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THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT
IN NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

A Thesis Presented to
The Faculty of Concordia Seminary
Department of Systematic Theology

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Divinity

by

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May 1944

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"Among the great events of the eighteenth century was the rise, in an obscure corner of the civilized world, of a new school of theology." ¹ The leaders of the school were of the pure English stock, educated for the most part at the recently founded Yale College—"parish ministers in small villages and hamlets, and occasionally missionaries upon the near frontier, practical religious leaders who were stimulated to constructive thought by definite religious necessities in their own charges." ² One would think that such a movement, originating as it did far from the centers of thought and accumulations of scholarly material, led by men with less scientific training, could never be of interest to the Christian world beyond. But New England was destined to become the "principal element" ³ in the development of a great nation. "The theological movement begun by Jonathan Edwards when he preached his sermon upon 'Justification by Faith' in Northampton, in 1734, acquired an importance for the whole Christian civilization when it became the molding force of a great part of the constructive religious work done in the United States of America." ⁴ It became the dominant school of thought in New England Congregationalism. This denomination was instrumental in the establishment of foreign and home missions, in the founding of theological seminaries, in revivals, and in the planting of colleges. While the Edwardean theology was supreme in its midst, the Congregational Church was one of America's most influential church bodies.

It is not our concern in this paper to direct attention to the work of this school as a whole. It is much too complex to be treated within

1. Foster, Frank Hugh, A Genetic History of the New England Theology, p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

the limits of this thesis. Rather we choose to consider an important phase of the work of this theological school. This is the development of the Doctrine of the Atonement. In order to understand the work of the New England leaders who contributed to the theory of this doctrine, it is necessary to consider the historical background of the New England Calvinists, and the work of the founder of this school of theology, Jonathan Edwards.

The Pilgrim Fathers, who settled in New England in 1620, were stark Calvinists. Calvinism was the creed of John Robinson, the pastor of the Leyden Church, from which the Pilgrims came over to Plymouth. Robinson, in his "Defense of the Doctrine Propounded by the Synod of Dort", was in general accord with the "extreme application of the doctrine of divine sovereignty and of the helplessness of man."⁵ The settlers in the Massachusetts Colony in 1629 were "well read in divinity, and intense in their devotion to the Calvinistic system."⁶ After the overthrow of the monarchy in England, the formation of the Westminster standards was accomplished in 1646. The Savoy Confession, which the English Congregationalists had adopted in 1658, was essentially the same in doctrine as the Westminster Confession. It was adopted with slight changes, particularly with regard to church government, by the Boston Synod of 1680. Thus to all appearances the old Calvinism had fully maintained itself down to the close of the century.

During this entire period the emphasis of preaching in the churches was upon the Sovereignty of God; this was characteristic of Calvinism.⁷ Now, as Foster correctly observes, the doctrine of the Sovereignty of God affected the Congregational Church differently at different times.

5. Foster, op. cit., p. 12.

6. Ibid., p. 15.

7. Ibid., p. 29

The Puritans, having the conviction that they were elect, found strength in their convictions to sustain them in their difficulties. However, when the Sovereignty of God was preached in an over-emphatic way, and the inability of man stressed to those who were not conscious that they were the elect, it produced sluggishness, apathy, self-distrust, and despair. The undue emphasis on divine sovereignty and man's inability reduced the number of "conversions," and was beginning to deplete the churches of members. A paralysis spread over the churches; "conversions" were rare. The second generation of New England was largely "unconverted."

To remedy the situation, various means were employed. One of these was the Half-Way Covenant. It allowed parents, themselves baptized and of correct life, who would own the covenant⁸—that is, acknowledge the rightfulness of God's claims upon them, and promise to submit to church discipline even though not professing baptism—to have their children baptized. By the introduction of the Half-Way Covenant, the character of the church was changed. The church was no longer strictly the fellowship of believers; it was to perform the function of a school, and train men up to religion. The full scope of the change was not fully realized until 1707 when Solomon Stoddard, of Northampton, proposed a second method to remedy the deplorable situation of no "conversions" and empty churches. In this year Stoddard proposed to admit the unregenerate to the Lord's Supper as a means of grace, that is, of conversion. He believed that the unconverted should be urged to come to the Sacrament as a converting ordinance. This idea was derived from his low opinion of the Sacraments.

8. Half-Way Covenant: "A device of New England Congregational Churches in the latter half of the 18th century, according to which the children of church members in full standing were entitled to Baptism, on the ground that they were members of the Church, but on becoming adults, if unregenerate, they could neither come to the Lord's Supper, nor vote in ecclesiastical affairs; if, however, they "owned the covenant" and were of upright life, they

He believed they had the efficacy of a prayer, and no more. "Thus ultimately the doctrine of inability broke down the theory of the new birth in its relation to the church, as it early discouraged the actual exercises of repentance." ¹⁰ The Half-Way Covenant was introduced very largely into the churches of this period.

Still the decline continued in the churches, and soon a lax morality became evident. After a series of calamities: the Indian War, 1675-76; drought and pestilence; a "reforming synod" was called which met in Boston in 1679. The synod brought to light some of the prevalent sins: increase of profanity, intemperance, licentiousness. The increase of these sins gave ample evidence that a community was rising about the church and in the church, truly "the world", and the church was not subduing it. The Half-Way Covenant was partly to blame for this. People who owned the covenant and had their children baptized were generally satisfied with this alone. There was a general neglect of the Lord's Supper, and this was in part a reason for the "Stoddardism" which came in. Further decline permitted unconverted men to administer the ordinances of the church. The decay in the churches had reached the ministers themselves. The practice became general in Connecticut to admit persons to communion who did not profess ¹¹ to be converted. "The spiritual death increased, revivals were uncommon, ¹² immorality grew apace, and the state of religion went lower and lower."

8. (con.) might in turn present their children for baptism and thus secure for them the same privileges which they themselves enjoyed." Beckwith, C. A., p. 195: A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics, New York, Macmillan Company, 1923.

9. Foster, op. cit., p. 31.

10. Ibid., p. 32.

11. Ibid., p. 42.

12. Ibid.

With lax practice theological modifications entered in. The Arminian writers: Whitby, John Taylor, Dr. Samuel Clark, were imported and read. "What was called Arminianism, coupled with tendencies toward Arian and Socinian opinions, gradually superseded the old creed in the minds and teaching of many, especially in eastern New England." ¹³ Edwards thought Arminianism so prevailing that he devoted his principal writings against it, as we shall presently see.

We observe that undue emphasis on the Sovereignty of God and the inability of man has produced a pure formalism in religion, evidenced by the Half-Way Covenant and "Stoddardism". Further, there is an alarming absence of vital piety in the New England churches. At the same time, the Arminian writings entering into New England are being cordially received. It is obvious the New England churches have now reached a crisis; the entire theological system may give way to another. The great task facing New England theologians beginning with about 1730 is to modify Calvinism in such a way that it would on one hand retain the Calvinistic principle of the Sovereignty of God, and yet on the other hand recognize the responsibility of man, neglected too long, the results of which were all too apparent. The man who was chiefly responsible for the development of a modified Calvinism was Jonathan Edwards.

It was into the turbulent situation in New England that a new force entered in the person of Jonathan Edwards. He has been called "the greatest theologian that American Congregationalism has produced." ¹⁴ Edwards by birth and training belonged to the strictest circles of Calvinism. He was born at East Windsor, Conn., where his father, Timothy Edwards, was pastor, on October 5, 1703. After a youth of brilliant promise he was graduated at

¹³ Edwards, A History of Christian Doctrine, p. 394.
¹⁴ Walker, A Hist. of the Congregational Churches in the U. S., p. 253.

on February 15, 1727, as colleague with his grandfather, the aged Solomon Stoddard, whose death two years later left him the sole pastor of the Northampton church. "In Edwards there was a rare combination of fervor of feeling, of almost oriental fertility of imagination, and intellectual acumen, which clothed all that he said with glowing force, while beneath his words flowed the stream of a most carefully theologic system." ¹⁵ Edwards was further blessed in having a wife of remarkable intellectual force and intense spirituality, Sarah Pierpont, the daughter of Rev. James Pierpont of New Haven.

In order to understand correctly the work which Edwards was later to accomplish, his fundamental position must be kept in mind. He was a Calvinist; his family background, being thoroughly Calvinistic, encouraged this. He took singular delight in the material principle of Calvinism, the sovereignty of God. "It was about the doctrine of the divine sovereignty that his thoughts principally centered, and that this doctrine...became not only a conviction, but a delightful conviction." ¹⁶ His famous sermon, "Sinners in the hands of an angry God," provides ample testimony to his staunch Calvinistic position. God is the absolute sovereign, dealing with sinful mankind as He pleases. He states as the theme of his sermon: "There is nothing that keeps wicked men at any one moment out of hell, but the mere pleasure of God." ¹⁷ He then defines this "mere pleasure of God": "By the mere pleasure of God, I mean his sovereign pleasure, his arbitrary will, restrained by no obligation, hindered by no manner of difficulty, any more than if nothing else but God's mere will had in the least degree or in any respect whatsoever any hand in the preservation of wicked men one moment." ¹⁸ It is evident that Edwards was in full accord with historic Calvinism in his emphasis on the Sovereignty of God.

¹⁵. Walker, op. cit., p. 253. ¹⁶. Foster, op. cit., p. 49. ¹⁷. p. 78, "Sinners in the hands of an angry God", in Selected Serms. of J. Edw., ¹⁸. Ibid.

However, notwithstanding the fact that he was a true Calvinist, he still realized the need of an assertion of responsibility on the part of man. He was all too familiar with the serious moral defections then existing in the church, and he was desirous of doing something about them. These two factors: the sovereignty of God on the one hand and the need for personal responsibility on the other caused him to reexamine the old Calvinism. The problem that faced him has been stated in three questions: "How can an appeal be made to men to turn to the Lord under the Calvinistic system of determinism? How can one maintain Calvinism against the Arminian claim that man is a self-determining agent in both good and evil: How can the unfreedom of the will and man's responsibility for his sin be maintained at the same time?"¹⁹ This was the problem that confronted Edwards. His solution, which profoundly influenced New England theology, will be considered in the ensuing discussion.

Edwards first enters the picture in 1734 with a series of sermons on justification that began the great revival in New England, and began a new epoch in American religious life. Preached in Northampton, these sermons had a marked effect. After their presentation, the entire town seemed in deep spiritual concern. "Little else was talked of besides the interests of religion; and these impressions were deepened by the vividness with which Edwards depicted the wrath of God, from he exhorted men to flee."²⁰ By May, 1735, when the revival began to abate, more than three hundred persons, both young and old, were said to have experienced a regenerative change. The same impulse was felt in other towns of the Connecticut valley. "From Northfield on the north to Windsor on the south it affected every settlement on the river, and in Connecticut it

¹⁹ Mayer, F. E., Lecture Notes on "Modern Trends in Theology," p. 7

²⁰ Walker, op. cit., pl 255.

extended considerably widely, reaching points as far asunder as Lebanon,²¹ New Haven, Stratford, and Groton." It attracted the attention of many influential men: Benjamin Colman of Boston, Isaac Watts and John Guyse of England. In 1736 Edwards wrote his "Narrative of the Surprising Work of God," which was printed and circulated on both sides of the Atlantic in 1737-38, and turned public attention in all Anglo-Saxon non-prelatical circles to the American revival movement. Colman, in 1740, invited the Rev. George Whitefield to visit New England. When Whitefield, accepting the invitation, came to New England, his preaching aroused enthusiasm everywhere. Without question Edwards' sermons made a terrific impact upon the religious life of New England.

Now our chief concern is this: What was there about Edwards' sermons that caused such a tremendous revival? To answer this question, we shall deal particularly with Edwards' sermon on "Justification by Faith", following in the main Foster's fine discussion on the subject.²² Justification is defined as consisting not merely in the forgiveness of our sins, but in the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us, Edwards stressing not so much the passive but the active obedience of Christ. Our possession of Christ's righteousness is the ground of our being rewarded with eternal life. "Faith justifies, not as being morally worthy, but as a vinculum²³ connecting the soul with Christ." It was then, after all, not the Christ for us, but rather the Christ in us. Faith is made the condition of justification. "Faith is...the condition of forgiveness, because it unites the soul to Christ, so that there is a fitness in bestowing such a favor in consequence of it."²⁴ By faith man possesses the righteousness of Christ, with the consequent evidence of this in a moral life, and then is justified before God. Through his conception

21. Walker, op. cit., p. 255.

22. Foster, op. cit., pp. 52-54. 24. Foster, op. cit., p. 53.

23. Fisher, A History of Christian Doctrine, p. 409.

of faith Edwards has introduced the activity of man. Edwards had realized that more room was needed for the activity of man. He had seen that "conversions" were the great need of the time. "He saw also that the tendency among the Arminians to confuse a 'good, moral life' with the Christian life, and to depend for salvation upon the striking at the day of judgment of a kind of moral balance sheet between good and bad deeds, was a fundamental abandonment of the gospel;"²⁵ hence his development as outlined above. The result of these sermons, as already pointed out, was the renewal of "conversions" in large numbers. "The doctrine of regeneration acquired practical effectiveness, for men were actually born again in great numbers, in the revivals of the years 1735 and 1740, and thus the old paralysis was broken up."²⁶

In 1750 Edwards was dismissed from Northampton after a severe case of church discipline. He then went as missionary to the Indians to Stockbridge. Here, having sufficient time to study and write, he wrote his three great works: Freedom of the Will (1754), Nature of Virtue (1755), and Original Sin (1758). These three works of Edwards must be studied briefly in order to understand fully his development of the responsibility of man, his modification of historic Calvinism, and his influence upon subsequent theologians.

Edwards, over a period of years, had come to the conclusion that the chief cause of the symptoms of moral laxity, indifference, etc., then prevalent in the religious life of church people, was the theory of the will as it was held at that time. In 1754 he printed his "Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, etc."

25. Foster, op. cit., p. 53

26. Ibid., p. 54.

Edwards begins his treatise with a definition of cause. Cause is any antecedent which so affects man that it becomes cause. An event in the realm of mind without a cause is inconceivable to Edwards. Foster points to an ambiguity in this definition. Motives are 'causes' determining the will. Is the motive an occasion upon which the efficient will acts, or an efficient cause operating upon the will? Edwards' definition gives no answer. In one term he includes efficient and occasional causes. Edwards followed Calvin in dividing the mind into faculties, understanding, and will. Here again a criticism is in order. "Edwards confounded the emotions, the action of which is necessary, with the will, the action of which is free, and attributed to the latter, as a matter of self-evidence, all the necessity of the former." Further confusion resulted from the use of "inclination", which was used to denote an emotion, then in the same sentence to denote a volition—a fallacy of the ambiguous middle. Fisher adds this remark:

The principal inconsistency of Edwards in his discussions of the subject, ... is the failure persistently to identify or persistently to distinguish voluntary and involuntary inclinations. Inclination and choice are treated as indistinguishable and yet the one is spoken of as the antecedent and cause of the other. The ambiguity of 'inclination' and its synonyms has been a fruitful source of confusion. 26d

From these fundamental considerations Edwards develops his theory of the will. Every act of the will is an act of choice, involving alternatives. If the will is placed between two things, between which a choice is to be made, the question develops: What determines the will to choose the one rather than the other? The Arminians said that the will determined itself. Edwards says the will is determined by the motive which it actually follows. Therefore a positive power is ascribed to motives. They are causes, possessing efficient causation. Upon a

26a. Foster, op. cit., p. 64. 26b. *Institutes*, Bk. I, ch. xv., pars. 6-8.
 26c. Foster, op. cit., p. 64. 26d. Fisher, op. cit., p. 397.
 26e. Foster discusses Arminian positions on free will, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

perfect knowledge of their nature and potency, the future action of a being influenced by them could be determined. The prevailing motive both determines that the action of the will shall take place and also how it shall take place. It does this because it possesses a certain attractive power, or because it is an apparent good. Since the prevailing motive acts as a cause, it is evident that the greatest apparent good in any group of conflicting apparent goods will determine the will. Hence the maxim: the will is as the greatest apparent good. It follows that the choices of the will are as necessary as the events of the physical world. They are caused by motives in the same sense as these are caused by the forces of objects and events in nature. Still this does not infringe upon the liberty of man, because it leaves him so far entirely able to do what he wills. This is the meaning of liberty. To suppose that freedom means that a man can will as he wills, as the Arminians claimed, is to involve oneself in contradiction. Virtue or vice consists in the nature of the choice made in any case irrespective of its origin. Commands and threats are motives which may be employed; but whatever the motives, as a man chooses, so is he.

