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MYTHICAL CRITICISM

An Evaluation of Rudolf Bultmann

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Rudolf Bultmann has not lacked his champions. For many, he is almost Martin Luther *redivivus*. Others see him as Satan *incarnatus*. No matter which is the stronger influence, we cannot escape the undeniable importance of this man. He is a devout churchman; a keen, critical scholar of the Bible; and a disciple of Martin Heidegger. His way of doing theology has begun a new chapter in the history of interpretation.

If Bultmann's own scholarly output has been prodigious, the theological dialogue which he has engendered has been overwhelming. A paper of this scope could not begin to assimilate all of the relevant material. It will be our specific purpose in the next few pages to outline the principle features of Bultmann's mythical criticism—his call for demythologization and his existential interpretation of the kerygma. Also, we shall briefly investigate the directions in which Bultmann's thought has been developed by his leading followers. We shall conclude with some general observations concerning the function of myth in literature and the validity of mythical criticism for Biblical exegesis.
All his early writings indicated the direction in which Bultmann was heading, but the essay which really began the entire debate and brought into sharp focus the program which he had in mind was "New Testament and Mythology," published in 1941. He begins by leaving no doubt as to which aspects of the New Testament fall under the heading "myth." Not only the three-storied view of the universe, but all the passages which speak of good and evil spirits at work in the universe, everything that points to supernatural intervention in the earthly process—all this is mythical. Our creedal statements are all embedded in the mythical framework—God sending His Son to earth to die on a cross and then raising Him from the dead, the consequent defeat of death and evil spirits, the ascent into the clouds with the promise to return at the end of the world, the believer's involvement in this salvation through baptism and eucharist—"all this is the language of mythology, and the origin of the various themes can be easily traced in the contemporary mythology of Jewish Apocalyptic and in the redemption myths of Gnosticism."1 For Bultmann, myth is that which speaks of God and His action as objective and observable, immanent in this world. "Myths give to the transcendent reality an immanent, this-worldly objectivity."2 These words are always chosen with extreme care, for Bultmann wishes to be very clear as to what he is doing. When he speaks about myth or the nature of miracles or acts of God, he
does not at all insist that God does not act in behalf of men. He only insists that the action of God is observable only to faith. He has said this a number of times in a number of ways, and it is absolutely necessary that we be clear about this. For instance, in his article, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics," he says, "Faith, which speaks of its encounter with the acts of God, cannot defend itself against the charge of illusion, for the encounter with God is not objective like a worldly event." And then two paragraphs later, "That God cannot be seen apart from faith does not mean that he does not exist apart from it." And so when he speaks of myths of the incarnation or resurrection, he is not saying that the incarnation and resurrection stories are fictitious legends which have a religious or spiritual meaning. He is saying that the reality of the incarnation and the resurrection is not susceptible to scientific, historical proof, but is observable only to eyes of faith.

But even more than this, the question of historical accuracy is itself not at all a main concern. The acts themselves have a secondary importance outside of the context of faith. To use our traditional terminology, a man goes to hell even though God's Son died on the cross and rose again for him if he does not believe that this is so and respond in faith to this action of God. The crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ as isolated historical events or as abstract propositions must be brought into the present
in order to work their power. The contents of the word of Christ, says Bultmann, "may also be formulated in a series of abstract propositions," but "abstract propositions can only become the Word of God when it is proclamation—i.e. when it takes the shape of an event here and now in the viva vox—that is the eschatological meaning of the ζωή."5

There is a certain denigrating of history in all this, and Bultmann has been reproached by a number of critics for his loss of the historical emphases in Christianity. We shall discuss the relation of demythologization and history later. At this point it is important that we see that in his strong emphasis on the present meaning of Christian faith, Bultmann does not feel it necessary to deny the reality of God's acts in history. This is the error of an earlier liberal theology to which he is as strongly opposed as is Karl Barth. In fact, Thomas Oden has noted the interesting situation that "the energies now being put into a new quest for the historical Jesus are being expended, significantly enough, not by those attacking Bultmann for his lack of historical rootage for faith, but precisely by Bultmann's closest associates and students."6

Moreover, those who are so concerned about the historic, objective nature of the saving events are victims of a kind of schizophrenic approach to the problem. Carl Braaten has made the incisive statement,

On the one hand the historical facts in question are said to be objective in the sense that they may be ascertained and
established by scientific historical methods, while on the other hand, the redemptive occurrences are supposedly accessible as such only to faith. Now, which is it?

Why demythologize? The first answer that has been given is that the Biblical message is patently set within a world view that is in many ways antithetical to the world view of modern man. Then it was necessary to see that to speak of the world view of the first century as mythical does not necessarily flatly contradict a traditional understanding of the historical nature of the saving events. Finally, Bultmann insists that his ultimate reason for demythologizing is that the Gospel may be preached. All too often the Gospel simply does not get a hearing because our scientifically-minded age has no room for spirits, good or evil, directly involved in the course of worldly history. Replying to Karl Jaspers, Bultmann said,

The purpose of demythologization is not to make religion more acceptable to modern man by trimming the traditional Biblical texts, but to make clearer to modern man what the Christian faith is. He must be confronted with the issue of decision, be provoked to decision by the fact that the stumbling block to faith, the skándalon, is peculiarly disturbing to man in general, not only to modern man. . . . Such an attempt does not aim at reassuring modern man by saying to him: "You no longer have to believe this and that." To be sure, it says this among other things, and may thereby relieve his pangs of conscience; but if it does so, it does so not by showing him that the number of things to be believed is smaller than he had thought, but because it shows him that
to believe at all is qualitatively different from accepting a certain number of propositions. 8

In this connection, Bultmann insists on his own close association with Luther's way of thinking. Demythologizing is not only permissible, it is necessary, in order to insure the vitality of a faith fixed on the proper focal points. As he has said repeatedly,

Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought. Like the doctrine of justification, demythologizing destroys every longing for security. There is no difference between security based on good works and security built on objectifying knowledge. . . . He who abandons every form of security shall find the true security. 9

We have now come to the question of what happens when Bultmann demythologizes. The answer has been indicated in what we have already said. One of Bultmann's characteristic emphases is the fact that you cannot interpret in a vacuum. You cannot approach the Biblical material in an absolutely cold and objective fashion. The basic presupposition for every form of exegesis is that "your own relation to the subject-matter prompts the question you bring to the text and elicits the answers you obtain from the text." 10 The approach which you favor is your hermeneutic, and you are far ahead in the game if you realize that you must have a hermeneutical principle, and therefore you choose one with care. Bultmann has approached the problem head-on. Since every interpreter is dependent on conceptions which he has
inherited from a philosophical tradition, "our question is simply which philosophy today offers the most adequate perspective and conceptions for understanding human existence. Here it seems to me that we should learn from existentialist philosophy." Here lies Bultmann's famed relation to Martin Heidegger. John Macquarrie's comment on the relation of Biblical and existentialist thought is instructive:

What existentialism teaches about the being of man has a certain kinship and sympathy with the understanding of his being implicit in biblical thought, so that the theologian who approaches the Bible with an existentialist understanding of being is likely to interpret its teaching in a way which would be faithful to the authentic thought of the biblical writers themselves. Bultmann's major debt to existentialism lies in his understanding of eschatology, and this in turn relates to history--specifically, the relation between universal history and personal history. This he develops at great length in his Gifford Lectures. The point is clear:

The meaning in history lies always in the present, and when the present is conceived as the eschatological present by Christian faith the meaning in history is realized. ... Always in your present lies the meaning in history, and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only in your responsible decisions.

This is the heart of Bultmann's existentialist theology (and we should note that Bultmann demythologizes because of his commitment to existentialist interpretation, and not vice-versa--demythologizing is really a secondary concern). The
overarching concern is for a life of decision called into question in the present, and his theological thrusts may be sorted out under this heading. If we demythologize, we do so in order to have the Biblical message confront us in the present, and here we should note what Bultmann says about Biblical eschatology. In a very real sense, history ended in Jesus Christ, and Bultmann sees Biblical precedent in making this emphasis. The process of demythologizing the early Christian conception of Jesus began partially with Paul, and radically with John. Although Paul still expected the end of the world as a cosmic drama, "with the resurrection of Christ the decisive event has already happened." But for the more radical John, "the coming and departing of Jesus is the eschatological event. The resurrection of Jesus, Pentecost and the parousia of Jesus are one and the same event, and those who believe have already eternal life." As Bultmann demythologizes eschatology, he has some creative insights—"As in the conception of heaven the transcendence of God is imagined by means of the category of space, so in the conception of the end of the world, the idea of the transcendence of God is imagined by means of the category of time." In the face of this transcendence, the world is empty in its transitoriness. But it is also empty "because men have turned it into a place in which evil spreads and sin rules. The end of the world, therefore, is the judgment of God." Further, "the end of the world has not only a negative but
also a positive meaning. To use nonmythological terms, the finiteness of the world and of man over against the transcendent power of God contains not only warning, but also consolation. The function of New Testament eschatology, then, once we rid it of its Jewish apocalyptic trappings, is to point to the direct confrontation of God and man in an ever-present eschatological Now. But at this moment of confrontation, another element is also always present—the eschatological event of Jesus Christ. This brings into focus the remaining elements in Bultmann's thought. The moment of confrontation, of decision, is radically different for Christian and non-Christian. Here is the *kerygma* which Bultmann is so insistent upon preserving. Here is where the choice is made between authentic and inauthentic existence. Here is where the power of preaching creates faith.

It is in this concern for the present that existential philosophy makes its contribution to man's understanding. Existentialism insists that man is a historical being, and his existence is true only in the present acts of existing:

> He realizes his existence if he is aware that each "now" is the moment of free decision: What element in his past is to retain value? What is his responsibility toward his future, since no one can take the place of another? No one can take another's place, since every man must die his own death.

And yet for all the value of existentialist philosophy in clarifying man's position and the poles of his existence, we must see that its function is purely preliminary. It brings clarification and understanding, but not power. It
tells man his condition, but it does not release him from it: "Existential philosophy, while it gives no answer to the question of my personal existence, makes personal existence my own personal responsibility, and by doing so it helps to make me open to the word of the Bible." In his essay, "Humanism and Christianity," Bultmann has carefully explained the difference between faith and non-faith at the moment of decision. As always, he goes out of his way to be scrupulously fair in evaluating both sides of the picture. Humanism is not the presumptuous faith in man that sets man above all. Rather,

humanistic faith is faith in the idea of man which stands as a norm above his empirical life, prescribing his duty and thereby bestowing upon him dignity and nobility. Humanism is faith in the spirit of which man partakes, the spirit by whose power man creates the world of the true, the good, the beautiful, in science and philosophy, in law and in art.

And further,

for humanism there is genuine freedom only in the acknowledgment and acceptance of a norm superior to the subjective, arbitrary will. The freedom of subjective arbitrariness is a delusion, for it delivers man up to his drives to do just that at any moment which at the moment lust and passion dictate.

Finally, "autonomy, understood in its genuine sense, is theonomy, for the law of the spirit which is consented to in freedom is the law of God." But, having cited humanism's value, we must point up its differences from Christianity--differences which lie in the realm of the Beyond.

For humanism God's Beyond is spirit of
which man with his spirit partakes. . . . For the Christian understanding, God is always the hidden one and the coming one. God's Beyond is his constant futurity, his constant being-out-before. With this transcendent God man has communion only in openness to the future.

