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Pierre Manent: The Empire of Modernity and the Church's Response

Hayden Lukas

My mother used to work in the bed management department at a large hospital near our home. Her job was to coordinate with nurses, doctors, and other administrative staff to manage which patients were assigned to which beds and to ensure the patients were transported to the right places at the right time. Her department had a joke that every day their job was to solve a gigantic jigsaw puzzle whose picture was always changing. New situations are always arising in a hospital: some patients are discharged; others arrive. Some people die; some are born. Some have infectious diseases and need to be contained. It was her department's job to solve the puzzle as its picture shifted, to make sure everyone remained or got to where they needed to be safely and efficiently.

"A gigantic puzzle whose picture is always changing" is an apt description of the modern world. Historian James Simpson describes the continual change of forms in culture, economics, and politics since the late medieval period to the present as a "permanent revolution."[1] That is to say, *change* is the only predictable thing about the modern world; the only certain thing about the future is that it will look different than the present, and the definitive feature of the present is that it is different from the past.

All the same, the Church is compelled to address and engage this ever-changing world. Because the Church must fit into a puzzle whose picture is always shifting, she is left feeling alienated from a world she (theoretically) once felt at home in. More pressingly, Christians often get caught up in the rapidly-changing circumstances of the modern world, finding themselves pulled into economic, social, or political changes they did not foresee and, for the most part, cannot control. What is a Christian to do in such a world?

The French Catholic political philosopher Pierre Manent (b. 1949) identifies two responses to the ever-changing situation of modernity that have not worked. The first is a capitulation to the modern world. Under this first response to modernity, Christians are allowed go along with any and all changes to the picture of the

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modern puzzle. If modern man can incorporate himself into whatever cultural or political movements that arise with a spotless conscience, so can the Christian. The terms "modern man" and "Christian" are, roughly, equivalent. Manent believes that for the Christian, the temptation to go along with whatever new movement arises should be dismissible as a result of modernity's "inflated confidence" in itself which tends to "leave us prey to arbitrary prevailing opinions and the current state of knowledge."[2] When modern man blindly follows any "new" political, social, or cultural arrangement, he is often falling into arbitrary pressures—and, as Manent tries to show, an inflated view of man's place in *history*.

But the opposite is just as much a temptation for the Church. This is to commit to whatever came before the present—Lutheran orthodoxy, scholasticism, Thomism, or some reconstruction of the early church. Manent will not let this second "conservative" or "traditional" position off the hook either. He calls such a position "cowardly, [...] a refusal to face the question honestly."[3] By depending entirely on the past without creatively facing the present, we will either be consigned to the endless historical research necessary to reconstruct the past accurately or be filled with a zeal for a false construction of the past we imagine to be true. The process of retrieving history informs but cannot exhaust one's engagement with that history; concerning the past, there must always be a statement made in and for the present age. The history of ideas is a provisional refuge, not our home.

Manent's body of work often problematizes the modern conservative impulse to draw on the history of thought with modernity's conception of history, and this essay will attempt to explain this dynamic. To do this, I will explain the basics of Manent's account of modernity as a way of evaluating history, drawing on the work of other political philosophers to supplement Manent's account. Then I will examine how the work of Manent and Emile Perreau-Saussine, with the Catholic response to the Enlightenment, can contribute to the Church's strategy to engage with the puzzle of modernity.

Modernity: History vs. Nature and Grace

Modernity tells a particular story about the history of world. According to the modern scheme, the drama of civilized human life is depicted in three acts: ancient, medieval, and modern. Discussing these eras, we have become more and more accustomed to using the terms pre-modern and modern. There are ready markers for the transition from the *pre-modern* to the *modern*, usually in the form of major figures or events in world history or the history of ideas: Luther and the Reformation in *religion*; Hobbes, Locke, and the (somewhat later) revolutions against absolute monarchism in *political theory* and *politics*; Descartes in *speculative philosophy*; Galileo, Bacon, or Newton in *natural philosophy*; and Bacon, Smith, and the ascendency of modern capitalism in *economics*. All these mark a transition from the pre-modern to

the modern era.