26f

Foster has two further criticisms in this connection:

The application of the law of causality to the operations of the mind is in contravention of the simplest facts of consciousness. ...The fallacy of the infinite series may be forced upon every argument touching the domain where God and man unite and the spheres of the finite and infinite intersect. If Edwards overthrew freedom by his argument, he also virtually overthrew the existence of God; for if God is required as a cause of the world, then a cause is required for God, and a cause for this cause, and so on ad infinitum.

The services of Edwards by his theory of the will were manifold. By ascribing to motives causative power, he wants to make man responsible. Edwards propounded a distinction between natural and moral

ability and inability. Natural ability and inability arise from natural or physical causes. In like manner, moral ability and inability arise from motives. This distinction was of use in distinguishing between what we might call the "can't" or lack of power, and the "can't" which is really "won't". The Calvinism of the early days, as we have seen, had no place for any ability to good, and this had had a paralyzing influence. Edwards introduced an ability. Fisher states Edwards' position as follows:

The Arminian objection that, according to Calvinism, a sinful man cannot love God, cannot repent, is met by a denial. He can if he will. If it be asked, can he will, the question is pronounced to be absurd. He is possessed of conscience and will; he has a natural ability to do all duty, notwithstanding the certainty that without the operations of grace, he will not—that is, notwithstanding his moral ability. The first is the ground of responsibility; the second, of dependence. Both are absolute. 26g

In his theory Edwards believed that he had "demonstrated the absolute control of God while leaving freedom and responsibility to man." 26h

In regard to the origin of evil, Edwards had some definite conclusions. 26i

The Arminians had said that necessity made the Almighty the author of sin.

But to Edwards the fall was like every other event in the world preceding from the will—a volition caused by motives. In the last analysis these motives were presented by God, and in this sense God willed the fall.

Edwards does not like the phrase: God willed the fall. Rather he teaches that God ordered the system in which sin would infallibly come to pass.


He draws the line of agency, and so of the authorship of sin, at the action—that is, at the sin, making this man's. Thus God is the author of the system, man of the sin.

26g. Fisher, op. cit., p. 401.

26h. Walker, op. cit., p. 283.

26i. Foster, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

Before leaving Edwards' theory of the will, we should like to clarify its concepts and the difference between it and Arminianism by two diagrams. ^{26j} God, according to Edwards, ordered the system in which man was able to make his choices. Arminianism ignored this first part, the system, and gave to man the absolute power of choice. The diagrams follow:



The difference between Calvinism and Arminianism is clear from the above diagrams. Note the extent of will in both systems. In Arminianism the choice of will is absolute; God is absent. In Edwardean Calvinism the choice is limited to the system in which God has placed man: Family, Community, etc. In this system man has a choice.

In leaving Edwards' theory of the will, let us again note the responsibility and activity which is given to man. Edwards was steering a careful course between the absolute freedom of the Arminians, and the inability as it had been preached in New England.

We now take up Edwards' on original sin, "the second great subject
 26k
 on which Edwards entered the lists against the Arminians." "The
 Scriptural Doctrine of Original Sin Proposed to Free and Candid Examination" by John Taylor of Norwich, England, appeared in 1740. In this
 work Taylor rejected the doctrine of the imputation of sin, and taught
 that the whole work of Christ was comprised in His obedience. The doctrine of satisfaction to justice in every form was entirely left out.
 Edwards replied to this work in his "The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended," which appeared in 1758, just after his death.
 We introduce this treatise of Edwards with a quotation from Foster:

The theory of the current Calvinism required the supposition that there rested upon the descendants of Adam a double guilt—that of Adam's first sin, imputed to them, and that of a corrupted nature which was truly and properly sin. The order of the thought is: first, Adam was made a federal head; second, his sin imputed; third, corruption of nature visited upon mankind; finally, actual sin in consequence. This is the so-called 'immediate imputation'. Upon this theory there are two kinds of sin, voluntary and involuntary. 26l

Edwards had already taught that sin was voluntary. He now extends his position to the point where all sin is voluntary. Sin is imputed not
 26m
 by an arbitrary decree, as Calvin taught, but as man's voluntary participation in Adam's sin. It is imputed because it is the sin of all men, for they have committed it in Adam. "Thus he extends his doctrine, excludes every sin but voluntary sin, and so gives fully to New England theology its first great distinguishing doctrine, that all sin consists in choice. Thus he completes at this point the work begun in the treatise
 26n
 on the will."

26. k. Fisher, op. cit., p. 402.

26l. Foster, op. cit., p. 86.

26m. Calvin, Institutes, Book II, Ch. 1, par. 7: "the cause of contagion is, that it was ordained by God that the gifts He had conferred on Adam should by him be preserved or lost."

26n. Foster, op. cit., p. 87.

To maintain this connection of the race with Adam, Edwards proposes a theory somewhat new. He rejects the idea that original sin consists in a positive taint. He simply says that the Holy Spirit must and did withdraw from man after his sin. The result: man set himself up as his own standard and fell into further sin. Hereupon, either in consequence of the established course of nature, or of a special divine constitution, the descendants of Adam were born, as he was, after his sin, destitute of holiness, so negatively evil or depraved, out of communion with God, and certain to pursue the course of their fleshly affections; that is, to fall into sin. All are looked upon as sinning in and with their common root. God righteously withholds special influences and special communications from all for this sin. As a result of this act of God's, men consent to Adam's sin as soon as they begin to act. Imputation follows this consent. Edwards' order is as follows: 1. The "constitution". 2. Birth of men without the spirit. 3. Positive evil disposition or sin, which is consent to Adam's in. 4. Charge of guilt. How did Edwards justify this "constitution" to himself? Foster gives a fine summary:

Some things entirely distinct and very diverse are yet united by the constitution of the creator so that they are in a sense one, as for instance the oak, a hundred years old, and the acorn. Even the identity of created intelligence depends upon the constitution of God. Continuance of the same consciousness, or memory, is essential to continued personal identity; and yet this continued memory is the constitution of God and not the work of man himself. Indeed, the continued existence of every created entity, whether person or thing, is nothing but the continued creation of God. It is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing at every moment. The continued identity of anything is therefore only the consistency with which God produces now what he produced a moment since; or it is the divine constitution. By the same constitution, Adam and the race may be the same person, and so the loss of Adam be the loss of his posterity. 26o

26p

Edwards' contributions may be summarized in three propositions:

1. In the extension of the proposition that sin is voluntary action to

26o. Foster, op. cit., p. 88.

26p. Ibid., p. 89.

the principle that all sin is voluntary action. 2. In the removal from theology of the idea that man's corruption consists in a positive taint imparted to his nature. (The whole matter is explained when it is taught that the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from sinning Adam, and corruption traced to this root.) 3. In an idea introduced, the maintenance of the doctrine of the actuality of depravity in man by the supposition of an established order of nature, or divine constitution.

A final work of Edwards, which deserves particular attention, is "The Dissertation Concerning the Nature of True Virtue," published in 1765 though written ten years earlier. Foster considers this work,^{26q} "Edwards' principal contribution to religious thought." Edwards in this treatise does not content himself, as philosophers before him had done, with the inquiry: What is the abstract quality of virtue? He sets forth, on the contrary, the nature of virtue in the concrete, or the principle of goodness. This he finds to be benevolence, or love to intelligent being. It is love to the entire society of intelligent beings according to their rank, the amount of being which belongs to them. Thus it is a proportionate love; supreme and absolute as regards God, limited as regards inferior beings. "Under this conception, ethics and religion are inseparably connected."^{26r} True love to man is love to him as being, or as having being in himself. It is indissolubly connected, if it be real and genuine, with a proportionately greater love toward God. This benevolence, embracing in itself all goodness, is the fountain and essence of specific virtues. It is described as a "propensity to being, which prompts one to seek the welfare of the objects loved."^{26s} It is not synonymous with delight in the

26q. Foster, op. cit., p. 91.

26r. Fisher, op. cit., p. 404.

26s. Ibid.

happiness of others, but is the spring of that delight. "An essential element in Edwards' whole theory is a double excellence of universal love: first, a rightness recognized by all men, whether they be good or bad; and a peculiar, transcendent love, revealed only to the good, or on the condition of the exercise of love as a practical principle."^{26t}

The disinterested love which is identical with virtue is the antipode of self-love. If self-love signifies nothing but a man's loving what is pleasing to him, this is only to say that he loves what he loves. With Edwards, loving an object is synonymous with being pleased with it. But the proper meaning of self-love is regard to self in distinction from others, or regard to some private interest. Self-love includes all particular affections which do not involve a regard to universal being and a willingness that the subordinate interest should give way whenever it competes with the interests and rights of the whole.

Previous moralists had been too exclusively occupied in considering the theme of virtue with simple reference to the relations of man toward man. "Edwards would show, on the contrary, that true virtue must include a virtuous attitude toward God himself, which is, however, the essence of religion, and would thus advance to the lofty position that there can be no true virtue in the narrower sphere of what is ordinarily called morality, which is not, at the same time, religious."^{26u} Fisher believes that "the scientific construction of the theory of virtue, especially in the place which love to God finds in it, is original with Edwards."^{26v}

The principles which Edwards laid down had a wide influence; "finally created an independent school of ethics."^{26w} The union of religion and

26t. Fisher, op. cit., p. 404.

26u. Foster, op. cit., p. 98.

26v. Fisher, op. cit., p. 407.

26w. Foster, op. cit., p. 101.

morality, the place which love to God finds in the system—these greatly influenced succeeding men. Furthermore, the teaching that any act is virtuous, if it is prompted by the motive of love, made possible an appeal to repentance. The philosopher Fichte has spoken of the work which Edwards accomplished in the sphere of virtue in glowing terms:

So has this solitary thinker of North America risen to the deepest and loftiest ground which can underlie the principle of morals: universal benevolence which is in us, as it were potentially latent, and in morality to emerge into full consciousness and activity, is only the effect of the bond of love, which encloses us all in God."26x

26x. Fichte, System der Ethik, quoted in Fisher, op. cit., p. 407.

Our major concern in this thesis is the doctrine of the atonement in New England theology. However, what has gone before is essential to a proper understanding, not only of Edwards' views with regard to the atonement, but also of the men whom he influenced. We shall take up now the study of the doctrine of the atonement according to Edwards. For a proper comprehension of the doctrine, we shall consider it both from the development as suggested by Fisher, and also from the excellent and thorough consideration of the doctrine by Franks. We begin with Fisher's discussion:

A paper by Edwards on "The Satisfaction of Christ" is one of the most profound of his many discussions. He begins with the statement: Where there is sin, something of the nature of compensation is required, either punishment or a repentance, humiliation, and sorrow which are proportionate to the guilt incurred. It is not possible for men to make a repentance answerable to the guilt of sin, due to the infinitude of guilt. Edwards then continues his discussion, and Fisher organizes the dissertation into four parts:

1. Christ is first presented as an Intercessor. As a prerequisite to this office, He must enter fully into the mind of the offended party, as well as the distress of the party offended. This absolute sympathy, identification of Himself in feeling, with both parties, is necessary to qualify Him to intercede. His intercessions, without it, would not be intelligent on His own part, or acceptable and prevailing.

2. The sympathy of Christ with God and with man, the offended one and the offender, was perfected by means of His death. Thereby it attained its consummation. Then He understood fully what guilt involves: He appreciated

26y. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 409. 410.

both the holy resentment of God, and the criminality and hopeless situation of man.

3. The substitution of Christ was primarily in His own heart. "It was love, which comes under another's burden, makes another's suffering ^{26z} lot its own, lays aside self, as it were, and becomes another." This inward substitution led to, and was completed in the final act of self-sacrifice.

4. By His voluntary submission to death, Christ signified His absolute approval of the righteousness of the law on both its penal and its preceptive side. He gave the strongest possible proof of His sense of the justice of the divine administration in the allotment of death to the sinner. "Being among men, and one of them, He honored and sanctioned the law both by keeping it, by overcoming temptation, and also by sharing, without a mur- ^{26aa} mur, in the righteous penalty which He had not personally incurred."

While Anselm and Karg had ignored active obedience entirely, Edwards and his followers emphasized active obedience to the exclusion of the passive obedience.

This presentation appealed to certain men, because it was "an attempt to find the moral and spiritual elements of the Atonement, and thus unfold ^{26bb} its rationale." Edwards is interested not in the quantity of the Saviour's suffering alone, but in the sources and meaning of it. "While holding that Christ suffered the penalty of sin, Edwards not only carefully excludes the idea that He was in consciousness, or in fact, an object of wrath; but he dwells also upon those spiritual perceptions and experiences which gave ^{26cc} significance to the pain which He endured."

26z. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 409. 410.

26aa. Ibid.

26bb. Ibid.

26cc. Ibid.

Franks' discussion is more comprehensive than that of Fisher. We thought it profitable to include Franks' analysis of Edwards' doctrine of the atonement almost in its entirety:

Jonathan Edwards, "the true founder of a distinctive American theology," develops the doctrine of the work of Christ in his discourse: "Concerning the Necessity and Reasonsbleness of the Christian Doctrine of Satisfaction for Sin." Edwards argues as follows:

"Justice requires that sin be punished, because sin deserves punishment" (p. 458). Greater sins deserve greater punishment, less sins less punishment. All sins, however, require punishment according to their demerit. Sin, viewed as an offense against God, is, however, of an infinite demerit. God must therefore punish it with infinite punishment, "unless there be something in some measure to balance this desert" (p. 459). Human repentance or sorrow for sin can, however, never reverse the existing balance, since sin is infinite, and there can be no infinite sorrow for sin in finite creatures. To propose that God should pardon sin because of human repentance is no different from asking that He should pardon it with no repentance at all. Repentance is required when sin is pardoned, not as amends for sin, but in view of compensation already made.

Sin strikes at God. It would, if it could, annihilate Him. Therefore it must be repaid by God with enmity. God, as ruler of the universe, must maintain order in His kingdom. This is His justice. God's holiness also demands the punishment of sin. God, being holy, is opposed to sin, and must be at enmity with the sinner. God's antipathy to sin must be visibly manifested. "If there had been only a declaration of God's abhorrence and displeasure against sin, the creature might have believed it,

26dd. Franks, Robert S., A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ in its Ecclesiastical Development, Vol. II, pp. 182-189.

