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OSCAR CULLMANN'S CONCEPT OF TIME

A Research Report Presented to the
Department of Systematic Theology,
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Divinity

by

John Fuchs

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OSCAR CULLMANN'S CONCEPT OF TIME

INTRODUCTION

In the foreword to the second edition of his book Christ and Time, Oscar Cullmann admits that this work is not intended to answer the questions raised by systematic theology. He goes on to claim that the giving of such answers is not the real task of a New Testament scholar like himself, nor, in his opinion, should it be. In his own words:

Is it not the most valuable service that the New Testament scholar can render to the systematic theologian that he permits the questions that are not solved in the New Testament itself to stand as questions? And does not the real responsibility of the exegete in relation to systematic theology lie precisely in this limitation, so that his duty is to hand on these questions in the very form in which they are presented by the objective New Testament data?

In this book Cullmann has done the task of a New Testament scholar as he sees it and has, as far as possible, performed this "most valuable service" for the systematic theologian. However, such a service is also a challenge to the systematic theologian, the challenge to formulate and to evaluate answers to the questions which have been handed on to him. In its own limited way, this paper is an attempt to meet this challenge. It is an attempt to understand Cullmann's concept of time, to investigate the relationship between this concept and other theological questions to which Cullmann has addressed himself, and to determine whether or not this conception of time has implications which Cullmann himself has not yet thoroughly explored.

At the outset we must admit that Cullmann regards questions about the nature of time as ancillary to his primary concern, which, he tells us, is "the presentation of the Biblical redemptive history."² Yet it

is precisely this point, the relationship between time and history, which is important for Gullmann's understanding of the nature of Heilsgeschichte. The three chapters of this paper will attempt to demonstrate that Gullmann's conception of time is a factor which influences, even though it does not completely determine, the answers which he finds to other questions of biblical theology.

First, however, the reader might be helped by a swift summary of what Gullmann's understanding of the nature of time is. As far as he is concerned, man can understand time only in terms of its primitive Christian symbol, the line. "The New Testament knows only the linear time concept of Today, Yesterday, and Tomorrow; all philosophical reinterpretation and dissolution into timeless metaphysics is foreign to it."³ In other words, part of Gullmann's method is to describe time in terms which contrast it to the Greek cyclical conception of time, in which time is differentiated from a timeless Beyond, otherwise known as eternity. For Gullmann there is no such thing as timelessness; eternity is the unlimited extension of the time-line into both the past and the future. This conception of eternity is not differentiated from time qualitatively, but in respect to the limitation of its extension. "What we call 'time' is nothing but a part, defined and delimited, by God, of this same unending duration of God's time."⁴

The above assertion is primarily based on a study of the New Testament use of the word aion ("age") which, according to Gullmann, shows us that "between everlastingly continuing time and limited time, the New Testament makes absolutely no difference in terminology."⁵ Another Greek word dealing with time and frequently used in the New Testament,

kairos, generally denotes a definite point of time with a fixed content, showing that it is possible for God to use time to accomplish His purposes. According to Gullmann, the conception of time which the New Testament presents in terms of these two words is one of the "basic presuppositions of all New Testament theology."⁶ Aside from these few fundamentals, however, Gullmann does not deal with the nature of time per se, but only in its relation to other theological questions, some of which will be dealt with in the chapters of this paper.

The use of a geometrical term in the titles of these three chapters is not based upon what Gullmann calls "the misconception . . . that I have taken as my preconceived starting point a geometric figure."⁷ It is assumed without question that Gullmann is being methodologically honest with his readers and with himself. However, Gullmann here cannot be denying that geometric figures are helpful in understanding his concept of time. He himself uses geometric figures in this book, (p. 82, p. 188) figures which are extremely helpful for making his position clear. Similarly, the use of the term "linear" is an attempt to clarify our understanding of Gullmann's position, not to charge him with working from a preconceived notion of the nature of time.

CHAPTER I

THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND GULLMANN'S CONCEPT OF HEILSGESCHICHTE

The relationship between history and biblical redemptive history, between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte, is one of the most important issues confronting contemporary theologians. Some theologians attempt to deal with this problem by regarding the temporal and historical elements of the Christian proclamation as a framework which must be removed by the theologian in order for him to arrive at the central kernel of the biblical message. This method is one of "de-mythologizing" the Christian proclamation, to use the term of Rudolf Bultmann, one of the principal proponents of this process. It is this temporal and historical element, which Bultmann and others regard as mythological covering, which Gullmann claims is the actual center of the Christian proclamation. It is important to see that Gullmann's disagreement with Bultmann on this point is not so much a matter of methodology as it is a question of the conclusions which he draws. Gullmann too seeks to get at what is central in the biblical message and disclaims any biblicistic attitude which "treats all statements in the Bible as of equal worth."¹ He too maintains that certain aspects of the Bible are peripheral elements (Rahmenelementen) which are not to be confused with the heart of the biblical message. However, what Gullmann finds at the center of the biblical proclamation is that which Bultmann has rejected as unnecessary husk, namely, the Christian conception of time and history. His own conclusion is: "The historical character of salvation, which Bultmann

regards as unacceptable to the modern mind, . . . is not a secondary element, but it is the essence of the thought of the New Testament."² Bultmann also recognizes that the content of the central theme of theology is at the heart of his differences with Cullmann. He makes this plain in his critique of Christ and Time, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Cullmann distinguishes between two aspects of the Christian conception of time and treats these two aspects separately in the first two sections of his book. On the one hand, he maintains that "salvation is bound to a continuous time process (fortlaufendes Zeitgeschehen) which embraces past, present, and future."³ On the other hand, it is also his position "that all points of the redemptive line are related to the one historical fact at the mid-point, . . . This fact is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ."⁴ This distinction, however, does not only deal with two aspects of the concept of Heilsgeschichte. It also implicitly supposes that there are two different ways of looking at the nature of time.