The either-or of humanism and Christianity ultimately is this: "Does man will to live his life by his own resources, his own power, or by the grace of God? . . . As the Christian faith knows that man receives his real life not from the law but by grace, it also knows that it is precisely grace which provides the power to fulfill the law." And now, to be very explicit, to reach the essential point, "This word of grace has been made concrete in Jesus Christ, who is present as the word of God in the proclamation of the church."26

Here we are face-to-face with Bultmann's understanding of Jesus Christ as eschatological event. It is in this connection that he advances his controversial views on the significance of the crucifixion and resurrection. "According to the New Testament the decisive significance of Jesus Christ is that he—in his person, his coming, his passion, and his glorification—is the eschatological event."27 The eschatological event of Jesus Christ is a once-for-all event.

"Once for all" is not the uniqueness of an historical event but means that a particular historical event, that is, Jesus Christ, is to be understood as the eschatological "once for all." As an eschatological event this "once for all" is always present in the proclaimed word, not as a timeless truth, but as happening here and now."28
And what is achieved in this moment of decision? Through God's grace in Jesus Christ, the believer gains his self by losing his self. He is open to the future, while the possibilities of the future bring only anxiety and fear to the non-Christian. "The future always offers to man the gift of freedom--Christian faith is the power to grasp this gift."29 And again: "The New Testament speaks and faith knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable of self-commitment, capable of faith and love, of his authentic life."30 And so man is always what he is at the present moment of decision--"The adjective 'Christian' can never qualify the substantive character. Only the decision of each new moment can be called 'Christian.'"31

When we speak of the eschatological event of Jesus Christ, we are speaking, first and foremost, about crucifixion and resurrection. Bultmann presents his views about this clearly and succinctly in "New Testament and Mythology." It is the cross which is the central event in Christianity. It is the crucifixion, not the resurrection, which is the true stumbling-block of Christian faith--the skandalon that all of God's power is concentrated in a naked man dying on a cross. "The abiding significance of the cross is that it is the judgement of the world, the judgement and the deliverance of man."32 Through the power of the cross we are crucified with Christ--we lose our life, and therefore are capable of finding it. At each eschatological moment of decision in our lives, the cross of Christ gives us the
power to choose authentic existence—"If it is true that the Christian faith involves free openness to the future, then it is freedom from anxiety in the face of the Nothing. For this freedom nobody can decide of his own will; it can only be given, in faith." The cross of Christ is not merely mythical; it is an actual, observable, historical event. But it is not merely this, either. It is a historical event with cosmic significance, an event which reaches into each present moment with its power. And here lies its connection with the resurrection:

The meaning of the cross is not disclosed from the life of Jesus as a figure of past history, a life which needs to be reproduced by historical research. On the contrary, Jesus is not proclaimed merely as the crucified; he is also risen from the dead. The cross and the resurrection form an inseparable unity.

What, then, is their relationship?

The resurrection is not a mythical event adduced in order to prove the saving efficacy of the cross, but an article of faith just as much as the meaning of the cross itself. Indeed, faith in the resurrection is really the same thing as faith in the saving efficacy of the cross.

And again, "If the event of Easter Day is in any sense a historical event additional to the event of the cross, it is nothing else than the rise of faith in the risen Lord, since it was this faith which led to the apostolic preaching." There is no denying that Bultmann is logically consistent at this point. The reason for his views lies in his insistence on existentialist theology, not in his demand for demythologization. Christianity provides power for the ever-
present moments of decision in personal existence. Faith in the cross brings the power to crucify the self, to trust solely in God to care for the future, to choose the selfless options of love and sacrifice. The resurrection puts the seal on this. It is an affirmation of our faith in the cross. As we have died in the crucifixion, we have new life in the resurrection. The only historically demonstrable fact of that first Easter is that the disciples were new men. Their faith had risen. Did Jesus actually rise from the dead? At the one point level of existence the answer must be yes, for the disciples demonstrated the power of the resurrection. In their lives and faith, He had risen. The moments of decision in their lives confirmed this. Jesus rose in their kerygma, in their preaching. Is the resurrection an event that can be tested by scientific measurement? No, "the resurrection cannot be a miraculous proof capable of demonstration and sufficient to convince the sceptic that the cross really has the cosmic and eschatological significance ascribed to it."37 Was the tomb actually empty? Only to eyes of faith. And, existentially speaking, it is beside the point anyway. Crucifixion and resurrection are one eschatological event in the life of the Christian.

At this point we must develop questions and answers hinted at in this understanding. How do we come to believe in the cross as the cross of Christ and as the eschatological event? There is only one answer—through preaching. "Christ meets us in the preaching as one crucified and risen. He
meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else. The faith of Easter is just this—faith in the word of preaching."38

One of the striking assets of Bultmann's theology has been his pointing up again the central significance of preaching in the work of the church. In fact, for Bultmann, one of the great glories of the church is that this is where the proclamation is continued and carried on. The emphasis is decidedly a traditional one: God comes to us in His Word.

God meets us in His Word, in a concrete word, the preaching instituted in Jesus Christ. While it may be said that God meets us always and everywhere, we do not see and hear Him always and everywhere, unless His Word supervenes and enables us to understand the moment here and now.39

God's Word is not existential philosophy. Even more to the point, it is a Word rooted in history. Here Bultmann sees one avenue by which he can approach those who are put off by his lack of historical consciousness—"This living Word of God is not invented by the human spirit and by human sagacity; it rises up in history. Its origin is an historical event, by which the speaking of this word, the preaching, is rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus Christ."40 What is normative for Christian faith is precisely a historical event, but an event that has present significance. This is the kerygma, the proclamation of the saving act of God—

The kerygma maintains that the eschatological emissary of God is a concrete figure of a particular historical past, that his eschatological activity was wrought out in a human fate, and that therefore it is an event whose
eschatological character does not admit of a secular proof.41

