

Concordia Seminary - Saint Louis
Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary

Masters of Divinity Thesis

Concordia Seminary Scholarship

12-1-1981

Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

Alan Borcharding

Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, borcherdinga@csl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholar.csl.edu/mdiv>

 Part of the [Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Borcharding, Alan, "Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion" (1981). *Masters of Divinity Thesis*. 47.
<http://scholar.csl.edu/mdiv/47>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Concordia Seminary Scholarship at Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters of Divinity Thesis by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact seitzw@csl.edu.

PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF HEGEL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A Research Paper Presented to the Faculty
of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis,
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for elective
H-200

by

Alan Borcharding

December 1981

Won Yong Ji
Adviser

1-25-82
SJT

36473

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Abbreviations

Chapter One: Influences on Hegel's Development.....1

A. Greek Philosophy.....1

 1. Ancients and Moderns.....1

 2. Plato and his predecessors.....2

 3. Aristotle.....4

 4. Neoplatonism and Mysticism.....6

B. Rationalism.....7

 1. Descartes.....7

 2. Spinoza8

C. The Enlightenment.....11

 1. Rousseau.....11

 2. Kant.....12

D. Post-Kantian Idealism.....16

 1. Jacobi.....17

 2. Fichte.....19

 3. Schelling.....20

E. Romanticism.....21

 1. The Hellenic Ideal.....21

 2. The attack on mechanistic physics.....23

 3. The *hen kai pan*.....24

Notes to Chapter One.....26

Chapter Two: Hegel's Philosophical Enterprise.....27

A. Hegel's Life and Writings.....27

B. Synoptic overview of Hegel's metaphysics.....31

C. The character of Hegel's philosophizing.....35

 1. His style.....35

 2. Hegel's attitude towards prior thinkers36

Notes to Chapter Two.....37

Chapter Three: The Absolute as Spirit.....38

A. Hegel's predecessors on the Absolute.....38

 1. Spinoza and Schelling.....38

 2. Kant and Fichte39

B. Hegel: The Absolute as Spirit.....39

 1. The ambiguity of *Geist*.....39

 2. The reflective unity of Substance and Subject.....40

 3. The Absolute as Systematic Science.....41

C. The Road to Spirit.....42

 1. The problem of an introduction.....42

 2. Universal education43

Notes to Chapter Three47

Table of Contents, continued

Chapter Four: The Hegelian Dialectic.....49

A. The Dialectic of Understanding.....49

B. The Dialectic of Reason.....51

 1. The ambiguity of *aufheben*.....51

 2. The Concept52

 a. The meaning of Concept.....53

 b. Synonymns for the Concept.....54

 c. Teleology in the Concept56

 3. The conceptual dialectic of moments.....57

Excursus: The Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Myth.....59

Notes to Chapter Four.....62

Chapter Five: Hegel's Philosophy of Religion.....65

A. Hegel encounters religion.....66

 1. *Volksreligion* and *Volksgeist*.....67

 2. *Das Leben Jesu*.....67

 3. *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion*.....68

 4. *Der Geist Christentum und sein Schicksal*.....69

 5. Phenomenology and Religion.....69

B. Themes.....71

 1. Trinity.....71

 2. Death of God.....72

 3. Incarnation73

 4. Creation.....74

 5. The Fall75

 6. Redemption.....75

Notes to Chapter Five76

Conclusion: Religion in the Speculative Philosophy.....77

A. The identical content of religion and philosophy.....78

B. Proofs of God's existence.....78

 1. Hegel's "God".....78

 2. Hegel's critique of Kant.....79

 3. Hegel's ontological proof.....30

C. Art, Religion, Philosophy.....31

Getting Started in Hegel's Philosophy: A Basic
 Annotated Bibliography.....33

Primary Source Bibliography.....86

Bibliography of Books Used.....89

Bibliography of Articles Used.....94

PREFACE

When I began study in Hegel's philosophy a couple of years ago, I soon discovered that getting started in the system is a veritable jungle. I found myself reduced to the expedient of reading and re-reading countless pages in book after book, but even then the task seemed hopeless. Having finally gained some working knowledge of the Hegelian system, it is my hope that this cursory introduction to the philosophy of Hegel will save others from the same dire labors and hours of frustration which I endured.

This introduction is designed to aid a person with the desire to study the Hegelian philosophy of religion; it is not itself an introduction to his philosophy of religion (this ought to be obvious from the relative length of the early chapters and the relative brevity of the last two chapters). It is hoped that three particular enemies of the reader in Hegel's philosophy can be overcome in this paper: the tracing of origins, the identification of main principles, and the vast literature.

The first chapter is devoted to the roots of Hegel's philosophy. Initial exposure to this chapter may evoke the response that it is too involved and lengthy, but it will become apparent that it is precisely this kind of background material which gives a reader essential insights. This material is not found in any particular group of sources; it must be gleaned, point by point, from many sources.

The second, third, and fourth chapters are devoted to an

Preface, continued.

exposition of his philosophy in its main outlines. The purpose of this exposition is to pinpoint the major principles which are operative in his philosophy. The problem which all four of the first chapters intends to alleviate is the fact that these principles are not clearly explicated in any small group of sources. The reader soon finds himself reading either general discussions which gloss over the key points of difficulty, or engulfed by a deluge of technical literature which discusses perhaps only one or two of many desired points. It is the purpose of this paper to congeal these many points into a simple, connected exposition.

The mountain of literature is also a hazard which must be faced. One part of this problem is the fact that there is so much that one has no idea where to start, and what materials are in what source. The other part of the literature problem is also a familiar one, that one does not know whom to trust. Hopefully, if the reader will venture to trust the reports given at the end of each section, this dual problem will be alleviated.

As mentioned above, this is not an introduction to his philosophy of religion. Besides being a topic much beyond the possible length of the paper, there are competent books on the subject. The purpose of this paper is rather to prepare the reader to study the philosophy of religion with comprehension. For this reason, the coverage of the actual philosophy of religion in chapter Five and ^{the conclusion} A is much more basic and the literature-reports are much smaller. (Besides, the literature is so massive that it would be more confusing than helpful.)

Regarding the extent of the originality in this paper, I

Preface, continued.

should say that on the whole, the material is digested from a multitude of sources and explained in my own fashion. Several insights were not found in any resource.

It seems appropriate that I acknowledge here a great debt to Dr. James Collins. It was in a seminar which he conducted that I was led to begin studies in Hegel, and I owe a great deal to his penetrating scholarship both in the classroom and in the pages of his books.

Chapter One: Influences on Hegel's Development

An enduring nemesis of the historian of thought is the fact that every thinker (indeed, every age) is both a result of what transpired before and also an individual entity with an inexpressible genius. There is a tension between study of the concrete formative influences on a thinker and the unique personal insights of the person. We will not understand Hegel by simply reading about his age and influences, nor will we understand him by reading summaries of his works in an encyclopedia. In order to reach a balance between influence and individuality, we will in the first two chapters cover background material and in the third and fourth chapters cover the essentials of his system in general.¹ In this first chapter we will cover the following five areas of influence on his philosophy: Greek philosophy, Rationalism, the Enlightenment, Post-Kantian Idealism, and Romanticism.²

A. Greek philosophy

It is with good reason that Hegel is often called the "German Aristotle." Not only were his interests as broad as Aristotle's; Hegel managed to incorporate much more Greek thought into his philosophy than his contemporaries (who were also involved in a kind of Greek revival). We will introduce the matter with a brief note, and then see how Greek philosophy influenced Hegel.

1. Ancients and Moderns. In the "history of ideas" literature

there is frequent reference to "the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns." This is a convenient way to get at much of what Hegel wanted to accomplish in his philosophy.³ The problem is usually set up in terms of a "quarrel" over the applicability of ancient learning to modern intellectual growth. The problem surfaced in the seventeenth century, when the ideals of Sir Francis Bacon came to the forefront in scientific experiments. Bacon called for banishment of the anti-experimental attitude in Greek science which had paralyzed research in the Middle Ages. Thus he became a pioneer in the direct observation approach to scientific learning. The three points of contention which the seventeenth century raised against the ancients may be summarized as: an attack on the authority of the untested wisdom of the ancients, impatience with those who copy books in lieu of observing nature, and the importance of inductive experiments.⁴ As we will see, this new way of doing scientific study led to a new world view which was scandalously different from that of the Greeks.

Although the study of Jones is limited to England, it covers the topic thoroughly. This theme is also applied to areas of learning other than science, including literature. A more general survey is to be found in the excellent treatment of Randall, chapters IX and X. See also Phen 19/Phân 28.

2. Plato and his predecessors. The pre-Socratic philosophers are certainly important in understanding Hegel's development. This is so partly because their philosophy became the basis for Plato's thought (very important to Hegel) and partly because Hegel was directly influenced by their thoughts. Of particular interest are Anaxagoras (praised for his theory of νοῦς; note Phen 34/Phân 40), Heraclitus (whose dictum πάντα ῥεῖ Hegel

viewed as an early expression of his own philosophy of absolute *Werden* ["becoming"]), and the Eleatics (Zeno and Parmenides in particular) who discovered the limits of merely dialectical reasoning.

Hegel had a very high regard for the thought of Socrates (c.470-399 BC.) and Plato (428-348 BC.). He considered Socrates the first to discuss conscious subjectivity and the notion of universal truth. Socrates' emphasis was on the Universal, in opposition to the arbitrariness of the Sophists, and this made him an immensely important figure in Hegel's eyes. Unfortunately, the Socratic dialectic (as reported by Plato) was often as destructive as it was constructive.