Binding salvation to a continuous time process implies that the existence of this process is an essential aspect of both Heilsgeschichte and secular world history. Let us quickly review the steps by which Cullmann connects these two concepts so closely. Cullmann begins by analyzing the two Greek words with a temporal connotation used most frequently in the New Testament, kairos and aion. He finds that kairos basically deals with a definite point of time with a fixed content. In its theological aspect, kairos deals with "times that God in his sovereign

power has fixed and that therefore have a special significance in relation to His plan of salvation."⁵ The word aion, on the other hand, signifies a period of duration. This duration may be defined exactly, but it may also be undefined and incalculable. From this second, undefined use of aion, Gullmann draws the conclusion that "in the New Testament field it is not time and eternity that stand opposed, but limited time and unlimited, endless time."⁶ On the basis of this understanding of the word, Gullmann distinguishes three kinds of duration, namely:

(1) A duration of unending extension which is unlimited in both directions and is usually designated by the word "eternity," (2) that duration which is limited in both directions, by the Creation at the one end and by the Parousia at the other, and (3) durations which are limited in one direction but not in the other, specifically (a) the duration before the Creation and (b) the duration after the Parousia.

After making this threefold division of the aiones, Gullmann goes on to make the inference that a linear conception of time is necessary if a meaningful distinction is to be made between the aion before the Creation and the one after the Parousia. He tells us: "all this can take place only in a time framework that continuously moves straight forward."⁷ Therefore, for Gullmann, time is something which not only has its own intrinsic value, but which also gives the events which occur in time their meaning and value. In his own words:

This, however, means that the worth of an epoch of time does not consist in its relation to a timeless eternity; each epoch has its own meaning precisely as a portion of time. This meaning is recognized, however, only from the mid-point which itself is time.⁸

It follows as a logical corollary of this assertion that, if time were not linear, salvation as it has been revealed to man would not be possible.

However, the assertion that time is essential to God's plan of salvation and that the time of the aiones before the Creation and after the Parousia is qualitatively no different from the time of our own age also has implications for Gullmann's conception of the nature of God. By definition, the divine attribute of eternity cannot be understood by Gullmann in the sense of timelessness. Yet the eternity which he has described as "the endless succession of the ages" still "is possible only as an attribute of God."⁹ Since, as we have already seen, (p. 2 supra) our time is merely a limited section of this limitless duration, it would seem to follow that in some respect our time is also an attribute of God. This would mean that God and time are not identical, but neither are they entirely separate entities. Endlessly extended time as an attribute of God differs from time as men understand it in respect to the means by which God measures time. "God alone rules over time, for he alone can survey it in its entire extension, and measure it with measures which are . . . different from ours."¹⁰ Just as the timekeeper of a basketball game can manipulate the clock so that the team which is trailing its opponents has additional time in which to catch up, so God, in His sovereign lordship over time, determines the duration of the different aiones. This human comparison is not, of course, intended to imply that God exercises this lordship in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

That which prevents the divine lordship over time from being arbitrary and capricious is itself a temporal event, namely the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. This historical fact is the mid-point to which all aspects of the redemptive line are related. As a historical fact this mid-point is in itself an essential part of the

three aiones which Cullmann has distinguished. As a mid-point, however, Cullmann speaks of this event as a new division of time which is imposed upon the still continuing three-fold division.¹¹ The word which Filson has translated as "impose" (uberschneiden) is perhaps more accurately rendered as "intersect" or "overlap." Nevertheless, God's use of this new division demonstrates that He can exercise his lordship over time in more than one way. He not only determines the duration of the aiones; He also gives meaning to all aiones by filling a specific kairos with a specific content. From this it follows that something more than time itself is essential to redemptive history, namely, the meaning which God has given to the events of Holy Week. In this sense it is possible for Cullmann to speak of time as the framework (Rahmen) of Heilsgeschichte.

This work of filling a specific kairos with a special content is ascribed by Cullmann both to God the Father as He plans man's salvation and to God the Son, who willingly assumes the role of the 'ebed Yahweh in order to effect this salvation, thus becoming the mid-point of Heilsgeschichte. Two passages from one of Cullmann's shorter works, The Return of Christ, should suffice to demonstrate more clearly what Cullmann means by calling time the framework of redemptive history. Speaking of the Father's plan of salvation, Cullmann tells us that "time is not a reality hostile to God, but, on the contrary, the means of grace by which God intends man's salvation."¹² As the other side of the coin, Cullmann tells us that Jesus "inserts his own death into the framework of the history of salvation."¹³ Finally, in another brief essay, He Who Comes After Me, Cullmann mentions both of these aspects of time in one short sentence which summarizes God's plan of salvation. He writes:

"This plan is, on the one hand, entirely Christocentric, on the other, completely bound up with its unfolding in time."¹⁴ Here it is implied that time is both a means of grace and the framework for the Christ-event.

If time is an attribute of God, and if the central event of the biblical redemptive history is completely bound up with its unfolding in time, does it follow that for Gullmann Heilsgeschichte and world history are indistinguishable? This seems to be one of the questions raised by Bultmann's critique of Christ and Time. Bultmann would give an affirmative answer to this question. As far as he is concerned, Gullmann has eliminated any meaningful distinction between redemptive history and secular history. In Bultmann's own words:

I cannot see that for him "history" in the phrase "history of salvation" has any different meaning from what it has in "history of the world," nor can I understand how the Old Testament history of salvation as history is in principle different from the history of the people of Israel that is also open to the profane historian.¹⁵

The subsequent pages of Bultmann's critique reveal that there is an assumption concerning the nature of time which is basic to his criticisms of Gullmann. This assumption is that a distinction must always be made between existence within time and the temporality of existence itself. For Bultmann "temporal existence means to exist in constantly new decisions, in constantly new encounters, whether with men or with destiny."¹⁶ It is this type of temporality which, for Bultmann, has been eliminated for the Christian by the event of the cross. Thus for Bultmann the cross is the decisive event of salvation history, but not because it is bound up with its unfolding in time, as Gullmann maintains. It is decisive because it eliminates, for the person who has died and risen with Christ, such aspects of temporality as temptation through suffering and death.

For Bultmann time itself is only the framework for Heilsgeschichte, not a process which has been transformed by God into a means of grace.