The kerygma is that which cannot be demythologized; God has specifically acted for man in Jesus Christ. And yet this kerygma is not simply the announcement that Jesus died on the cross and rose again. Kerygma, proclamation, preaching, brings the event into the present. It is a call to a decision for authentic existence. As Bultmann describes it in his Theology of the New Testament, the proclaimed word

is kerygma—herald's service—in the literal sense—authorized, plenipotent proclamation, edict from a sovereign. Its promulgation requires authorized messengers, "heralds," "apostles" (= sent men) (Rom. 10:13-17). So it is, by nature, personal address which accosts each individual, throwing the person himself into question by rendering his self-understanding problematic, and demanding a decision of him.42

This dual aspect of kerygma (historical fact and personal address) is necessary to rescue preaching from the charge of being a history lecture, on the one hand, or a lecture in humanistic ethics on the other. Kerygma is the preaching of an event, but it cannot take a completely objective form since it calls men into question in the multiplicity of their actions. Erich Dinkler, one of Bultmann's closest followers, summarizes Bultmann's position in this way:

The kerygma in the New Testament contains the calling and challenging Word of God occurring in the redemptive act of Christ, the Word of God spoken in the man Jesus of Nazareth once for all, Εχθρος Χριστός. This kerygma, the proclamation of God as acting in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ
for us, is part of the paradoxical event
and cannot be objectified if it is under-
stood in faith. 43

And this leads us to the final aspect of Bultmann's
thought—the role of faith. Faith is not the abandoning of
the modern world view for the world view of the first cen-
tury. It is not merely intellectual assent that certain
things happened at certain times two thousand years ago, or
agreement about a body of doctrine concerning these events.
Faith is commitment of oneself to the life revealed in Jesus
Christ. It is an agreement to live up to the obedience
demanded by God, and a seizing of the power God gives to
obey those demands. It is sacrificing oneself in every
present decision in order to gain one's self, in order to
become a new being. It is trust in God above all things.
As Bultmann says it, faith "is both the demand of and the
gift offered by preaching. Faith is the answer to the
message. Faith is the abandonment of man's own security,
and the readiness to find security only in the unseen
beyond, in God." 44 And more: "Faith in the sense of obedient
self-commitment and inward detachment from the world is only
possible when it is faith in Jesus Christ." 45

"The purpose of my existential interpretation of myth is
precisely to inquire into the possibility of a valid meaning
for the mythical picture of the world, and in this I am
trying to proceed methodically," 46 says Bultmann. This
remark, directed against the "arbitrary assertions" of Karl
Barth, is a clue to the radical honesty and integrity with
which Bultmann approaches his task. Starting from the fine vantage point of taking the secular world seriously, he is making one of the most significant attempts of our time to communicate with "a world come of age" (in Bonhoeffer's later happy phrase). But because his approach is radical, because he has made concessions which have not been made before, a number of men have attacked him at a number of points. Many of the questions asked are valid (although some could only stem from reading him carelessly or belligerently), and facile answers which explain away every objection accomplish nothing.

One of the major legitimate criticisms of Bultmann is that he has lost the historical nature of the Biblical revelation, the pattern of Heilsgeschichte which is the heart of the Biblical message. This criticism comes from a number of respected figures concerned with Lutheran or Roman Catholic orthodoxy—Walter Kūnneth, Ernst Kinder, Paul Althaus, Ludwig Ott, Karl Adam, to name a few. Oscar Cullmann's remarks are relevant here, as he notes that the foolishness of the cross

is not, as Bultmann thinks, a faith in that which is not within man's control and at his disposal. That faith many Greeks would have been able to accept and to express with the aid of real myths. But that the redemptive act is an historical datum, that was "foolishness" for Greek thought and is that for modern thought.47
As we shall see, this criticism applies much more to Fritz Buri and Schubert Ogden than to Bultmann, but it does point up the historical problem in Bultmann's theology. In dealing with this, we must realize that the objection works with a particular conception of history—history understood as a process which takes place within a stable metaphysical framework. This understanding was almost certainly that of the Biblical writers and undoubtedly that of the Middle Ages, but this does not mean that it is necessarily normative for us. Bultmann has developed his answer in his Gifford Lectures, but in this connection he draws on the work of a colleague very close to him in his general theological outlook. This colleague is Friedrich Gogarten, and his book, *Demythologizing and History*, is an attempt to speak to this point. Within the historical approach to theology, according to Gogarten, two points of view are discernible, each guided by its own concept of history. One is the "official" theology of the church, which thinks in terms of objective historical happenings on which Christian faith can be based. But the existential view of history, a view which has its roots in Dilthey and Troeltsch, maintains that history is not an object which can be viewed from the outside. Rather, personal involvement is absolutely necessary—"Modern man is able to envisage history only from the point of view of his own responsibility for it." 48 Again, "whenever one is concerned with history one is concerned also with the historical character (Geschichtlichkeit) of human
existence. . . . This means that the historical character of human existence is involved in every approach to history.  

Therefore, faith can never be established by demonstrating that certain objective happenings took place in the past. Faith arises on the basis of an existential interpretation of the sacred history, which lets us see it as the disclosure of our own historical existence, responsible under the Word of God. It is interesting to note that Gogarten insists that this existential understanding was Luther's understanding, lying behind his sola fide principle. Whether Luther's name is invoked or not, it is obvious that this radical shifting of the historical nature of faith, from a series of saving events in the process of the world to the history of a personal existence, will not satisfy everyone. And yet it can be argued that the one understanding is as legitimate as the other, or (avoiding Bultmann's pitfall of mutual exclusion), one is as necessary as the other. In any case, although existentialist interpretation forsakes the "official" understanding of history, demythologization as such does not necessarily do so, as we have seen from all that Bultmann has said about the nature of myth.

Associated with the historical criticism is the complaint about the loss of the corporate nature of Christian faith in Bultmann's great insistence on the personal character of faith. To a certain extent this is true, although his equally strong emphasis on existential encounter offsets this somewhat. At the same time, Krister Stendahl, noting that
Bultmann is not faithful to Pauline theology in this regard, also observes that Bultmann is not much further away from Paul than Augustine and Luther, with their great concern for introspection and individual reconciliation.  