26ee. Franks, Ibid., p. 182.

26ff. Edwards, Remarks on Important theo. Controversies, {Chap. VI, Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 458f quoted in Franks (Page ref. in parentheses).

but could not have seen it, unless He should also take vengeance for it." (p. 462) God's honor requires the punishment of sin. "If we consider sin as levelled against God, not only compensative justice to the sinner, but justice to Himself, requires that God should punish sin with infinite punishment." (p. 463) "The majesty of God must be vindicated by punishment" (p. 463); "unless there could be such a thing as a repentance, humiliation, and sorrow, proportionable to the greatness of the majesty despised" (ibid.).

The Divine law demands the punishment of sin: without a sanction it would be no law, but only counsel. Moreover, the punishment threatened by the law must be executed: otherwise the Law is implicitly abrogated. God therefore cannot abrogate His law or dispense with it. It would be a slur on the perfection of the law to abrogate it. God's authority would be set aside, and His truth violated by the abrogation of the law.

"The satisfaction of Christ by His death is certainly a very rational thing" (p. 471). The principle of mediation is a natural principle, since Christ is said to have borne our sins for us. (Is. 53, 4. ll. 12; Heb. 9, 28; 1 Pet. 2, 24).

Some definitions require to be premised: "By merit, I mean anything whatsoever in any person or belonging to him, which appearing in the view of another is a recommendation of him to that other's regard, esteem, or affection" (p. 472). In short, merit is whatever recommends, irrespective of intrinsic worth. "By patron, I mean a person of superior dignity or merit, that stands for and espouses the interest of another, interposes between him and a third person or party, in that capacity to maintain, secure, or promote the interest of that other by his influence with the third person, improving his merit with him, or interest in his esteem and regard for that end. And by client, I mean that other person whose interest the

patron thus expresses, and in this manner endeavors to maintain and promote." (p. 473).

These things being premised, Edwards now argues as follows: It is not unreasonable, that respect should be shown to one person in view of his union with another, or, what is the same thing, on account of the second person's merit. In such a case the merit of the second person is imputed or transferred to the first; and these persons are so far substituted, the one for the other. This will properly take place, in proportion to the closeness of the union between the two persons. It will take place, above all, where the union is the closest possible.

The union is perfect, when the patron's love puts him so fully in sympathy with the client, that he is willing even to be destroyed for his sake. The patron's intercession will especially avail, if he has manifested his interest in his client at his own expense. His hardships are calculated to purchase good for his client. Such benefit will accrue to the client, if, above all, the patron pleads his cause, and appeals for him to one by whom the patron is highly regarded: this last person will naturally make the condition that the client should gratefully recognize the great service of his patron.

In the special case, where the patron's merit appears in the expense of his own welfare for the good of the client, such expense is in itself the price of the client's welfare; but the merit of the patron is added to the price and gives it moral value. The acceptance of the patron will above all be natural, where the patron goes so far as to take the place of the client, so far as may be consistent with keeping his merit inviolable. If the client be an offender, the intercession of the patron must be such as to conserve, both his own merit and virtue, and his union with the client. His union with his client must be accompanied by circumstances

demonstrating regard for his friend and also for virtue and holiness. The dignity of the patron will naturally be considered. The degree of union with the client required will be in inverse proportion to this dignity of the patron. The amount of suffering required of the patron will obey a similar rule. The client will be regarded as a member of his body, whom he loves as himself, yet not equally with himself. "A man loves his little finger as himself, yet not equally with the head; but yet with the same love he bears for himself, according to the place, measure, and capacity of the little finger." (p. 479) The last requisite is a perfect cohesion of the client with the patron, or in a word, he must have complete faith in him. Then the intercession of the patron can have no improper consequences. These things apply to the case of mediation between God and man. The Mediator here must undertake the debt of men, and bear its penalty.

This Christ did. "Christ suffered the wrath of God for men's sins in such a way as He was capable of, being an infinitely holy Person, who knew that God was not angry with Him personally, but infinitely loved Him" (p. 481). He could not bear the wrath of God in the same sense as the wicked in hell, who realize God's hatred of them. "Christ therefore could bear the wrath of God in no other but these two ways, viz. in having a great and clear sign of the infinite wrath of God against the sins of men, and the punishment they deserved; and in enduring the effects of that wrath." (p. 481).

As to the first point, Christ doubtless had a clear view in His last suffering, both of the hateful nature of the sin of man, and of the dreadful punishment of sin. For, on the one hand, the malignity of sin was never so apparent as when men crucified the Son of God. On the other hand, the sight of the evil of sin, the enduring of temporal death with such extreme

extreme pain, God hiding His face, the dying a death that was by God's appointment an accursed death, the having a sight of the malice and triumph of devils, and the being forsaken of His friends,—all combined to present to Christ a striking view of the punishment of sin. "Now the clear view of each of these things must of necessity be inexpressibly terribly to the man Christ Jesus." (p. 482) This clear view of sin, unbalanced by the sense of God's love (since God forsook Christ), was infinite pain to Him. This was His bearing of our sins, in distinction from His bearing the Divine wrath, which consisted in His sense of the dreadfulness of the punishment of sin. The latter, Christ bore through His pity for, and sympathy with, the elect, fixing the idea of their punishment in His mind as if it were His own; and here, again, He was uncomforted by any sense of Divine love. The same ideas, however, which so distressed the soul of Christ, were the motive power of His endurance of such suffering. The more He hated sin, and pitied the elect, the more was He engaged to honour God, and to save the elect by His suffering.

Christ was personally sanctified in His sufferings, His enmity to sin being increased by His experience of its bitterness, and the exercise of His obedience or holiness tending to increase the root of it in His nature. "Though the furnace purged away no dross, yet it increased the preciousness of the gold; it added to the finite holiness of the human nature of Christ" (p. 485). Thus He was sanctified, or made perfect in His sufferings, and so was prepared for the high degree of glory and joy to which He was to be exalted.

Christ also endured the effects of God's wrath. "There was a very visible hand of God in letting men and devils loose upon Him at such a rate, and in separating Him for His own disciples.... Besides, it was an effect of God's wrath, that He forsook Christ" (p. 485). The only explanation of the sacrificial system of the Old Testament is that it was

ordained as a type of the sacrifice of Christ. For there could be no real atonement in the Old Testament sacrifices, yet they were organized to be performed with the greatest pomp, expense, and trouble; what could be the reason for it, but that they were typical of the true atonement?

The idea of satisfaction involves only the equivalence of the punishment suffered, and the union between Christ and others which made it possible for Him to be their representative. By Christ's satisfaction the law is fulfilled independently of His merit or excellency. "The blood of Christ washes away sin. So it is represented in the Scripture. But, although the blood of Christ washes away our guilt, it is the Spirit of Christ that washes away the pollution and stain of sin. However, the blood of Christ washes also from the filth of sin, as if purchases sanctification; it makes way for it by satisfying, and purchasing it by the merit of obedience implied in it." (p. 489).

"Late philosophers seem ready enough to own the great importance of God's maintaining steady and inviolate the laws of the natural world. It may be worthy to be considered, whether it is not of as great, or greater importance, that the law of God, that great rule of righteousness, between the supreme moral Governour and His subjects, should be maintained inviolate" (p. 489). No argument against the necessity of strict satisfaction can be drawn from the fact that human rulers sometimes dispense with their own laws, forbear to execute them, and pardon offenders without the suffering of a substitute. Human justice is imperfect: Divine is perfect.

Franks declares that "Edwards discourse is no mere reproduction of the traditional Protestant theology." ^{26gg} It contains germinal thoughts, ^{26hh} all of which have resulted "in important developments in modern theology."

Franks lists the following: 1. A perfect repentance on man's part might

26gg. Franks, op. cit., p. 188.

26hh. Ibid.

have sufficed to satisfy for sin: of such a repentance sinful man was, however, incapable. 2. Christ's sufferings in bearing the Divine wrath and the burden of human sin are to be understood psychologically through His sympathy with, and pity for, men. It was not, however, impossible for Him, as an infinitely holy person, to bear the very pains of hell to be endured by the damned. 3. Christ Himself was perfected by His sufferings, "the exercise of His obedience or holiness tending to increase the root of it in His nature."²⁶ⁱⁱ

2. Joseph Bellamy

The second name on the list of those who have suggested the Edwardean theory of the atonement is Joseph Bellamy, the pupil and friend of the

²⁶ⁱⁱ. Franks, op. cit., p. 189.

elder Edwards, the theological teacher of the younger Edwards and
 27 Smalley. Like the elder Edwards, he sanctioned, for the most part,
 both the views and phrases of the old Calvinists. He repeatedly declares
 that God must, and that He "does always, throughout all his dominions,
 not only in word threaten, but in fact punish it(sin) with infinite
 severity, without the least mitigation, or abatement in any one instance
 28 whatever." Still this writer develops certain relations of the old
 theory which decidedly recommend the new. On the old Calvinistic ground,
 the Atonement ought to be described as originating partly from the dis-
 tributive justice of God. In agreement with this, Dr. Bellamy says that
 "God's inclination to punish sin according to its desert, induced Him to
 29 give his Son to die in our stead." This forcible reasoner, in addition,
 introduces a class of ideas which are the germs of the Consistent Calvin-
 ism developed soon after he published his treatises. He insists, in
 opposition to many old Calvinists, that "Justifying faith is an holy act,"
 30 not "a thing in which the mind is merely passive." We shall now consider

27. Joseph Bellamy, born in Cheshire, Conn., February 20, 1719; graduated at Yale College in 1735, at the age of sixteen; studied with Edwards at Northampton in 1736; settled at Bethlehem (south of Litchfield) April 2, 1740, when a little more than twenty-one years old; remained pastor there, having declined many calls, among others one to New York, till his death in 1790. Created Doctor of Divinity by Aberdeen in 1768. According to Walker, op. cit., p. 287, "He was the most gifted preacher of any of the Edwardeans,—a man of unusual pulpit abilities....Bellamy's home practically became a theological seminary." (Not less than sixty ministers were trained there.)

28. Joseph Bellamy, Works, Vol. I, pp. 262, 263, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xxxix, as are all following quotations from the Works of Bellamy.

29. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 343, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xl.

30. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 406, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xl.

certain details in which Bellamy either presses the Old Calvinism so far as to recommend the New by contrast, or else deviates from the Old Calvinism and suggests the germinal principles of the New.

At first view Bellamy makes the impression that God Himself undertook to do all that was required of man, and that God obeyed the law under the penalty that lay upon man to undergo. He often says of Christ,

A God lays aside his glory, appears in the form of a servant, and becomes obedient; and so, in the creature's stead and behalf, pays that honor to the Governor of the world which was the creature's duty. 31

The argument suggested by language such as the above is the following: Christ, as a man, was under obligation to obey the law for Himself. He could not as a man do more than His duty. He did our whole duty for us. He performed our obedience that it need not be performed over again by ourselves. His performance of our duties was designed to be and may rightly be given over, transferred, and imputed to us. But He owed perfect obedience to the law for himself as a man. Therefore, He must, as God, have rendered this obedience which was not required of him.

...the force of Bellamy's argument is, that the obedience of the God-man cannot be efficacious, unless it be an obedience which the God-man is under no obligation to render. Now the man is under obligation to render perfect obedience to the law; therefore the atoning, and the free, unrequired obedience must be that of God. 32

The successors of Edwards and Bellamy endeavored to avoid both the substance and form of such an argument, zealously contending that the atonement did not consist in any supererogatory active obedience transferred from Christ to His elect.

Bellamy often, not always, shrinks from the logical results of the old Calvinistic theory of the atonement. If Christ has literally performed for us our whole duty; if He has, in the same literal sense, endured the whole punishment threatened against us and has thus satisfied all the demands of the law, it logically follows that God is bound, by

31. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 437-38, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xli.

32. Park, op. cit., p. xlii.

distributive justice, to save all for whom Christ died. Their salvation can be claimed as a right. They, as related to Christ, have borne their punishment already and have perfectly obeyed the law. They cannot be justly required either to suffer again or to keep the law again. However, Bellamy is careful to represent the Atonement, not as obligating God in justice to save us, but as "opening a door" for Him to save us, "removing a bar to our salvation", "taking all obstacles out of the way of our salvation." He repeats these and similar expressions so often, gives them such a prominence, that he may be considered as one of the foremost men in recommending to New England theologians their favorite method of defining the Atonement. He says,

Jesus Christ did, by his obedience and death, open such a door of mercy, as that the Supreme Governor of the world might, consistently with his honor, take what methods he pleased, in order to recover rebellious, guilty, stubborn sinners to himself. 33

Again:

In general, from what has been said, we may see that the mighty bar which lay in the way of mercy is removed by Jesus Christ; and now a door is opened, and a way provided, wherein the great governor of the world may, consistently with the honor of his holiness and justice, his law and government, and sacred authority, and to the glory of his grace, put in execution all his designs of mercy towards a sinful, guilty, undone world. 34

Dr. Bellamy gives special prominence to the Doctrine of General Atonement. The Doctrine of Limited Atonement was developed as follows: If Christ literally obeyed the law for those whom He died to save; if He literally endured the whole penalty of their sin, then it would be unjust to require of them a second obedience when one has been fully rendered and to threaten against them a second punishment when one has been completely borne. Then all men for whom He died will be saved. But all

33. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 299, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xliv.

34. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 292, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xlv.

men will not be saved. Then Christ died for the elect only. Thus the Doctrine of the Limited Atonement was a necessary result from the doctrine that Christ literally satisfied the demands of the law and of distributive justice. But Bellamy teaches that the Doctrine of Limited Atonement is false! "He thus undermines the whole theory of Christ's literal punishment, and supererogatory obedience." He not only affirms that "the great God, instead of executing the sentence of the law in all its severity upon a guilty world, does, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, grant to mankind in general these (i. e. all their) common favors," but he also affirms,

35

what Christ has done, is, in fact, sufficient to open a door for God, through him, to become reconcilable to the whole world. The sufferings of Christ, all things considered, have as much displayed God's hatred to sin, and as much secured the honor of his law, as if the whole world had been damned; as none will deny, who believe the infinite dignity of his divine nature. God may now, therefore, through Jesus Christ, stand ready to pardon the whole world....So that there is nothing in the way but that mankind may, through Christ, be received into full favor, and entitled to eternal life. God may stand ready to do it, consistently with his honor. What Christ has done is every way sufficient. 37

The old Calvinism teaches that, though Christ's Atonement is sufficient for all men, it was designed for the elect only. Though it is great enough for all men, it is intended for only a part of them. This dogma is denied by Bellamy again and again. "And God has expressly declared that it was the design of Christ's death to open this door of mercy to all." Again:

38

But God never designed to bring the non-elect to glory, when he gave his Son to die for the world. He designed to declare himself reconcilable to them through Christ; to offer mercy; to invite them, in common with others, to return; and to assure all that he that believeth shall be saved; and to use means with them more or less, according to his pleasure; but finally, they being obstinate, he designed to leave them to themselves, to take their own course, and in the end, to deal with them according to their own deserts. (Matt. 23: 37, 38 and 22: 1-7). 39

35. Park, op. cit., p. xlv.

39. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 307, Park, p. xlvi.

36. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 311-317, quoted in Park, p. xlv.

37. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 292, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xlvi.

38. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 292, quoted in Park, ibid., p. xlvi.

Bellamy gives special prominence to the Sovereignty of God in the application of the Atonement, and here he recommends one part, which in its logical results involves the whole of the Edwardean scheme. He often recognizes the distinction between God as a sovereign, and God as a righteous Governor. If all men literally sinned in Adam, then the evils to which they are subject from the first moment of their earthly existence are not the immediate result of Divine Sovereignty, but of Divine Justice. So, if all the punishment which the law threatens to the elect, has been endured for them; if all the obedience which the law requires for the elect has been performed for them; if Christ has done the whole duty of the elect, with the design of securing their salvation; then He so deserves to be rewarded with their salvation, that He may demand this reward from distributive justice. A refusal to give Him this reward, to regenerate and save the elect whom He has purchased, would be unjust. Accordingly, the elect are and must be saved not on the ground of present sovereignty, but on the ground of strict distributive justice, justice to Christ, if not to the elect as related to Christ. God was a sovereign in originally electing them and in providing an atonement for them. But after their punishment is suffered and their obedience fully performed, God is not a sovereign in remitting the debt so amply paid, nor in bestowing a reward so fairly earned. "In decreeing that an atonement be made for the elect, he was fulfilling His sovereign pleasure towards them, but in applying the atonement to the elect, he is fulfilling the demands of distributive justice to Christ, if not to the elect as related to Christ."⁴⁰

In addition, Bellamy teaches that God not only was, but is "at perfect liberty to have mercy on whom he will, according to his sovereign pleasure."⁴¹

40. Park, op. cit., p. xlix.

41. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 359, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xlix.

Thus Christ's merits are sufficient for all the world, and the door of mercy is opened wide enough for all the world; and God, the supreme Governor, has proclaimed himself reconcilable to all the world, if they will believe and repent. And if they will not believe and repent, he is at liberty to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to show compassion to whom he will show compassion; according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace. He sits sovereign, and a rebellious, guilty world are in his hands, and at his disposal; and the thing that seems good in his sight, that will he do; and it is infinitely fit, right, and best he should; that the pride of all flesh may be brought low, and the Lord alone be exalted forever. 42

3. Samuel Hopkins.

The third writer whom we shall name is perhaps the most important in favor of the Edwardean theory, among those who did not adopt its distinctive style. We refer to Samuel Hopkins. Like his teacher, Edwards, and his companion, Bellamy, he makes an impression favorable in many respects to the older form of Calvinism. But he exhibits many salient points from which the Edwardean theory has been drawn out and built up. We should expect that Hopkins would fall in with the course of progress upon this doctrine already marked out by Bellamy (1750). How far this expectation is realized we are now to see.

Hopkins begins by exalting the law of God. This is the eternal, unchangeable rule of righteousness; it cannot be abrogated. An essential part of it is its penalty against the disobedient. This is as

42. Bellamy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 301, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. xlix.

43. Samuel Hopkins, born in Waterbury, Conn., September 17, 1721; died in Newport, R. I., December 20, 1803; entered Yale in 1737, graduating in 1741; studied theology for a short time (eight months) with Edwards; settled in Great Barrington, Mass., 1745; dismissed in 1769; installed in Newport 1770. Beginning his writing in 1759, he published constantly during his Newport pastorate, closing with his System of Doctrines in 1793, and a volume of sermons (1803?). Walker has this to say of him, op. cit., p. 287: "Edwards's younger disciple and most intimate personal friend was Samuel Hopkins,—not an interesting preacher like Bellamy, nor so vivacious a writer, but a controversialist of even greater power, and a theological thinker who developed certain features of Edwards's teachings so fully that his own name was often given to the ultra-Edwardean school of which he was the founder. A man of great natural modesty, of self-denying Christian life, and one of the earliest of the New England opponents of human slavery, his personal character always commanded respect; but his theological opinions were assailed and defended with the utmost bitterness."

unchangeable as the law itself. Man by transgression has fallen under this penalty. By the nature of the law, it must be executed in the true meaning and spirit of it. If not, God Himself joins with the sinner in dishonoring the law, and favors, justifies, and encourages rebellion.

This otherwise insuperable difficulty, this mighty bar and obstacle in the way of shewing any favour to man, and escaping eternal destruction, is the ground of the necessity of a Mediator and Redeemer by whom it may be wholly removed, and man be delivered from the curse of the law; and saved consistent with the divine character, with truth, infinite rectitude, wisdom, and goodness; and so as not to set aside and dishonor, but support and maintain the divine law and government. 44

Thus, the fundamental idea of Hopkins' theology is the necessity on God's part of a mediator before He could forgive sin; or, he teaches distinctly the objective theory of the atonement.

Now what about the work of Atonement? At first sight, Park and Foster disagree in their conception of Hopkins' views. Park declares, and he reinforces his statement with a quotation from Hopkins, that the Atonement consists "merely in the sufferings and death of Christ."⁴⁵ On the other hand, Foster declares that "the work of the atonement (according to Hopkins) consists of two parts: first that accomplished by the suffering of Christ, and, second, that accomplished by his obedience."⁴⁶ Park and Foster really agree; for in another section of his discussion of Hopkins' doctrine, Park asserts that "although the atonement consists in the sufferings and death of our Lord, yet the righteousness of Christ, his entire work in our behalf, includes his perfect obedience to the precepts, as well as his endurance of the penalty of the law."⁴⁷ For the purposes of our discussion, we shall

44. Samuel Hopkins, Works, p. 322, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 178.

45. Park, op. cit., p. li.

46. Foster, op. cit., p. 178.

47. Park, op. cit., p. liv.

follow the line of thought suggested by Foster.

The work of the Atonement, then, consists of these two parts: that accomplished by the suffering of Christ, and that accomplished by His obedience.

At first sight it would appear that Hopkins accepted exactly the old theory whereby the sufferings of Christ were the literal penalty of the law suffered in the place of sinners. Christ was to make atonement for the sins of men "by suffering in his own person the penalty or curse of the law under which by transgression they had fallen."⁴⁸ "The sacrifices of the Old Testament are quoted to prove the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice."⁴⁹ Christ "by his sufferings took on him the penalty of sin, and bore the punishment of it so as effectually to put it away from all who believe in him that it may never be laid to their charge to condemn them."⁵⁰

But modifying expressions soon begin to appear. Hopkins, in commenting upon the favorite text of subsequent divines (Rom. 3: 25, 26),⁵¹ has this to say:

Here the design of the Redeemer is expressed, and the great thing he is to accomplish is to maintain and declare the righteousness, the rectitude, and unchangeable truth and perfection of God in opening a way by his blood, his sufferings unto death, for the free pardon

48. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 324, quoted in Foster, op. Cit., p. 178.

49. Foster, op. cit., p. 178.

50. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 326, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 178.

51. Rom. 3, 25-26: Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time His righteousness; that He might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.

of sinful man, consistent with his rectoral justice and truth, doing that which is right and just both with respect to himself, his law and government, and all the subjects of his kingdom. 52

Note the phrases: "rectoral justice," "right and just both with respect to himself, his law and government, and all the subjects of his kingdom." This points to a new understanding of the suffering of the penalty. A new kind of justice is introduced. "Hopkins was perfectly familiar with, and accepted Edwards's doctrine that mere 'natural justice,' though having in itself a kind of beauty, had no moral beauty or virtue, and therefore was not fit to be the governing motive of the divine action, and could, accordingly, never be executed by God." 53

Demands of love might make the execution of justice the only course left to the divine being. But a mere and exact satisfaction of natural justice as such could have a place in his government.

The word "equivalent" is often used to express the relation of the sufferings of Christ to those required by the law. 54 They were equivalent because of the greatness and worth of His person. Hopkins says further:

Thus we see how Christ suffered for sin, was made a curse, that is, suffered the curse of the law, the curse of God: and in his sufferings, he, in a sense, suffered and felt the displeasure and wrath of God; and the anger of God against sin and the sinner was in a high and eminent degree manifested and expressed in the sufferings and death of Christ, consistent with his not being displeased, but well pleased with Christ himself, and loving him because he laid down his life for his people. 55

We see here how completely Hopkins has adopted the new theory of the Atonement, how he has changed the view of God's position from that of the "offended party" to that of "Governor," has made the sufferings of Christ an example rather than the literal suffering of punishment, and brought the whole transaction under the rectoral, or public justice of God.

52. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 323, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 179.

53. Foster, op. cit., p. 179.

54. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 339, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 179.

55. Hopkins, *ibid.*, quoted in Foster. *ibid.*

At the heart of the matter, then, Hopkins is altogether ^Edwardian in his theory of the Atonement. However, in the second portion of his doctrine, that referring to the obedience of Christ, he seems to remain with the older Calvinism. The Westminster Confession taught that the obedience of Christ was the price with which positive blessings were purchased for believers, and that His righteousness was imputed to them.⁵⁶ Hopkins follows the Confession, but in his own way. The suffering of Christ atoned for the sins of men, and procured for them forgiveness; but it

only delivers from the curse of the law, and procures the remission of their sins who believe in him, but does not procure for them any positive good; it leaves them under the power of sin, and without any title to eternal life, or any positive favour, or actual fitness or capacity to enjoy positive happiness. This would be but a very partial redemption, had the Redeemer done no more than merely to make atonement for sin, by suffering the penalty of the law for sinners, and in their stead. It was therefore necessary that he should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead, that by this perfect and meritorious obedience, he might honour the law in the preceptive part of it, and obtain all the positive favour and benefits which man needed, be they ever so many and great. 57

The foundation of this idea is the doctrine of the federal headship. Adam was a federal head. His obedience, though he owed it for himself, would have gained certain benefits for his posterity, and they would have been positively blessed with good and granted eternal life. But he fell, and so the federal headship resulted in their being sinners and lying under the wrath of God. Just as his obedience might have procured them blessings, so the obedience of Christ procures them blessings. But as Christ is of far greater dignity than Adam, he procures blessing far greater than would have been bestowed in consequence of Adam's obedience.⁵⁸

By the obedience of Christ all the positive good, all these favours and blessings are merited and obtained, which sinners need, in order to enjoy complete and eternal redemption, or everlasting life in the kingdom of God. By this he has purchased and obtained the Holy

56. Westminster Confession, p. 55.

57. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 345, Vol. I, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 180.

58. For a more complete discussion of this, see Foster, op. cit., p. 181.

Spirit, by whom sinners are so far recovered from total depravity, and renewed, as to be prepared and disposed to believe on Christ and receive him, being offered to them; and he carries on a work of sanctification in their hearts, until they are perfectly holy. 59

We perceive that the conception of imputation involved here is different from that ordinarily held by the Calvinistic divines of Hopkins' time.

In conclusion, under this head, Hopkins teaches general atonement.

Hopkins favors the Doctrine of the General Atonement.

That he did not regard this doctrine as essentially wrong, might be inferred from the unqualified commendation which he bestowed upon Bellamy's True Religion Delineated, a treatise which is both explicit and emphatic in asserting that the atonement was designed for all men. 60

Then, Hopkins admits that

"all sinners under the gospel are 'really put into a capacity for obtaining salvation', and that whether they desire and accept of this salvation or not; it being freely offered to their choice and acceptance. In this sense it is made possible to all; and their constantly neglecting and refusing to desire and endeavor to become partakers of it does not alter the case with respect to this. 61

Here it is clearly implied that the salvation of the non-elect, "of those who persevered in refusing what they might have chosen," ⁶² was made possible to them. It was made possible by the Atonement; "if actually made so, it was designed to be made so; then the atonement was designed for the non-elect." ⁶³ This is the essence of the Doctrine of General Atonement.

The Redeemer has made an atonement sufficient to expiate for the sins of the whole world; and, in this sense, has tasted death for every man, has taken away the sin of the world, has given himself a ransom for all, and is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, so that whosoever believeth in him may be saved, and God can now be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus. Therefore, the gospel is ordered to be preached to the whole world, to all nations, to every human creature. And the offer of salvation

59. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 348, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 181.

60. Park, op. cit., p. lx.

61. Hopkins, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 212, quoted in Park, p. lx.

62. Park, op. cit., p. lx.

63. Ibid., p. lx.

64. Hopkins' Works, Vol. I, p. 365, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 181.

by Christ is to be made to every one, with this declaration, that whosoever believeth, is willing to accept of it, shall be delivered from the curse of the law, and have eternal life. 64

Before we leave this great triumvirate of the New England theologians, we append three conclusions, suggested by Park in his remarks on the work of these three men. 65 First, these three intimate friends were in substantial agreement with each other in regard to the Doctrine of the Atonement.

Park declares that "they obviously regarded themselves as coinciding on the substance of the doctrine." 66 Secondly, the three friends, Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins, are in essential agreement the doctrine, which has been adopted by the school of the younger Edwards. "The spirit and aim of this school coincide with the general spirit and aim of that great triumvirate, in regard to the essential parts of the doctrine of the atonement." 67

The school did not regard itself as doing anything more than carrying out to their consistent conclusions certain principles taught by their three illustrious predecessors. As Hopkins was the confidential friend of the elder Edwards, so was he of the younger. Furthermore, there is not one word in the correspondence of Hopkins after the publication of the discourses of the younger Edwards which implies any radical opposition to any of the principles avowed there. 68

From the intimacy of Dr. Hopkins with President Edwards and Dr. Bellamy on the one hand, and with Drs. Edwards, Smalley, Spring, West, and Emmons on the other, he becomes an invaluable witness to the essential coincidence between the school of the elder Edwards and the school of the younger one, in regard to the atonement. He laid his hands upon both schools and blessed them both. 69

Thirdly, while Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins are in substantial agreement with the school of the younger Edwards, they differed from that school in some particulars (as we shall see), as indeed they differed from each other at times. Each of the three made statements which the other two

64. See footnote on previous page.

65. Park, op. cit., p. lxii.

66. Ibid. 67. Ibid.

68. We accept the testimony of Park here, op. cit., p. lxiii.

69. Park, op. cit., p. lxiii.

did not exactly approve, although neither of them regarded the other as essentially at variance with himself. They were independent thinkers, and each of them aimed to be right and true, rather than to make all his new assertions coincide with all his old ones.

The fact that every noted advocate of the Old Calvinism differed occasionally from himself, was one cause which prompted the younger Edwards to reexamine the whole subject of the atonement. 70

II. Development of the New Theory of Atonement.

We have considered up to this point the contributions to the doctrine of the Atonement by Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins. They did not concentrate in their writings on the Doctrine of the Atonement. Other subjects gained their primary interest. However, they made many provocative suggestions to the theory of the Atonement which were a potent force in the development of the doctrine, which will be considered in this section of the thesis.

1. The Universalistic Controversy

In spite of all the disturbances involved in the Revolutionary War, theological thought in New England continued to move steadily on. The close of the war was to be signalized by the more open appearance of a movement which threatened the very existence of the new divinity, and delivered the mightiest blow against New England Congregationalism which it ever received—Unitarianism. But still earlier there was another movement of a similar nature which called out some of the most important treatises which fall under our view in the whole history of New England—Universalism. From this attack there resulted the general introduction among the New England divines of Bellamy's theory of the Atonement.