This account of history, like any account of history, is not obvious or natural, but constructed. The medieval Christian conceptualization of history had a different division of time than the modern periodization. Instead of "pre-modern" and "modern," the history of the world was roughly construed as following the two testaments of the Christian Scriptures. There is time before Christ's birth and after Christ's birth. It is in the middle of the 6th century, the period that begins the transition from the classical era to the medieval era, that the Scythian monk Dionysius Exiguus started counting time using the words *anno Domini*, the Lord's year. In the medieval Christian view, past, present, and future events were measured with reference to the Incarnation of the Lord, whose life was the central turning point in historical existence.

Sergio Cotta (1920-2007) argued that modernity is distinct from the medieval Christian view of history exactly because "the religious event of the Incarnation stops being regarded as the decisive turning point of historical existence."[4] But what, exactly, is put in the place of the Incarnation? We might only say, "the events of the 16th and 17th century." In his study *The Crisis of Modernity*, Italian political philosopher Augusto Del Noce (1910-1989) demonstrated that genealogies or definitions of modernity which rest on sifting out what is "modern" and what is "pre-modern" in Descartes or other foundational modern figures are never entirely successful in exorcising the pre-modern demons out of any modern philosopher.[5] That is, modernity is never able to find an *entirely modern* philosopher, but only philosophers who contribute to modern philosophy. It is up to the present interpreters of modernity to decide what is and what is not characteristically modern. The same is true in political and natural philosophy, as well as in religion—modernism is identifiable as a phenomenon but there are no philosophers who speak for all of modernity when they say "x is modernity." Modernity, then, is recognized as a *historical phenomenon* before it becomes recognizable as a set of beliefs (and it is dubious that modernity ever has become strictly identifiable with some definite set of beliefs). While this problem of defining a civilization-wide system of belief in history is not unique to modernism, it is worth asking: What exactly happened in the 16th and 17th centuries that qualify them as the central turning point in historical existence?

This question is where Manent starts his explorations of the foundations of modernity. According to Manent, modernity is some *thing* that arose in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe that identifies itself as a new period in history. Apart from this, Manent offers no strict definition.[6] Because modernity is primarily identified by its role as a historical phenomenon, Manent is interested in what other ways we might interpret a system that is (theoretically) identifiable in economics, politics, religion, philosophy, and science. Instead of evaluating a philosophy or a science or an economic arrangement by its place in *history*, Manent argues that there are other

standards of judgement originating from before modernity that help us to evaluate the significance, fittingness, or truthfulness of a system.

For the West, among the most prominent and consistently used options available to evaluate the significance of a civilization-wide system of beliefs were *nature* and *grace*. Manent's entire reading of Western history is framed as the dialectic between nature and grace. As Ralph C. Hancock explains:

> Although Manent is often at pains to emphasize [the] polemical opposition between modernity and Christianity, in fact his deeper and more original thesis is that it was the reciprocal critique of classical nature and Christian grace—the erosion of both natural and supernatural substance effected by this critique—that produced modernity, a denaturalized nature that yields waves of radicalization, that is, History.[7]

Manent's thesis is that *history* became the measure which was employed in the modern period to decide what was right and what was wrong. This supplanted the measure which existed in the pre-modern period—the dialectic between the antique pagan conception of nature and the revealed conception of Christian grace. Modernity, for Manent, is the triumph of history over nature and grace, and thus the period in which nature and grace are measured according to history, not the other way around.

The dialectic between nature and grace, as Hancock says above, is constituted by their reciprocal critiques. The critiques go something like this: (1) grace is the critic of nature insofar as grace claims nature is not enough in itself. But at the same time, (2) nature is the critic of grace insofar as nature claims that grace offers nothing that nature is not already capable of receiving or doing on its own.

