foundation," 83. "Foundationalism is that theory of knowledge usually chased back to Descartes." See also Part 1 of Stout, *Flight from Authority*, which is devoted to explaining foundationalism and its impact on philosophy and theology. In a similar vein, see Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science*, 8–20.

[19] Diogenes Allen and Eric O. Springsted, *Philosophy for Understanding Theology*, 2nd ed. (Louisville: John Knox, 2007), 210.

[20] Allen and Springsted, *Philosophy for Understanding Theology,* 210.

[21]Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 25.

including theology, since Descartes. In other words, foundationalism generally has "set the agenda." Another way of saying this is that foundationalism became part of what Charles Taylor calls the "immanent frame." The immanent frame is a specific modern social imaginary. The concept of the "immanent frame" reflects the idea that now, socially, we imagine that there is "a 'natural' order, to be contrasted to a 'supernatural' one, an 'immanent' world, over against a possible 'transcendent' one."[22] Believers in the transcendent will then argue for a transcendent world, but because the immanent frame sets the agenda to focus on the natural world and becomes the default position, since everything else then is "supernatural."

Taylor describes this frame as something that is "not usually, or even mainly a set of *beliefs* which we entertain about our predicament, however it may have started out; rather it is the sensed context in which we develop our beliefs."[23] Foundationalism is part of this sensed context in our time. It has "sunk to the level of such an unchallenged framework, something we have trouble often thinking ourselves outside of, even as an imaginative exercise."[24] Wittgenstein called this a "picture, a background to our thinking, within whose terms it is carried on, but which is often largely unformulated, and to which we can frequently, just for this reason, imagine no alternative."[25] A third way of making the point about foundationalism setting the agenda is to say that foundationalism has become part of the social imaginary.

Perhaps the clearest sign that something is part of a social imaginary is when it is threatened. For example, skeptics and atheists took for granted that religion was on its way to extinction until the late 20th century, when religious traditionalists and fundamentalists reasserted

[22] Taylor, *Secular Age*, 542.

[23] Taylor, *Secular Age*, 549.

[24] Taylor, *Secular Age*, 549.

[25] Taylor, *Secular Age*, 549.

their political and cultural power. Then arose the so-called "new atheists," like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett. Liberal democratic orders seemed to be taking hold in Europe and the Americas until recently. Now one sees books like Mark Lilla's *The Shipwrecked Mind*, which argues that the American political mind, having once embraced the revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment, now has become reactionary against them.[26] His book, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West*, also documents the place that religious passions play in the politics today amid the failed realization of the secular future the Enlightenment envisioned.[27] To establish this, he explores the role religion played in the philosophy and political underpinnings of the Enlightenment up to World War II.

Despite these academic and cultural challenges to Enlightenment rationality, many still uphold it. For example, linguist and psychologist Steven Pinker is committed to telling the story of its success and ensuring its ideals are advanced far and wide.

> The Enlightenment has worked—perhaps the greatest story seldom told. And because this triumph is so unsung, the underlying ideals of reason, science, and humanism are unappreciated as well. Far from being an insipid consensus, these ideals are treated by today's intellectuals with indifference, skepticism, and sometimes contempt. When properly appreciated, I will suggest, the ideals of the Enlightenment are in fact stirring, inspiring, noble—a reason to live.[28]

Pinker believes that the Enlightenment gives people a reason to be live, because Enlightenment rationality is the only frame from which one can conceive of ourselves and the world we live in. Enlightenment rationality is what you need in order to understand science, morality, politics, and progress. Everything gained in Modernism is at stake with Enlightenment rationality. Because,

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[26] Mark Lilla, *The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction* (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).

[27] Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

[28] Steven Pinker, *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress* (New York: Penguin, 2018), 6.

ultimately, if Enlightenment rationality fails everything gained is lost and people are back to the dark ages.

Enlightenment reason must have the ultimate priority. Pinker writes:

> Foremost is reason. Reason is nonnegotiable. As soon as you show up to discuss the question of what we should live for (or any other question), as long as you insist that your answers, whatever they are, are reasonable or justified or true and that therefore other people ought to believe them too, then you have committed yourself to reason, and to holding your beliefs accountable to objective standards. If there's anything the Enlightenment thinkers had in common, it was an insistence that we energetically apply the standard of reason to understanding our world, and not fall back on generators of delusion like faith, dogma, revelation, authority, charisma, mysticism, divination, visions, gut feelings, or the hermeneutic parsing of sacred texts.[29]

For Pinker, the world stands or falls on the foundation of Enlightenment reason, and so he is working to restore, maintain, and advance these Enlightenment ideals which are threatened by recent developments in sociology, psychology, etc.[30] And he is right; they are being threatened.

It is important to distinguish foundationalism as a position and foundationalism as setting the context, because not everyone accepted foundationalism as such. But many thought about themselves and their lives in foundationalist terms. This fact is reflected in the common dualities in Western society's paradigms of rational and romantic, faith and reason, the classifications of objective and subjective, objectivism and relativism, and religious and secular.[31] It is demonstrated in Church history, for example, in the theological positions of Lutheran Orthodoxy versus Lutheran Pietism.

An illustration of the dualities that result from Foundationalist Rationalism is found in Pascal's Wager. Blaise Pascal, a mathematician and major figure of the Enlightenment, believed

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[29] Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*, 8.

[30] Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*, 8–9. It might be concluded that Pinker and others suffer from Cartesian Anxiety, which we will be explored in Chapter One.

[31] Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, 11.

that he lived within two domains: The domain of mathematics and theoretical physics and the domain of faith and human destiny. He argued that humans should not and could not determine religious arguments through observation. Such attempts were illegitimate and vain. Faith was real and living but was not acquired by or demonstrable in the natural world. Faith does not consist of intellectual assent through observation. Rather faith is love and trust in God. Because reason cannot determine the existence of God or answer questions of faith, nor calculate the losses or gains of faith, people should wager their lives as though God exists. Why not? He argued that if God exists, then they will have a life of eternal happiness. It is a "win-win." Since there is nothing to lose, people should bet their life on God's existence. Pascal set up a duality between science and faith. Science in the natural world is observable and demonstrable; it is the stuff of facts and reason. Faith is gift of God, which cannot be proven, but only believed.[32]

Pascal presents a dualism that results from Foundationalist Rationalism: Science and faith, reason and faith, or objectivism and subjectivism. On the one hand are the observations of natural life, which are questioned, evaluated, tested, and proven. On the other hand are the things of God, which can only be known by faith. Descartes and Pascal, while different in their approaches, set the foundation of this bifurcation. It was so widely assumed that for a long time it was rarely questioned or even noticed. Foundationalist Rationalism became the default position of rationality both for philosophy and, as I will explore in detail later in the dissertation, for theology. It became part of the modern social imaginary.

But by the mid-twentieth century, Christian theologians began to question Foundationalist Rationalism regularly. A well-known example is George Lindbeck. By questioning

[32] Leszek Kolakowski, *Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing*, trans. Agienszka Kolakowska (New York: Allen Lane, 2007), 132.

Foundationalist Rationalism, he can be labeled a *post- or anti-foundationalist*.[33] His theological method is articulated in his book *The Nature of Doctrine*, where he outlined three models of understanding church doctrine. According to the prevailing foundationalism, either doctrine is a binding objective propositional truth claim or doctrine is an expression of generally shared subjective experiences. His rule theory of doctrine transcended the distinctions required by Foundationalist Rationalism. To support his theory of doctrine, Lindbeck also proposed a model of religion that transcended the conceptions of religion required by Foundationalist Rationalism. He proposed a "cultural-linguistic model" of religion. He compared his cognitive-linguistic model to a "cognitive-propositionalist" model, which regarded religions in terms of the objective truth claims and stressed them as cognitive ventures, and also to an "experiential-expressivist" model, which regarded religions in terms of inner subjective experience and stressed them as affective ventures. Lindbeck accomplished this by appropriating the outlook of several non-theological disciplines, including the later Wittgenstein on "forms of life" and "language games"; the sociology of knowledge, which stressed how knowledge is socially constructed; and cultural anthropology.[34] From these poles, Lindbeck proposed how religion is better understood like a language or a culture that enables certain propositional questions and certain inner experiences. Among other things, the cultural-linguistic model constrains the limits of rationality to the larger cultural-linguistic framework of a community.[35]

In this dissertation, I will argue that theological rationality exists within the context of

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[33] George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Christian Doctrine: Religion and Theology for a Postliberal Age.* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), 130–32. Lindbeck identified his larger "postliberal" project with "antifoundationalism." Of interest for this project, he argued, "Antifoundationalism, however, is not to be equated with irrationalism. The issue is not whether there are universal norms of reasonableness, but whether these can be formulated in some neutral, framework-independent language" (130).

[34] Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 6.

[35] Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 18–27.

God's creation: from the Father Creator who lives in relationship of trust with His children through the work of the Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. Reason is formed in the Creator's children by means of His Word and normed by the Creeds and Confessions of the Church or the Regula Fidei. Philosophy and the cognitive sciences will also be examined to provide a more complete picture of how rationality works sociologically, psychologically, and through embodied language in the human creature. From this research the dissertation will appropriate how Christian practice is aided and enriched by understanding reason this way. But first we should consider more closely what Foundationalist Rationalism seeks to do, and why.

A Cognitive Approach

A dissertation on rationality in Western philosophy of mind since Descartes and its implications for post-Foundationalist theology and practice could have been written. So also, a dissertation on the implications of the linguistic turn, starting with Hamann, running through Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Austin, Searle, Rorty et al, also could have been written. There is a dissertation based on the development of hermeneutics (a parallel to Richard Bernstein comes to mind, on virtue ethics (MacIntyre), on perspectives (Kuhn et al), or on developments in logic since Frege.

It is precisely this range of possibilities—and the possibilities just indicated only cover those discussed in philosophy, not other disciplines like psychology—that suggests this particular study. Reason and rationality come up so often and so diversely nowadays. What might Christian theologians make of this?

This dissertation is an answer to this question. Clearly thinkers in a variety of disciplines find something amiss in what is assumed to be the "standard" or "received" or "assumed" understanding of reason and rationality. Theologians have tended to think so. This explains the

development of theological prolegomena and biblical hermeneutics, and the interest in rational apologetics. But once one reads more broadly in intellectual disciplines, one finds other forms of dissatisfaction and a variety of proposals for improvement.

This dissertation began with the intuition that this variety could yield a number of insights for Christian theology and practice. And the final written version is a survey of some of these insights. An objection to this type of dissertation could be that it is highly selective. It is, but rationality is both so fundamental and so widely discussed that I had to be drastically selective.

One way that this dissertation tried to maintain an appropriate degree of coverage has been in the structure of the dissertation. It seeks to be "post-Foundationalist," meaning that it begins with an account of the "standard" understanding of reason and rationality associated with the Enlightenment. From this understanding, it becomes clear that the Enlightenment rationality, what you have called "Foundationalist Rationalism," has a definite stance of reasoning and an ideal for reasons, but also an ideal for the reasoner. This gives rise to the basic division in the dissertation.

Another way this dissertation has tried to maintain an appropriate degree of coverage is with the chapters on the reasoner. Reason has been defined in the common way of being means to an end, and rationality is then the account of having and pursuing appropriate means to ends. Foundationalist Rationalism assumes that the ideal reasoner is free from constraints of context, biases, emotions, community, etc. Its ideal resembles a "thinking machine," and its ideal for the mind is the computer. But how thinking about human beings as "rational" has taken several directions, and this dissertation is careful to observe different directions.

One direction has given attention to ends, not to means. To be sure, reason is not *about* ends but about means. But, to turn an old saying around, "the ends justify the means."

That is, without ends, there are no means, and in fact no way of conceiving of means. But what about ends? They will affect rationality. This is, to be sure, an ancient conviction, but it has been revived recently by Christian theologian and philosopher James K. A. Smith.

Another direction has given attention to the fact that our minds work with emotions and biases. Emotions and biases can interfere with reasoning, but more generally contemporary cognitive psychology argues how they are indispensable.

A third direction has given attention to how our reasoning is often guided by metaphors. Metaphors are often used to make our thinking clearer or to make our thinking stand out in particular way. But contemporary psychology points out how metaphors also make possible how we actually think. In other words, metaphors are not only what we think about, they are also what we think with.

A Way Forward

The brief discussion of Lindbeck reflects only one example of Christian theology that questions Foundationalist Rationalism in a thoroughgoing manner and that offers a different conception of theology that is post-foundationalist. There have been others, some very prominent Anglo-American theologians, including Stanley Hauerwas, Lesslie Newbigin, and David Bosch. All of them rely on developments from non-theological disciplines. Hauerwas, for example, relies heavily on philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre[36], Newbigin on philosopher Michael Polanyi,[37] Bosch on Thomas Kuhn.[38]

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[36] Stanley Hauerwas, *Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Philosophy and Theology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 14.

[37] Lesslie Newbigin, *The Gospel in Pluralist Society* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 14–38.

[38] David Bosch: *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991). It's in the subtitle: Paradigm shifts from Thomas Kuhn. "With the aid of the idea of paradigm shifts I

This dissertation is like these and other attempts to appropriate insights from non-theological disciplines for more faithful theology and practice. What distinguishes this dissertation is primarily that it surveys and tries to make sense of a variety of developments about rationality that have appeared in the last fifty years. Instead of focusing on a particular problem or issue, like doctrine in the case of Lindbeck or the history of Christian mission like Bosch, I have surveyed what is being said about reason and rationality from a variety of standpoints and interests and tried to reflect on Christian theology and practice in view of them. This is because the prevailing understanding of reason in modern Western churches and among modern Western theologians has been largely informed by what I have called "Foundationalist Rationalism." This rationality is assumed, and so its influence is varied. Accordingly, it makes sense to try to deal with it through a varied approach, and contemporary developments into the nature of reason make a varied approach possible.

Therefore, it makes sense to think of this dissertation as a "second-generation" project. A first generation has recognized and appreciated the limits and challenges of Foundationalist Rationalism, and genuine insights and developments have come from them. More is sure to come. But I want to argue that there is also value in taking stock of these developments, try to make sense of them in a more inclusive way. This dissertation is my argument.

First, the dissertation will put the concept of rationality into its usual modern setting and then observe how this concept has been questioned and superseded. After this comes the main contribution: A critical survey and appropriation of different contemporary conceptions of rationality from philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Why? Foundationalist Rationalism has

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am attempting to demonstrate the extent to which the understanding and practice of mission have changed during almost twenty centuries of Christian missionary history" (xv).

been the default position, and I want to show how theology might think about rationality in ways that go beyond it.

The main contribution of the dissertation will look like this: It thinks about Foundationalist Rationalism as having a basic aim, namely, to offer reasons that should be convincing to everyone. "Reason," as I have pointed out already, is a means to an end. The end that is basic to Foundationalist Rationalism, and that the dissertation will question and challenge, is that the reasons offered should be appropriate to all people. This aim means that Foundationalist Rationalism contends that reason should not depend on context but rather have universal purchase. In other words, Foundationalist Rationalism regards reason ideally as acontextual and universal. Because of this aim, it makes a basic assumption about being rational persons: They are free of biases and influences. Ideally, they are, to use a common expression, "thinking machines."

Accordingly, the dissertation will procced in two parts along these two lines, namely, the ideal for reasons and the assumption about reasoners. The first part will be taken up by Chapters One and Two. Chapter One begins by explaining the acontextualism and universalism of Foundationalist Rationalism. The ideal of reasoning for the Enlightenment has been mathematics, especially geometry with its axiomatic method. This method proceeds from a small set of foundational axioms or principles, and then deductively proves the rest. It requires no authorities to ratify or approve its findings or procedures, and its conclusions cannot be denied without raising the suspicion of denying them being either stupid or evil, *as long as the axioms are unassailable*. The main search, then, had been for such axioms, or "foundations." Ideally, foundations would not depend on any *context,* that is, a tradition or institution or superstition, and if so, all the conclusions would hold universally. Hence the acontextualism and universalism

of Foundationalist Rationalism. A key figure in this will be René Descartes. Then the chapter will illustrate how this kind of rationality has been widely accepted in Christian theology as necessary for theological method, especially with the treatment of the Scriptures.

Acontextualism and universalism had their critics and opponents since the 18th century, but they became influential only in the 20th century. Chapter One will proceed by identifying some of them and how they have informed Christian theology. The most important critical arguments have shown that "acontextualism" is impossible because context is necessary *for* reasoning in the first place. Christian theological movements like postliberal theology and post-Constantinian theology have adopted these arguments. The chapter will conclude by examining some important instances, and then it will argue for Christians more widely to adopt this outlook.

Chapter One will show why it makes sense for Christians to understand reason as always dependent on a tradition and on a community. But Christians will want more from an account of reason and reasoning. They will want to know how there is a distinctive Christian rationality, a specific and faithful way for Christian reasoning. Chapter Two will take up this desire by observing how Christians since ancient times have identified certain standards or canons to govern their reasoning. The first significant instance was Irenaeus in opposing the Valentinians, where he argued how orthodox preaching and teaching of the gospel followed or reflected a widely held Rule of Faith, and how they were already recognized in specific written instances of the gospel. The Christian Church adopted this approach and developed it with formal creeds and with the New Testament canon. In the language of this dissertation, the creeds and the New Testament canon functioned to illustrate and promote a specifically Christian rationality in faith and life. The chapter will then show how the Lutheran tradition refined this approach in its own confessions of faith and also with some of its distinctive theological distinctions.

Chapters Three through Six will turn from the question of how reasoning should be understood and guided to the question of what it means to be a rational being. In other words, they take up the subject of rationality as theological anthropology.

Chapter Three serves as a bridge between the first two chapters and the remaining chapters. It will explain and illustrate the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. In other words, it will explain and illustrate the account of human persons as rational beings that Foundationalist Rationalism assumes. Here René Descartes will also be the key figure, because he explicitly argued for the anthropology that must accompany his highly influential rationalism. Descartes argued that reason is a function of the mind alone, and that the mind was essential to the human person. This rendered a model of the human person as a "thinking thing" or a "thinking machine." The recent advance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) makes the "thinking machine" a reality, at least in some respects. This technology raises once more the question of what it means to be human, including the idea of the human person as a rational being. In other words, the question about whether the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism is adequate or even realistic is not only theoretically but practically important, and if not, then what are better alternative models?

Chapters Four through Six survey different ways that show how the "thinking machine" model assumed by Foundationalist Rationalism is inadequate, and which point to a fuller, more realistic model of human creatures. Chapter Four does this by considering the anthropology proposed by Christian philosopher James K. A. Smith in his "cultural liturgies" project. Chapter Five does this by considering "dual cognition" models of the human mind proposed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their work on human judgment and decision making, and also by psychologist Jonathan Haidt in his work on moral psychology.

Chapter Six does this by considering the idea of "conceptual metaphors," that is, the kinds of metaphors that govern our understanding and reasoning. In each chapter, I will summarize especially the anthropological model each of these figures offers and their arguments for proposing them, then offer an assessment about how they are consistent with Christian theology, especially the rationality in the Christian canons as articulated in Chapter Two, and finally offer illustrations for how these models might benefit Christian practices.

CHAPTER ONE

REASON IN AN ENLIGHTENMENT CONTEXT

Introduction

This chapter will tell part of the story of the Enlightenment's Foundationalist Rationalism beginning with Descartes and later Kant. It will examine how it became to be part of the social imaginary and the default position of philosophy in the West. Foundationalist Rationalism has its own story that must be told to establish how it has had so much influence on Western culture. This chapter will examine its defining principle that reason is acontextual and universal. Unintentional critiques happened through this history, especially in the 20th century, and they will be explored as they demonstrate the cracks that inevitably developed in Foundationalist Rationalism.

This chapter will also explore how Foundationalist Rationalism impacted the Christian Church and how the Church tried to work within the frame Foundationalist Rationalism created. Unfortunately, this produced in fears and distortions. Some Christians tried to bridge the principle of acontextual/universal reason with Christianity, and their evaluations will be heard. Others like James McClendon and James Smith, and Alasdair MacIntyre proposed a different understanding of rationality to supplant Foundationalist Rationalism.

In the end, this chapter will show that Foundationalist Rationalism, contrary to its own belief, is a historical, contextual tradition. Moreover, it will show that Foundationalist Rationalism could never achieve its aim and is therefore false because it cannot free itself from its history and context. Lastly, it will argue that Christians need to return to their historic, contextual tradition and work within the frame of rationality it provides.

The conviction that reason could be free from tradition, context, and history is found in

Immanuel Kant's famous essay, *What Is the Enlightenment?* Kant argued that human beings possessed already what they needed to free themselves from "immaturity." He argued:

> Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! "Have courage to use your own understanding!"—that is the motto of enlightenment.[1]

History and context hindered Kant's self-centered pursuit because it forced him to work within the frame others created. By tying him to a particular people and past, he was not free to make conclusions on his own. Tradition and religion did something similar because it meant that people were under the authority of God or the Church, which limited a self-pursuit of knowledge that transcended their conception of God and religion. God and religion suppressed man in his immaturity. Humans must free themselves from these chains in order to be rationally enlightened and truly free. Pursuing this type of freedom also meant that one could not be part of a community (like a citizen), which hindered this endeavor, but it must be done privately, or at least among those with the same clear pursuit of freedom, if it was ever to achieve its goal of transcendence.

This rationality was possible if people simply could "think for themselves" by freeing oneself to transcend to Kant's categorical imperative. His categorical imperative is a set moral laws all people must follow regardless of desires or circumstances; it is a set of unconditional laws. It was the equivalent of doing your moral duty. What constitutes moral judgment, then, is acontextual, universal reason itself, through which freedom from religion, tradition, history, and contexts.[2]

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. and ed. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 41.

[2] Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein* (London:

Kant's rationality was born out the Enlightenment tradition, which was birthed following years of theological civil war where men fought and died for their particular view of faith or tradition: Protestant (of varying confessions) and Roman Catholic. It led to years of famine, plagues, and overwhelming and destructive moral chaos. What emerged in the Enlightenment was Cartesian search for certainty, a fixed point in which of all of life knowledge could rest.

> I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or if nothing else, until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain. Archimedes sought but one form and immovable point in order to move the entire earth from one place to another. Just so, great things are also to be hoped for if I succeed in finding one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshaken.[3]

This point of certainty, his Archimedean point, was not found the traditional authorities of the past: the Church, the Bible, the King. It could not be found in religious wars over doctrines, and not even in the skepticism that dominates every age. No, the Cartesian search for certainty needed an accessible, although hard to find, foundation.

The only foundation that could be found was what could be known through the pursuit of reason, particularly, reason produced by means of knowledge, epistemology, and science. What could be known brought the possibility of certainty, and what could be certain had to be justified. Descartes found this point of certainty in himself.

> What then will be true? Perhaps just the single fact that nothing is certain. But how do I know there is not something else, over and above all those things that I have just reviewed, concerning which there is not even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not some God, or by whatever name I might call him, who instills these very thoughts in me? But why would I think that, since I myself could perhaps be the author of these thoughts? Am I not then at least something? But I have already denied that I have any senses and any body. Still I hesitate; for what follows from this? Am I so tied to a body and to the senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have persuaded myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world: no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Is it then the case that I too do not exist? But doubtless I did exist,

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Routledge, 2002), 153–60.

[3] Rene Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 13.

> if I persuaded myself of something. But there is some deceiver or other who is supremely powerful and supremely sly and who is always deliberately deceiving me. Then too there is no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me. And let him do his best at deception, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall think that I am something. Thus, after everything has been most carefully weighed, it must finally be established that this pronouncement "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind.[4]

Descartes reduces the pursuit of the Archimedean point to himself, that is, his cogito, what he can conceive in his mind. It is in this pursuit, having to leave all traditions and traditional sources of authority that Descartes now has to justify himself.

Jeffrey Stout called this pursuit of justification the "Flight from Authority." He writes:

> Just as Luther sought the sort of justification that would be a match for the radical sinfulness he discovered in his own will and heart, traditional epistemology has sought the sort of justification that would be a match to the radical skepticism implicit in its own Socratic questions and Cartesian doubts.[5]

These questions and doubts needed answers that could be true in every context. Such an endeavor freed from history, tradition, and religion required a particular foundation, a unique justification. In other words, in order to justify a set of beliefs a foundation is required that could be immediately justified, rather than an endless rabbit hole of beliefs. Foundations require a stopping point. "A justification of accepted belief in the face of radically skeptical challenge reconstructs the edifice of human knowledge on a foundation of certainty."[6] These foundations needed to be infallible, indubitable, and self-justifying. They had to be "logically independent from every possible cognition."[7] Otherwise, they could no address radical skepticism. These foundations also required "a way of building upon a foundation of such cognitions must be

[4] Descartes, *Meditations*, 13.

[5] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 26.

[6] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 27.

[7] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 27.

fashioned such that even the higher levels of resulting be immune from skeptical assault."[8] The only thing foundation strong enough for a Cartesian to build upon were: "beliefs about the contents of their own minds, beliefs involving some kind of 'privileged access.'"[9] And the cornerstone of that foundation was the mind of the individual, the *cogito*, the center for all human justification and authority. Because the *cogito,* freed oneself from all traditions and community and allows one to discover truth in the privacy of subjective illumination. According to Descartes, the *cogito* is everything because there is no other truth than the self. It is the ultimate freedom.

> Where Descartes' project takes him from here is familiar territory to any modern philosopher: the *cogito*, the various arguments for God's existence, talk about mental eyes, what Quine has called the 'idea' of the idea. For Descartes, as for Luther before him, what most matters in life is no longer played out in the dimensions of community and tradition. One discovers truth in the privacy of subjective illumination, and this truth is underlined by a kind of self-certifying certainty. Community, tradition, authority: these have all started to give way to the individual, his inwardness, his autonomy.[10]

The challenge that Descartes himself wrestled with and sought to justify is a problem that philosophy and theology in the modern West has inherited. It is the need to discover a secure foundation upon which we can securely ground our lives. This problem is felt need to be free from all external authorities, while at the same time to justify oneself in a foundation of certain.

However, Stout astutely pointed out that it is inadequate to think that Descartes' problem was simply "the problem of knowledge." He did not deny that there is such a problem, but that this oversimplifies what Descartes himself wrestled with.[11] Descartes had inherited two basic ways of knowing from Scholasticism: *scientia* ("knowledge" or "science") and *opinion*

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[8] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 27.

[9] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 34.

[10] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 49–50.

[11] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 37.

("opinion"). *Scientia* refers to what can be demonstrated; *opinio* denotes what is not demonstrated. "Demonstration is that mode of reasoning which displays necessary connections between a proposition and its principles, as when a geometric proposition is deduced from or reduced to the first principles of geometrical science."[12] So, *scientia* or science would be "matters susceptible to rigidly scientific demonstration in the fashion of the deductive proof."[13] *Opinio* would be opinions judged to be *probable*. "Probable," in this case, being before the modern concept of mathematical probability, is "a kind of proof that rests on what the authorities approve. Such matters differ completely from science."[14] By the time of Descartes, Stout suggests, he was dealing with the disintegration of both categories of knowledge: "Descartes' problem was how to engage in responsible thought and effective persuasion when central categories were in such severe disrepair."[15]

How did this happen? *Scientia* fell into trouble through the Ockhamists, the Reformation, and the advent of modern skepticism. Ockhamists "narrow[ed] the scope of *scientia* to the point of triviality" by teaching that "God might be intervening at any point, creating the exceptional case or tinkering with the natural order of things."[16] Such thinking limited even the possibility of *scientia*. So did the stress on human fallenness promoted by the Reformers and later by the Jansenists. The discovery of ancient skepticism promoted modern and more radical forms of skepticism that "fostered the notion that *scientia* is, quite simply, impossible."[17] *Opinio* fell into trouble first by Reformation attacks on many authorities and its promotion of *sola scriptura*, and

[12] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 38.

[13] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 39.

[14] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 39.

[15] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 40.

[16] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 40.

[17] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 40.

later by Counter-Reformation attacks on *sola scriptura*.[18]

Descartes sought to navigate a way forward through this crisis. He gave up entirely on *opinio,* because it relied on authority and authority was unreliable. Stout explains: "The problem of many authorities reveals the unreliability of authority *per se*. Even if all the authorities agreed on some point, Descartes concludes, 'what they teach us would not suffice for us.'"[19] Instead, he turned to *scientia*. Descartes' pursuit of what could be demonstrated by means of *scientia* resulted, in *scientia* becoming its own source of authority. It became, in actuality, its own tradition.[20]

Science As A Tradition

Descartes' desire for a certain, demonstrable foundation led to the *scientia* becoming the resolution to skepticism and the void left by abandoning traditional authorities in favor of what could be knowable. Foundations of certainty in the things knowable required a transcendence of self toward things that could be knowable and demonstrable to everyone (universalism) and regardless of context or tradition (acontextualism).

The clearest instance of *scientia* as pursued by Descartes is modern natural science, or, for convenience, "science." Science birthed in the Enlightenment is generally viewed as objective and factual; it is *scientia*. Christianity or religion is merely subjective and experiential; it is an *opinio*. Science claims this by asserting the universality of reason necessitates that it be

[18] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 41–46.

[19] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 49, quoting Descartes from the *Meditations* in René Descartes, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Mineola: Dover, 1955), 6.

[20] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 68. "Descartes can now be located squarely within the Platonic-Augustinian tradition. Indeed, it was this tradition which supplied most of the concepts and images he used in his attempt to transcend all tradition. Once this unacknowledged debt is recognized it should no longer be surprising that the attempt did not succeed" 68–69).

understood and applied in the same way in all circumstances at all times.

However, from a historical standpoint and from the historical narrative of natural sciences, what counts as knowledge changes radically from time to time and are not universally agreed upon. Thomas Kuhn, a historian and philosopher of science, provides a compelling argument that science is in fact derived from a tradition like that of any other tradition, including Christianity. He does this showing that science actually operates through its own unique history of traditions and paradigms, or models for pursuing scientific knowledge, and paradigm shifts:

> Undoubtedly the research work that any given paradigm permits results in lasting contributions to the body of scientific knowledge and technique, but paradigms themselves are very often swept aside and replaced by others that are quite incompatible with them. We can have no recourse to notions like the "truth" or "validity" of paradigms in our attempt to understand the special efficacy of the research which their reception permits.
>
> On the contrary, the historian can often recognize that in declaring an older paradigm out of date or in rejecting the approach of some one of the pre-paradigm schools a scientific community has rejected the embryo of an important scientific perception to which it would later be forced to return. But it is very far from clear that the profession delayed scientific development by doing so…
>
> My point will become clearer if I now ask what it is that the existence of a paradigm leaves for the scientific community to do. The answer—as obvious as the related existence of resistance to innovation and as often brushed under the carpet—is that scientists, given a paradigm, strive with all their might and skill to bring it into closer and closer agreement with nature. Much of their effort, particularly in the early stages of a paradigm's development, is directed to articulating the paradigm, rendering it more precise in areas where the original formulation has inevitably been vague…[21]

Kuhn argues that the paradigms which result in a change in scientific dogmas over time. The rationality employed in a particular paradigm is unique to its history, time, place, context, and it also changes based on new research, technological advancement, and scientific philosophy.

[21] Thomas S. Kuhn, "Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in *Scientific Change*, ed. A. C. Crombie (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 358–60. For his full account of paradigms, paradigm shifts, and growth of scientific knowledge, see especially Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

These dogmatic paradigms are also unique to the scientist or scientific tradition from which they come. Therefore, science is a tradition like that of any other tradition.

Alasdair MacIntyre writes that science itself often recasts the narratives of its own history to reconstruct its tradition. He writes, "a tradition then not only embodies the narrative of an argument, but only to recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other argumentative retellings."[22] He concludes the rationality of science, both natural and social science, breaks down. "Scientific reason turns out to be subordinate to, and intelligible only in terms of, historical reason."[23] History or context, then, is also tied to the rational narrative that science presents. "When the connection between narrative and tradition on the one hand, and the theory and method on the other, is lost sight of, the philosophy of science is a set of insoluble problems. Any set of finite observations is compatible with any one out of an infinite set of generalization."[24] In other words, science must use a rationality that is tied to history or context as its paradigms continually shift.

Joel Okamoto exposes the parameters of the scientific tradition. "Science limits itself to what can be observed or inferred from what can be observed… [and] offers what purports to be the possible explanation—right now."[25] New discoveries can change what was once considered known and true within its tradition. The history of science, its narrative, and continue pursuit of invention demonstrate that science uses ever-changing paradigms of rationality and that, despite the claims of Foundationalist Rationalism that reason is acontextual and universal, there is no

[22] Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science," *The Monist*, 60, no. 4 (October 1977): 461.

[23] MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crisis," 464.

[24] MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crisis," 471.

[25] Joel P. Okamoto, "Modern Science, Contemporary Culture, and Christian Theology," *Concordia Journal* 43, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 55.

such thing. Foundationalist Rationalism fails to meet its own acontextual and universal standards. Even science is its own rational tradition that is subject to its own history and context.

This refutes every assertion of Foundationalist Rationalism that reason is acontextual and universal. What does this mean for Christianity? Which tradition of rationality can we trust? It is important for Christians to understand that Foundationalist Rationalism is disproven in order to regain for them to focus on the rationality of their own historic, contextual Christian tradition and within that tradition to maintain a theological method which corresponds to the rationality their tradition embodies.

First Things: Theological Prolegomena

The Enlightenment's flight from authorities like tradition and religion embraced a different tradition in *scientia*. This tradition required what was rational was what could be demonstrated or proven. Everything else was a matter of *opinio* or opinion. It also had consequences for theology. In fact, the Christian tradition now had to participate at least to some extent within the frame of Foundationalist Rationalism. Evidence of this is found in the advent of "prolegomena" in the 17th century.

Prolegomena deals with the first things in dogmatics such as the nature of theology and the revelation of scripture. But why are prolegomena necessary? Robert Preus in his *Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism* traces the advent of prolegomena in dogmatic texts after the Reformation:

> In the first flush of theological literature by Lutherans after the Reformation there were no formal prolegomena to dogmatic works, and prolegomenous matter can be culled only from the practice of these presuppositions and principles in the body of

> the dogmatic writings. By the close of the 17th century very large books were written that pertained solely to the introduction to theology.[26]

Historically, prolegomena are a post-Reformation, modern phenomenon. For example, Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*,[27] widely recognized as the first Lutheran dogmatics textbook, does not deal with prolegomena. Its first edition, the one that Luther praised so lavishly in his *Bondage of the Will* does not begin with prolegomena but with free will.[28] There was no need to defend theology itself.

However, after the Enlightenment, many theologians had to use reason to teach about itself. In fact, theology is defined by the means or method to reach its ends. David Lumpp explains:

> A prolegomenon to theology in general or to specifically systematic theology typically begins with a definition of theology itself, one that goes beyond the self-evident 'reasoned articulation about God.' The definition, in turn, signals one's priorities and indicates how other aspects of the prolegomenon (among them what one identifies as theology's purpose and agenda, its integrating theme or core doctrinal assertion, the source[s] of its authority or the 'criteria' of theology, and sometimes a resulting theological method) will be unfolded.[29]

Prolegomenon, as Lumpp articulates, provide, as the name states, the first place in theological textbooks because it serves as the means to teach what theology is and is not.

Prolegomena arose to deal with questions and challenges from the Enlightenment concerning the nature of theology. These questions and challenges, furthermore, struck at the validity of the entire theological endeavor, because they went to the nature and character of the

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[26] Robert D. Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism: A Study Theological Prolegomena* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1970), 75.

[27] Philip Melanchthon, *Commonplaces: Loci Communes 1521*, trans. Christian Preus (St. Louis: Concordia, 2014).

[28] Martin Luther, "The Bondage of the Will," [1525], in *Career of the Reformer III*, ed. Philip S. Watson, vol. 33, *Luther's Works* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1955–1976), 16.

[29] David A. Lumpp, *First Things First: A Primer in Lutheran Theological Prolegomena* (St. Louis: Concordia Seminary Press, 2012), 21.

revelation of Holy Scripture.[30] The necessity of prolegomena on this topic illustrates that the most important topic for Protestant theology has been revelation, because ultimately the question has been about whether and how God can be known. The importance of this question is obvious: If God cannot be known, then theology as thinking and talking about God is meaningless. Put in the language of reason and rationality, the Enlightenment challenged theology as the means to the end of knowing and following God.

Naturally we should recognize that the way prolegomena developed was in response to the Enlightenment's questions about knowing and our knowledge. But since the interest of this dissertation is in the influence of the Enlightenment conception of reason, it will not consider the question of revelation, which is the usual occupation of prolegomena. Nor will it consider whether the "conservative" stress on Scripture as objective divine revelation or the "liberal" stress on inner experience as subjective divine revelation. Instead, the prevalence of prolegomena shows how Christian theologians accepted the Enlightenment's conception of rationality, what this dissertation calls Foundationalist Rationalism, without serious challenge, and how it has affected the general aim and procedure of the theological project, whether explicitly and formally in dogmatics or implicitly and informally in much of Christian practice.

We see this influence clearly in the general aim for theological beliefs and values to be accepted for reasons that do not depend on context, for theological beliefs and values to be universally valid. These aims, which this dissertation calls "acontextualism" and "universalism," derive clearly from the Enlightenment project, not from the Christian tradition. In fact, it has been doubts and fears about "tradition" as a set of beliefs, values, and practices particular to a community that have been taken to be suspect, at least for the general public.

[30] Francis Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1950), 1:3–186.

In saying this, it is important to acknowledge that Foundationalist Rationalism has never been universally accepted in the West. However, it has been the *default position* in conceiving rationality. This means that other views and proposals for how to make decisions or judgments have usually cast themselves *against* or *beyond* Foundationalist Rationalism in the theological method. The default position of Foundationalist Rationalism is illustrated in common distinctions like "objective and subjective" and "fact and opinion." But since Foundationalist Rationalism is the default position, it is generally assumed without question. This means that it usually *sets* the theological agenda rather serves as an item on the agenda to be discussed. This set theological agenda is often illustrated in how Christians frame their theological method, which since the Enlightenment has begun with prolegomena.

Foundationalist Rationalism's Acontextual/Universal Reason and the Cartesian Anxiety

Foundationalist Rationalism maintains that humanity ought to live by reasons that apply and hold regardless of person, place, language, or historical context, in other words, that are "acontextual." The way Foundationalist Rationalism typically tries to show this is by demonstrating that claims are *universally valid* for all people, places, and situations. This is its "universalism."

Why does the conviction that reasons should be acontextual and universal seem so compelling? It is because only such reasons overcome the obstacles raised by bias, prejudice, tradition, and superstition. This feature goes by various names. Perhaps it is most often called "objective reason." Richard Bernstein defines objective reason as "The basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or

rightness."[31]

This is best demonstrated in the axiomatic method of geometry. The following brief account of the axiomatic method both explains the method and also suggests why Foundationalist Rationalism adopted it as a paradigm:

> Everyone who has been exposed to elementary geometry will doubtless recall that it is taught as a *deductive* discipline. It is not presented as an experimental science whose theorems are to be accepted because they are in agreement with observation. This notion, that a proposition may be established as the conclusion of an explicit *logical* proof, goes back to the ancient Greeks, who discovered what is known as the "axiomatic method" and used it to develop geometry in a systematic fashion. The axiomatic method consists in accepting *without* proof certain propositions as axioms or postulates (e.g., the axiom that through two points just one straight line can be drawn), and then deriving from the axioms all other propositions of the system as theorems. The axioms constitute the "foundations" of the system; the theorems are the "superstructure," and are obtained from the axioms with the exclusive help of principles of logic.[32]

Like the axioms of geometry, Foundationalism sought *axioms* for knowledge of God, nature, ethics, and civil politics. In Christian theology, this led to the need for prolegomena.

With the axiomatic method, the conclusions are only as sound and secure as the axioms. The axioms must be accepted as apparent or inevitable, rather than as proven on the basis of more elementary ideas. For example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence gave the claim "All men are created equal…" axiomatic status by calling them "self-evident."

But axioms are not often "self-evident," even if one is actively looking for them. So, the question of *procedure* was also significant. The axiomatic method in key Enlightenment thinkers began with *doubt*. The classic instance is Descartes. In the *Meditations on First Philosophy*, he "first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in [his] youth [he] had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that [he] had subsequently built upon them." So, he

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[31] Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,* 8.

[32] Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, *Gödel's Proof* (New York: New York University Press, 1958), 4.

resolved to set aside all opinions for which there were reasons to think doubtful, and also all opinions "that are not completely certain and indubitable."[33] This led him first to consider the conclusion that nothing is certain, but then to realize that he himself was the personal subject who was doubting. From this he concluded "this pronouncement 'I am, I exist' is necessarily true…"[34] This pronouncement, famously known as "the Cogito" from the Latin original, *cogito ergo sum*, states the Cartesian axiom, the sure *foundation* upon which to build the "superstructure."

The Enlightenment sparked the search for other "foundations" or "axioms," most notably "experience" with empiricism. Empirical foundations, that is, foundations "to be accepted because they are in agreement with observation," lack the full degree of certainty that a logical foundation supposedly has, because a new observation could nullify the earlier agreements of observation to foundation. Still, empirical foundations have been commonly accepted through modern natural science.

The fact that empirical foundations can matter so much means that Foundationalist Rationalism is driven by more than a desire for absolute certainty. What is this overriding factor? It is a certain kind of *fear*. Richard Bernstein calls this fear "the Cartesian Anxiety." Cartesian Anxiety is the felt need of having to justify your beliefs using the same tools, arguments, and proofs of Foundationalist Rationalism and the so-called objective facts of objective reason. Bernstein describes what the Cartesian Anxiety is:

> [Cartesian Anxiety] is a quest for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us. The specter that hovers in the background of this journey is not just a radical epistemological skepticism but the dread of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch bottom nor support ourselves on the surface. Descartes leads us with an

[33] Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, 9.

[34] Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, 13.

> apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. *Either* there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, *or* we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.[35]

The fear of intellectual and moral chaos is the key motive and most determinative factor for Foundationalist Rationalism. To escape this fear, it is necessary to have reasons that do not depend on tradition or community or opinion, but that are "acontextual." Only such reasons will secure "universal validity" for claims about what we know and how to lead our lives. This is why *acontextualism* and *universalism* are the most compelling features of Foundationalist Rationalism.

An Acontextual/Universal View of Christian Revelation

Acontextualism is a basic feature of modern Western Christianity, especially Protestantism. Its prevalence shows how thoroughly Foundationalist Rationalism has influenced the Church. We can see this in the conviction that genuine knowledge of and right faith in God is possible, even desirable, apart from the influence of tradition or culture. This influence shows in the common assumption among Christians that one's knowledge of and faith in God does not and should not depend *upon context*. Ideally, God is known through experience and reason that is free from the biases and conventions of particular traditions or communities. This means that much of modern Western Christianity has tended to be *acontextual* in the same way as Foundationalist Rationalism.

Acontextualism has been the goal of both modern theological liberals and modern theological conservatives. We can see this clearly with the help of George Lindbeck's

[35] Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, 18.

characterization of them as "experiential-expressivists" and "cognitive-propositionalists."[36] Experiential-expressivists try to be free from biases and conventions by holding that their experience of God is internal or subjective, and their knowledge of God is principally knowledge of the inner experience. In this way, knowledge of God is free from external factors. So-called "theological liberalism" follows this direction. For others, the knowledge of God is ideally in the form of objective experience and propositional knowledge. This knowledge of God is twofold: Natural and Special. As the term suggests, natural knowledge of God is the knowledge that comes through nature, and this is supposedly available to all people, regardless of context. The common scriptural supports for this position include Psa. 19:1 ("The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands" NIV) and Rom. 1:20 ("For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse" NIV). The special revelation of God includes the Scriptures. Their lack of bias is supposedly guaranteed by their divine inspiration. So-called "theological conservatism" follows this direction.

These two theological camps disagree about many specific points of doctrine and practice, but at a deeper level, they share a common conviction on the importance of being free from the influence of context and having universal applicability. This common conviction has rarely been acknowledged as a sign of Christian unity. But this conviction can be discerned by examining the ways both camps operate in two basic ways: through their views on the nature and use of the Scriptures, and through their approaches toward apologetics.