The introduction of Universalism into America was performed by the Rev. John Murray, who came to this country in 1770. He was a follower of James Rely of London, who, in a book entitled "Union; or a

Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and his Church," propounded the doctrine of salvation en masse in its extremest form. He says,

Christ's righteousness is upon all his seed; by his single act, before they had any capacity of obeying the similitude of his obedience, or of assenting to what he did or suffered. This manifests such a union to him, such an inclusion of the whole seed in him, as renders his condition theirs in every state which he passes through. Inasmuch that his righteousness, with all the blessings and fruits thereof, is theirs, before they have known it, believed it, or ever were conscious of existence. Thus by the obedience of one are many made righteous. 71

Murray always preached upon the basis of this theory. Hosea Ballou summarizes his teaching as follows:

A few are elected to obtain a knowledge of the truth in this life, and these go into Paradise immediately at death. But the rest who die in unbelief, depart into darkness, where they will remain under terrible apprehensions of God's wrath until they are enlightened. Their sufferings are neither penal nor disciplinary, but simply the effect of unbelief. Some will believe and be delivered from their darkness in the intermediate state. At the general judgment, such as have not previously been brought into the truth will "come forth to the resurrection of damnation;" and, through ignorance of God's purpose, they "will call on the rocks and mountains to fall on them," etc. Then the Judge will make the final separation, dividing the "sheep" or universal human nature, from the "goats" which are the fallen angels, and send the latter away "into everlasting fire." 72

Against such a movement, which was beginning to draw away their people from evangelical truth, and which was having an influence, more or less certain, among thinkers, the New England school must protest. They did this with one consent; and "they would not have been the children of the Puritans if they had not."
73

The labors of Rev. Murray could not at once produce results sufficient to call for general public notice. In 1779 he organized the first Universalist church in Gloucester, Mass. By the year 1785 Universalists were numerous in Massachusetts to justify the calling of a convention.

71. Union (4m. ed.), pp. 26, 27, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 190.

72. Universalist Quarterly, January, 1848, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 191. Foster says of Ballou, "Hosea Ballou 2d, than whom there could be no better authority."

73. Foster, op. cit., p. 192.

In 1782 the Rev. Charles Chauncey, D. D., minister of the First Church, Boston, issued his "Salvation of All Men Illustrated and Vindicated as a Scripture Doctrine." This was the "first marked evidence that Universalism was beginning to find a place among the Congregational clergy."⁷⁴

In this tract Chauncey published a number of excerpts from the writings of foreign Universalists. He "taught the ultimate rescue of mankind, through Christ; though he held that many might undergo a protracted period of suffering hereafter."⁷⁵ The next year Chauncey supported these beliefs in a second anonymous tract. These treatises were replied to by a number of ministers, both Edwardeans and Old Calvinists, "notably by Samuel Mather and Joseph of Boston, Peter Thacher of Malden, Timothy Allen of Granville, Mass.,...and the 'New Divinity' leaders Hopkins and Emmons, during 1782 and 1783."⁷⁶ But Chauncey persevered. In 1784 he set forth another anonymous, "but hardly unacknowledged", book, "The Mystery hid from Ages...or, the Salvation of all Men,"⁷⁷ a defense of his previous work. To this work Edwards (the Younger) gave a very able answer in 1790.

An instance that created much alarm, mainly because it appeared in an unexpected place concerned the Rev. Joseph Huntington, of Coventry, Conn., who died in 1794, supposedly in sympathy with his ministerial brethren. However, his posthumous "Calvinism Improved" in 1796 showed him a Universalist, the "improvement" being the extension of the divine elective decree to include all mankind.

The title of Huntington's work shows the general doctrinal attitude of the early Universalists. While some believers in ultimate restoration, like Chauncey, were not Calvinistic, many of this way of thinking were

74. Foster, op. cit., p. 198.

75. Walker, A History of the Congregational Churches in the United States, p. 295.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

staunchly Calvinistic. These latter drew from the "satisfaction" theory of the Atonement the strongest argument either for the immediate blessedness of all men at death or their final redemption. The younger Edwards thus stated their position in his "Brief Observations on the doctrine of Universal Salvation" of 1784:

The doctrine is, that all mankind, without exception but none of the devils, will be saved; that this universal salvation will take place immediately after the general judgment, so that after that time there be no punishment of any individual of the human race; that this deliverance from future punishment is obtained in the way of the most strict justice; that Christ having paid the whole debt, for all mankind, it is not consistent with justice that any man should be punished for sin in his own person. 78

This position was naturally more difficult for the Edwardeans than for the Old Calvinists to answer, as long as the "satisfaction" theory, so long characteristic of Calvinism, was maintained. The Old Calvinist could reply that all for whom Christ died would be saved; but that His Atonement was limited, being only for the elect. But while the Edwardeans maintained the doctrines of election and future punishment as vigorously as did the Old Calvinists, they had also asserted, since Bellamy published his "True Religion" in 1750, that the Atonement was general, Christ having died for all men. It was to meet the difficulties of this situation that the Younger Edwards introduced a theory of the Atonement novel to New England.

2. Jonathan Edwards the Younger

The new Edwardean theory did not indeed spring alone out of the exigencies which brought it forth, though these were its immediate cause. Its principles lie back in the teachings of the elder Edwards and his contemporaries, though the full meaning of those principles was not perceived by them. In their exaltation of the sovereignty of God

78. Walker, op. cit., p. 296, has this quotation.

they had taught that not only the provision of redemption in general, but the rescue of each soul in particular, was a work of divine sovereignty. This position was a departure, as Walker correctly observes, from the old Calvinism.

This position was a departure from the spirit of the Old Calvinism, which represented God as sovereign in election and in providing Atonement, but held that after Christ had rendered satisfaction for each of the elect the salvation of the individual whose debt was thus paid was an act of justice, not of sovereignty. 79

The Edwardeans, in taking this departure, must inevitably have reached eventually the position that the sinner's debt was not literally discharged by the sufferings of Christ, and hence that the Atonement was not a "satisfaction."

The full statement of the later Edwardean position was given in
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 81
 three sermons preached by the younger Edwards at New Haven in October, 1785, and printed in the same year, under the title of "The Necessity of Atonement."

79. Walker, op. cit., p. 297.

80. Three Sermons on the Necessity of Atonement, and the Consistency between that and Free Grace in Forgiveness, by Jonathan Edwards, D. D. (Contained in Park's Discourses and Treatises, pp. 1-42)

81. Jonathan Edwards the Younger, born at Northampton in 1745; 13 years old at death of his father, by whom he had been designed as missionary to the Indians; graduated at Princeton, 1765. Walker, op. cit., p. 293: "...the reception of his degree was followed by a period of theology training under Bellamy." In 1769 pastor of the North Church in New Haven;—"a conspicuous post, from which he was dismissed in 1795, really, though not ostensibly, by reason of doctrinal opposition."—Walker, op. cit., p. 293. Then Pastor in a little town of Conn., Colebrook (1796-1799). In 1799 elected president of Union College in Schenectady, New York. Died in his new office, on August 1, 1801. Foster, op. cit., p. 189: Had been with Hopkins "at Great Barrington for about nine months" before he came to Bellamy "with a letter of introduction from Hopkins." Walker, op. cit., p. 294: "Jonathan Edwards the Younger was, like most of the Edwardean leaders, a successful trainer of ministerial candidates, numbering among his pupils men like Presidents Dwight of Yale and Griffin of Williams,...He edited his father's works; he expounded his father's system with originality and force; like Hopkins, he attacked negro slavery; he was a power in the churches always. But he gained his chief repute as a developer of the Edwardean system through discussion in regard to the atonement, which had its rise in consequence of the teachings of the introducers of Universalism into New England."

The first sermon is from the text: "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace." (Eph. 1: 11). Forgiveness is here said to be in the exercise of grace, and at the same time in consequence of a redemption by the blood of Christ. How are these two parts of the proposition consistent? This, according to Edwards, "has been to me one of the Gordian knots"⁸² of theology. He seeks to loosen this knot by three successive inquiries:-

1. "Are we forgiven through the redemption or atonement of Jesus Christ only?"⁸³ He answers this question in the affirmative. The Scriptures clearly teach it. Then "the necessity of the death and atonement of Christ sufficiently appears by the bare event of his death....we cannot suppose....that the infinitely wise and good Father would have consented to the death of his only begotten and dearly beloved Son....if there had not been the most urgent necessity."⁸⁴ "With this a posteriori argument,"⁸⁵ which is Calvin's, he supports an argument entirely scriptural."

2. "Our next inquiry is, what is the reason or ground of this mode of forgiveness? or why is an atonement necessary in order to the pardon of the sinner?"⁸⁶ Edwards answers that "it is necessary on the same ground, and for the same reason, as punishment would have been necessary, if there had been no atonement made. The ground of both is the same."⁸⁷ He then asks this question: "Why would it have been necessary, if no atonement had been made, that punishment should be inflicted upon the transgressors of the divine law?"⁸⁸ He answers that this "would have been necessary to maintain the authority of the divine law. If that be

82. Edwards, The Necessity of Atonement, p. 3.

83. Ibid., p. 4.

84. Ibid., p. 5

85. Foster, op. cit., p. 201.

86. Edwards, op. cit., p. 6.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

not maintained, but the law fall into contempt, the contempt will fall equally on the legislator himself; his authority will be despised and his government weakened." ⁸⁹ Edwards continues; he argues as follows:

Moral creatures must have a moral government. Within the sphere of that moral government there must be moral law, with a penalty to be inflicted upon transgressors.

When moral creatures are brought into existence, there must be a moral government....This is the dictate of reason from the nature of things. Besides the nature of things, we have in the present instance fact, to assist our reasoning....But in order to moral law, there must be a penalty; otherwise it would become mere advice, but no law. In order to support the authority and vigor of this law, the penalty must be inflicted upon the transgressors....It is no impeachment of the divine power and wisdom to say that it is impossible for God himself to uphold his moral government over intelligent creatures when once his law has fallen into contempt. He may, indeed, govern them by irresistible force, as he governs the material world; but he cannot govern them by law, by rewards, and punishments.... 90

Edwards now argues for an atonement as follows: If no atonement had been made, the penalty of the law would have been inflicted. Sinners can be pardoned only in consequence of an adequate atonement. The atonement is to be the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; it supports the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution.

For these reasons it appears that it would have been necessary, provided that no atonement had been made, that the penalty of the law should have been inflicted, even in every instance of disobedience: and for the same reasons doubtless was it necessary, that if any sinners were to be pardoned, they should be pardoned only in consequence of an adequate atonement. The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported: that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God. 91

This is the substantial part of the first sermon. The concluding portion is taken up with the consideration of a number of objections,

89. Edwards, op. cit., p. 6.

90. Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 8.

91. Ibid.

such as this: if God had seen fit to order it so, we might have made atonement for our own sins, etc.

The second sermon begins with the third question:

3. "Are we, notwithstanding the redemption of Christ, forgiven freely by grace?"⁹² He considers several ways, in which the word "grace" was brought in, such as those of Rely and of the older Calvinists. He then continues with the exposition of his own theory. He begins by defining the terms: justice and grace.

The word justice is used in three distinct senses:

a. Commutative justice.

Sometimes it means commutative justice (which) respects property and matters of commerce only and secures to every man his own property. 93

b. Distributive justice.

Sometimes it means distributive justice, (which) consists in properly rewarding virtue or good conduct, and punishing crimes or vicious conduct. To treat a man justly in this sense is to treat him according to his personal character or conduct. 94

c. General or public justice.

Sometimes it means general or public justice, (which) comprehends all moral goodness; and though the word is often used in this sense, it is really an improper use of it. In this sense, whatever is right is said to be just, or an act of justice; and whatever is wrong or improper to be done, is said to be unjust, or an act of injustice. To practice justice in this sense, is to practice agreeably to the dictates of general benevolence, or to seek the glory of God and the good of the universe. 95

The term grace is next explained.

Grace is ever so opposed to justice that they mutually limit each other. Wherever grace begins, justice ends; and wherever justice begins, grace ends. 96

Grace and commutative justice:

Grace, as opposed to commutative justice is gratuitously to relinquish

92. Edwards, op. cit., p. 15.

93. Ibid., pp. 20, 21.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

your property, or to forgive a man his debt. And commutative injustice is to demand more of a man than your own property. 97

Grace and distributive justice, general justice:

Grace as opposed to justice in the distributive sense, is to treat a man more favorably or mildly than is correspondent to his personal character....With regard to the third kind of justice,...as it comprehends all moral goodness, it is not at all opposed to grace; but comprehends that, as well as every other virtue, as truth, faithfulness, meekness, etc....And even grace itself, which is favor to the ill-deserving, so far as it is wise and proper to be exercised, makes but a part of this kind of justice. 98

Edwards now applies these explanations to the solution of the difficulty; he states the question as this: "Is the pardon of the sinner, through the atonement of Christ, an act of justice or of grace?" He answers this question in a triple way, according to his three definitions of justice. 99

Commutative justice:

That with respect to commutative justice, it is neither an act of justice nor of grace, because commutative is not concerned in the affair. We neither owed money to the deity, nor did Christ pay any in our behalf. His atonement is not a payment of our debt. If it had been, if it had been, our discharge would have been an act of mere justice, and not of grace. 100

Distributive justice:

With respect to distributive justice, the discharge of the sinner is wholly an act of grace. This kind of justice has respect solely to personal character and conduct of its object....With regard to the case now before us, what if Christ has made an atonement for sin? This atonement constitutes no part of the personal character of the sinner; but his personal character is essentially the same as it would have been if Christ had made no atonement. And as the sinner in pardon is treated not only more favorably, but infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character, his pardon is wholly an act of infinite grace....101

General or public justice:

In the third sense of justice before explained, according to which anything is just what is right and best to be done, the pardon of the sinner is entirely an act of justice. 102

97. Edwards, op. cit., p. 21.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 22

100. Ibid., p. 22

101. Ibid., p. 23

102. Ibid., p. 23.

Edwards, then, has answered his question in the following ways:

According to commutative justice, the pardon of the sinner is neither an act of justice or of grace. According to distributive justice, the pardon of the sinner is an act of grace. According to General or public justice, the pardon of the sinner is an act of justice.

There are a number of other discussions in this sermon, some of which are marked by great dialectical keenness. What has been presented above, however, is the key to the entire discussion.

The third sermon is occupied chiefly with "inferences and reflections." We shall note only four of these here, and these very briefly. "...the atonement of Christ does not consist essentially in his active or positive obedience", for this "would never support the authority of the law and the dignity of the divine government."¹⁰³ Again, in requiring an atonement,

God acts, not from any contracted, selfish motives, but from the most noble benevolence and regard to the public good. It has often and long since been made a matter of objection to....the atonement of Christ that it represents the deity as having regard merely to his own honor and dignity, and not to the good of his creatures, and therefore represents him as deficient in goodness. 104

"This is, of course, not an adequate treatment of the point whether God acts as the offended party or as Ruler, but it will be noted that it covers the point."¹⁰⁵ Still again, the atonement of Christ is not a satisfaction to distributive justice, but only to general justice, or the well-being of the universe. And finally, God was under no obligation in distributive justice to accept the atonement of Christ, though "the glory of God and the greatest good of the moral system"¹⁰⁶ did require him to accept it, and in this sense obligates Him.