Probably the greatest protest against Bultmann's theology has been directed against his conception of the resurrection gaining significance solely through its participation in the event of the cross. But it must also be remembered that for this very reason Bultmann says that the resurrection is not a mythological occurrence, but an eschatological event. Roy Harrisville reminds us that Bultmann's interpretation "does not constitute an outright denial of the objective facticity of the resurrection, but rather the possibility of its verification." Again, in his existential approach, Bultmann is working within a tradition of history which states that "there is no truth apart from engagement in it." The entire question is an exceedingly complex one, and we cannot investigate all the avenues of inquiry here. It may well be asked if what Bultmann says about the meaning of the resurrection is completely faithful to the Biblical witness, since Paul himself states that he can only proclaim the word of the cross as Gospel because of the resurrection. It is difficult to make the Bible say that the resurrection is subordinate to the cross, or can stand merely as an introduction to or a faithful response to the cross. Much more can and must be said about the resurrection than Bultmann does. And yet we
must see that what he does say is a valid and important emphasis, even if it does not constitute the whole truth. In terms of the approach to life as being lived in encounter, with decision in the present moment of paramount importance for existence, this understanding of the power of the resurrection is necessary. What Bultmann says has been picked up a number of times in the preaching of the resurrection, and rightfully so. For example, a fine popular treatment of the work of the Holy Spirit in creating resurrection faith unmistakably echoes Bultmann's emphasis--

What Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit are concerned about is that the resurrection must happen in our hearts, not simply that Christ must rise from the dead. He has risen from the dead. His task now is to rise in our hearts. Only if we proclaim His resurrection can He do this. All the work of God in Jesus Christ comes to nothing unless He does rise in us.53

By way of transition we may mention the criticism of Bultmann that he renders theology unnecessary in his extensive use of existential philosophy. That he makes use of philosophy, particularly Heidegger's existentialia, is patently true. Whether theology is rendered unnecessary in the process is another question. Existentialist philosophy, for Heidegger and others, attempts to find categories in which to describe the form and structure of existence. Heidegger characterizes human existence as care (Sorge), and this has a threefold structure. First, there is possibility, the fact that "man's being gets projected ahead of itself."54 This is reflected in Bultmann's constant
allusions to man's openness to the future. Second, there is facticity, the influence of man's environment upon him, man's "thrownness." "Man is thrown into a world to exist there in his situation."55 Basically, man's anxiety reveals this aspect of his existence to him. Third, there is fallenness--"Man flees from the disclosure of anxiety to lose himself in absorption with his instrumental world, or to bury himself in the anonymous impersonal existence of the mass, where no one is responsible."56 When this happens, man has fallen from the possibility of authentic existence into inauthentic existence. Now, how does one rise above inauthentic existence? Bultmann has used Heidegger's existential analysis of the human situation to great profit, but when it comes to the question of coping with the problems of existence, they part company. Heidegger, in his later thought, moves on to a consideration of conscience, a coming to terms with the fact of death and the confrontation with the "nothing," and an involvement in "being;" eventually he reaches a mystical region of thought somewhat analogous to Zen Buddhism. This later development will be discussed more fully below. Bultmann picks up some of these thrusts, but he differs basically as to how freedom from care is to be accomplished. He insists that one cannot achieve freedom on one's own--power only comes through the kerygma, the proclamation of the eschatological event of Jesus Christ. It is the kerygma which differentiates Christianity from secular philosophy, and Bultmann will not surrender this. As he says in a
A more substantial criticism of Bultmann's use of existentialist philosophy comes from his left (all the criticisms we have considered come from the orthodox group to his right). From this quarter the complaint comes that Bultmann is not consistent in his use of existentialism, that he cannot stop short of demythologizing the kerygma. This leads us into a consideration of the ways Bultmann's thought has been developed by "post-Bultmannian" theologians. One of the leading figures in the demand for "dekerygmatization" is the German theologian, Fritz Buri. Drawing on Jaspers (as Bultmann draws on Heidegger), Buri insists, in his "theology of existence," that "grace and revelation are not given in a special act, but are given with existence itself."58 Christianity offers nothing that cannot be gained in philosophy. Its value lies in the almost unique depth of existential insight available in Christian mythology, and it is the task of theologians to exegize this Christian mythology.

Buri's call for dekerygmatization has been brought into prominence in America by Schubert Ogden. In his book, Christ Without Myth, Ogden especially takes Bultmann to task for a "structural inconsistency" in his theology. On the one hand, Bultmann holds that authentic existence is possible to man as
man, but on the other hand authentic existence is possible for man only through faith in Jesus Christ. Summarizing Bultmann's argument, Ogden says that Bultmann introduces the distinction between a "possibility in principle" and a "possibility in fact." He argues that, although the natural man has the possibility in principle of understanding himself authentically, he does not have this possibility in fact, since, as he actually exists, he has always lost this possibility and can recover it only in consequence of God's act in Jesus Christ.\(^\text{59}\)