For theological liberals, the Scriptures are merely human records of and reflections upon the inner experience of God. They are *expressions* of experiences (hence the label, "experiential-

[36] Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 16.

expressivists"). Experiential-expressivists frequently do not only deny the inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures. They find these concepts *pointless*. Accordingly, experiential-expressivists regard church doctrines also as only expressions of inner experience, and they consider stressing the abiding importance of doctrines is to be pointless.[37] For theological conservatives, God is known chiefly by propositions about him and the universe (hence the label, "cognitive-propositionalists"). The source of these propositions is from God himself, both in nature but chiefly and completely through the divine inspiration of the Bible. Inspiration is what gives the Scriptures their universal authority, because inspiration means that the biblical writers do not depend upon any human context or power. This in turn, guarantees their infallibility, that is, their complete reliability. Accordingly, the teaching of the Scriptures, or doctrine, is abidingly important and binding.

The differences between experiential-expressivists and cognitive-propositionalists are further reflected in *practice*. Perhaps most obviously, they affect the point and interpretation of the Bible. For cognitive-propositionalists, the Scriptures are to be read "literally." What counts as the literal or plain sense varies, but the assumption that literal interpretation should be pursued is constant. A certain kind of biblical hermeneutics is required, namely, one that supports and explains *propositions* to be believed. Moreover, when combining inerrancy and the literal sense, certain propositions become essential. Examples include creation in six days, the global flood occurring only several thousand years ago, the sun standing still, Jonah being swallowed by a fish, and Jesus rising from the dead. They become identity markers. Experiential-expressivists, by contrast, embrace "non-literal" interpretations.

As these examples show, the history of biblical hermeneutics demonstrates another way

[37] Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 17, 34.

that Christians have tried to work within the frame of acontextual reason. Hans Frei has traced the historical impact that Spinoza had on hermeneutics as he pursued an objective reading of the text of Scripture. For Spinoza it was obvious that literal meaning and historical reference are district and frequently in opposition, but it is "the religious force (distinct from the meaning or truth) of the scripture cuts athwart all these ways of meaning because it appeals to the heart rather than the head."[38] This appeal to a "religious force" led to the Historical-Critical method of exegesis, which Hans Frei documents.[39] Despite this appeal to an "objective" acontextual interpretation of the text working within the frame of the Historical Critical method, the opposite actually occurred with the advent of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, on the one hand, argued that the Bible can be understood without any context whatsoever. The text is to be read literally, and the literal meaning is what the text says and how it should be objectively and universally interpreted. Higher Criticism's approach is similar as it offered its own set of universal criteria for an objective reading of the text.[40]

Contemporary Challenges and Alternatives to Foundationalist Rationalism

The Enlightenment, including its Foundationalist Rationalism, had its critics from the beginning. But, as we have seen, the disagreements and debates usually oscillated between the poles of "objectivism and relativism," to use the terms of Richard Bernstein.[41] "Objective versus subjective," "fact versus value," "reason versus faith," are common slogans that also indicate the

[38] Hans Frei, *Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Study of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics.* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 46.

[39] Frei, *Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative*, 46.

[40] A simple conversation between a Premillennial Dispensationalist and an Amillennialism reveals conflicting opinions on eschatology. Or a conversation about what the bible teaches about justification between different confessions of the Christian faith will also reveal a different understanding of scripture. Both examples run counter to the idea that scripture is acontextual and universal.

[41] Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, 8.

assumed frame in which debates are conducted.

But there have also been critics who have gone "beyond objectivism and relativism." An early but still relevant example is the 18th century German writer and thinker, Johann Georg Hamann, to whom I will return in Chapter Two. A later and still relevant 19th example is Friedrich Nietzsche. Hamann remains relatively obscure even today, but it is worth noting that Nietzsche's influence only emerged after his death in 1900. Moreover, both Hamann and Nietzsche would be called "irrationalists" by some noted 20th century figures.[42] This label indicates that these thinkers were still understood within the Enlightenment frame even into the middle and end of the last century.

But it is easy to see that confidence in acontextual, universal reason was shaken by intellectual developments in the 20th century. One of the most important was the famous theorem of Kurt Gödel in 1931. Earlier I indicated how the axiomatic method was taken as paradigmatic. Gödel proved that complete and consistent sets of axioms could not be given for whole systems of mathematics, including elementary arithmetic. Gödel's proof is daunting, but its conclusions are plain and far-reaching:

> [Gödel] presented mathematicians with the astounding and melancholy conclusion that the axiomatic method has certain inherent limitations, which rule out the possibility that even the ordinary arithmetic of the integers can ever be fully axiomatized. What is more, he proved that it is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a very large class of deductive systems—elementary arithmetic, for example—unless one adopts principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves…

[42] Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Herder, and Hamann*, ed Henry Hardy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 312–13. Berlin labels Hamann an irrationalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2010), 14. MacIntyre labels Nietzsche an irrationalist.

> Gödel's findings thus undermined deeply rooted preconceptions and demolished ancient hopes that were being freshly nourished by research on the foundations of mathematics.[43]

Gödel's proof has had little direct influence on the social imaginary, but it does directly undermine the paradigm of the axiomatic method. If it cannot hold for elementary arithmetic, and if the reasoning for arithmetic is so complex that it puts in doubt its own internal consistency, then there seems little chance that the axiomatic method can actually work for the much more complex situations involved in everyday life.

Others called into question whether anyone could actually proceed acontextually at all, and by arguing that our knowledge and our reasoning depend on contexts. Hamann did this by arguing how language worked already in the 18th century. Quoting Hamann, Isaiah Berlin writes: "'Without language, we would have no reason; without reason, no *religion,* and again, Where there is no *word* there is no reason—and no world.'"[44] As pointed out earlier, Thomas Kuhn did this with his argument that natural science advanced by revolutions rather than gradual evolution.[45] In *The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions* he traces the history of scientific evolution by noting the revolutionary changes in science over time. These revolutions demonstrated that different approaches or paradigms, as he called them, were rationally incommensurate, and they showed how all scientific endeavors are part of a contextual tradition. In literary studies, Stanley Fish made a similar argument with his theory of "interpretive communities." This theory that interpretation is better understood as contextualized than as either "objective" or "subjective." He argued that the meaning of the text is determined not from the text as an object nor by the reader as a subject, but by "interpretive communities" that govern

[43] Nagel and Newton, *Gödel's Proof*, 6.

[44] Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment*, 314.

[45] Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

even what a text is and the interpretive possibilities for readers.[46] Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman did this with their account of a sociology of knowledge, that is, a social account of knowing and knowledge. This account showed how it makes sense to think of knowledge as always being contextualized by a societies and their activities.[47]

Similar arguments that thinking and practice is always contextualized found their way into Christian theology. Just as the influence of Foundationalist Rationalism's acontextualism was particularly clear in biblical interpretation, so also is the argument against acontextualism. A widespread problem with acontextualism is that it forces the assumptions and arguments into specific prescribed modes. For example, in the case of biblical hermeneutics the modes are Fundamentalism or Higher Criticism, which tries to examine the text either from a purely literal or a historically neutral perspective. This results in an "either this or that" bifurcation of reason forces Christians to either limit what they can do or try to show universal validity. The fear, of course, is being ignored. Christians fear their truth claims will not be considered in the public square because they do not meet the tenets set by Foundationalist Rationalism. But this makes Christian claims subject to authorities outside of Christ and the Church. Post-Enlightenment arguments often highlight this point.

Stanley Hauerwas offers an explicit instance of this kind of argument. He argued for understanding biblical interpretation as contextualized in his book *Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from the Captivity to America*. He started by observing how both conservative and liberal interpreters might disagree about many interpretations, but they agree that

[46] Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 12–15, 303–70.

[47] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Lockman, *Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor, 1967).

interpretation itself should be acontextual: "The fundamentalist and biblical critic share the assumption that the text of the Bible should make rational sense (to anyone), apart from the uses that the Church has for Scripture. Fundamentalism and biblical criticism seek to depoliticize the interpretation of Scripture on the grounds that the text has an objective meaning."[48] But Hauerwas undermined this attempt to "depoliticize" interpretation, that is, to remove interpretation from the influence of communities and context. He showed that both fundamentalism and biblical criticism were only "repoliticizing" interpretation, that is, putting interpretation into a *new* context: "The result for both is repoliticization of Scripture by giving unchecked power to some interpreters without such power being justified."[49] Hauerwas argued that the matter of power needed to be addressed directly and properly, which he believes can only happen when the church itself is a contextual interpretative community for the Bible. Writing at about the same time, Francis Watson agreed: "If theology is to be Christian, however, the ecclesial community must be seen as its primary point of reference."[50] Biblical interpretation always takes place within a context, never apart from one. And so the basic interpretive question is, "Which context?" not, "How does one escape context?"

Fear of being ignored or obsolete also explains why the influence of acontextualism has been strong in Christian apologetics. Timothy Phillips and Dennis Okholm, editors of the collection *Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World*, illustrate the influence of acontextualism by observing, "Christians are being forced to choose between and Enlightenment view of 'truth' and 'morality' and a relativistic denial of rationality and morality with correlative

[48] Stanley Hauerwas, *Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 18.

[49] Hauerwas, *Unleashing the Scripture*, 18.

[50] Francis Watson, *Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 6.

reduction of all conflicts to power."[51] As with biblical interpretation, the question posed by Foundationalist Rationalism is whether one will proceed acontextually or surrender the possibility of claims being taken as true or right. Christian apologetics in the 20th Century often acquiesced to Foundationalist Rationalism's claim that reasons for believing truth claims should be acontextual and universal. William Lane Craig outlines what this meant: "According to this modernist viewpoint, religious beliefs were rational if and only if one has evidence on which those beliefs are based."[52]

The assumption from Foundationalist Rationalism, then, is if the Christian faith cannot prove its truth claims, then, according to the Foundationalist Rationalism standard of universal acontextual rational truth, those claims were regulated to values, and, therefore, irrational. In this context, "postmodern" typically implies a willingness to give up or overcome acontextualism. The collection Phillips and Okholm edited gave various answers to this question: How do Christians convince postmodernists of the truth of the Gospel in a society "that no longer believes in objective truth as demonstrable by a predefined standard of rationality… and in a culture where a variety of rationalities exist?"[53] A particularly clear response to this question comes from Philip Kenneson on "objective truth."

In *The End of Apologetics*, which sharply criticized modern apologetics, Myron Penner noted that, in apologetics, a "sort of militancy often attaches to the pursuit of objective truth because of the perception that truth is indifferent to persons and a perceived need to demonstrate

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[51] Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, *Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 11.

[52] William Lane Craig, "Politically Incorrect Salvation," in *Christian Apologetics in a Postmodern World,* 81.

[52] Craig, "Politically Incorrect Salvation," 81.

[52] Newbigin, *Gospel in a Pluralist Society*, I81.

[53] Phillips and Okholm, *Christian* Apologetics, 11.

one's beliefs indeed are objective truth that appears to be connected to the fixation on objectivity."[54] Kenneson attacked this problem by arguing that there is so such thing as "objective truth." Like others, he contended that "objective truth" was so attractive because of the "intense anxiety [that] naturally follows when one begins with the premise that doubt is more fundamental than truth."[55] Kenneson was articulating the impact Cartesian Anxiety has had on Christian apologetics.

> If what Christians believe is not objectively true, then on what basis could they possibly commend it to others? This temptation to appeal to objective truth is particularly strong among Christian apologists, who believe they strengthen their claim by insisting that their message is *objectively* true, presumably because they likewise believe that the alternative is merely that it is *subjectively* true: merely true for them.[56]

The resolution of this tension for Christians and Christian apologetics, he argues, is moving beyond the alternatives of objective and subjective truth. "Rather than tightly clutching this concept and insisting that the gospel can only be proclaimed faithfully within such a philosophical framework, we might take the time to explore opportunities that present themselves once the prop is gone."[57] If, as the title of his essay states, there is no such thing as objective truth, on what can Christians and Christian apologetics rely as the source of truth? He says:

> I think such a move has exciting possibilities. Part of my task, therefore, involves not so much arguing *against* the notion of objective truth as suggesting that the intellectual problems that produced the dichotomy between the "objective" and the "subjective" need not continue to preoccupy us. In short, this old paradigm of knowledge and truth is a dead-end street down which we need not continue to travel. Reminding ourselves that this model of knowledge and truth is merely a model might free some Christians from one understandable reaction to my proposal: that

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[54] Myron Penner, *End of Apologetics* (Grand Rapids: Baker), 2013), 144.

[55] Philip D. Kenneson, "There's No Such Thing as Objective Truth, and It's a Good Thing, Too," in *Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World,* 157.

[56] Kenneson, "Objective Truth," 158.

[57] Kenneson, "Objective Truth," 168.

> Christians simply *cannot* abandon the idea of objective truth because to do so would be to deny something central to the gospel. But the fact that most Christians throughout most of history have done well without the concept might encourage these latter Christian to ask *why* they feel so much is at stake here.[58]

The question of why, as Kenneson suggests, is not the way to move forward, but rather *how* or *in what way* should Christians frame rationality that extends beyond Foundationalist Rationalism's acontextual and universal frame to better suit Christian theological method.

It is only through challenging Foundationalist Rationalism and by reframing rationality that Christians can meet the challenges posed by biblical hermeneutics and apologetics today. Hauerwas and Kenneson are Christian examples. But they are specific examples, focused on particular problems. What about more general approaches to reframing rationality? There are at least two philosophical approaches that are both more general and that have been adopted already by Christian theology. They might be called "tradition" and "perspectivism." Both approaches have been raised already in this chapter. Tradition was raised when I discussed the argument for understanding science as a tradition. Perspectivism was the outlook behind Lindbeck's distinction of cognitive-propositionalism and experiential-expressivism. Now I want to explain more fully the approaches themselves and to note how they have been adopted in contemporary Christian theology.

Tradition

The Enlightenment's "flight from authority" was to a considerable extent a flight from *tradition*. *Opinio,* as discussed above, had authority because it was the authority of tradition. The acontextualism of Foundationalist Rationalism was an attempt to reason without tradition. But, as also discussed already, this proved to be impossible in the case of modern natural science.

[58] Kenneson, "Objective Truth," 160.

Philosophers like MacIntyre argue that this is impossible in general, that acontextualism is impossible. In MacIntyre's case, all rationality presupposes a tradition, even when the tradition itself is unacknowledged or denied. Although his analyses and arguments have usually focused on moral reasoning, his own account of rationality is more general and applies more broadly, and Christian theologians have seized on this. MacIntyre engages Foundationalist Rationalism's frame of acontextual/universal reason especially in his books *After Virtue*, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality*? and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition*.[59]

MacIntyre's argument is historical. For MacIntyre it is undeniable that in human history there have been different accounts of rationality, that is, different assumptions about reasoning, different setting in which reasoning takes place, and different aims for undertaking reasoning in different places and times. This is one aspect of his argument that rationality always depends upon a tradition.

The other aspect of his argument is that all Enlightenment attempts to find an acontextualized rationality have failed. Figures like Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hume gave varied arguments.[60] But all of them "had to fail." They were not, as they supposed, working free from constraints of tradition. Rather, they were "the inheritors of a very specific and particular scheme of moral beliefs, a scheme whose internal incoherence ensured the failure of the common philosophical project from the outset."[61] The reason is that moral discourse continued to use

[59] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory,* 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2010); *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1988); *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2012).

[60] MacIntyre, *After Virtue,* 36–50.

[61] MacIntyre, *After Virtue,* 51.

terms and offer judgments from classical theism, but the assumptions of classical theism had been abandoned. The result was incoherence.[62] But if moral discourse was incoherent, then what was actually happening? MacIntyre contends that Nietzsche had understood it in the 19th century: moral language was not objective, even though objective detached language was used, but rather "expressions of subjective will."[63]

What was it that the Enlightenment abandoned? Here, too, the argument is historical, and he argues historically that it is a virtue theory of ethics, especially running from Aristotle and through Thomas Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotle, Augustine and the Bible. MacIntyre believes that Aquinas' *Summa* demonstrates the possibility of an alternative rational frame that goes beyond the acontextual/universal frame of the Enlightenment. According to MacIntyre,

> The *Summa* sets out in its ordering of universal concepts the framework for a type of narrative of moral enquiry to be enacted by individuals who do and will exhibit their rationality by participating in the forms of rationality established by and through a particular *tradition*, and, indeed, insofar as moral enquiry integral to the moral life itself, a framework for a set of narratives of particular lives.[64]

His frame through which MacIntyre understands and thinks about reason can be called "tradition." In *After Virtue* MacIntyre defines tradition: "A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."[65]

The tradition frame of rationality encompasses both history and present, and leaves open what may come in the future. It includes both universal truths and subjective experience, but views context as ever-present place for reason to be conducted. To accomplish this, MacIntyre

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[62] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 60.

[63] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 113. See also chapter 2 of *After Virtue*. Here MacIntyre reworks the moral theory of emotivism to explain why modern moral discourse uses objective language to express personal positions.

[64] MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 129–30. Emphasis added.

[65] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 222.

believes the view that reason is contextual must be recovered. As such, his view challenges the acontextual frame of Foundationalist Rationalism and the fear of relativism. MacIntyre writes,

> Just because at any particular moment the rationality of a craft is justified by its history so far, which has made it what it is in that specific time, place, and set of historical circumstances, such as rationality is inseparable from the tradition through which it is was achieved. To share in the rationality of a craft requires sharing in the contingencies of its history, understanding its story as one's own, and finding a place for oneself as a character in the enacted dramatic narrative which is that story so far. The participant in the craft is rational *qua* participant insofar as he or she confronts to the best standards of reason discovered so far, and the rationality in which he or she thus shares is always, therefore, unlike the rationality of the encyclopedic mode, understood as a historically situated rationality, even if one which aims at timeless formulation of its own standards which would be their final and perfected form through a series of successive reformulations, past and yet to come.[66]

This frame of rationality includes historical truths incorporated with personal interaction with them, while, at the same time, leaving opportunities for present and future possibilities to be included to the tradition frame. It eases the Cartesian Anxiety, by harmonizing history with experience and the present. To say it another way, the master within the tradition will exemplify the best standards of the past up to the present and direct others going forward toward the *telos* of a fully perfected frame. Through this frame one is able to draw from the authority of the tradition to interpret and reinterpret it as it engages new and unexpected ways. MacIntyre believes that the tradition is the frame through which to teach others how to engage the world. "It is by the ability to teach others how to learn this type of knowing how that the power of the master within the community of a craft is legitimized as a rational authority."[67]

MacIntyre has been influential among Christian theologians for several reasons, including his critique of Enlightenment ethics, his historical approach to philosophical argument, and his account of tradition for rationality. It is the last feature that matters for this dissertation, but all

[66] MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions,* 65.

[67] MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions,* 66.

three features are evident in the writings of Stanley Hauerwas, the theologian most often connected with MacIntyre. Although Hauerwas has written and spoken widely, his work has especially focused on ethics. It is unsurprising that much of Hauerwas's writing about MacIntyre is connected with virtue.[68] But Hauerwas has also relied on MacIntyre specifically on rationality.

Hauerwas demonstrated this clearly in his book *The Work of Theology*.[69] He tried to explain how he learned to think theologically, which he did by reflecting on a comment MacIntyre made:

> MacIntyre's comment came in response to the problem … of how someone can act in a reasonable manner when faced by what seems to be the impossibility of deciding between antithetical accounts of what is just and/or true. This is a person, according to MacIntyre, who has not yet given their allegiance to any tradition of enquiry, hence the inability in the face of alternative traditions to know what to do. The comment to which I want to direct attention is MacIntyre's suggestion that the initial response to such a person is straightforward, namely, the answer "will depend upon who you are and how you understand yourself."[70]

Hauerwas recognizes that some will think this advice leads to relativism, because it turns a person back on himself, "but such an accusation only reproduces the understanding of rationality that MacIntyre argues is mistaken."[71] The understanding of rationality is Foundationalist Rationalism, which "assume[s] that to be rational entails the attempt to provide neutral, impersonal, and independent standards of rational judgment," or what I have called acontextualism.[72] But this is confused, and MacIntyre (and Hauerwas with him) argues that people who assume acontextualism are themselves representatives of a particular tradition. This

[68] See, for example, *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), in which he writes, "The debt I owe Alasdair MacIntyre is apparent on almost every page of this book…" (x).

[69] Stanley Hauerwas, *The Work of Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015).

[70] Hauerwas, *Work of Theology*, 11–12, quoting MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*,391.

[71] Hauerwas, *Work of Theology*, 12.

[72] Hauerwas, *Work of Theology*, 12.

means that they are able "to think for themselves only by thinking with others."[73] This has in fact happened, but they have also been trained to ignore this fact. "Who you are and how you understand yourself" is not entirely subjective. It is the product of having lived in certain communities and learning to think with others.

In this particular book, Hauerwas applies this insight specifically to his own theological training, but elsewhere he applies to Christians generally. On occasion, it directs this point to Foundationalist Rationalism, as in "The Church's One Foundation Is Jesus Christ Her Lord or In a World without Foundations All We Have Is the Church" in the book *In Good Company*.[74] He tries to show how to practice theology without foundations. He writes well aware of Cartesian Anxiety: "To do theology with no other foundation than Jesus Christ strikes many as dangerous if not irresponsible. Such a theology, it is claimed, surely must be relativistic and fideistic, since it lacks any 'rational' basis."[75] But as already pointed out, he knows that "foundations" of this kind are false and that all rationality is acquired in and through a community, which is why he argues, "For in a world without foundations all we have is the church."[76] The church under the influence of the Enlightenment had often tried to do without the church and tradition. But, Hauerwas writes: "The attempt to do theology as if such lives did not need to exist is now at an end. God has forced us to see that there is no 'foundation' more sure than the existence of [Christian] lives," that is, the church.[77]

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[73] Hauerwas, *Work of Theology*, 13.

[74] Stanley Hauerwas, *In Good Company: The Church as Polis* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 33–49.

[75] Hauerwas, *In Good Company*, 33.

[76] Hauerwas, *In Good Company*, 33.

[77] Hauerwas, *In Good Company*, 48–49.

Perspectivism

In recent decades Christian philosophers have demonstrated that that Enlightenment rationality, having sought to divest itself from the fetters of tradition by advancing acontextual or universal reason, is in fact a tradition. This silences the fear of Cartesian Anxiety. Remember the Cartesian Anxiety is not something that can be easily quieted by platitudes like "Everything is OK now," or "Don't worry, be happy." This anxiety is only resolved by restoring trust and confidence that our claims can be justified or criticized in ways that are not merely subjective judgments. MacIntyre's tradition-oriented account of reason is one way. Another way comes from Christian theologian James McClendon and atheist philosopher James Smith. In their book *Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism*, they dissect the acontextual/universal frame of the Enlightenment Foundationalist Rationalism which brought about Christianity's fear of relativism, and they also propose a larger frame within which Christianity can operate.

"Convictions are the beliefs that make people the way they are."[78] McClendon and Smith believe that a path forward to navigate people's convictions is to take them seriously, but, also, to understand the foundations on which those convictions are built. It is often people's convictions, they argue, that bring disagreement, confusion, and conflict. In order to understand what makes some beliefs *convictions,* you need to understand what rationality frames them. In this way they are recontextualizing rationality. They argue there are three basic stances or frames.

Two of the stances they identify are very familiar, because they reflect the two poles that give rise to the Cartesian Anxiety. On the one hand, there is foundationalism, or objectivism, or,

[78] James W. McClendon and James M. Smith, *Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism*, rev. ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 7.

as McClendon and Smith call it, *imperialism*. Imperialists assume that there is one right way to have convictions, and that all differences in convictions as "wholly contingent."[79] Those who hold convictions in a different way are wrong in how they hold them. These wrong ways stem either from ignorance or perversity, that is, it is "ignorance or perversity rather than to serious differences about what it means to be rational or humane or reverent or scientific."[80]

In contrast to imperialism, there is *relativism*. This frame finds imperialism as "unjustified" and "inadequate," unsupported by current research. There is no reason to assume there is only one right way to have convictions. As a result, "The relativist regards convictional differences as an inevitable, ineradicable, and ultimate fact of human existence and denies the existence of any common element relevant to mutual understanding."[81] The "relativist" believe that convictions indicate the people are simply living in different worlds, and that the differences in convictions stemming from the different worlds cannot be settled rationally.

But instead of thinking that imperialism and relativism are the only two alternatives, McClendon and Smith propose a third way of viewing religious convictions, which they call "perspectivism." Like relativism, "Perspectivism regards convictional conflict as expected"; but unlike relativism, conflict is "not inevitable, fundamental, but not ultimate, enduring but not inherently ineradicable."[82] For perspectivists, "Persons or communities with different convictions

[79] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions*, 8.

[80] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions*, 8.

[81] McClendon and Smith, *Conviction*, 8. "To sharpen our focus on these two: while the imperialist holds that convictional differences can be eliminated by the application of the correct method and the correction of (others') character defects, the relativist holds that conflict among convictions cannot be resolved by any means that presuppose serious communication among the opponents. If there should be a conversation from one way of conviction to another, it must for the relativist be the result of some non- or extrarational cause or process, and the shift should put the convert as completely outside his or her former view as he or she had been completely inside it before" (8–9).

[82] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions*, 9.

will experience, think, and speak about their worlds differently, and these differences will not necessarily be the result of mistakes or a character flaw. But neither are they walls or electronic scramblers, making communication, understanding, or even persuasion among worlds impossible."[83] This is because there are common elements even among differing sets of convictions. The task is "to discover and use them in resolving conflict requires measures that cannot be limited to convictional lines."[84]

The threefold typology of McClendon and Smith is similar (but not identical) to the three models of religion offered by Lindbeck in *The Nature of Doctrine*. Convictional imperialism is closely related to Lindbeck's cognitive-propositional model of religion, which understands different religions to be essentially different sets of propositional truth claims. Convictional relativism is similarly closely related to Lindbeck's experiential-expressivism, which understands different religions to be different expressions of subjective inner experience, and different corresponding claims only to be different expressions of inner experience. Consequently, the truth of any religion is relative to that religion. Convictional perspectivism is closely related to Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model of religion. Here, different religions are the result of different convictions about the world and human life. This means, like perspectivism for McClendon and Smith, that persons from different religious communities "will experience, think, and speak about their worlds differently." They will reason coherently, but according to different assumptions, values, and aims. But the differences are not "walls or electronic scramblers, making communication, understanding, or even persuasion among worlds impossible."

[83] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions*, 9.

[84] McClendon and Smith, *Convictions*, 9.

McClendon, Smith, and MacIntyre demonstrate that another frame of rationality is not only possible, but more useful particularly for Christians. This frame embodies both history and the present, and allows the Christians to evaluate, reject, or adopt contemporary philosophies and sciences that fit into their frame. By employing this the frame of perspectivism or tradition they can rationally process what this means for Christian life and how it might benefit the church's practices. But what their work clearly shows is that the Enlightenment's Foundationalist Rationalism is also a tradition, in the same way that science is a tradition, and that the tradition of Foundationalist Rationalism does not rationally hold as it presents itself.[85]

Conclusion

Descartes' quest for certainty within the privacy of his subjective *cogito* and Kant's moral push to transcend oneself to embrace the categorial imperative of acontextual/universal reason has led to Foundationalist Rationalism becoming the default rational position of the West and a nearly irrevocable element of the social imaginary. This chapter makes two major conclusions: 1. Foundationalist Rationalism is a tradition. It is historically contextual to the Enlightenment. While its influence is substantial, it is only one of many rational traditions in the West. Weakened by its own assertations that reason is acontextual and universal, it is defeated by clear realization that is itself a tradition with a history, context, and influence. Its death knell rings clearly now, but it will sound forth louder and clearer by the research presented below from its own scientific endeavors.

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[85] Further commentary on the science as a tradition see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," *The Monitor*, vol. 60, no. 4 (1977): 453–72; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Joel P. Okamoto, "God the Gospel and Modern Science: Reflections on the Church's Witness and Message in a Scientific Age," *Lutheran Mission Matters*, 24, no. 3 (2016); and Joel P. Okamoto, "Modern Science, Contemporary Culture and Christian Theology," "*Concordia Journal*, 43, no. 3, (Summer 2017): 45–63.

Jeffrey Stout concludes with the historical consequences of Descartes and Kant's Enlightenment project and its rational ends:

> Kant gave us a pure moral will ideally constrained by the universality of the categorical imperative. Existentialists deleted the categorical imperative, convinced that its putative universality was merely a sign of bad faith, and kept the rest of the picture. Post-structuralists thought existentialists were silly to excite themselves over the pure moral will of a featureless self, and proceeded to drop selves from the picture altogether. This left them with *nothing but* conceptual schemes – and therefore with no means for telling a story. The past became a series of absolute ruptures. Such a past could be edifying only by virtue of teaching us what we are not. But this edification remains useless insofar as we who might make use of it have disappeared. Our own disappearance is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Kantian premises from which the dialectical progression began. Beyond deconstruction lies a self whose character is not 'divorced from the traits that constitute it,' whose freedom does not 'consist in decisions taken apart from all desires, habits, and dispositions,' and whose history is inextricably intertwined with the histories of other selves.[86]

Ding dong the witch is dead! Not quite, but there is hope. This is good news for Christians. While the work begun by McClendon and Smith and MacIntyre lays a good foundation for a new rational frame for Christian reason, but it is incomplete. It lacks what establishes truth and reliability, it fails to clearly articulate the true means of Christian reason. While it restores the idea that Christianity should recover its own tradition, it does not deliver on how this tradition is given, maintained, and shared. The next chapter will encourage Christians to return to their historic, contextual tradition as the means of rationality which stills anxiety and fear as it ends relativism by means of the sure and certain Word, Jesus Christ.

[86] Stout, *Flight from Authority*, 261.

CHAPTER TWO

A CHRISTIAN FRAME OF REASON

Introduction

Chapter One identified acontextualism and universalism as the characteristic features of reason and reasoning after the Enlightenment. In its so-called "flight from authority," the Enlightenment understood itself to be moving beyond reason based on tradition, sentiment, superstition, and prejudice. Reason rested on foundations that did not rely on the situation, community, context, or tradition. Such acontextual reasons could be relied upon by everyone.

The acontextual and universal ideals of reason that this dissertation labeled "Foundationalist Rationalism" influenced Christian thinking and practice. Theological prolegomena are an illustration of this influence, as well as the move toward an "objective" biblical interpretation and the felt need for apologetics to operate within the assumptions and aims of Foundationalist Rationalism.

But there have been approaches in philosophy, history of science, literary studies, and sociology that do not only criticize Foundationalist Rationalism, but they suggest an alternative approaches to conceiving of rationality. Their approaches are different, but all of them "recontextualize" rationality. At the end of Chapter One, I highlighted two ways. In the terms used by McClendon and Smith, rationality always assumes and depends on one's *perspective*. MacIntyre's rationality always assumes and relies on a *tradition*.

Chapter One calls for recontextualizing rationality, but what does that look like? This chapter will answer that question. I will seek to show what kind of rationality is arguably Christian. Given how fragmented the Church has become since the Enlightenment, an answer to what is authentic Christian rationality is not obvious. To move beyond Foundationalist

Rationalism, we should also consider *how* to discern and argue for an authentic Christian rationality.

This chapter is not arguing that retrieving Christian rationality means taking traditional Christian positions like "The Scriptures are the Word of God" or "Jesus physically rose from the dead." Arguing for such positions would be confusing ends for means. Arguing for and returning to an authentic Christian rationality are different than returning to "premodern theology" or "premodern exegesis." These might be the ends that a return to Christian rationality calls for, but, again, this confuses ends for means. It can be easy to be confused on this point, and to avoid this confusion, I want to be clear that this dissertation is focused on rational means.

This chapter considers how authentic Christian means to achieve their ends might be recovered today after Foundationalist Rationalism. Recovering authentic Christian means to achieve their ends will be first explored by engaging briefly the "irrationalism of Johann Georg Hamann. Hamann's "irrationalism" was turning to Jesus Christ and His word in the Scriptures. In this way, Hamann serves as a forerunner of this approach within the context of the Enlightenment. Another figure that will be considered in this chapter is second century Christian theologian, Irenaeus. Irenaeus demonstrates a certain kind of "genius" about rationality. He recognized that the orthodox and the Valentinians had two different rationalities, which operated as a metaphor of the fox vs. the king. But he was more than critical. He identified explicit means to faithful Christian ends: the Rule of Faith and the written gospels. This has been an enduring contribution to the Church, and it is reflected in a more refined form with the Nicene Creed and the identification of the New Testament canon, and then also later with Lutheran Confessionalism. The chapter will further explore the Lutheran Reformation, which marks another development in Christian rationality. This development is its own "genius" because it

affirms and advances Irenaeus' two canons of rationality, and appropriates it for what it means to be human and how God communicates to His children. Finally, the chapter explores how to instill Christian rationality. It is not enough to "have" a rationality. Rationality must also be cultivated and put into practice. This chapter will conclude by considering this task with the example of catechesis, and further it will propose a method for how this may be done.

Johann Georg Hamann

Although Foundationalist Rationalism captured the minds of many thoughtful people inside and outside of the academy, not all agreed with its search for reasons that are acontextual and universal. Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1780) emerged as a preeminent early critic of Enlightenment rationalism. Born in Königsberg, Prussia, Hamann was a friend of Immanuel Kant and a major figure in the German Counter-Enlightenment. On a trip to London as a young man, Hamann experienced a radical religious conversion. This conversion led him to reject the rationalism of the Enlightenment and embrace Orthodox Lutheranism.[1] His conversion led him to argue that rationality does not consist of a set of objective or subjective truths that existed in and of themselves. Rather, Hamann argued that reason is always centered in someone, namely, the Logos made flesh, Jesus Christ.[2] This thought was by no means original to Hamann. In fact, its origin is traced back to Christ and the Apostles, and it was worked out at length by the so-called "Logos" theologians of the second century. But because Hamann argued for this Christ-centered rationality at the same time that Foundationalist Rationalism was being implemented within the academy, his contribution as a "counter-Foundationalist" is significant.

[1] John R. Betz, *After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of J. G. Hamann* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 54. Betz speaks briefly about Hamann's embrace of Luther's "Great Exchange." Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment*, 354, also speaks of Hamann's Lutheranism.

[2] Berlin, *Three Critics*, 315–16.

Hamann is a prototype for what is needed today, that is, someone who appreciated Enlightenment rationality even as he denounced it, and someone whose response suggests a way forward. He can be called a prototype (or a forerunner) because he was an Enlightenment era figure, a contemporary and friend of Kant, whose criticism and challenge to the Enlightenment rationality were well ahead of their time.

Hamann wrote unsystematically over a range of topics, but what matters for this dissertation is that Hamann has been labeled an "irrationalist" for his views on reason. He was critical of the Enlightenment rather than constructive. He spoke of the "metacritique" of reason over against the "critiques" of Immanuel Kant.[3] Because Hamann's work was critical of the claim that reason should acontextual and universal, he was called "irrationalist" or "anti-rationalist" by interpreters of the Enlightenment.

One of the most important contemporary critiques comes from 20th century philosopher Isaiah Berlin. As a committed rationalist, Berlin was hostile to Hamann, whom he regarded as opposed to "the entire rationalist trend of European philosophy, from the Greeks to medieval scholasticism, the Renaissance, and above all the French *philosophes* of his own time, and by implication their disciples in the following two centuries."[4] It was the perception that Hamann was completely opposed to the Enlightenment rationality that caught Berlin's attention. Berlin writes:

> Hamann's theology and his religious metaphysics I find I am neither drawn to nor competent to discuss except in so far as they are part and parcel to the rest of what he

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[3] Betz, *After Enlightenment,* 242–48. "And doubtless Hamann intends us to understand his *Metakritik* in this way, namely, as a literary *supplement* to what he viewed as a *contingent, historical* work. Thus Hamann suggests elsewhere that his kind of criticism, his metacriticisn, is that of a "re-reading" (*Nach-lese*) or "parody" (*Nach-Spott*) or "post-lude" (*Nach-Spiel*). On the other hand, playing on the traditional connotation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Metakritik* also carries the sense of that which goes "beyond" the *Critique* in the sense of "surpassing" it," Betz, *After Enlightenment,* 243.

[4] Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment,* 312.

> wrote… My interest lies in the fact that Hamann is the first out-and-out opponent of the French Enlightenment of his time. His attacks upon it are more uncompromising, and in some respects, sharper and more revealing of its shortcomings, than those of later critics. He is deeply biased, prejudiced, one-sided, profoundly sincere, serious, original; and the true founder of a polemical anti-rationalist tradition which in the course of time has done much, for good and (mostly) ill, to shape the thought and art and feeling of the West. [5]

According to Berlin, Hamann's "irrational" critique of the Enlightenment's conception of reason is the key to understanding him and his ongoing importance.

> What is it that is today worth resuscitating in Hamann's views and personality? Hardly his theosophy, central though this was to himself, and interesting and important in the history of Protestant religious belief. He was neither the first nor the greatest of those who believed that the only path to understanding was revelation; that prayer, meditation, the Christian life and innocence of spirit made it easier for the soul to be made whole; that nature in its entirety could be viewed as a book in which in great and luminous letters, the whole history of the world and of man could be read by those who knew how to read; that all things and events were a great hieroglyphic script that needed only a key, which God's words alone provided, to reveal the nature and the fate of man and his relationship to the world and to God.
>
> Even though this was the heart of Hamann's new transfigured outlook; what was truly—and deeply—original was his conception of the nature of man, the method by which he established it, and the polemical use that he made of it. He hated his century with an almost pathological hatred, and attacked what was most characteristic in it with an unparalleled sharpness and strength. He was the first writer in modern days to denounce the Enlightenment and all its works, and not merely this or that error…. Hamann rose in revolt against the entire structure of science, reason, analysis – its virtues even more than its vices. He thought the basis of it altogether false and its conclusions blasphemy against the nature of man and his creator; and he looked for evidence not so much in theological or metaphysical axioms or dogmas or a priori arguments, which the Enlightenment, with some justification, thought that it had discredited as methods of argument as in his own day-to-day experience, in the empirically—not intuitively—perceived facts themselves, in direct observation of men and their conduct, and in direct introspection of his own passions, feelings, thoughts, ways of life.[6]

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[5] Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment,* 318. See also Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment*, 321. Historian B.A. Gerrish notes that Luther is also considered by historians to be an "irrationalist," B.A. Gerrish *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 5.

[6] Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment,* 341–42.

Berlin's criticism centers on "reason." The heart of Berlin's criticism is that Hamann identified reason with language. He writes, "Language is the first and last organ and criterion of reason."[7] Hamann regarded both Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism as sharing "the central fallacy that for him needed eliminating. The facts were otherwise. Language is what we think with, not translate into…"[8] Hamann stood apart for believing that languages are not the various, particular, contextualized media through which pure facts could be communicated and pure reasoning related. Languages for Hamann make reason possible in the first place. Kant had spoken about his philosophy as a "Copernican revolution."[9] Copernicus had argued that it is not the sun that goes around the earth, but the earth that goes around the sun. He completely reversed the picture of the universe. Kant did something similar for minds and the external world. He argued that it is not that the mind conforms to the external world, but that the external world conforms to the mind. This was his critique of pure reason. Hamann's argument was another Copernicus-like move. This meant, among other things, that there is no "pure," "acontextual," "universal" rationality, but always something constrained by language.

Hamann, however, went even further than this, because his starting point for his thought here was God and his Word—Scriptures, and the Incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ. Berlin recognized this himself:

> Of course I do not wish to say that Hamann condemns ordinary reasoning, in the sense in which we speak of reasonable people or actions. It seems to me that his idea of the Vernunft which guides ordinary thinking is closer to what we mean by 'understanding', *Verstehen* as opposed to *Wissen*, which leads to a true sense of reality, God's creation; an eye for the concrete, the individual, the unique, the flow of living life; the encounter with the real, face to face. It is this that appealed to Jacobi and Goethe: the imaginative or quasi-artistic insight which Wilhelm Dilthey and his

[7] Berlin, *Three Critiques*, 316.

[8] Berlin, *Three Critiques*, 316.

[9] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Co., 1929), 25.

> followers developed so richly, and which so irritated the great systematiser Hegel, and for that reason alone might have stirred the enthusiasm of Kierkegaard. For Hamann this deep interrelationship of God, man and nature stems from the divine Logos which 'was in the beginning' and by which the world came to be. It is this profoundly religious approach that is conveyed by such words as 'Without language, we would have no reason; without reason, no religion', and again, 'Where there is no word there is no reason – and no world.' This surely refers to the creative power of the Logos which gives reality to all there is, and which animates human souls, for which nature, history, Holy Writ and much else is God's voice that speaks to us. This is scarcely what is meant by the reason of the sciences, or the generalising scientific or rational methods of the Cartesians, the French philosophes, the entire tradition of the European Enlightenment. It is this rational outlook that Hamann opposed with all his strength. It is this rebellion against systems, objective, unbreakable uniformities, application of mathematical methods, calculation that I and others mean by speaking of his anti-rationalism – the banner of Counter-Enlightenment that he raised – and of the influence of this on some of the philosophers of the so-called Romantic school of thought which originated in Germany in the early nineteenth century, and their descendants.[10]

The point in considering the analysis and assessment of a hostile critic of Hamann has not been the criticism itself, but what the critic was critical of: God, Christ, the Scriptures. But Berlin was critical not merely of the fact that God, Christ, and Scriptures were all important for Hamann. He was critical because Hamann subordinates human reason to God, Christ, and the Scriptures. In other words, Berlin was critical because Hamann was contextualizing reason to God, His Word, language, history, etc.

Hamann's own thinking is fragmented and often speculative. This makes him interesting for theological scholarship, but not of clear use in retrieving traditional Christian rationality. However, he does suggest that we look back to the past before moving forward. This way forward is contextualizing reason to God, Scripture, Creeds and Confessions and tradition.

Hamann's theological view of reason, against Foundationalist Rationalism, in recent decades has made him the object of interest for postmodern theology; especially to Oswald

[10] Berlin, *Three Critiques*, 314–15.

Bayer, Gwen Griffith Dickson, John Milbank, and John Betz.[11] They recognized that Hamann does not deny reason as a means to an ends, but denies *on theological grounds* that rationality can be acontextual and universal. Milbank, for example, spoke of Hamann radicalizing the Reformation insight of justification by faith alone to include all knowledge: knowledge by faith alone.[12] While there is some justification for saying this, this way of putting the matter suggests fideism, or it all comes down to faith. Milbank's assumption aligns more with Pascal, rather than Hamann himself, who understood rationality as visceral and tangible in the person and work of Jesus, the Logos, but also embodied in His Word. Hamann's insight gives us a starting point to trace out the traditional canons or standards for Christian rationality, that is, the standards that had been passed down through the generations and centuries.

In this way, Johann Georg Hamann matters as the forerunner. While he appreciated the Enlightenment rationality, he rejected its "acontextualism." Instead, he argued that reason is always contextualized because "language is reason." However, he is especially a forerunner for Christians in particular because he identifies language with the Logos. In this way, he provides a modern personality for his attempt to reason by and through the Logos, which is also the argument of this chapter and dissertation.

Rules and Norms as Rational Means

Rules might be understood as rational means to an end. Rules are necessary for nearly every activity of life, but they are specifically necessary for identifying and playing games. Rules are necessary for a player to know what the game is and how the game is played correctly. Rules

[11] Oswald Bayer, *Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as Radical Enlightene*, trans by Roy A. Harrisville and Mark C. Mattes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012). Gwen Griffith Dickson, *Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metacriticism*, (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1995).