103. Edwards, op. cit., p. 31.

104. Ibid., p. 36.

105. Foster, op. cit., p. 204.

106. Edwards, op. cit., p. 41.

Edwards' treatment of the subject is hampered by the circumstances which called it forth. It does not afford a complete view of the Atonement, nor does it present it from its proper starting-point. Foster¹⁰⁷ takes this view. Only by inference is the great difference between it and the old Calvinistic theory introduced: the change of the view of God from that of the "offended party" to "ruler". In addition, the theory of virtue is not applied as it should be, though God is said to act with a view to the highest good of all. This theory has often been called the "governmental" or "New England" theory, and resembles in many respects the view advanced by the great Dutch Arminian in the seventeenth century,¹⁰⁸ Hugo Grotius.

- It differs from his theory chiefly in the clearer emphasis which it lays on the atonement as revealing the heinousness of sin, and in its presentation of benevolence as the central thought in the atonement itself. 109

This theory was developed by Smalley, West, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and finally Professor Park. "...it speedily became the dominant view in¹¹⁰ American Congregationalism." From this time on the rectoral theory of the Atonement took the place of the satisfaction theory, and as time went on received better statements from successive theologians. The progress of this thesis will lead us to discuss these other presentations. We shall now, however, consider the other original statements of it, noticing next Smalley's.

107. Foster, op. cit., p. 204.

108. Grotius, or De Groot, Hugo, Dutch scholar and statesman; born Delft, April 10, 1583; died Rostock, August 28, 1645; noted for De Jure et Belli, laying the foundation of the then new science of international law. Grotius has "influenced the New England theology, his government theory of the Atonement being that which dominated the American pulpits for a century or more; the modified Calvinism of Andover, championed by Jonathan Edwards, Bellamy, Edmunds, and Park, being opposed to the purer Calvinism of Princeton and New Brunswick." (Americana, Vol. 13, pp. 490-91.)

109. Walker, op. cit., p. 299.

110. Ibid, p. 299.

5. John Smalley and Stephen West

It is an interesting fact that Edwards, Smalley, and West published their views within the same twelve month period, 1785-86. ¹¹¹ That was the period, as we have seen, when the eruption of Universalism into New England had assumed a peculiarly alarming aspect.

¹¹² Smalley's reply to Rellyanism is introduced by the following statement of its argument:

God is obliged in justice to save men as far as the merit of Christ extends: but the merit of Christ is sufficient for the salvation of all men; therefore God is obliged in justice to save all. ¹¹³

Smalley had been a pupil of Bellamy, who taught that Christ died for all men. Hence he naturally said,

The minor proposition I dare not deny. I question not the sufficiency of the merit of Christ for the salvation of all mankind....The only thing therefore which I have to dispute in this argument is the obligatoriness of the Redeemer's merit on the Supreme Being: or, that it is of such a nature as to afford any ground to demand salvation from God as a just debt. ¹¹⁴

Smalley here questions the major premise, which is to question the whole idea that the death of Christ is a satisfaction to justice, as Calvinism had held. By this view he follows Bellamy farther. With him he makes God a governor, and not the offended party, in the matter of sin and forgiveness, which is evident from the whole discussion. He has apparently read Grotius, for he cites an illustration which Grotius gives, the act

¹¹¹. Park refers to this interesting fact in op. cit., p. lxviii.

¹¹². John Smalley, born at Columbia, Conn. (then Lebanon), June 4, 1734; studied theology under Bellamy, 1736-37; ordained at New Britain, 1758. Remained at New Britain until his death, June 1, 1820. Walker, op. cit., p. 293: "A pupil of Bellamy, he was in turn the teacher of Emmons. His doctrinal contributions to the "New Divinity" was a development along lines marked out by Edwards,"...

¹¹³. John Smalley, Two Sermons—Justification through Christ, an act of Free Grace. (pp. 43-64). None but the Believers Saved through the All-sufficient Satisfaction of Christ. (pp. 65-85). Contained in Pard, Discourses and Treatises, pp. 43-85. Here the reference is to p. 58.

¹¹⁴. Ibid.

of self-mutilation by Zeleucus, by which he spared one eye to his son,
 115
 who had broken the law, the penalty of which was to lose two eyes.

"Smalley's contention is, therefore, that justification is an act of
 free grace, to which God is in no sense obligated in justice, and which
 116
 he freely performs unto believers alone." His two sermons are in full
 accord with what Edwards and West were bringing out about the same time
 on the atonement. However, he is too much restricted by the practical
 aim of his efforts, the refutation of Murray, to present the new theory in
 the most comprehensive way or to give it the best analytical statement.
 This special service has, by general consent, been ascribed to Edwards
 the Younger, whose work has been already discussed in this thesis.

Another original work on the Doctrine of the Atonement in this
 117
 period was that of Stephen West. West presents his views in an essay
 of more than two hundred pages (Entitled The Scripture Doctrine of the
 Atonement, Proposed to Careful Examination (1785).) This work is written
 in a much fuller and more satisfactory form than the work of Edwards the
 Younger, but it is in complete accord with him as to the positions taken.
 West published his essay in 1785. Its preface is dated April 14, 1785.
 It was finished therefore about six months before the delivery of Edwards'
 celebrated sermons on the Atonement.

115. Smalley, op. cit., p. 50.

116. Foster, op. cit., p. 200.

117. Stephen West, born at Tolland, Conn., November 13, 1735; died
 at Stockbridge, Mass. (where he was minister from 1758 to 1818), May 15,
 1819. Educated at Yale, graduating in 1755. Studied theology with Rev.
 Timothy Woodbridge at Hatfield, Mass., probably in 1757. West was the
 immediate successor of Edwards (the elder) in the Stockbridge pastorate.
 Walker, op. cit., p. 295 states that he "was brought from his original
 Arminianism to a high type of Edwardeanism by the influence of his neigh-
 bor at Great Barrington during the early part of his ministry,—Samuel
 Hopkins." He published essays upon Moral Agency (1772)—"a hyper-Ed-
 wardean defense of Edwards's 'Freedom of Will' against the criticism of
 Rev. Dr. James Dana, of New Haven." (Walker, op. cit., p. 295.) Also
Evidence of the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ (1816), besides the
 essay now under consideration.

The leading principle of his essay is that of the elder Edwards, that God loves to reveal His own character, a principle lying at the basis of the Atonement. Some of the more important particulars in the essay will be considered now.

The aim of the Creator in all His works is to manifest His attributes.

"A display or manifestation of his own true and infinitely holy character¹¹⁸ was the chief and ultimate end which God had in view in creation."

Therefore, the design of the penalties of the law is to exhibit the attributes of God.

The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in the suffering of the sinner, in no other way than as they serve to exhibit the righteous character of God, and prove him to be a hater of iniquity.¹¹⁹

Accordingly, the design of the Atonement is to manifest the attributes of God.

Of course, therefore, the true reason why God required an atonement for sin was, that the real disposition of his own infinite mind, toward such an object, might appear; even though he pardoned and saved the sinner.¹²⁰

The design of the Atonement is to manifest the same attributes which would otherwise have been manifested in the punishment of sin.

The same character, the same disposition, of the Deity, which would have appeared in the death of the sinner, was designed to be exhibited in the death of Christ.¹²¹

The Atonement, then, honors the law as much as the infliction of the legal penalties would have honored it. The Atonement expresses exactly the same divine attributes as are expressed in the penalties of the law, and therefore honors the law by accomplishing its great end. The design of the law is accomplished, its main spirit is fulfilled in the Atonement, which is a substitute for legal penalty. The Atonement is "a sensible exhibition of

118. West, The Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 7, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxv.

119. West, pp. cit., p. 23, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxv.

120. West, op. cit., p. 15, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxviii.

121. Ibid., p. 33, quoted in Park, *ibid.*, p. lxxix.

that divine wrath which is threatened in the law."¹²² Therefore the Atonement may be defined as follows: "that which magnifies the broken law of God, and does it the same honor, which would have been done by the execution of its penalty whenever it be incurred."¹²³

Thus it appears that the Atonement does not consist in the active obedience, viewed as the holiness of Christ, but in His sufferings and death.

The great end of the coming and death of Christ was not to give evidence of the equity and righteousness of the moral law; but rather to exhibit in its proper colors, the disposition of the divine mind toward us for breaking it.¹²⁴

The coincidence of West with the majority of the Edwardians on this theme is too obvious for comment. Now, as the Atonement does not consist in the active obedience, viewed as the holiness of Christ, so it does not consist in His literally suffering the penalty of the law. West declares, "The principal weight of Christ's sufferings arose from the deep impressions which were made upon his mind, of the awful anger, the sore displeasure of God against sinners."¹²⁵ West often takes the view that if God expressed any anger whatever, it must have been against sinners. "If, in the sufferings and death of Christ, God expressed any degree of anger whatever, it must have been against sinners; because no degree of it existed against

Christ."¹²⁶ The assertion then that our Lord suffered punishment, the curse of the law, is to be understood in the general, not in the restricted sense of the words punishment and curse. West asserts,

Natural evils which express the anger of God are the curse of the law. Natural evils Christ suffered and those to a high degree.

122. West, op. cit., p. 37, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxix.

123. Ibid., p. 158, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxx.

124. Ibid., p. 35, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxi.

125. Ibid., p. 132-34, quoted in Park, op. cit., lxxiv.

126. Ibid., p. 102, quoted in Park, op. cit., lxxiv.

These are all a curse, and the curse of God; and evidently represented as the curse of the law. And when we consider the dignity of the person, and the excellency of the character of Christ; if the natural evils he suffered from the hand of God, were sufficient to express to the view of creatures, as high a degree of divine displeasure, as the natural evils which God brings on the sinner himself, when he executes the curse upon him; it can be no reflection upon Christ, nor imply the least defect in his character, to consider him as having endured the curse of the law, and in this sense having been made a curse for his people, that they might be the righteousness of God in Him. 127

The Atonement is not made, then, by executing the literal penalty of the law, but in some other way, equally advantageous to the honor of the law, and satisfactory to its main spirit and aim.

In this double use, the general and the exact, of the words punishment, curse, &c., Dr. West is often followed by those Edwardians who believe that our Lord did not satisfy distributive justice, nor the literal demands of the law. 128

Of course, then, the Atonement does not impose any obligation on the distributive justice of God, to save any one who has sinned.

Could it be, that by his arduous and glorious work, the Great God and Savior brought himself into debt to his rebel subjects? On what possible grounds can we found any claims? Because Jesus has so loved us, as to wash away our sins in his own blood, shall we, therefore, claim pardon and salvation as our due? Instead of that, how manifest is it, that nothing could ever, so clearly and fully demonstrate, that the salvation of sinners must be only by grace, as the atonement made by Christ—or, manifest such unspeakable riches and glory in that grace by which sinners of mankind are saved! 129

Furthermore, as Christ was not literally punished in enduring the exact penalty of the law, and as therefore our sins are not literally imputed to Him, so His righteousness is not literally imputed to us. Christ endured evils as a result of God's anger against us, and we receive benefits as a result of Christ's obedient suffering for us.

127. West, op. cit., pp. 93-94, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxiv.

128. Park, op. cit., p. lxxv.

129. West, op. cit., p. 177, Park, op. cit., p. lxxvi.

The happy and blessed fruits of Christ's glorious righteousness are conferred upon sinners of mankind, and enjoyed by them.... This is the true and only proper import of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to believers. This is to have his righteousness imputed to them; for them to enjoy the benefits, the happy fruits of it. 130

It is obvious, from the preceding quotations, that West caught the spirit, as well as the words of the Edwardean theory. That theory, we say it again, is distinguished in ascribing not only the origin but also the application of the Atonement to mere Sovereignty. Now partly to exalt the sovereignty of God, West represents the Atonement, not as making it necessary, but as making it consistent for God to save men. It is not compulsory on God as a just judge, but proper or desirable for Him as a free Sovereign to save men. That is, not to save a part of the race, provided they are elected, but to save any or all of the race, provided that His sovereign benevolence can promote the welfare of the universe by their salvation. West says,

But merely from the exhibition which was made of divine wrath in the sufferings of Christ, the pardon, even of one sinner could, with no certainty be inferred: —Unless it might be inferred from the highest evidences of the reality of God's displeasure against us, that therefore he would, certainly not punish, but pardon us. Upon such atonement being made, the situation and circumstances are such, that the great Governor of the world may consistently bestow, or withhold mercy, just as shall tend most effectually to answer the general purposes of divine goodness. Whereas, had there been no atonement, there would have been the highest inconsistency in the bestowment of pardon, even of one sinner. 131

West illustrates the structure of the Edwardean theory, by ascribing the application of the Atonement not only to the Sovereign right, but also to the Sovereign grace of God. "A main design of his essay is to show, that the sufferings and death of Christ give a sensible, visible, manifestation, a vivid picture of God's retributive sentiment against us, therefore of our demerit, of our present ill-desert, and thus give eloquent testimony

130. West, op. cit., p. 108, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxvi.

131. Ibid., p. 140, 141; quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxvii

that we are saved while we deserved to be lost, are saved by grace which
 152
 consists in favoring those who may still be justly punished." West
 declares that "The clearer views we have of the displeasure of God on
 one hand, the more lively apprehension shall we have of divine grace on
 153
 the other." But the Atonement of Christ is the vivid sign of God's
 displeasure against us; it gives the most sensible demonstration of His
 anger against our sinful character. Therefore it sets off and holds in
 bold relief the disposition of God to bestow "good upon those whose char-
 acter he righteously abhors;" "yea, the atonement is the only glass in
 which the true beauty and glory of the free, sovereign grace of God can
 154
 be seen."

Foster explains the contribution of West to the theory of the Atonement in the following way:

Here we see the government founded upon the character of God, and this presented as goodness, love, which consists in regard for the general good. And what is more important, the maintenance of the government of God is a maintenance of this as a mere government, but it is a maintenance of the character through the government, and thus for the 'public good.' In other words, the love of God to His creatures, though not this alone, leads him for their sake not to forgive without the atonement. 155

Walker sums up the work of West in his essay as follows:

In this volume West maintained that the atonement was designed to manifest the divine attributes, to show the disposition of God's mind toward men for the breach of his law, and that it involved 'no obligation on the justice of God to pardon and save the sinner. 156

Park has this interesting criticism of the work of West:

It is, in some respects, the most beautifully scientific of all the early Edwardean treatises on this theme. If it had developed more fully the idea, that the death of Christ was designed to maintain the authority of God's law, and exhibit the firmness of God's purpose to punish all men who are not in their Redeemer, it would merit the honor of being the first and the best treatise which introduced the Edwardean theory. 157

152. Park, op. cit., p. lxxvii.

153. West, op. cit., pp. 119-121, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxvii.

154. Ibid., pp. 165-179, quoted in Park, op. cit., p. lxxvii.

155. Foster, op. cit., p. 205.

156. Walker, op. cit., p. 297. 157. Park, op. cit., p. lxxv.

4. Further Contributions to the theory: Emmons, Burge,
Taylor, Finney.

We have considered, in our last section, the two other original statements of the Doctrine of the Atonement, i. e., Smalley's and West's. We continue now with the further development of the doctrine among the New England divines, and present further contributions to and clarifications of the theory as proposed by Edwards, Smalley, and West.

West presented more fully than his predecessors the origin of the atonement in the love of God. But he left something to be desired in respect to the orderly development of this central thought. His successors remedied this defect with increasing plainness of statement.