On Manent's reading of Western history, these two critiques exist side-by-side and are used as tools to evaluate political, economic, and philosophical theories *as a general rule*. In medieval Christendom, there was some stability in the dialectic between nature and grace best exemplified in the Thomistic synthesis. Manent maintains something like Aquinas's view: "Grace has meaning only if it presupposes nature: it corrects and perfects nature, without destroying it."[8] But he also admits this synthesis is "unstable and fragile," held together only by Aquinas's "architectonic genius, later reinforced by the approval given to it by some institution as, in the case of Thomism, the Catholic Church, the institution par excellence."[9] As the institutions which supplied stability to the relationship between nature and grace broke down through the complex history of the Western Church and Western politics, what Hancock described as "waves of radicalization" more and more consistently shot through the modern world. These "waves of radicalization" are what we

see in the transition from the pre-modern to the modern period—paradigm shifts in natural and speculative philosophy as well as violent incursions for the sake of economics, religion, and political philosophy.[10]

One key architect of radicalization whom Manent engages with extensively is Montesquieu (1689-1755). Montesquieu was one of the first modern theorists who claimed that law is purely instrumental. For Aquinas, virtuous living (according to the law) is a vehicle for perfecting our nature. This perfection of nature can only be effected by God's grace, but is measured according to the law. But for modernists, law was only meant to ensure one's rights are protected. Law is understood not as something which is necessary to perfect nature, but only an instrument employed by humans who seek to protect the rights they have according to their human nature. Even though law is not essential to perfect human nature, the human individual cannot live without law altogether. "He needs law, but only to protect his nature as it is prior to the law. The law of the modern state, liberal law, is a simple instrument of nature and does not, in principle, modify or perfect nature."[11]

What we mean by "nature" becomes very important at this juncture. Manent notes that "nature" had two meanings in the ancient world. "Whereas Aristotle studied human beings whose virtues and vices were so many expressions—dispositions—of [a] common nature, Cicero considers this diversity for its own sake; he detaches individual particularity from common nature."[12] For Cicero, "human nature" usually means "individual personality" rather than a common "human nature." The concept of a unique personality *qua* human nature is picked up many centuries later, Manent shows, by the founders of modernity.

This is significant when modern humans must make policy decisions for their communities. A major tension in the modernist instrumental law is whether it should be combined with Aristotle's view of a "common nature" or Cicero's view of a "particular nature." This decision changes a regime's philosophy of law drastically. The force of the state employing the instrument of law for the purpose of protecting a common rational nature is very different from the force of the state protecting the peculiar natures of individual humans. In this choice, we find the tensions inherent in liberal democracy beginning to bud.

The paradox at the heart of modernity is the instrumental law: We will use the law to liberate us from all laws. The ancient law set out to perfect human nature, and so the law strove to be contiguous with human nature even as it exceeded that nature. The new law of modernity turns this situation on its head, seeking to ensure that man's nature is never repressed by a law of virtue. Modern man strives after "the promise of eternal nature, which is at last itself, only itself and entirely itself; and of the new law, nature's efficacious and docile instrument. [...] The world ought to be—it will be!—a free state of nature."[13] The state of nature can only be regained through the imposition of a law which does not repress nature, but allows it to be recovered. To adapt the phrase of Rousseau: Man is essentially free, but *under the law* of virtue he finds himself everywhere in chains. Modernity presents a new law which is a *grace* meant to help us attain our true nature *apart from works of the law*. In this way, grace and law are equivalent terms for the modern just as much as they were for Aquinas.

Manent observes that the dialectical tension between nature and grace/law ends, for the modern man, in complete paradoxical negativity. Modern man flees law, but by doing so ends up fleeing nature as well because the new conception of law necessitated an equally new conception of nature. Because nature was increasingly identified with what is repressed by laws which, according to the Christian tradition, brought the soul closer to virtue, the view that virtue is *a perfection of nature* became incoherent. In the new modern arrangement, both nature and law become the enemy of the total freedom modern man seeks to establish for himself. Manent explains in the famous closing passage of *The City of Man*:

> Modern man, as modern, both flees from and seeks out law. He flees the law that is given to him and seeks the law he gives himself. He flees the law given to him by nature, by God, or that he gave himself yesterday and that today weighs on him like the law of another. [...] The law he seeks ceaselessly and continually become the law he flees.
>
> In this enterprise, the nature of man is his principal enemy. [...] Nature is the condition and summation of all that one must flee. Modern man thus affirms the difference between the law he seeks and the law he flees by ever more completely fleeing and subjecting nature, including his own nature. He subjects nature to his "liberty," his "autonomy," to the law that is always new and of which he is forever the author. This is to say that he subjects nature to the continual affirmation of the difference itself.[14]

This "continual affirmation of difference" is the difference between one's liberty and one's nature. The two exist in a zero-sum game, where the "law" of liberty is always striving to be the victor over nature.

Modern Liberal Democracy and the Christian

If the instrumental view of law is what led to the foundations of the modern worldview, what tools do Christians have to evaluate modernity? At the beginning of this paper, I noted Manent believes that the triumph of the modern will is associated with a certain view of history. But it turns out that *history* is itself the evaluative tool which makes modernity possible; the historical moments which comprise the arrival of modernity are able to justify the new forms of life they bring *by virtue of being what happened*—they are a pure expression of liberty's triumph over nature. If we were to judge modernity by nature or grace (or law), it would cease to be a modern evaluation of modernity.

Manent's most original thesis (per Hancock, quoted above) is that modernity is the result of nature and grace losing their ability to credibly interpret the world. Modernity simply maintains its power by asserting control over the interpretation of history in the vacuum of credibility. As Augusto del Noce notes, it does this by no ultimate basis in reason, nature, or law, because modernity is exactly the negation of these. It stays in power only by a totalitarian assertion of power, because it "rests on no evidence."[15] History is a paltry *tertium quid* which asserts that those forms and practices which arise from the freedom of the will are right and true. According to what standard? The standard of what appears by the workings of the freedom of the will: history.

Because this rests on no evidence, we are right to question our own regime: liberal democracy. The translator of del Noce, Carlo Lancellotti, summarizes del Noce's position concerning the problematic aspects of liberal democracy *qua* modern democracy as follows:

> Whereas older totalitarianisms politicized reason on the basis of a philosophy of history (Communism) or a mythical racial narrative (Nazism), the new one does so through the ideological invocation of 'science' in a very broad sense. The result is...a 'subordination of culture to politics,' which to Del Noce is precisely the defining characteristic of totalitarian societies and is also perfectly compatible with the preservation of the formalities of democracy.[16]

Liberal democracy is totalitarian to the extent that it wishes to bring every aspect of life under the ability of the state to control through its self-legitimating *instrumental law,* including the Christian religion.

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Manent comes to a very similar conclusion, arguing that modernity exerts imperial control over our interpretation of history:

> There is no more natural or noble idea than that of empire, of gathering of the human race under one sole governor who is the instrument and symbol of its unity. Once man defines himself as a historical being who lives essentially in the element of history, he gives this idea the greatest ever conceivable extension by integrating the succession of generations into a unified whole. … Humanity gathered in this way no longer needs any visible head: with no emperor, it is the truly universal empire.[17]

This historical imperialism of modernity seeks to have all eras interpreted under its frame. But this frame is only, as Manent says, the continual affirmation of difference between nature and liberty, a triumph of the will. Placing history as the determinative factor of truth is the acknowledgement of the stalemate between the reciprocal critiques of nature and grace. History "displaces" man's relationship with nature and grace, and only throws him into the paradox of the two without hierarchized guidance.[18]

The Church and Liberal Democracy

The Christian in a liberal democracy faces the modern challenge to evaluate existence in terms of an ever-changing history. And as this ever changing puzzle continues to shift, we find that the church is often being coopted or cast out by modernity. This is, of course, nothing new. The church has always needed to decide how to act in response to a world that seeks to absorb it in some way. From the Church's perspective, "among its very enemies are concealed its future citizens, and even among its most sworn enemies lie hidden predestined friends, who as yet do not know it themselves."[19] But the same is true from the world's perspective: the present members of Christ's body can become totally beholden to the world, to the point of becoming *of* the world rather than of Christ. These mutually opposing perspectives are always intermingled. As Augustine had it, "In truth, these two cities are entangled together in this world, and intermixed until the last judgement effects their separation."[20] As such, even if the church is to be *in* the world and not *of* the world, the church is still caught in the world's matrix. Our world is a liberal democracy and we are caught up in its matrix.