How valid is Bultmann's criticism? His main problem seems to be that he is looking for the distinction between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte precisely where Gullmann maintains that this distinction cannot and dare not be found, in its temporality. For Bultmann Heilsgeschichte eliminates temporality for the believing Christian. If it does not, it is not Heilsgeschichte. Gullmann does not make this distinction between temporal existence and an existence within time. Therefore, although Gullmann does recognize that a distinction can be made between history and myth, he maintains that the time-line of biblical redemptive history which unites them is more essential to the Christian conception of salvation than is the criterion of factual verifiability which separates them. "The demonstration that a myth is not 'historical' does not imply that the happening whose account it preserves is not 'temporal.'"¹⁷ By this statement Gullmann indicates how highly he values the involvement of a linear time-process with redemptive history. Until Bultmann learns to appreciate the high estimate which Gullmann places upon the time-process, or Gullmann modifies his position that temporality is indispensable to Heilsgeschichte, these two distinguished theologians will not be discussing this question upon common ground.

If, then, Gullmann does not place the distinction between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte in the temporality of the former and the non-temporality of the latter, how is the distinction to be made? Gullmann seems to make a distinction by means of the concept of representation. For Gullmann representation (Stellvertretung) is the principle according to

which a double movement along the redemptive line takes place. In the Old Testament the movement is one of progressive reduction, from mankind to the people of Israel to the remnant of Israel to the One, Christ. Christ, as the center of the redemptive line, becomes the Redeemer, both of mankind and of the entire creation. In the New Testament the movement is one of progressive advance, from Christ to the Church to the redeemed creation of the new heaven and the new earth. Here again it is important to see how vitally the linear process of time itself is connected with this principle. As Gullmann puts it:

The thought of election and representation makes its appearance only in connection with the development that takes place on the time line which we have described. It is not possible to speak in the abstract concerning these central Primitive Christian concepts. 18

Since Christ is the mid-point of both processes, this passage is a reminder that the difference between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte cannot be temporal. If there is any distinction, it is between those who have been elected as representative of all creation and those who have not. The former are included both in the sphere of Geschichte and in the sphere of Heilsgeschichte, while the latter are included only in the sphere of Geschichte. At the creation, before the principle of representation began to operate, these two spheres were identical; at the creation of the new heaven and the new earth, when the principle of representation shall have been completed, the two spheres will once again be identical. Thus it can be seen that Gullmann combines a theological with a spatial concept in order to make a distinction between Heilsgeschichte and Geschichte at any given segment of the temporal process. The implications of this picture of the relationship between space and time will be treated in a later chapter of this paper.

One more question should be dealt with in this chapter. It is raised by the last quotation which has been cited, in which Gullmann tells us that it is impossible to speak in the abstract concerning primitive Christian concepts. The context of this assertion indicates that by "in the abstract" Gullmann means "without taking into account that segment of the time-process during which a salvation-event occurs." The question might be raised here: How is it possible to speak or write about any event of the past without speaking about it in the abstract, that is, during a segment of the time-line other than that irrepeatable segment during which the event actually took place? To put this question another way: How can we discern our own relationship to the rest of the redemptive line if it is impossible to abstract ourselves from our own involvement in the linear process of Heilsgeschichte? For that matter, how can Gullmann draw us a picture of the entire salvation-line without abstracting himself from his own involvement in a certain segment of it? This is a problem which is raised by Gullmann's insistence that time is an irreversible, irrepeatable process by means of which God acts to redeem a fallen creation. From at least one point of view, the answer to these questions is a negative one, that it is impossible to picture time apart from our own psychic involvement in it. Although he does not seem to be speaking to Gullmann's viewpoint directly, Canon Jean Mouroux has given clear articulation to the position that man cannot picture time as Gullmann has done. In his recent book, The Mystery of Time, Mouroux maintains, along with Augustine, that the present is the means by which the psyche measures all time. "The present is, then, the very ground of existence through which past and future are actualized and time engendered."¹⁹

Therefore, Mouroux concludes, "it is futile to try to picture time as a relationship between different successive things, events arranged linearly and arising irreversibly without past or future."²⁰

This assertion cannot be placed in direct contrast to Gullmann's position, because it is taken from a chapter in which Mouroux is discussing "human time," that is, time as it is structured by the human psyche. Mouroux, like Gullmann, realizes that God measures time in a vastly different manner than do human beings. Gullmann, however, does not attempt to answer the questions raised in the previous paragraph by means of this distinction between divine and human methods of measuring time. He maintains that the formulations by which the Church expressed her understanding of the Christ-event are in themselves Heilsgeschichte, another aspect of God's use of time as a means of grace by which he brings salvation to people. In this way he gives an indirect answer to these questions. An example of how Gullmann places both event and formulation within the same process of Heilsgeschichte can be found in The Christology of the New Testament, where he tells us:

But if the process of arriving at Christological understanding took place in early Christianity in connection with these central events of the first century, we can say that this process itself belongs within the Heilsgeschichte.²¹

From this assertion it would seem to follow that every formulation which attempts to understand fully "those central events of the first century," from the ecumenical creeds, through our Lutheran confessions, right down to the latest article in a theological journal (or even the latest paper by an undergraduate seminarian) are part of the process which "itself belongs within the Heilsgeschichte." In this way it can be seen that the importance of the primitive Christian conception of

time has led Gullmann to de-emphasize the distinction between formulation and event, between revelation and its content, a distinction which is of great importance to many contemporary theologians.

CHAPTER II

THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND CULLMANN'S UNDERSTANDING OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Let us quickly summarize the three ages which, according to Cullmann, are recognized by the New Testament. There is the age before the Creation, the "present" age, which lies between the Creation and the End, and the "coming" age, in which the first creation will be replaced by the new creation.¹ These three ages are intersected or overlapped by the mid-point of redemptive history, the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, which itself is a temporal event of the "present" age. From the point of view of Heilsgeschichte, this mid-point is the kairos to which all of the other kairoi of the redemptive process are related and from which they derive their own meaning and value. This mid-point, however, is not merely a means of dividing the "present" age into eras designated by the phrases "before Christ" and "year of our Lord." This mid-point is also that which inaugurates the "coming" age and creates what Cullmann calls "the temporal tension between present and future."² It is in the atmosphere of this tension, according to Cullmann, that the ethics of the New Testament were formulated and it is in this same atmosphere that they are lived by God's people today.