We will note four primary aspects of Plato's philosophy which are important for understanding Hegel. First, Plato's claim that the Forms [$\epsilonἶδῶται$] are the basis of reality seemed to Hegel to foreshadow his own doctrine of the Idea. Second, Plato's understanding that reality is two-tiered, with the sensible reality in flux around us and the true reality, the Forms, fixed above, seemed to Hegel to be important in reminding us that the world as it appears around us is one of deception and endless change (this is the meaning of the cryptic passage in Phen section 47/Phän page 35). Third, Hegel believed that Plato's philosophy approximates closer to his than most later philosophers, because Plato's conceptual apparatus was more flexible. Fourth, the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις [reminiscence] is of great significance for Hegel (e.g., note Phen section 13/Phän p.15).

The material probably more helpful than any other one source is in Gadamer's first essay. Gadamer's well-seasoned schol-

arship is evident (but the translation is poor--see the original, cited in the bibliography of articles at the end of this paper). The essay of Findlay in O'Malley *History* is helpful, but the criticisms of Palmer which follow it are justified. Maluschke has a very helpful analysis of how Hegel viewed Plato's *Parmenides* on pp. 43-54. Stace is interesting but typically verbose and not entirely accurate. Wiehl focuses on the roots of Hegel's metaphysics in Plato's predecessors and in Plato's theory of Forms. Bloch's chapter "Hegel und die Anamnese; Contra Bann der Anamnese" is a reasonably accurate assessment of Hegel's doctrine, but Bloch does not hesitate to disagree with Hegel's whole theory of *Erinnerung* [remembering].

3. Aristotle. Hegel's close affinity with the philosophy of Aristotle is well established, though aspects are woefully in need of further research. Though there are many points of similarity, we will isolate the four main ones here.

First, Aristotle's teleology is conspicuously present in Hegel's cosmology. Not only does the word *zweck* and its compounds appear frequently in his writings (e.g. Gauvin's *Wortindex* lists over 250 instances of *zweck* in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* alone) ; the very Aristotelian view of teleology as immanent in nature is clearly also Hegel's own position.

Second, the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism is present in Hegel's philosophy in at least two ways. The more obvious presence is simply in Hegel's dialectical pattern, as he claims that we begin with a universal, qualify it with a particular claim (for him, "negation"), and draw a conclusion which is neither of the premisses alone, but a new synthetic thesis. The presence of this influence is (I believe) attested to by the frequency with which we find the word for "(logical)middle term" [*Mitte*] appearing in the non-logical works (e.g., according to the *Wortindex* the word *Mitte* appears 63 times in the *Phänomenologie*).

The other use of Aristotle's syllogistic is to be found in

Hegel's account of how philosophical "knowledge" progresses and accumulates. Remembering that for Aristotle and for Hegel "science" is not an empirical gathering of facts (the modern approach) but absolute truth, Aristotle claims that we attain scientific truth by starting with the definition of the essence of the thing as the major premiss of the syllogism, adding a minor (particular) premiss gained from experience, and reaching a conclusion. The conclusion is then the new major premiss for a further syllogism, and knowledge is thereby accumulated. Aristotle claims that definitions are formed by a process of induction {ἐπαγωγή} from experience (*Posterior Analytics* II,19). On the basis of Aristotle's claim that the definition of definition contains both a universal genus and also difference (*Metaphysics* 1037b-1038a) we may note that Hegel starts on a similar note in the logical progression of his metaphysics. Further, as in the syllogism of Aristotle, the universal-particular-conclusion pattern is fundamental to the movement of his system. Finally, the Hegelian notion of *Erfahrung* [experience] as the source of the middle terms for the "syllogism" of philosophy runs parallel to some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. (See pp.44-45 below.)

Third, Aristotle differed from Plato in taking the essences of things out of the "beyond" and placing them in the things themselves. Hegel and Aristotle agree that the essence of the thing is in the thing (compare Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Forms and Hegel's criticism of Kant's "thing-in-itself"), that it is a self-contained unit and that its essence can be discerned from it (this is the point of Hegel's clever use of the word for perception, *Wahrnehmung* ["grasping the true"]). This is parallel

to Aristotle's use of the concept of intuition ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$), that we intuitively know the essences which are contained in a definition and thereby know the οὐσία or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Further, as we will see, Hegel's vocables *Selbstzweck* [self-contained-goal] and *Wirklichkeit* [actuality (= "balanced reality")] approximate to Aristotle's ἐντελέχεια [actuality, form, essence].

Finally, it seems that Hegel's concept of "God" was inspired by Aristotle's famous characterization of god as "thought thinking on thinking" (*Metaphysics* 1072b, quoted by Hegel at length at the end of the *Encyclopedia*).

The outstanding treatment of the relation between Aristotle and Hegel is by Mure. As a major translator of the Oxford edition of Aristotle's works, he is eminently qualified to discuss their relationship. Others especially helpful are Gray, Weiss (*Hegel's Critique*), and Findlay (*Re-examination*). Also helpful in a broad way are Gadamer's first essay and Rosen (who is good on the whole topic of Greek philosophy in Hegel). One who is seeking a very basic discussion will find Stace helpful. Regarding the connection between Aristotle's definition of definition and Hegel's metaphysics, the only literature I am aware of is a remark in Glockner's essay (p.82, fn.14). This deserves more investigation.

4. Neoplatonism and mysticism. There is certainly a strong element of Neoplatonic influence in Hegel's philosophy. This is most evident in the basic cosmological doctrine of Neoplatonism, the *exit-reditus* pattern. Neoplatonists typically held that the ultimate reality is the One, which is beyond time and space (and our knowing). From the One emanated the divine mind (not a deity to be worshipped), from which emanated the entire world. There is thus an *exit* of the world from the divine mind, and at the end of time there will be a great return (*reditus*) to the divine mind. This is a more picturesque way of stating the main point of Hegel's philosophy.

The outstanding source on this relation is Rosen, pp. 52ff.

Bloch also has some helpful material on pp. 479-480. Research in this area is woefully lacking.

Also of interest is the heritage of German mysticism which its mark on Hegel. Of particular interest is Jakob Böhme (1575-1624), who receives high praise from Hegel. Böhme was a visionary mystic who claimed to have seen "the Being of Beings, the Byss and the Abyss, the eternal generation of the Trinity, the origin and descent of this world, and of all creatures through the Divine Wisdom" (Second Epistle, section 6). He claimed to have seen the *Urgrund*, the metaphysical ground of being, and claimed that the *Urgrund* has a will for self-knowledge (= the Father) which generates and "knows" a "heart" (not a literal heart, of course) which is the Son. Emanating from these two is the "moving life" (= the Spirit); this triadic relationship is the pattern for the existing world. While much more could be mentioned from his philosophy which would elucidate Hegel, this ought to be sufficient to show the kind of influence which certainly exists.

An excellent resource on this topic is the dissertation of Annegrit Brunkhorst-Hasenclever, pp. 257-264. Bloch maintains the largely tenable thesis that Hegel's language is actually a melting pot of many "languages": theological, mystical, artistic, Swabian idioms, aphorisms, catchwords of the Romantics, etc. (pp.18-21).

B. Rationalism

1. Descartes. Hegel affirmed what has traditionally been said of Descartes (1596-1650), that he is the founder of modern philosophy. This is so, it is commonly agreed, because Descartes took the "transcendental turn" to the consciousness of the thinking subject. We note that Descartes began his philosophy on "systematic doubt" of everything except the premiss "I think, there-

fore I am." He was convinced that God has placed "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind, and since it is impossible for God to deceive, these ideas are an adequate basis of knowledge. (His thought is viciously circular: the veracity of my knowledge is guaranteed by God, and the notion of God is itself a "clear and distinct" idea.) Hegel praises Descartes for taking this turn to the consciousness (Hegel's own *Phenomenology* starts with the consciousness), but Hegel faults Descartes for stopping at a single stage of doubt (negation). It is not, on Hegelian grounds, sufficient to recognize finitude by negating; we must negate the negation.

We can also note Hegel's affinity with the movement called Rationalism (of which Descartes is acknowledged to be the "founder") There are two basic points which Hegel's vision shared with the aims of Rationalism: "1) the objective of coming to a comprehension of the All (*das Ganze*), the totality of being, or, as they frequently called it, the 'Absolute'; 2) the objective of describing the world precisely as an organized system of Reason,"⁵

The article by Weiss ("Cartesian Doubt and Hegelian Negation") in O'Malley (*History*) summarizes the situation very well. An equally worthwhile treatment is to be found in Navickas, chapter 1.

2. Spinoza: Hegel regarded Spinoza (1632-1677) as the most important rationalist, and we will be well repaid if we find out why. Spinoza may well have been the greatest single influence on Hegel's philosophy.

A key axiom in Spinoza's system is *omnis determinatio est negatio* [every determination is a negation]. By this he means that when the infinite is determined (meaning "limited", not "caused") there are particular restraints placed on it. Whenever

infinite being is qualified (as is the case when we designate existing particular things) there is also a finitude or negativity expressed. All existing things share the characteristic finitude which is a limit, or negativity, in its relationship to infinite Substance.

Hegel takes the liberty of converting Spinoza's formula ("liberty" because this is not justified on logical grounds) to a formula which suits his purpose: "all negation is determination [Bestimmtheit]". This is the most basic principle in Hegel's philosophy. Although all positive description is, as Spinoza says, negative, it is thus equally true that all these finite determinations are positively existing. In other words, it is equally true to say that all (limiting) determination is negation and all negativity is positively existing. In the context of Hegel's system, we can further say that all that exists is essentially negative. Negativity is the foundation of all existing things.

Hegel's criticism of Spinoza in this matter is based on the fact that Spinoza stopped with a single negation. Hegel holds that without a negation of negation, the particularity which is entailed by the first negation will never be overcome and there will be no unity. In other words, it is necessary to negate the finitude which is implicit in the first negation if we are to unite reality. More will be said about this in the discussion of dialectic in Chapter IV.

There is another point on which we see the direct influence of Spinoza on Hegel's philosophy. Spinoza rightly affirms that

the infinite, properly conceived, is completely free from limits and particulars/determinations. Since the infinite is undetermined, it is impossible to attribute any qualities to it, and hence even to think or speak about it. This approach is certainly evident in how Hegel treats the Idea (and ordinary mental concepts), claiming that without the particulars of human experience the universal is empty and meaningless. (But this is also in Kant: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind" [thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A51/B75).