The Church might be tempted to say "Liberalism, that's the enemy!" With these words, American anti-liberals such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas have created impressive bodies of work. For all their virtues, Hauerwas and MacIntyre's views on our political, social, and economic situation amount to

little more than those four words. MacIntyre is such an "eminent case" of this anti-liberal anger that Manent's associate Emile Pereau-Saussine wrote a biography on MacIntyre to showcase this anti-liberal anger.[21]

One of the central pillars of MacIntyre's work is how he employs Aristotle and Aquinas in his attack on liberalism. Perreau-Saussine observes that MacIntyre will often pit Aquinas's understanding of man as a "social animal" against Aristotle's understanding of man as a "political animal." The difference between the two represents for Perreau-Saussine "the Christian diminishment of the city of men, and the universalism of the city of God." By siding with Aquinas, "MacIntyre aligns himself with a tradition that has never placed politics at the center. [… This] tradition insufficiently confronts the questions that the founders of liberalism raised."[22] In adopting this (admittedly venerable) tradition in Christianity, "MacIntyre is always 'for' the sub-political community threatened by the political community that rises to power, and 'against' the latter."[23] Indeed, in this respect, MacIntyre is "as un-Aristotelian as possible, interested neither in political form nor in political regime… there is no trace in [MacIntyre's] work of the Aristotelian debate on political justice, holding in tensions the demands of a small number and those of a great number."[24] It can be noted that the same is true of Stanley Hauerwas's political platform of pacifism. Political form and justice are ignored for the sake of reflection on virtue and tradition, the latter pair being used as a bludgeon against the former.

If the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre recovers through Aquinas is apolitical and antiliberal, Perreau-Saussine observes the strangeness that MacIntyre should find himself an immigrant to the postwar cornerstone of liberalism's empire, the United States.

> Why did MacIntyre leave Europe in 1969? Why did he need to immigrate into the United States, into the most liberal of the commercial republics? Beyond the Atlantic, MacIntyre discovered not being of his time. European homogenization entails an imperious demand for presentism. Yet, in its origins, America was intended precisely as a land where different temporalities could coexist without melting together. … MacIntyre's America is the same as that which gave asylum to the Puritans of the 17th century: the territory not ruled by the treaty of Westphalia.[25]

Manent riffs on this point: "MacIntyre escaped from the powerful by taking refuge in the world's most powerful country, from money by taking refuge in the world's richest country, and from the nation-state by taking refuge in the last nation-state in the West."[26] In doing so, MacIntyre was able to retreat into one of the many "social segments into which American democracy is subdivided," allowing him to

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"forget liberalism."[27]

The Church, following the lead of MacIntyre (or Hauerwas), should be asking herself if in reality she amounts to nothing more than an "Aristotelianism of the opposition." Is the church's existence *only* meant to critique the power structures of the world she finds herself in? Manent argues this, too, is a strange form of cowardice:

> It leaves the great city in the power of practical heresies, and to be happy, it takes refuge in the pores of liberal society—as, in the Middle ages according to Marx, commerce took refuge in the pores of feudal society. But this is to flee combat while claiming to fight on. The critique of liberalism that would only define it by its errors lacks plausibility. We need to explain a bit why liberalism is stronger than our good Aristotelian reasons.[28]

If the church wants to address the empire of liberalism, she must at least admit what benefits she is willing to accept by living under liberal law. And she must be willing to explain whether these are *goods* which the Church so willingly accepts—that is, the accumulation of wealth, the relative power of self-determination, and a unique degree of social stability.