[12] John Milbank, *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, (London: Routledge, 1999), 28.

require a specific language to identity both the game being played and the rules being used. This language is means to an ends. For example, softball and baseball are very similar in appearance. Both play on a diamond shaped field, they use similar tools or pieces bats, balls, and bases. Both use a similar language for scoring and timing: balls, strikes, base hits, innings, etc. Despite many similarities the rules are not the same. For example, the distances between bases. In baseball it is 90 feet and 60 feet in softball. The outfields also measure differently. Softball uses a larger ball and a shorter bat than baseball. Pitching speeds, distances from the pitching mound, and styles of pitching are also different for each sport. It is not enough to simply play a game with a bat and ball, you need to know the right rules which govern the specific game you are playing.

Hoyle's rules in card playing also illustrate this point clearly. "It is widely assumed that every card game has official rules specifying the only right way to play. This is like saying that there is only one correct form of a language and that all dialects are invalid."[13] Of course, there are many card games. How are the rules established for each game? Context provides the answer: "Games acquire official rules only when they become popular enough to be played in clubs and tournaments that attract players from widely different regions. It then becomes necessary to ensure that competitors from different 'dialect' areas follow a set of rules codified in advance rather than having to negotiate each game as it is played."[14] Rules for certain games like Cribbage become codified with the designation "Official Rules." This designation ensures that the right rational rules govern the specific game regardless of specific dialect. "What most people mean by 'official rules' is a clear description of how a particular game is played—the sequence of activities that define and distinguish one game from another. Such defining rules

[13] "Rules and Hoyles," accessed January 8, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/topic/card-game/Rules-and-Hoyles.

[14] Britannica, "Rules and Hoyles."

must be distinguished from procedural rules, which govern the corrections and penalties for mistakes and breaches of etiquette..."[15]

Rules for playing sports or cards are rational means. The rules are not the game itself, but provide the rational means to tell you how the game, whatever it is, is to be "officially' played. Rules make the "right" game possible by telling the players what makes for the game. At the same time, rules also identify which specific game they are playing (softball or baseball). These are the rational means to ensure the ends that right rules govern the right game. The rules are means for a specific game with specific rules to ensure it is played rightly within its context.

These examples illustrate how rules are a rational means to both identify and play a game. However, this chapter is concerned with how rules are a rational means to identify and "play" a specific Christian theology. I will begin by considering the rational means that Christian theologian Irenaeus identified and implemented in the second century.

The Genius of Irenaeus' Theology

Hamann argued that Christian reason is always contextualized by the Logos. This section will address how Christians have historically and confessionally understood and promoted this understanding.

Christians identified and argued for their rationality early on in their history. Irenaeus in the second century argued that Christians are to be faithful confessors of God's truth. Disputes between orthodox Christians and the Valentinian heretics required the Church to gather together to give a clear and faithful confession of the authority of the Word of God. Irenaeus was concerned not only with the end of making "a faithful confession," but also about the means to

[15] Britannica, "Rules and Hoyles."

this end, that is, how to get a faithful confession.

This means that Irenaeus was concerned about *rationality*. He did not speak in such terms, and it might be surprising that he thought in such terms. But from our perspective and because of our needs, it is clear that he was. He disputed the conclusions that the Valentinians taught, but he especially contested them on the grounds of *rationality*, that is, because of the means they used to reach their conclusions. Irenaeus countered them by pointing out the rationality of the orthodox, that is, the orthodox means of achieving faithful ends.

In *Against the Heretics*, Irenaeus acknowledged that both the Valentinians and the orthodox used the Scriptures (what contemporary Christians usually call the "Old Testament") to identify and worship God and to preach and teach about Jesus Christ. But their actual outcomes were wildly different. Why? According to Irenaeus, it was because they proceeded along different lines. This is evident in this well-known passage:

> Such, then, is their system, which neither the prophets announced, nor the Lord taught, nor the apostles delivered, but of which they boast that beyond all others they have a perfect knowledge. They gather their views from other sources than the Scriptures; and, to use a common proverb, they strive to weave ropes of sand, while they endeavour to adapt with an air of probability to their own peculiar assertions the parables of the Lord, the sayings of the prophets, and the words of the apostles, in order that their scheme may not seem altogether without support. In doing so, however, they disregard the order and the connection of the Scriptures, and so far as in them lies, dismember and destroy the truth. By transferring passages, and dressing them up anew, and making one thing out of another, they succeed in deluding many through their wicked art in adapting the oracles of the Lord to their opinions. Their manner of acting is just as if one, when a beautiful image of a king has been constructed by some skillful artist out of precious jewels, should then take this likeness of the man all to pieces, should rearrange the gems, and so fit them together as to make them into the form of a dog or of a fox, and even that but poorly executed; and should then maintain and declare that this was the beautiful image of the king which the skillful artist constructed, pointing to the jewels which had been admirably fitted together by the first artist to form the image of the king, but have been with bad effect transferred by the latter one to the shape of a dog, and by thus exhibiting the jewels, should deceive the ignorant who had no conception what a king's form was like, and persuade them that that miserable likeness of the fox was, in fact, the beautiful image of the king. In like manner do these persons patch together old wives'

> fables, and then endeavour, by violently drawing away from their proper connection, words, expressions, and parables whenever found, to adapt the oracles of God to their baseless fictions.[16]

The Gnostics claimed a "perfect" knowledge they had about God beyond what the prophets had written and what the Lord and the apostles had said. They further used gathered points of teaching from sources beyond the Scripture in order to "scheme together without support. In so doing, they disregard the order and connection of the Scriptures."[17] In other words, they did not follow the *rationality* of the Scriptures. The orthodox, on the other hand, remained with the word of the Lord and His apostles and followed the rationality of the Scriptures.

Irenaeus' famous analogy of the mosaic shows that he construed the situation and dealt with it in terms of *rationality*. What Irenaeus does is similar to showing that there were different games being played, because they followed different rules. He demonstrates that the orthodox and Valentinians were using two different *kinds of reasoning* to achieve their ends. As a result, they came out with different outcomes. According to the analogy, the Valentinians arranged things to portray a fox, while the orthodox arranged things to portray a king. "Their manner of acting is just as if one, when a beautiful image of a king has been constructed by some skillful artist out of precious jewels, should then take this likeness of the man all to pieces, should rearrange the gems, and so fit them together as to make them into the form of a dog or of a fox…"[18]

Irenaeus does not only explain *that* the orthodox and the heretics had two different rationalities. He also set forth two ways that governed and guided *how* the orthodox reached their

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[16] Irenaeus, "Against the Heretics," *Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writing of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 326.

[17] Irenaeus, "Against the Heretics," 326.

[18] Irenaeus, "Against the Heretics," 326.

proper ends in preaching and teaching the gospel and presenting Jesus Christ. To set the orthodox view as the faithful truth in accordance with the Lord and His apostles, he proposed a Rule of Faith and accepted written forms of the gospel as means for guiding Christians toward the appropriate ends in their preaching and teaching. By establishing these two "rules" or "canons," Irenaeus identifies basic features of what I have already called the "rational frame" in order to read Scripture properly and present a faithful Christian confession to counter false teaching. This is the "genius" of Irenaeus. He made other important contributions to theology, but Irenaeus made an enduring contribution to Christian theology by recognizing this need to think about rationality and by identifying and arguing for these two kinds of rules or canons that guided their own preaching and teaching.

The Rule of Faith functions especially as the rule or standard which norm Christian hearing and reading the Scripture, that is, it functions as a rational means by which Christians understand the Scriptures and guard against heresy, that is, false teaching.[19] This is Irenaeus' version of the Rule of Faith:

> The Church, though dispersed through our the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith: [She believes] in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who became incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of God, and the advents, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and His [future] manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father "to gather all things in one," and to raise up anew all flesh of the whole human race, in order that to Christ Jesus, our Lord, and God, and Saviour, and King, according to the will of the invisible Father, "every knee should bow, of things

[19] Todd R. Hains, *Martin Luther and the Rule of Faith: Reading God's Word for God's People*, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2022), 15. "Lutherans tend to be the ones who see the analogy of faith, analogy of Scripture, and the rule of faith as the same thing." "Luther defines the analogy of faith as understanding Scripture according to the catechism, that is, the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Our Father, and the sacraments—all of which he trusted as God's word. Moreover, Luther wanted this method to have a positive and negative function. Positively, we can only understand Scripture by the analogy of faith; negatively, it guards against heresy (19)."

> in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess" to Him, and that He should execute just judgment towards all; that He may send "spiritual wickednesses," and the angels who transgressed and became apostates, together with the ungodly, and unrighteous, and wicked, and profane among men, into everlasting fire; but may, in the exercise of His grace, confer immortality on the righteous, and holy, and those who have kept His commandments, and have persevered in His love, some from the beginning [of their Christian course], and others from [the date of] their repentance, and may surround them with everlasting glory.[20]

Irenaeus also claims *universality* of this Rule of Faith.

> As I have already observed, the Church, having received this preaching and this faith, although scattered throughout the whole world, yet, as if occupying but one house, carefully preserves it. She also believes these points [of doctrine] just as if she had but one soul, and one and the same heart, and she proclaims them, and teaches them, and hands them down, with perfect harmony, as if she possessed only one mouth. For, although the languages of the world are dissimilar, yet the import of the tradition is one and the same. For the Churches which have been planted in Germany do not believe or hand down anything different, nor do those in Spain, nor those in Gaul, nor those in the East, nor those in Egypt, nor those in Libya, nor those which have been established in the central regions of the world. But as the sun, that creature of God, is one and the same throughout the whole world, so also the preaching of the truth shineth everywhere, and enlightens all men that are willing to come to a knowledge of the truth. Nor will any one of the rulers in the Churches, however highly gifted he may be in point of eloquence, teach doctrines different from these (for no one is greater than the Master); nor, on the other hand, will he who is deficient in power of expression inflict injury on the tradition. For the faith being ever one and the same, neither does one who is able at great length to discourse regarding it, make any addition to it, nor does one, who can say but little diminish it.[21]

For Irenaeus, the Rule of Faith guides preaching and teaching in the first case by being a summary of everyone had *received*; in other words, it summarized what they believed by hearing the gospel. So, preaching and teaching should be such that it leads to an end like this. This is the "king" image of the mosaic analogy. This is how the Rule of Faith is a means toward an end.

A concern for rationality is evident also when Irenaeus argued that the written gospels were another rule or canon. The Rule of Faith summarized what would be believed and handed down

[20] Irenaeus, "Against the Heresies," 330.

[21] Irenaeus, "Against the Heresies," 330–31.

by hearing "the preaching of the truth." If the Rule of Faith shows what one believes after hearing, then the written gospels give the norm for what *is heard*, that is, the norm for preaching and teaching itself. Irenaeus identified the written gospels as clear evidence of the original preaching of the apostles, and he used them as means to determine what is to be heard as God's word.

The quotations that follow introduce how Irenaeus identified and argued for the second rule or rational means.[22] Irenaeus writes:

> 1. We have learned from none others the plan of our salvation, than from those through whom the Gospel has come down to us, which they did at one time proclaim in public, and, at a later period, by the will of God, handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith. For it is unlawful to assert that they preached before they possessed "perfect knowledge," as some do even venture to say, boasting themselves as improvers of the apostles. For, after our Lord rose from the dead, [the apostles] were invested with power from on high when the Holy Spirit came down [upon them], were filled from all [His gifts], and had perfect knowledge: they departed to the ends of the earth, preaching the glad tidings of the good things [sent] from God to us, and proclaiming the peace of heaven to men, who indeed do all equally and individually possess the Gospel of God. Matthew also issued a written Gospel among the Hebrews in their own dialect, while Peter and Paul were preaching at Rome, and laying the foundations of the Church. After their departure, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, did also hand down to us in writing what had been preached by Peter. Luke also, the companion of Paul, recorded in a book the Gospel preached by him. Afterwards, John, the disciple of the Lord, who also had leaned upon His breast, did himself publish a Gospel during his residence at Ephesus in Asia.
>
> 2. These have all declared to us that there is one God, Creator of heaven and earth, announced by the law and the prophets; and one Christ the Son of God. If any one do not agree to these truths, he despises the companions of the Lord; nay more, he despises Christ Himself the Lord; yea, he despises the Father also, and stands self-condemned, resisting and opposing his own salvation, as is the case with all heretics.[23]

[22] Irenaeus, "Against the Heresies," 413. Special focus on Book 1, Chapter X on the Rule of Faith; Book III, Chapter I on the Four Gospels, and Book III, Chapter II on how heretics follow neither Scripture nor tradition.

[23] Irenaeus, "Against the Heresies," 414–15.

Irenaeus demonstrates how this orthodox tradition of the Gospel came to be. It was handed down from Christ to the apostles. Then the apostles passed the Gospel down to the bishops. But Irenaeus also makes the additional point that the Gospel has been preserved in written forms. The Church did not rely only on the oral tradition to guide and correct preaching and teaching. The Church also has written standards from the apostles. In doing this, he is exemplifying that he is working with an authentic Christian rationality. Irenaeus and those who followed him handed down and aligned all Christian teaching and practice according to the two canons of the Scripture and the Regula Fidei. These canons define and embody the historic tradition of the Christian faith. By the fourth century, the Church recognized canon first by Athanasius in 367 in the East and then Eusebius in the West produced a listed of the accepted canon.[24] It is also during this time that the Nicene Creed became a doctrinal standard for the Church.[25]

The Legacy of Irenaeus' Theology

From our contemporary standpoint, Irenaeus' legacy is in recognizing the importance of rationality for Christian theology, and also by identifying and articulating two enduring means for Christian reasoning. Hamann was a forerunner for us by arguing during the Enlightenment that reason is always contextualized, and by setting the Logos, Jesus Christ, as the context for all reason. Irenaeus, from the second century, was a forerunner for us by recognizing that some theological disputes are about rationality and by identifying and using the Rule of Faith and the written gospels as rules and norms to establish and maintain authentic Christian preaching and teaching, or, to repeat, to identify and "play" a specific Christian theology.

Much later, Lutheran Confessionalism represents an explicit recognition and continuation

[24] F. F. Bruce, *The Canon of Scripture* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 71–82 and 124–33.

[25] J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd ed. (New York: David McKay, 1972), 205–62.

of this approach to Christian rationality. With her confessions, the Lutheran Church identifies herself as Christian by acknowledging the Scriptures as rule and norm, and also certain symbols and other confessional documents. The Lutheran tradition followed the historic Christian faith in handing down the two canons of the Scripture and the Regula Fidei in the way of Irenaeus to embody its confession.[26] The first generation of Lutherans even copied Irenaeus' terminology for their confession of faith. "Irenaeus had applied the term 'the rule of faith' to such a standard, using a secondary authority to encapsulate the essence of Scripture for guiding the public proclamation of the gospel. In the early 1530s the Wittenberg theologians began calling such an *analogia fidei* a 'body of doctrine' (*corpus doctrinae*)."[27]

In their history of the Lutheran Confessions, Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen articulates the unique confessional nature of Lutheranism through historian of religion Ninian Smart's description of shared human elements of religion. Smart outlined six basic elements to religion which describe how religious communities stress these rudiments differently.[28] Liturgical ritual shapes the piety of the Eastern Orthodox and the Anglicans. Episcopal polity also matters to both of them, and also to the Roman Catholic Church in a defining way.[29] What about Lutherans? Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen assert that Lutherans explain reality by their "confessions of faith."[30] These Confessions of Faith for Lutherans define the Bible as the final authority, or, as Lutherans often say, the Bible is the *norma normans* or "the ruling rule." This means the Bible, as the Word

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[26] Martin Chemnitz, *Examination of the Council of Trent Part 1*, trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1971), 245–46.

[27] Charles P. Arand, Robert Kolb, and James A. Nestingen, *The Lutheran Confessions: History and Theology of The Book of Concord* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012), 7.

[28] Ninian Smart, *Worldview: Cross Cultural Explorations of Human Beliefs* (New York: Scribner's, 1983), 62–158.

[29] Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen, *Lutheran Confessions*, 1–9.

[30] See Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen, *Lutheran Confessions*, 2. Cf. Joel P. Okamoto, "Making Sense of Confessionalism Today," *Concordia Journal*, 41 no. 1, (Winter 2015): 34–48.

of God, is the ultimate norm of faith and life. But Melanchthon, the author of the Augsburg Confession, "also recognized that the church had always had secondary authorities to guide and mediate the delivery of the biblical message to the people of God."[31] These secondary authorities are the *norma normata*, that is, the "the ruled rule," or the *norma secundum quid,* that is, "the secondary rule." They are the secondary norms *because* they testify to the teaching of Scripture. The secondary norms embody the "rule of faith" (*Analogia Fidei* or *Regula Fidei*) for the Lutheran confession. These two norms serve to guide and correct faith and life, and they are definitive for Lutheran identity.[32]

The primary canon of Scripture and the secondary canon of Creeds and Confessions are necessary to preserve the teaching of Christ and impart faithfulness in hearing, receiving, and sharing His word in their Christian lives. It is sometimes held that there "No creed but the Bible." So, an explanation about the necessity of secondary canons is needed. The simplest way to explain is to observe that this saying itself is a "secondary canon." Lindbeck explains how secondary canons or norms are inescapable:

> First, in reference to the inescapability of doctrine, it would seem that the "creedless Christianity" professed by a number of groups (including, for example, many Quakers and the Disciples of Christ) are not genuinely creedless. When creedlessness is insisted on as a mark of group identity, it becomes by definition operationally creedal. Indeed, usually it becomes at least semiofficial, as in the slogan used by some Protestants, "No creed but the Bible."[33]

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[31] Arand, Kolb, Nestingen, *Lutheran Confessions,* 2.

[32] Robert Kolb, *Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church 1530-1580* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1991), 40. "Luther believed that the Word of God takes on living form as the words of the Gospel message spoken by Christ's disciples. Luther's understanding of God's Word enabled his followers to believe that a document such as a confession could be a secondary authority. As long as it was based on Scripture, a contemporary confession of faith in Jesus Christ could convey the power of God as it transmitted the Biblical message."

[33] In *The Nature of Doctrine*, Lindbeck explains that doctrinal norms are inescapable. "First, in reference to the inescapability of doctrine, it would seem that the 'creedless Christianity' professed by a number of groups (including, for example, many Quakers and the Disciples of Christ) are not genuinely creedless. When creedlessness is insisted on as a mark of group identity, it becomes by definition operationally creedal. Indeed, usually it becomes at least semiofficial, as in the slogan used by some Protestants, 'No creed but the Bible'" (60).

Robert Kolb articulates how secondary canons are foundational to the Lutheran confessional tradition:

> Some Christians may deceive themselves into thinking that they operate without such secondary authorities, written or unwritten, one kind or another, but they do not… Thus, when the Lutherans pledged themselves to their creeds and confessions, they were only making clear where they would turn for this kind of adjudication, interpretation, and guidance in the theological tasks of the church. They were forthrightly identifying how the authority of the inspired Scriptures moves into the life of the church.[34]

"Life of the church" includes rightly confessing and interpreting the truth of the Scriptures, which is mediated through the secondary canon, that is, Creeds and Confessions of the Church. "Life of the church" also means teaching and training believers by means of the Scriptures to life lives of faith in Christ and faithful living.

It must be understood that Scripture is the chief norm handed down through Christ and the apostles, but that it does not exhaust what Christians learn from and are governed by. For Lutheran Confessionalism, Scripture has a special place and function, but Christians will and should live with not only the written text of the Bible but also the tradition in which the Bible is heard and read. This tradition provides the context to understand the content and aim of Scripture. Robert Jenson helpfully summarizes this tradition by explaining how the gospel is passed down. The "gospel" refers to the authoritative witness of the words and deeds of Jesus Christ witnessed and shared by the apostles. "Tradition" is the context in which this is done and serves as the means by which the gospel is passed down. Jenson explains:

> Therefore the gospel cannot occur apart from the process of its own tradition, the occurrence of the gospel depends on the chain of witnesses who have brought the news from the first witnesses to those who now hear. Theology is an act of interpretation: it begins with a received word and issues in a new word essentially related to the old word. Theology's question is always: In that we have heard and

[34] Kolb, *Confessing the Faith*, 133.

> seen such-and-such discourse as gospel, what shall we now say and do that gospel may again be spoken.[35]

The gospel comes down through a tradition. "It begins with a received word," as Jenson puts it, which is the word of the gospel spoken in the past. But the gospel "issues in a new word essentially related to the old word." How does this happen properly? What are the means to insure this happens? They are Scripture and Creeds and Confessions of the Church. These Creeds and Confessions, that is the Lutheran Confessions, operate as the tradition, or Regula Fidei.[36] It is through Regula Fidei that preserves as a rational means the ends, which is a faithful confession of who God is and what He has done and spoke.

The Confessions of the Lutheran Church found in *The Book of Concord* are for Lutherans the Rule of Faith. They are rational means to explain and summarize Scripture because they are in agreement with Scripture. The Lutheran Confessions are explicit about this. The Epitome of the Formula of Concord states in its Rules and Norms, "We believe, teach, and confess that the only rule and guiding principle according to which all teachings and teachers are to be evaluated and judged are the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testament alone."[37] The Epitome's *Rules and Norms* continue by also including the Christian Creeds and other confessional writings including the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Small and Large

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[35] Robert W. Jenson, *Systematic Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1:14.

[36] The term "Regula Fidei" has a long history and application in the church. It also goes by other names like the "Analogy of Faith." Cf. John F. Johnson, "Analogia Fidei as a Hermeneutical Principle," *Springfielder* 36 no., 4 (1973), 249–259. It may also have different definitions. Robert Preus says the Regula Fidei are the "articles of faith that could be summarized under the categories of Law and Gospel" (*The Theology of Post Reformation Lutheranism*, vo1. 1, 350); c.f. Otto Hof, "Luther's Exegetical Principle of the Analogy of Faith," *Concordia Theological Quarterly*, 38, no 4 (1967): 242–57. See also Todd R. Hains, *Martin Luther and the Rule of Faith*: "Luther defines the analogy of faith as understanding Scripture according to the catechism, that is, the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Our Father, and the sacraments—all of which he trusted as God's Word" (19).

[37] Epitome.1 in Kolb and Wengert, 486.

Catechisms of Martin Luther as "witnesses and explanations of the faith."[38] These rules are norms listed in the Book of Concord are the second canon of the Christian faith and constitute the Regula Fidei. The Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord concludes summarizing the linking of the two canons of Scripture and the Regula Fidei: "Just as we base our teachings on God's Word as the eternal truth, we present and cite these writings as testimonies of the truth and as the unanimous correct understanding of our predecessors who steadfastly held to pure teaching."[39]

This linking of the two canons becomes the hermeneutical principle of the Lutheran confession of *Sola Scriptura*. Sola Scriptura is more than a slogan, and it means other than "No creed but the Bible." It is understood well as a hermeneutical principle, that is, as a key way that the Christian rational frame is worked out in practice, because it unites and appropriates Scripture and Regula Fidei to faithfully confess and follow what Scripture teaches. John F. Johnson explained this function with the term *analogia fidei* or "Analogy of Faith": "I suggest that *analogia fidei* may be understood as *Vorverstaendnis*, that is, the interpreter may approach the hermeneutical task with a definite conviction, principle, or criterion according to which he operates."[40] "Analogia" cited from Romans 12:6 in its Greek usage implies a harmonious relationship, and, therefore, in the work of hermeneutics works as the harmonious principle bringing together Scripture and the Confession of Faith.

> *Analogia fidei* has become a harmonizing principle for Lutheran theology.[41] [The] *Analogia fidei* will drive us to an even deeper respect for, and commitment to, our Lutheran Confessions (not because they are our Confessions but because they are drawn from Scripture) which define the article of justification as the heart both of the

[38] Ep7.8 in Kolb and Wengert, 487.

[39] SD 13 in Kolb and Wengert, 529.

[40] John F. Johnson "Analogia Fidei as Hermeneutical Principle," *Springfielder* 36 no. 4 (March, 1973): 250.

[41] Johnson, "Analogia Fidei as Hermeneutical Principle," 255.9

> Gospel and Scripture. This is really our *Vorverstaendnis.* This is really central to the *regula fidei.* We are reminded that the Lutheran Confessions contain no truths that rest in themselves; valid expositions set forth by the Confessions receive their validity solely from the apostolic Gospel. The church can never establish its own articles of faith; it cannot establish anything that is not already established by the revelation of God. By committing the church exclusively to the apostolic Gospel, the Lutheran Confessions free the Church from the binding power of all teachings not based in the Word of God.[42]

As demonstrated above reason operates in a frame. Scripture and the Regula Fidei are the rational means or "means to end" of Confessional Lutheranism for operating within this frame. The "end" or goal for the Confessional Lutheran tradition is "formulation of God's Word for their own times and places,"[43] and the Scriptures and Confessions are key means to make sure this happens faithfully. Scripture and the Regula Fidei are central and indispensable for the rationality of Confessional Lutheranism.

The Genius of Lutheran Theology

Lutheran theology inherited and preserved the two canons of Irenaeus (the Scriptures and the Regula Fidei) as a means to preserve a faithful confession of Jesus Christ. This is evident in the Book of Concord itself, which identifies the "ecumenical creeds"—the Apostles Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed—as part of its rule of faith. But the specifically Lutheran confessions of faith articulated the Christian confession in another direction than the ecumenical creeds: salvation. Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen explain:

> The creeds and confessions seek to be nothing less than answers to Jesus' question, "Who do you say that I am?" (Matt. 16:15). The three creeds (and for that matter the distinctively Lutheran confessional writings) all stand in the trajectory of the New Testament's confession of Christ…
>
> The creeds stand in this trajectory of the various New Testament confessional statements when they seek to answer that question, "Who is Jesus?" how do the

[42] Johnson, "Analogia Fidei as Hermeneutical Principle," 532.

[43] Arand, Kolb, Nestingen, *Lutheran Confession,* 7.

> creeds confess Christ? One's identity is shaped by a story in which relationships take place. The creeds first answer the question by setting forth the Son's relationship to God and then to the human race. In doing so, they set forth a trinitarian and incarnational Christology. Within those relationships they set forth the story of God's entrance into the world in order to rescue his creation. These two affirmations provide the context for rightly understanding the story of Jesus. The Reformation built upon them to bring out the soteriology of the story. Luther's Small Catechism captures it first by affirming that Jesus is "true God born of the Father from eternity" and "true man born of the virgin Mary." The Reformer then tells how this Jesus Christ rescued us and made us his own.[44]

Irenaeus developed his two rules in order to identify and preserve the "story" that Arand, Kolb, and Nestingen refer to, in other words, the gospel. The goal of preserving the story is unmistakable in the written gospels, because they are versions the story of Christ. But this goal is also evident in the Apostles and Nicene Creeds, as with other baptismal creeds. As Frances Young writes in *The Making of the Creeds*, "It's as though the essential content is indeed a *story*."[45] They relate the summary of this story by beginning with God as the Creator, then confessing Christ's incarnation, death, resurrection, ascension, and return in glory, and concluding by confessing the Holy Spirit, the Church, the resurrection of the dead, and eternal life. "[A]s we all know," Frances Young explains, "there are various ways of telling the same story depending on the selection of the material, if not the artistry of the narrator. These features are important pointers to the fundamental nature of the creeds: they are summaries of the gospel, digests of the scriptures."[46] Like the written gospels, the creeds are also rational means to preserve the gospel. But preserving the gospel also required being clear about "the Son's relationship to God and then to the human race." This resulted in the trinitarian and incarnational teachings in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

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[44] Arand, Kolb, Nestingen, *Lutheran Confessions,* 41.

[45] Frances Young, *The Making of the Creeds* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1991), 5.

[46] Young, *Making of the Creeds,* 5.

The particular genius of Lutheran theology is that Lutherans use the Scriptures and the Regula Fidei as a means to advance what Robert Kolb and Charles Arand call a "Wittenberg way of thinking" in various writings, especially in their book, *The Genius of Luther's Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary Church.*[47] The "genius" they argue is that the means of Scripture and the Regula Fidei can define, not only a faithful confession of Jesus Christ or justification, but, also, what it means to human, which is a theological anthropology. The frame can also be the means to articulate how God communicates with His creates. The "genius" of Luther's theology in "A Wittenberg way of thinking," provides a frame to think about any under of topics because it is frame through which Lutherans can engage any theological topic. It is a rational means to an ends to explore and articulate the way of doing theology practiced by Luther and his Wittenberg colleagues and advanced by the Lutheran Confessions.

In this case they advance theological anthropology and how God communicates. Kolb and Arand write:

> This volume does not follow a traditional model of presenting Lutheran doctrine, namely, one topic at a time…. Instead, readers will find in these pages two extensive essays (parts 1 and 2) that portray the genius that guided the crafting of Wittenberg teaching, sketching a 'Wittenberg way' of thinking biblically and theologically. Both essays intend to anchor their framework for such thinking historically, and both intend to offer readers foundational insights for the practice of theology, a matrix for the faithful formulation of the message of Scripture in the twenty-first century.[48]

Notice how Kolb and Arand are explicitly interested a "'Wittenberg way' of thinking" and "a matrix for the faithful formulation of the message of Scripture," rather than "follow a traditional model of presenting Lutheran doctrine." These are unmistakable signs of interest in the

[47] See also the collection by Robert Kolb and Charles Arand, *The Way of Concord: From Historic Text to Contemporary Witness* (St. Louis: Concordia Seminary Press, 2016).

[48] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Lutheran Theology*, 13–14.

rationality of the Lutheran Reformation. What Kolb and Arand did was identify, explain and propose a particular *means* for faithfully bringing the message today.

Others have understood this "Wittenberg way of thinking" as a rationality. One reviewer put it this way: "Luther's genius was not his destination but how he went upon his journey."[49] The contrast drawn here is between particular conclusions and the underlying logic. Conclusions certainly matter. But how does one keep a tradition going? Not simply by repeating the conclusions. It is by being able to take a similar journey, that is, by continuing to operate according to the same rationality. Luther's genius, so to speak, lay in the rationality he highlighted and pursued, rather than in particular conclusions.

Kolb and Arand recognized this. They also appreciated that this had been largely forgotten. So, they proceed (as the quote above noted) by first "anchor[ing] their framework for such thinking historically" but then they "intend to offer readers foundational insights for the practice of theology." These insights were reasons in doing theology, not conclusions to be reached.

One way that Kolb and Arand describe the framework of how God's Word can be interpreted is as a "body of teaching." It is not necessary, they say, to examine every article or member of the body of doctrine, but, rather, to provide governing principles (rules and norms) through which they believe. "The concept of the proper working of God's Word involves our understanding of how its whole relates to its various parts and how those individual 'teachings' relate to his 'teaching' or message as a whole."[50]

Luther and Melanchthon used the metaphor of the body to describe the means by which

[49] Joe McGarry, a review of "Robert Kolb and Charles R. Arand. *The Genius of Luther's Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary*," in *The International Journal of Systematic Theology* 13, no. 3 (July 2011): 373–74.

[50] Kolb and Arand, *Genuis of Luther's Theology*¸ 208.

biblical teaching can be summarized and priority given to how the body works.

> We could compare its head to our understanding of Christ and its heart to the teaching regarding the justification of the sinner before God. One arm might be the doctrine of baptism, the other the biblical teaching regarding the Lord's Supper; the circulatory system represents the proper distinction of law and gospel, the nervous system the distinction of two kinds of human righteousness. With this metaphor we can answer two aspects of the question 'How pure does our teachings have to be?' The metaphor helps us properly grasp the necessity of correctly understanding what the Bible teaches.[51]

The metaphor of the body provides Lutherans to properly understand how God's Word is summarized as well as how it works a body of teaching. In this way, Lutherans can evaluate and regulate those teachings that keeps them focused on a faithful confession of what the Bible teaches.

The body metaphor provides a helpful way for Christians to determine the rules and norms of what really matters and what takes priority in a vast network of options. With this in mind, Kolb and Arand describe how this system of the body works to provide governing principles for faith and life from the Word of God.

> These presuppositions or governing principles provide the energy and the direction for the formation and application of the truths of Scripture as expressed in the many articles of faith or doctrinal topics that help us organize our processing and delivery of the biblical witness to God and his interaction with his human creatures. This is the manner in which Luther's anthropological presuppositions of the two kinds of human righteousness and his theological presuppositions of the Word of God serving as God's instrument of the presence and power in the world function in the Wittenberg theology.[52]

The two presuppositions that Kolb and Arand articulate in *The Genius of Luther's Theology* are the Two Kinds of Human Righteousness and a particular theology of the Word of God. Both presuppositions demonstrate the means by which Lutherans do theology. Here is how: Both the

[51] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 208–9.

[52] Kolb and Arand, *Genuis of Luther's Theology*, 14.

Two Kinds of Human Righteousness and the theology of God's Word have their origin in God the Creator. The Two Kinds of Human Righteousness answer the question, "What does it mean to be human?" It answers this question from the origin of God being the Creator. Since God is the Creator, there are two ways in which every creature rightly pursues its existence of what it means to be human. The first way is in relationship to God. In a right relationship with God the Creator, one is passive. One's very existence comes through God's creative Word, and one's redemption comes through the recreative Word. The human creature receives from God, and the human creature properly responds in faith and trust. The second way is active righteousness which orients the human creature in the world God made for the wellbeing of other human creatures and for the creation itself. These Two Kinds of Human Righteousness are central to the theological argument of the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. [53]

This distinction matters broadly because it applies to theological topics like faith and works. Christian identity is exercised in faith and good works. Faith is a gift from God and the human creature lives before God (*coram deo*) in passive righteousness. But faith is active in good works from the identity humans have before the world (*coram mundo*). This is articulated in the Formula of Concord.[54] Kolb and Arand summarize what this life looks like: "First, faith gives the Christian a new orientation and new spiritual impulses. Second, everything that a human creature does in faith as a child of God that is not contrary to his will is a good work (Romans 14:23)."[55] The Two Kinds of Human Righteousness also finds appropriation in Augsburg Confession in Article II concerning Original Sin, Article IV Concerning Justification, Article XX Concerning Faith and Good Works. The various appropriations of the Two Kinds of

[53] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 24–27.

[54] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 104–5. SD IV in Kolb and Wengert, 576.

[55] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 105.

Human Righteousness speak to how vastly it flows through f the Lutheran body of doctrine like a nervous system.[56]

Likewise, the other presupposition of the theology of the Word of God also flows through the body of doctrine's nervous system. This presupposition articulates how God deals with His creation primarily through His word. Although attention is rightly paid to the content of the Word of God, Kolb and Arand identify six *functions* of the Word in Luther's theology. Three are of special interest for this dissertation:

> "The Word creates." "God's speaking is the foundation of all reality apart from his person."[57]
>
> "The Word re-creates." "God's original creation of all reality also served Luther as the model for God's re-creating activity in bringing sinners back to himself[58]
>
> "The Word elicits faith." "The Creator generates such trust at the center of his human creatures by speaking to them, through his commitment and promise to them in the various forms of his Word…. A divine promise is a word that does not subject itself to proof or testing. It is a word that elicits trust from its hearers and binds them on the one who promises."[59]

The functions of the God's Word are also appropriated in the Augsburg Confession in Article V Concerning the Ministry of the Church, Article VII Concerning the Church, IX–XIII Concerning Baptism, The Lord's Supper, Concerning the Confession, Concerning Repentance, and Concerning the Use of the Sacraments. As with the Two Kinds of Human Righteousness, the theology of God's Word pulsates through the nervous system of Lutheran theology.

This how Lutherans reason. To say it another way, these are the means to the ends. This is authentic Christian rationality. As Kolb, Arand, and others mentioned above suggest, the

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[56] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 14.

[57] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 135–36.

[58] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 137. See also "God's Word kills and makes alive" (148 ff., esp. 156).

[59] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 140, 141.

Scripture and the Regula Fidei are understood well as providing a rational frame for Christian life and thought. "Post-Foundationalist Confessional Frame of Rationality" is the label this dissertation gives to this frame of reason. This frame consists of two canons: the primary canon of the written Word of God or the Scripture, and the second canon is comprised by the Creeds and Confessions of the Church. This second canon serves as a response and norming frame to the canon of Scripture.

From this perspective, catechesis may be understood as consisting of the different means the Church uses to impart the rationality of this frame. Catechesis teaches both the Gospel or Scripture as the primary canon and the Regula Fidei as a response to form a rationality within the catechumen.

It is important to clarify why these two canons are retained and promoted in Lutheran Confessionalism. First, both canons have the same starting point: God is the creator. Second, historically for Lutherans, the primary theological means to guide the teaching of the Scriptures and the Regula Fidei has been Luther's Small Catechism. The catechism is not merely a book of Christian facts, but rather as Charles Arand describes, a "handbook" for Christian life. Arand writes:

> Luther designed his catechisms to accompany the Christian from Baptismal font (from which he or she received new birth) to the grave (from which he or she will rise to new life). Along this journey the catechism keeps the Christian centered on the chief articles of the Christian faith. In doing so, it provides the Christian with a defense against spiritual assaults on the one hand and assists Christians in making sense of their lives on the other hand. To that end, the catechisms provide an invaluable service to the novice and veteran of the faith alike.[60]

"Making sense of their lives" implies a rationality which Luther's catechisms impart.

[60] Charles Arand, *That I May Be His Own: An Overview of Luther's Catechisms* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2000), 115.

Given the rational frame outlined above and the theological method of Post-Foundationalist Confessionalism, it is necessary to explore how this is appropriated to catechesis as a rational means to an ends. The first part argues that the method of catechesis matters. In order to incorporate what a psychological view of rationality teaches, as argued above, the means of communicating and teaching this rationality must be considered. The argument below states that catechesis is taught appropriately by implementing the ancient learning method of the Trivium. This was the assumed method of learning being practiced in Luther's day, and it is the learning method assumed in Luther's Small Catechism. It will also provide an example of how this may be done in contemporary settings.

Chapters Four through Six will appropriate various features of gleaned from the research presented in the previous section. It will argue that these features are necessary to incorporate in order to achieve the ends of catechesis. It will be argued that contemporary psychology and educational insights do not replace the scriptures, but amplify the means through which the faith is imparted by the Word of God. The Word is the means, but appropriating features of psychological learning enable it to be communicated in a more receptive environment.

"For You": Appropriation for Catechesis in the Individual's Life

> Is it not the great defect of our education to-day… that although we often succeed in teaching our pupils 'subjects,' we fail lamentably on the whole in teaching them how to think? They learn everything except the art of learning? It is as though we had taught a child mechanically and by rule of thumb to play *The Harmonious Blacksmith* upon the piano, but had never taught him the sale or how to read music.[61]

Writing immediately following World War II, Dorothy L. Sayers laments the condition of communication in her country. Literacy is at the highest rate in history, but people cannot speak

[61] Dorothy Sayers, "The Lost Tools of Learning," Classical Christian https://classicalchristian.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Dorothy_Sayers_The_Lost_Tools_of_Learning.pdf, accessed June 8, 2023, 6.

to one another, writers do not know what terms they are using, young people forget everything they have learned in school, and, although we can read and write, none of the writing makes sense. Sayers concludes emphatically that despite the educational advances of her time, students do not know how to think because they do not have the language tools or the education models, which she believes are necessary to think.

Sayers' solution is to return to the Middle Ages and the ancient Trivium: Grammar, Logic/Dialectic, Rhetoric. "The whole of the Trivium was in fact intended to teach the pupil the proper use of the tools of learning, before he began to apply them to subject."[62] The Trivium provided a means to an ends. The means of learning grammar taught them the language itself. Logic (in some cases the word dialectic is used) taught them "how to use language, to define his terms and make accurate statements; how to construct an argument and how to detect fallacies in argument (his own arguments and other people's). Dialectic, that is to say, embraced Logic and Disruption."[63] Rhetoric taught students how to speak and be persuasive in their arguments. It taught them to set a thesis and gave them the tools from the previous components from which to defend that thesis. Sayers goes on to outline how this is does in various "subjects," including theology.[64]

Sayers's comments are significant because they provide a practical path forward, but they

[62] Sayers, "Lost Tools of Learning," 7.

[63] Sayers, "Lost Tools of Learning," 7.

[64] Sayers, "Lost Tools of Learning," 13–14. Theology is the Mistress-science, without which the whole educational structure will necessarily lack its final synthesis. Those who disagree about this will remain content to leave their pupils' education still full of loose ends. This will matter rather less than it might, since by the time that the tools of learning have been forged the will be able to tackle Theology for himself, and will probably insist upon doing so and making sense of it. Still, it is as well to have this matter also handy and ready for the reason to work upon. At the grammatical stage, therefore, we should become acquainted with the story of God and Man in outline—i.e., the Old and New Testament presented as parts of a single narrative of Creation, Rebellion, and Redemption—and also with 'the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments.' At this stage, it does not matter nearly so much that these things should be fully understood as that they should be known and remembered. Remember, it is material we are collecting (14).

also allow for God's children to be rationally formed in a way that is ultimately good for them. One of the great themes of the Early Church and the Reformation was that Christ-centered, Scripture alone doctrine normed by the Regula Fidei were "good for you." This is essentially Luther's argument against Erasmus about the bound will in the *De servo arbitrio.*

> I frankly confess that, for myself, even if it could be, I should not want "free-will" to be given me, nor anything to be left in my own hands to enable me to endeavour after salvation; not merely because in face of so many dangers, and adversities and assaults of devils, I could not stand my ground; but because even were there no dangers. I should still be forced to labour with no guarantee of success.¦ But now that God has taken my salvation out of the control of my own will, and put it under the control of His, and promised to save me, not according to my working or running, but according to His own grace and mercy, I have the comfortable certainty that He is faithful and will not lie to me, and that He is also great and powerful, so that no devils or opposition can break Him or pluck me from Him. Furthermore, I have the comfortable certainty that I please God, not by reason of the merit of my works, but by reason of His merciful favour promised to me; so that, if I work too little, or badly, He does not impute it to me, but with fatherly compassion pardons me and makes me better. This is the glorying of all the saints in their God.[65]

The Gospel freed Luther to live as God's child. It was good for him to have the truth of God's Word and work, but also to live in relationship with Him and fellow believers in His promises.

Ellen Charry makes the point that the Enlightenment introduced concepts into theology that challenged Christians to consider other theological concepts which we not necessarily focused on what was good for Christians.

> [Calvin's] theology turned Protestantism away from the vision of God as the goal of life and instead stressed the certainty of trust in God's love, even while insisting that God indeed may not elect all to salvation. With the seventeenth century, abetted by the epistemology of John Locke, theology began to dismantle the notion of sapience all together.
>
> Sapiential theology warmed with modernity. Theology came to be thought of as the intellectual justification of the faith, apart from the practice of the Christian life. The wisdom of God has ceased to function in the church as the foundation of a good life. Theology is no longer expected to be a practical discipline, burdened as it is in the modern period with the awkwardness of speaking of God at all. Theology became

[65] Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will*, trans. J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids: Revell, 1957), 313–14.

> preoccupied with considerations of the conditions of knowledge. And even this enterprise is now question by the descendants of Nietzsche, who dispute the notion of knowledge altogether, asserting that knowledge is simply a front for power.[66]

The loss of theology in general, and catechesis specifically, being dedicated to the aim of providing what is "good for you," is what this the follow seeks to restore. This is best restored by providing the right kind of theological method, both the process of catechesis itself, but also the content of what is being taught.

In that spirit, proposed is a brief outline of how the Trivium might be taught in the local congregation without a Lutheran day school. It could be added to or subtracted from in any number possible ways, but it encourages the categories of the Trivium to be implemented at the appropriate age level.

First, the Church should appreciate the value of memorization to establish a storehouse of factual information. Remembering that repetition is the foundational exercise for creating long-term memory, congregations should engage in practices that provide for this opportunity. For example, one model is used by the author of this dissertation. First, long-term memory is achieved by reciting, that is, practicing the texts of the Ten Commandments, Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer at Sunday School Opening to create long-term memory. It is the intention that these texts become automatic. The same is done with the meanings in Luther's Small Catechism during catechism instruction by dividing up and reciting the Six Chief Parts and their meanings throughout the year. This is a second-tier approach to learning based upon the foundational texts of the Small Catechism. Here exploration in recitation of Luther's meanings, will give way to application to what they mean for the Christian. Further appropriation is also

[66] Ellen T. Charry, *By the Renewing of Your Mind: Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4–5.

made to the Christian life, callings and service which the Christian does *because* they are a child of their Father.