Finally, we note in passing Spinoza's infamous formula *Deus sive Natura* [God or Nature; God = Nature]. Spinoza is ordinarily called a pantheist because he recognized no real distinction between God and Nature. We cannot discuss the implicit influence of his monotheistic Jewish background on this view, but it is important to see a similarity between his conclusion and that of Hegel (who held that "God" became the world). Spinozism was very popular among the Romantics at Hegel's time. For example, Goethe was known to carry a copy of Spinoza's *Ethics* in his coat pocket, and Hegel's predecessor in the first chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, Fichte, generated such an *Atheismusstreit* [atheism-controversy] while at the University of Jena that he was compelled to leave in 1799. Hegel's close friend and co-editor of a journal Schelling was a known pantheist.

A very good treatment of this connection is to be found in Maluschke, Chapter 3. Sarlemijn, pp. 121-124, is extremely important, as is Rotenstreich, *passim*. Stace's treatment is brief but substantial (pp. 32-34).

C. The Enlightenment

The complex nature of what is usually called the Aufklärung [Enlightenment] is such that it is very difficult to characterize it accurately. It involved the physics of Newton, the anthropology of Hume and Kant, and the social theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, to name just a few strands of activity. We may portray the outcome of this age by summarizing the resulting anthropological problems in two statements. First, it became necessary to clarify [aufklären] the new-found human subjectivity in its relation to the new-found scientific objective reality (understood by Romantics as the problem of the "one and all"). Second, it became necessary to clarify the general conclusion that as part of nature man is subject to the same natural laws as the rest of nature (understood by the Romantics as the problem of human freedom). We note that these are the two very problems which Kant, the epitome of Enlightenment thinkers, felt constrained to address ("the starry skies above and the moral order within").

1. Rousseau. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) formulated a theory of religion which greatly influenced Kant and the young Hegel. Rousseau claimed that whatever is convincing in the "sincerity of the heart" demands our assent. This, combined with his conviction that the conscience is essentially pure but often corrupted by corrupt society, forms the basis for his religious thought. His philosophy is based on a sort of Cartesian certainty, whereby the convictions of the heart are guaranteed by a superior being called God. Self-certainty is both the basis for our conviction that God guarantees truth and for assurance that our

moral beliefs are well-grounded.

It is well known that Kant tried to modify this scheme with the substitution of human reason for the immediate certainty of God's work in the conscience. Thus, for Kant, rational deliberation is the new basis for grounding our moral decisions. This becomes a moral theology when Kant adds the claim that there must be some connection between moral goods here on earth and some reward for attending to these goods. It is God who supplies the necessary connection between goods and rewards with the promise of a blessed hereafter.

Clearly, this is not a convincing rehabilitation of Rousseau, either from the standpoint of traditional theology or from a perspective of moral philosophy. Nonetheless, this was the approach which the young Hegel and his comrades embraced while in their formative years at the Tübingen Seminary.

Despite the importance of this connection, the literature is alarmingly small. The best explicit treatment is by Dieter Henrich in Christiansen (*Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*). The first chapter of Taylor is also particularly useful. A more general discussion is generated by Krüger. On Hegel's enthusiasm for Rousseau as a Revolutionary during his Tübingen days see Rosenkranz (32-34) and Wiedmann(English version) pp. 19-22.

2. Kant. Trying to describe the relationship between the philosophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Hegel in the space of a few paragraphs is an extremely difficult task. Hopefully, what follows is an adequate indication of what is happening; clarification can be gained from the sources listed at the end of this section. In the material which follows, we will try to achieve the following goals: a) show how Kant's philosophy set up a problem which Hegel tried to remedy, b) note Kant's treatment of the proofs for God's existence, and c) note how

Kant's philosophy of religion set the stage for Hegel's early encounters with Christianity.

a. The Kantian philosophy in general. In agreement with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, Kant acknowledged that the general problem of philosophy is to determine the grounds for certainty in knowledge. Kant allowed Hume's claim that the mind is barraged by a storm of confused sense-data, but added his own claim that the mind structures the data. Kant further claimed that the mind operates on three levels: sensibility (i.e. sense perception), understanding [*Verstand*], and reason [*Vernunft*]. The two forms of sensibility which order the incoming data are space and time. While the forms of sensibility fall under what he calls the "Transcendental Aesthetic" (transcendental referring to the fact that this faculty is above the material it puts in order), the understanding operates with the "Transcendental Analytic." This function of the mind is to organize and describe what is grasped by sensibility in propositional statements. These two functions of the mind are strictly confined to knowledge derived from sense experience, but the faculty of reason goes beyond these concepts to what is not observable. The faculty of reason (using the "Transcendental Dialectic") is concerned with what are usually called theology and metaphysics.

While knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding is on certain footing, he claims, because it is based on experience, the ideas of the faculty of reason are only postulates. The three postulates (corresponding to the traditional Rationalist categories [viz. Wolffian]) are God, the World, and the Soul.

None of these are observable, and each is fraught with problems in the history of thought. Regarding rational psychology (the soul) Kant showed the paralogisms (logical fallacies) which attend the premisses which are nonetheless accepted as true. Regarding rational cosmology (the world), Kant shows that contradictory propositions can be proved regarding the status of the world (antinomies). Finally, rational theology is impossible, as we will see.

What good are these ideas of reason? They help us unify our experiences. The idea of the soul gives us a point around which to gather our experiences, i.e., a self. The idea of the world preserves the concept of human freedom, and as we noted above, the notion of God serves to furnish us with a notion of retribution and reward necessary for ethics.

Having laid this groundwork, we can now make the application to Hegel's philosophy. First, we note that what Kant calls the transcendental dialectic is a purely negative concept. This is so, because Kant claims that Reason cannot legitimately form positive (constitutive) ideas, only negative (regulative) ideas. This is important, for we can see that Kant is employing Reason only to keep our lives in order, not to give us information beyond what is available in sense experience. This brings us to the Kantian notion of the "thing-in-itself" [*das Ding an sich*] which is a key concept for him. He believes that there must be a basis for what exists which transcends the things, and he refers to the hypothetical ground of the things which exist as the "things in-themselves" (the in-self referring to an abstraction or isolation from all sensible matter. The upshot of this is to claim that

there is a sharp division between what is truly knowable and what is mere construction of the intellect (note the similarity to Plato's doctrine of the Forms). It may be said that the entire enterprise of Hegel consists in an attempt to put the "thing-in-itself" (which is the rough equivalent to an "essence") back into the world as Spirit (which is the essence of the world).

b. Kantian morality and Christianity. The Kantian morality has the division between will and reason as its basic structure. As noted above, the will is subjected to the demands of moral reason as the decision-making process of the person attempts to determine what is the ethical course of action. Though in his earlier of the "early" writings Hegel follows the basic Kantian morality in forming his philosophy of religion, he later in the "early" period attempted to make "love" the unifying force in religion.

c. Proofs of God's existence. Kant recognized three kinds of demonstrations of God's existence: the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Physico-theological. We do not have the liberty to follow more than the conclusions here. The Ontological argument, as Kant understands it, starts from the a priori concept of God alone. The basis of Kant's rejection of this proof lies in two areas: first, the concept of an absolutely existing being is unverifiable, and second, we cannot overcome the gulf between the (mental) concept and the really existing thing. The Cosmological argument (from the fact that things exist) and the Physico-theological (from the experience that there is purpose and order in the world) break up on several accounts. Most telling is the fact that

we cannot use the information based on sense data to argue what is beyond observation, since we are using what is already given as categories in our own minds to prove what is in principle unprovable. In other words, these proofs are based on a sense of orderly existence which is not "in things" but in our minds. Again, ideas of reason cannot constitute; they can only regulate.

There is a sizeable literature on this material. For a general account of Kant, the standard textbooks are fine (Collins, *History*, is particularly lucid). Of especial interest on the problem of knowledge in Kant and Hegel is Navickas, pp. 6ff. The discussion by Harris in *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 17-25 is extremely important in coming to grips with the problem of Hegel's appropriation of Kant's terminology. For a detailed analysis of the proofs of God's existence, see Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy*. Maluschke's chapters 4 and 5 are particularly edifying on a more technical level.

D. Post-Kantian Idealism

The four thinkers which we will consider in this section are all considered "Idealists." By Idealism we mean an opposition to both Naturalism and Realism. Idealism is a trend in the history of thought (not confined to any one period of history) which claims that mind and thought are more real than material objects. As opposed to Naturalism, Idealism denies that thought is a process derived from nature and makes the counter-claim that our very concept of "nature" is a mental construct. As opposed to Realism,

Idealism denies that material things exist independently of the mind. Idealism claims that "things" as we know them are (in the radical, or "subjective" form) not "out there" at all, or (in the more typical form) are unknowable without the structuring function of the mind. Kantian Idealism is called "Critical Idealism" because it is of the latter type (in conjunction with the "critical" philosophy of Hume). The successors to Kant were quick to spot several fault-lines in his philosophy, and it is this modified Idealism as expounded by those post-Kantians which we will address here.

1. Jacobi: the philosophy of religious feeling. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) was no systematic philosopher, but an insightful critic of other philosophers. Himself a mystic, he was deeply influenced by Pietism and was a bitter enemy of the antismaterialistic religion of the Enlightenment. He was deeply influenced by Spinoza and Hume. From Spinoza he came to realize the consequences of rationalistic religion, and felt deeply repulsed by Spinozism (which he considered the equivalent of fatalistic pantheism). He was positively influenced by Hume, who claimed that the role of religion in life is confined to the feeling of the reality of the human consciousness.