If MacIntyre's "Aristotelianism of the opposition" is the eminent case of anti-liberal anger, Perreau-Saussine believes the institutional Catholic Church is the eminent case of Christians striking an acceptable bargain with liberalism. In his excellent *Catholicism and Democracy*, Perreau-Saussine examines how the French Catholic Church wrestled with the appearance of liberal democracy:

> If, over the past two hundred years, the Catholic Church has been confronted with a political system—liberal democracy—whose triumph it did not foresee, and for which it was therefore ill prepared, it has nevertheless adapted to it. The Church has come to appreciate the political system of which it was at first suspicious, but without falling prey to a naive political enthusiasm.[29]

Perreau-Saussine argues a limited affirmation of liberal democracy is a necessary corollary of Vatican II.

He also observes that Vatican Reforms worked in tandem to dismantle the Catholic Church's role in European politics. The penalty of vesting infallible spiritual authority in the Pope at Vatican I (1869–70) was the loss of political power by the time of Vatican II (1962–65). By Vatican II, Catholics were even affirming the right to religious liberty! No longer is it the Catholic's dream that the pope

exclusively decides the political fate of all of Europe, or all the world. While the Pope might intervene politically with recommendations to political leaders for many years to come, the Roman Pontiff is not likely to lead a campaign against the proverbial Normans in Civitate in the next few centuries, if ever again.

Perreau-Saussine characterizes Manent's position on how the Church should fit into a liberal democratic regime in a few words: "The church should teach, not give orders."[30] Unlike Hauerwas, Manent does not believe the Church is the perfect polity. He agrees with anti-Catholic political thinkers like Machiavelli and Rousseau: "The church governs badly."[31] In this way, Manent's political vision is not a Schmittean political theology which tries to make the world into a theocracy. Rather, it identifies the state as legitimate apart from the church. The Catholic Church is closer to liberal Aristotelianism than it is to a MacIntyrean Aristotelian anti-politics. Liberal democracy is, in part, what the Catholic Church reconciled itself to in the Vatican Reforms. As such, the Catholic Church affirms that the city of man is worth something in itself, even if it is built on a megalomaniacal interpretation of its own grandeur. That is, the city of man—as ridiculous, incoherent, disastrous, and violent as it is—is able to exist under the watchful eye of God, and Christians should respect this.

To say that the city of man is determined by history is to say with Augustine that it is wholly ruled by an arbitrary "lust for power."[32] The modern world seeks to control an empire not through the application of the virtues of law, reason, or nature, but through a transparent power play. Perreau-Saussine observes that for the Christian, the problem is clear: "History does not receive its final meaning from itself but it has a meaning, and its content is certainly not morally indifferent. The meaning of history is that history transcends itself. Human longings are only satisfied in the heavenly city."[33] All the same, "the eschatological dimension of God's kingdom cannot be absorbed into the realization of a Christian Empire. Communities are formed by sinners: earthly peace is fragile because there is no true *concordia*. Human happiness here and now is mixed with fear. Societies want peace but mostly on their own terms."[34] That is, society will do what it wills, to their benefit or their detriment. Christians need to recognize that their voice might not matter.

Whether we are ruled by the law of virtue and the liberal instrumental law, St. Augustine was serious that the city of man is only ruled by lust for power. What Manent and del Noce expose as the transparent power politics of modernity are, under a broadly Augustinian framework, no different than how the city of man has always been governed—the overturning of one law for another for the love of power. In this sense, there is something fundamentally broken about politics as a discipline and an institution. This only makes politics all the more important to get closer to "right" and further away from "wrong." By *right* I roughly mean more stability,

more justice, less murder and death, and by *wrong* I roughly mean less stability, less justice, more murder and death. To put this another way: Christians need to be able to acknowledge the relative good of a society finding peace on its own terms, even if they are modern terms in the bare assertion of power. Insofar as they are integrated into that society, Christians are able to participate in promoting these relative goods. This is because the relative political peace and stability of a society make the practice of the virtues possible. Even if Hauerwas or MacIntyre would contest this, their actions (accumulating wealth in roles at the most prestigious educational institutions in the most prestigious liberal democracies) prove it to be false. Peace and stability are not conjured from thin air or by cordoning peace and stability off into the realm of a non-political church. Christians must pay close attention to both political form and political virtue without playing one against the other.