In Seventh and Eighth grade, which is what the pastor teaches here, each class begins with a question or problem for the students to consider. This exercise is connected to the rhetorical or logical component of the Trivium. Because students are accompanied by their parents, this serves as an opportunity for students and parents to consider together the question or problem. Constituting the environment, these questions range in difficultly and seriousness, but are designed to stimulate thought and conversation. The question may be accompanied by a game or exercise to further stimulate the point or truth being conveyed in one of the chief parts of the catechism. Once the this is completed, students and parents explore the Scriptures or a point of doctrine that needs to be further understood. In other words, we get to the point of the catechetical teaching. The aim is to get their attention, enable them to respond using their long-term memory, and stimulate their thinking in the short-term by challenging to consider what God wants them to believe and confess. Being able to connect the doctrine or teaching to a specific text helps them be able to logically process and access (or reason).

Finally, the rhetorical process comes as they can articulate their faith through examination. Examination can take many forms from a faith-profession paper or question and answer. It could also take an apologetic aim in which catechumens are asked to explain and defend their faith. Certainly, this is helpful to be able to form, answer, and defend articles of their faith.

Of course, this is not an exhaustive or overly substantial explanation, but a brief illustration of the possibility that the Trivium method gives to catechesis. More research and appropriation can and should be given to the actual implementation of this method within the context of the congregation. Allowances for location, age, educational abilities, and overall context for learning

should be considered.

Catechetical Method

The psychological view of rationality (more about this in Chapter Four) teaches us to consider reason in a context. It addresses the impact that influence and biases have and how these are present and passed on in everyone's context. It also teaches value of relationships, stories, and method have in forming memory. By helping us consider the challenges of thinking, we can learn to teach the faith in a way that is faithful to the Lord, His word in the Scriptures and normed by the Creeds and Confessions. Below are some insights demonstrated above which may be appropriated to catechesis, that is, teaching the Christian faith.

Luther's Small Catechism has been used for centuries as the rational means to an ends. It is the means to teach the Word of God and to norm the way the word is communicated. The Formula of Concord called Luther's Small Catechism the "the Bible of the Laity, for everything is summarized that is treated in detail in the Holy Scriptures and that is necessary for Christians to know for salvation."[67] Its versatility in forming has been noted by John Pless.

> The Small Catechism is multifaceted. Eric Gritsch has called it a 'whetstone' for the Church as it sharpens the basic distinctions necessary for Christian proclamation and life. Kirsi Stjerna identifies it as a 'compass,' for it navigates the Church's reading of Scripture. Charles Arand says that the Small Catechism is a 'theological Swiss Army knife,' for it can be used for several tasks. The Small Catechism is a handbook in doctrine, summarizing the Scriptures' teaching of human sin and God's mercy in Christ. It serves as a prayer book. Ludwig Ihmels opined that 'the Catechism is not only a school book, and not only a confessional book but it is a life book.'[68]

Pless will advance that the Catechism is a manual for discipleship because it encompasses all of these things as it teaches the Christian faith to God's children.

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[67] Ep 5 in Kolb and Wengert, 487.

[68] John Pless, *Luther's Small Catechism: A Manual for Discipleship* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2019), 7.

Exploration of these versatile claims about the rational means of the Small Catechism is helpful. The Small Catechism, as noted above, was written by for the rational means to teach all people the Christian faith. Luther himself wrote about his intention that the Small Catechism be used as a manual for faith and life in his Preface to the Large Catechism, and used himself as an example for those to follow.

> But I say this myself: I am also a doctor and a preacher, just as learned and experienced as all of them who are so high and mighty. Nevertheless, each morning, and whenever else I have time, I do as child who is being taught the catechism and I read and recite word for word the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, the Creed, the Psalms, etc. I must still read and study the catechism daily; and yet I cannot master it as I wish, but must remain a child and pupil of the catechism–and I also do so gladly. These fussy, fastidious fellows would like quickly; with one reading to be doctors above all doctors, to know it all and to need nothing more. Well this, too, is a sure sign that they despise both their office and the people's souls, yes, even God and his Word. They do not need to fall, for they have already fallen all too horribly. What they need, however, is to become children and begin to learn the ABCs, which they think they have long since outgrown.
>
> Even if their knowledge of the catechism were perfect (although that is impossible in this life), yet it is highly profitable and fruitful to read it daily and to make it the subject of meditation and conversation, and meditation the Holy Spirit is present and bestows ever new and greater light and devotion, so that it tastes better and better and is digested as Christ also promises in Matthew 18[:20], 'Where two or three are gathered in my name, I am among them.'
>
> For this reason alone you should gladly read, recite, ponder, and practice the catechism, even if the only advantage and benefit you obtain from it is to drive away the devil and evil thoughts. For he cannot bear to hear God's Word. And God's Word is not like some idle tale… but as St. Paul says in Romans 1[:16], it is 'the power of God' that burns the devil's house down and gives us immeasurable strength, comfort, and help.[69]

The catechism was given to the family "as the head of the household should teach." By so doing, Luther moved the teaching the faith into the home and daily life. The faith was no longer exclusively in the hands of the doctors of the Church, but Luther gave fathers and mothers for use in the context of the home where all could daily hear, read, mark, learn, and digest.

[69] Large Catechism Preface.11 in Kolb and Wengert, 381.

The Catechism was used as a rational means to teach Christians, both the content of the Christian faith and how that faith formed them in a life of prayer. Luther, himself, regarded the Small Catechism as his own personal prayer book.

> I regard the personal prayer books as by no means the least objectionable. They drub into the minds of simple people such a wretched counting up of sins and going to confession, such un-Christian tomfoolery about prayers to God and his saints! Moreover, these books are puffed up with promises of indulgences and come out with decorations in red ink and pretty titles.... These books need a basic and thorough reformation if not total extermination.[70]

In contrast to the numerous breviaries and devotional books of his day, Luther believed that the texts of the Ten Commandments, Creed, and Lord's Prayer were enough for him to teach him about the Father who commanded him to pray and promised to hear him in Jesus Christ. It was the Father's word that alone could protect, counsel, and comfort. These texts formed him in this faith as he prayed and meditated upon them.

Luther's 1535 letter to Peter Beskendorf (his barber) titled "A Simple Way to Pray" offers further evidence that Luther intended the Catechism to be used as a means for prayer. Luther was realistic. He knew that the devil and the flesh were always going to attempt to preempt Christians from praying.

> First, when I feel that I have become cool and joyless in prayer because of other thoughts (for the flesh and the devil always impede or obstruct prayer), I take my little Psalter, hurry to my room, or, if it be the day and hour for it, to church where a congregation is assembled and, as time permits, I say quietly to myself and word-for-word the Ten Commandments, the Creed, and if I have time, some words of Christ or of Paul, or some Psalms, just as a child might do (LW 43: 193).

> It was the Lord's Prayer, especially, that formed Luther's understand of prayer. His childlike approach encourages Peter to consider praying like one would consider speaking to his father and holding on to this means of communicating as a source of life and health.

[70] Martin Luther, "Personal Prayer Book" in *Devotional Writings II*, ed. Gustav K. Wiencke, vol. 43, *Luther's Works* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), 11.

> This in short is the way I use the Lord's Prayer when I pray it. To this day I suckle at the Lord's Prayer like a child, and as an old man eat and drink from it and never get my fill. It is the very best prayer, even better than the Psalter, which is so very dear to me. It is surely evident that a real master composed and taught it. What a great pity that the prayer of such a master is prattled and chattered so irreverently all over the world!... In a word, the Lord's Prayer is the greatest martyr on earth (as are the Name and Word of God). Everybody tortures and abuses it; few take comfort and joy in its proper use (LW 43: 200).[71]

With the Lord's Prayer as a Christian's model and guide, the Christian could be confident that it was the prayer from the Lord Jesus Himself, and as such, could take comfort that it was His words in their mouths. It was this prayer that was the means that brought the ends of comfort and joy.

Catechesis is an instance of operating by the *analogia fidei.* Because the Catechism delivered into the mouths of Christians the very words of God, at the same time, it provided a rational norm, a Regula Fidei, to understand the Scriptures. Luther trusted that these texts were enough to teach and retain the Christian faith in the laypeople in the practical piety of prayer. To that end he writes:

> Indeed, the total content of Scripture and preaching and everything a Christian needs to know is quite fully and adequately comprehended in these three items [i.e., Ten Commandments, Creed, Lord's Prayer]. They summarize everything with such brevity and clarity that no one can complain or make excuse that the things necessary for his salvation are too complicated or difficult for him to remember.
>
> Three things a person must know in order to be saved. First, he must know what to do and what to leave undone. Second, when he realizes that he cannot measure up to what he should do or leave undone, he needs to know where to go to find the strength that he requires. Third, he must know how to seek and obtain that strength. It is just like a sick person who first has to determine the nature of his sickness, then find out what to do or leave undone. After that he has to know where to get the medicine which will help him do or leave undone what is right for a healthy person. Then he has to desire or search for this medicine and to obtain it or have it brought to him. Thus the commandments teach man to recognize his sickness, enabling him to perceive what he must do or refrain from doing, consent to or refuse, and so he will recognize himself to be a sinful and wicked person. The Creed will teach and show

[71] John T. Pless, "Fidelity to the Catechism in Prayer and Teaching," *Lutheran Forum* (Fall, 2005): 13.

> him where to find medicine—grace—which will help him to become devout and keep the commandments. The Creed points him to God and his mercy, given and made plain to him in Christ. Finally, the Lord's Prayer teaches [him how to ask for this grace, get it, and take it to himself, to wit, by habitual, humble, comforting prayer; then grace is given, and by the fulfillment of God's commandments he is saved]. In these three are the essentials of the entire Bible.[72]

Luther's Small Catechism enabled Christians to, not only have a textbook to teach them the essential doctrines of the Christian faith, but a multifaceted book which shaped their entire life in Christ. He accomplished what few could by incorporating both theological truth and training in discipleship and piety using facets of educational method including reality forming questions, emotions, and stories.

Stories are important to impart the faith both personally and collectively. The Small Catechism is replete with biblical stories which teach the truth being conveyed, but which also connected to the hearers to the biblical witness. Luther's early catechisms also featured woodcuts to convey the truth of the text you may not have been able to read, as well as hymns and chorales that invited the catechism to be used in Church services and at home. Stories and images should be included in catechetical instruction. Our human story is founded and shaped by God's story. He is our creator and redeemer. His word communicates, not merely human history, also it does that, but it is our history, too. It is the history of how God, our Father, created the world, its creatures, and human life. It's a story about relationships: from the fall into sin and was redeemed by Jesus Christ. It is an emotional story, because it wraps within its pages the hopes and dreams, failures and loss, sorrows and joys of God's children ravaged by sin personally and intimately, and, yet saved by His grace alone. These stories are normed by the Creeds and Confessions of the Church. These are not any old story; it is *the* story.

[72] *LW* 43:13; cf. Pless, "Fidelity to the Catechism in Prayer and Teaching," 8–15.

As the "Christian story of everything" catechesis must also include how God's story forms, shapes, destroys, and enlivens our story by telling His story. Because of our place as God's children in His creation, we must be formed to see the world His way. But we also are able to see that His story that is not *just* about you and me, it is about everything and all of us.[73] Since within this story, everything is up for grabs, Christians should be aware of how the Bible and Creeds and Confessions (Regula Fidei) convey their story. They do so, as Okamoto says, "by doing it."[74] The Catechism promotes this. First, with the Creed, which brings the individual Christian into the Story. "I believe that God has made me … I believe that Jesus Christ … is my Lord, who has redeemed me … that I may be his own and live under him in his kingdom … I cannot by my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ … but the Holy Spirit has called me by the gospel. Second the life of the believer, by keeping the commandments and by praying. Third, by bringing in the means by which God makes believers: Baptism the Lord's Supper, confession and absolution.

The rational end goal of catechesis is that Christians can claim "His story, is *my* story" as the navigate life. This rationality has to be continually formed in us because it is part of the relationship we have with God. This is who His kids are, this is what His kids believe, this is what His kids do. "We must teach the Lord's teaching, but he must facilitate the learning and he does that in those crises when other gods refuse to work and he alone is present, when his word alone sounds through the darkness with his call and comfort."[75] It may be helpful at times to incorporate the stories of fellow Christians, the Saints, who have gone before or who are present

[73] Okamoto, "Word of the Cross," 53.

[74] Okamoto, "Word of the Cross," 55.

[75] Robert Kolb, *Teaching God's Children His Teaching: A Guide for the Study of Luther's Catechism* (St. Louis: Concordia Seminary Press, 2012), 30.

now. It is a common practice to invite Christians to come share their story with the catechumen. The Catechism is not really learned until life strikes, and our instruction may be a long time in coming to fruition for some of our students."[76] These stories witness to the Father who has acted in Christ to make children to live in the world carrying out the work He's given them to do. These stories make a "worldmaker."[77]

The concept of worldmaker brings together the person's own story and experiences with that of another story. In catechesis (and preaching) this is done by bringing into a person's story and experiences, the story of God's creative and redemptive work. This is a crucial aspect for catechesis, which highlights Willingham's work on the influence of story in memory making. "Depending on what we hear from others and tell ourselves, we add and subtract, refine and revise, reorder and rearrange. As a result, we bring into existence a new world version. 'Worldmaking as we know it always starts from the worlds already at hand; *the making it a remaking*.'"[78] Catechists will do this as the remake the individuals world in the image of the God's word and work. "To do this preachers [teachers] must explain, teach, and correct misunderstandings about God, the world, and the human condition. Through this teaching, preachers [teachers] make the world for hearers as it really is."[79] Because God's promise is always "for you," teachers will apply this directly into the lives and experiences of the individual's story into the new world of God's story. "When this happens, and when God works and strengthens faith in their hearts according to his gracious will, this world becomes *their*

[76] Kolb, *Teaching God's Children His Teaching*, 30.

[77] Peter Nafzger, "Preacher as Worldmaker: Reflections on the Nature and Purpose of Christian Preaching," *Concordia Journal*, 45, no 1 (Winter 2019): 57.

[78] Nafzger, "Preacher as Worldmaker," 57.

[79] Nafzger, "Preacher as Worldmaker," 57.

world."[80]

Catechesis should operate using metaphors[81] which teach children their identity, but also how they should think about the God who made and redeemed them. These metaphors should teach them how to think about themselves. The metaphor of father and children is found in all three of the primary texts of the Small Catechism: The Ten Commandments, Apostles' Creed, and Lord's Prayer. It is also a primary metaphor in the redemption of the Father's children in Holy Baptism. The Small Catechism teaches that children to believe and reason by means of their identity: "He is our true Father and we are His true children."[82] Teaching them to confess the identity of who their God is, that He is their true Father, and that individually and collectively, they are His true children, is imparting to them a way of looking at themselves and the creation in which their Father has placed them. Doing so is communicating a rationality. By means of the Scriptures and Regula Fidei God children at taught that God is their father, that He made them, that His word teaches them how they are to be. The end of reason is that they are His children. This rationality also confesses the gift of this relationship lived out through the trust He gives through faith. In the end, they confess what He did and who He makes them to be. "Believing is always inextricably linked with teaching. God's people cannot be quiet precisely because they are God's children, chips off the old block, imitating-projecting the image of-their heavenly Father as children always wont to do. They taught teach."[83] They also confess His desire and their need to be with Him and live under Him and His fatherly kingdom, and by His grace live life as His kids. His word in Scripture and the Regula Fidei, becomes their study and

[80] Nafzger, "Preacher as Worldmaker," 57.

[81] More will be written about metaphors in the next chapter.

[82] Martin Luther, *Luther's Small Catechism with Explanation* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2017), 19–20.

[83] Kolb, *Teaching God's Children*, 21.

delight. Through this word they are preserved as the word is engraved in their memories, processed, and publicly confessed so that they can say: "I will delight in your statutes; I will not forget your word" (Psalm 119:61).

Luther's Small Catechism abounds with versatile means to impart the truth of God's Word. From memorization, stories, and images, to teaching Law and Gospel, the prayer and the Sacraments, the faith is conveyed to those who hear, read, mark, learn, and digest it. This method handed down beginning with Irenaeus to Luther to the present, preserves an orthodox confession of faith. Because it is the Word of God in a condensed, summarized form, it provides a norming norm for the Lutheran Confession. In this way, the tradition of rationality in the Lutheran Church is handed down from one generation to another.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to show how Christians after Foundationalism might recover their authentic rationality. It did so, first, by exploring the genius of Irenaeus' two canons, the Scripture and the Regula Fidei. In time of great division and controversy in the Church, Irenaeus provided a means to an end, that is, a rational frame through which a faithful teaching centered in Jesus Christ and the Word of the Gospels could be confessed and maintained. Lutheran confessionalism followed Irenaeus' genius by following his confession of two canons and appropriating it as "their very own" during the Lutheran Reformation. But the Lutheran Reformation also further developed a Christian rationality. Robert Kolb and Charles Arand have recently brought this forward by showing how the Lutheran tradition of theology and practice operates through two presuppositions: the Two Kinds of Human Righteousness and the theology of God's Word. These presuppositions function like the nervous system of the Lutheran body of doctrine works as a means to an end.

The Lutheran frame of reason "Post-Foundationalist Confessionalism" is imparted in various ways, but a key way is through catechesis. Catechesis is a means to teach the Christian faith in line with the canons of the Scriptures and the Regula Fidei. Dorothy Sayers provides important insights into how Classical education provides a helpful method to teach children how to think, which is one basic goal of catechesis.

Doctrine does not exist for itself, but is means of serving the work and word of Jesus Christ so that all may hear and believe, and by believing have life in His name. Chapter Three will consider what Foundationalist Rationalism said about the reasoner; it will consider its anthropology. Contrasting this anthropology is what the Scriptures and Regula Fidei teach about what it means to be human. Robert Kolb and Charles Arand help bridge this in their *The Genius of Luther's Theology.*

CHAPTER THREE

THE REASONER

Introduction

This dissertation promised to survey different ways of understanding reason and reasoning that challenge the dominant paradigm following the Enlightenment, what the dissertation terms "Foundationalist Rationalism," and to advance some proposals for Christians and their own understanding of reason and reasoning today.

Chapters One and Two focused on how reasoning should take place. Chapter One focused on the nature of reason and rationality in the Enlightenment It examined the influence of Foundationalist Rationalism on Christian theology and practice, and it highlighted and evaluated some important ways in which Foundationalist Rationalism has been criticized and superseded in recent decades. This chapter focused on the "acontextualism" of Foundationalist Rationalism, which is its assumption that human reasoning takes place ideally free from the influence of contexts like traditions and cultural backgrounds. Accordingly, this chapter focused on proposals that argued how acontextualism is a mistake, and how all reasoning must be understood as taking place in contexts like traditions and cultural backgrounds.

Chapter Two took the further step of asking about a specifically Christian rationality. It showed how the Christian Church since ancient times has been seeking to preserve its distinctive rationality by identifying certain standards or canons. Irenaeus inaugurated this method in the second century by advancing the two canons, the Regula Fidei and the four Gospels, to serve as rules or norms to identify orthodox preaching and teaching of the gospel. Later the entire Church adopted this approach by acknowledging formal creeds and by identifying a canon of apostolic writings. During the Reformation, the emerging Lutheran tradition, desiring to show and

maintain its own orthodoxy, consciously adopted this approach with the Augsburg Confession and the entire Book of Concord. But the Lutheran tradition also advanced some theological distinctions, not formally stated but clearly implied in both theology and practice. The chief ones which Luther advanced were his teaching of what it means to be human, or the Two Kinds of Human Righteousness, and how God communicates to humans through His Word, or the theology of the Word of God.

But a survey about reason should also include consideration about the reasoners and not only reasoning itself. The latter chapters of the dissertation will do this. This chapter serves as a bridge from Chapters One and Two to Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

This theological bridge takes us from the Enlightenment's concept of rationality to the anthropology that accompanies this concept. This model of what a human being is can be summarized by phrases like "thinking machine" and "thinking thing." In contrast to this model, these chapters will identify and argue for some alternative anthropological models that are congruent with Christian faith and practice, or, to use the language of this dissertation, that are congruent with Christian rationality.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six will evaluate how Foundationalist Rationalism required a particular anthropology to the person. These chapters also will lay out these questions, criticisms, and arguments that provide a fuller, more realistic anthropology than Foundationalist Rationalism. Accordingly, in seeking to recover a more authentic Christian anthropology, theology should also consider these questions, criticisms, and alternative anthropologies by considering what they mean for theological anthropology. In doing so, appropriations from this research will be applied to theological anthropology and Christian practice. This is what Chapters Four, Five, and Six pursue.

Before turning to specific questions, criticisms, and alternatives, it is necessary to consider anthropology more generally, both Foundationalist Rationalism and Christian anthropology, in view of Foundationalist Rationalism. Chapters Four, Five, and Six will explore three features of current research in cognitive science that will provide a more expanded view of anthropology beyond Foundationalist Rationalism, which expand the Christian view of anthropology.

The Enlightenment Reasoner

The bridge from the tenets of Foundationalist Rationalism to a more expanded view of theological anthropology begins by considering what these tenets of Foundationalist Rationalism required from the person who reasons or the reasoner. Foundationalist Rationalism's anthropology required a reasoner who reasoned best along the lines of the axiomatic method of mathematics. The axiomatic method functions by specific rules of logical deductions based on certain propositions or axioms. The axiomatic method, in line with its acontextualism and universalism, assumes that the ideal reasoner is one capable of operating in the axiomatic method consistently, that is, universally. Because of the universal natures of the axiomatic method, it can be applied universally. It idealizes and limits humans as "thinking machines" or "thinking things."

We can see this kind of anthropology with Descartes.

Descartes' Anthropology

Following the Thirty Years War, Europeans began to piece together their lives after decades of religious warfare. It is within this context that Rene Descartes began to ask questions

about what it meant to be human.[1] Descartes' anthropology began with questions and doubts. He questions the existence of God and what it means that humans can have doubts and be fooled. Concluding that man can be deceived, he explores further what that says about himself. To free oneself from doubting one has to be free from the things that deceive. Those things Descartes concludes, are material. Material things deceive, even the material things of his own body.

If Descartes cuts out the material, what is left to free him from doubts? He is looking for something certain, an unshakable foundation, an Archimedean point he can look back upon. Eventually, he is left with himself, that is, his existence. "What I can conclude is that I exist."[2] "What then did I use to think I was? A man, of course. But what is a man? Might I not say a 'rational animal?' No, because then I would have to inquire what animal' and 'rational' mean."[3] He has already concluded that the material world deceives; it brings no certainty.

Descartes concedes that he exists, but what does *this* mean? "But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses."[4] What it means to be human for Descartes is what he, himself is able to perceive in his mind, his *cogito.* The mind brings certainty, the body is doubtful. He is a thing that exits and a thing that thinks. The result is Descartes famous phrase: *cogito ergo sum*. Since the *cogito* cannot be doubted, Descartes posited that only the *cogito* could bring certainty. Through this assessment, Descartes put forth a particular view of what it means to be human. His anthropology is humans are *thinking things*.

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[1] Anothy Kenny, *An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 207–8.

[2] Rene Descartes, *Rene Descartes: Meditations, Objections, and Replies,* ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 14.

[3] Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, 14.

[4] Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, 15.

What does this mean about everything else in the world? To be a thinking thing, Descartes argued that humans must be free from things like doubts, suspicions, traditions, and even the body itself. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concludes that the mind and the body are distinct from one another. The mind is what I understand as "me," but the body, while closely connected, is not a thinking thing and therefore not essential to a person's identity. Because of this, Descartes' quest for certainty can come only from the mind. It is the only indivisible thing.[5] The result of this is what is commonly called today the "mind/body dualism."

Pursuing certainty free from doubt led Descartes to conclude that man is a thinking thing. This anthropology became the dominant anthropology of Western civilization to the present. In order to sustain this anthropology, certain things must be maintained. First, man has to be free from anything that causes doubt like history, religion, tradition, and context. Free from those things, the reasoner is free from the influence of context. Since context does not limit a person to a specific age, it also can be said that their reasoning, because that is what a thinking thing does, is universal. This liberates man to be an autonomous or a free-thinking thing.

Such universal freedom finds certainty what "I" know through what philosopher Roger Scruton calls "first person privilege."[6] Since it is from the perspective of what "I know," everything is subjective. This is attractive because it means that reason results in being "me" being free; free from the body and the material doubt. While passions, desires, and emotions are present, the assumption is that these must be controlled and mastered by reason.

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[5] Rene Descartes, *Discourses and Meditations on the First Philosophy,* trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 101.

[6] Scruton, *Short History of Modern Philosophy*, 38–39. "My immediate certainty of my own mental states is contrasted with my uncertainty about all corporeal things, in such a way as to lend support to the contention that what I am is an immaterial, substantial being, accidentally and temporarily connected with the body through which I act. I am substance, but not a corporeal and my privileged awareness of the contents of my own consciousness is supposed somehow to be explained by that" (39).

What are some consequences of Descartes' anthropology? By separating itself from the body and the material, humans are left to rational exploration through internalization or introspection. Internalization leads to Descartes' ultimate goal for humanity, "self-sufficiency." "Self-sufficiency" means that the reasoner must objectify everything else in the world, that is, treat everything else as objects. Charles Taylor explains: "We have to objectify everything in the world, including our own bodies, and that means to come to see them mechanically and functionally, in the same way that an uninvolved external observer would."[7] In other words, humans become disembodied observers.

Descartes' anthropology was the prototype of the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. Its influence is shown philosophically in the mind/body dualism: if we are thinking things and the mind can be trusted, but the body is doubtful, what do you do with the body? The bifurcations of "objective/subjective" define the way humans navigate what is known. Religion, tradition, contexts, et cetera become suspicious because they lead to doubts. Religion is reduced to a "value" rather than a fact. Relegated to the subjective domain, things spiritual and religious brought about the modern phenomenon of unbelief.[8]

Is Descartes right? Are humans only thinking things and everything else is doubtful? Is that all there is to human anthropology? Certainly not. This is why Descartes' anthropology is being evaluated and reconsidered. His anthropology is extremely limiting. In reducing humans to thinking things, he excludes much of what has traditionally and widely been assumed to part of it means to be human, including feelings, memories, other people, and the external world. These

[7] Charles Taylor, *Sources of Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 147.

[8] Taylor, *Sources of Self*, 158. "This is the new conception of inwardness, as inwardness of self-sufficiency, of autonomous powers of ordering by reason, *also* prepared the ground for modern unbelief. It may even provide part of the explanation for the striking fact about modern Western civilization as against all others, the widespread incidence of unbelief within it" (158).

are not denied, but their absolute importance for being human is denied. Sociology demonstrates how much context and community matter for human development. Where you grow up, the family of origin you have, the kinds of education to which you are exposed form us differently. Feelings and emotions are real aspects of being human; psychology should be considered. Pain, injuries, and diseases are not imaginary; physical bodies matter.

This dissertation seeks an anthropological models for Christians that include more to what it means to be a human reasoner than Descartes proposed. Chapters Four, Five, and Six will explore various features of human anthropology that provide a fuller, richer, more realistic picture of the human reasoner. Meanwhile, we need to consider the consequences of Descartes anthropology personified in the human thinking machine adopted and exploited by Foundationalist Rationalism.

The Thinking Machine

Foundationalist Rationalism assertion that human rationality was logical, mathematical, and precise led to humans being compared to the modern digital computer. The clearest contemporary sign of this assumption is the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI assumes that the human mind can be imitated entirely by a set of assumptions and completely mechanical (valueless) procedures. For example, as this dissertation is being written, a great deal has been made of Generative Pre-programmed Transformers (GPT) and their ability not only to produce texts indistinguishable from those of human authors but even to carry on extended conversations with human beings.

AI assumes and promotes the Enlightenment idea that human reason is acontextual and universal. As such, the rationality and subsequent AI technology likens humans to “thinking machines.” The idea is that human reason is acontextual/universal, logical and mathematical is

an ancient one, originating with Plato and Aristotle, but the idea resurfaced in the 1650s with Thomas Hobbes, who reduced reason to computation. Rationality for Hobbes worked through symbols and methodical rules in a mechanical process. Ultimately, human reason operated mathematically. He is explicit about this to a degree that makes it clear why philosopher John Haugland, in his survey of AI, called him "the grandfather of AI."[9] According to Hobbes, "When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from *Addition* of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from *Subtraction* of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part."[10] Hobbes proceeded to show that this applied even to writers of politics and to lawyers, and he concluded: "In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there is also place for Season; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do."[11] Accordingly, he defined reason as "nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of general names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts…"[12] But it would be Alan Turing in the mid-Twentieth Century who spoke of computing machines as "imitating" human thinking in his 1950 article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," where he proposes a version of the "imitation game" to test the intelligence of computing machines. [13]

Philosopher John Searle calls this version of AI "weak AI" because it presupposes a computer can be built powerful enough to *simulate* any aspect of the human mind. But more

[9] John Haugeland, *Artificial Intelligence*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 23.

[10] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1914), 18.

[11] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 18.

[12] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 18.

[13] Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," *Mind Quarterly: A Review of Psychology and Philosophy* LIX, no. 236 (October 1950): 433–60.

recently, it has been proposed that human minds *are* versions of computing machines. They argue with that with the right software program, a computer can emulate or be equivalent to the human brain. John Searle calls this "strong AI."[14]

Artificial Intelligence is a mechanical form of intelligence that fits Foundationalist Rationalism's expectations of the human person. It presumes and demands that bias, feelings, or other variations do not exist, and that context and intelligence are consistently the same and applicable in all circumstances (universal). According to computer scientist Pei Wang, for this to happen naturally in humans, it requires that one's reasoning system meets the following requirements:

> Finite: The system can work with constant information–processing capacity, in terms of processor speed and storage space.
>
> Real–time: The system has to deal with problems that may appear at any moment and demand immediate response.
>
> Open: The system must face input data and problems of any content, as far as they can be expressed in a format recognizable to the system.[15]

This is what is required in order for the human brain to be optimal as computing machine. In other words, the brain must rationally function consistently inputting (acontextually and universality) as a computing machine.

Wang, however, goes on to conclude that while this version of mathematical logic or acontextual/universal reasoning is required for AI to function properly, it does not align with how humans think. Applying the mathematical logic of Foundationalist Rationalism is designed as an idealistic conception of human rational systems. He argues that axiomatic method is

[14] John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains and Programs," *Behavioral and Brain Science*, 3 (1980): 417–24. Also discussed in John R. Searle, *The Mind: A Brief Introduction* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2004), 62–64.

[15] Pei Wang, *Non-axiomatic Logic: A Model of Intelligent Reasoning,* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 14.

limited to mathematics and not does fully apply even for AI, let alone humans, because it is not realistic to human rational capabilities.[16]

But AI still raises the question of what it means to be human. If a robot (a type of artificial intelligence) acts like a human and looks like a human, is it/he/she human? This question is very general, and so a concrete illustration might help. Robert Jenson offered a telling one for Christians: "Suppose a robot were constructed that in general behaved intelligently, and when asked 'Do you believe in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit?' responded, without explicit antecedent programming, 'I believe, and ask God to help my unbelief.' Should the church thereupon baptize it?"[17] Jenson said that this question derived from a team in an AI laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A member of this team included for a time "a theologian, whose half-quizzical goal was to build a robot she could baptize."[18] Even if one answers like Jenson—no, the robot should not be baptized, because the robot is not a human creature—we are left with the question, "Exactly how are we different?" This means we should be clear about our answer to the question, "What is a human being?" especially as a reasoning or rational being.

The Enlightenment Reasoner: A Thinking Machine

Immanuel Kant famously defined the Enlightenment anthropology by distinguishing who the Enlightened reasoner was:

> Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in

[16] Wang, *Non-axiomatic Logic*, 16–17. Dr. Wang is also clear that this view of human rationalizing systems is part of tradition of logic and mathematics that was inherited from the Enlightenment and remains a dominate feature of artificial intelligence research today. Connecting to this to a tradition elucidates the fact that axiomatic rationality is tied to a historical context.

[17] Robert W. Jenson, *On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 16.

[18] Jenson, *On Thinking the Human*, 16n1.

> lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! "Have courage to use your own understanding!"–at is the motto of enlightenment.[19]

His aim was to free man from his "self-imposed immaturity," which was embodied in the traditions, especially religious beliefs, that confined him. According to Kant, the problem was not reason, but man's environment, including himself. This environment must be "cleansed" in order for reason to operate correctly. Steven Pinker, a linguist and a strong proponent of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment rationality, explained:

> If there is anything the Enlightenment thinkers had in common, it was the insistence that we energetically apply the standard of reason to understanding our world, and not fall back on generators of delusion like faith, dogma, revelation, authority, charisma, mysticism, divination, visions, gut feelings, or in the hermeneutic parsing of sacred texts.[20]

Kant believed this was possible because with Foundationalist Rationalism's understanding of reason as acontextual, universal, mathematical, and logical. With this definition of reason, as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Descartes and other Enlightenment thinkers argued, then human beings needed to discover their true potential as what they really were "thinking machines."

Thinking machines can realize their potential to "think for themselves" because the capacity for reason was already in them. Speaking to this anthropology, Steven Pinker confirms this outlooks when he writes:

> [Rationality] is a kit of cognitive tools that can attain particular goals in particular worlds. To understand what rationality is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters, we must begin with the ground truths of rationality itself: the ways of an intelligent agent [thinking machine] ought to reason, given its goals and the world in which it lives. These 'normative' models come from logic, philosophy, mathematics, and artificial intelligence, and they are best tools for understanding the 'correct' solution

[19] Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What Is the Enlightenment?*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 41.

[20] Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*, 8.

> to a problem and how to find it. They serve as an aspiration for those want to be rational, which should mean everyone.[21]

Reaching the optimal level of anthropology, according to Pinker, should be the goal of everyone. As the "intelligent agent," his term for the "thinking machine," you aspire to be like mathematics and artificial intelligence. This is the ideal reasoner.

What does the Enlightened machine become? Steven Pinker describes the ends that the thinking machine will accomplish:

> For all the flaws in human nature, it contains seeds of its own improvement, as long as it comes up with norms and institutions that channel parochial interests into universal benefits. Among those norms are free speech, nonviolence, cooperation, cosmopolitanism, human rights, and an acknowledgement of human fallibility, and among the institutions are science, education, media, democratic government, international organizations, and markets. Not coincidently, these were the major brainchildren of the Enlightenment.[22]

The true Enlightenment thinker will embody and work toward the universal acquisition of all of these characteristics, which empower them to advance the high ideals, as his title suggests, of reason, science, humanism, and progress. "The power of rationality to guide moral progress is of a piece with its power to guide material progress and wise choices in our lives."[23] Other qualities or character traits, as well as religion and any other tradition, is considered "un-Enlightened" or "anti-progressive." Unless the reasoner acquiesces to the thinking machine system, they cannot be considered moral at all.

While this might be the dominant assumption inherited from Enlightenment rationalism, it is not the only way to view human anthropology.

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[21] Steven Pinker, *Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters* (New York: Viking, 2021), 7.

[22] Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*, 28.

[23] Pinker, *Rationality*, 340.

A Christian Reasoner

Christians believe that the human reasoner exceeds the imagination of Foundationalist Rationalism's thinking machine. In contrast to the thinking machine of Foundationalist Rationalism, humanity for Christians is not defined by itself, but by what God has said. In the explanation to the First Article of the Apostles' Creed, Martin Luther wrote:

> I believe that God has made me and all creatures; that He has given me my body and soul, eyes, ears, and all my members, my reason and all my senses, and still takes care of them. He also gives me clothing and shoes, food and drink, house and home, wife and children, land, animals, and all I have. He richly and daily provides me with all that I need to support this body and life. He defends me against all danger and guards and protects me from all evil. All this He does only out of fatherly, divine goodness and mercy, without any merit or worthiness in me. For all this it is my duty to thank and praise, serve and obey Him.[24]

These words summarize what Christians confess about their creation, the body that they have, and the world in which they live. Christians are made by God, created with certain gifts that Creator provides and maintains for the body and also for life in His creation. These gifts constitute what it means to be human: body and soul, seeing, hearing, and moving. Reason and senses are the intellectual gifts of God used within the context of the Father placing His children into the world. The Father remains as a constant presence of faithful giving, providing, and protecting all out His "goodness and mercy." Such giving comes with the creature's response of thanking, praising, serving, and obeying.

A second feature to created theological anthropology is the redemption of this creature, a son or daughter of God, lost and condemned by the fall of Adam and Eve into sin. Theological anthropology also must include the hereditary or original sin which pervades humanity from natural birth to death, the consequence of sin. Humanity's salvation can only be in Jesus Christ.

[24] Luther, *Luther's Small Catechism with Explanation*, 16.

Luther confesses:

> I believe that Jesus Christ, true God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and also true man, born of the Virgin Mary, is my Lord, who has redeemed me, a lost and condemned person, purchased and won me from all sins, from death, and from the power of the devil; not with gold or silver, but with His holy, precious blood and with His innocent suffering and death, that I may be His own and live under Him in His kingdom and serve Him in everlasting righteousness, innocence, and blessedness, just as He is risen from the dead, lives and reigns to all eternity.[25]

Through His incarnation, perfect obedience, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension Jesus Christ "raised our human nature" from the depths of sin and hell to be redeemed and restored children of God. Theological anthropology consists of these two critical realities, creation and redemption.

As a creature redeemed by God, the Christian reasoner is aided by a fuller understanding of how reason operates within the human person. This expanded view of anthropology will be highlighted in three ways. Chapter Four will explore how the human creature operates as someone defined not by reason but by love, and how this creature comes to be within a context and a community. It will explore the alternative anthropology of James K. A. Smith who advances that human persons are what they love and that desires operate through the practice of cultural liturgies.

Chapter Five will evaluate how the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism's "thinking machine" reduced humans to objects which operated similarly to computers. Instead, recent research in the cognitive psychology advances that human cognition works in two levels, and that human reasoning often serves or is constrained by more basic heuristics (rules of thumb), biases, and intuitions.

Finally, Chapter Six will explore the claim from cognitive linguistics that metaphors—

[25] Luther, *Luther's Small Catechism with Explanation*, 17.

thinking about one thing in terms of another thing—informs and shapes much of human rationality.

Each chapter will assess each anthropological model in light of Christian theology and draws conclusions about how these new directions in anthropology can benefit Christians in their lives.

Conclusion

This brief chapter serves a bridge which takes us from the propositions of Foundationalist Rationalism and Christian reasoning through to the other side where this dissertation will consider the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism produced, its ends: an individual who could "think for themselves" unhindered by the shackles of tradition, especially religion, to be a free, unbiased thinker. This type of thinking is equated with a thinking machine that functions by means of axiomatic mathematics or Artificial Intelligence. With the power of rationality in themselves, the means produces a reasoner who reasoned mathematically, logically, and autonomously. This reasoner is contrasted by Christian anthropology which teaches that rationality is God's created gift. Formed as a reasoner who lives in relationship with Him as their Faither through the gifts He gives. The Christian reasoner is created by means of God's Word as a creature given the gift of reason from God Himself. This reason is formed in the reasoner by the means of the Word of God, and by so doing they made (ends) His children to hear, believe, think (reason), and live according to His word.

Contemporary philosophy and cognitive linguistics argue that humans possess an anthropology where reason is embodied. Despite the dominance of Enlightenment belief that reason is exclusively a mental or psychological capability, Antonio Damasio and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson demonstrate that human reason is in fact embodied in the biological processes

and context in which they live. Their view of anthropology expands beyond Foundationalist Rationalism, but also offers Christians a further way to understand and appropriate their anthropology with what contemporary science reveals about human rationality.

The chapters below show us that viewing humans as thinking machines, as Foundationalist Rationalism does, is, of course, not supported by the Word of God and the tradition of the Christian faith. These anthropologies are opposed to one another. Significantly, however, is that Foundationalist Rationalism's thinking machine anthropology is also challenged and expanded by contemporary psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive linguistics. It will evaluate the influence Foundationalist Rationalism had socially on the reasoner in the Church by surveying the work and conclusions set forth by James K. A. Smith. Smith's anthropology challenges and expands the idea that humans are thinking machine, and, instead, aligns rationality to what people desire in a context and community formed by cultural liturgies. It will discuss the psychological impact Foundationalist Rationalism's anthropology has on the individual reasoner. Far from reasoning logically or mathematically, it will conclude that humans reason through both individual and communal influences, biases, and emotions. Finally, it will argue that anthropology is ultimately embodied in language, particularly the language of metaphor. All of this will provide a context and, indeed content, for the rational frame of the Scripture and Regula Fidei to be appropriated for life of the Christian (theological anthropology) through the approach of Post-Foundationalist Confessionalism. As it provides a new direction for Christians to consider their human anthropology.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CHALLENGING ANTHROPOLOGY: GIVEN ME REASON AND ALL MY SENSES

Introduction

Chapter Three showed how Foundationalist Rationalism developed an anthropology to go along with its account of reasoning or rationality. Descartes was the most important figure for the *anthropology* of Foundationalist Rationalism, just as he was for its *rationality*. He is famous for saying, "I think, therefore I am." This was his anthropology in a sentence. Descartes argued that a human being is primarily a "thinking thing," *homo sapiens*, whose reason works best autonomously regardless of context ("acontextually"). Since he had also argued that reasoning is best conducted apart from the influence of context, it was natural for him to propose an anthropology of the "thinking thing."

Chapters One and Two of the dissertation surveyed contemporary philosophy and theology to develop an account of rationality that goes beyond the assumptions of Foundationalist Rationalism, and also that helps the Church to reason faithfully. Chapters Four, Five, and Six will survey some contemporary thinking in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics to develop an account of the human creature as a rational being that goes beyond the assumptions of Foundationalist Rationalism, and also that helps the Church to nurture Christians who will reason faithfully. The thinking in each chapter has been selected for two reasons. One reason is that the thinking offers a clear criticism of the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. The kind of criticism in the different chapters is different, but all of them are clearly critical of a "thinking thing" account of human creature as rational beings. Another reason is that the thinking connects in a direct way with Christian theology and practice.

Each chapter will have the same rough outline. First, the chapter will explain its approach

to answering the question, "What is a human creature as a rational being?" Next, the chapter will identify and explain the thinking it uses to answer this question. Then the chapter will show how this account of being a rational being fits with the account of Christian rationality detailed in Chapters One and Two. Finally, the chapter will illustrate this fit with a concrete example or suggestion for Christian ministry.

Chapter Four will give an account of the human creature that goes beyond the "thinking thing" anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism by considering how all reasoning happens in a *context*. As noted in Chapter Three and briefly mentioned above, Foundationalist Rationalism argued that human beings are ideally rational when they are not influenced by tradition, communities, unexamined assumptions, and biases, but are disengaged from this factors. In other words, Foundationalist Rationalism argued for an *acontextualized* account of human creatures as rational beings. But this chapter will argue for a *contextualized* account of rational beings.

This chapter will argue that, just as context is essential to reason, context is also essential to conceiving of human creatures as rational beings. To do this, it will rely on the work of Christian philosopher James K. A. Smith on cultural liturgies, especially his anthropology which conceives of human creatures as "lovers" rather than thinkers, and also as "liturgical animals." Smith's work is germane because he criticizes Foundationalist Rationalism's reduction of human beings to solitary, isolated "thinking things," and also because he develops an alternative anthropology to Foundationalist Rationalism. Instead of humans reduced to "thinking things," he proposes an anthropology that accounts for human rationality in terms of their *contexts*. In other words, he offers a "recontextualized" anthropology. Smith proposes an anthropology that understands a person's reason operating in the context of one's loves and desires, and whose loves and desires are acquired and formed through practices in particular settings and communities. He calls these

settings and practices "cultural liturgies." Instead of conceiving of human beings as isolated "thinking things," Smith shows how much better sense it makes to conceive of them as formed and informed by "liturgies" or practices, hence the label "liturgical animals." Liturgical animals are persons formed and informed by their context, and this account of human beings is one version of a "recontextualized" anthropology.