For Ogden this is an inconsistent position, and he cites Kant as his authority—"Du kannst, denn du sollst; and unless this rule can be shown to be false—and, as we have indicated, it appears to be self-evident—the conclusion just drawn cannot be evaded."\(^\text{60}\) Ogden assumes his position with a number of theologians of the "left" whom he names, as he accepts the first proposition and denies the second—it is true that man has the possibility of authentic existence in principle, but it is not true that man does not have this possibility in fact: "When it is viewed from the standpoint of modern man's picture of himself and his world, his claim that authentic historicity is factually possible only in Jesus Christ must be regarded as just as incredible and irrelevant as the other myths with which it properly belongs."\(^\text{61}\) But, contrary to Ogden, we should note that Bultmann has impressive authority on his side for maintaining this paradox of existence. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, talking about original sin, is saying much the same thing when he maintains that although
sin is inevitable, it is not necessary. The same emphasis is part of the doctrine of original sin in the Formula of Concord, where it is insisted that sin is not substance, but accident. Nevertheless, refusing to acknowledge that this inconsistency may be a necessary paradox (Thomas Oden has pointed out that Ogden is quite alone in his position⁶²), Ogden goes on to formulate a "constructive alternative" to Bultmann's proposals. He suggests two principles toward this end. First, "the demand for demythologization that arises with necessity from the situation of modern man must be accepted without condition."⁶³ This means that the kerygma too must be demythologized, and is essentially the same proposition as Buri had made. The second principle is that "the sole norm of every legitimate theological assertion is the revealed word of God declared in Jesus Christ, expressed in Holy Scriptures, and made concretely present in the proclamation of the church through its word and sacraments."⁶⁴ This sounds very conservative, and is indicative of Ogden's own inconsistency, or at least indicative of a failure on his part to express clearly what he has in mind. The candle is burning at both ends. After proposing this second principle, he will again go on to say that the only final condition for sharing in authentic life is "a condition that can be formulated in complete abstraction from the event Jesus of Nazareth and all that it specifically imports."⁶⁵ This condition is that one "must understand himself in the concrete situations of his existence in the authentic way that is an original
possibility of his life before God." The fact that Ogden has not fully satisfied his own standards for constructive suggestions does not mean that what he has to say is not worthwhile and thought-provoking reading. There are a number of rather enigmatic hints at the implications of his suggestions. Although it is true that even in his subsequent articles he still has not accomplished his purposes satisfactorily (an indicative statement appears in a 1963 article—"The whole meaning of this [Christ] event is to express or reveal God's transcendent love as the sole basis of our authentic existence"), Thomas Oden's comment about him is generous and fair—"His discussion may increasingly be recognized as perhaps the most decisive affirmation of the grace of God as Creator in contemporary theological literature." It is interesting to note that a very cautious conservatism goes right along in insisting that if we allow Bultmann's position, we must allow Ogden's. There can be no temporizing, no qualifications. Commenting on Christ Without Myth, K. Runia says,

'It cannot be denied that this view is consistent. We for ourselves believe that this is indeed the logical outcome of Bultmann's starting point. Bultmann himself may not draw these conclusions, but it was to be expected that others would go further. In the long run half-way positions cannot be maintained.'

For this kind of criticism, it is apparently inconceivable that one can demythologize and still remain a Christian, that one can acknowledge the pervading influence of the world view of the first
century in the Scriptural materials and still claim that the kerygma must be maintained and that God has acted supremely and decisively in Jesus Christ. John Macquarrie has approached this problem with great insight in his The Scope of Demythologizing, and his conclusion is noteworthy: "The limit to demythologizing is nothing other than the recognition of the difference between a philosophy of human existence and a religion of divine grace." 70

In addition to the liberal development of Bultmann's views by Buri and Ogden, there are two other significant trends which have developed from the theology which he originated--the new quest for the historical Jesus, and the implications of the later Heidegger for theology. 71

Perhaps the most important thing to note about the new quest is that its adherents insist that it is new. There is no attempt to come to the same conclusions as the nineteenth century quest or that of Albert Schweitzer. There are two major differences from the old quest: first, there is now a frank recognition that the sources are not coldly factual, biographical reports, but kerygma which tells us how the primitive church believed in and preached Jesus as the Lord; second, the emphasis in the old quest lay in establishing the distance between the Jesus of the Gospels and the Jesus of history, whereas the emphasis in the new quest is establishing the unity between the Christ of the kerygma and the Jesus of history. It is easy enough to see how this stems from Bultmann. He has insisted that the kerygma be based on Jesus
of Nazareth, a concrete figure of history, even if the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection are mythological expressions through which one interprets existence, rather than objective statements about the life of Jesus. Now, still following Bultmann, the new quest asks to what extent the kerygma continues Jesus' understanding of Himself. This is not a question of His inner feelings, but of an understanding that overflowed into actions and words. This is an attempt to encounter the whole person of Jesus through the individual sayings and actions in which His intention and selfhood are latent. This is accomplished by sifting the synoptic Gospels for the actual sayings and deeds of Jesus, and then examining them for what they reveal about His self-understanding. In this process, everything is rejected that has a kerygmatic tone, since this may have been composed by the church. Also excluded from consideration are any Gospel materials which could have arisen in contemporary Judaism. According to James M. Robinson's A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (Robinson is the leading American figure in the movement), there are now two ways of gaining knowledge about the person of Jesus. One is the via kerygmatica—the church's kerygma presents an understanding of Jesus which it presupposes to be a continuation of His own understanding of Himself. The other is the via historica—modern historiography uses the non-kerygmatic material of the Gospel to reconstruct the self-understanding of the historical Jesus. Thus history, as well as the kerygma, offers to those who accept it the possibility of authentic
existence. The new questers claim they have established that Jesus intended a historical encounter with Himself to be an eschatological encounter with God, and that He consequently understood His existence as that of bringer of eschatological salvation. This does not prove that the kerygma is true (which lies beyond proof and is in the realm of faith), but that the kerygma is faithful to Jesus. This optimistic appraisal of the situation has been undercut by Bultmann himself. He agrees that Jesus' own message may reveal a great deal about His understanding of existence, but this is ultimately irrelevant to faith. What is proclaimed by faith is not Jesus' understanding of existence, but the crucified and resurrected Christ. In Jesus' ministry we have only the promise; in the kerygma we have the eschatological fulfillment. It is the resurrection faith that turns the "once" into the "once for all," that makes what Jesus did on Golgotha not just a past event, but an event which is present for me. Since Bultmann's criticism, others have been having second thoughts as well about the value of the new quest, and the movement which was so strong in the fifties has become less sure of itself in the sixties.