In opposition to Kant, Jacobi made a radical shift in his interpretation of the role of faith and reason. Kant clearly designated the knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding as the most "real" while relegating Reason to a secondary role. To state this in ordinary language, Kant placed sensation and its systematization into the role of rationality, and placed

"reason" in the role of faith. Jacobi opposed this with a more "common sense" approach, claiming that the immediate intuition of what we call real (sensation and thoughts of the existing world) is "faith" because we accept the world around us with the same immediacy as faith. What Kant calls Reason Jacobi claims to also be a form of belief, since concepts such as God, immortality, etc., are not accessible to the understanding except by faith (in its more usual sense).

The upshot of this is that feeling [*Gefühl* (usually having a rather broader meaning than the English "feeling")] is now the basis of all knowledge. Hegel shows a guarded sympathy for this view in the early work *Glauben und Wissen* [Faith and Knowledge, 1802], which stated that all ordinary knowledge is a kind of faith. Nonetheless, we will see that Hegel castigates this position for having reduced all knowledge to feeling. As he often said with reference to Schleiermacher, our knowledge of the absolute truth is not a matter of edification but a matter of systematic philosophical knowledge.

We note in passing that this is the source of Schleiermacher's theology. Granted that Schleiermacher was influenced by other sources (e.g. Plato, Spinoza), still, Jacobi was the primary source for Schleiermacher and, in the twentieth century (with Fries) also Rudolf Otto.

On the source and content of Jacobi's philosophy, some excellent sources are Beck, and Kröner I, 303-315. On the relation of Jacobi to Hegel, see the concise discussion by Harris in *Difference* pp. 25-32 and the magisterial treatment of Bonsiepen, pp. 42-3, 55-63.

2. Fichte: the philosophy of Subjectivity. Johann Gottlieb

Fichte (1762-1814) tried to systematize philosophy around what he understood to be the main point of Kantianism, that the self is primary and is the means of relating to the world. His philosophy of subjectivity (so called because he starts with the thinking subject) begins with the Ego (self) and from the existence of the Ego deduces a system of scientific knowledge [*Wissenschaftslehre*] (again, scientific meaning absolutely true). He employs a triadic dialectic in the form thesis-antithesis-synthesis (this is frequently mistaken for Hegel's dialectic as well) which follows this pattern: thesis: The Ego posits itself (I am myself; I=I); antithesis: the Ego opposes itself (non-I is not myself; something exists which is not-I); synthesis: (finite)Ego and (finite)non-Ego are both contained in the infinite Ego. The second stage, the antithesis, corresponds to the "world"; here we can see the influence of Spinoza and we will see something similar in Hegel.

This rather mysterious teaching is aimed at maintaining the subjective consciousness as the starting point of our knowledge, and from its existence positing the existence of the world. The unity of self and world is found in the Absolute mind or subject. It is not easy to see how he overcomes the problems Kant had with the self-world relation; it seems that his problems are just as severe, if not worse.

For descriptions of his philosophy, see, for example, Collins (*History*) and Copleston. For a good account of his writings relate to Hegel's early philosophy, see *Differencepp.* 32-39. Again, Bonsiepen provides an insightful discussion on pp. 64-67. Kroner, I, 362-538, provides an extensive description of his philosophy and explicates the relation to Kant.

3. Schelling: the philosophy of Identity. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) traversed no less than four distinct (though cumulative) stages in his philosophy. Though the other stages are also of considerable interest to scholars, our main interest lies with the third, his "Philosophy of Identity." First propounded at length in 1803, this is basically a reworked Spinozism. In contrast to Spinoza's dead, materialistic determinism, Schelling proposed that neither a philosophy of nature nor a philosophy of knowledge (mind) are adequate alone; they need each other for completeness. He claimed that nature and knowledge are bonded by reason in an undifferentiated identity. Itself springing from the Absolute, Reason is the source of both (external) nature and (internal) knowledge. The supreme law of reason is the law of identity, $A=A$. Thus, while some distinctions are to be made regarding form (e.g. subject-object), the essence of all is an undifferentiated unity. (It was this claim which led Hegel to remark tartly in the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology* that this is "the night in which, as it is said, all cows are black" [Phen 9/Phän 17]).

This leads to a vitalistic pantheism (influenced by Giordano Bruno and others), where life is the principle of the inorganic world. He held that we can distinguish God formally from nature, but not essentially. God cannot be understood rationally, because God's essence is will which is evident only in his action.

Schelling's philosophy is similar to Fichte's in that he is still operating with an Idealism which seeks to unite thought and reality. But there is a major difference, in that Schelling

placed the primary seat of reality outside the mind. For this reason, Schelling is traditionally designated an "Objective Idealist" and Fichte a "Subjective Idealist."

The best general sources are the same as for Fichte. Cerf's innovative dialogue between Kant, Hegel, and Schelling in *Difference*, pp. xxiv-xxxv is very informative. See Rosen, pp. 58-62 for a concise and helpful discussion. A magisterial treatment is in Kroner (I, 535-612 and II, 1-254).

E. Romanticism

There can be no doubt that Hegel's philosophical doctrines were shaped by the romantic philosophies of his contemporaries, but it is not so clear how far their influence extends into his philosophy. The very diversity of their ideals and the lack of systematization which was characteristic of that movement is also a serious reason why we shall have difficulty showing their precise influence on Hegel. It is clear that he became less "Romantic" as he matured, but there remained unmistakable elements in his philosophy to his death. Our consideration of their influence on Hegel's philosophy will fall under three headings: the Greek Ideal, the revolt against mechanistic physics, and the ideal of the *hen kai pan*.

A concise survey of the course of thought in the fifty years prior to and including Hegel's youth, summarizing the thought and relationships of Romantics to other movements, is in the first chapter of Taylor. (This is a "must" for everyone- one reviewer enthusiastically remarked that Hegel would have learned from it!) Chapter XVI of Randall is very helpful in understanding the Romantic spirit. Arthur O. Lovejoy's classic includes a fine chapter (Ten) on the principle of plenitude in Romanticism.

1. The Hellenic Ideal. We are justified in referring to the Hellenic Ideal for two reasons. (We are limiting the scope of "Romanticism" and "Romantics" to the Germans roughly contemporaneous

with Hegel.) This was an "ideal" in the sense that it was an artificial reading of Greek culture. The Greek Ideal was derived from exalted philosophical and literary works, not from study of archaeology and works displaying the life of the common man (e.g., Hesiod). This was also an ideal in that the Romantics believed that this "age of Pericles" is an ideal which transcends time and is applicable for today.

There were two basic characterizations of the Greek man which were common among the Romantics. One was that of the "Neoclassical" harmonious man who lives within the limits set by the gods. His life is dominated by *sōphrosynē*, sober and harmonious living. The other ideal was that of the "universal traveller," the free spirit whose mind ("genius") roams the range of reality in order to experience life to the fullest. The second (which is even more unreal than the first) overtook the first during the period of *Sturm und Drang* in the 1770's and dominated the Romanticism which most influenced Hegel.

In his earlier years (but not abandoned later) Hegel was fond of comparing the Greek *Volksreligion* [people's religion] with Christianity. He admired the Greek syncretistic attitude, which incorporated the customs and religions of its constituent peoples into its culture, and deprecated Christianity for arrogantly banning native religions. (Note his well-known complaint: "Christianity has depopulated Valhalla and destroyed the sacred groves.") Though Hegel was always in favor of this syncretistic view of religion, his greater interest was that people be allowed to remain in their indigenous religions (this is important, he held, since he believed that native government and native religion

belong together). Unlike many of his contemporaries, Hegel did not find viable prospects for rebirth of Greek culture; he held that it is impossible to return to a revitalized Hellenic culture. What we need to do, he claimed, is to learn to appropriate their values and strengths as part of the present.

The final point of Hegel's involvement with Greek culture lies with the concept of the *polis*. He believed that the reason why Prussia had had such a miserable history up to his time was that there was too much individualism (fostered, he held, by Rationalism, Pietism, and the Enlightenment). He held up the Athens of Pericles as his model for a city in which the will of the individual and the collective will of the city are the same. In such an idyllic social climate, there will be cooperation and unity which will certainly advance the progress of Spirit in the World.

The classic work on this topic is Gray's. Gray works expertly in the area and actually provides a rather good introduction to Hegel's philosophy. Also very helpful are the first chapter of Taylor and Plant (entire book; especially chapters I, II, and VII) and Rosen, *passim*. The monograph of Crites does a good job on Hegel's early conception of religion.

2. The attack on mechanistic physics. As we noted in the discussion of Kant, his theory of knowledge is primarily devoted to an account of how the new-born science of physics can be preserved from destruction by the monster of skepticism. The appearance of Newton's *Principia* in 1687 marked the *terminus a quo* for an age of mechanistic science, particularly physics. The Newtonian physics is characterized by the working of laws which are innately contained in the universe, requiring no external (divine) acts of preservation to preserve them. The result of the new mechanistic physics was widespread, influencing anthropology and

social theory to a radical extent.

The Romantics were unified in their disdain for mechanism. They wanted desperately to grasp the unity of the universe as an organic, living being (this is also an early Greek notion). They demanded a return to their Greek ideals, man living in nature as part of nature, united with it as part of a cosmic life-force.

Randall chapter XI is a good account of the new mechanism. Again, the first chapter of Taylor is good.

3. The hen kai pan. This expression from Lessing expresses the desire of the Romantics to unite reality. Though Lessing was certainly more in the Enlightenment tradition, his Spinozistic desire to unify all into a unity of substance (pantheism) does sound a bugle call to the Romantics.