The goal of this chapter is to connect Smith's liturgical animal anthropology with the account of reason set forth in Chapters One and Two, in order to give a consistent Christian account of the human reasoner. Doing so provides another anthropology to be considered in contrast to viewing humans as "thinking things." A further goal is to show how it is a specifically Christian anthropology that is contextual because it views forms human reasoning within the context of God's creation by means of liturgies that follow the Christian Rule of Faith, are centered in His Word and Sacrament, and align with the Two Kinds of Righteousness.

You Are What You *Love*: Beyond a Thinking Thing

James K. A. Smith is a prominent Reformed philosopher who is currently professor of philosophy at Calvin University, where he holds the Gary & Henrietta Byker Chair.[1] He gained wide recognition for his 2006 book *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, which argued that postmodern French philosophers like Jacques Derrida were not threat to the church, as so often thought.[2] But his 2009 book *Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and* Culture and his 2016 book *You Are What You Love* that are especially relevant for this project.[3]

[1] The biographical information is current in 2024. It is taken from the Calvin University website (https://calvin.edu/people/james-ka-smith) and from Smith's own website (https://jameskasmith.com/).

[2] James K. A. Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to the Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).

[3] James K. A. Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation.* (Grand Rapids:

In *Desiring the Kingdom*, Smith argues that modern Christian education usually has gotten people wrong because Christian education has been wrong how human beings think.[4] Smith notes that Christian education usually has been focused on cognitive formation because they understand that human beings are cognitive creatures. The reason why education operates in this way is because it has adopted an anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism, a view of the human person is a purely cognitive being. Christian education, with this anthropology in mind, has focused on cognitive formation when it assumes that believers must be educated to know, recount, and even believe by means of a pedagogy that is focused on the mind's capacity to know and distinguish ideas. This pedagogy comes from the Enlightenment's anthropology which reduced humans to "thinking things."[5] Smith's project proposes a different way of looking at learning. It begins by viewing people and how they think differently. Smith "recontextualized" anthropology by exploring how people thinking within the context of their loves and desires within their uniquely religious, liturgical practices.[6]

Smith's approach begins by identifying and challenging the "thinking thing" anthropology in the contemporary church. He sees that contemporary Christians "often approach discipleship as primarily a didactic endeavor—as if becoming a disciple of Jesus is largely an intellectual project, a matter of acquiring knowledge."[7] This point "hit home" for him in an advertisement for

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Baker Academic, 2009). James K. A. Smith, *You Are What You Love: The Spiritual Power of Habit* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2016).

[4] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 17.

[5] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 18.

[6] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 18. "It is an invitation to re-vision Christian education as formative, rather than just informative project. Too much of our thinking about education (including recent talk about worldviews) sees education as a matter of disseminating information precisely because it assumes that human beings are primarily thinking things, or maybe believing animals. But I think both of these models give us a stunted, flattened picture of the rich complexity of being human" (18).

[7] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 2.

a Bible verse memory program.

> At the center of the ad was a man's face, and emblazoned across his forehead was a startling claim: "YOU ARE WHAT YOU THINK." That is a very explicit way to state what many of us implicitly assume. In ways that are more "modern" than biblical, we have been taught to assume that human beings are fundamentally *thinking things*. While we might never have read—or even heard of—seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes, many of us unwittingly share his definition of the essence of the human person as *res cogitans*, a "thinking thing" … "You are what you think" is a motto that reduces human beings to brains-on-a-stick. Ironically, such thinking-thingism assumes that the "heart" of a person is the mind. "I think, therefore I am," Descartes said, and most of our approaches to discipleship end up parroting his idea.[8]

Smith called this anthropology "an intellectualist model of the human person." This model portrays a person as like a machine. He explained this model further in *Desiring the Kingdom*: Having cast aside the senses and the body already in his meditations, Descartes concludes that "I" am a "thinking thing." In other words, *what* I am is an essentially immaterial mind or consciousness—occasionally and temporarily embodied, but not essentially. This bequeaths to us a dominate and powerful picture of the human person as a fundamentally thinking thing—a cognitive machine defined, above all, by thought and rational operations. We call thing a broadly "rationalist" or "intellectualist" picture of the human person, and it has both a long pedigree (back to Plato) and a large progeny (through Kant and into the present). It entails a sense that persons are defined by thinking and is often allied with the sense of functional disembodiment (that is, the person as thinking thing is only contingently related to a body). As such, what nourishes or fuels the "I" is a steady diet of ideas, fed somewhat intravenously into the mind through the lines of propositions and information.[9]This model assumes "that learning… is primarily a matter of depositing ideas and beliefs into mind-containers."[10] In other words, the

[8] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 3.

[9] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 42.

[10] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 3.

human person is pictured like a machine with a tank or container filled up with raw materials—ideas and beliefs—that "thought and rational operations" process into finished products.

This anthropology has led Christian education toward pedagogies aimed at the mind and was expressed in "what you know" and "knowing" the right things. This "you are what you think" anthropology assumed learning is about distilling ideas and beliefs through our reason. Smith also explained how this intellectual model was adopted "even for versions of Christian faith that are proclaimed 'anti-intellectual.'" He explained in *You Are What You Love*:

> Many modes of Christian piety and discipleship that are suspicious of formal theology and higher education are nonetheless "intellectualist" in how they approach discipleship and Christian formation, narrowly focusing on filling our intellectual wells with biblical knowledge, convinced that we can *think* our way to holiness—sanctification by information transfer. Indeed, that's precisely the conviction behind the ad for the Bible verse memory program mentioned above: If "you are what you think," then filling your thinking organ with Bible verses should translate into Christlike character, right? If "you are what you think," then changing what you think should change who you are, right?[11]

Smith does not answer his own question, but clearly the answer is "Wrong." Filling your thinking organs with Bible verses does not translate into Christlike character. Changing what you think does not change who you are. The problem is "thinking-thingism." The problem is assuming the anthropology of Descartes and the rest of Foundationalist Rationalism.

Smith's path toward a more adequate anthropology starts with a caution that a better model or account of being human should not simply reject thinking or knowledge. "To question thinking-thingism is not the same things as rejecting thinking … We don't need *less* than knowledge; we need more."[12] For Smith, the problem with Foundationalist Rationalism is more

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[11] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 4–5. See also Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 42: "While this model of the person as thinking thing assumed different forms throughout modernity (e.g., in Kant, Hegel), this rationalist picture was absorbed particularly by Protestant Christianity (whether liberal or conservative), which tends to operate with an overly cognitive picture of the human person and thus tends to foster an overly intellectual account of what it means to be or become a Christian."

[12] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 6.

about it being too narrow or about leaving out too much, rather than being mistaken. The kind of anthropology needed after and beyond Foundationalist Rationalism does not discard or marginalize reason. Smith explains what is needed:

> That's why we need to reject the reductionistic picture we've unwittingly absorbed in the modern era, one that treats us as if we're only and fundamentally thinking things. Instead we need to embrace a more holistic, biblical model of human persons that *situates* our thinking and knowing in relation to other, more fundamental aspects of the human person. We've become so used to reading the Bible with Cartesian eyes—seeing the world through Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" lens—that we see it confirming our intellectualism and thinking-thingism.[13]

In this passage, Smith is calling for what I have called a "recontextualized" account of human creatures as rational beings, that is, to repeat Smith's words, "a more holistic, biblical model of human persons that *situates* our thinking and knowing in relation to other, more fundamental aspects of the human person."

The "you are what you think" anthropology that proposes that human beings make decisions, achieve goals, and in general flourish by acquiring knowledge of facts and ideas, and then reasoning from them toward the right decisions, goals, and ways of life. When dealing with very specific contexts, it is easy to think this anthropology make sense. Playing games like chess, planning a vacation, or proposing a new business are such specific contexts. In situations like these, gathering information and ideas and then working out the alternatives and weighing the options are the ways to proceed. This happens in many areas of life, and because of this, it is easy to think the "you are what you think" anthropology make sense for all of life. But in the context of an entire life, this anthropology does not work reliably. Life is too complicated, and the needed information and ideas are too limited. This is why Smith when asked, "If 'you are what you think,' then filling your thinking organ with Bible verses should translate into

[13] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 6. Emphasis original

Christlike character, right? If 'you are what you think,' then changing what you think should change who you are, right?" he was asking rhetorical questions. They did not need to be answered.

Smith recognized that some Christians would expect that the alternative anthropology would consider human creatures as *believers*, meaning that they are defined by the beliefs they assent to. These Christians likely would be thinking like Smith about how the "intellectualist model" of "you are what you think" is inadequate. Beliefs are more basic than ideas, which the intellectualist model works with. They are the assumptions and values that direct one's thinking. According to the "believers" model, which some in Smith's own Reformed tradition have adopted, "What defines us is not what we think—not the set of ideas we assent to—but rather what we *believe*, the commitments and trusts that orient our being-in-the-world… Before we are thinkers, we are believers."[14] Smith also rejects this model, which also would fail to fully capture what it means to be human. It still focuses on the cognitive dimension. It also would produce a pedagogy that would only be an extension of an informative or quasi-rationalist pedagogy already at work in Christian academia.[15] Smith is aware his words are controversial for Christians, since "believing" is basic to what it means to be Christian. Smith does not deny this. Smith, however, argues that a fuller anthropological model requires an "orientation to the world [that] is not knowledge, or even belief, but of *love*."[16]

Smith finds this anthropology implied in St. Paul's prayer for the Philippians: "And this is my prayer: that your love may abound more and more in knowledge and depth of insight, so that

[14] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 43. Smith identifies Reformed philosophers Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff with this model. See n. 6 on this page.

[15] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 43.

[16] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 44.

you may be able to discern what is best and may be pure and blameless for the day of Christ, filled with the fruit of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ—to the glory and praise of God" (Phil. 1:9–11).[17] Smith draws attention to the relationship between knowledge and love that Paul assumes. Paul does not pray that their knowledge would deepen so their love would grow, but rather the reverse. Smith concludes: "It's not that I know in order to love, but rather: I love in order to know. And if we're going to discern 'what is best'—what is 'excellent,' what really matters, what is of ultimate importance—Paul tells us that the place to start is by attending to our *loves*."[18] If the intellectualist model implies, "You are what you think," then Paul suggests a "more holistic, biblical model" grounded in the conviction "You are what you *love*."[19]

To fill out this model, Smith investigates the writings of St. Augustine.[20] In contrast to a mind-centered, cognitive intellectualism, Augustine understands human creatures as *desiring* creatures whose desires form patterns of life which also incubate our desires, which are determined basically not by what people know, but, rather, by what people love.[21] Augustine offers a dynamic approach to human anthropology as lovers rather than a purely intellectual one. This anthropology moves from the mind to the heart:

> This Augustinian model of human persons resists the rationalism and quasi-rationalism of the earlier models by shifting the center of gravity of human identity, as it were, down from the heady regions of mind closer to the center regions of our bodies, in particular our *kardia*—our gut or heart. This point is to emphasize the way we inhabit the world is not primarily as thinking, or even believers, but as more affective, embodied creatures who make our way in the world more by feeling our way around it.[22]

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[17] Quoted in Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 6.

[18] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 7.

[19] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 7. See also Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 43.

[20] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 46.

[21] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 18.

[22] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 47.

A *lover* anthropology describes human beings as desiring creatures, and by doing so, Augustine provides a fuller, more dynamic anthropology in contrast to a cognitivist or even a believer anthropology which reduces human creatures as rational beings to their minds or faith.[23]

Smith breaks down this anthropology into four basic features: Intentionality, Teleology, Habits, and Practices. Together they show that "you are what you love."

1. *Intentionality: Love's Aim*. The first feature of this anthropological model is that human persons are "intentional" creatures. "Intention" here is the philosophical notion of being "directed" toward something.[24] This is a fundamental feature of human minds. Our minds are capable of directing their attention or focus on something. These intentions may be conscious or unconscious, although Smith follows philosopher Martin Heidegger and understands most of our intentions to be unreflective.[25]

   Intentionality is involved in all matters of awareness, but when Smith calls human persons "intentional" creatures, he means especially that they are directed toward something or someone by a deep *love*. "Love" in this case is not an emotion or feeling. According to Smith, love is the fundamental way a human being lives in the world. He explains: "We are primordially and essentially agents of love, which takes the structure of desire or longing. We are essentially and ultimately desiring animals, which is simply to say that we are essentially and ultimately lovers. To be human is to love, and

[23] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 8.

[24] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 48.

[25] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 50. Smith's illustrations are mundane and therefore make his point effectively: "Our primary or default mode of intending the world is not reflective or theoretical; we don't go around all day *thinking* about how to get to the classroom or *thinking* about how to brush our teeth or *perceiving* our friends. Most of the day, we are simply involved in the world. We navigate our way and orient ourselves for the most part without thinking about it—like driving home from work by a route so familiar that we can do it without even being "conscious," and thus sometimes find ourselves in the driveway unable to remember driving home" (50).

it is what we love that defines who we are. Our (ultimate) love is constitutive of our identity."[26] In the words of Smith's slogan, "*You are* what you love," with the stress on the "You are."

2. *Teleology: Love's End*: Turning to the second feature of this anthropology, we put the stress on the predicate: "You are *what you love*." Since our love constitutes our identity, Smith also understands human beings in terms of *what they love*. For this reason, Smith understands human persons as *teleological* creatures.[27]

   The love that human persons have may be either conscious or unconscious, but in either case it is aimed toward a goal or *telos*. The goals or *teloi* that Smith means are large and life-defining, rather than chores or items on a to-do list, or even "a list of ideas or propositions or doctrines; it is not a list of abstract, disembodied concepts or values."[28] Rather, "what we love is a specific vision of the good life, an implicit picture of what we think human flourishing looks like."[29]

   Smith's preferred term for this vision is "kingdom," as reflected in the title of the book *Desiring the Kingdom*. He explains: "[T]o be human is to desire 'the kingdom,' *some* version of the kingdom, which is the aim of our quest. Every one of us is on a kind of Arthurian quest for the 'Holy Grail,' that hoped-for, longed-for, dreamed-of picture of the good life—the realm of human flourishing—that we pursue without ceasing."[30] Smith likens this to a kingdom because "we are attracted to a vision of the

[26] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 50–51.

[27] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 52.

[28] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 53.

[29] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 52.

[30] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 54.

good life that is painted for us in stories, images and icons."[31] The *telos* is a vision of the good life; a picture of human flourishing. This good life, because he is Christian, is equated to some type of kingdom. This vision is enacted by aiming love toward a particular goal. Smith describes the way this is carried in the human life. "The heart is the fulcrum of your most fundamental language of— a visceral, subconscious *orientation* to the world. The heart is the existential chamber of our *love*, and it is our loves that orient us toward some ultimate end or *telos*. It's not just that I "know" some end, I *want* something, and want it ultimately. It is my desires that define me. In short, you are what you love."[32] Human persons form themselves into the "kingdom" vision they have imagined in which they will flourish and for which they will orient their lives.

3. *Habits: Love's Fulcrum*: The third feature of this anthropology is how human beings acquire these aims, that is, how "you become what you love." Our ultimate aims and loves are not innate; the versions of "kingdom" that people desire are not "programmed" or "hard-wired" into us. They are formed by habits or dispositions, which are a "fulcrum" because they are the "hinge that turns our heart."[33] Smith, who follows Aristotle, Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, thinks of habits as "motivating actions, decisions, etc.… of our disputations—our precognitive, tendencies to act in a certain way toward certain ends." The process of acquiring habits or dispositions is often unconscious, but, nevertheless, involves our entire person, "mind and body" or "body and soul." With our focus on our kingdom vision, habits become "second

[31] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 54.

[32] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 8.

[33] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 56.

nature."[34] In this way, we *become* what we love.

4. *Practices: Love's Formation*: The fourth feature of this anthropology is about the means by which habits and dispositions are acquired. How do you become what you love? Smith's answer is through *practices*. Because humans are embodied creatures, habits and dispositions become active through practices, routines, or rituals that grab hold of our hearts through our imagination, which is closely linked with our bodily senses. In this way, our practices engage the whole person not only the mind. These things train our adaptive unconsciousness toward our aims of a good life. Smith notes, "[O]ur ultimate love is what we *worship*."[35] For this reason, Smith calls these practices "liturgies" because they are connected to "loves," which are what human persons worship.[36] Human worship practices take internal orientations of love and desires and aim them toward external ideas, concepts, ways of life, people, and things which form their identities by what they love.

The final two features of this anthropology, about habits and practices, lead into the other major aspect of Smith's contribution toward this project, which is the "liturgical animal." Much more will be said about them shortly. But this is a convenient point to summarize and draw initial conclusions about how Smith argues that human reason is situated in a larger context, which is the aim of this chapter.

Smith argues that an anthropology of "you are what you love" evaluates critically and extends beyond the anthropology of "you are what you think," which is the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. Foundationalist Rationalism reduces human beings to exclusively

[34] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 55–57.

[35] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 51.

[36] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 57–62.

thinking things. Smith follows Descartes to liken human beings to "thinking things," which means they are like machines that process raw materials. Ideas and facts are the raw materials that "reason" turns into products.

Smith proposes an anthropology that expands human rationality to include loves and desires, which extend beyond ideas and beliefs. Smith's "you are what you love" anthropology is crucial to this dissertation because he expands and provides an alternative anthropology to that of Foundationalist Rationalism. Smith focuses on developing approaches to Christian education and discipleship that follow this anthropology, and so he does not draw much attention to the relationship of "reason" to "love" in his account. Nevertheless, it can be drawn out.

It is important to understand that the anthropology Smith proposes does not deny or marginalize reason. Instead, it situates reason in the context of something more basic or primordial, which is love. To repeat, "love" in this case is not an emotion or feeling, but a disposition. Love is the name for being disposed toward something or someone, especially something ultimate. Smith names ultimate aims "kingdom," which is a word for a vision of the good life. The human person as a rational being is someone whose reasoning takes place and is directed toward some version of the "kingdom," that is, toward a vision of the good life.

By doing this, Smith shows how Foundationalist Rationalism's anthropology, the "thinking-thingism," is *incomplete* and *confused*. When "reason" was defined in the Introduction to the dissertation, philosophers Bertrand Russell and Bryan Magee were cited. Both stressed that reason was about means, not ends. As Russell put it: "'Reason' has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends."[37] Foundationalist Rationalism's notion of

[37] Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), 8.

reasoning obscured this meaning. Smith's critique and constructive alternative shows this plainly. Smith situates reason within the context of ends—goals or *teloi*, to use his words.

This fits my goal of articulating an anthropology that is beyond the thinking thing anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. Smith's work provides a helpful example that others see flaws in Foundationalist Rationalism's anthropology and his work to expand this anthropology to include human loves and desires is an important alternative to evaluate, but it is also a launching point to challenge Foundationalist Rationalism's tenet that reason is acontextual and an internal working of the mind.

Smith not only challenges this, but he also explores how *external context* forms the way humans think. Context, he demonstrates, is essential to rational formation. It is to this second aspect of Smith's anthropology that I now turn to.

Cultural Liturgies: Rational Formation in Contexts

In the preceding section, I outlined the four features of Smith's anthropology and concluded by showing what this means for understanding a human person as a rational being. The outline began "from the inside out," that is, from the mind and reason to a person's loves, to the habits needed to form a person's loves, and to the practices by which appropriate habits are acquired. From this, Smith gave a way to move from an anthropology summarized in the line, "You are what you think" to an anthropology summarized in the line, "You are what you love."

Now in this section, we follow the opposite approach also taken by Smith, which goes "from the outside in." This leads to an anthropology of the "liturgical animal." This account is identical in content to the "lover" anthropology of "you are what you love" described above. The "liturgical animal" account works with the same four basic anthropological features: Intention, Teleology, Habits, Practices. But it views the human creature from a different perspective. It

starts with Practices. This is because it is ultimately *practices* that are responsible for personal formation and growth. Appropriate habits of loving and desiring are formed through practices, and through practices "you become what you love."

Smith calls practices "liturgies." So rather than thinking things or *homo sapiens*, Smith defines human anthropology as *homo liturgicus*, that is, "liturgical animals." Liturgical animals are "animals that are religious animals not because we are primarily believing animals but because we are liturgical animals—embodied, practicing creatures whose love/desire is aimed at something ultimate."[38] They can be sacred or secular, but in all cases, their goal is that those who are involved in liturgies "approach the world in a certain way, to value certain things, to aim for certain goals, to pursue certain dreams, to work together on certain projects. In short, every liturgy constitutes a pedagogy that teaches us, in all sorts of precognitive ways, to be a certain kind of person."[39] Specifically, what a person loves and desires are also formed by that orientation into a person's practices and habits. Internal desires are formed by external forces. These external forces, context, communities, and content then recontextualize how a person thinks. "Liturgies are formative practices or pedagogies of desires that are trying to make us a certain kind of person."[40] Humans are what they love because their loves and desires are aimed toward what we worship.

This last point is significant: practices are connected to and formed by what we *worship*, which is why Smith calls them "liturgies." He writes,

> In order to appreciate the spiritual significance of such cultural practices, let's call these sorts of formative, love-shaping rituals 'liturgies.' It's a bit of an old, churchy word, but I want to revive and expand it because it crystalizes a final aspect of this model of the human person: to say 'you are what you love' is synonymous with 'you

[38] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 40.

[39] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 25.

[40] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 24.

> are what you worship.' The great Reformer Martin Luther once said, 'Whatever your heart clings to and confides in, that is really your god.' We become what we worship because what we worship is what we love.[41]

Focusing on love aimed at worship practices brings into consideration how liturgical animals can be trained to be specifically Christian liturgical animals, which recontextualizes Christian pedagogy that focuses on the context, community, and content utilized in their formation. However, liturgical animals are not exclusively aimed at Christian "ends," rather Smith exposes that the liturgical animal practices liturgies formed in them by their culture.

These are the "cultural liturgies," as Smith calls them, which are repetitive practices that shape the desires and loves of liturgical animals and move them toward a fixed-point or *telos* present in everyday contexts. Operating through context, community, and content are essential to what it means to be human; they constitute the "world" or "culture" that human beings actually inhabit day-to-day. Smith demonstrates how essential these are to human identity, who you are, is what you love based on your orientation toward the world by illustrating how prevalent cultural liturgies are in everyday lives.

Smith illustrates how liturgical animals are formed through the context of cultural liturgies by using the shopping mall as religious center where love's aims are influenced and where religious practices are formed. The *telos* formed in liturgical animals by the shopping mall ultimately fashions their vision of the kingdom they want to have.

Smith asks us to imagine that Martian anthropologists come to Earth to observe our rituals and religious habits, and what would happen if they showed up at a shopping mall.[42] They would find a good place to observe how Earthlings practice their rituals and religious habits, which

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[41] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 20–21.

[42] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 19–24.

would in turn be a good illustration of how liturgical animals are formed by practicing cultural liturgies.

The Martians visit the mall, and they study it in terms in terms of rituals, symbolism, worship, and liturgies. They would see thousands of pilgrims arrive at a temple, that is, a popular site enchanted by colorful buildings and appealing slogans. The faithful filter in from the parking lot into the sanctuary. Light from above streams in through skylights of the temple illuminating plants and trees and water features. Bright lights, fancy fixtures, marble floor tell you that this is a special place. The finest of things are found here and promised to the pilgrims. “All of it can be yours! It’s all for you!” In this place, dreams are fulfilled and imagination soars. Surely, this is the finest of temples! The rituals begin as people navigate its lofty grandeur. Each person follows the ritual of searching, seeing, buying, loving, wearing. It is a “catholic” space offering a variety of options where needs and desires are met, but the enchantment creates desires that one cannot help but try to satisfy in this place with a desire for more, or so retailers hope. Ritual sacrifices take place as people give their treasures (money) to have part of this place, an idol of their own from this temple of wonders. They carry the precious idol home wrapped in boxes and bags. Almost everyone goes home happy and fulfilled. All the senses are engaged. People are transfixed by the beauty. Bright, dazzling lights beckon worshippers like siren calling, “Come, over here! Cheerful, inviting music you can hum along to fills the atmosphere. Iconography of various mediums abounds in symbolic names and slogans, window displays, and models. This temple of delights radiates the “gospel” power of beauty. It says to the faithful, “This is way life should be. We have what you want. Come in, fulfill your every desire! It is all for you!” All of this captures the heart, the mind, the senses, and changes behavior. “I want it! It’s mine! Look at me now!” Everyone goes home happy with desires satisfied, loves formed, and a yearning for

more next week.

In this illustration, the mall is a gathering place for worship. It is built and appointed for worship, which is desiring and loving a vision of the good life. Names, slogans, displays, and models all serve to convey this vision and to fulfill the desire to participate in this good life—by shopping. It is a version of a "cultural liturgy," and shoppers are a kind of "liturgical animal."

The pièce de résistance of mall liturgical worship may be the goddess Victoria's Secret, which Smith says is "in on Augustine's secret."[43] Victoria's Secret embodies the symbolic image of what the human heart desires. It "quite intentionally combines passion with transcendence."[44] Not only does this store present itself in the glitz and glamour of sophisticated decadence, but it also views the human form in its ideal. Its icon of beauty depicts sophistication, but also the "secret" exploring what you could be for a woman and for men what you know you want to have by providing this narrative for shoppers and passersby alike. The message is clear: Victoria's Secret wants your heart. Smith writes:

> The mall is a religious site, not because it is theological but because it is liturgical. Its spiritual significance (and threat) isn't found in its 'ideas' or its 'messages' but in its rituals. The mall doesn't care what you think, but it is very much interested in what you *love.* Victoria's secret is that she's actually after your heart.[45]

The religious goddess Victoria with her siren trance to "come and wear, you can be like me, you can *have* me" is unforgettable. Once you see it, you have to have it (either to wear the stuff or have a girl who does). She enchants the desires your heart and forms what you love by training you how to practice their religion. You have to offer her money as a sacrifice in order to have what she has, to be what she can make you to be, and to gain the sexual appeal and confidence of

[43] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 76. The entire illustration is given and discussed on 75–77.

[44] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 76.

[45] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 41.

which she deems possible if only you buy the bra. On the outside, it might seem like only a bra, a "necessary" item for women's apparel, but Victoria makes it into something more. It is seductive, illusive, and most importantly, by wearing it, it is your empowerment because it is your "secret" to possess and share at will.

By doing these things, Victoria's Secret and the mall in general, constitute *practices* intended to form certain desires. Victoria's Secret's visional message is that by buying her wears, you can be like her. With this bra you will be sexy, desired, and feel confident as a sexual person. By wearing her underwear, you will be just like her. And that is what you really want: to be desired by your partner and feel pretty and confident underneath your outer clothes. The message, the images, the stores in the mall, the displays in the stores, and the like all combine to enable women to desire a certain look or feel, and this in turn forms a certain rationality, that is, a certain way to think about yourself to achieve the ends of being this kind of person. It is a "cultural liturgy."

The concept of cultural liturgies, supported by examples and illustrations from common contemporary life, demonstrates the soundness of Smith's anthropological model. The model is something already followed successfully in everyday life. It is a model that actually works in practice. Its success shows practically that the "thinking thing" anthropology that emerged in the Enlightenment and has been promoted by Foundationalist Rationalism is something of the past.

Smith argues that the Church should be aware of this, because it supports his argument, and the argument I am making, too, that the Church leave behind "thinking-thingism," adopt a fuller, more faithful anthropology, and begin to aim Christian loves and desires in the right way.[46] Formation and practices happen are not only Christian or religious things, but they are part of the

[46] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 21–25.

"religious nature," that is, the inclination to worship, present in every human. However, since Smith is writing to Christians and his aim is Christian formation (pedagogy), he considers how Christians can aim their loves and desires toward worship and teaching that forms them in specifically Christian ways because they are *homo liturgicus.*

What makes this work important and germane to this dissertation is that Smith's work on Christian education and discipleship develops an anthropology that successfully criticizes the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism, in particular, its acontextualism, and that also successfully offers an alternative anthropology rooted in the Christian tradition and relevant to Christian practices and oriented to the Kingdom of God. This anthropology, moreover, yields an account of human creatures as rational beings, which is the aim of this chapter. The "You are what you love" perspective situates reason within more basic and primordial loves and desires. This means that human creatures are rational beings but the ends toward which they reason are governed especially by what they love. The "liturgical animal" perspective locates the human creatures within communities and the practices, rituals, and institutions they have by which persons acquire and form loves and desires. These practices shape loves and desires, and in turn they affect how a person reasons. Reason operates in liturgical animals according to practices of cultural liturgies. According to Smith's liturgical animals and liturgies, human persons do not in the way of a thinking machine, but according to loves and habits of love acquired and formed through cultural liturgies, that is, contexts in which the liturgical animal acquires and exercises their desires. Cultural liturgies as illustrated by Smith recontextualizes liturgical animals within a context that forms their orientation to the world as reasoners. Cultural liturgies form the rationality of liturgical animals; they are a means to an ends. Ultimately, they demonstrate that humans are not acontextual thinking things as Descartes imagined, but context, community, and

practices form humans to be "certain kinds of people." By doing this, Smith liberates humans from the dark room of the intellectual thinking thing, and recontextualizes humans into the visceral formation of the flesh by means of cultural liturgies.

What the mall illustration also demonstrates is that human beings are not always aware that human loves are being formed.

> We have seen that love is a habit. This means that our love is like second nature: it directs and propels us, often under the radar of conscious awareness, like breathing and blinking. It also means our loves acquire direction and orientation because we can be immersed over time in practices and rituals—what we've called "liturgies.—that affectively and viscerally train our desires. So, just as our habits themselves are unconscious—operating under the hood—it is also the case that the process of *habituation* is unconscious and covert.[47]

The unconscious nature of loves formation through practices and habits leads Smith to conclude that they are part of what Charles Taylor calls the "social imaginary." He means that these things form humans not because of they are cognizant choices, but because cultural practices are secular liturgies repeated by means of rituals that teach us how and what to love.[48] It is only by examining our loves and desires by doing a "liturgical audit" that we are able to get a true picture of who we are.[49]

Liturgical audits reveal that humans are not thinking things after all. Not only does this undermine Foundationalist Rationalism's thinking thing, but it provides a launching point for Christians to embrace a truly Christian anthropology that embodies the whole person.

> Because we tend to be intellectualists who assume that we are thinking things, we construe temptation and sin accordingly: we think temptation is an intellectual reality, where some idea is presented to us that we then think about and make a conscious choice to pursue (or not). But once you realize that we are not just thinking things, but creatures of habit, you'll begin to realize that temptation isn't just about bad ideas and wrong decisions, it's often a factor of de-formation and wrongly ordered habits.

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[47] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 32.

[48] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 45–46.

[49] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 54.

> In other words, our sins aren't just discrete, wrong actions and bad decisions; they are *vices*. And overcoming them requires more than just knowledge; it requires rehabitation, a re-formation of our loves.[50]

Rehabitation and re-formation are always important, because, as noted already, loves are not innate. But for the situation this dissertation is dealing with, which is moving beyond Foundationalist Rationalism, rehabitation and re-formation first mean being freed from its anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. But, as I will argue shortly, they also mean following closely an authentically Christian rationality. What this rationality is what I argued in Chapter Two. This rationality developed with the Rule of Faith, creeds, and confessions. This rationality further developed in certain theological distinctions and themes. Together they enable the Church to consider the means which, not only form human anthropology, but also equip God's children to live Christian lives in time by auditing their cultural liturgical practices and habits, repenting of them, and being formed by God to live active lives of faithfulness to God in love and service to their neighbor.

What makes Smith's liturgical animal anthropology attractive and useful is that it expands the idea of what it means to be human beyond Foundationalist Rationalism "thinking thing." More than that, he provides a real, truer, more embodied assessment of the human person. Through love, desires, habits, and practices recontextualize liturgical animals into a more complete, wholistic account of what it means to be human. Liturgical animals are formed in their desires and loves through habits and practices determined by contexts and communities. Smith's anthropology recontextualizes the human person in the context of their culture: body, desires and loves, and within the community they inhabit. But which context is best suited for Christians?

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[50] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 54. See also *Desiring the Kingdom*, 177, for a similar account of sin: "our sin represents the violation of trust… Disordered action is a reflection and fruit of disordered desire, and our misdirected *desires* are as much a violation and transgression as sinful *actions*."

Which version of the Christian kingdom should one acquire?

The Anthropology of James K. A. Smith Evaluated according to the Anthropology of the Two Kinds of Righteousness and the Word of God

The preceding sections of this chapter have explained the anthropology that James K. A. Smith develops and works with in books like *You Are What You Like* and *Desiring the Kingdom*, and they have shown how it is a fuller and more adequate anthropology than the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. These sections also showed how Smith's anthropology of "you are what you love" and the "liturgical animal" accounted for human creatures as rational beings.

As a Christian philosopher writing for Christian communities, Smith has given an excellent example of a Christian developing an anthropology that intended to criticize and move beyond the confines of Foundationalist Rationalism. But this dissertation is interested in offering an anthropology that also follows or reflects the rationality of the Christian church. Chapter Two of the dissertation argued for the contours of this rationality with Rule of Faith and the creeds and confessions of the Church, and more specifically in the Lutheran Confessional tradition. This chapter made use of the findings of Robert Kolb and Charles Arand that the Two Kinds of Righteousness and the Theology of the Word of God were like the nervous system or circulatory system for the entire creedal and confessional tradition. This section will consider Smith's anthropology according to this kind of rationality. Like the analysis given earlier, this section will first consider the "you are what you love" dimension of this anthropology, and then the "liturgical animal" dimension.

Evaluating the "You Are What You Love" Anthropology

Once again, the anthropology of "you are what you love" *recontextualizes* human reasoning after Foundationalist Rationalism's influential *acontextualized* account of human

beings as rational. The "thinking thing" anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism discounted "contexts" like loves and settings. But Smith argues that there are both theological and practical reasons who this anthropology is flawed and how a fuller anthropology situates reason with a person's ultimate loves and desires, that is, their vision of the good life or "Kingdom." Paul and Augustine supply the theological reasons, while the contemporary cultural practices, including shopping, supply the practical reasons.

At first glance, the Lutheran Confessional tradition might view Smith's "you are what you love" anthropology negatively. This is because its Augustinian roots may be in conflict with the two kinds of righteousness, especially in the Lutheran doctrine of justification by grace through faith. This doctrine is the core feature of the specifically Lutheran confession of the Christian faith. The two kinds of righteousness are righteousness before God the Creator (*coram Deo*) and righteousness before the world God created (*coram mundo*). This means that what Smith calls the "Kingdom" for Christians will include both righteousness before God and righteousness before the world.

But righteousness before God is always by God's grace, and not through our own efforts or merits. Lutheran teaching is that God acts by imparting a righteousness on the human creature. In this act the human is passive. Lutherans calls this an alien righteousness because it comes from outside ourselves. "Righteousness we receive is an 'alien' righteousness, a righteousness that is acquired by someone else and belongs to someone else. It is given to us from outside us. As Luther expressed it, 'Above this life I have another righteousness, another life, which is Christ.'"[51] Luther's insistence that righteousness, like love and faith has an external object: that object is always the Word of God.

[51] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 39.

Smith's anthropology of "you are what you love" stresses the human person as *active*. Smith focuses his interpretation of Augustine on his famous quote from his *Confessions* that human identity is, "'You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until it rests in you.'"[52] Smith believes these words capture two important points: "First, it recognizes that human begins are made *by* and *for* the Creator who is known in Jesus Christ. In other words, to be truly and fully human, we need to 'find' ourselves in relationship to the One who made us and for whom we were made."[53] A second feature of Augustine's claim is this: "the implicit picture of being human is *dynamic.* To be human is to be *for* something. To be human is to be on the move, pursuing something, *after* something."[54] This second feature, which calls being human "dynamic" and "to be *for* something," is what seems at odds with the two kinds of righteousness, which stresses the initiative of God and views human creatures as being *passive*.

This concern is reinforced with how Smith identifies the heart is the anthropological center of the body: It is the "teleological orientation in the heart, the seat of our longing and desires."[55] The heart, or *kardia* in Greek, is for Smith, "the fulcrum of your most fundamental longings—a visceral, subconscious *orientation* to the world. Because the heart is the existential chamber of our *love,* and it is our loves that orient us toward some ultimate end or *telos*."[56] The accent in Augustine and therefore Smith focuses on what human creatures do, rather than God's action.

The same concern also comes through when Smith lays out this aspect of Augustine's anthropology: "Because we are made to love the One who made and loves us—'we love because

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[52] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 7–8.

[53] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 8.

[54] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 8.

[55] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 8.

[56] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 9.

he first loved us' (1 John 4:19)—we will find the 'rest' when our loves are rightly order to this ultimate end."[57] Smith believes that loves and desires should be oriented toward the kingdom in order to find "rest in You (God)." Since human beings have a natural desire for some kind of kingdom, Christians must be intentional about training or disciplining toward this vision of the kingdom that aligns with Christ. For Smith, Christian liturgies or practices form habits oriented toward the "rest" Augustine describes in God's kingdom. These practices meet humans already on a journey or search, and they present persons with the God's kingdom in place of theirs. Smith hopes that the liturgical animals, "whose loves are shaped by worship," will find their orientation rightly within the kingdom of God.[58] Smith's emphases on having a natural desire, about being intentional about training, and about already searching all imply human beings doing something, not being passive.

There is at least a *difference* in approach to anthropology between that which Smith and his influences like Augustine propose, and that which is brought out by the two kinds of righteousness. Smith's anthropology emphasizes human loving and desiring for rest, while the Lutheran teaching about righteousness before God emphasizes God's initiative and activity and human passivity. The question is whether this difference implies a *contradiction* between the two approaches.

To deal with this question, it first must be remembered that Smith works from a different tradition of the Church than I do, and so the concerns I identify are based on working from the tradition of Lutheran Confessionalism. But it also must be recognized, as I argued in Chapter Two, that there are good reasons—it is "rational"—to regard this Lutheran tradition as

[57] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 10.

[58] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 23.

embodying a faithful Christian rationality. Therefore, the concerns I raised are appropriate, and therefore I must address them.

The basic answer is that *there is a difference, but there is no contradiction*. To reach this answer, we should begin by seeing that Smith himself provides the entry point to address this concern in a passage quoted earlier, which now is worth quoting again:

> In order to appreciate the spiritual significance of such cultural practices, let's call these sorts of formative, love-shaping rituals "liturgies." It's a bit of an old, churchy word, but I want to revive and expand it because it crystalizes a final aspect of this model of the human person: to say "you are what you love" is synonymous with "you are what you worship." The great Reformer Martin Luther once said, "Whatever your heart clings to and confides in, that is really your god." We become what we worship because what we worship is what we love.[59]

Smith cites Luther in the Large Catechism on the commandment, "You shall have no other gods." The Large Catechism, it should be remembered, is one of the Lutheran confessional documents. It is recognized as an authority. Luther here was defining a "god," which is "Whatever your heart clings to and confides in." This was Luther's way of saying "faith." It is "faith" that makes someone or something your god. These two passages from the Large Catechism show this clearly, and they also show how Smith's anthropology aligns with Luther and Lutherans.

> A "god" is the term for that to which we are to look for all good and in which we are to find refuge in all need. Therefore, to have a god is nothing else that to trust and believe in that one with your whole heart. As I have often said, it is the trust and faith of the heart alone that make both God and an idol. If your faith and trust are right, then your God is the true one. Conversely, where your trust is false and wrong, there you do not have the true God. For these two belong together, faith and God. Anything on which your heart relies and depends, I say, that is really your God.[60]
>
> Let each and everyone, then, see to it that you esteem this commandment above all things and not make light of it. Search and examine your own heart thoroughly, and you will discover whether or not it clings to God alone. If you have the sort of heart

[59] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 20–21.

[60] LC I.2–3 in Kolb and Wengert, 386.

> that expects from him nothing but good, especially in distress and need, and renounces and forsakes all that is not God, then you have the one, true God. On the contrary, if your heart clings to something else and expects to receive from it more good and help than from God and does not run to God but flees from him when things go wrong, then you have another god, an idol.[61]

We can see from these passages that Smith's view of human beings as naturally loving and desiring creatures is in line with the way Luther in his Large Catechism presents human creatures when he asserts that all human beings are looking for a god. The Large Catechism pictures every human creature as looking for something or someone to trust in. The question is whether or not one looks to the true God. This passage shows that when Smith says, "You are what you love" and "You are what you worship," it is the same as when Luther and the Lutheran Confessions teach about "faith." When we have faith, we "look for," "find," and "expect" good things from God. In Smith's terms, when we have faith, we desire the Kingdom.

In addition, Smith's idea that human creatures desire "rest in God" and love and worship God for finding their rest in God, which he learned from Augustine, is consistent with how the Large Catechism defines a god as that which "we are to look for all good and in which to find refuge in all need." The perspectives are different, but the point is the same. It might be explained this way: Smith and Augustine look at human creatures as looking for satisfaction, while Luther looks as God as the one who satisfies all human needs. But the same outcome is the result. In fact, Kolb and Arand speak in nearly the same way Smith does to describe human creatures: "All human attitudes and actions flow out of the central, core trust that determines *who we think we are.*"[62] The "you are what you love" anthropology of Augustine and Smith aligns well with the "you are what you trust" anthropology that flows from the two kinds of

[61] LC I.28 in Kolb and Wengert, 390.

[62] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 140.

righteousness. There is a difference, but there is no contradiction.

Evaluating the "Liturgical Animal" Anthropology

Evaluating the "liturgical animal" dimension of Smith's anthropology according to the rationality of the Lutheran Confessional tradition does not raise a question about whether there is a contradiction. But I will argue that the theology of the Word of God in the Lutheran Confessional tradition *sharpens* Smith's "liturgical animal" anthropology.

To do this, we can begin by seeing that Smith himself also provides the entry point to address this concern in a passage quoted earlier, which also is worth quoting again:

> Because we tend to be intellectualists who assume that we are thinking things, we construe temptation and sin accordingly: we think temptation is an intellectual reality, where some idea is presented to us that we then think about and make a conscious choice to pursue (or not). But once you realize that we are not just thinking things, but creatures of habit, you'll begin to realize that temptation isn't just about bad ideas and wrong decisions, it's often a factor of de-formation and wrongly ordered habits. In other words, our sins aren't just discrete, wrong actions and bad decisions; they are *vices.* And overcoming them requires more than just knowledge; it requires rehabitation, a re-formation of our loves.[63]

"Sin" is not a central topic in *Desiring the Kingdom* or in *You Are What You Love*. But, as this passage shows, it serves to highlight another way in which the "intellectualist" anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism of "you are what you think" is incomplete: It tends to reduce sin to "bad choices" or "bad decisions." But sin is more than what we do and what we fail to do; it is about the kind of persons we are. Smith speaks of it here as "deformation and wrongly ordered habits." In another place, he describes sin as "disordered desire."[64] In the Lutheran idiom of the Large Catechism, it is having a false god or an idol, because "it is the trust and faith of the heart

[63] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 54.

[64] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 177.

alone that makes both God and an idol."[65] Therefore, Smith explains, "overcoming them requires more than knowledge; it requires rehabitation, a re-formation of our loves."

"Liturgy" is Smith's term for the setting, practices, and rituals that re-form a person's loves. They can be secular or sacred, and they often would not be called "liturgy" or "worship," but they are, according to Smith's definition, because they re-direct and re-form a person's desires. They turn a person into a particular kind of worshipper. The right liturgies and practices are essential as means to ends, certain kinds of people. His view of human creatures beyond thinking things is essential and viewing them as lovers, desiring creature, and believing creatures.

But how do the Christian liturgies work? I argue that the Lutheran Confessional tradition offers an even sharper, more focused answer than Smith offers. Smith argues that "you are what you love." The "loves" in this case are versions of "Kingdom," or visions of the good life. "Liturgies" are practices that offer and that form persons into this vision.