That being said, we are ruled by a regime whose lust for power leads to immense real-world suffering. This real world suffering is related to the modern critique of two important Christian teachings: law and grace. In his desire to not be co-opted by liberalism, MacIntyre lashes out against a system that has provided one of the most stable environments in human history. Lutherans could instead learn from their Catholic brothers: keep a calm head. Reject the people who want politics to be a zero-sum game where Christians are either agents of subversion in a relatively stable liberal society or theocratic heretic-hunters that seek to turn the American Empire into a theocracy. Perhaps a theocratic regime was possible at one time and perhaps a desert-dwelling church is a possibility, but neither of these are honest responses to our ever-changing modern world.

By allowing ourselves a comfortable existence in the pores of the stable liberal democracies of the West, stable teaching positions in liberal arts universities, or the dedicated study of theology on a beautiful campus like Concordia Seminary, we are hypocrites if we only denounce the society that makes this possible. Our society—certainly built on much suffering—has also made important forms of human flourishing possible, which the Church also enjoys. Allow that the world must find its own peace, and that we as Christians are caught in the matrix of this lesser peace. This matrix, of course, is what Augustine called *time*. *Time* is related to but not exactly what Manent calls *history*. When Christ returns, we will dwell in eternity, not in time. That eternity is *always* coming soon, and it was and is and will be so much better than the compromised existence we must continually work in today.

Endnotes

1 See James Simpson, *Permanent Revolution: The Reformation and the Illiberal Roots of Liberalism* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019).
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4 Sergio Cotta, quoted in Augusto del Noce, *The Crisis of Modernity*, trans. Carlo Lancellotti (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 4.
5 Del Noce, *Crisis of Modernity*, 5.
6 Pierre Manent, *City of Man*, 8–9.
7 Ralph C. Hancock, "Pierre Manent: Between Nature and History," in *Reason, Revelation, and the Civic Order: Political Philosophy and the Claims of Faith*, Paul R. DeHart and Carson Calloway eds. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 121.
8 Manent, quoted in Hancock, "Pierre Manent," 123.
9 Manent, *City of Man*, 33.
10 Ralph C. Hancock, "Pierre Manent," 121.
11 Ibid., 35.
12 Pierre Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City: On the Western Dynamic*, trans. Marc LePain (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013), 139-140.
13 Pierre Manent, *City of Man*, 35.
14 Pierre Manent, *City of Man*, 204.
15 Del Noce, *Crisis of Modernity*, 10.
16 Carlo Lancellotti, "Augusto del Noce on the 'New Totalitarianism'" *Communio* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2017), 324.
17 Manent, *City of Man*, 205–6.
18 Ibid., 204.
19 Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City*, 274.
20 Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods (Peabody, Mass 2014: Hendrickson), I.35, 35.
21 Pierre Manent, *Foreword to Alasdair MacIntyre: An Intellectual Biography* by Emile Perreau-Saussine, trans. Nathan J. Pinkowski (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022), xi.
22 Perreau-Saussine, *Alasdair MacIntyre*, 122.
23 Manent, foreword to *Alasdair MacIntyre*, xii.
24 Ibid., xiii.
25 Perreau-Saussine, *Alasdair MacIntyre*, 120-121.
26 Manent, foreword to *Alasdair MacIntyre*, xvi.
27 Manent, foreword to *Alasdair MacIntyre*, xvi.
28 Ibid.
29 Emile Perreau-Saussine, *Catholicism and Democracy*, trans. Richard Rex (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 151.
30 Perreau-Saussine, *Catholicism and Democracy*, 124.
31 Ibid.
32 Augustine, *The City of God*, I.1, 3.
33 Emile Perreau-Saussine, "Heaven as a political theme in the City of God," in *Paradise in Antitquity: Jewish and Christian Views*, Markus Bockmuehl and Guy G. Stroumsa eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 191.
34 Ibid., 189.