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Dr. Nathaniel (Nathanael) Emmons expresses the connection between the love of God and the Atonement by a more orderly deduction. He says, that God is fundamentally love. Before created things came into being, God exercised this love toward Himself. Now He directs it toward His creatures.

All the moral perfections of the Deity are comprised in the pure love of benevolence. God is love. Before the foundation of the world there was no ground for considering love as divided into various and distinct attributes. But after a creation new relations arose; and in consequence of new relations, more obligations were formed, both on the side of the Creator, and on that of his creatures. Before created things existed, God's love was exercised wholly towards himself. But after moral beings were brought into existence, it was right in the nature of things that he should exercise right affections

138. Nathaniel Emmons, a native of East Haddam, Conn., born in 1745, a graduate of Yale in the class of 1767. His ministerial studies were in part under Smalley. A warm friend of Hopkins. "...from Hopkins, more than from Smalley, the pattern of his theology was derived." (Walker, op. cit., p. 300) His only pastorate, from 1773 to 1827, at Franklin, Mass., where he died at great age in 1840. "A man of enormous industry, of much wit, and of exceeding keenness of mind, Emmons's best work was as a trainer of candidates for the ministry, of whom it is thought not less than a hundred passed under his molding touch....No man of his age was more widely a force in the religious life of New England." (Walker, op. cit., p. 300)

towards them according to their moral characters. Hence the goodness, the justice, and the mercy of God are founded in the nature of things. That is, as long as God remains the Creator, and men remain his creatures, he is morally obliged to exercise these different and distinct feelings towards them....139

A difficulty appears in sparing and forgiving the wicked.

Now, there never was any difficulty in the way of God's doing good to the innocent, nor in the way of his punishing the guilty; but there was a difficulty in sparing and forgiving the wicked....This was a difficulty in the divine character, and a still greater difficulty in the divine government; for God had revealed his justice in his moral government....140

Emmons now asks the question: How could grace be displayed consistently with justice? He answers,

This question God alone was able to solve....By inflicting such sufferings upon Christ, when he took the place of a substitute in the room of sinners, God as clearly displayed his hatred of sin, and his inflexible disposition to punish it, as if he had made all mankind personally miserable forever. 141

Thus again, the government of God is founded upon His character, and ruled in accordance with it. There is still something of the 'juridicial and external' in the form of presentation, and it needs to be corrected, perhaps, by emphasizing the fact that the government here to be maintained is not a government of brute force, but a moral one, "a government of moral agents by means of influence." 142 Emmons says,

It belongs to God not only to exercise a natural government over the natural world, but to exercise a moral government over the moral world. The proper mode of governing subjects is by laws, rewards, and punishments. 143

Foster has a pertinent remark at this point:

An objection sometimes made to the statement that the interests of God's government required the atonement is, that God is able to take care of his government, and nothing that a sinner can do on account of the free forgiveness of men can ever weaken it. It will be seen

139. Nathanael Emmons, Two Sermons on the Atonement, pp. 116-117. (Contained in Park, Discourses and Treatises, pp. 111-116).

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Foster, op. cit., p. 211.

143. Nathanael Emmons, The Works of Nathanael Emmons, Vol. VI, p. 182, (ed. 1842).

upon reflection that this objection views the government of God as a government of force, and not a moral government. It is important, therefore, with reference to the the objection, to note, ..., the true conception of the government of God which underlies the governmental view. It will be evident at last that it is the force-theory which is 'external', and not the view resting upon the thought of a moral government. 144

We find a more satisfactory treatment of this point in the work of
145

Dr. Edward D. Griffin on the Atonement. His treatise on the extent of
146

the Atonement emphasized topic, and so had occasion to dwell more at length upon the nature of moral government. "Whatever difference there is (between
147

Emmons and Griffin), is more of form, however, than of substance."

Griffin proceeds to define moral government, in its relation to dominion over the mind, in a limited sense, in a general and more perfect sense:

Considered in relation to its dominion over the mind, a moral government may be called a government of motives; for these are the instruments by which it works. It is of course acting, not upon the disposition

144. Foster, op. cit., p. 211.

145. Griffin, Edward Dorr: American Presbyterian, president of Williams College; born at East Haddon, Conn., Jan. 6, 1770; died at Newark, N. J., Nov. 8, 1837. He was graduated at Yale in 1790, studied theology under Jonathan Edwards, and began to preach at New Salem, Conn., in Jan., 1793. In 1795 he became pastor of the Congregational Church at New Hartford, in 1801 associate pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Newark, and pastor in 1807. He was professor of Rhetoric at Andover Theological Seminary from 1809 to 1811. In 1811 he became pastor of the Park Street Church, Boston, but returned to his former pastorate in Newark in 1815. In 1821 he was elected president of Williams College. On resigning this office in 1836 he returned to Newark. His principal works are, Lectures Delivered in the Park Street Church (Boston, 1813); The Extent of the Atonement (New York, 1819); and The Doctrine of Divine Efficacy Defended, 1833. "He achieved success and distinction as preacher, educator, and author." p. 78, The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia, Vol. V. 1909.

146. Edward D. Griffin, D. D., An Humble Attempt to Reconcile the Differences of Christians respecting the Extent of the Atonement. (Contained in Park, Discourses and Treatises, pp. 137-427). "In 1819, after Dr. Emmons had published some of his discourses, Dr. Griffin gave to the public his 'Humble Attempt to reconcile the differences of Christians' on this theme. He designed...partly to disprove certain principles which he regarded Dr. Emmons as maintaining, and partly to reconcile two opposing evangelical schools, by showing that their differences arose from their more general or more restricted, their more vague or more precise, terminology." Park, An Introductory Essay, p. lxxix.

147. Foster, op. cit., p. 212.

by insensible influence, but upon the reason and conscience of a rational being by manifest motives....In a limited sense a moral government is the mere administration of law; but in a more general and perfect sense, it includes the whole treatment which God renders to moral agents....148

What does a moral government comprehend? Griffin continues,

A moral government wields all the motives in the universe. It comprehends the entire system of instruction intended for creatures. The Bible lies wholly within its bounds. It comprehends the public dispensation both of law and gospel, with the whole compages of precepts, invitations, promises, and threatenings. It comprehends the atonement, and all the covenants made with men, and all the institutions of religion, with the whole train of means and privileges.... It comprehends a throne of grace, with all the answers to prayer. It comprehends a day of probation, with all the experiments made upon human character....It comprehends the day of judgment....It comprehends all the sensible communion between the Infinite and finite minds; all the perceptible intercourse between God and his rational offspring; all the treatment of intelligent creatures viewed otherwise than as passive receivers of sovereign impressions. 149

Caleb Burge (1782-1838) whose Essay on the Scripture Doctrine of
150

Atonement is regarded as one of the "very best of the New England treatises upon the subject",
151

reproduces these ideas in various forms. He employs certain forms of expression, not common elsewhere, which present with special felicity the substitute which New England theology has to offer for the doctrine that the Atonement satisfied the distributive justice of God. Its emphasis upon the individuality of man forced it to the position that, since justice demanded the punishment of the sinner himself, no other arrangement could satisfy exactly this demand. Yet there was something in God Himself that must be satisfied by an Atonement. This Burge calls His "justice to himself." He says,

148. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 293-298.

149. Ibid.

150. Park, The Rise of the Edwardean Theory of the Atonement: An Introductory Essay, p. lxxviii: "Rev. Caleb Burge published his Essay on the Atonement, three years after the treatise of Griffin. It was introduced into the world under the auspices of Dr. Emons, Dr. Samuel Worcester of Salem, Dr. Spring of Newburyport, and Dr. Burton of Tretford. Rev. Dr. Woods of Andover often expressed his high opinion of it. That eminently pious missionary, Rev. Daniel Temple, remarked once to the writer of this Introduction: 'I have derived more instruction in regard to the Atonement, from the treatise of Mr. Burge, than from any other uninspired volume!'"

151. Foster, op. cit., p. 212.

Every good being, in order to do justice to his own character, must manifest his goodness. A wise being, in order to do justice to his character, must manifest his wisdom; or, at least, he must not manifest anything which is opposite to wisdom. All must allow that if one being should knowingly give a wrong representation of his own character (if this were possible) there would be the same injustice done which there would, if the same representation were made by another. 152

Therefore, in order to represent properly his own character, and be just to Himself, God must forgive only upon a provided Atonement.

"This is the truth underlying the incorrect statements of the strict satisfaction theory." 183

154

Dr. N. W. Taylor placed the moral government of God in the forefront of his theology. "Two-thirds of his printed lectures are more decidedly the freedom of man in connection with this topic." 155 But they are only the development of what has been taught from the first in New England. This appears in the definition of a perfect moral government given at the beginning of his treatise. Taylor defines as follows:

152. Caleb Burge, An Essay on the Scripture Doctrine of Atonement, p. 450. (Contained in Park, Discourses and Treatises, pp. 429-546.)

153. Foster, op. cit., p. 213.

154. Nathaniel William Taylor: Congregationalist preacher, teacher, and author; born at New Milford, Conn., June 23, 1786; died at New Haven, March 10, 1858. Was graduated at Yale College in 1807; studied theology with President Dwight, and became pastor of the First Church in New Haven in 1811, which office he resigned in 1822, to take the chair of dogmatic theology in the theological department of Yale College, where he continued to teach until his death. After his death his Practical Sermons were published (New York, 1858); also Lectures on the Moral Government of God (2 vols. 1859); also Essays and Lectures upon select Topics in Revealed Religion (1859); "As a preacher he was singularly impressive, combining solidity and clearness of thought with a remarkable eloquence. Unusual results followed upon his sermons, especially in connection with Revivals. From early youth deeply interested in the problems of theology, and endowed with metaphysical talents of a very high order, he worked out, on the basis of the previous New England theology, an elaborate system, which gained numerous adherents, and powerfully affected theological thought and preaching in America beyond the circle of its professed advocates." The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, p. 284.

155. Foster, op. cit., p. 213.

The influence of the....rightful authority of a moral governor on moral beings, designed so to control their actions as to secure the great end of action upon their part through the medium of law. 156

157

Moral beings are defined as "beings capable of moral action." The

main staple of Taylor's argument is formed from the points which Griffin

had previously emphasized, except that

they receive new force from the new theory of the constitution of the mind, which, beginning with Asa Burton, had now in Taylor's hands given American theology a better division of the faculties of the mind, and, by separating the sensibility and the will, had made a reasonable theory of moral action for the first time possible. The 'control' spoken of is a control through influence, and this is the influence of authority. The law promulgated requires 'benevolence'as the best kind of action and as the sum of obedience. 158

Taylor views benevolence on the part of the moral governor and its manifestation as one fundamental ground of his authority.

In this fact is involved another. The moral governor who is truly and perfectly benevolent, must feel the highest approbation of right moral action and the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. These particular emotions in view of the true nature and tendency of right and wrong moral action are inseparable from the nature of benevolence in every mind. Again, benevolence, in the specific form of it now stated as the character of the moral governor, must, from the very nature and design of his relation be supremely concerned and absolutely committed to secure so far as he is able, right moral action in every instance, and to prevent wrong moral action in every instance by the influence of his authority. 159.

Even the legal sanctions ratify God's authority by manifesting His benevolence. Thus, when men have sinned, their salvation can be given only upon an atonement. Otherwise God would not appear to hate sin, or would disregard the obligations imposed by benevolence to maintain the authority of the law. He is especially strong in the development of this line of thought. The immutability of God's character is the foundation of the immutability of its sanctions. Therefore, as God is what He is, He must maintain the authority of His law; hence the principle:

the perfect equity or justice of a moral governor can be reconciled with mercy to transgressors only through an Atonement. 160

156. N. W. Taylor, Lectures on Moral Government of God, Vol. I, p. 7, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 213.

157. Ibid. 158. Foster, op. cit., p. 214.

159. Taylor, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 86, quoted in Foster, op. cit., p. 214

160. Foster, op. cit., p. 215.

Taylor shuts up the objector to an Atonement by getting him to the point where he either denies the benevolence of God, or maintains the future exact retribution of this wicked world, or else admits an Atonement. He does this with such cogency and force that he almost develops a new proof of the necessity of the Atonement. The necessity lies in the demands of real and comprehensive benevolence. 161

It is unnecessary in this thesis to quote from the writings of Charles G. Finney. The reason is, that the same views would be found to be repeated in connection with his more radical opinions upon the freedom of the will. 162

The meaning of a moral government; the character of God as love, which constitutes the divine response to the immediate affirmations of his own intellect as to obligation; love as having respect to the moral system as a whole and demanding a satisfaction to 'public justice'; and the perfect adaptation of the divine government and of the atonement to securing the best good of all concerned, are brought out by him in terms largely identical with those employed by his predecessors, but with the added clearness which correcter views as to the nature of the mind and moral agency rendered possible. 163

Our discussion to this point has shown us that these New England writers emphasized the divine government as the sphere within which the Atonement was wrought. However, all of them with increasing clearness founded that government upon an ethical idea, a conception of the character of God as love. This factor saves the theory from the charge of artificiality and superficiality, this despite the fact that they did not seek to make the ethical idea prominent, or generally to deduce the whole theory from it. However, the points already discussed cannot be made as full and clear as they should be until we discuss something further. That is the relation of election to the Atonement.

161. Cf. Foster, op. cit., p. 215 for references to Taylor's works.

162. Charles Grandison Finney, born at Warren, Litchfield County Conn., Aug. 29, 1792; died at Oberlin, O., Aug. 16, 1875. Studied to be a lawyer. Sudden conversion in 1821. Under presbytery in 1822; licensed to preach in 1824. Active in revival labors. Pastor of Second Free Church in New York (1832) and Pastor of Broadway Tabernacle in 1834. In 1835 to Oberlin as professor of theology; president of Oberlin in 1852. A popular preacher, an influential teacher. Lectures on Systematic Theology define his theological position.

163. Foster, op. cit., p. 215.

5. Final Additions to the theory to 1860: Discussions of
Moral Agency and Imputation.

The question of the extent of the Atonement was prominently brought before the New England writers from the first of their investigations upon the subject. The Universalists had made the proposition that Christ died for all a principal step in their argument. The old theories had avoided their conclusion only by denying that He died for all. However, the truth that Christ died for all was too plain to admit of denial, in the opinion of the New England thinkers. For this reason they taught the Doctrine of a General Atonement from the first.

Edwards the Younger says nothing in particular upon this point in his three sermons. West, on the other hand, proceeds to draw the conclusion which must follow as soon as the premises of the new theory were adopted: The Atonement was sufficient for the whole world, not in the sense that it "superseded all use of punishment in the divine govern-
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ment," but in the sense that it made "such a manifestation of divine dis-
pleasure against the wickedness of men as is enough to convince every candid spectator that the disposition of the divine mind is perfectly
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conformable to the true spirit of God's written law." "The direct end of atonement is answered," West says, "and such a manifestation made of divine righteousness as prepared the way for a consistent exercise of mercy. Now, God would not appear to give up his law even though he
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pardoned the sinner." West then dwells largely upon the dignity of Christ's person as exalting the Atonement made by Him and contributing
167
to its perfection, and so to its universality.