The sharper, more focused answer I propose lies in a different way to understand what Smith calls "love's fulcrum." This is the third of the four features of his anthropology.[66] The idea of a "fulcrum" is part of Smith's response to questions like these:

> Just *how* does that happen? How does our love get aimed in different directions? Does this happen by some kind of magic or alchemy? Does it happen by the dissemination of ideas and propositions that convince us to pursue this vision? What are the mechanisms by which particular visions of the good life get infused in our hearts such that they could motivate and govern a way of life (decisions, actions, pursuits, relationships)?[67]

[65] LC I.2 in Kolb and Wengert, 386.

[66] See Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 55–57.

[67] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 55.

Smith attributes his own answer to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and it is by acquiring the right *habits*, that is, by acquiring "precognitive tendencies to act in certain ways and toward certain ends."[68] Mentioning Aristotle, Aquinas, and habits in a Lutheran context invites controversy, because so much Reformation theology argued against the influence of Aristotle and Scholasticism. But dealing this controversy would be distracting and unnecessary if we return to Smith's original questions. "Just *how* does that happen? How does our love get aimed in different directions?"

The answer from the Lutheran theology of the Word of God is this: "Our love and trust and worship get aimed at the true God because of his Word of *promise*." This is how the Lutheran Confessional tradition *sharpens* Smith's answer. The Word that God speaks does not only *revea*l his vision of the Kingdom, but it *promises* the Kingdom, too. Revelation brings knowledge, and knowledge is essential. But promise brings faith. It is promise that elicits trust. God's Word of promise, as Kolb and Arand explain, "is a pledge and guarantee of God's favor in the eschaton."[69] A revelation of a truth gives you knowledge, but a promise of what is to come instills faith in the promise itself, and in the person making the promise. As the Apology to the Augsburg Confession explains, "a promise cannot be received in any other way than by faith" (Ap 4.112). This is because a promise is a word about the future. It cannot be said to be "true" like something that happened in the past. A promise is someone's pledge and guarantee about what lies ahead. A promise invites one to trust that the promiser will fulfill the promise. This is why the Apology said, "a promise cannot be received in any other way than by faith." God's promises are his pledges and guarantee about the future, about eternal life and salvation. They

[68] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 55.

[69] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 42.

invite some to believe the promise and to trust in God. This is how divine promise is "love's fulcrum." It is God's pledge and guarantee that rehabitates and re-forms our loves; it is God's promises that reorients our trust.

Another and more familiar term for God's promise is "gospel." The word "gospel," Kolb and Arand caution, "runs the risk of being viewed primarily as information about yesterday's events."[70] But "gospel" properly speaking is God acting.

> God acts through words that he calls 'gospel' to do more than inform human beings about his own disposition toward them. His Word is what modern linguists call 'performative speech.' Indeed, it is 'creative speech.' It accomplishes his will and actualizes his presence in human lives. By means of the spoken, written, and sacramental forms of the word, the Word of God imparts the passive and active righteousness of God.[71]

This is why the Lutheran Confessional tradition understands that God's Word of promise—the promises of God in spoken, written, and sacramental forms—is essential to the Church's liturgies. This does not mean that all formative practices are means for speaking the Word of promise. There are *two* kinds of righteousness, and this means that the vision of the good life is not only for eternity through faith, but also here and now through love for our neighbors. Here, the formation of virtues through practice and discipline has its important place. But the ultimate vision includes life in the world to come, and this is God's gift, which he *promises* and which we receive by *faith*. The gospel is "love's fulcrum"; the promises of God are what direct a person's love and trust toward him.

In summary, James K. A. Smith's anthropology of the liturgical animal challenges the "thinking thing" anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. By doing so, Smith's work is. useful to this dissertation. His Liturgical Animal anthropology embodied in the phrase, "you are

[70] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 41.

[71] Kolb and Arand, *Genius of Luther's Theology*, 135.

what you love" also provides an alternative to the "thinking thing" anthropology." "You are what you love" or his liturgical animal is also accompanied by a rationality that is formed through liturgies or practices. These liturgies and practices are contextualized everywhere in Western culture as evidenced by his example of the shopping mall and Victoria's Secret. These examples recontextualize reason within cultural liturgies or practices as they shape human loves and desires.

Smith's project provides a helpful way to see how human loves and desires are shaped by liturgies or practices to form certain rational ends. Despite having a different starting point- love and desires, verses Luther's function of the Word, Smith's anthropology recognizes and easy incorporates Luther's understanding that humans are formed and shaped by words. Recall that liturgies are "cultural practices, sorts of formative, love-shaping rituals."[72] Of course these love shaping practices and rituals are present everywhere, hence Smith's mall illustration, but his ultimate concern is how Christian rituals and symbols should be used as formational practices. It is my argument that these formational practices occur specifically through words, therefore liturgies become essential formational practices because they impart a rationality formed by means of the Word with the ends that one is made Christian, given and strengthened in faith.

Sacraments as Means of Forming Christians

This chapter has explored how James K. A. Smith's liturgical anthropology provides a model of the human creature as a rational being which goes beyond the "thinking thing" anthropology advanced by Foundationalist Rationalism. Smith, whose work focuses on Christian education and discipleship, argues that this view of human anthropology is especially

[72] Smith, *You Are What You Love*, 23.

problematic, because this is not how human beings actually are formed. Smith advances the work of Augustine, who proposed that human beings are primarily lovers, desiring creatures. As such, Smith argues that the real question for Christian worship and education is how they appropriately form human loves and desires. Smith argues that it is through "liturgies," which are practices which form and shape human loves and desires. Liturgies, active in both secular (e.g., the mall) and religious (e.g., Christian worship) contexts shape a particular vision of the good life. This vision of the "good life" for Christian is shaped by words. As this Christian vision is acquired and people are formed to be Christian, their rationality is shaped and becomes increasingly "Christian."

Because my project seeks to advance a Christian account of human creatures as rational beings, I evaluated Smith's anthropology in view of the Lutheran Confessional tradition. Smith's anthropology lent itself to be assessed in terms of both the two kinds of righteousness and the theology of the Word.

Discussions of anthropology are often abstract, including this chapter up to this point. But a concrete illustration will help me to be more concrete. I will begin with this question: "How does a human being become someone who reasons like a Christian?" Someone who believes "You are what you think" might answer: "By memorizing the Bible" or "By knowing your Christian doctrine." But someone who believes "You are what you love" and "We are all liturgical animals" could answer in a variety of ways, but I will explore this one: "By participating in the sacramental life of the Church." This answer has been selected for three reasons. First, it is very different than what Foundationalist Rationalism would propose. Second, it is intimately connected with what is typically thought of as "liturgy," "worship," and "rituals." Third, it is *rational*.

The Augsburg Confession teaches that "the sacraments are instituted not only to be signs by which people may recognize Christians outwardly, but also as signs and testimonies of God's will toward us in order thereby to awaken and strengthen our faith" (AC XIII.1). Sacraments are instruments through which faith comes. What are these "signs and testimonies"? The Apology of the Augsburg Confession gives this as the strictest definition: "If we define the sacraments as rites, which have the command of God and to which the promise of grace has been added, it is easy to determine what the sacraments are, properly speaking…. Therefore, the sacraments are actually baptism, the Lord's Supper, and absolution (the sacrament of penance)" (Ap XIII.3, 4).

Now, if these rites function as the actual sacramental Word, then Christians should understand the sacramental rites of baptism, the Lord's Supper, and absolution as means to shape and form reason, because they orient people toward the particular vision of the Kingdom of God. How do they do this? In the case of rites or sacraments, they deliver the very Kingdom of God itself to the human creature. They sustain Christians for life in Christ's kingdom by strengthening their faith.

Next, the question should be, "How are the rites to administered?" In particular, how should rites or sacraments be administered toward the ends as means of rational formation? They should be administered toward the ends of "awakening and strengthening faith," because this is how the appropriate love and trust are formed.

However, one point that may easily be overlooked is that each rite or sacrament accomplishes something different in ones who receive them. Holy Baptism, as Matthew 28 shows, brings one into the life of a Christian by means of water and the Word to the ends of making the baptized a disciple of Christ. The rite makes people Christian. It initiates and sustains life with Christ by uniting the baptized to Christ as Romans 6 and Galatians 3. Union with Christ

also gives and sustains the baptized with the benefits of forgiveness of sins, eternal life, and salvation. This is how baptism awakens and strengthens faith. The Large Catechism: "Christians always have enough to do to believe firmly what baptism promises and brings—victory over death and the devil, forgiveness of sin, God's grace, the entire Christ, and the Holy Spirit with his gifts."[73] Through the means of the sacrament or rite of Holy Baptism results in these rational ends: "Thus, we regard baptism and put it to use in such a way that we may draw strength and comfort from it when our sin or conscience oppress us, and say: 'But I am baptized! And if I have been baptized, I have the promise that I shall be saved and have eternal life both in soul and body.'"[74] "I am baptized" is the rational ends of a Christian's identity and the frame through which they live their lives of discipleship in Jesus Christ.

Similarly, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper serves as the means to gather the baptized into one communal meal. Here the Lord gathers to Himself for the awakening and strengthening of faith. Luther writes in the Large Catechism, "Therefore the Lord's Supper is given as a daily food and sustenance so that our faith may be refreshed and strengthened and that it may not succumb in the struggle but become stronger and stronger."[75] The Large Catechism also explains how the Lord's Supper is necessary means to carry one through the suffering and struggles of this life by sustaining one with the fullness of Christ's body and blood that come by the Word. The Lord's Supper is also necessary for the community's defense against the real spiritual assaults of the devil himself.

From the strength of faith given in the Lord's Supper, the Christian community results in the ends of Christian life through action. Luther writes, "Because they have been baptized and

[73] LC IV.41 in Kolb and Wengert, 461.

[74] LC IV.44–45 in Kolb and Wengert, 462.

[75] LC V.24 in Kolb and Wengert, 469.

received into the gospel of Christ, they should also enjoy the fellowship of the sacrament so that they may serve us and be useful. For they must all help us to believe, to love, to pray, and to fight against the devil."[76] The rational ends of the Lord Supper is the gathering of the baptized, the strengthening of faith, protection from the devil, and lives of Christian action toward their neighbor. All of this is summarized in a widely-prayed collect: **"**We give thanks to You, almighty God, that You have refreshed us through this salutary gift, and we implore You that of Your mercy You would strengthen us through the same in faith toward You and in fervent love toward one another; through Jesus Christ, Your Son, our Lord, who lives and reigns with You and the Holy Spirit, one God, now and forever."[77]

Finally, the rite of absolution is the means of restoration to the community of the faith when sin separates and is divided by the spiritual forces of the devil, the world, and the flesh. Guilt and shame which are exposed by the law and the sinful condition of the world are able to be acknowledged, spoken aloud, owned, and released to the mercy seat of God through Jesus Christ. Christians are taught to recognize the need to acknowledge their sins before God and neighbor and to pray for grace as part of daily Christian life. Moreover, they desire release from sin, restoration to a rite relationship with God and the ones they have sinned against. Again, the Luther's Large Catechism, not only speaks of the need to confess to free consciences of sin, but the restorative power that absolution offers from both the pastor and from neighbor to neighbor. "Thus the divine ordinance of Christ himself has placed absolution in the mouths of his Christian community and commanded us to absolve one another from sins. So if there is a heart that feels its sin and desires comfort, it has here a sure refuge where it finds and hears God's Word because

[76] LC V.87 in Kolb and Wengert, 476.

[77] The Commission of Worship of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, *Lutheran Service Book* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2006), 166.

through a human being God looses and absolves sin."[78] The ends achieved by means of confession and absolution is that the Christian is restored to God and the community. Luther summarizes these ends when he writes, "Therefore, when I exhort you to go to confession, I am doing nothing but exhorting you to be a Christian."[79]

The means of the Word in the rite and sacrament results in the ends that faith is awakened and strengthened. Christians receives these means with the result that they have and become the ends of what they promise. Smith's liturgical anthropology provides a way to see how rites and liturgies enact what people become by delivering people the very Kingdom of God. Lutherans understand that these rites and liturgies make Christians whose faith is awakened and strengthened. Christians have what the rites and sacraments promise: forgiveness, rescue, life, salvation. Moreover, they also receive identity, help, healing, communal belonging that they are searching for in this life. Through the rite or sacraments Christians are oriented toward, recalibrated for everyday life with God in His kingdom.

While Lutherans, particularly, confessionally embrace all of these things in the rites or sacraments, they do not speak of them as rational means to an ends. Doing so aligns with Smith's anthropology of the liturgical animal whose affective, desiring, and worshiping nature is influenced and formed in the context of communal, liturgical practices. It also aligns with what the Lutheran Confessions say the rites or sacraments do. Speaking to them as means that result in faith awakened and strengthened, and that people are given identity, a community, and restoration when fallen is a helpful, important way to convey the rationality already written and confessed in Confessional Lutheranism.

[78] LC Brief Exhortation.14 in Kolb and Wengert, 477–78.

[79] LC Brief Exhortation.32 in Kolb and Wengert, 479.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to challenge the anthropological tenet of Foundationalist Rationalism that humans are thinking things. Descartes advanced this when he reduced human beings to "thinking things," summarized in his famous saying, *Cogito, ergo sum*: "I think, therefore I am." Human beings, according to Descartes, think ideally when they are free of context and community. The anthropology of James K. A. Smith, which presents human beings as liturgical animals who reason through desires as lovers, is one that both challenges this Enlightenment anthropology and provides a constructive and plausible alternative. Smith showed how people reason through love and desires. Loves and desires are created through what Smith calls "liturgies."

Since one major feature of this dissertation is an account of Christian rationality, I evaluated Smith's anthropology from the standpoint of the Lutheran Confessional tradition, which I already argued embodies and promotes an authentic Christian rationality. I showed that Smith's anthropology and the Lutheran Confessional tradition are consistent with each other, but I also argued that the Lutheran distinction of two kinds of righteousness and the Lutheran theology of the Word sharpened this anthropology.

Finally, to illustrate how this anthropology might contribute concretely to Christian practice and theology, I considered the administration of sacraments in view of this anthropology. These rites are the means to form ends: Christians are made and born into the Kingdom of God, community is made and faith awakened and strengthened at the Lord's Supper, and restoration is given through the rite of Confession and Absolution. Viewing them as such calibrates Christians to look at themselves and live in this world the certain means for faith to be awakened and strengthened. These rites constitute what it means to live by faith alone.

CHAPTER FIVE

HE ALSO GIVES ME ... AND STILL TAKES CARE OF THEM: PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF REASON

Introduction

Chapters Four, Five, and Six explore ways for Christians to develop an anthropology that goes beyond the limits of the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. As shown in Chapter Three and observed again in Chapter Four, the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism reduces the human creature to a "thinking machine" or a "thinking thing." This anthropology is summarized by Descartes: *Cogito, ergo sum*, or "I think, therefore I am," and in the Bible memory verse advertisement that got the attention of James K. A. Smith: "You are what you think." Smith sought to develop an account of Christian worship, education, and discipleship that did not assume this anthropology, which is still widely held. This anthropology situated human reasoning within the context of ultimate loves or desires, what Smith called versions of the "Kingdom" or visions of the good life. He likened this change to a shift of the center of human being from the head to the heart. Instead of believing "You are what you think," he proposed a model of the human person summarized as "You are what you love." But these loves and desires are not innate; a person must acquire them and be formed into living in these visions of the good life. This happens through what Smith calls "liturgies," or practices, rituals, and settings through which this vision is given and living in this vision becomes possible.

Smith's anthropological model is valuable for this project in three ways. First, it shows how the "thinking thing" anthropology is *incomplete and confused*. This model does not account for the ends toward which reason is supposed to work. Reason is a means to an end, not an end in itself, so any anthropological model that does not account for reason's ends is incomplete. But this model sees the human person as ideally autonomous, free from influences. This means that

the model *cannot* account for reason's ends. This is incomplete and confused, since reason is a means to an end. Second, Smith's anthropological model, unlike the "thinking thing" model, *accounts for reason's ends*. This model is summarized in the slogan, "You are what you love." But Smith's anthropology also accounts for how ends are acquired through liturgies, which is summarized in the claim that human beings are "liturgical animals." Third, Smith's anthropological model is *consistent with Christian rationality*. Smith, being a Christian philosopher and interested in Christian worship, education, and discipleship, articulated a model meant to be helpful for Christians. But this dissertation aims for articulating a distinctive Christian rationality, so Smith's model was evaluated and sharpened according to the two kinds of righteousness and the theology of the Word of God.

But Smith's model did not explore the model of human reasoning itself. Chapter Three showed how Enlightenment Rationalism developed its "thinking machine" model because it assumed that being rational was *mathematical*. Ideal reasoning was modeled on mathematical proofs and mathematical operations, which is why Foundationalist Rationalism modeled the human reasoner after a "machine."

Developments in contemporary psychology show that it is wrong to assume that human minds ideally work in a purely logical and mathematical way, like an abacus or a calculator. Human beings can think in precise, mathematical ways, but recent work shows how this is not the usual way of reasoning. The "default mode" or the ordinary way of reasoning relies on shortcuts and intuitions.

This Chapter Five explore two of these developments: The work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on heuristics and biases at work in human reasoning, and the work of Jonathan Haidt on moral intuitions, judgments, and reasoning. Like Smith's contextual approach, this

chapter will advance that intuitions and biases are present and grounded in everyday experiences in God's creation. Being in the context of creation produces intuitions and biases that influence human reasoning.

Building on the previous two chapters, recall that the anthropology of the Enlightenment treated humans as objects. It reduces to a "thinking machine" or "thinking thing." Recent work in psychology has explored new and alternative features of human anthropology that also challenge this view of human reasoners. But it approaches anthropology by asking about the human mind and how it works.

This kind of psychology is often called "cognitive," and its development is part of what is now called the "cognitive revolution."[1] Cognitive science is not only new but diverse and broad. George Lakoff, a cognitive linguist whose work will be explored in Chapter Six, explains that this field

> brings together what is known about the mind from many academic disciplines: psychology, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, and computer science. It seeks detailed answers to such questions as: What is reason? How do we make sense of our experience? What is a conceptual system and how is it organized? Do all people use the same conceptual system? If so, what is that system? If not, exactly what is there that is common to the way all human beings think? The questions aren't new, but some recent answers are.[2]

This chapter and the next chapter explore two specific areas that fit under this very large umbrella. Both explicitly challenge the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism and offer new and different aspects of anthropology that matter to Christian practice and theology. They are appropriate areas to survey for a Christian account of human creatures as rational beings.

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[1] According to Howard Gardner, in his history of the cognitive revolution, "the term *cognitive science* first began to be bandied about in the early 1970s." Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 5.

[2] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), xi.

Toward a Cognitive Understanding

To begin, some attention should be given to cognitive science. Cognitive science views human reasoners by what the inner processes of the brain actually did. The brain, they recognized, is embodied. That is, the brain is a physical organ set within the context of the body and its environment. Mental processes, memory, attention, language, perception, problem solving are all areas that cognitive psychology explores. Expanding the field of study greatly, it is helpful, in fact necessary, to understand the connection between our physical brains and bodies to things like our "thoughts, feelings, and behaviors." Christian physician Curt Thompson argues that cognitive science even allows for and benefits people spiritually:

> I have noticed how much patients benefit when they have a better understanding of the structures and functions of the brain. It seems to help them see the connection between the activity within their bodies and their thoughts, feeling, and behaviors. It gives them a greater appreciation of what makes them uniquely human. Finally, it enables them to pay more attention to the various aspects of their minds through which God is speaking.[3]

This dissertation is focused on one aspect of being human: the human creature as a rational being.

In the early 20th century, the operations of the mind and brain were neglected by many. How did cognitive psychology arise? To get to this place, we might ask how psychology progressed from Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum* to cognitive psychology. American neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux sketched out an answer in *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life.*[4] LeDoux identifies three general stages, starting with Descartes. He called the first stage "introspective psychology," because it was a study of consciousness. Consciousness is

[3] Curt Thompson, *Anatomy of the Soul: Surprising Connections Between Neuroscience and Spiritual Practices that Can Transform Your Life and Relationships* (Carol Stream: Tyndale, 2010), 31.

[4] Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

subjective and unobservable. It can be examined only through introspection (hence the label).[5] This meant that psychology could not be a "science," which must deal with observable data.

The second stage tried to make psychology "scientific" in this way. This is "behavioral psychology," and it arose in opposition to introspective psychology. LeDoux explains:

> Throughout much of the first half of this century, psychology was dominated by behaviorists, who believed that the subjective inner states of mind, like perceptions, memories, and emotions, are not appropriate topics for psychology. In their view, psychology should not be the study of consciousness, as had been the case Descartes said "Cogito, ergo sum," but instead should be the study of observable facts—objectively measurable behaviors. Being subjective and unobservable (except by introspection), consciousness could not, in the behaviorists' mind, be examined scientifically. Mental states came to be known pejoratively as 'ghosts in the machine.' Behaviorists were known to ridicule those who dared to speak of mind and consciousness[6]

Behaviorism denied that consciousness matters at all, and they treated the mind as if its operations were unimportant to know about. "Behaviorism rejected consciousness as a legitimate subject matter for psychology and treated the events occurring between stimuli and responses as hidden in a black box. Cognitive science tries to understand the processes that occur inside the black box."[7] The idea of the "black box" comes from engineering. The term refers to a system where you do not explain how the inputs give you the outputs; you just know what will happen for a given input; it is a black box.[8] Behaviorism treats minds as black boxes. What is "going on inside" is of no consequence. Their position can be summarized as "for an input, you get an output."

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[5] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 25.

[6] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*¸ 25.

[7] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 26.

[8] According to Mario Bunge, "A black box is a fiction representing a set of concrete systems into which stimuli S impinge and out of what reactions R emerge. The constitution and structure of the box are altogether irrelevant to the approach under consideration… In other words, only the behavior of the system will be accounted for." "A General Black Box Theory," *Philosophy of Science* 30, no. 4 (1963): 346.

The development of the digital computer in the mid 20th century gave a fresh reason to think about how the mind worked. The so-called "Turing machine" offered the promise that "a simple machine... could in principle carry out any possible conceivable calculation."[9] Turing showed that, at least in theory, any conceivable task could be accomplished as long as the task could be broken down into a set of simple instructions. Turing himself imagined that such a machine could be made whose responses to questions could not be distinguished from those of a human person, and with this in mind he devised what is now famously called the "Turing test."[10]

The promise of the digital computer suggested that the human mind operated in the same way, understanding it was itself a kind of a thinking machine. The development of the computer was a major impetus toward the cognitive revolution. LeDoux explains, "Computer operations became a metaphor for mental functions, and the field of artificial intelligence (AI), which seeks to model the human mind using computer simulations, was born."[11]

The cognitive revolution, however, was not a return to Descartes. There were two important differences. First, Descartes made a sharp distinction between "mind" and "body," or between "mental" and "physical," but cognitive science does not. Many, in fact, understand mental activity to be entirely physical or material. Second, Descartes understood the "mental" to be "conscious," but cognitive science often assumes and studies the so-called "cognitive unconscious," which is a focus on "unconscious *processes* as opposed to conscious *content*."[12] "For Descartes, if it wasn't conscious it wasn't mental: mind and consciousness became

[9] Gardner, *Mind's New Science*, 17.

[10] A[lan] M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," *Mind* 59 (1950): 433–60. See also Gardner, *The Mind's New Science*, 17–18.

[11] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 26.

[12] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 29.

synonymous after him."[13] But cognitive science assumes that much "mental" activity is unconscious and that this unconscious activity should be studied.

One important assumption that cognitive science initially shared with Descartes and with Foundationalist Rationalism was what I call "acontextualism," or the belief that rationality is ideally unaffected by tradition, context, emotions, etc. But attempts at artificial intelligence ("AI") to solve problems and perform tasks soon showed that this assumption was wrong. Their assumption did not work because it does not track with how humans actually reason. LeDoux explains: "AI researchers realized early on that knowledge was needed in problem-solving machines—problem solvers with impeccable logic but without facts didn't get very far. However, knowledge was a crutch to logic in these models. It is now believed that thinking does not normally involve the pure reasoned rules of logic."[14] To support this contention, LeDoux cited two related lines of research. One line argues that human reasoning is not modeled properly after the laws of logic. He cited Philip Johnson-Laird, whose research showed that people are rational, but "they just don't achieve their rationality by following formal laws of logic."[15] He also cited Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who "showed that people use their implicit understanding of the way the world works, often relying on educated guesswork rather than formal principles of logic, to solve the problems they face in their daily lives."[16] The other line of research argued for the importance of emotions in reasoning. LeDoux was especially interested in this, because he was concerned about the "emotional brain." He concluded: "The logical/illogical or rational/irrational distinction is not a very sharp one when it comes to

[13] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 27. See also Gardner, *The Mind's New Science*, 49–54.

[14] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 35. Emphasis added. In an endnote, LeDoux cites Gardner, *Mind's New Science* for the finding of AI researchers. See Gardner, *Mind's New Science*, 138–81.

[15] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 35.

[16] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 35–36.

separating emotion and cognition, and is certainly not a clean way of defining what a science of mind should be about."[17]

The cognitive revolution is diverse and still emerging. Developments like those in AI continue to make cognitive science relevant and interesting. There is undoubtedly much that might be explored for an anthropology after Foundationalist Rationalism. But in this chapter I will focus on developments in the two lines of research that LeDoux identified, because they address directly and clearly the idea of human persons as rational beings. In particular, I will explore the work of Kahneman and Tversky on heuristics (shortcuts) and biases (unconscious systematic errors or "guesswork"), and the work of moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, a proponent of "social intuitionism" that contends that "intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second."[18]

Heuristics, Biases, and Human Beings as Rational Agents

Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002 "for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty."[19] But Kahneman readily acknowledged this work was done jointly with Amos Tversky, who died in 1996.[20] Kahneman

[17] LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 37.

[18] Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Vintage, 2013).

[19] "Daniel Kahneman—Facts." NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2024. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2002/kahneman/facts/ To be precise, the award is called "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel," because it was not established by Alfred Nobel himself.

[20] Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," *American Economic Review* 93 (2003): 1449. In his book *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2011), Kahneman wrote: "Our collaboration on judgment and decision making was the reason for the Nobel Prize I received in 2002, which Amos would have shared had he not died, aged fifty-nine, in 1996" (10).

said that there was "magic" in their collaboration. In the peak years of their collaboration, they published eight articles, five of which, as of 2002, had been cited over a thousand times. For comparison, they published 200 works separately, and only two of those exceeded that threshold. "Amos and I shared the wonder of together owning a goose that could lay golden eggs—joint mind that was better than our separate minds."[21]

Like all cognitive psychologists, Kahneman and Tversky were interested in *how* human minds work, and they assumed that much of what minds do is *unconscious*. In later work, Kahneman proposed that human minds function in a two-tiered system: System 1 "thinking fast" and System 2 "thinking slow."[22] Kahneman notes that "System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with a little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control."[23] This system is "intuitive," and it is something we are born with. This system enables human creatures to be "prepared to perceive the world around us, recognize objects, orient attention, avoid losses, and fear spiders."[24] But many acquired mental activities become automatic through practice. Kahneman explains:

> System 1 has learned associations between ideas (the capital of France?); it has also learned skills such as reading and understanding nuances of social situations. Some skills, such as finding strong chess moves, are acquired only by specialized experts. Others are widely shared. Detecting the similarity of a personality sketch to an occupational stereotype requires broad knowledge of the language and culture, which most of possess. The knowledge is stored in memory and accessed without intention and without effort.[25]

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[21] Daniel Kahneman, "Daniel Kahneman – Biographical." NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2024. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2002/kahneman/biographical/

[22] Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 19–105. For a briefer summary, see Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality," 1450–1452.

[23] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 21–22.

[24] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 20.

[25] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 22.

System 1 responds automatically to certain questions and situations. When asked, 2 + 2, you automatically respond, 4; reading words on billboards; detecting hostility in people's voices; understanding simple sentences. All of these are examples of how the intuitive, automatic reasoning in System 1 works.

System 2 "allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration."[26] System 2 is more complex than System 1; it is usually associated with what psychologists call "consciousness." Examples of this are: focusing on the voice of a particular person in a crowded and noisy room; look for a woman with white hair; tell someone your phone number; fill out a tax form; check the validity of a complex logical argument.[27] Unlike, System 1 these actions are not automatic, but require conscious consideration.

System 2 is often identified as the "conscious" part of rationality which "thinks" by making decisions and deciding what to do. However, for Kahneman it is System 1 which is the real hero, because it automatically organizes intuitions, feelings, and desires into immediate responses. For example, it responds immediately to danger. This system of thinking is usually associated with what is called "gut feelings," because it answers simple, well-learned facts instantaneously. Kahneman's assessment in System 1 is often unconscious and effortless. It makes sense of System 2 and in this way is the real start of the mind's thinking systems, because of its automatic, interpretive ability.[28]

System 2, on the other hand, handles more complex and diverse thought processes. For

[26] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 21.

[27] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 22.

[28] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 21.

example, it can manage conscious or "thoughtful" responses such as intentional focus and more complex equations like 17 x 24, which Kahneman uses to illustrate the difference between System 1 and System 2.

> You knew immediately that this is a multiplication problem, and probably knew that you could solve it, with paper and pencil, if not without. You also had some vague intuitive knowledge of the range of possible results. You would be quick to recognize that both 12,609 and 123 are implausible. Without spending some time on the problem, however, you would not be certain that the answer is not 568. A precise solution did not come to mind, and you felt that you could choose whether or not to engage in the computation.[29]

It was System 1 that recognize this as a multiplication problem, but System 2 that would doubt that the answer is 568 or decide to actually engage in the computation. The thinking system needed to "problem solve" or "think things through."[30] Thinking in this system is associated with rule-following and being "self-aware."

Interaction between these systems is highly efficient and sophisticated. Kahneman describes their interconnectedness this way:

> The division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes performance. The arrangement works well most of the time because System 1 is generally very good at what it does: its models of situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually accurate as well, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate. System 1 has biases, however, systematic errors that it is prone to make in specified circumstances.[31]

These two systems function differently because of physiology. System 2 takes more energy between the two systems and, because of that, it is more effortful. It takes more areas of the physical brain system achieve its goals. More effort means that more energy is used and because of that this system is often "lazy," that is, tries to conserve energy.[32] System 2 thinking also takes

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[29] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 20.

[30] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 20–24.

[31] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 25.

[32] Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow*, 35.

more time. Time, attention, and effort give System 2 its secondary position. The brain automatically defaults to System 1's responses because they take less effort and therefore less energy making it is the body's number one go-to. The arrangement seems to maximize our capacities. This is how System 1 is "the real hero."

Kahneman's model of the human person as a rational being was significantly different than the model usually assumed in economics and other social sciences. The usual model understood the human person as having only one system, not two, which is effortless like System 1 but have the ability to be precise like System 2. Kahneman explains: "The rational agent of economic theory would be described, in the language of the present treatment, as endowed with a single cognitive system that has the logical ability of a flawless System 2 and the low computing costs of System 1."[33] The work that Kahneman and Tversky accomplished together, for which Kahneman received the Nobel Prize, showed how this model was fundamentally flawed, which is how their work matters for this dissertation.

While System 1 may be the hero and the automatic go-to, it is sometimes inaccurate. Inaccuracies have various causes, but Kahneman and Tversky were interested especially in what they would call "heuristics and biases."[34] A "heuristic" is "a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions."[35] In general, heuristics are useful, but sometimes they lead to "severe and systematic errors," or what they called "biases."[36]

For example, because it takes much time and effort to think using System 2, System 1 is

[33] Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality," 1469.

[34] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 109–95; and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185 (1974): 1124–31.

[35] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 98.

[36] Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty," 1124. See also Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 28.

prone to "jump to conclusions."[37] Kahneman illustrates this by observing the using System 1 the presence of doubt or associative memories creates a type of bias in its functioning. He describes a phenomenon, that is, this "heuristic," called "What You See Is All There Is" (WYSIATI). One of the features of the brain's rational systems is that it makes associations. Consistency of information, rather than completeness or truth, makes all the difference in the brain's ability to make decisions. Kahneman explains: "The measure of success for System 1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create. The amount and quality of the data on which the story is based is largely irrelevant."[38] He showed what he meant:

> Consider the following: "Will Mindik be a good leader? She is intelligent and strong…" An answer quickly came to your mind, and it was yes. You picked the best answer based on the very limited information available, but you jumped the gun. What if the next two adjectives were *corrupt and cruel*?
>
> Take note of what you did *not* do as you briefly thought of Mindik as a leader. You did not start by asking, "What would I need to know before I form an opinion about the quality of someone's leadership?" System 1 got to work on its own from the very first adjective: intelligent is good, intelligent and strong is very good. This is the best story that can be constructed from two adjectives, and System 1 delivered it with great cognitive ease.[39]

The WYSIATI heuristic leads the mind to use the available data, put together a coherent study, and give a "biased" answer.

It is important to recognize the *character* of these biases. Kahneman and Tversky called them "cognitive," meaning that they had to do with the processes of the brain, and not "with motivational effects such as wishful thinking or the distortion of judgments by payoffs and penalties."[40] Of course, "motivational effects" also result in biases, but their study focused on

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[37] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 79.

[38] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 85.

[39] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 86.

[40] Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty," 1130.

cognitive biases.

Kahneman and Tversky first presented their heuristic and biases program in the article "Judgment under Uncertainty." It identified three basic heuristics and 20 biases that resulted from these heuristics.[41] These heuristics were "representativeness," "availability," and "adjustment and anchoring." Unlike the WYSIATI heuristic, these three heuristics "are employed to assess probabilities and to predict values." Put less technically, these heuristics showed how people *intuitively* judge how likely something is or guess at how many items there are. This shows why it made such an impact on economics and on other areas that call for thinking in numbers.

But some of their experiments are straightforward and accessible, and they illustrate clearly how readily human persons do *not* think according to logical rules but according to heuristics. This includes what Kahneman called the "best-known and most controversial of our experiments," the Linda problem.[42] This illustration is valuable not only because the illustration is readily accessible, but because they altered the experiment, making it increasingly apparent what the correct response should be, but still received more incorrect answers. In other words, System 1 and its heuristics continued to dominate the thinking of many of their subjects.

Here is their description of "Linda":

> Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.

Participants in the first version of the experiment were given a list of possible scenarios for

[41] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 8.

[42] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 156. See also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment," *Psychological Review* 90 (1983): 293–315.

Linda, and they were asked to rank the scenarios by likelihood. The list was:

Linda is a teacher in elementary school.

Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.

Linda is active in the feminist movement.

Linda is a psychiatric social worker.

Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.

Linda is a bank teller.

Linda is an insurance salesperson.

Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.[43]

Logically, it is more likely that Linda is a bank teller than that Linda is both a bank teller and feminist. Kahneman explains: "Think in terms of Venn diagrams. The set of feminist bank tellers is wholly included in the set of bank tellers, as every feminist bank teller is a bank teller. Therefore the probability that Linda is a feminist bank teller *must* be lower than the probability of her being a bank teller."[44] But participants ranked Linda being a "feminist bank teller" higher than being a "bank teller."

When they first did this experiment, Kahneman and Tversky compared "between subjects," that is, they gave some participants a list that included only "Linda is a bank teller" and the rest of the participants a list that included only "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement." But then they conducted a "within-subject" experiment, where all participants saw the list including *both* "Linda is a bank teller" and "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement." They were convinced that participants would notice that Linda being a

[43] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 156–57. See also Tversky and Kahneman, "Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning," 297.

[44] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 157.

"bank teller" was more likely than being a "feminist bank teller." In fact, they were so certain of this that they did not run a separate experiment at first, but an assistant running a different experiment asked subjects to complete this question as they were being paid. But this ad hoc trial showed that they ranked "feminist bank teller" as more probable than "bank teller." Subsequent experiments gave the same result.[45]

In what they "later described as 'increasingly desperate' attempts to eliminate the error," they reduced the questionnaire to this simple question: "Which is more probable? Linda is a bank teller. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement."[46] It was this version of the Linda problem that became both famous and controversial. Kahneman explained:

> This stark version of the problem made Linda famous in some circles, and it earned us years of controversy. About 85% to 90% of undergraduates at several major universities chosen the second option, contrary to logic. Remarkably, the sinners seemed to have no shame. When I asked my large undergraduate class in some indignation, "Do you realize that you have violated an elementary logical rule?" someone in the back row shouted, "So what?" and a graduate student who had made the same error explained herself by saying, "I thought you just asked for my opinion."[47]

Kahneman and Tversky's work on heuristics and biases attracted a great deal of attention, and in many fields, "including medical diagnosis, legal judgment, intelligence analysis, philosophy, finance, statistics, and military strategy."[48] According to Kahneman, a key reason for the broad appeal of their work was because they usually included the full text of the questions they used in their research. They provided readers with actual demonstrations of how prevalent heuristics and

[45] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 158.

[46] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 158.

[47] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 158. Kahneman reported that the majority gave the correct response to the short version of the Linda problem in only one study, with graduate students in the social sciences at Stanford University and the University of California Berkeley.

[48] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 8. According to Google Scholar in 2024, this article had been cited more than 52,000 times.

biases are, and also to question how human beings are rational—a key matter for this dissertation. The Linda problem illustrates this well. According to Kahneman,

> The use of demonstrations provided scholars of diverse disciplines—notably philosophers and economists—an unusual opportunity to observe possible flaws in their own thinking. Having seen themselves fail, they became more likely to question that dogmatic assumption, prevalent at the time, that the human mind is rational and logical. The choice of method was crucial: if we had reported results of only conventional experiments, the article would have been less noteworthy and less memorable. Furthermore, skeptical readers would have distanced themselves from the results by attributing judgment errors to the familiar fecklessness of undergraduates, the typical participants in psychological studies.[49]

Christian theologians and pastors should be included in this list. As I explored in Chapter Four with the help of James K. A. Smith, the "dogmatic assumption … that the human mind is rational and logical" is common in the contemporary church. But the work that Kahneman presents gives a different picture. This is made clear by presence of bias, which overrides any conception of the human mind functioning rationally as a computer. Their dual process view of human thinking provides a compelling picture of the human reasoner which includes a fuller picture of the human person as a rational being.

The Rider and the Elephant

Jonathan Haidt is a social psychologist, specializing in moral psychology. Haidt is interested in moral decisions, which he defines as righteousness, although not from a theological sense. In his book *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*, he states: "I chose the title *The Righteous Mind* to convey the sense that human nature is not just intrinsically moral, it's also intrinsically moralistic, critical, and judgmental."[50] He believes that humans are actually obsessed with being righteous, especially with being *self-righteous.* "I want

[49] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 9.

[50] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, xix.

to show you that an contention that this is 'not a bug or error' that makes us fail to be objective and rational."[51] Rather, it is a human obsession with righteousness that leads us in a continual struggle with one another over accountability, that is, who and what is right and who or what is wrong, and why these types of choices and behaviors lead to all manner of conflict, as the title suggests, from religion to politics, and much more.

Like Smith and also like Kahneman and Tversky, Haidt challenges the prevailing model of human persons as fundamentally "rational," meaning that they ideally act according to reasons that they discern apart from the influence of emotions, desires, or contexts. Like Smith, Haidt questions this model of the human being as a "thinking thing" or a "thinking machine." Smith explained the "thinking thing" as

> a cognitive machine defined, above all, by thought and rational operations. We call thing a broadly "rationalist" or "intellectualist" picture of the human person, and it has both a long pedigree (back to Plato) and a large progeny (through Kant and into the present). It entails a sense that persons are defined by thinking and is often allied with the sense of functional disembodiment (that is, the person as thinking thing is only contingently related to a body). As such, what nourishes or fuels the "I" is a steady diet of ideas, fed somewhat intravenously into the mind through the lines of propositions and information.[52]

Smith noted how prominent this model remains among Christians, but he criticized it along these lines:

> [T]hey approach discipleship and Christian formation, narrowly focusing on filling our intellectual wells with biblical knowledge, convinced that we can *think* our way to holiness—sanctification by information transfer. Indeed, that's precisely the conviction behind the ad for the Bible verse memory program mentioned above: If "you are what you think," then filling your thinking organ with Bible verses should translate into Christlike character, right? If "you are what you think," then changing what you think should change who you are, right?[53]

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[51] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, xix–xx.

[52] James K. A. Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 42.

[53] Smith, *You Are What You Love: The Spiritual Power of Habit* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2016), 4–5.

Haidt was critical of this "rationalist" picture in moral reasoning in a similar way. He observed how many assume, to use Smith's phrase, "you are what you think": "From Plato through Kant and [20th century psychologist Lawrence] Kohlberg, many rationalists have asserted that the ability to reason well about ethical issues *causes* good behavior. They believe that reasoning is the royal road to moral truth, and they believe that people who reason well are more likely to act morally."[54]

Haidt called this belief the "rationalist delusion," and he countered this belief with research that showed how moral philosophers were no more ethical than other people. He explained:

> But if that were the case, then moral philosophers—who reason about ethical principles all day long—should be more virtuous than other people. Are they? The philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel tried to find out. He used surveys and more surreptitious methods to measure how often moral philosophers give to charity, vote, call their mothers, donate blood, donate organs, clean up after themselves at philosophy conferences, and respond to emails purportedly from students. And in none of these ways are moral philosophers better than other philosophers or professors in other fields.
>
> Schwitzgebel even scrounged up the missing-book lists from dozens of libraries and found that academic books on ethics, which are presumably borrowed mostly by ethicists, are more likely to be stolen or just never returned than books in other areas of philosophy. In other words, expertise in moral reasoning does not seem to improve moral behavior, and it might even make it worse…[55]

However, Haidt approached anthropology from a perspective different from both Smith and Kahneman and Tversky. Smith approached anthropology from the perspective of modern philosophy. Kahneman and Tversky approached anthropology from the perspective of judgments and decision-making. But Haidt approached anthropology from the perspective of moral

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[54] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 103.

[55] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 103–4. Haidt cites the following references by Schwitzgebel and his co-authors: Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, "Do Ethicists and Political Philosophers Vote More Often than Other Professors," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 1 (2009): 189–99; Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, "The Self-Reported Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors," unpublished ms., University of California at Riverside, 2011; and Eric Schwitzgebel, et al, "Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences," unpublished ms., University of California at Riverside, 2011.

reasoning. He asked in effect, "What model of the human person as a rational being is consistent with their moral reasoning?"

Haidt began seeking an answer by considering the three usual models, which he attributed to Plato, David Hume, and Thomas Jefferson.

> Plato said that reason *ought* to be the master, even if philosophers are the only ones who can reach a high level of mastery. Hume said that reason is and ought to be the servant of the passions. And Jefferson gives us a third option, in which reason and sentiment are (and ought to be) independent co-rulers, like the emperors of Rome, who divided the empire into eastern and western halves.[56]

Each of these models *assumed* that reason and emotion were fundamentally different processes. "One of the greatest truths in psychology is that the mind is divided into parts that sometimes conflict. To be human is to feel pulled in different directions, and to marvel—sometimes in horror—at your own inability to control your own actions."[57] He adopted "a Jeffersonian view in which moral emotions and moral reasoning were separate processes. Each process could make moral judgments on its own, and they sometimes fought it out for the right to do so."[58]

But Haidt could not prove this view. His own research supported Hume over Plato and Jefferson. His studies tried to determine the relationship of emotions and moral reasoning by giving subjects scenarios that were likely to be found ambiguous, wrong, or repulsive. They were asked to drink juice in which a sterilized cockroach had been dipped. They were asked to sign a piece of paper saying they had sold their souls to the researcher. They were told a story about a sister and a brother who decided to have sexual intercourse. After they reacted, subjects were asked to explain their reasons.[59] The research showed that "People make moral judgments

[56] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 36.

[57] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 32.

[58] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 41.

[59] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 43–47.

quickly and emotionally. Moral reasoning was mostly just a post hoc search for reasons to justify the judgments people had already made."[60]

But Haidt also realized his own research might be a shortcoming. Using bizarre scenarios to elicit these post hoc rational responses was not necessarily or even likely to be how most moral thinking works. He only made progress when he realized that the problem was with assuming that emotions and cognition were distinct.