The fact that this "coming" age has been inaugurated does not in itself, of course, create this tension. What creates the tension is that this "present" age, also a segment of the "time framework that continuously moves straight forward," (cf. p.6 supra) has not yet been completed. In this sense it is possible for Cullmann to speak of a "chron-

ological dualism," in that two segments of the linear time framework overlap each other. Gullmann describes the early Christian belief in this chronological dualism in the following manner:

This is the conviction that, on the one hand, in Christ the end is already fulfilled, and that nonetheless the consummation is still in the future, since the framework of the present world still endures. We shall see that this dualism has already found expression in the primitive conception of the State.³

It will also be seen that this dualism finds expression in the primitive Christian conception of individual ethics.

First, however, we have to ask whether or not there is a tension in Gullmann's own thinking about the nature of time, a tension between his description of a chronological dualism and his conception of time as a linear process which continuously moves straight forward. It is legitimate to wonder whether there might be a chronological sequence in which these positions are proposed by Gullmann. If such a sequence should be detected, then it might be inferred that further scholarship had caused Gullmann to modify or even to change his understanding of the nature of time. An initial reading of Gullmann's works might give the impression that there is such a sequence. The earlier works seem to emphasize the linear nature of time, while later efforts seem to stress his idea of a chronological dualism. However, a closer scrutiny of the material shows that this generalization is not completely valid. Already in The Return of Christ Gullmann finds it possible to tell us that "in Jesus, but only in Him, the temporal tension which exists between the present age and the age to come is already abolished, although his work continues to develop in time."⁴ This reference indicates that the idea of a temporal tension between the aiones was a part of Gullmann's

picture of the nature of time even before he began to investigate areas such as the primitive Christian attitude toward the state.

How then is it possible for two segments of the linear time process to overlap each other? Gullmann, of course, does not address himself directly to this question, which is in keeping with his self-limitation to the role of a New Testament scholar and his avoidance of speculative problems concerning the nature of time. Perhaps a geographical illustration will help us to answer this question which Gullmann has handed on to us. Let us imagine that there are three towns located on Route 82: Parma toward the east, Strongsville ten miles west of Parma, and Berea ten miles west of Strongsville. A Parma resident starts out in his car with the goal of going to Berea. It is legitimate to speak of him as being on the Road from Parma to Berea. Our traveller passes through the town of Strongsville, which intersects the Road from Parma to Berea. What Road is he on now? The only thorough answer which can be given is: "He is on the Road from Parma to Berea and he is on the Road from Strongsville to Berea and he is at a specific point on Route 82!" In an analogous way, it is Gullmann's position that the world is in the age which began at the creation and will end at the Parousia and it is in the "coming" age which began with the coming in the flesh of Jesus Christ and it is bound up with a specific point of the time process. It should be noted that in each case the third designation does not depend upon the first two for its validity. Our traveller would still be at a specific point on Route 82, even if the three towns should suddenly be wiped off the map. Likewise, the world would still be bound up with a specific point of the time process, even if the events which inaugurate and term-

inate the various ages had never happened. I believe that this illustration is perhaps the most efficient way to do justice to Gullmann's understanding of the present position of the world in relation to Ge-
schichte, Heilsgeschichte, and the temporal process.

At this point the objection might be resurrected that Bultmann was right after all, that Gullmann does blur all meaningful distinction between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte. In order to give this objection its second burial, it is necessary for us to turn to the geometrical illustration which Gullmann uses to help explain his understanding of this present era of chronological dualism. Gullmann has designated this era as that of "the complete lordship of Christ," by which phrase he is attempting to express the idea "that Christ from the time of his resurrection is head of the Church and likewise head of all visible and invisible beings."⁵ Because of this lordship there is a close relationship between redemptive process and general world process, but they are not identical. Gullmann explains his geometric illustration in the following manner:

We must rather conceive two concentric circles, whose common center is Christ. The entire circular surface is the reign of Christ; the inner circle is the Church, the surface lying between the two circumferences is the world.⁶

The fact that the smaller of these circles, the Church, keeps expanding in area illustrates the truth that in the present era the movement of the principle of representation is one of progressive advance.

The criterion which determines whether or not a person belongs to the inner circle of the Church or only to the outer portion of the circle of the world is whether or not that person is aware, by faith, of the lordship of Christ over the whole world. This concept, the knowledge

of Christ's lordship, is fundamental to Gullmann's understanding of the relationship between the Church and the world. Speaking of the members of the Church, Gullmann writes:

By this faith they know concerning Christ's rule over them and over the entire world. The rest of the visible and invisible world is also ruled by Christ, but for the time being does not know it. . . . Because the Church alone knows of this Kyrios Christos, it must preach this lordship to those who, without knowing it, are also subjected to it and fulfill the function assigned to it.'

From this passage the impression might be drawn that Gullmann's concept of faith is rather one-sided, with all of the emphasis being on faith as the intellectual awareness of the lordship of Christ. This impression might be strengthened if some of the nuances of the German word wissen, which Gullmann uses here, were to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, this impression should be balanced by taking into account Gullmann's contention that many of the early Christians were willing to suffer martyrdom because of this "knowledge" of the lordship of Christ.

Whether this description of faith places too much emphasis upon its intellectual aspect or not, it is important to see that this knowledge of the lordship of Christ is not only a knowledge of the spatial area of this lordship; it is also a knowledge of the temporal extent of the rule of Christ. Further, it is a knowledge by the individual that both of these aspects of Christ's lordship apply to him personally. Perhaps our geographical illustration can again be used to make these points clearer. Our traveller once again starts out from Parma to go to Berea. There is no speed limit posted before he passes through Strongsville. After he passes through Strongsville, however, there is a posted speed limit. Whether our traveller sees the sign or not, he is on a road which is under the "lordship" of the posted speed limit. However, knowing or

not knowing this law will make a difference, all other human factors being set aside for the moment, in whether our traveller belongs to that group of motorists which is keeping the law, or to that group which is breaking it. Further, our motorist must combine his knowledge of the speed limit with his knowledge that he is on that part of the linear process of Route 82 which lies between Strongsville and Berea in order to realize that the "lordship" of the speed limit applies to him personally. It must, of course, be remembered that, both in Gullmann's position and in our illustration, these three factors can only be separated conceptually and not in their actual occurrence.