For the purposes of this study, we may simplify the aims of the Romantics into four main desires (profiting from the analysis of Taylor, chapter one). The first desire of the Romantics was to unify anthropology, which the Enlightenment had dissected. The second desire was to propose a novel view of freedom. The Enlightenment saw freedom as the absence of oppression from the state and church, but the Romantics viewed freedom in terms of the free expressiveness of the individual person. The third was a call for unity with nature, to find the community of the human spirit with the spirit of life in nature. This found several expressions, all amounting to an exaltation of "feeling" [Gefühl]; typical is Schiller's famous *Lied an die Freude* [Ode to Joy]. Used by Beethoven in his Ninth (Choral) Symphony, Schiller in this poem refers to "joy" as the "magic which binds back together what custom boldly divides" and in

numerous ways expresses the *hen kai pan* theme. The fourth goal was to find community with other people on the basis of community with nature, in a *polis*-like unity.

Hence our characterization of this goal as the *hen kai pan*, the one and the all. Remembering our initial analysis of the Enlightenment, that they struggled with the problems of individuality and science, we see that the Romantics struggled with same problems but reached quite different answers from the Enlightenment. Hegel does fall heir to some Enlightenment (principally as he used and altered the philosophical tendencies of Kant and his successors), but on the whole he is far more sympathetic with Romantic ideals. We will not be far off base, for example, if we characterize his famous *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the struggle for the individual consciousness (the one) to find its place in what lies outside it (the all).

Notes to Chapter One

¹I cannot agree with Findlay's opinion that Hegel's philosophy was "autochthonous growth, begotten more out of his own personal broodings over the mysteries of Christianity and on the strange arguments of the Platonic *Parmenides*, than from the philosophers who went before him in time" (article "Hegel" in O'Connor, *Critical History*, page 322). Actually, Hegel was perhaps the most history-conscious of all philosophers. Findlay's remark (indeed this article) is sadly below the level of his usual fine scholarship; his writing and the nature of his historical studies show us that he does not really believe this.

²For Hegel's own discussions of these thinkers, consult the three volume *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie [Lectures on the History of Philosophy]*.

³This is a good approach to understanding Hegel's philosophical enterprise in general. It is used by Rosen (5ff.), Gadamer (7f, 33, 58), and Kroner II, 255, with considerable success.

⁴Jones, p.21.

⁵Kainz, *Commentary*, page 7.

Chapter Two: Hegel's Philosophical Enterprise

We are now ready to investigate the Hegelian system itself. We begin this chapter with a biographical sketch, including notes on his writings, and devote the remainder of the chapter to a discussion of the nature of his writings.

A. Hegel's life and writings

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was born in Stuttgart. He was sent to the local school at the age of three and the Latin school at age five; at the age of ten he went to the excellent local *Gymnasium*. In the winter of 1788-89 he began study at the Tübingen *Stift* (theological "foundation"; roughly equivalent to a seminary). Sharing a room with Hölderlin and Schelling, he declared his chief areas of study to be philosophy and theology. Though his lifestyle was rather "free" (he enjoyed drinking wine and playing cards at the local cafes somewhat to excess), he was a gifted student who stayed at or near the top of his class. Upon the passing of his examination in theology in 1793, he went to Berne^(Switzerland) as a private tutor in accord with the custom of his day. As was also the custom, he used his private time to read and develop his own thoughts. In 1797 he took a more appealing position in Frankfurt (where his friends were). This was a period of intense questioning for Hegel, and he wrote numerous essays

in his private journal which were published by Hermann Nohl in 1907 under the title *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*. Though several essays are fragmentary and all are from a young and tender mind, they are quite helpful in better understanding the later Hegel. Some of these essays will be examined in Chapter Five.

In 1801 he accepted a position at the University of Jena as an unsalaried lecturer (as a *Privatdozent* he would be paid by the individual students on a per-lecture basis). There he collaborated with Schelling for a couple of years on the *Kritisches Journal*. He published his first book of any sort in 1801 (the so-called *Differenzschrift*), but his first major work ^(*Phänomenologie des Geistes*) did not appear until 1807. This work was written hurriedly in 1806 while Napoleon was besieging the city; Hegel escaped the looting troops with the last part of the manuscript in his pocket.

Desperately needing a job, he accepted the editorship of a newspaper (*Die Bamberger Zeitung*). There at Bamberg he was able to keep up with the details of world events, in keeping with his desire to be well-informed regarding the progress of Spirit in the world. Finally bored with his position to the point of desperation, he pleaded with his friend Niethammer to find him a different job. Being the senior inspector of the public schools, Niethammer had him placed in Nurenberg as head-master of the *Gymnasium* (1808). Though the multitude of duties was oppressive, Hegel did find time to get married in 1811 (he was 41; his bride Marie was 20) and begin publication of his next work. This was the ponderous *Wissenschaft der Logik* [*Science of Logic*] (Book One, 1812, Book Two, 1813, Book Three, 1816; Book One substantially revised, 1831). He was blessed with a fine and happy family life

to the end of his days, having two sons who distinguished themselves professionally. They also had a daughter who died in infancy and there was the illegitimate son Ludwig, born in 1807 in Jena to the wife of Hegel's landlord.

In 1816 Hegel finally received an invitation to teach at the University of Heidelberg. While there he published his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse* [*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*] in 1817, and his reputation grew steadily. In 1818 he was asked to teach at the University of Berlin, to replace the famous Fichte who had been gone for several years. (His famous conflict with Schleiermacher, then Rector (President) of the University, began immediately but did not escalate to seriousness until 1820.) While at Berlin he became the most important philosopher in Europe and was considered such until a few years after his death. In 1821 he finished his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [*Basis of the Philosophy of Law*], a description of the proper functioning and theoretical foundations of the State.

While at Berlin he was asked to fill numerous official posts and found himself quite busy with activities other than teaching, including election to the post of Rector in 1829. He died in 1831 after a very brief illness, traditionally classed as cholera, but this is by no means certain.

Hegel published only four major works during his lifetime: *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Science of Logic*, *Encyclopedia*, *Philosophy of Right*. But there are literally bushels of notes from his lectures which have been published. The two editions published by his friends and students (1832 and 1841) also contain lecture

series on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion, the history of philosophy, and aesthetics. There remain bushels more of letters, notes, notebooks, and such which are invaluable to serious researchers. Much already is published piecemeal, but are now being published in a continuous text-critical edition by Felix Meiner Verlag in a planned set of 36 volumes.

Most introductions of any size offer a worthwhile introduction to Hegel's life and works. Franz Wiedmann's little *Hegel* is a delightful introduction to his life, times, and works which has no equal. He provides a sane and basically neutral account of the events which are considered controversial. Unfortunately, the fine bibliography and multitude of fascinating pictures which grace the German edition has been decimated in the English edition.

The more detailed biographies in English are those by Mueller and Kaufmann. Both are essentially accurate regarding facts, but need to be used critically. Kaufmann's work, like his book on Nietzsche, is more noteworthy for its polemic and literary discussion than for any philosophical erudition. Kaufmann spends too much energy proving theses already known and accepted (e.g., the conclusion of Haering that Schiller was an important influence on the young Hegel) and not enough energy elucidating Hegel's philosophy. He sees Hegel as decidedly anti-Christian, which is simply not true to the extent which Kaufmann claims (Kaufmann was more anti-Christian than Hegel). Kaufmann's dislike for Hegel is quite apparent, and on the whole his book is not all that useful for someone trying to get his bearings in Hegel. Overall, this book is edifying after some other reading has been done, but is not a good place to start.

Mueßler is sympathetic with Hegel, but the English version of his work is but a pale shadow of the German original. Though enlightening, it is helpful more as an intermediate discussion than as a beginning resource. Reviews of these books are to be found in Weiss' "Critical Survey" article in O'Malley, *The Legacy of Hegel*. On the whole, these works should be used after a basic acquaintance with the Hegelian system has been achieved from more even-tempered and reliable sources such as those by Wiedmann, Taylor, Rosen, and Collins.

Of the technical biographies we mention the main ones: Rosenkranz, Haym, Fischer, Haering, and Glockner. Karl Rosenkranz was a disciple of Hegel and is considered a very reliable source for information about Hegel's life and thought because he was not strongly associated with either the "left" or the "right" wing Hegelians. (Right wing Hegelians were theologically and politically conservative; most left wing Hegelians were atheists and/or Marxists.) His *Georg Wilhelm*

Friedrich Hegels Leben (1844) is still a staple for research. Rudolf Haym's *Hegel und sein Zeit* (1857) is important, but Haym did maliciously alter and delete some facts and materials. The *Hegels Leben, Werke, und Lehre* of Kuno Fischer gives the perspective of a Right Hegelian. The painstaking researches of Theodor Haering (1929-38) and Hermann Glockner (1929-40) are scientific and immensely thorough and helpful.

B. Synoptic overview of Hegel's metaphysics

Difficult though it is to briefly summarize Hegel's thought, the practical worth of this survey will depend on the reader's initial grasp of Hegel's system. In order to do this efficiently, we will limit our consideration to the skeleton of his system, his logic/metaphysics (which are the same thing for him). Such a summary is best made by taking two complementary points of view first, the trans-human (if we use the term divine this will only be confusing later) and then, the human perspective.

Seen from a trans-human perspective, that of what he would call logic (or, he would also say, theo-logic), we can trace the same movement in two ways. Logically, cosmic or "universal" history consists in a movement from the most general (and empty, as we noted from Spinoza) to the most particular, and then to a unity of the two. Since the universal concept is indeterminate it is without content, it is incomplete and strives for completion. This completion can come only in "knowing" the content which it lacks. This striving is not because of any conscious desire (the universal concept has no consciousness of its own), but because it is logically necessary that everything incomplete find completion. (These rather confusing axioms will be described and explained in Chapter Four.) The upshot of this is that the Universal strives to know itself through Particulars which are implicit in it.

Since both are one-sided, the universal without content and the particular without form (since it is a multitude of singulars unrelated to a universal), the unity of the universal and particular seeks to find itself. From a logical point of view, this conjunction of the universal (the major premiss) and the particular (the minor premiss) seeks a conclusion. All this will be clearer after discussing the other elements which form part of his system.