This shift happened after Haidt studied the book *Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition* by Howard Margolis on political thinking.[61] Haidt explained: "Margolis was trying to understand why people's beliefs about political issues are so often poorly connected to objective facts…"[62] Margolis was not a psychologist, although he first turned to cognitive psychology for a solution. At this time (the 1980s), most models about the mind were based on the computer, but "Margolis thought that a better model for studying higher cognition, such as political thinking, was lower cognition, such as vision, which works largely by rapid unconscious pattern matching."[63]

An experiment that supports this model is the "Wason 4-card task."[64] This experiment shows subjects four cards. Each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other, and subjects see four of them arranged like this: "E" "K" "4" "7." Their task is to choose the fewest cards to decide whether this rule holds: "If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other side."[65] Everyone correctly chooses the "E," checking for an even number.

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[60] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 47.

[61] Howard Margolis, *Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[62] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 48.

[63] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 48.

[64] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 48. Peter Wason, "Regression in Reasoning?" *British Journal of Psychology* 60 (1969): 471–80.

[65] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 48.

But then many choose the "4," checking for a vowel. This is not logical for the task, because turning over the "4" to find a "B" on the other side would not disprove the rule. Logically, the "7" should be checked, because the rule would be disproved if a vowel were found on the other side of the "7" card. Why were they illogical? It seemed that the subjects were "doing simple-minded pattern matching: *There was a vowel and an even number in the question, so let's turn over the vowel and the even number*."[66] Subjects, however, proved to be no more consistently logical when they were told what the answer is first and then asked to explain why it is correct, because "they are just as able to offer an explanation, and just as confident in their reasoning, whether they are told the right answer (E and 7) or the popular but wrong answer (E and 4)."[67]

Findings like Wason's led Margolis to conclude that *reaching judgments* and *making justifications for these judgments* were two different cognitive processes, which related in this way:

> Given the judgments (themselves produced by the non-conscious cognitive machinery in the brain, sometimes correctly, sometimes not so), human beings produce rationales they believe account for their judgments. But the rationales (on this argument) are only ex post rationalizations.[68]

Margolis called these two different cognitive processes "seeing-that" and "reasoning-why." "Seeing-that" is the process of how we make judgments. It is the type of rapid, automatic pattern matching that we process effortlessly because it is mostly unconscious. "Reasoning-why" is the process of how we justify our judgments. Margolis explains: It is the process "by which we

[66] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 49.

[67] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 49–50.

[68] Margolis, *Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition*, 21, quoted by Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 50.

describe how we think we reached a judgment, or how we think another person could reach that judgment."[69] "Reasoning-why" is a well thought out process that is conscious and takes effort.[70]

For Haidt, "Margolis's ideas were a perfect fit with everything I had seen in my studies."[71] They explain both how people rapidly made a judgment but then slowly and sometimes poorly offered a justification. But Margolis's ideas always made sense of situations where reasons are easy to find.

For the purpose of this dissertation, what matters most is that Margolis led Haidt to realize that the prevalent dichotomy between emotion and cognition, the kind of dichotomy that Foundationalist Rationalism assumed, should be replaced by a dichotomy between lower cognition and higher cognition. Haidt said that Margolis "helped me see that *moral judgment is a cognitive process*, as are all forms of judgment. The crucial distinction is really between *two different kinds of cognition:* intuition and reasoning."[72]

Intuition is a broader category than emotion. Emotions are a kind of intuitive cognition, not an entirely separate process. But moral intuitions are broader than emotions. Haidt explained:

> Moral emotions are one type of moral intuition, but most moral intuitions are more subtle; they don't rise to the level of emotions. The next time you read a newspaper or drive a car, notice the many tiny flashes of condemnation that flit through your consciousness. Is each such flash an emotion? Or ask yourself whether it is better to save the lives of five strangers or one (assuming all else is equal)? Do you need an emotion to tell you to go for the five? Do you need reasoning? No, you just see, instantly, that five is better than one. *Intuition* is the best word to describe the dozens or hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments and decisions that we all make every day. Only a few of these intuitions come to us embedded in full-blown emotions.[73]

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[69] Margolis, *Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition*, 76, quoted by Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 51.

[70] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 51.

[71] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 51.

[72] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 53. In an earlier article co-written with Richard Shweder, the same distinction is made, and it is attributed to Margolis. Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt, "The Future of Moral Psychology: Truth, Intuition, and the Pluralist Way," *Psychological Science* 4 (1993): 364.

[73] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 53.

Haidt "called these two kinds of cognition the rider (controlled processes, including 'reasoning-why' and the elephant (automatic processes, including emotions, intuition, and all forms of 'seeing-that')." This metaphor makes it clear that the elephant is generally in control. In other words, Haidt argues that human beings are primarily intuitive beings. Haidt writes, "The rider is our conscious reasoning—the stream of words and images of we are fully aware. The elephant is the other 99 percent of mental processes—the ones that occur outside of awareness but that actually govern most of our behavior."[74] This metaphor exposes how human beings reason, though it appears often irrationally, is in fact, according to Haidt, part and parcel of what it means to be a human reasoner, because both aspects are cognitive processes. Human intuitions are primarily automatic. Intuitions are "rapid, effortless moral judgments and decisions that we all make every day."[75] Most intuitions do not require full-blown rational justification because they are automatic responses. Akin to a "gut reaction," intuitions, because they fire rapidly, often cannot and may never be explained. One simply conveys the sentiment: "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong."[76]

Returning to Haidt's metaphor of the rider and the elephant helps explain how humans make moral judgments. "The mind is divided, like a rider on an elephant, and the rider's job is to serve the elephant."[77] Using this central metaphor, Haidt describes the process of making moral judgments:

> Moral judgments are not merely a cerebral affair in which we weigh concerns about harm, rights, and justice. It's a kind of rapid, automatic process more akin to the

[74] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, xxi.

[75] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 53.

[76] Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitivist Approach to Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review*, 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–834.

[77] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 1.

> judgment animals make as they move through the world, feeling themselves drawn toward or away from various things. Moral judgment is done by the elephant.[78]

The "elephant," then is the automatic process of cognition in which moral judgments are made. Emotions, intuitions, and things that are observed comprise the elephant. It is the place where most of the moral psychology takes place. It is the center of moral activity. "Intuitions come first, and under normal circumstances they cause us to emerge in socially strategic reasoning."[79] The "rider" is the controlled processes of cognition where patterns are connected to behaviors and is often considered the "conscious" or "rational" part of decision making.[80] This is the part of the cognitive system that plans or solves problem. It might also do a fair bit of analyzing. But the power-side of the system is the intuitive/emotive side, the six-ton elephant that the rational rider is trying to control.

To summarize: Intuitions come first, and strategic reasoning comes second.[81] The divided mind works this way: the elephant is ultimately the one in control not the rider. The rider is the conscious will that operates by means of reasons and formulates goals. The elephant is our intuitions: our gut feelings, our visceral reactions, outside of conscious control. What does this mean for our moral reasoning? Haidt explains, "Moral intuitions arise automatically and almost instantaneously, long before moral reasoning has a chance to get started, and those first intuitions tend to drive our later reasoning."[82] Reasoner's intuition's often reveal what has moral strategic objectives that lie behind them.

But the rider and the elephant metaphor, and the model of reason and intuition it represents,

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[78] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 79.

[79] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 82.

[80] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 58–59.

[81] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, xx.

[82] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, xx.

raises a new question: If reason does not often or usually inform our moral judgments but instead justifies them, then why does reasoning happen in the first place? The elephant is automatic. Why the rider?

Haidt's own answer is revealing: Moral reasoning is to justify ourselves before other people. This idea is clearer in another metaphor Haidt invented: the intuitive dog and its rational tail. "*[M]oral reasons are the tail wagged by the intuitive do*g. A dog's tail wags to communicate."[83] Our moral reasoning is how we justify our moral intuitions and judgments to others, rather than usually used to arrive at moral judgments in the first place. We often think we are arguing from truths or facts, of which we hold dear, but, in reality, it is often an illusion. The fact is that moral reasoning is for others. Haidt explained: "We do moral reasoning not to reconstruct the actual reason why *we ourselves* came to a judgment; we reason to find the best possible reasons why *somebody else ought to join us* in our judgment."[84] This is one important reason Haidt called his model "*social* intuitionism."

Another important reason for calling the model "social intuitionism" is that social influence rather than rational argumentation plays a large role in a person's moral judgments—including changing their minds. Haidt explained:

> Moral talk serves a variety of strategic purposes such as managing your reputation, building alliances, and recruiting bystanders to support your side in the disputes that are so common in daily life. I wanted to go beyond the first judgments people make when they hear some juicy gossip or witness some surprising event. I wanted my model to capture the give-and-take, the round after round of discussion and argumentation that sometimes leads people to change their minds.[85]

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[83] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 56–7. See also Haidt, "Emotional Dog and Its Rationalist Tail," 814–34. Haidt later regretted the title, because some took it to mean he still accepted the dichotomy between emotion and cognition. He changed it later to "the intuitive dog and its rationalist tail."

[84] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 52.

[85] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 55.

Using the metaphor of the dog and its tail, Haidt writes: "You can't make a dog happy by forcibly wagging its tail. And you can't change people's minds by utterly refuting their arguments."[86] Using the metaphor of the rider and the elephant, he writes: "If you want to change people's minds, you've got to talk to their elephants."[87] The elephant is mostly in control, not the rider. This is illustrated in the image Haidt uses: the elephant is large and in charge, the rider can control the elephant, but only to a certain extent. Emotions, gut feelings, and other intuitions are the dominant forces humans use in moral judgments, not reasoning.

But human beings are not isolated individuals. They are social creatures who care about what other people think, and others can and do affect moral thinking: "[F]riends can do for us what we cannot do for ourselves, they can challenge us, giving us reasons and arguments that sometimes trigger new intuitions, thereby making it possible for us to change our minds. We occasionally do this when mulling over a problem by ourselves, suddenly seeing things in a new light or from a new perspective… For most of us, it's not every day or even every month that we change our mind about a moral issue without any prompting from anyone else."[88]

However, change does not happen by talking to the rider or by wagging the dog's tail. "If you want to change people's minds, you've got to talk to their elephants."[89] Haidt cites Dale Carnegie to illustrate this:

> Dale Carnegie was one of the greatest elephant-whisperers of all time. In his classic book *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, Carnegie repeatedly urged readers to avoid direct confrontations. Instead he advised people to "begin in a friendly way," to "smile," to "be a good listener," and to "never say 'you're wrong.'" The persuader's

[86] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 57.

[87] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 57.

[88] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 55. Psychopaths are the exception to this.

[89] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 57.

> goal should be to convey respect, warmth, and an openness to dialogue before stating one's own case.[90]

Earlier I noted that Kahneman and Tversky had focused on matters that did not involve motivations or other influences. One upshot of this is that heuristics and biases that they identified are difficult to overcome even with considerable attention and effort. Changing the biases and intuitions is hard to do and rare, but possible. Kahneman speaks to this in a scientific, psychological way:

> Biases cannot always be avoided, because System 2 may have no clue to the error. Constantly questioning your own thinking would be impossibly tedious, and System 2 is much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in making routine decisions. The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try hard to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high.[91]

Haidt's social intuitionist model is different because it takes external influences into account, especially social ones, and because it suggests how intuitions might be changed: by dealing with the elephant. But this may not be easy or straightforward, especially for those accustomed to trying to rationally argue with others. Haidt notes, "Classes are for riders, and riders are just going to use their new knowledge to serve their elephants more effectively. If you want to make people behave more ethically, there are two ways you can go. You can change the elephant, which takes a long time and is hard to do… or you can change the path the rider and the elephant find themselves traveling on."[92] A new path means new influences that train the elephant to align with its rider.

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[90] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 57.

[91] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 28.

[92] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 106.

How Does Contemporary Psychology's View of Human's Reasoning Benefit Christians?

My survey of both Kahneman and Tversky on heuristics and biases and Jonathan Haidt on moral judgment and reasoning show how cognitive psychology has expanded our understanding of the human reasoner through their dual process approaches to human thinking. Such expansion enables a view of the person beyond the "thinking machine" anthropological model of Foundationalist Rationalism. It reveals that human intuitions, emotions, desires, biases, and influence play a significant role in human reasoning, and that a different model of the human creature as a rational being is needed.

Kahneman, Tversky, and Jonathan Haidt are important contributors because they make two basic considerations of human reasoning that matter to any anthropological model. First, they challenge the assumptions of Foundationalist Rationalism that human beings are first and foremost "thinking things," and, as thinking things, reason logically and mathematically. They showed that it is a mistake to believe that the ideal human being is neutral, unbiased, and unattached machines. Second, they offer different models of human creatures as rational beings. Their models provide a fuller anthropology for Christians to use and engage as an alternative to Foundationalist Rationalism.

Now, the question turns to *how* Christians might benefit from cognitive psychology's dual process research and *how* it might be appropriated and utilized. James K. A. Smith's liturgical anthropology did not have to be "translated" or "adapted" for Christians to use in their lives. This is not the case for both Kahneman and Tversky and for Haidt. At first, it may seem a stretch to connect Kahneman and Tversky's work to the Church. After all, Kahneman and Tversky studied how we make judgments and decisions in terms of probabilities, frequencies, and estimates—all mathematical ideas. Mathematics does not have a distinctive place in the Church. Still, their work does speak to an anthropology that is non-mathematical in nature, because they show how

human persons are not mere calculating machines. Jonathan Haidt's work also challenged the "thinking thing" model of reasoning through his social intuitionist model. Haidt's research focused on a different area of human thinking, but his basic conclusion is the same as Kahneman's and Tversky's: Human reasoning is informed by intuitions, and it usually serves to justify these intuitions. Both Kahneman and Tversky and also Haidt effectively *challenge* the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism.

But Haidt's model is the more obvious choice for Christians trying to construct an alternative anthropology. One reason already has been stated: the focus on numbers and mathematics with Kahneman and Tversky does not have a clear place in thinking about Christian practice and theology. Another reason is that Haidt is concerned with how human beings have "righteous minds," that is, how they make and then justify moral intuitions and judgments. Morality and righteousness are essential features of Christian life and teaching, whereas probabilities, frequencies, and estimates are not. A third reason is that Haidt was explicitly concerned with the social dimensions of moral judgments and reasoning, which is reflected in calling his own model "social intuitionism." How our moral judgments and reasoning matter to others, how others matter to us, and how they can be acquired and changed are all questions that Haidt has answers for.

But for this dissertation, there are two further assessment questions. First, it must be asked how Haidt's model fits with the account of the human reasoner developed in Chapter Four.

The "intuitionist" side of Haidt's model is generally consistent with Smith's model. Smith argued that human beings are better understood not as "you are what you think" but "you are what you love." Smith situated reasoning within or under loves and desires. The dual cognition model that Haidt proposes has a similar structure, which situates reasoning within or under

intuitions. The difference between Smith and Haidt is that Smith understands loves and habits as "precognitive," but Haidt (like Kahneman and Tversky) argues that intuitions are a different form of cognition. Nothing in Smith's proposal would change, however, if it adopted a dual cognition understanding, and so the two proposals are in this respect generally consistent.

The "social" side of Haidt's model is also generally consistent with the "liturgical animal" aspect of Smith's anthropology. In this case, Smith's model, which detailed the concept of "cultural liturgies," is more specific than the general points that Haidt made about how moral judgments and reasoning are affected by other persons. But the two models are generally consistent with each other.

The second assessment question is whether Haidt's social intuitionist model has particular benefits for how Christians can understand and form human creatures to be faithful Christian reasoners. The answer to the "understanding" side of the question is "Yes," and I believe it can be readily explained with two simple illustrations of how, as Haidt summarizes his model, "intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second."

The first illustration shows how this happens in matters of Christian *practice*. Recently, my daughter, aged 12, attended a worship service in another congregation. This service was held in a building that was purposefully designed to not look like a traditional church. It featured a stage area where worship was led by a praise band. The pastors did not wear vestments and walked around during their 45-minute sermon in jeans and denim shirts. Later my daughter informed me that they had gone to some sort of strange service with Grandma and Grandpa. Her judgment was that it was wrong. In her words, "it was really weird." It was clear from her words and tone that this judgment had taken little cognitive effort. And her reasons were: "It wasn't really church, dad. Nobody really sang, the pastor walked around in jeans and a flannel shirt, and they

didn't have communion. I don't really know what it was, but it wasn't church." Moreover, it was easy to explain her quick judgment. Her intuitions had been shaped by her experience at our church, which is "traditional" in the sense that we use liturgical rites from a hymnal; I wear vestments; I preach from a pulpit; and we sing hymns played by an organist.

This illustration shows how readily Haidt's social intuitionist model applies and how Christians can see it at work in their own lives. The elephant is intuitive. The rider, the one guiding the elephant, is the source of strategic reasoning. In the case of my daughter, she intuited that her grandparent's church was "weird" and "wrong" because their worship lacked, in her opinion, the liturgical structure, sights, and sounds of her home church. The illustration demonstrates that intuitions first and reasoning second and that human minds do not work in the mechanical and mathematical way like Foundationalist Rationalism taught. My daughter intuited that the service was "weird," because of intuitions formed in her home congregation. Her elephant was formed to process worship this way, and her rider did not do anything to contradict her assessment.

A second illustration shows how Haidt's psychology makes sense also in matters of doctrine. For years congregations of different Christian denominations in our community would take turns to host Vacation Bible School (VBS). Each church would provide the building, pastor, and workers of VBS. Other community church members would assist them as needed and as warranted by confessional commitments. But recently some congregations in our community no longer had the membership or pastors to host VBS themselves, so a committee was formed of members from different congregations to oversee this community VBS and supply what was needed for each congregation to host VBS.

Our congregation has held its own VBS every year independent of the community

committee, but when contacted by the committee, our congregation wanted to hear what the committee had to say. After telling us which program they would do and how the theme would be decorated in our sanctuary, a committee member who belonged to an Assemblies of God congregation said that the first thing we would need to do would be to remove the baptismal font from the center of the floor in the front. She reasoned that baptism was controversial, even divisive, among the community's denominations, especially infant baptism, and also that the font must be removed to make way for the themed decorations.

The intuitive judgment of the members of our congregation was obvious from their facial expressions and body language. As the saying goes, "you could cut the tension with a knife." One of our members tapped her fingers on the table and said, "Who do you think you are? How dare you come into our church and tell us to remove our baptismal font. Absolutely not!" The meeting made no more progress, and the community VBS happened in another congregation.

Looking back at this meeting, it was evident how "intuitions come first, and strategic reasoning second" explains how things went. It was the "elephant" of the community committee member who called for moving the baptismal font and the "rider" who gave the reasons: baptism was controversial, and the font was in the way of decorations. Baptism was not a fundamental doctrine for her confession of faith. Because of this, her intuition upon seeing the font was to simply move a piece of furniture because it was in the way for what she deemed was the "bigger picture" or the ultimate aim. She did not reason that the baptismal font, a representation or symbol of the Sacrament of Holy Baptism itself, was a fundamental expression of faith for our Lutheran congregation. In the same way, it was the "elephant" of our congregation's member who responded: "Who do you think you are?" The intuition by our member was that moving our baptismal font indicated that baptism, near and dear to the Lutheran Confession, a foundational

biblical doctrine, was being diminished by moving the font itself. This response was not "thought through." Doctrine was "violated" simply by moving the font without any further consideration or conversation needed. This view was expressed, not only by the member who spoke, but from the entire delegation of our congregation's membership.

No one, however, tried to speak to anyone else's "elephant," and the meeting came to nothing. Even if someone had, perhaps the result would have been the same. But it was clear that rational arguments would have had no effect. Haidt's social intuitionism explains why this is so often the case. This illustration also shows how becoming "elephant-whisperers" like Dale Carnegie makes much sense.

But what does Haidt's social intuitionism, and cognitive psychology more generally, indicate for *forming* Christian reasoners? The basic answers to this question have already been given. Haidt writes: "there are two ways you can go. You can change the elephant, which takes a long time and is hard to do… or you can change the path the rider and the elephant find themselves traveling on."[93] What does this mean for Christians? I will close this chapter by exploring a specific instance: catechesis.

Teaching from Memory

"Catechesis" is a traditional Christian means for forming believers. Catechesis is teaching the Christian faith, but its point is not simply to deliver information but to form a Christian in the new life the Father has given in Jesus Christ through His Holy Spirit.[94] The goal of catechesis is whole-life formation and, in this case, forming the mind of Christ in the baptized.[95] The aim is

[93] Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 106.

[94] Robert Kolb, *Making Disciples Baptizing: God's Gift of New Life and Christian Witness* (St. Louis: Concordia Seminary Publications, 1997), 11.

[95] Kolb, *Making Disciples*, 101.

that a new person is made.

This aim means that catechesis is a Christian practice that would benefit from insights from social intuitionism. Because intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, social intuitionism raises questions like, "How do Christians gain the right kind of intuitions?" or "How do we acquire the right kind of elephant?"

The idea of the rider and the elephant puts an old approach to teaching the faith in a new light. This old approach is teaching catechesis through the classical model. What Haidt gives is both a defense for continuing its use and also guidance for using it effectively. Of course, it must be said there are critics of the method because of its insistence on grammar and texts, which they assume makes the method about rote memorization. Both Smith about "you are what you think" and Kahneman, Tversky, and Haidt about cognition give good arguments against any such approach. However, Haidt's anthropology actually advances the method for its utility in forming the rationality of the student. It does so because the model facilitates making the Word "part of the learner" through repetition and memorization.

In the strict sense, the texts of the Catechism are the Ten Commandments, Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. They do not form Christian lives *ex opere operato*, that is, merely by performing the actions of repeating and memorizing. Instead, they provide the language and meanings for how to view ourselves as God's creatures and how to engage and evaluate God's creation. The Ten Commandments form the catechumen's understanding of obedience, guilt, and wrath, but also shape the way they see themselves as children who live in faithful love toward their Father and service to their neighbors. The Creed teaches the doctrine of the Trinity, but also how humans view their identity as the Father's children. They are created by Him to live and cared for in His creation. The Second Article teaches that Jesus is Lord and that He redeemed us

to live under His lordship as His very own. The Lord's Prayer instructs on what to pray to God, but more importantly the teaching also forms us how to speak to God as their loving, caring Father who wants to hear them and act on their behalf. Such an endeavor shapes the elephant (intuitions) and as well as its rider (strategic reasoning). In this way, Haidt's anthropology helps us to practice catechesis that does not merely impart information but engages in whole-life formation. In other words, social intuitionism helps us to understand and practice catechesis as "changing the elephant." In themselves, repetition and memorization do not make one intuitive, but they are first steps that lead to further steps which do make one intuitive. The classical model begins with the memorization of the texts to form a living memory of the texts themselves from which they can build greater knowledge, recall, and application through the didactic and rhetorical stages of classical learning.

But repetition and memorization, initiated in the grammar stage, also presents the challenge that students find this hard. The problem is thinking is hard. Memorization is also hard, and it is not what students want to do. Here is where Haidt's idea that we "change the path" applies.

But how might we do that? For an answer, let us turn to cognitive psychologist and educator Daniel Willingham and his book *"Why Don't Students Like School?"*[96] Thinking is hard because the brain is not designed only for conscious thinking. In this important respect, Willingham tracks closely with the dual cognition models already discussed in this chapter. He notes three properties of thinking: 1. Thinking is slow. While visual systems may have instant recognition, thinking systems are not instantaneous. 2. Thinking is effortful. It takes concentration. You cannot think and do something at the same time. 3. Thinking is uncertain. A

[96] Daniel T. Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School? A Cognitive Scientist Answers Questions about How the Mind Works and What It Means for the Classroom,* 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Jossey-Bass, 2021).

person may or may not come up with the right conclusion, or any conclusion at all.[97]

Willingham diagnoses the plight of human thinking from the perspective of the cognitive scientist who is also a teacher: "We when we can get away with it, we don't think. Instead we rely on memory. Most of the problems we face are ones we've solved before, so we just do what we've done in the past."[98] The memory system is much more reliable, so humans use that first. It takes less effort to use the memory system because it provides answers quickly. Thinking, on the other hand, is hard and takes much more work and humans are lazy.

Willingham proposes that memory systems should be intentionally formed. In this way, memory systems, which focus on instant recall, function in the same way intuitions do.

> First, some of the most important functions (for example vision and movement) do not require thought: you don't have to reason about what you see; you just immediately know what is out in the world.
>
> Second, you are biased to use memory to guide your actions rather than to think. But your brain doesn't leave it there; it is capable of changing in order to save you from having to think. If you repeat the same thought-demanding task again and again, it will eventually become automatic; your brain will change so that you complete the task without thinking about it.[99]

The key, then, for forming elephant's intuitions, which sends them down a new road, is practice.[100] Even though a task may initially take lots of thought, when we practice the same task enough times, but practice itself is hard, and definitely not enjoyable. However, that is the point of turning down a new path. Willingham explains: "We are naturally curious, and we look for opportunities to engage in certain types of thought. But because thinking is so hard, the conditions have to be right for this curiosity to thrive, or we quit thinking rather readily." The

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[97] Willingham, *Why Don't Student Like School?*, 4.

[98] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 5.

[99] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 7.

[100] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 7.

next pages outline the conditions. Focus on them. Memorizing by itself is hard. Using what is memorized may not be—with practice. Finding the right kind of practice is worth exploring.

Discovering students' curiosity takes trying out different kinds of methods, tools, and activities to discover the "right" niche for students to practice.

> Despite the fact that we're not good at it, we actually like to think. We are ritually curious, and we look for opportunities to engage in certain types of thought. But because thinking is hard, the conditions have to be right for this curiosity to thrive, or we quit thinking rather readily.[101]

While liking to think, the right level of difficulty can either put you off to learning or challenge you to learn more. Learning has to be at the "right level" of difficulty. Of course, this means learning is contextual and often individual, but what Willingham is hoping to provide is not to say, "just make learning easier," but, instead, "how can we make thinking easier?"[102]

Easier thinking, instant recall, being intuitive is enabled by practice, repetition by being formed in the grammar of catechesis. The elephant is sent down a new path each time it encounters a situation through what has been formed in before. Practice of grammar happens when it is challenged by questions in the rhetorical stage of catechesis. Here the elephant begins to get used to the language and implement it for whatever path it is taking since it is a working memory.

One strategy Willingham offers is to use storytelling. Stories, Willingham writes, have great power and are important for learning strategies. "The human mind seems exquisitely turned to understand and remember stories—so much so that psychologists refer to stories as 'psychologically privileged,' meaning that they are treated differently in memory than other

[101] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 11.

[102] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 11.

types of material."[103] In Haidt's terms, stories operate on a different path for the rider and the elephant. Because of this, stories play an important role in teaching, but also in comprehension. Stories are easily remembered to draw associations with characters and experiences, but also what they teach.

Teachers make use of stories in the classroom because stories can be comprehended. The audience knows the general structure of stories and are readily connected. "There must be a causal connection, so if the cause is not immediately apparent, the audience will think carefully about the previous action and try to connect it to present events."[104] Stories are interesting and engage the hearer in ways other information does not. Because they are interesting, students listen. Often hearers elicit an emotive response to stories as they are drawn in to the characters and events, their inferences and circumstances. Stories are easy to remember because what Willingham calls "thinking about meaning" and because of their casual nature.[105] Very few people are intimidated by stories.

For example, when I illustrate living out your identity as child of your Creator Father, is telling a story about my grandfather.

> One week a year during my childhood I stayed with my grandparents. We lived in the same town, but this week was special because every night I spent at their house. My grandfather insisted on driving me to school, even though they only lived a few blocks from the school. He used this time to instruct me on what it meant to a Lowe, his grandson. He would tell me stories of his childhood, he would talk about what was happening in the world, and sometimes he would even bring up my friends. One memorable time on one of those trips my grandfather said: "I saw Levi's name in the paper for minor in possession." Levi was a classmate and friend. "I can't imagine how embarrassed his grandma was (a friend of my grandparents). Just think if your grandmother saw your name in the paper for something like that. You are a Lowe. Remember that. Have a great day at school; see you at 3:15." I could have crawled through the air conditioner vents to get out of that conversation. His meaning was

[103] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 71.

[104] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 73.

[105] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 72–73.

> clear- what you do, how you act has consequences. You belong to a family and what you do is a reflection of the family you have. You are responsible, not just for yourself, but to all your family; especially your "fathers." So, it is with God, your Father, and His family. We belong to Him and there are certain expectations of how you are to live. I have never forgotten my grandfather's words and, while they were living and even now, I remember his words and teach them to my children- you are a Lowe, you are a child of your Father, and you are accountable to your family. My grandfather taught my intuitions to remember I belonged to a family, and strategic reasoning in future compromising situations meant that there I was to be responsible, remember their feelings, and act with them in mind.

"Thinking about meaning" is significant, not only for retention, but because it informs how students think. Willingham notes how "thinking about meaning" is communicated. First, he notes that "emotions do play a role in remembering, and an emotional reaction will be better remembered, but are not necessary for learning."[106] Second, repetition also makes learning work because practice improves transfer of information, but is more effective when it is connected to a context. By exploring the relationships that exists between information and other contexts, enables repetition to have greater success. Ultimately, "practicing yields three benefits: (i) it can help mental process become automatic and thereby enable further learning; (ii) it makes memory long lasting; and (iii) it increases the likelihood that learning will transfer in new situations."[107] A final contribution to "thinking about meaning" is: "For material to be learned (that is, to end up in the long-term memory), it must reside for some period in working memory – that is, a student must pay attention to it. Further, *how* the student thinks of the experience completely determines what will end up in long term memory."[108] Teacher style and ability to organize ideas into lessons help accomplish this.[109]

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[106] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School?*, 63.

[107] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School*, 131.

[108] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School*, 67.

[109] Willingham, *Why Don't Students Like School*, 70-71.

Conclusion

This chapter has once more presented a fuller, more attractive anthropology than that of Foundationalist Rationalism. Foundationalist Rationalism believe that humans reasoned logically and mathematically. Having established in the previous chapter the importance that context has in rational formation, this chapter explored how psychology, particularly recent writing on desires and intuitions, gives a fuller picture of how humans reasons. Jonathan Haidt and Daniel Kahneman demonstrate thinking models that reveal human's reason primarily through intuitions and biases first, while strategic reasoning is second.

What I have argued in this chapter is not only a challenge to Foundationalist Rationalism, but also an appropriation of dual process theories of the brain proposed by cognitive psychologists. If we accept that human reasoners, according to contemporary cognitive psychology, reason first through intuitions and biases, then through strategic reasoning, teachers, preachers, catechists, parents, etc. should use methods for training both systems, that is, in Haidt's language, "the rider and the elephant."

This model should lead the Church and her theology to recognize this and ask both how this informs how we understand our reasoning and arguments, but also how human reasoners may be formed or shaped. While this formation may be done in other ways, I have illustrated that memorization and storytelling provide examples of how System 1 and 2 may be formed through Christian education and catechesis. In this way the provide helpful ways for people to learn to "pay attention" to their context as they rationally navigate life in matters of practice and doctrine as Christians shaped by God's Word.

CHAPTER SIX

ALL THIS HE DOES ONLY OUT OF FATHERLY DIVINE GOODNESS AND MERCY: METAPHORS WE LIVE BY

> **"**Language is the medium of all understanding and all tradition. And language is not to be understood as an instrument or tool that we use, rather it is the medium in which we live."[1]

Introduction

The previous two chapters have explored how looking from the outside in anthropology has challenged, expanded, the Enlightenment ideal of human beings as "thinking machines." Chapter Four explored how Christian philosopher James K. A. Smith proposed a richer, fuller anthropology than the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. Smith effectively criticized the Enlightenment model that can be summarized by Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum*, or "I think, therefore I am," and by the line "You are what you think." This anthropology pictures the human being as a "thinking thing" or a "thinking machine." But this model supposes that what human beings need to reason well is accurate information and a smoothly operating machine, which means a machine that operates free from biases, emotions, traditional expectations, etc. Smith showed how this model does not make sense, and instead followed earlier figures including St. Paul and Augustine to propose that it is not reasoning but desires at the center of our selves. Hence, anthropology is better summarized as "You are what you love." But ultimate, life-defining loves and desires are not innate. They must be acquired, and one must be accustomed to them. This happens through what Smith calls "liturgies," that is, practices and rituals (along with the settings and institutions in which they take place) by which one comes to acquire and to be shaped by ultimate loves. An important aspect of Smith's argument is his demonstration that

[1] Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 145.

such liturgies are central to modern Western life, in matters including economics and education. These "cultural liturgies" show that all of us are "liturgical animals," and he calls on the church to reclaim this understanding and its practices. Smith, then, does not deny that human beings are rational animals, but his account of how reason functions and how one attains rationality through liturgies is both an account that goes beyond Foundationalist Rationalism and also is consistent with faithful, rational Christian faith.

Chapter Five turned to contemporary cognitive psychology, especially with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and their work on heuristics and biases, and with Jonathan Haidt and his social intuitionist model. Their work, proceeding from a different perspective than Smith's philosophical viewpoint, both demonstrates how human beings cannot be pictured according to the ideal of a thinking machine, but that human beings are better understood as "thinking fast and thinking slow," or as having both an automatic intuitive cognition and a slower, conscious, rational cognition. They do not deny that human beings are rational, but they argue persuasively how it makes good sense to think of human beings processing information in two ways, and that most of it is automatic, that is, outside of conscious control. This kind of model is broadly consistent with the picture that Smith drew, and its benefits for Christians is both in helping them to deal with others rationally and to form Christians to be rational in Christian ways.

This chapter turns to a different area of cognitive science. It will focus on the field of cognitive linguistics, and in particular its argument that much of human reasoning happens through *metaphors*. In other words, this chapter will explore how metaphors actually inform how we think. Because of this, it is important to consider what metaphors Christians use to think, and how these metaphors are acquired.

Metaphors Make Meaning

In order to understand how metaphor matters for an anthropological model, we should be clear about the concept of "metaphor" being used by cognitive linguists. It turns out that Christian theology readily provides a way to see this.

"Metaphor" in theology is a term used in two ways. Often a "metaphor" is calling something by another name like "Jimmie is a live wire" or "That car is a boat." A metaphor in this sense is a rhetorical device that uses a comparison to make a particular point, e.g. a simile, "Barbara is like a gem." A metaphor in this sense is "referential," which means it conveys a truth or a reality by using figurative language. Theological examples of using metaphors this way are found in J. A. O. Preus's book *Just Words*. For Preus, "metaphor" as "calling something by another name" is a means that to "make an association between what is known and what is unknown."[2] "New birth" is an example of a theological metaphor, as Peter wrote: "He has given us new birth into a living hope" (1 Peter 1:3) and "You have been born again" (1 Peter 3:23).[3] So are "light," "inheritance," and "sacrificial lamb."[4] For clarity, this kind of metaphor will be labeled "rhetorical metaphor." Rhetorical metaphor is used as a linguistic expression or rhetorical device used in a referential way, that is, figurative or poetic way. In this way, a rhetorical metaphor is a matter of "reason," because it is a means toward an end. "Calling something by another name" is a means to draw attention to a particular point. Rhetorical metaphors help *in* our reasoning.

But there are also metaphors that affect *how we think in the first place*. Contemporary Christian theology has discussed and sometimes criticized calling God "Father" as being an

[2] Jacob A. O. Preus, *Just Words: Understanding the Fullness of the Gospel* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2000), 33

[3] Preus, *Just Words*, 43, 45.

[4] Preus, *Just Words*, 63–69; 129–33; 175–80.

inappropriate *metaphor*. Note that saying that "God is our heavenly Father" is an instance of metaphor, because it is "calling God by another name." But the discussion and debate about this metaphor mostly lies not in whether the association is clear (everybody agrees that it is), but in whether it helps us think about God properly. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson call metaphors that work like this "conceptual metaphors."[5]

It is conceptual metaphors that indicate still another model of human persons as rational beings. This is because conceptual metaphors *shape* our conception of reality and affect how we reason. Conceptual metaphors are "mappings across conceptual domains that structure our reasoning, our experience, and our everyday language."[6] Lakoff and Johnson explain that much of our subjective mental life, including experiences like affection and achievement or judgments about importance and difficulty, is done by thinking, reasoning, and visualizing about them in ways that come from "mostly sensorimotor domains," that is, from our physically embodied actions and life. For example, this happens "when we conceptualize understanding an idea (subjective experience) in terms of grasping an object (sensorimotor experience) and failing to understand an idea as having it go right by us or over our heads. The cognitive mechanism for such conceptualization is conceptual metaphor, which allows us to use the physical logic of grasping to reason about understanding."[7]

Conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson further explain, "is pervasive in both thought and language. It is hard to think of a common subjective experience that is not conventionally conceptualized in terms of metaphor."[8] In other words, metaphors thoroughly shape how we

[5] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 45.

[6] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 47.

[7] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 45.

[8] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 45.

think.

How can they make such a sweeping claim about our subjective experience? Because of the language we use. "Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature."[9] They illustrate the pervasive nature of conceptual metaphors with the metaphor "Argument is War." This metaphor finds its way into many common expressions:

> Your claims are indefensible.
> He attacked every weak point in my argument.
> His criticisms were right on target.
> I demolished his argument.
> I've never won an argument with him.
> You disagree? Okay, shoot! If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
> He shot down all of my arguments.[10]

Lakoff and Johnson stress that the metaphor is not a mere figure of speech, as is the case with rhetorical metaphors. It is metaphor because we understand one thing (argument) in terms of another thing (war). But the meaning of the term "argument" is not heightened by the term "war," and the term "war" does not draw attention to an aspect of "argument," as would be the case with a rhetorical metaphor. In this case—a case of a conceptual metaphor—"ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR."[11] They explain:

> We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. It is

[9] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4.

[10] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 4.

[11] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 5.

> in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.[12]

This metaphorical concept "Argument is War" is actually lived out in our day-to-day communication. The "war" metaphor structures both the concept and the language of argument in such a way that this is an ordinary way of talking about arguments and actually having arguments.

It is because conceptual metaphors like "Argument is War" *structure* our thinking, speech, and action that they call such metaphors "literal," as paradoxical as this sounds. They explain:

> Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphor is not merely in the words we use—it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way—and we act according to the way we conceive of things.[13]

Alasdair MacIntyre illustrates how the conceptual metaphor "Argument is War" works and also why it makes a certain sense to call it "literal" when he writes about the moral arguments made in modern politics. He cites the Supreme Court's role in the Regents of the University of California vs. Bakke in 1978.

> The type of decision which I have in mind is exemplified by the Bakke case, where two, at first sight strongly incompatible, views were held by members of the court, and Mr. Justice Powell who wrote the decision was the one justice to hold both views. But, if my argument is correct, one function of the Supreme Court must be to keep the peace between rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible principles of justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications. So the Supreme Court in Bakke both forbade precise ethnic quotas for admission to colleges and universities, but allowed discrimination in favor of previously deprived minority groups. Try to conjure up a set of consistent principles behind such a decision and ingenuity may or may not allow you to find the court not guilty of formal inconsistency. But even to make such an attempt is to miss the point. The Supreme Court in Bakke, as on occasion in other cases, played the role of a peacemaking or truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of

[12] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 4.

[13] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 5.

> conflict, not by invoking our shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole has none.
>
> What this brings out is that modern politics cannot be a matter of genuine moral consensus. And it is not. Modem politics is civil war carried on by other means, and Bakke was an engagement whose antecedents were at Gettysburg and Shiloh. The truth on this matter was set out by Adam Ferguson: "We are not to expect that the laws of any country are to be framed as so many lessons of morality . . .. Laws, whether civil or political, are expedients of policy to adjust the pretensions of parties. and to secure the peace of society. The expedient is accommodated to special circumstances..." (*Principles of Moral and Political Science* ii. 144). The nature of any society therefore is not to be deciphered from its laws alone, but from those understood as an index of its conflicts. What our laws show is the extent and degree to which conflict has to be suppressed.[14]

MacIntyre's real-life example shows how the Argument is War metaphor happens. The Supreme Court played the role of navigating a divisive situation in order to avoid a potential serious conflict where the Argument is War had literal antecedents extending all the way back to the Civil War. The Supreme Court served as peacemaker in this example to a moral, political argument that could possibly have real "war-like" consequences.

Lakoff has shared repeatedly how he came to understand how metaphors shape how we think, speak, and act.[15] A young woman came into his seminar soaking wet from rain and crying. Finally, the woman says, "I can't do this today, I have a metaphor problem with my boyfriend. Maybe you can help." The class gathered around her, and she continued saying, "On the way to class my boyfriend said that our relationship had 'hit a dead-end street.'" The class said, "If it's hit a dead end, you can't keep going. You have to turn back." It became obvious to the class that English had a lot of expressions that described love as a journey; e.g., "love has been a long bumpy road," "we're going in different directions," or "we're at a crossroads." Lakoff looked for

[14] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 253–54.

[15] George Lakoff, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eu-9rpJITY8&t=233s

a generalization in this relationship and he concluded that love was a journey. Lovers are travelers, love relationship is a vehicle. Common life goals are the destinations of the love journey. Difficulties in the relationship are difficulties in the journey. Together these are used for a systematic, almost mathematical, mapping of relationships to journeys.

The woman said to Lakoff, "I don't care, he's still breaking up with me. He's thinking in terms of this metaphor." Lakoff then examined how people "think in terms of a metaphor." For his illustration "love is a journey," he observes, the vehicle is not moving (spinning the wheels) love isn't going anywhere, no progress. People are putting energy into the relationship, but it isn't going anywhere and it's frustrating. Reason about travel is being mapped on the reasoning about love in a systematic way. The idea is to understand the use of "dead end street," the inference is "you gotta do something else." Lakoff later recognized that this type of metaphor is what he calls a "conceptual metaphor" These types of metaphors inform how people think.

By describing how conceptual metaphors work, Lakoff and Johnson explain how metaphors make meaning:

> Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish—matters of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.[16]

[16] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 3.

Metaphors take us from conceptual categories to meaning, that is, to "defining our everyday realities." We use metaphors to form meaning that connects from the act of speaking or reading to something real. Philosophically speaking meaning is a form of derived intentionality: "the original or intrinsic intentionality of a speaker's thought is transferred to words, sentences, marks, symbols and so on. If uttered, meaningfully, those words, sentences, marks, and symbols now have intentionality derived from the speaker's thought."[17] But these words have to be interpreted, often through metaphors, to determine meaning, and the interpretation of meaning is rational and shapes how we think.

Metaphors and What It Means to Be Human

It is easy to see the significance of conceptual metaphors for understanding what it means to be human, and how conceptual metaphors suggest yet another model or account of human persons as rational beings. This account is that human persons reason effortlessly through metaphors, that is, they experience, understand, and think about any one thing in terms of another thing, like "argument" with "war." Moreover, the "metaphors we live by" (to borrow from Lakoff and Johnson) are frequently drawn from "sensorimotor domains," that is, from our physically embodied actions and life. In this way, then, human persons have an "embodied rationality."

This anthropological model is radically different from the model of Foundationalist Rationalism, which presupposed that reasoning is entirely "mental," implying that reasoning is "disembodied." So, the model implied by cognitive linguistics on conceptual metaphors does not only situate human reasoning in a larger mental picture and in a social context, but that it pictures

[17] John Searle, *Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (New York: Basic, 1998), 141.

reasoning as depending on an embodied existence.

Smith's anthropological model could be summarized with the slogans, "You are what you love" and "liturgical animals." Haidt's anthropological model emphasized, "Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second." Lakoff and Johnson summarized theirs in three propositions:

The mind is inherently embodied.

Thought is mostly unconscious.

Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical.[18]

This anthropological model, moreover, is distinguished from the "thinking thing" anthropology in another way: through the idea of making meaning. The pervasive use of metaphor to structure thinking implies that human beings as rational beings are radically different than even an immensely elaborate Turing machine.

To appreciate, we can begin by recognizing that every day people navigate life using words to create meaning. From reading them on the page of a newspaper or Facebook post, to speaking them in deep conversations with friends, words comprise our life by conveying truth and defining our realities.