From this estimation of the position of the Christian in relation to Christ, in relation to the world, and in relation to the ongoing time process, Gullmann's understanding of what the ethical stance and attitude of the Christian ought to be flows in a cogent and coherent manner. Because the Christ-event has caused this age to be one of temporal tension, the attitude of the Christian toward the world is based neither on the principle of world affirmation nor on the principle of world denial, but on a combination of both principles. Gullmann describes this combination in the following manner:

The believer lives in a world concerning which he knows that it will pass away, but he knows that it still has its divinely willed place in the framework of redemptive history and is ruled by Christ. In so far as he knows that it will pass away, he denies it: in so far as he knows that it is the divinely willed framework of the present stage of redemptive history, he affirms it.⁸

Gullmann finds one example of this combination of principles in the attitude of the primitive Christian community toward the secular state. In so far as the state is something that will pass away, the

Christians deny it. They do not use the secular courts to settle their intra-community disputes, as St. Paul reminds the Corinthians in the sixth chapter of his first epistle to them. In so far as the state is the means by which God permits these secular powers to control the framework of redemptive history, the Christians affirm it. They obey the injunction of Paul to "be subject to the governing authorities."⁹ Gullmann correctly points out that, in spite of the exegetical pot-shots to which it has been subjected, his interpretation of the exousiai in Rom. 13,1 as the invisible powers of the present age does not determine Gullmann's understanding of the Pauline attitude toward the state. "It by no means introduces a radically new understanding of the Pauline conception of the State"¹⁰ is his reminder to his critics. Rather, as has been shown, Gullmann's understanding of this problem stems from his picture of this age as one of temporal tension and chronological dualism for the Christian.

When, then, is the Church to oppose the state? According to Gullmann, this is to be done whenever the state exceeds the role which God has assigned to it in the present stage of redemptive history. For example, when the state proclaims the total lordship of its human head, it is claiming for itself the role of Christ. Such claims must be denied by the Church. That is why faithful Christians of the first centuries would go to the lions before they would confess "Kyrios Kaisar." That is why any totalitarian state is in principle incompatible with the proclamation of the primitive Church that "Jesus is Lord." Therefore, according to Gullmann, the Church, while it loyally affirms the state and renders to it everything necessary for its existence, is at the same time always ready to deny any claims that the state might make in areas be-

yond its divinely willed limits, and to warn the state that such claims are satanic. To bring the wheel of his thought full circle, it should be noted that, as far as Gullmann is concerned, the Church will maintain this attitude toward the state only so long as it remains aware of its own position in the process of redemptive history. His own summary of the situation is:

The Church will fulfill this assignment if it remains faithful to the fundamental eschatological attitude of the New Testament. It could be shown how in the course of history the Church has always assumed a false attitude toward the State when it has forgotten that the present time is already fulfillment, but not yet consummation.

The same combination of principles, neither world-affirmation nor world-denial, also applies to the stance of the individual Christian over against the things of this world. Gullmann uses the exhortations of Paul in I Cor. 7,29-31 as an illustration of how this combination of principles is to be applied. He intimates that many exegetes emphasize only the negative conclusions in this passage, in which the Christians are urged to live "as though they were not rejoicing" and "as though they had no goods." Gullmann balances this accent by reminding his readers that the words "as though" show us clearly that the Christians still did rejoice, that they still did buy and sell the things of this world. That the individual Christian will practice this combination of principles, however, depends upon his being aware of his present role in the redemptive process. According to Gullmann, such an awareness of his present role cannot take place unless the Christian is also aware of his relationship to the mid-point of the process, the Christ-event which occurred in past time. "Our personal life is anchored in the time line of the Christ-event, which comprehends past, present, and future."¹²

On this basis, but only on this basis, can such biblical expressions as "to die with Christ," "to be glorified with Christ," and "Christ lives in me" be interpreted in a non-mystical manner. "The dependence of the individual life on a process which unfolds in time"¹³ is, according to Gullmann, what distinguishes the participation of the Christian in the Body of Christ from the participation in a timeless myth by the follower of a Greek mystery religion. For the mystic, participation in the myth or in the god which he seeks takes place beyond time; for the Christian, participation in the Body of Christ takes place in the present because the past has become real for him, yet the past remains distinct from the present. Gullmann's understanding of Baptism illustrates both aspects of this participation in Christ's Body:

Through Baptism . . . there becomes real for the individual, on the one side, the "dying with" and the "rising with" Christ, and so the participation in what occurred in the past, and on the other side, the impartation of the Holy Spirit, and so the participation in the redemptive occurrence of the present and the future.¹⁴

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to the Christian for the service of the Church, the present unfolding of the redemptive process. This means that the service of each and every Christian finds its value in redemptive history, in the indicative of the present and complete lordship of Christ. It is in this indicative that all New Testament imperatives are anchored. These imperatives are not to be taken as the setting forth of general rules, but as the giving of "concrete instructions for concrete cases."¹⁵ The principle by which this indicative of Christ's lordship is to be applied to these concrete cases is the principle of love. "The imperative of love of neighbor grows out of redemptive history's indicative of the love of God for us."¹⁶ When and how

this application is to be made, however, is not left to the subjective judgment of the individual Christian. One of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to each Christian is that of "testing," which Cullmann defines as "the capacity of forming the correct Christian ethical judgment at each given moment."¹⁷ Cullmann's understanding of the relationship between individual Christian ethics and redemptive history can perhaps be summarized in this manner: Because the Christian, a member of the Body of Christ, knows where the Body has been and where It is going, he is able to have a proper attitude toward the things of this world, to have a wife, for example, as though he did not. Because the Christian knows where he is right now, he is able to apply the indicative of Christ's lordship to his own immediate problems and situations.