The other part of this trans-human viewpoint is what Hegel refers to as the divine. Hegel's use of this approach is easier to grasp because his language and concepts are simpler and more familiar, but yet it is much more difficult because what he means by God and divine are not at all what is usually meant. Nonetheless, this approach from the side of theological language is helpful to us. Hegel uses the language of the Christian Trinity, stating that the Universal which existed "before" the world is the Father, the Father alienated part of himself from himself, which is the world (the kingdom of the Son, who emptied himself), and the path of return is that of the Spirit, who unites Father and Son. In the third age, that of Spirit (*Geist*; note that the German for Holy Spirit is *Heilige Geist*), the universal and the particular are united in the community. It may be helpful to note a similar train of thought on the part of the Modal Monarchians, who claimed that the Godhead exists in three discrete modes such that when the Father existed, the Son and Spirit did not, and when the Son existed, the Father and the Spirit did not, etc. So far as I can tell, this parallel with Hegel's thought is unintentional, and it is not an exact parallel, but still it is close enough for helpful comparison.

In brief, the trans-human (divine) viewpoint sees the progress of a contentless universal concept from being "in-itself" to a state of self-alienation, where it is broken into itself and its other. Having come to know itself in its other (not unlike knowing oneself in a mirror image), there is then the return back to itself as Spirit living in human consciousnesses and unifying itself. In Hegel's scheme of things, these three steps (alienation, self-knowledge, unification) correspond to his interpretation of the Christian story of creation, redemption, and sanctification.

From the human point of view, the Hegelian philosophy is the striving of Spirit to return to its original oneness. Since the original (and the later forms of) Concept is not conscious, it gains consciousness only in the self-consciousness, only in the human consciousness. Perhaps the axiom which is most helpful overall in understanding the Hegelian philosophy is his claim, "*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*" ([The True is the Whole] Phen 11/Phän 19). This has several implications. First, the partial is false. Second, since rationality is a uniquely human feature, our search for truth implies that we will be thinking the whole. Ultimately, the whole is to be found only in the final reunion of Universality and Particularity (God and the World, in his peculiar language) as a completed Whole, where the Universal knows itself as Particular content and is thus a balanced whole.

I believe that there are three most basic principles which underlie the Hegelian system, and that these principles must be clearly understood before the system can be understood at all.

The first, and the most basic, is his desire for balanced completeness. Reminiscent of Plato's compulsive desire for unity,

Hegel insists that his philosophy begin with and return to a balanced completion.

The second principle, inherited from Spinoza, is that negativity is the foundation upon which all reality is built. The contradictory, negative nature of everything having real existence dictates that nothing can be static. There is a ceaseless passing into opposites, moving back and forth from one (conceptual) position to an opposite which was implicit in the first.

But what keeps this shifting mass of contradiction from sheer chaos? What makes it intelligible? The answer to both questions is the third principle, immanent teleology. Inherited from Aristotle, Hegel's teleology dictates that from beginning to end (this is already telic language) there is a rationally intelligible purpose which is being acted out in existence. This teleology is immanent in the structure of what is, it is a logical and rational movement. Does this allow us to predict future events? Hegel would say, yes and no. We do know that the end of reality is one of balanced wholeness which is rationally intelligible, and in this sense we know the future. But since the true is the whole, we are not licensed to predict individual events; they are only part of the picture and do not accurately reflect any balanced state of affairs. We cannot expect that any individuals will necessarily obey the rational teleology, but we know that the overall progress will be positive (Hegel calls this the "Cunning of Reason" [*Die List der Vernunft*]).

Really worthwhile summaries of Hegel's philosophy are surprisingly rare. The treatments of Gray (the Introduction to the excellent *G.W.F. Hegel On Art, Religion, Philosophy*) and Findlay (*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, sub "Hegel") are

concise and helpful. Ideally, one should read as many summaries and introductions as possible and check them against the texts and against each other. This is more necessary in the case of Hegel research than in most other beginning philosophy studies, because there is simply no brief and satisfactorily lucid introduction to his philosophy (with the possible exception of Collins, *History*).

The treatments of Findlay (*Reexamination*), Rosen, Taylor, and Collins (*History*) are the plumb-lines by which the others can be measured. For first-hand acquaintance, the beginning reader will best get hold of all three parts of the *Encyclopedia* and page through it. The presentation which was given in the text above is uniquely my own, and I believe that it singles out some key points frequently passed over in the majority of summaries.

C. The character of Hegel's philosophizing

1. His style. Hegel's written style is notoriously difficult.

Bloch puts it well: "Hegel is difficult, there is no doubt; he is one of the most inconvenient [unbequemsten] among the greatest thinkers. Many of his sentences are like vessels filled with the strongest and most fiery drink, but the vessels have only very small handles or none at all. Also, there are copious transgressions against civil grammar which strike not merely against the linguistic purist, and sometimes right on the head" (*Subjekt-Objekt*, p.18).

We know that Hegel (like Kant, whose formal style is not much better) was able to write clearly when he wanted to do so. Some commentators are bitterly critical of Hegel's style (e.g. Mueller, who calls the *Phenomenology* a "pitiful heap of unintelligible gibberish" [p.207]), while others are more sympathetic. Bloch defends Hegel bravely, holding that Hegel was trying to say in ordinary language what is impossible to adequately express in any language. He claims (and rightly so) that Hegel is in fact using many languages at once (pp. 19-20), but perhaps Bloch defends the vagaries of Hegel's style too much. A certain amount of the murkiness is certainly caused by the extreme haste with which the

Phenomenology and the *Science of Logic* were produced.¹ We cannot discuss other views, such as that of Kaufmann, within this study. Suffice it to say that Hegel's style is extremely difficult, but this is mostly by choice as he strives to express a new system in old words (and barbarous combinations thereof).

The discussions of Bloch (pp. 18-21), Kaufmann (pp. 115-138), and Mueller (p. 207 and passim) are interesting but all inferior to the excellent treatment by Cook, Chapter IX.

2. Hegel's attitude towards prior thinkers. In keeping with his dictum that the true is the whole, Hegel believed that philosophy does not sort and discard ideas. All prior thoughts are legitimately part of the Whole which alone is true. Those thoughts which are ordinarily (or technically) considered "false" are actually legitimate parts of the Whole, no less than "true" ones, because they all contribute to the fullness of reality. Much like Aristotle, Hegel believed that the work of his predecessors is incomplete but important prolegomena to his own philosophizing. He says this clearly in the opening paragraphs of the *Phenomenology of Sp̄rit*:

The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted, and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements.²

I am partial to viewing Hegel's way of doing philosophy as similar to the way an experienced editor operates with a staff of bungling cub reporters. That is, Hegel found it necessary to use the material which was given him, but with the constant need for revision and rearrangement. Thus his philosophical system is his own, but it is composed principally of materials gathered by his predecessors and contemporaries. Cf. Gray, *Hegel's Hellenic Ideal*, pp. 68ff.

Notes to Chapter Two

¹Regarding the *Science of Logic*, Hegel wrote the following to his friend Niethammer: "It is no small task to write a 500 page book in the first semester of one's marriage.--But *injuria temporum!* I am no academic; reaching proper form would have taken me another year, and I need money now to live on" (*Briefe I*, p.393, translation mine).

²*Phenomenology* p.2; *Phänomenologie* p.10: "So fest der Meynung der Gegensatz des Wahren und Falschen wird, so pflegt sie auch entweder Bestimmung oder Widerspruch gegen ein vorhandenes philosophisches System zu erwarten, und in einer Erklärung über ein solches nur entweder das eine oder das andre zu sehen. Sie begreift die Verschiedenheit philosophischer Systeme nicht so sehr als die fortschreitende Entwicklung der Wahrheit, als sie in der Verschiedenheit nur den Widerspruch sieht."

Chapter Three: The Absolute as Spirit

"*The Absolute is Spirit*; this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its significance and content was, one may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy."¹ Here we have a central concept in Hegel's philosophy, that the ultimate basis of reality is Spirit.

This chapter is to be an explanation of the implications of this claim.

A. Hegel's predecessors on the Absolute

We are, of necessity, limiting this discussion of the Absolute to Hegel's immediate predecessors: Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. These four are divisible, for our purposes, into two pairs: Spinoza and Schelling; Kant and Fichte.

1. Spinoza and Schelling: The Absolute as Substance. We recall from Chapter One that Spinoza claimed that God is the same as Nature, and that this is again equivalent to infinite substance. What most people found shocking, and what Hegel found untenable in this position, is the fact that substance is ordinarily associated with dead, inert matter. Though this is not quite what Spinoza intended, certainly his deterministic world held no attraction for Hegel. We recall that Schelling posited (in his third period of thought) a common source for nature and knowledge, namely reason. In his earlier (second) period he had espoused (and never repudiated)

the further claim that nature is superior to mind, and what the mind knows it receives from nature. This is claiming that the basis for reality is actually nature (which is itself from reason), and that the knowledge which we have of nature is a result of reason. Thus both Spinoza and Schelling held that nature (as substance) is the prime source of reality. Hegel repudiates this approach, holding that the Absolute is not only substance, or principle, but is also subject.

2. Kant and Fichte: The Absolute as Subject. Kant and his disciple Fichte both claimed that the knowing subject is most basic in reality. Kant modestly left the subject primarily in the human consciousness, subjugating all knowledge to its formative influence. Fichte went further, making the Ego the cosmic ground of existence. Hegel was not content with this approach, either, since claiming that the Absolute is subject leaves many unanswered questions regarding the relation of the (mental) subject to (physical) reality.

The most helpful discussions of this are in Collins, *History*, and Rotenstreich, Chapters one and two.