> Making meaning might be one of the most important things we do. For starters, it's something we're doing almost constantly. We understand who they refer to and what situations they describe. We make inferences about things that weren't mentioned and prepare to respond appropriately. Constantly, tirelessly, automatically, we make meaning. What's perhaps most remarkable about it is that we hardly notice we're doing anything at all. There is a deep, rapid complex operations afoot under the surface of the skull, and yet all we experience is seamless understanding.[19]

Language enables us to communicate, to command, to inform, to form social relationships. It is essential to understanding ourselves as human. "With language we can communicate what we

[18] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 3.

[19] Benjamin K. Bergen, *Louder Than Words: The Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning* (New York: Basic, 2012), 3.

think and who we are. Without language, we would be isolated. We would have no fiction, no history, and no science. To understand how meaning works, then, is to understand part of what it means to be human."[20]

Making meaning, in turn, helps us to distinguish being human in another way. It separates us from computers. Remember that computers operate through a series of human-applied instructions. As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the most interesting technological advances today is Artificial Intelligence (AI), and one of the most provocative questions it raises is about what it means to be human. Does AI have any bearing on what it means to be human? Figuring out the difference between what is really human and what is a computer simulating as human is an ongoing area of research.

Famously, however, a philosophical distinction between human beings and digital computers was argued by philosopher John Searle. It is called the "Chinese Room Argument," and he used it against the idea of "Strong AI." Strong AI is the desire to create machines which are ontologically indistinguishable from the human mind. The Chinese Room Argument shows that human beings have the ability to make meaning, whereas computers do not. While information and experiences could conceivably be imputed to computers, meaning cannot.

> If Strong AI, were true, then anybody should be able to acquire any cognitive capacity just by implementing the computer program simulating cognitive capacity. We imagine that I am locked in a room with boxes full of Chinese symbols, and I a rule book, in effect, a computer program, that enables me to answer questions put to me in Chinese. I receive symbols that, unknown to me, are questions; I look up in the rule book, what I am supposed to do; I pick up the boxes, manipulate them according to the rules in the program and have out the required symbols, which are interpreted as answers. We can suppose that I pass the Turing test for understanding Chinese, but, all the same, I do not understand a word of Chinese. And if I do not understand Chinese on the basis of implementing the right computer program, then neither does

[20] Bergen, *Louder Than Words*, 3.

> any other computer just on the basis of implementing the program because no computer has anything I do not have.
>
> You can see the difference between computation and real understanding if you imagine what it is like for me also to answer question in English. Imagine that in the same room I am given questions in English, which I then answer. From the outside my answer to English and the Chinese questions are equally good. I pass the Turing test for both. But from the inside, there is a tremendous difference. What is the difference exactly? In English, I understand what the words mean; in Chinese, I understand nothing. In Chinese, I am just a computer.[21]

Searle's thought experiment shows that attaching meaning to symbols is a decisive difference between humans and computers. It defines us and differentiates us from computers.

However, cognitive scientist Benjamin Bergen argues that there is more to be understood and appreciate about how humans make meaning. He argues that there is more to making meaning than recognizing symbols. "Simply identifying and arranging symbols in some language, even if those symbols represent something in the real world, isn't enough to make meaning. It's not enough to say you understand something."[22] Humans do more than understand language and words; it is part of their physical, bodily processes. Chapter Five observed how cognitive science argues how human emotions and human reasoning are intimately connected, and also how this means that human reasoning is embodied, because emotions are bodily responses. Bergen's point about meaning is in the same vein. Meaning is part of our physical, material body, that is, it is embodied in the human person. Embodiment is the source of human intrinsic capacity to make meaning. "Embodiment, which started to stand for the idea that meaning might be something that isn't distilled away from our bodily experiences, but is instead tightly bound by them."[23] Embodiment enables rationality by connecting thought to the physical

[21] Searle, *Mind*, 63.

[22] Bergen, *Louder Than Words*, 10.

[23] Bergen¸ *Louder Than Words*, 12.

body and the environment or context in which humans live lives.

"Embodiment," we should observe, is itself a metaphor. But the embodiment metaphor as demonstrated through cognitive linguistics is another way to demonstrate a more comprehensive, realistic anthropology then the "thinking machine" metaphor of the Enlightenment. Descartes' philosophy of reason resulted in an anthropology focused on the inside, which isolated the individual to an autonomous existence. Descartes' anthropology was disembodied from the human person. He argued that of all creatures, humans were the only rational ones, and this rationality made humans unique. The rational capabilities of humans were disembodied from any human biology of the brain (or any other physical part of the body) and all thought was a conscious thought. Thought was made up ideas, which functioned like mathematical symbols drawn external reality. Experience and context are unnecessary because they are inalienable to the human person. Imagination and emotions played no role in the mind's rational processing, whatsoever.[24]

Kant's moral philosophy argued for an anthropology where morality was determined by "pure" reason alone. Moral laws were automatically generated by the individual person. However, these laws were universal and, as such, bound each individual. Categorical imperatives were necessary to ensure that this morality functioned universally. For example. Lakoff and Johnson write extensively about Kant's moral judgment functioning anthropologically like a "Strict Father."[25]

Lakoff and Johnson's analysis of both Descartes and Kant speak to central roles that folk psychology and metaphors play in their rational assertions. Their analysis speaks to the

[24] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 408.

[25] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 322.

importance that metaphors play in evaluating the history of reason, but by so doing, they demonstrate that reason cannot be spoken of or understood apart from metaphors. These metaphors are also inextricably linked to the fact that humans are embodied persons.

Descartes, Kant, and Foundationalist Rationalism's disembodied thinking machine is dismantled by the work of cognitive linguistics. "The embodiment of meaning… locates meaning in the body and in the unconscious conceptual system."[26] Meaning produces a rational way of looking at the world, it informs how human think. Human anthropology operates through the body and its conceptual system, which locates moral judgment and decision making within in the same subject.

> Real human reason is embodied, mostly imaginative and metaphorical, largely unconscious and emotionally engaged. It is often about human well-being and about ends determined by human well-being. Since morality concerns well-being and since our conceptions of morality arise from our modes of well-being, morality enters human reason most of the time. It not only affects the choice of ends, but also the kinds of reasoning done in achieving those ends.[27]

Reason operates through these embodied means within the human body and the context in which it lives. Interacting with various subjects within this context forms within humans a way of making choices.

Christian Use of Conceptual Metaphors

Conceptual metaphors operate and reflect an *embodied* rationality. In this way, the concept of Conceptual metaphors "dismantles" the anthropology of Foundationalist Rationalism. Conceptual metaphors also have constructive value for Christian theology and practice, and now the chapter turns toward them.

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[26] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 462.

[27] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 536.

Recall that metaphors are used in the Bible in two ways: rhetorical and conceptual. A rhetorical metaphor is, "the Lord is my shepherd" or "God is my rock." Rhetorical metaphors are not the consideration of this section, but, rather, conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphors are used to describe how we think about something.[28]

Christian theologian Colin Gunton traces the history of metaphor and how metaphors are used as rhetorical speech back to Aristotle. Aristotle wrote that a metaphor was a "an application of an alien name by transference."[29] It is from that starting point that Foundationalist Rationalism concluded that metaphors could not be taken literally because they were by their very nature nonliteral language and unable to convey truth. Gunton explained:

> The view of metaphor as an abuse of language came, like other rationalist beliefs, to its climax in the Age of Reason, but has a long history, which has been traced back to Aristotle on the subject. One effect has been to consign metaphor to the realm of rhetoric, which has increasingly come into question as a discipline concerned more with 'deceit' than with respectable form of persuasion. An absolutive division, accordingly, came to be made between argument and rhetoric, truth and ornament, literal and metaphorical, with all the virtues on one side, all the vices on another… On such an account, metaphor is disqualified from being a means of our rational interaction with the world: *unless it ceases to be metaphor, it cannot tell the truth.*
>
> Highly significant is the fact that recent work gives much attention to the place of metaphor in scientific discovery, the one sphere in which, on the rational account, we should not expect to find it. The fact is, however, that it is now widely held that metaphor plays and essential part. Two main approaches to this topic can be found in recent philosophy. Both hold, in distinction from the old view, that no advance in knowledge of the world is possible without changes in the meaning of words, that is to say, by means of the development of metaphor or other figures of speech. Classical physics, for example, developed with the help of the metaphorical description of the universe as a machine, as the words of Descartes suggest: 'I have described the Earth and the whole visible universe *as if it were* a machine'. Advances beyond classical physics took place partly with the help of another metaphor … the notion of a *field.*[30]

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[28] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 45.

[29] Preus, *Just Words*, 32.

[30] Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality, and the Christian Tradition* (London: T&T Clark, 1988), 29–30.

Gunton's interest is primarily in how metaphors are used in theology and how theology uses traditionally understood rhetorical metaphor in Christian teaching and formation, but he also considers that metaphors might be used in a different way. In this way, his writing serves as bridge from rhetorical metaphor to conceptual metaphor, which is the focus of this section. He notes that Christians are enabled how to think and live through metaphors. "Accordingly, when the New Testament speaks of the life and particularly the cross, of Jesus as a sacrifice, a victory and the justification of the sinner, may it not be that we encounter 'mere' metaphors but linguistic usage which demand a new way of thinking about and living in the world? Here is *real* sacrifice, victory, and justice."[31] Gunton means that these metaphors are more than rhetorical or figurative or poetic speech as metaphors sometimes are. Instead, they create a new reality by delivering what Jesus has done to atone for the sins of the world. They speak to the relationship God now has with His people, but, more than that, they speak of new way that Christians think about God. He is building to what conceptual metaphors accomplish.

Scriptural metaphors enable Christians to think about God, atonement, etc., but in ways extended from their usual meanings. Conceptual metaphor is embodied in human sensorimotor experience which forms a rationality that God uses to conceive in us the truth, that is the reality of these words speak. In other words, Conceptual metaphors shape how humans think about God.

God as Conceptual Metaphor

As noted already, the metaphor "God is Father" has been discussed vigorously because it informs how Christians conceive of and reason about God. In the language of cognitive

[31] Gunton, *Actuality of Atonement*, 51–52.

linguistics, the debate has been over a conceptual metaphor. Considering this debate helps us see the theological significance of conceptual metaphors.

One group that has analyzed metaphors as conceptual metaphors are feminist theologians. Feminist theologians are helpful in this case because they demonstrate the rational parameters for metaphors that are controversial for them, especially "God is Father." Most importantly for our purposes, they show that theological language and its meaning matter because they inform rationality or shape thinking through metaphors.

Feminist theologian Sally McFague defines a metaphor as, "an assertation or judgment of similarity, as well as difference, between two thoughts."[32] According to McFague, these thoughts are held as permanent tension with one another and are productive a new reality. This creative tension between thoughts produces an open-ended re-description of reality, which has structural as well as effective power.

Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve Sweetser write about how metaphors, particularly "God is Father," properly inform Christian rationality, despite the inferences and objections this metaphor has on their Feminist theology. They begin by with feminist theologian Sally McFague's definition of metaphor. "Metaphor in McFague's understanding is a way of 'seeing one thing as something else, pretending 'this' is 'that' because we do not know how to think or talk about 'this,' so we use 'that' as a way of saying something about it … when thoughts are brought together to form a metaphor, both are changed by the relationship."[33]

McFague recognizes that metaphors "do something" by creating a "re-description" of

[32] Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve. E. Sweetser, "Metaphors for God: Why and How Do Our Choices Matter for Humans? The Application of Contemporary Cognitive Linguistics Research to the Debate on God and Metaphor," *Pastoral Psychology* 53, no. 3 (January 2005): 208.

[33] DesCamp and Sweeter, "Metaphors for God," 208.

reality. She is not the only one. Janet Soskice defines metaphor as "a figure of speech in which one speaks of one thing in terms of suggestive of another… metaphor is a form of language use, a linguistic phenomenon, with a unity of subject matter, and which draws upon two or more sets of associations connected with the two linguistic domains involved."[34] But Ronald Frye claims that metaphors do more than make associations: "The New Testament metaphors 'Father' and 'Son' have actual power to name: they are the 'transparent equivalents to the divine reality.'"[35] The metaphor "Father" which they consider, Frye believes, is considered as "central and structural to faith."[36]

DesCamp and Sweetser note that the metaphor "Father" is indicated by some traditional theologians to be God's actual name, and its significance lies in the truth that "God can actually name God's own self."[37] But they judge this a linguistic fallacy. "Father, linguistically, is a relational term. The use of the possessive pronoun in Our Father, My Father, and Your Father is a linguistic indicator of the attempt to distinguish the father being spoken about from some other father; this is entirely unlike the use of a proper name."[38]

It is necessary to state this because DesCamp and Sweetser want to establish that cognitive linguistics enables us to consider that metaphors have a broader application and use, especially when it comes to God. Because God is not perceivable through the senses, and as a result is an abstract concept. Cognitive linguistics shows that abstract concepts are primarily understood through metaphor.[39]

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[34] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 209.

[35] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 210.

[36] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 211.

[37] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 213.

[38] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 213.

[39] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 215.

> This assertion raises howls from the theologians who suppose the proposition that human language for God is only human projection. Human concepts of God must necessarily take place within the realm of human cognitive capacities." Stating this from a theological viewpoint, Brian Wren says, 'Divine revelation cannot be made except through human experience'—to set them against each is a false opposition. Based on the findings of cognitive linguistics, the authors assert that metaphor in religious 'revealed' language functions the same way that metaphor in every day language functions. If one wishes to argue differently, that argument can only be based on faith claims. These claims are not consonant with contemporary research about how humans make meaning.[40]

The argument from cognitive linguistics is that metaphors are a matter of thinking and not merely the use of language. "Metaphor imposes a structure on thinking, and allows one to *reason about*, not just talk about, one thing in terms of another."[41] Therefore, metaphors are required to "reason and speak about time, causation, states and other abstract concepts."[42] This is the essence of conceptual metaphors.

With this established, DesCamp and Sweetser conclude that metaphors come from human cognition that are grounded in primary scenes and experiences. Experiences from childhood on form scenes with which humans cognitively form metaphors. Primary scenes become primary metaphors. One of these primary metaphors is that child to father. These metaphors are also culturally enriched because they are embodied in the individual who lives shares relationships in a family and within the wider community they inhabit. In this way, "as a primary metaphor, it is so culturally rooted that it functions as if it were literal truth (or primary metaphor!) for the culture in question."[43] That is to say, because everyone has a father, and has an experience of being a child of a father, they are enabled then to consider or reason how God shares qualities human father have. For example, He identifies as a man, he brings life or creates, he is nurturing,

[40] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 215.

[41] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 215.

[42] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 215.

[43] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 217.

and he provides, etc. Such conceptions of a father get applied to God. So, that Christians now think of God or reason about Him, as if He were "a father."

With considerations to emotional intimacy and physical proximity, directionality of the source and target in metaphor mapping, DesCamp and Sweetser conclude:

> When one uses any metaphor to speak of God (and the authors contend that one cannot speak of God without using metaphor), the structure of the source domain is used to reason about God. Hence, these metaphors actually constitute our relationship with God in crucial ways. When one calls God 'Father,' one projects, for instance, both trust and rebellion, love and resentment from the parent-child space into the God-human space. This is neither conscious nor intentional.
>
> The current resistance to inclusive metaphors means new entailments, new things highlighted, new things hidden, new cognitive structure with which one can reason about God, new implications about God and humans. New metaphors mean changing our licensing stories and deep cultural roots. But using new metaphors also means that we have to deal with the entailments and implications of old metaphors, either by satisfying them or bringing them to consciousness and repudiating them.
>
> How we speak about God clearly shapes how we think of God, and of God and humans. If we choose new concepts those concepts do not satisfy us as a cognitive level, we will find them impossible to sustain even if we prefer their political import.[44]

DesCamp and Sweetser are resolved that there are some metaphors, those metaphors about God, specifically, that should not be reconsidered or replaced, because the connections they reflect are so deeply embodied they cannot be replaced without satisfying the old ones and building a new frame. This is attested to in the Bible's narrative of creation all the way through the incarnation of Jesus Christ, His Son. This broad attestation shows that this how God wants us to conceive of Him. He is a relational God, a Father. God is Father is a relational metaphor since it embodies the identity and qualities that God shares with creation. The metaphor also speaks to the relationships which God's children share with one another; He is the Father of the family He made with His own hands to go and father children (Gen. 1:28). "How we speak of God clearly

[44] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 236.

shapes how we think of God, and of God and humans. If we choose new concepts, but those new concepts do not satisfy us on a cognitive level, we will find them impossible to sustain even if we prefer their political import."[45] While DesCamp and Sweetser might desire another metaphor of God, it will never satisfy the concept of God embodied in the language, hearts, minds of the people who worship Him because it embodied in the creation and creatures He has made.

Living as God's Children with the Mind of Christ

Many conceptual metaphors exist for the Church. Some, however, are reflected in the way we think about God as DesCamp and Sweetser show. God is Father because that is the relationship He has with His creation. These can be called "relational" metaphors. Others are "directional"; they speak to the way God interacts with His creation. Both relational and directional metaphors teach us about God, but they also operate conceptually: They enable us to *conceive* things about Him and His interaction with us, and they inform how we reason in view of Him. As the Church considers the way God wants His children to think or reason, much of it begins with the conceptual metaphor, the "mind of Christ," which God gives in relationship with His Son and directionally from Him to us. This is the metaphor that enables an authentic Christian rationality to operate among Christians.

Recognizing the need to teach and reprioritize this type of reason comes from research in the field of apologetics and evangelism.

> The Christian community needs to reprioritize wisdom in order to live faithfully in a discontinuity different culture. Submerged as we are in a society that values fairness over justice, consuming over creating, fame over accomplishment, glamour over character, image over holiness, and entertainment over discernment, we need a blueprint for what life is meant to be. In a culture skeptical of every kind of earthly

[45] DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 236.

> authority; where information is dirt chape and where institutions and leaders so often disappoint, we need *God-given wisdom*.[46]

Wisdom's authority comes from the one who gives it. Human wisdom comes from traditional sources of authority like parents and teachers, but nowadays wisdom also comes from "experts," journalists, politicians, Hollywood stars, and YouTube and TikTok influencers as Kinnaman noted. This is the wisdom of the world. Because humans are also skeptical of authority, especially U.S. Americans, sources acknowledging your source of authority is critical because, by acknowledging the source, you may also have to examine the rational influence it has over you.

As demonstrated above, these sources of authority impart a rationality through conceptual metaphors embodied in human experiences. Christians believe that God is the source of wisdom, and that God is s God Himself. God imparts His wisdom by giving His children the mind of Christ. Having the mind of Christ is a conceptual metaphor through which one both receives the wisdom of God (means) and by this wisdom is shaped by ways conceive of God and the human relationship God creates and maintains with His children. The mind of Christ requires certain metaphors, which is the ends of reason, because the mind of Christ results in a particular way of conceiving of God. These metaphors are the ultimate influencers in Christian faith and life. Some of these metaphors include, but certainly not limited to, God is Father, Word is Promise, and Up/Down.

But what does it mean to have the mind of Christ? First, to have the mind of Christ, is to have Christ Himself. Christ, the Son of God, is also the wisdom of God. St. Paul explores how Christ embodies this rationality in the passage from 1 Corinthians chapter 1.

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[46] David Kinnaman with Aly Hawkins, *You Lost Me: Why Young Christians Are Leaving Church … and Rethinking Faith* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2011), 210.

> Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For consider your calling, brothers: not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being might boast in the presence of God. He is the source of your life in Christ Jesus, whom God made our wisdom and our righteousness and sanctification and redemption." (1 Cor. 1:20–30)

Second, to have the mind of Christ is to be formed by Christ by means of His Word to the ends that Christians conceive of God in a certain way. Rationally conceiving of God in a certain way enables Christians to engage the reality of their life experiences with the word and work of God in Christ Jesus. Conceptual metaphors make this possible for the Christians. Below we will consider certain metaphors.

The Mind of Christ: The Father's Child

"Father" is the metaphor embodied in the rational mind of every human to some extent, because it is embodied in human relationships. Everyone has a father. While experiences with fathers vary, this metaphor provides biological content and environmental concepts of the relationship every human has with the one who created them, who nurtured, provided, (God-willing) showed love and compassion, taught write from wrong, while instilling in his children dependence and trust, and, of course, when necessary, fear.

God as Father is the quintessential conceptual metaphor for Christians to use to rationalize their relationship with God. Jesus himself called God "Father" to all believers (e.g., in the Sermon on the Mount), and in Baptism God makes all the baptized "sons of God" (Gal. 3:26–

28). Martin Luther appreciated this relationship well, and his experience, while unique, is also an illustration. Robert Kolb summarizes it:

> Luther perceived God as Father, as creator of the human creature. Despite some unpleasant memories of strict parents, his interaction with them as he grew older indicates a very healthy relationship also as a child, and his experiences of fatherhood delighted him and shaped his understanding between God and his human creatures. 'Father' conveyed for him a sense of assurance, comfort, and being safe. No Aristotelian Unmoved Mover placed itself in Luther's path. Luther experienced God's intense emotions in the biblical text and also experienced them in his own encounters with God. The living God confronted the man Martin, who was first of all, as Aristotle had taught, a rational being (*animal rationalis*), dependent on his own conforming himself to an immutable and eternal laws of the universe to attain his own welfare.
>
> As a whole person, with mind, will, and emotions, Luther found himself engaged by the God who laughs and weeps. God fashioned his human creatures for fellowship and community with himself, and he worries about them when they stray; when they are faithful, and he takes delight in them. God burns with anger of a deeply hurt parent who cannot bear the ingratitude and rejection of his children. God melts into tenderness, care, and concern for his faithful people.[47]

Luther's own rationality was formed by his understanding of God gleaned from His word and his own life experience. This is what makes the metaphor God is Father not only faith forming, but relational. As a son to a father and a father to a son, so it is with God, mysterious as He is. He reveals Himself as the Creator, calls Himself a father, and creates humanity and calls them His children. All of this comes from God the Father, whose Word, His Son Jesus, makes us children like Jesus. It through the rationality of *His child* that we now conceive of the life in the world.

Luther will use this understanding of God is Father when he writes his explanation of the First Commandment: "We should fear, love, and trust in God above all things."[48] He will explore the contour of this metaphor in the explanation of the First Article of the Apostles' Creed and in

[47] Robert Kolb, *Martin Luther and the Enduring Word of God: The Wittenberg School and Its Scripture-Centered Proclamation* (Grand Rapids: Basic, 2016), 44.

[48] *Luther's Small Catechism with Explanation*, 13.

his explanation of the Introduction to the Lord's Prayer. All of these explanations are connected to the Father who creates a relationship with His children by His adopting love in Jesus Christ. In his explanations, Luther also explores the contours of reason by connecting the identity of the God is Father to the human relationship and emotions of "fear, love, and trust." This embodied emotions invite the Father's children to come to Him in prayer, not out of fear of rejection, but through the relationship they share as a father and child. From this relationship, he kindly commands them to ask "as dear children ask their dear father." Such phrases teach who God the Father is: He is *their* Father by means of His creating and adopting them in love. This relationship is embodied in an experience of coming to Him through fearing, loving, and trusting. In this way, the relationship produces people who reason as children of God, not slaves of God, whose identities are bound to their fathers who are also bold enough to ask their Father as dear children ask their dear earthly fathers.

God as our Father is a metaphor, because it is relational as a father to a child. It has emotional connection embodied in fear, love, and trust. As Kolb noted, Luther could come before His Father in prayer and by hearing His Word because of the fellowship and communion God as our Father created with His children. This metaphor, because it is embodied in the human experience, the mind conceives an emotional connection and apply this to God Himself. But there is more: this relationship informs the way children look to their father because of what they receive from the Father: love, support, comfort, and trust that His word delivers. Luther's life and catechetical explanations reflect this. Luther's piety of prayer embodied his continuous desire for the Lord to teach them His voice, His words.

The metaphor is put into practice not only through prayer but first in baptism. The relationship between God is Father and His children is formed through baptism. God adopts the

corrupt and damned children of Adam and Eve and claims them as His own. Adoption happens through Word and Water in the liturgical rite of Holy Baptism:

> Dearly beloved, Christ our Lord says in the last chapter of Matthew, "All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to Me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." In the last chapter of Mark our Lord promises, "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved." And the apostle Peter has written, "Baptism now saves you."
>
> The Word of God also teaches that we are all conceived and born sinful and are under the power of the devil until Christ claims us as His own. We would be lost forever unless delivered from sin, death, and everlasting condemnation. But the Father of all mercy and grace has sent His Son Jesus Christ, who atoned for the sin of the whole world, that whoever believes in Him should not perish but have eternal life.[49]

Having established the authority of the Father given to Christ in Matthew 28, Christ, the Son of the Father, now claims the baptized in the Father's name. Because of the "Father of all mercy and grace has sent His Son Jesus Christ, who atoned for the sin of the whole world," baptism now claims God the Father's children as His own in Christ. The human relationship of father and son, of being lost and delivered (found), is now matrixed through God the Father's sending Jesus to atone for sin.

The claiming of and identifying of children of Adam as now children of God, God is Father, is continued throughout the baptismal service. Mark 10:13–16 is read identifying Jesus as the One who summons earthly children to come to Him (means) for (ends) the kingdom of God (God is our Father) belongs to them. The Father's kingdom belongs to children only. Next, the Our Father (Lord's Prayer) is prayed and the Creed is confessed identifying the chief teachings of the Father's word. Then the child (young or old) is baptized in (by means) the name of God Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with the water. The proclamation is made: "The almighty God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has given you the new birth of water and of the Spirit and

[49] Commission on Worship, *Lutheran Service Book*, 268.

has forgiven you all your sins, strengthen you with His grace to life everlasting."[50] After receiving a literal cloth symbolizing the covering of Christ's righteousness and burning light symbolizing the light of Christ, the newly baptized (adopted) is proclaimed a member of the family.[51] As the baptismal hymn proclaims: "Here we bring a child of nature; Home we take a newborn creature, Now God's precious son or daughter, Born again by Word and water."[52] The matrixing between a human creature born a child of Adam and Eve made a child of God the Father through (means) Holy Baptism results (ends) in the God's own child who lives life in this faith, truth, and reality. Through baptism, the conceptual metaphor becomes a literal reality that God is our Father.

Earthly fathers teach their children how to think and reason by speaking and doing. They tell them and show them how to understand and navigate life. Our father's voice resounds in our ears when we get in the car to drive, we pick up a ball on the field, when we speak to our moms and spouses. By their words and actions, our human fathers taught us their wisdom. This is an embodied-word relationship. By bodily practicing the word, the word become part of who one is.

The embodied-word relationship of God our Father is imparted through His words and

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[50] Commission on Worship, *Lutheran Service Book*, 271.

[51] Commission on Worship, *Lutheran Service Book*, 271. Almighty and most merciful God and Father, we thank and praise You that You graciously preserve and enlarge Your family and have granted ***[name(s)]*** the new birth in Holy Baptism and made ***[him/her/them]*** ***[a member / members]*** of Your Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and ***[an heir / heirs]*** of Your heavenly kingdom. We humbly implore You that, as ***[he/she/they]*** ***[has/have]*** now become Your ***[child/children]***, You would keep ***[him/her/them]*** in ***[his/her/their]*** baptismal grace, that according to Your good pleasure ***[he/she/they]*** may faithfully grow to lead a godly life to the praise and honor of Your holy name and finally, with all Your saints, obtain the promised inheritance in heaven; through Jesus Christ, our Lord.

Almighty and most merciful God and Father, we thank and praise You that You graciously preserve and enlarge Your family and have granted Erielle the new birth in Holy Baptism and made her a member of Your Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and an heir of Your heavenly kingdom. We humbly implore You that, as she has now become Your child, You would keep her in her baptismal grace, that according to Your good pleasure she may faithfully grow to lead a godly life to the praise and honor of Your holy name and finally, with all Your saints, obtain the promised inheritance in heaven; through Jesus Christ, our Lord.

[52] Commission on Worship, *Lutheran Service Book*, 593. "See the Wonder in the Making" stanza 4.

actions, by means of preaching and teaching, to the end that His children have His wisdom. Wisdom which is taught by the Father, through the Holy Spirit, in His Son Jesus to His children. Wisdom enables God's children to know His voice. Hearing Him, is a continual means by which He forms children who hear Him, and "read, mark, learn, and digest" the Word in such a way that their lives are changed by the Spirit's working to conform their lives to it; this is wisdom. The Spirit, the gift from the Father, works through the Father's Word, Jesus.[53]

God our Father's Words shape the way we speak to Him. He puts His words in His children's mouth.

> The child learns to speak because his father speaks to him. He learns the speech of his father. So we learn to speak to God because God has spoken to us and speaks to us. By means of the speech of the Father in heaven his children learn to speak with him. Repeating God's own words after him, we being to pray to him. We out to speak to God and he wants to hear us, not in the false and confused speech of our heart, but in the clear and pure speech which God has spoken to us in Jesus Christ.[54]

First, Christians learn to speak from the identity and relationship they have with God is our Father by means of the word and work of His Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, God's Son, opens our human ears by His Holy Spirit, and through the Spirit speaks human words. These words are the Father's words; they come from His mouth into our ears and into our hearts by faith alone. From human hearing His words, we speak back human words to His ears in the words He has given us to use in prayer. The Psalms are the prayerbook of the Bible, as such they implant the Father's words in our ears and from them we speak by means of the Father's embodied, incarnate Son, Jesus Christ. Dietrich Bonhoeffer explains these means work.

> How is it possible for a man [David] and Jesus Christ to pray the Psalter together? It is the incarnate Son of God, who has borne every human weakness in his own flesh,

[53] Ap IV.43 in Kolb and Wengert, 127, "Justification takes place through a free promise, it follows that we cannot justify ourselves. Otherwise, why would a promise be needed? And since a promise cannot be grasped in any other way than by faith, the gospel (which is, strictly speaking, the promise of the forgiveness of sins and justification on account of Christ) proclaims the righteousness of faith in Christ."

[54] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Psalms: The Prayer Book of the Bible* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1970), 11.

> who here pours out the heart of all humanity before God and who stands in our place and prays for us. He has known torment and pain, guilt and death more deeply than we. Therefore it is the pray of the human nature assumed by him which comes here before God. it is really our prayer, but since he knows us better than we know ourselves and since he himself was true man for our sakes, it is also really his prayer, and it can become our prayer only because it was his prayer.[55]

Our heavenly Father, as earthly fathers do, puts His literal words in the mouths of His children. His children speak these words by means of Jesus Christ, His Son and in the end, they sound like Him. God's children speak like Him; they hear, read, mark, digest, and speak His literal words. Speaking his words His voice becomes Jesus' voice, and Jesus' voice, their voice. In so doing, they say what He says, and, by doing this, they reason the way He desires His children to think.

Promise

The Father gives His Word, His promise. His word delivers what it says, He promises it. The Father's promise depends upon who He is and the relationship He shares with His children.

> In contrast to every metaphorical set of statements that teach about the deity, this assertion declares that God's truth and will are not abstract entities, but are directed verbally and publicly as a concrete promise to a particular hearer in a specific situation. 'God' is apprehended as the one who makes a promise to human beings in such a way that the person who hears it can have full confidence in it. God's truth is grounded in his faithfulness, in which he stands by the Word that has gone forth from him. God has obligated himself in such a way by the baptismal *promissio*.[56]

The promise is as good as the One who makes it: God, the Father, Creator of heaven and earth. The promise is also Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, and given by the Spirit. "Christ himself is the unity of the promise and fulfillment, of the ideological content of the Word and its realization, and of prayer and answer to prayer."[57] The Father who gives the promise, creates in

[55] Bonhoffer, *Psalms*, 20–21.

[56] Bayer, *Martin Luther's Theology*, 54.

[57] Regin Prenter, *Spiritus Creator,* trans. John M. Jensen (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 107

His hearers, His children, the ability to trust the promise, and, in so doing, He enables them to also share the promise with other children. The Word, Jesus Christ gives the promise, and with the promise Jesus gives us wisdom.

Our world needs wisdom and promise. Knowledge, education, personal experience, emotional connectedness and all various forms of intelligence abounds, but how do we glean what is good from that and provide an alternative to worldly thinking? What is missing, as Kinnaman wrote, is wisdom. "Wisdom empowers us to live faithfully in a changing culture."[58] The wisdom that comes from above is the wisdom the world needs (James 3:17). Gerhard Forde speaks to the directionality of God's wisdom and promise by using the metaphor of "up and down."

Up and Down

The directionality of this metaphor "up and down" connects humans to the reality that Kant's transcendental theology is outside of the Scriptures. God always comes down. He comes down and acts. He did so at the Tower of Babel, at Jacob's Ladder (Jacob does not climb the ladder), and many more times, but, ultimately and finally, in Jesus Christ. God comes down to Mary at the Annunciation, in Bethlehem's manger, at the Cross and in the Resurrection of Jesus from the dead. God continues to come down in the promise of "Behold, I am with you always" (Matthew 28:20). This is Luther's Reformation discovery, but it becomes problematic in the theology of Foundationalist Rationalism.

> What we have, as a consequence, is another instance of getting ourselves all tangled up in a theology of our own making. Really what we attempt to do once again is to speculate about things over which we have no control. We attempt to mount up to heaven to find loopholes in God's won almightiness. We think that we can arrange

[58] Kinnaman, *You Lost Me*, 212.

> things so that he is not *absolutely* almighty and thereby make room for at least that minute bit of freedom.
>
> But in so doing we lose the very point of the theology of the Reformation. For the problem is not the abstract one of what God might or might not be like up there 'in heaven,' not what he might or might not have willed in the secret of his own counsel, but what he has actually willed and done *for you* here on earth. He has sent his Son to die and conquer the grave, he *has* baptized you and given you the sacrament of his body and blood and that is the *revelation* of his almighty will!
>
> The point is that it is only the down to earth God who can help us. God as he is 'in himself' Luther insisted, is of no concern to us. We must fix our attention on the revealed God. It is what he has *actually* down that is important because that is the revelation of his will, the opening up of his heart 'for you' here on earth.[59]

A Father who creates children to live through His promise, is the Father whose wisdom is communicated not as them ascending to Him, but He comes down-to-earth to them. This "down-to-earth" wisdom is the wisdom the metaphor that shapes and informs a distinctly Christian rationality. This is possible since the "down-to-earth" metaphor is a summary of the entire Scriptures. God came down to form Adam and Eve. After the Fall He clothed them. He came to Abraham with a promise. He came to the prophets with His word and Spirit. Finally and fully, He came down in the incarnation of Jesus Christ in the womb of the Virgin Mary. He still comes with the witness of the Apostles to the life death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. He comes in His Word and Sacraments to deliver Jesus into our physical bodies. This is the wisdom of God; salvation is not a path to God, but God comes to humanity. This is the wisdom of God. Wisdom is not an idea or an academic discipline, but a Person, God Himself, whose word speaks and creates, enlivens and forms humans to be His children with ears to hear and hearts to believe, and life to live within His creation.

Cognitive linguistics helps us to understand how these metaphors inform how we think

[59] Gerhard Forde, *Where God Meets Man: Luther's Down-to-Earth Approach to the Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972), 25.

(reason). But this is not any kind of wisdom, this is wisdom is the Incarnate Word, the only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth. This Word, Jesus Christ, is the wisdom of God, and, as such, He gives His incarnationally, that is through material means: language—letters: consonants, vowels, syntax; water, bread, and wine; the human voice. These are His down-to-earth embodiments of Himself His Spirit uses as a rational means to an ends. God is Father and Child of God become the primary metaphors of the Christian identity. From these metaphors, with the Word of God as the means of reason, the Christian engages life in the world. Wisdom, then, is gained from the means of the word of God, and is exercised in a life of faithfulness of receiving from the Father and share His wisdom with other children.

Conclusion

This chapter turns to yet another line of criticism to the thinking machine ideal. It will focus on the field of cognitive linguistics, and in particular its argument and findings that much of human reasoning is governed by metaphors. It introduced the idea of Conceptual Metaphors from contemporary cognitive linguistics. This is the idea that much of our thinking is shaped and directed by metaphors. Metaphors are usually thought to be "figurative" but when they govern our thinking, they are "literal," in that they shape our understanding of reality. The idea of Conceptual Metaphors is new, but Conceptual Metaphors themselves reflect an essential feature of human rationality. Conceptual Metaphors, however, do more than help us to rethink what it means to be human. They also help us to appreciate more fully what it means to be Christian.

Conceptual Metaphors enable us to see the God who created the world, not as distant abstract God, but a God who is Father. The relationship of father and child is inextricably tied to our everyday lives. It is part of us because it is embodied. As such God reveals Himself as a Father Creator, as the Father of Jesus who lives in relationship with the children, He made and

recreated in Holy Baptism. The metaphor promise speaks to God's relationship in action. Through this metaphor He teaches us that His word is true because He delivers on what He says. His promise restores us to the relationship of trust that He makes with us. In the same way, the metaphor "up/down" reveals the directionality of His activity with us. He is the first actor. As He walked with Adam and Eve before and after the Fall, as He came to Abraham and the prophets, so He comes. Ultimately, the Incarnation of Jesus Christ reveals that God Himself is embodied in our own flesh and blood.

These metaphors provide examples of how the primary metaphor of the Mind of Christ works in the Christian life. Christians can use the Conceptual Metaphors prevalent in the Word of God to reason about who God is and what He does for them. They can use these metaphors to govern the faith He gives, but also as wisdom from above to make choices, teach others the gospel, and navigate life.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary, this dissertation has identified and explained several ways in which Christians should regard reason and reasoning after the Enlightenment.

To do this, Chapter One explored Enlightenment rationality and how the Church has inherited this rational frame that the Enlightenment viewed reason as best resting on certain foundations of certainty. The Enlightenment believed certainty could only be attained if reasoning was free of the influence of contexts, especially tradition and religion. Taking the axiomatic method of mathematics as its model, I termed the Enlightenment's rationality "Foundationalist Rationalism," which became the default position and part of the social imaginary of Western philosophy and theology.

Foundationalist Rationalism resulted in the bifurcation of faith and reason, objective and subjective, fact and value. Christianity especially was caught in the middle of these bifurcations, and out of fear was often gripped with what Richard Bernstein called the "Cartesian Anxiety." This is evidenced by the development of the field of biblical hermeneutics and its pursuit of apologetics to explain the Christian faith in terms of contemporary culture, especially the sciences: history, archaeology, biology, etc.

Not all embraced Foundationalist Rationalism. Already in the eighteenth century, Johann Georg Hamann, a Lutheran and friend of Immanuel Kant, was a notable dissenter of Enlightenment rationality because it at best obscured Christ and His work, and at worst rejected Him altogether. Rationality, he argued, was formed by the Word of God and lived from that truth in the life and work of the Incarnate Word Jesus Christ. For this belief he was labeled an "irrationalist." In the 20th century, Foundationalist Rationalism came under a variety of criticisms, and arguments were made for a new frame of reason. For example, in philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre did this with tradition, and James McClendon and James Smith did this with

perspectivism. Christian theologians like George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas pursued theological models along these lines. This dissertation especially relied on arguments that Foundationalist Rationalism's claim that reason is acontextual and universal is false, because it can be shown that Foundationalist Rationalism itself has a historical context and is itself a tradition.

Chapter One only showed that Christians can and should move beyond Foundationalist Rationalism. Chapter Two went a step further to show how Christians might discern and argue for an authentic Christian rationality. It did so by turning first to Irenaeus. Faced with division and controversy in the Church, he identified two means to the end of faithful gospel preaching and teaching, that is, he provided two rational means through which a faithful teaching centered in Jesus Christ could be maintained. He made an enduring contribution with this, and Lutheran confessionalism is evidence of his contribution. But the Lutheran Reformation also developed Christian rationality in its own directions with its distinctions about the Two Kinds of Human Righteousness and about the Word of God.

Foundationalist Rationalism also resulted in a specific account of human beings, which was explored in Chapter Three. The idea that reasoning and anthropology were inseparably connected was explicit in Descartes and widely adopted after him. So, a survey about reason and reasoning should explore the anthropology implied by accounts of rationality. This chapter took up the Enlightenment model. This anthropology reduced the human person as a rational being to a being who operates like a thinking machine. In our time, Artificial Intelligence serves as the most advanced result and model for this "thinking machine" anthropology.

Chapter Four challenged this anthropology through the work of Christian philosopher and theologian James K. A. Smith. He was interested in Christian worship and education, but to do

this, he explored the anthropological assumptions involved. He recognized the dominance of Enlightenment assumptions and thinking in these areas. He argued that humans are more than thinking things, and they are more fully understood as desire-centered creatures. “You are what you love” is the theme, and what you love constrains why and how you will reason. Smith also gave a detailed argument that human desires and live are formed. According to Smith’s account, desires themselves are acquired and shaped through specific practices, which he calls “liturgies.” Liturgies enable persons to be formed and shaped through habits in order to achieve the *telos* of their ultimate desires, which is some vision of the good life. I evaluated Smith’s anthropology through the Lutheran Confessional tradition to show that they are consistent with the two kinds of righteousness and the theology of the Word. I further illustrated how the sacramental rites are the means to the ends through which Christians are made and born into the Kingdom of God. Sacraments awaken and strengthen faith, and these rites constitute what it means to live by faith alone.

Having evaluated a more complete anthropology than Foundationalist Rationalism’s “thinking thing” in Chapter Four, Chapter Five explored some recent work in cognitive psychology on human reasoning through intuitions. Rather than viewing humans as logical and mathematical, I explored the fuller picture of human beings advanced by psychologists Daniel Kahneman on Amos Tversky decision making, and also Jonathan Haidt, who demonstrated that humans reason through a dual process where intuitions come first and reasoning comes second. I argued that the Church has good reasons to adopt this dual process, and I proposed that the Church should adopts methods for training account for this process. I illustrated this proposal by explaining how through memorization and story telling might be effective ways of training Christians that accounts for this dual process. Used in catechesis, this training helps Christians

navigate life in matters of practice and doctrine rationally, that is, as Christians shaped by God's Word.

Chapter Six challenged the thinking machine model by advancing that reason is embodied and expressed in language, particularly metaphors. Rather than being merely figurative, metaphors also often shape our literal understanding of reality. Conceptual metaphors help us rethink what it means to be human because they are embodied in the human experience, but, more specifically, what it means to be Christian. I argued that metaphors like Father, promise, up/down help form in Christians the "Mind of Christ" because they are prevalent in the Scriptures. Ultimately, they help us to reason who God is and what He does for us. They govern the faith He gives, give wisdom to form our choices, teach others the Gospel, and enable Christians to navigate life.

This dissertation is a survey, and one of my hopes is that it might prompt others to pursue some of the paths I went down. I will conclude by suggesting areas that might be explored or explored further.

The first suggestion is to expand the understanding of confessionalism as a rational tradition. I focused on Lutheran Confessionalism because I am wholeheartedly committed to it and because I am well acquainted with it. But I traced confessionalism back to Irenaeus, before the formal creeds and New Testament canon. Confessionalism is a catholic tradition, and exploring confessionalism as a rational tradition at least would help today's diverse situation better understand itself.

The second suggestion is to explore more fully how these and other post-Enlightenment insights into rationality and rational beings can strengthen Christian practices. I illustrated some ways in Chapters Two, Four, Five, and Six, but no more than illustrations. However, I am

convinced that catechetical instruction, administration of the sacraments, liturgical practices, preaching, evangelism, and formal theological education can be critically assessed and enriched along the lines I pursued. Chapter Four's use of Smith's loves and desires as what it means to be human in relation to the sacraments as rites of bringing people into the kingdom and forming Christians to reason needs further exploration and appropriation in liturgics and catechesis. There is a lot of work that can be done with cognitive psychology's tools to engage Christians in catechesis, evangelism, and apologetics. The usefulness of these tools is essential to Christian formation and interaction in the world, especially in how to rationally engage the Christian and non-Christian in conversation. I am sure there is future work in the relationship between reason and emotions. Finally, metaphors, both conceptual and embodied, must be engaged for homiletics. Preaching as forming thinking, forming ways of engaging the whole person is vital research to be done.

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