This brief summary of Cullmann's understanding of New Testament ethics should suffice to show that for him this position is closely connected with the primitive Christian conception of time as a linear process. In evaluating Cullmann's understanding of New Testament ethics, it is legitimate to ask whether this dependence upon the linear concept of time is really necessary in order for Cullmann to arrive at these conclusions. For example, does it require an understanding of the linear process of time in order to realize that the seventh chapter of First Corinthians does not give general rules but "concrete instructions for concrete cases?" Could not this same insight be obtained merely by taking seriously the first phrase of this chapter, "now concerning the matters about which you wrote?" Is it necessary to maintain that the New Testament concept of time is linear in order to be able to say that "the imperative of love of neighbor grows out of redemptive history's

indicative of the love of God for us?" Have not many exegetes come to a similar conclusion without investigating the biblical concept of time or coming to any conclusions about the nature of time? Is Gullmann perhaps more of a systematician than he himself realizes? Answering all of these questions in the affirmative does not, of course, invalidate any of Gullmann's conclusions concerning the nature of New Testament ethics. It does, however, point out that Gullmann's approach to this problem, by way of the biblical concepts of time and history, is not the only path by which to arrive at his conclusions, and may not be the shortest, most direct route.

Our main concern, however, is with Gullmann's concept of time. It is now necessary to evaluate that aspect of time which Gullmann's studies in the area of ethics have caused him to emphasize more heavily, namely the concepts of chronological dualism and temporal tension. If the chronological dualism consists of the overlapping of two segments of the linear time process, where is the temporal tension located? Is this tension something which exists between events themselves, between the salvation events by which Christ has already fulfilled and established his lordship and the events of secular history which, as part of the framework of this present age, have not yet passed away? This is what Gullmann seems to imply. There is, however, an alternative location for this temporal tension, namely the psyche of the Christian, who by God's grace has been drawn into the redemptive process through his participation in the Body by Which Christ exercise His lordship, but who has not been taken out of this present world. Mouroux is a convincing proponent of this concept of temporal tension. Speaking of the individual

Christian, he tells us:

His psyche is the battleground of an inevitable tension. By his activities as a member of the human race, he lives in cosmic time. By faith he lives in the Church's salvation-time. Insofar as his psyche is in the world, salvation-time seems to be inserted in cosmic time; insofar as his psyche sees God, by faith, cosmic time seems to be enveloped in salvation-time.¹⁸

If it could be shown that what Gullmann calls the "coming" age is identical to what Mouroux calls "salvation-time," and that what Gullmann calls this "present" age is what Mouroux calls "cosmic time," then it would be much easier to understand what Gullmann means by the term "temporal tension." This temporal tension could then be explained as the individual Christian's subjective realization that he is simul justus et peccator. Gullmann, however, does not write about the redemptive process from this subjective viewpoint. The passage from Mouroux cited above emphasizes how, at a given moment in the present, salvation-time envelops cosmic time for an individual Christian. Gullmann, however, would maintain that the "envelopment" (he does not use this exact word) of the world process by the salvation process does not actually occur until the end of the world process, because this "envelopment" is itself a temporal process, the process which has previously been described as the progressive advance of the movement of the principle of representation. "The world process has already begun to enter again into the redemptive process without, however, being as yet identical with it. . . . at the end . . . the redemptive history again becomes world history,"¹⁹ is the way that Gullmann expresses this idea. Gullmann, however, does not really make clear whether the distinction between redemptive process and world process is ontological or conceptual. Some passages seem to imply one view; some of them seem to imply the other. Unless

Gullmann should address himself to this question more specifically, his readers will only be able to speculate as to the precise meaning and location of what Gullmann calls "the temporal tension between present and future." This problem can be both simplified and complicated by a study of Gullmann's picture of the events which will end this tension. Such a study is the subject of this paper's third chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND CULLMANN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE END OF THIS PRESENT AGE

There are two major themes in Cullmann's description of the end of this present age which are related to his concept of time. The first of these themes is his treatment of the doctrine of the resurrection, which has stimulated reaction in many theological circles. The second of these themes is the distinction which Cullmann makes between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God, a distinction which has not provoked as much theological reaction as it deserves. As these two themes are studied in this third chapter, perhaps it will be seen that they are helpful for tying together some of the loose ends of the previous chapters. Space does not permit us to connect these two themes to each other, or to treat either of them exhaustively. They will be studied here only as they relate to Cullmann's concept of time.

"The Christian belief in the resurrection, as distinct from the Greek belief in immortality, is tied to a divine total process implying deliverance."¹ With these words Cullmann connects the New Testament teachings concerning the resurrection with the New Testament concept of time. At the same time, Cullmann tells us that the resurrection "is a new creation of matter, an incorruptible matter."² Therefore, from the point of view of the resurrection, chronological tension consists in the fact that in the resurrection of Christ the new creation has already been inaugurated, but will not be consummated until the creation of the new heaven and the new earth, which is to take place at the end

of this age. The term "end," Gullmann tells us, "is to be taken literally, that is, temporally."³ from this premise follows Gullmann's assertion that "those who have died in Christ, even as dead, do not yet belong in the future stage of redemptive history, but in the present stage."⁴ From this assertion there follows a description of the "interim state" of the dead in Christ which helps us to understand Gullmann's concept of temporal tension. In his own words:

We wait and the dead wait. Of course the rhythm of time may be different for them than for the living; and in this way the interim time may be shortened for them. . . . this expression to sleep, compels us to the view that for the dead another time-consciousness exists, that of the "sleeping." But that does not mean that the dead are not still in time.⁵

That there are two time-consciousnesses within the temporal tension clearly implies that temporal tension is not only a result of the Christians subjective realization that he belongs to two different ages. Temporal tension is also found in the objective fact that the new creation of a spiritual body takes place at at least two different chronological points of the present age. It has taken place in the resurrection of Christ and it will take place for all men at the end of this present age.

When Gullmann describes the nature of this new creation, however, he clouds his description of the New Testament concept of time somewhat. In describing this new creation, Gullmann writes:

Then only for the first time there will be nothing but Spirit, nothing but the power of life, for then death will be destroyed with finality. Then there will be a new substance for all things visible. Instead of the fleshly matter there appears the spiritual, that is, instead of corruptible matter there appears the incorruptible.⁶

This description of the new creation raises some problems from the systematician's point of view. First, that the newness of the new creation

consists of its incorruptibility is based on the premise that the corruptibility and death of this present creation are caused by sin. This premise is explicitly set forth by Gullmann earlier in this essay.⁷ Since this is the case, does the assertion that "there will be a new substance for all things visible" imply that the substance of this present age will be completely destroyed? If this is true, where is the continuity between our present soma and our resurrection soma? From the context of this assertion, however, it is evident that what Gullmann means to say is that our mortal body will be "transformed" into a spiritual body. Then, however, he cannot speak of a new bodily "substance" being created, at least not in the usual sense of that term, because the Spirit-created quality of incorruptibility is related to man in the same manner as is the sin-created quality of corruptibility. The dangers of identifying sin and human substance have been clearly set forth in our Lutheran confessions⁸ and do not need to be repeated.