B. Hegel: the Absolute as Spirit

1. The ambiguity of Geist. A long-standing disagreement among Hegel scholars concerns the "proper" translation of the word *Geist*. Sometimes it signifies the individual human mind (in which *Geist* comes to consciousness), and sometimes it signifies universal Spirit in the world. At times he intends both meanings, but usually he is emphasizing one or the other. While Mind is important in Hegel's philosophy, it conjures up too many reminders of the Neo-

Hegelians in early twentieth-century Britain. Spirit, on the other hand, is easily applied to the "human spirit," the "spirit of an age," and the Holy Spirit-- all very important aspects of Geist for Hegel. ¹¹

There is some important literature on this matter. An important discussion of this and other difficult terms is recorded in Kainz' article "Roundtable" (in O'Malley, *Legacy*). Robert Solomon's important article, reprinted in Macintyre, is helpful on a deeper level. We see another instance of Kaufmann's careless impatience as he hastily dismisses the "Mind" translation without considering its merits (p.160).

2. The reflective unity of Substance and Subject. The Absolute is Spirit. Spirit, for Hegel, includes both substance and subject; these two aspects are indicated by the alternative translations Spirit and Mind (respectively). The absolute substance, the ground of all, is also spirit. How can these two, substance (which undergoes the dialectical changes of generation and corruption) and subject (characterized by intuitive immediacy) be unified? Hegel believes that the act of reflection captures both of these aspects. Reflection of the intellect thrives on the dialectic of opposites, such as is present in generation and corruption, and reflection may also refer to the return of the substance to itself. Thus Mind (human and "cosmic") reflects on itself, knowing itself intuitively and also dialectically.²

This is not the easiest to understand, but it is very important. Hegel's vision is certainly profound, uniting subjective thought with objective substance under the aegis of reason. The rationally reflective subject is automatically reflecting on something. It is vital that this point be understood, for, like Plato, Hegel is adamant in insisting that ultimate reality is rationally

knowable. Though the term "reason" can be confusing as Hegel uses it, Hegel insists that "the true is the rational."³

Most helpful on this matter are Collins, *History*, and Rotenstreich.

3. The Absolute as Systematic Science. Absolute Mind/Spirit finds its perfect embodiment in Science. Again, "Science" is not the modern empirical science but the ancient conception of *scientia*, absolutely true knowledge. The redundant modifiers "systematic" and "philosophical" are sometimes added to emphasize the fact that this is ultimate wisdom.

"That the True is actual only as System, or that the Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the mental image of the Absolute as *Spirit*--the most exalted Concept and that which belongs to the modern age and its religion."⁴ Substance and Subject are fully united into a balanced whole only in the systematically whole philosophy. The form of philosophy, the logical categories of a thinking subject, becomes identical with the substance of reality, which is the content of philosophy. The term "actual" is the operative element in the passage above, and this term will be explained in Chapter Four below. Here we will note the conclusion that the True is completed, or properly balanced, only in a System which encompasses all reality.

One implication, noted above, of this notion of the "systematic whole" is that the form and the content of philosophy become identical. The very expression "Absolute" implies that this is the all-inclusive category, and the most basic and pervasive of all categories. But the Absolute (Mind/Spirit) not only has form and content, it is an identity of form and content. Put in other

words, logic and metaphysics are the same. Metaphysics, the science of substance, and logic, the science of the thinking subject, are reflectively identical in Absolute Mind/Spirit. "[The developmental stages of Spirit] no longer fall apart into the opposition of Being and Knowing, but abide in the simple unity of Knowing. They are the True in the form of the True, and their difference is merely the difference of content. Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into the Whole, is the Logic or the *Speculative Philosophy*."5

The best source for this information is the Preface to the *Phenomenology*. On an advanced level, the expositions by Glockner (p.135ff.) and Hinrichs (Chapter VIII, "Das absolute Wissen") are superb.

C. The road to Spirit

1. The problem of an introduction. The expositor of Hegel faces the same problem as Hegel himself faced: where do we start? Since truth resides only in the finished whole, there is no "true proposition" with which we can make a beginning. Either we cannot start at all, which is absurd, or we can start anywhere. The latter is the case, and it is the person learning who decides where to start: "In this way philosophy_A ^{shows} itself to be a circle which goes back into itself, which has no beginning as in the sense which other Sciences have, so that the beginning has a connection only to the subject who resolves to philosophize, not to the Science as Science."6 The start with the "person" is precisely that of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

An extremely helpful discussion of the problem of a beginning is to be found in Hyppolyte, pp. 4-11. Hegel presents a more technical treatment of this problem in the *Science of Logic*, pp.67-78/ *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, pp. 51-64.

2. Universal education: Remembering in Experience. What is the process whereby one learns the ultimate science? This is a major problem which faced Hegel. His answer is not one which is particularly simple, but it is profound and very important to his philosophical system.

As we will see more fully in the discussion of dialectic (Chapter Four below), Hegel claimed that the course of cosmic history has passed from the (empty, contentless) universal into its opposite, (mere confused) particularity, and the unity of the two one-sided parts into the synthesis of each into the (balanced, "actual") individual. Individuality, for Hegel, is always the unity of universal (objective) and particular (subjective) into a balanced whole. The (metaphorical) explanation which Hegel gives is that the empty universal must discover the particular content which is implicitly its own. The logical explanation is that every concept implies a contradictory concept which must be explicated before the first is fully understood. In order to know its implicit content, the universal becomes the implicit particulars and observes itself in the human mind (subject) which lives in the human body and the physical world (substance). As the human consciousness understands the world, this is also the Spirit educating itself. The result of this observation of the world is the reflective reunification of the Substance and the Subject in Speculative Science.

From this general account, we are ready to flesh out some details. There are two concepts which are central to properly understanding his account: *anamnesis* ["remembering," *Erinnerung*] and Experience [*Erfahrung*].

As we noted from the historical survey of Plato's influence on Hegel, Plato's doctrine of *anamnesis* (that the eternal soul in each successive human life retains the memory of what was learned in the previous lives) finds a new life in Hegel. "Although, from one point of view, the first appearance of the new world is only at first the Whole veiled in its *Unity*, or is its universal foundation, yet the richness of previous existence is present to consciousness in memory [*Erinnerung*]." ⁷ The notion that individuals are contributing to the overall "education" of Spirit (since the wisdom of Spirit cumulates with the passage of historical events) is a concept sometimes given the precise formulation "transcendental propaedeutic."

We have discussed the "remembering" and its cumulative action, now we can see how this amounts to "education." Hegel writes: "The series of ^{its} shapes, which the consciousness passes through along this path, is rather the comprehensive history of the education [*Bildung*; also "culture"] of consciousness itself to [the goal of] Science." ⁸ We cannot stop to discuss the similarities of this approach to the then contemporary literary genre of *Bildungsroman* (or *Erziehungsroman*) [culture/education-novel] as exemplified by Goethe's *Meister Wilhelms Lehrjahre*. ⁹ What matters here is that Spirit is educating itself in the observation of the world.

Hegel's very word for "experience" is instructive. The German word *Erfahrung* contains the concept of "journey," while the synonym *Erlebnis* emphasizes the inner subjective quality of "experience." Thus, we would refer to events in life as part of *Erfahrung* and an emotional experience as *Erlebnis*. We can note

with interest that Hegel's emphasis is betrayed by the fact that Gauvin's *Wortindex* gives about 150 instances of forms of *Erfahrung*, in the *Phenomenology*, while only two instances of *erleben* occur in the entire work.

From our explanation of how Aristotle influenced Hegel's philosophy, we concluded that the Aristotelian notion of Science as composed of chains of syllogisms is the root of Hegel's concept of experience. Again, Aristotle starts with a definition which is general and to which is added a particular observation which forms the "middle term" upon which the conclusion is based. The ideal instance of this is the "Barbara" mood, which follows the form "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal." For Hegel, the logical (universal, objective) seeks particular observations which can serve as the mediating "middle term" to balance itself. When the universal finds the (subjective) particulars it logically requires, the resulting balanced conclusion is only the basis for further discovery. Thus the concept of experience, for Hegel, follows the linking together of knowledge discussed by Aristotle. "This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness exercises on itself, regarding both its knowledge and its object (*insofar as the new true object springs out of it*), is properly [uniquely] that what is named *experience*."¹⁰

In brief, we can describe the universal education of Spirit as the process by which Absolute Mind/Spirit finds its balancing truth in the [philosophical] observation of itself as substance in particulars. This filling of the universal with observed particulars is precisely the return of Spirit to itself.

pp. 613ff.

Collins (*History*) and Findlay (*Re-Examination*, pp. 85ff., will

help the reader get his bearings. But the classic on this topic is Heidegger's famous essay, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung." Also helpful are Bloch, pp. 473ff., on *anamnesis*, and Puntel, pp. 287ff., "Die Erfahrung als dialektische Bewegung."

Notes to Chapter Three

- ¹My translation; *Enzyklopädie* sect. 384: "Das Absolute ist der Geist; dies ist die höchste Definition des Absoluten.--Diese Definition zu finden und ihren Sinn und Inhalt zu begreifen, kann man sagen, war die absolute Tendenz aller Bildung und Philosophie..."
- ²This point is made in *Phenomenology*, p.21 (*Phänomenologie* pp. 29-30): "Now, though this negative appears at first as a disparity between the "I" and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside itself, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the "I", it is the self-like or the Concept." (Translation modified.)
- ³The problem, as we will see in Chapter Four, is in the definition of "rational." Kroner, from a perfectly valid perspective, is also justified in his judgment, "Hegel ist ohne Zweifel der grösste Irrationalist, den die Geschichte der Philosophie kennt" [Hegel is, without doubt, the greatest irrationalist which the history of philosophy knows.] (II,271). Kroner's entire discussion (II,267-272) is very helpful.
- ⁴My translation; *Phenomenology* p.14. *Phänomenologie* p.22: "Dass das Wahre nur als System wirklich, oder dass die Substanz wesentlich Subject ist, ist in der Vorstellung ausgedrückt, welche das Absolute als Geist ausspricht,--der erhabenste Begriff, und der der neuern Zeit und ihrer Religion angehört."
The reader probably wonders by now why I take so many examples from the beginning of the *Phenomenology*. I do so because the *Vorrede* [Preface] and the *Einleitung* [Introduction] to the *Phenomenology* are considered to be classic introductions to his philosophy. Hopefully, repeated use of examples from these sections will encourage readers to feel some impetus to read and study these sections for themselves.
- ⁵My translation; *Phenomenology* p.22. *Phänomenologie* p.30: "Sie fallen nicht mehr in den Gegensatz des Seyns und Wissens auseinander, sondern bleiben in der Einfachheit des Wissens, sind das Wahre in der Form des Wahren, und ihre Verschiedenheit ist nur Verschiedenheit ist nur Verschiedenheit des Inhalts. Ihre Bewegung, die sich in diesem Elemente zum Ganzen organisirt, ist die Logik oder speculative Philosophie." Similar statements abound in Hegel's writings. (The German texts sometimes space for emphasis and sometimes use italics. We will adopt the policy in copying the quotations to use italics whenever emphasis is indicated.)