The third trend following Bultmann is the attempt to translate the later philosophical thought of Heidegger (as opposed to the early Heidegger which Bultmann used) into theological research, a translation bringing into prominence the necessity of a "new hermeneutic." The leading figure in this movement is Heinrich Ott, who is much concerned with
establishing a mediating position between Barth and Bultmann. The shift in thought from the early Heidegger to the later Heidegger can best be characterized as a move from existentialism to ontology, a shift of focus from human existence to the problem of being itself. Authenticity is no longer understood as a living out of one's own proper potentialities, but as the sheer "letting be" of "what is." Ott sees this position of the later Heidegger as supporting Barth far more than Bultmann. As with Barth, the movement is away from the self and its understanding of existence toward that which is given. For the philosopher, this given is being; for the theologian, it is the revelation of God. Heidegger has taken his early characterization of human existence as care, with its carefully elaborated threefold structure of possibility, facticity, and fallenness, and shown how the anxiety involved is due to the confrontation with nothing—both the nothing of meaninglessness and the final nothing of death. But now this in turn leads to the confrontation with the wonder of being, the great insight that man's encounter with nothing leads to his realization of the reality of being. Man can escape anxiety by accepting what is. This means that the early existentialia are done away with, or are at best a step on the way to the knowledge of being. Ott is intent on showing that the freedom from all presuppositions indicates that theology should move beyond Bultmann in his extensive dependence on the philosophical presuppositions of the existentialia. Apparently Bultmann was appealing to a
philosophical position so incomplete as to be misleading. Furthermore, the truth of being expresses itself in language. Being speaks through man in language. Language uses man. This is why Heidegger places such an emphasis on poetry as a means of reaching the truth (an example is his interest in Hölderlin). The creative urge involved in poetry and the ability of poetic language to suggest is a way of being's unveiling itself. Here he is in accord with the modern literary theory of New Criticism, which, in speaking of the "intentional fallacy," makes the same point—one explicates a poem to find out what it says rather than to find out what the poet meant to say. It is this concern for language that introduces us to the "new hermeneutic," for language itself is hermeneutic. Bultmann speaks of the necessity of hermeneutical presuppositions for theology, and here he refers, as we have said, to existential self-understanding as the point of reference for his own theology. But now the function of hermeneutic is vastly wider. Hermeneutic refers to the fact that being (or, to use Heidegger's suggested analogy for theology, God) reveals itself in man's language. For Bultmann, the real task of exegesis is to interpret the text. In the post-Bultmannian hermeneutic, the text interprets us. The self-understanding found in the text leads to a criticism of one's own self-understanding. And this is not merely a presupposition, but rather a goal.

How does this effect Bultmann's program of demythologizing? Certainly the principle behind demythologizing, the
need to interpret the Scriptures in terms intelligible to modern man, is not abandoned. But Bultmann emphasizes that the Christian language of the New Testament has often become an obstacle to understanding. In the new hermeneutic the Biblical language, while it may not be identified with revelation, reveals God, and so Christian language is not irrelevant or optional. The problem is not so much that of demythologizing language so that Scripture is brought up to modern man; rather, modern man must be brought back to the Scripture so that his distorted relationships may be criticized. There is less emphasis on the human element in language and more on the relationship between language and being.

This is surely one of the most fruitful directions in which Bultmann's theological emphases have developed, although he himself has so far dissociated himself from the movement. He has re-emphasized the fact that language speaks only in man's speaking, and has said that Ott and the others have minimized the inescapable relation of language to man. Although this may be true, it is an objection that does not begin to come to terms with all the implications of the new hermeneutic (e.g. Heidegger speaks of man as being a "clearing for being"). It is also significant to note that although this new approach modifies Bultmann's work, it is no more amenable to Heilsgeschichte theology than he was, even though the Old Testament is again brought into serious consideration. Perhaps Gerhard von Rad's approach—the Word mediating the
event—will come into prominence in this area. We should also observe that Lutheran theology, emphasizing the role of the Word as a means of grace, can both learn and offer a great deal in the development of the new hermeneutic.

Finally, it can be argued that although Bultmann's theology has been taken in an important new direction, his work has by no means been eclipsed. Much of what he has said about the existential interpretation of Scripture remains as valuable as it ever was. Most of his theology will be applicable to the new situation, although perhaps in a modified form. All of his research remains as a monument to great scholarship. And the program for demythologization remains in force. In fact, if there is one major criticism to be made of Bultmann, it is that he has not taken myth seriously enough. To be sure, he has said again and again that "whereas the older liberals used criticism to eliminate the mythology of the New Testament our task to-day is to use criticism to interpret it." Yet one wonders if he has always really meant it. He qualifies this greatly when he says, "Myth indeed speaks of a reality, although in an inadequate way." Bultmann almost seems ready to replace the myth with the existential interpretation of it. And this is where the criticism levelled at him by theologians of the left and right, by later Heideggerians and Tillichians, is extremely important. We cannot dispense with myth, saying that the existential interpretation is finally the only possible method of approaching it. Richard Grabau summarizes this
point quite well when he says, "No one who insists upon the necessity of myth implies that there are myths that cannot be existentially interpreted. The only thing implied is that the existential interpretation does not constitute or exhaust the myth." And again,

Men have made many meanings out of myth: a literal, an allegorical, a moral, etc. Bultmann adds another: the existential. The difference between Bultmann and the earlier theologians is this. They thought that there really was myth and a plurality of interpretations which they tried to delineate. Each of the interpretations had its integrity and its function. None completely articulated the myth, nor did they all together. It remained always as the source of and control over the interpretations. Bultmann on the other hand has no patience with this. He denies validity to any other interpretation than his own.

Ian Henderson was one of the first to make the same point for the English-speaking world before Bultmann's work was translated—

The mythological is a basic form of human thought from which, consequently, we can never free ourselves. It is the way in which the human mind works when it tries to apprehend and to describe religious objects. Myth is thus a legitimate form of human thought; it is, in fact, the only one in which the super-sensible can be grasped.