A second problem raised by this description of the new creation is the dilemma posed by the question "is time itself one of the things which will have to be re-created at the new creation?" If it is, then the endless time-line cannot be an attribute of God, as Gullmann claims that it is, because the time of this present age will have been found to be something corruptible. However, if time is not re-created at the new creation, in what sense can it be said that "all things visible" will be re-created? Designating something as "visible" implies that it has spatial qualities. Designating these visible things a "matter," even if this noun is qualified by the adjective "spiritual," that is, created by the Spirit, implies that these visible, spatial things can be described

in the categories of the physical sciences. "This is certainly not the Greek sense of bodiless Idea!"⁹ Cullmann tells us, speaking of the spirituality of the new creation. If time is not re-created along with the space of all things visible, then it follows that time is independent of our present physical space. For most contemporary physicists this implication is just as unacceptable as are the other "necessarily outmoded framework elements" of the "primitive world view of the Bible" which, Cullmann tells us, "do not touch the kernel of the matter."¹⁰ Sir James Jeans summarizes this viewpoint of many contemporary physicists in these words:

The physical theory of relativity suggests, although without absolutely conclusive proof, that physical space and physical time have no separate and independent existences; they seem more likely to be abstractions or selections from something more complex, namely a blend of space and time which comprises both.¹¹

Jeans does go on to restrict the application of this suggestion to what he calls "man-sized physics" and suggests the possibility that modern astronomy will discover a way in which nature itself divides the space-time continuum into space and time.

It goes without saying that we do not intend to put this dilemma to God. To do so would be presumptuous and impudent. When this dilemma is put to Cullmann, however, it illustrates the difficulties in which Cullmann becomes involved when he maintains that some aspects of the primitive Christian world-view, their conceptions of time and history, are "basic presuppositions of all New Testament theology," while other aspects of this world-view are not. This difficulty raises the question of whether some, all, or any of our basic presuppositions have to be the same as those of the biblical writers in order for us to arrive at

the same theological conclusions. This question is at the innermost heart of Gullmann's differences with Bultmann. It is basic to their other differences which have been treated in this paper. All that can be done here, however, is to point out how important this difference is. An attempt to resolve it cannot be made now. Until a theologian has come to a conclusive position on this question, his evaluation of Gullmann's concept of time ought, in fairness both to Gullmann and to himself, to remain suspended.

Another theme which is part of Gullmann's picture of the end of this present age is the distinction which he makes between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God. The kingdom of Christ is associated with His role as a Mediator, which means that it will end at the consummation of this present age at the new creation, since a Mediator will no longer be needed. The exegetical base upon which Gullmann maintains this position is somewhat narrower than those upon which most of his other insights are founded. It is virtually limited to one explicit passage, I Cor. 15,28, which speaks of the Son becoming subject to the Father at the end, clearly implying the termination of what Gullmann calls the kingdom of Christ. In general, contemporary exegesis of this passage agrees with Gullmann that it refers to the end of Christ's role as a Mediator. However, one commentary reminds us that "the passage is a summary of mysteries which our present knowledge does not enable us to explain and which our present faculties, perhaps, do not enable us to understand."¹³ Gullmann, however, sheds some light on these mysteries by connecting them with the New Testament understanding of time. Gullmann admits that the distinction between these two kingdoms is not

very explicit in the New Testament. He attributes this to the chronological dualism by which the coming age of the new creation has been inaugurated before the present age has been completed. This is what makes it possible for Jesus, even before His death, to see Satan cast down from heaven. (Luke 10,17) When he distinguishes between these two kingdoms, Gullmann tells us that:

the chronological differentiation between them is unequivocally implicit in the New Testament. In substance the Regnum Christi is no more separate from the kingdom of God the Father than the Son is separate from the Father, but from the point of view of time it represents a power of its own.¹⁴

This passage does not only illuminate Gullmann's distinction between these two kingdoms; it also sheds light upon his understanding of the New Testament concept of time and the use which he makes of this understanding in his other studies. Here Gullmann ascribes to time the power to differentiate that which would otherwise remain undifferentiated, namely the content of these two kingdoms. In some respect, therefore, time is not part of this content, but exists independently of it. Of what does the content of these kingdoms consist? Does it consist of the total universe over which this kingship is exercised, or does it consist only in the truth that kingship is exercised? If the content of these kingdoms is the total universe, then time and space are separated by Gullmann in a way that again involves him in a contradiction from the viewpoint of contemporary physics. This problem once more stems from Gullmann's attempt to distinguish between aspects of the primitive world-view which are essential to biblical theology and aspects which are not. If the content of these kingdoms is the truth that kingship is exercised by God, then the scientific and philosophical problems of

the relationship between space and time no longer have any bearing on our evaluation of Gullmann's concept of time. This assertion follows from the premise that the Christian apprehends the truth of divine kingship by faith, not by scientific evidence. Therefore the time by which this kingship is divided into two kingdoms is also a matter of faith rather than sight.

For Gullmann, then, making the primitive Christian conception of time a basic presupposition of all New Testament theology offers the contemporary Christian a possible way of integrating the primitive concept of time held by the New Testament authors with his own world-view. He can accept, by faith, the primitive Christian concept of time and reject current philosophical insights on this subject to the extent that they conflict with the primitive Christian views. To do this, however, would put a different skandalon, the linear conception of time, in the place of the offensive significance of the temporal event of Good Friday. The offense of the cross does consist, in part, of its decisive, once-for-all character, as Gullmann so aptly points out. This may very well have been the chief way in which the cross was a stumbling block to the people of that era. Does not, however, the main offense of the cross consist in its condemnation of human pride and self-righteousness? Is it not more difficult for man to believe that his sins are serious enough to make the whole process of salvation necessary than to believe that the event of the cross is the mid-point of this process? Here Gullmann's stress on the importance of the linear concept of time has led him to over-emphasize one aspect of the offense of the cross at the expense of other aspects of this concept, again showing that perhaps he is more of a systematician than he himself supposes.