164. West, *The Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement*, pp. 135 ff.,
quoted in Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

165. *Ibid.*

166. *Ibid.*

167. *Ibid.*

Emmons is axiomatic and incisive, as usual. The proposition of his sermon upon the necessity of the Atonement is "that the atone-
ment of Christ was necessary entirely on God's account," i. e.,
not at all upon man's. Hence he argues,

Then it was universal, and sufficient for the pardon and salvation of the non-elect....If it has rendered it consistent with the justice of God to exercise pardoning mercy to one sinner, it has rendered it equally consistent with his mercy to exercise pardoning mercy to all sinners....It opens as wide a door of mercy to the one as to the other. 168

If the only obstacles are on God's part, once removed they are removed.

The great treatise on this subject is, however, that of Griffin.

We shall not fully comprehend his arguments unless we have somewhat clearly in mind the course of New England thought upon the whole subject of the will. This is necessary, for Griffin seeks to find a solution of the difficulties between the maintainers of limited and general Atonement by sharper distinctions upon moral agency. We must therefore anticipate the discussion of Griffin's contribution with a consideration of what has been accomplished before on this issue of moral agency.

The freedom of the will was the first great question which engaged New England theology when Edwards (the Elder) began his contest with the Arminians. His solution, though it provided for the divine sovereignty and the external freedom of man to do what he willed, did not provide for the freedom of the will itself. His contemporary and successor, Samuel Hopkins, felt this, and brought forward the idea that freedom was an inalienable attribute of the will as such, and made it to reside, not in Edwards' external freedom, but in the very exercise of volition. Emmons, fond of paradoxical forms of statement, emphasized human agency as much as he did divine sovereignty, and often employed much the same terms to describe each: God governs man through motives, and yet when motives have been presented, he acts upon the will, without which his

action could never respond to their stimulus. Thus God produces our volitions; in fact, all action in the universe is God's. But, on the other hand, by a mysterious connection between man and God, man acts exactly as if God did not act. He is perfectly free, and this in the same sense that God Himself is. Under God's universal agency, man has a real agency, which must no more be neglected than that of God. With varying success as to the theory of the will, the deepening tendency of the New England school was to view the divine and human operations in the matter of volition as if they were two concentric spheres. The question as to the possibility of the communication of independence to man they did not attempt to solve. The fact of natural powers was
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enough.

Now Griffin approaches the problem very much after the manner of Emmons. His purpose is to reconcile the two schools of thought upon the extent of the Atonement, and he says of these two schools,

One party contemplate men as passive receivers of sanctifying impressions; and their question is, How many did God intend by regenerating influence to make partakers of the benefit of the atonement? The answer is, The elect. And so say we. The other party contemplate men as moral agents; and their question is, How many did God intend to furnish with a means of pardon which they should be under obligations to improve to their everlasting good? The answer is, All who hear the Gospel. And so say our brethren. 171

He points to a mistake: the two characters of men have not been kept distinct.

The mistake of our brethren, as we view it, has arisen from not keeping these two characters of man distinct (viz., passive subjects and agents).... The two characters are about as distinct as body and soul; and on their marked separation the solution of almost every difficulty in metaphysical theology depends. 172

170. Cf. the discussion on this question in Foster, op. cit., pp. 217, 218.

171. Griffin, op. cit., p. 252 f.

172. Ibid.

Griffin then brings out his conception of the nature of a moral agent. He insists that a moral agent must act; his happiness depends on his acting.

None but moral agents bear out any relation to law, obligation, guilt, pardon, rewards, or punishments.... This is what we mean when we say that the atonement was a measure of moral government Now one of the things which essentially belong to a moral agent is, that he must act, and on his action his happiness depends.... You cannot therefore contemplate a man as needing an atonement, without contemplating him as one, who, if he has the opportunity, is to act towards the atonement, and is to enjoy or lose the benefit according as he receives it or rejects it Anything, therefore, which is done for a moral agent is done for his use after the manner in which things are for the use of free moral agents, or creatures governed by motives and choice and bound to act. That is, it is done that he may use it if he pleases, and that he may be under obligation to use it. 173

Griffin now continues. He states that men sustain two relations to God: as creatures and moral agents.

The foundation of the whole divine administration towards the human race lies in this, that men sustain two relations to God. As creatures they are necessarily dependent upon him for holiness, as they are for existence, and as such they passively receive his sanctifying impressions; and they are moral agents. 174

He now proceeds to prove that these two characters of men are "altogether distinct and independent of each other."

Now the great truth to be proved is, that these two characters of men (passive receivers and moral agents) are altogether distinct and independent of each other. And the proof is found in the single fact, that their moral agency is in no degree impaired or affected by their dependence and passiveness, nor their passiveness and dependence by their moral agency. That is to say, they are none the less dependent (as Arminians would make us believe) for being moral agents; and on the other hand (and this is the main point to be proved), they are none the less moral agents (as Antinomians seem to suppose), that is, are none the less susceptible of personal and complete obligations, for being dependent. For instance, they are none the less bound to believe because faith is 'the gift of God', nor to love because love is the 'fruit of the spirit'. Their obligations rest upon their capacity to exercise, not on their power to originate; on their being rational, not on their being independent. 175

The action of the Spirit does not abate the freedom of moral agents.

On the one hand, the action of the Spirit does not abate their

freedom. The soul of man is that wonderful substance which is none the less active for being acted upon, none the less free for being controlled. It is a wheel within a wheel, which has complete motion in itself while moved by machinery from without. While made willing, it is itself voluntary, and of course free. 176

Again, the absence of the Spirit does not impair "the capacity on which obligation is founded."

On the other hand, the absence of the Spirit does not impair the capacity on which obligation is founded. The completeness of moral agency has no dependence on supernatural impressions, and on nothing but a rational existence combined with knowledge. The bad, equally with the good, are complete moral agents, the one being as deserving of blame as the other are of praise; otherwise (for which forever settles the question), the unsanctified are not to blame and cannot be punished. 177

Griffin now concludes his argument. There will be a counterpart of the two characters of man in the heavens. The Atonement, by the Moral Governor, was a provision for moral agents. In this provision God did not distinguish between elect and non-elect.

I have shown you two independent characters on earth. If God acts towards these according to truth, there will be a counterpart of them in the heavens; he himself will sustain two characters.... altogether independent of each other. As he stands related to the mere passive receiver, he is the Sovereign Efficient Cause Now the atonement was certainly by the Moral Governor, because it was a provision for moral agents. It follows, then, that in making this provision he had no regard to the distinction of elect and non-elect (in distinguishing between which he acts as the Sovereign Efficient Cause). An atonement made for agents could know nothing of passive regeneration or any degree concerning it. 178

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These ideas represent the "highest point" reached by the New England writers upon the subject. The others re-echo more or less distinctly the teaching of Griffin. Burge says,

The atonement of Christ is, in a strict and proper sense, for all mankind. Christ tasted death for every man; for the non-elect as much as for the elect. Indeed, election has nothing to do with atonement any more than it has with creation, resurrection from the dead, or the general atonement. 180

He adds immediately,

From the necessity and nature of the atonement it is evident that

176. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 264, 265. 177. Ibid.

178. Ibid., pp. 269—273. 179. Foster, op. cit., p. 220.

180. Burge, op. cit., p. 525.

its extent is necessarily universal....The death of Christ completely removes them (the obstacles which stood in the way of God's pardoning sinners.) 181

We consider now, in brief, the artificial elements of the doctrine which these writers rejected. Among these the principal is the Doctrine of Imputation, with its associated idea of the strict equivalency of Christ's sufferings to our punishment. The elder Edwards had struggled with this problem. His treatise upon original sin was the most important of his works as illustrating the operations of his mind and the character of his theology in their relation to conservatism and progress. On the one hand, he will have nothing to do with treating men as they are not. But on the other hand, he cannot avoid a connection between Adam and a guilt for Adam's sin. Thus he struggles with the theories of identity and with ideas of divine constitution, till he makes us one with Adam in some sense, and yet declares that we are not guilty of Adam's sin by imputation, until we participate in it by consent. Such efforts in behalf of imputation were in vain. Edwards' successors regarded the idea with more and more distrust, and the controversy with the Universalists put an end to every effort to retain it. Universalism maintained that there was no grace in saving men, since the Atonement had merited salvation for them, and the merits were directly imputed to believers. Hence eternal life was bestowed as a thing that had been duly bought by this infinite price. But the New England thinkers found this too abhorrent to the Gospel. We are saved by grace, they said, and devoted a large part of the various discourses and treatises which we have been studying to proving that an Atonement is consistent with the exer-
182
cise of grace.

Emmons answers the question from the standpoint of the New England

181. Burge, op. cit., p. 525.

182. Cf. the discussion on these questions in Foster, op. cit., p. 221.

theory of the Atonement, when he says,

Though Christ suffered, the just for the unjust, though he made his soul an offering for sin, and though he suffered most excruciating pains in the garden and on the cross, yet he did not lay God under the least obligation, in point of justice, to pardon and save a single sinner....By obeying and suffering in the room of sinners, he only rendered it consistent for God to renew, or not renew, to pardon or not to pardon, to reward or not to reward, sinners; but did not lay him under the least obligation, in point of justice, to do either of these things for them. 183

Burge is perhaps as pointed as any of these writers. He says,

The righteousness of Christ, like that of every other holy being, consists entirely in his actions, feelings, and attributes. Essentially it consists in his love to God and other beings, and is as unalienably his as is any other attribute of his nature. Is it even possible that the actions which Christ performed while here on earth, in which his righteousness in part consists, should be so transferred from him to believers as to become actions which they have performed. 184

Burge says trenchantly, in reference to the idea that believers receive the righteousness of Christ by faith,

It is confidently believed that neither Scripture nor reason affords any more warrant for the opinion that it is even possible for the believer's faith to receive Christ's faith, or love, than for the opinion that a believer's walking on the highway receives Christ's walking upon the water. 185

183. Emmons, op. cit., p. 121.

184. Burge, op. cit., pp. 504-506.

185. Ibid.

A SUMMARY

We have now come to the close of our discussion of the Doctrine of the Atonement in New England Theology. We have traced the Rise of this Doctrine in the writings of the three members of the great triumvirate: Edwards (the Elder), Bellamy, and Hopkins. The chief contribution of Edwards (the Elder) to the theory was his exaltation of the sovereignty of God. He taught that God is sovereign in applying and conducting, as well as in originating the redemptive work. He also recommended to his followers their nomenclature. Bellamy, we have seen, was careful to represent the atonement not as obligating God in justice to save sinners, but as the opening of a door. This method of defining the atonement became the favorite method of defining the atonement of the later New England theologians. Bellamy also made a distinct departure from the old Calvinism in giving special prominence to the doctrine of general atonement. The later Universalistic controversy stemmed from this root. Bellamy also followed Edwards (the Elder) in giving special prominence to the Sovereignty of God in the application of the atonement. Hopkins pointed out the necessity on God's part of a mediator before He could forgive sin. He then changed the view of God's position from that of an offended party to that of a governor. This view profoundly influenced the later New England theologians. Furthermore, he advanced the view that the sufferings of Christ are an example rather than the literal suffering of punishment. He placed the whole transaction under the rectoral justice of God. In addition, he followed Bellamy in teaching a general atonement.

In the second section of this thesis we have discussed the development of the Doctrine of the Atonement. We dealt first with the problem that Universalism posed for the Edwardeans. The advocates of Universalism reasoned as follows: Since Christ has paid the whole debt, it is not consistent with justice that any man should be punished in his own person. The Edwardeans were now confronted with a difficulty. Since Bellamy, the Edwardeans had held that the Atonement was general. On the other hand, they also maintained the doctrines of election and future punishment. It was to meet this difficulty that the younger Edwards introduced his theory to New England. In his first sermon Edwards (the Younger) presented, in his opinion, the gordian knot of theology: Forgiveness is the exercise of grace; forgiveness at the same time is in consequence of a redemption by the blood of Christ. He conceded that forgiveness is in consequence of the redemption. The other part of the knot he then discusses. He proposes three uses of justice: commutative, distributive, and general or public justice; and a definition of grace. He then asks the question: Is the pardon of the sinner an act of justice or of grace? He answers that according to distributive justice, it is an act of grace. Edwards (the Younger) definitely changed the position of God from an offended party to that of a ruler. From this time on, the rectoral theory of the atonement takes the place of the satisfaction theory -- the theory that Christ satisfied the justice of God. Smalley, as we have seen, questioned the whole idea that the death of Christ was a satisfaction of justice. In this he concurred with Edwards. He also made God a governor, and not the offended party. He espoused the view that justification is an act of free grace. God is in no sense obligated in justice, which He fully performs to believers alone. West upheld the

view that the atonement was designed to manifest the divine attributes, to show the disposition of God's mind toward men for the breach of His Law. The atonement involved no obligation on the justice of God to pardon and save the sinner. West placed the origin of the atonement in the love of God. Emmons expressed the connection between the love of God and the Atonement by a more orderly deduction. He adopted the viewpoint that because of God's love, He had no difficulty in either doing good to the innocent or in punishing the guilty. The difficulty entered the picture in His forgiving the wicked. Emmons asks the question: How could grace be displayed consistently with justice? This God alone solved. Through the suffering of Christ God displayed His hatred of sin and His disposition to punish it. Again, in Emmons, the government of God is based on His character, and ruled according to it. Emmons made an addition here: This government was a moral one. Griffin developed the nature of this moral government. He stated that the moral government of God, in a general and perfect sense, includes the whole treatment of God to moral agents. Burge sets forth for us the substitute that New England theology has to offer for the old doctrine that the atonement satisfied the distributive justice of God. Burge stated that there was something in God Himself that must be satisfied by an atonement. Burge called this something in God, justice to Himself. God, to represent properly his own character and be just to himself, must forgive only upon a provided atonement. Taylor again put the moral government of God in the forefront of his theology. He gave the definition of a perfect moral government. He viewed the benevolence on the part of the moral governor and its manifestation as one fundamental ground of His authority. Taylor presented as his leading

principle: The perfect equity or justice of a moral governor can be reconciled with mercy to transgressors only through an atonement.

Thus all the New England writers placed the divine government as the sphere within which atonement was wrought. All of them with increasing clearness founded this government upon an ethical idea, a conception of the character of God as love.

In the last few pages of this thesis we have noticed how Griffin gave a solution between the maintainers of limited and general atonement by sharper distinctions upon moral agency. Also we devoted a few paragraphs to the rejection of the doctrine of imputation.

"This theory of the atonement underwent no essential change from this point during the progress of the New England school." ¹⁸⁶ True it is, that this doctrine received some ~~emphasis~~ ^{additions} in the theology of ¹⁸⁷ Park by his steady efforts to incorporate whatever good he found in other writers. But the scope of this thesis is only to 1860, and the work of Park will be left to another.

186. Foster, op. cit., p. 225

187. Edwards A. Park, born at Providence, R. I., December 29, 1808; died at Andover, Mass., June 4, 1900; graduated at Brown University, Providence, 1826, and at Andover, 1831; pastor at Braintree, Mass., 1831-33; professor of intellectual philosophy at Amherst, 1835-36; professor of sacred rhetoric at Andover, 1836-47; professor of systematic theology there, 1847-1881; professor emeritus until his death. One of the founders of the Bibliotheca Sacra in 1844, which he continued to edit till its transfer to Oberlin in 1883; published largely in this and other periodical issues; wrote a number of valuable memoirs, of which the most important theologically are those of Hopkins and Emmons; issued a volume of Discourses; and a posthumous Memorial Collection of Sermons.

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