The point of all this is that myth must be taken seriously. This is the emphasis of the later Heideggerian pronouncements on language, and it is something that poets have always known. Myth cannot simply be equated with fiction, for the events of myth reveal depths of being which the intellect can see only obliquely. This is the
reason why the great nineteenth century poet, William Blake, embodied in his verse the Christian visions which he turned into a private mythology. William Butler Yeats employed Irish myths early in his poetic career, and then moved on to create his own mythology as a structure for his magnificent poetry. Similar examples abound. D. H. Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent* is structured on elements of Christianity and the myth of the Mexican god Quetzalcoatl. In *Finnegans Wake*, James Joyce fuses elements of classical, Christian, and Hebraic myths to create a universal myth which he felt would embody the experiences of all men. The function of myth as structural principle has been developed by Northrop Frye in his *Anatomy of Criticism*--

The mythical mode, the stories about gods, in which characters have the greatest possible power of action, is the most abstract and conventionalized of all literary modes, just as the corresponding modes in other arts--religious Byzantine painting, for example--show the highest degree of stylization in their structure. Hence the structural principles of literature are as closely related to mythology and comparative religion as those of painting are to geometry.77

Behind this lies the basic principle that "the meaning or pattern of poetry is a structure of imagery with conceptual implications."78 Translating this into theological discourse--the Bible is mythology with conceptual implications. The task of theology is to uncover these conceptual implications, but this cannot be done at the expense of the mythology. A literary critic does not explicate Yeats's poems and then conclude that we can dispense with the structure
of imagery, the mythology, there. Ultimately this would mean that we could forget about the poems and just read the critic's essay—an option most readers would choose to bypass. This situation would be unattractive not only for aesthetic reasons (the rhythm and the radiance and the tightly-controlled organization would be lost), but also for reasons of truth (the poem would invariably be distorted as some elements are brought into undue prominence and others are forgotten completely). One appreciates the explication, the theology, for the aid to understanding that it provides, but one also realizes that the complete truth lies only in the poem, the mythology, as it is presented as the basic given.

This analogy with poetry suggests again another criticism that has been directed at Bultmann, namely, that his program of demythologization leaves no reason to assume that the Christian myth is more authoritative than classical myth, or, for that matter, the mythology of William Butler Yeats. We have seen that Buri and Ogden would, in large measure, subscribe to just this view and place poetry (in their case, philosophy) on the same level of revelation as theology. But, again, Bultmann, while acknowledging the power and truthfulness in secular affirmations, has insisted on preserving the kerygma, the historic core that God has acted in Jesus Christ, an action centering in the crucifixion and resurrection. In a manner of speaking, myth is fiction, and there is no scientific method by which the objective happenings described in
the Christian myth can be verified while the objective happenings in other myths cannot. Here, as Bultmann continues to remind us, faith plays its part: "The action of God is hidden from every eye except the eye of faith. Only the so-called natural, secular (worldly) events are visible to every man and capable of proof. It is within them that God's hidden action is taking place." Understanding that Christian mythology will not be usurped by existential interpretation, we must nevertheless realize the compelling truth of this interpretation. As Bultmann says, "De-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's mystery. The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the sphere of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal existence. Not what God is in Himself, but how He acts with man, is the mystery in which faith is interested." And further, the mystery of God lies not in the fact that He "interrupts the natural course of events," but that He encounters me "in His Word as the gracious God."

"Our understanding of religion must be contemporary," says John Macquarrie.

By this we do not mean that it must conform to the philosophical vogue of the moment. But we mean that there can be no escape from the twentieth century to the times of the New Testament or of the Middle Ages or of the Reformation. No doubt we can learn much from all of these times. But what is required is an understanding of religion relevant to our own time, that is to say, an understanding which comes to grips with the problems which . . . the current mood of our civilization causes us to notice.
Bultmann's theology—and the later Heideggerian theology which develops from it—are contemporary in this best sense of the word. This paper has attempted to suggest that Bultmann's great contributions to contemporary theology have been twofold. First, there is his mature existential theology, which, if it is not understood as an exclusive or complete interpretation, brings a necessary accent of Scripture into the prominence it deserves. Second, there is his program of demythologization, a program which can be implemented as the interpretation, not the elimination, of Christian myth. It is a program which enables the Gospel to speak to modern man with new power, for false and unnecessary stumbling blocks have been removed. The corrective influence of the theology developed from the later Heidegger, the "new hermeneutic," is important here. As Krister Stendahl has observed, "Bultmann's plea for demythologizing—regardless of the way in which he carries it out—is certainly here to stay."
FOOTNOTES


3 Rudolf Bultmann, "Bultmann Replies to his Critics," Kerygma and Myth, I, 200.

4 Ibid., I, 200-201.

5 Ibid., I, 209.

6 Thomas Oden, "Bultmann as Lutheran Existentialist," Dialog, III (Summer, 1964), 212, n. 63.


9 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 84.

10 Ibid., p. 51.

11 Ibid., p. 55.


14 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 32.

15 Ibid., p. 33.

16 Ibid., p. 22.


18 Ibid., p. 27.

19 Ibid., p. 56.

20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 81.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 83.
25 Ibid., p. 85.
26 Ibid.
27 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 80.
28 Ibid., p. 82.
29 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 152.
31 Bultmann, "Humanism and Christianity," p. 84.
33 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 77-78.
35 Ibid., p. 41.
36 Ibid., p. 42.
37 Ibid., p. 39.
38 Ibid., p. 41.
39 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 78-79.
40 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
44 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 40.


49 Ibid., p. 38.


52 Ibid.


55 Ibid., p. 354.

56 Ibid.

57 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 59.

58 John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 366.


60 Ibid., p. 118.

61 Ibid., p. 120.


63 Ogden, op. cit., p. 127.

64 Ibid., p. 138.

65 Ibid., p. 143.

66 Ibid., p. 144.


75 Ibid., p. 121.


78 Ibid., p. 136.

79 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 61-62.

80 Ibid., p. 43.

81 Ibid., p. 44.

82 Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp. 373-374.

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