CONCLUSION

At this point it is necessary to recognize that Gullmann has been analyzed and criticized from points of view other than those presented here. James Barr, for example, in his Biblical Words for Time, criticizes the method of lexical study upon which, he claims, Gullmann bases most of his findings. This method rests, Barr tells us, on "the assumption that biblical language, in its grammatical mechanisms or in its lexical stock, will somehow surely and naturally reflect, or correspond to, or cohere with, biblical thought."¹ This assumption has led Gullmann to call the words kairos and aion "concepts," even though not all of the occurrences of these words fit into the limitations of one particular concept. Barr demonstrates that, linguistically speaking, this is a bad habit. Barr further charges Gullmann with using Greek transliterations in order to escape the burden of demonstrating that a particular occurrence of kairos or aion does fit into what Gullmann understands as the New Testament concept of time.

John Marsh, in his The Fulness of Time, advances two further criticisms of Gullmann. In the first place, Marsh maintains that, if the biblical time-line arises from the joining together of God's kairoi, as Gullmann claims, then this time is not really linear. Secondly, Marsh feels that it is impossible for Gullmann to affirm a real doctrine of the incarnation within the categories of his thinking about time.² Our failure to treat these critiques in more detail has been a matter of selecting what was felt to be more important, not an attempt to ignore the stimulus of questions raised by these and other men.

Perhaps this paper, especially in its last two chapters has over-emphasized some of the difficulties in which Gullmann becomes involved when he permits the New Testament conception of time to influence and interpenetrate his approach to other New Testament questions. His approach has yielded not only problems for the theologian, but also many valuable and stimulating insights, in that it treats some areas of New Testament study from a new angle of vision. It is hoped that as the reader looks through these three windows into Gullmann's theological house he will see the stimulating insights as well as the puzzling problems.

As for the problems, it must be admitted that the treatment of them in this paper has been at best tentative and probing, perhaps excessively concise. It is hoped, however, that this paper indicates a trend in critiques of Gullmann, a trend away from the exegetical and toward the systematic, a trend that goes beyond the linguistic insights of a critic such as Barr to a study of the systematic presuppositions of both Gullmann and critics.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹Oscar Gullmann, Christ and Time, translated from the German by Floyd Filson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950) pp. 15-16.

²ibid., p. 16.

³ibid., p. 53.

⁴ibid., p. 62.

⁵ibid.

⁶ibid., p. 26. Chronos, a third Greek word for time, is treated by Gullmann in a very minimal manner.

⁷ibid., p. 16.

CHAPTER I

¹Gullmann, Christ and Time, p. 29.

²Gullmann, "Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of Myth and the New Testament," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXVII (January 1956), p. 24.

³Gullmann, Christ and Time, p. 32.

⁴ibid.

⁵ibid., p. 42.

⁶ibid., p. 46.

⁷ibid., p. 67, emphasis added.

⁸ibid., p. 68, emphasis added.

⁹ibid., p. 62.

¹⁰ibid., p. 79.

¹¹ibid., p. 89.

¹²Gullmann, The Return of Christ, in The Early Church, edited by A. J. B. Higgins (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956) p. 144.

- ¹³ ibid., p. 153.
- ¹⁴ Cullmann, He Who Comes After Me, in The Early Church, p. 182.
- ¹⁵ Rudolf Bultmann, History of Salvation and History, in Existence and Faith, translated from the German by Schubert Ogden (New York: Meridian Books, 1960) pp. 231-232.
- ¹⁶ ibid., p. 239.
- ¹⁷ Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 95.
- ¹⁸ ibid., p. 115, emphasis added.
- ¹⁹ Jean Mouroux, The Mystery of Time, translated from the French by J. Drury (New York: Desclee Company, 1964) p. 69.
- ²⁰ ibid., emphasis Mouroux's.
- ²¹ Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament, translated from the German by S. C. Guthrie and C. A. M. Hall (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959) p. 317, emphasis added.

CHAPTER II

- ¹ Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 67. The alert reader will notice that Cullmann here deals with only two of the three kinds of duration which, he claims, are signified by the word aion. For a good critique of Cullmann's understanding of the word aion, cf. James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (Naperville, Ill.: A. R. Allenson, 1962) pp. 63-78.
- ² Cullmann, The State in the New Testament (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1956) p. 111.
- ³ ibid., p. 4.
- ⁴ Cullmann, The Return of Christ, in The Early Church, p. 154.
- ⁵ Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 187.
- ⁶ ibid.
- ⁷ ibid., p. 188.
- ⁸ ibid., p. 213.
- ⁹ Rom. 13,1.
- ¹⁰ Cullmann, The State in the New Testament, p. 98.

- ¹¹ ibid., p. 91, emphasis added.
- ¹² Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 218.
- ¹³ ibid.
- ¹⁴ ibid., p. 221.
- ¹⁵ ibid., p. 229.
- ¹⁶ ibid.
- ¹⁷ ibid., p. 228.
- ¹⁸ Mouroux, op. cit., p. 269, emphasis Mouroux's.
- ¹⁹ Cullmann, Christ and Time, pp. 188-189.

CHAPTER III

- ¹ Cullmann, "Immortality of the Soul and Resurrection of the Dead," Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, XXI (1955-56), p. 21.
- ² ibid.
- ³ ibid., p. 26.
- ⁴ Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 233.
- ⁵ Cullmann, "Immortality . . .," p. 31.
- ⁶ ibid., p. 25.
- ⁷ ibid., p. 16.
- ⁸ FC, SD, I, 38-41, in Die Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche, edited by Hans Lietzmann (Fourth Edition by Ernst Wolf, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959) pp. 856-857.
- ⁹ Cullmann, "Immortality . . .," p. 25.
- ¹⁰ Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 30.
- ¹¹ James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943) pp. 63-64.
- ¹² Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 26, emphasis Cullmann's.

¹³Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1911), p. 357.

¹⁴Gullmann, Kingship of Christ and Church in the New Testament, in The Early Church, p. 116, emphasis added.

CONCLUSION

¹James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (Naperville, Ill.: A. R. Allenson, 1962) p. 161.

²John Marsh, The Fulness of Time (London, Nisbet and Company, 1952) p. 177.

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