Chapter Three Notes, Continued

- ⁶My translation; *Enzyklopädie* sect. 17: "Auf diese Weise zeigt sich die Philosophie als ein in sich zurückgehender Kreis, der keinen Anfang nur eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt, als welches sich entschliessen will zu philosophieren, nicht auf die Wissenschaft als solche hat."
- ⁷My translation; *Phenomenology* 7. *Phänomenologie* p.15: "Indem einerseits die erste Erscheinung der neuen Welt nur erst das in eine *Einfachheit* verhüllte Ganze oder sein Grund ist, so ist dem Bewusstsein dagegen der Reichtum des vorhergehenden Daseyns noch in der Erinnerung gegenwärtig."
- ⁸My translation; *Phenomenology* p. 50. *Phänomenologie* p.56: "Die Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, selche das Bewusstseyn auf diesem Wege durchläuft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Geschichte der *Bildung* des Bewusstseyns selbst zur Wissenschaft." (See also *Phenomenology*, sections 28 and 70.)
- ⁹See, for example, Kaufmann, page 158.
- ¹⁰My translation; *Phenomenology* p.55. *Phänomenologie* p. 60: "Diese *dialektische* Bewegung, welche das Bewusstseyn an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande ausübt, in *sofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand* daraus entspringt, ist eigentlich dasjenige, was *Erfahrung* genannt wird."
- ¹¹As further evidence of the many-sided character of the word *Geist*, witness the meanings given by Johannes Hoffmeister in his *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, Zweite Auflage (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1955) sub "*Geist*": *Luft, Hauch, Aether als unsichtbare Substanz* [air, breeze, aether as invisible substance]; *das Lebensprinzip selbst* [the very principle of life]; *angels, demons, etc.*; *Weltgeist* [the (impersonal) spirit of the world]; *der Heilige Geist* [the Holy Spirit]; *der menschliche Verstand* [human intellect]; *die menschlich schöpferische Intelligenz* [human creative intelligence]; "the spirit of" a time, nation, person, etc.

Chapter Four: The Hegelian Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic is the best-known feature of his system, and rightly so. Dialectic is his method, the moving force which makes the system go. The dialectic is a formidable (more like "impassable") barrier to understanding his system unless it is explained in detail. In the previous three chapters we have seen the elements which feed into the workings of his dialectic, and now we are ready to put the pieces together.

Hegel discusses two dialectics, one "false" (because it is partial) and the other "true" (because it thinks the Whole). The first is that of Understanding [*Verstand*] and the second that of (Speculative) Reason [*Vernunft*].

A. The dialectic of Understanding

"In mathematical cognition insight is an activity which is external to the main point [*Sache* has the connotation of essence for Hegel]; from this it follows that the true thing is altered by it. The means, construction and proof, indeed contain true propositions, but nonetheless it must be said that the content is false."¹

The reasoning power of the faculty of Understanding is limited to our ordinary logical methodology, and as such is "false." This dialectical movement is limited to consideration of opposites without the realization of how to unify them. As he admits above, the propositions themselves may be true, but when one is finished with the proper procedures there remains only a mass of one-sided

claims.

"This formalism...imagines that it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a form when it has endowed it with the same determination of the schema as a predicate. The predicate may be subjectivity or objectivity, or, say, magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, east or west, and the like. Such predicates can be multiplied to infinity, since in this way each determination or form can again be used as a form or moment in the other, and each can gratefully perform the same service for an other. In this sort of circle of reciprocity [*ein Cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit*] one never learns what the thing itself [*die Sache selbst*] is, nor what the one or the other is."²

The pedestrian multiplication of one-sided predicates is now Hegel characterizes all thought which has passed for logic and philosophy before his time.³

The conceptions of philosophy as circular and infinite are very important to Hegel. He views the kind of philosophizing which has gone before him (all examples of the dialectic of Understanding) to be examples of bad circularity and bad infinity. For Hegel, "bad" circularity is the endless motion from point to point without going anywhere new. Likewise with "bad" infinity, which is ceaseless passing from opposite to opposite without reaching completion. For the Absolute to be infinite and circular in a "good" sense, there must be an upwards spiraling as well.

"But sunk into the material and advancing in its movement, [scientific cognition] returns to itself, but not before its filling or content is taken back to itself, is simplified to the point of determinateness, has reduced itself to one side of its existence, and has passed over into its higher truth [*seine höhere Wahrheit*]. On this basis emerges the simple, self-overseeing whole itself out of the wealth in which its reflection appeared to be lost."⁴

The distinction between the dialectics of *Verstand* and *Vernunft* is so basic that discussions can be found in nearly any introduction. A basic presentation (though rather pedestrian and not altogether lucid) is given by Nancy Sherman in *Kant-Studien* 71,2(1980)238-253. Particularly helpful on a deeper level are Bloch (pp.121ff.) and Eric Weil in O'Malley, *Legacy*.

B. The dialectic of Reason

The dialectic of Understanding is stuck on the level of simple oppositions, or as he also says, mere negations. Negativity is the basic feature of existing things, but it is not sufficient to remain on this level if progress is to be made. There must be a second negation, a negation of negation, which negates this dividedness. This second negation (see *Phen.* section 30/*Phän.* p. 26) is the reversal of opposition which posits the reuniting of Spirit to itself.

In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not *unessential* determinations, but determination insofar as it is essential; its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual, but the actual, that which posits itself and is living in itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which begets and passes through its own moments, and this entire movement constitutes the positive[in it] and its truth.⁵

The recurrence of the word "actual" alerts us to the primacy of actuality and balance in his dialectic. The desire for unity and completeness (good Platonic goals) characterizes Hegel's speculative dialectic.

1. The ambiguity of *aufheben*. It may be said that the entire Hegelian system is based on a delightful ambiguity in the verb *aufheben*. Hegel himself describes the double entendre of this word (usually translated "to sublimate") in an excursus in the *Science of Logic*:

'To sublimate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand, it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.⁶

Thus, the first negation is suppressed in the positing of the second negation, but not done away with. The first negation is actually made part of the second negation. This is often expressed in the literature as the "sublation" of the first negation and its "supererogation" into the second negation.

2. The Concept. The German word behind the words Notion and Concept [*Begriff*] is a rich one which is not easily captured in translation. Much as *Geist* entails both an objective comprehensive-ness and a subjective apprehension, so also *Begriff* has both sides in its purview. Some philosophers (mostly British) militantly advocate the translation "Notion," arguing that this carries the implication of *nous* [intuition] which is an important part of this term. These are usually the same ones who call for the "Mind" translation of *Geist*. The advocates of NOTion justly claim that this mental emphasis is important, but as with *Geist*, the other side is more helpful in their rendition.

The word "notion" is far too light in its connotations to properly denote such a pregnant term as *Begriff*, and there is also an etymological aspect to the problem. The verb *greifen* means to grasp or clutch, and this is the root meaning of *Begriff*, "that which is grasped" (by the mind). This parallels the Latin *conceptus*, "captured together with." It is doubtful whether anyone save a die-hard philologist actively associates every use

of Notion with *nous* and Concept with *conceptus*. When these arguments are all weighed, it seems that Concept best expresses the meaning of *Begriff*.

See the "Roundtable" article by Kainz in O'Malley, *Legacy*.

It is not an easy matter to properly understand the relation of the Concept to the Hegelian system in general, but it is absolutely essential that the reader understand this point. This is the nerve center of his system. We will discuss the following three aspects of the Concept: the meaning of Concept, synonyms for the Concept, and teleology in the Concept.

a. The meaning of Concept. The principal significance of the Concept is the balanced underlying unity which it denotes of existing things.

Thus the *dialectical movement* of substance through causality and reciprocity is the immediate *genesis* of the Concept, the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the significance of its *becoming*, as of every becoming, is that it is the reflection of the transient into its *ground* and that the at first apparent *other* into which the former has passed constitutes its truth. Accordingly the Concept is the truth of substance; and since substance has *necessity* for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself as the truth of *necessity* and as the *mode of relationship proper to the Concept*.⁷

The Concept is the essence of all existing things. He claims that there is, underlying all things, a common bond of unity which flows through reality, and this unity is the Concept.

It is only fair to point out, however, that there are, in addition to the Concept, many "concepts." As the Concept is the essence of all reality, taken as a whole, the lesser concepts are in turn the essences of aspects of reality. Thus there is a concept of law, a concept of mathematics, a concept of zoology, etc. All the (lesser) concepts are then interrelated in that they

are all aspects of the Concept. All concepts, in as much as they are still of particular parts of reality, are only partial and are therefore "false." The true existence of each concept lies only in its relation to the whole of reality, which is complete only in the Concept.

b. Synonyms for the Concept. We can gain numerous insights into the nature of the Concept by studying expressions which contain correlative ideas. We will examine these three: "the truth of," [*das Wahrheit der*], "essence" [*Wesen*], and "actuality" [*Wirklichkeit*].

The expression "the truth of" has already occurred in several quotations given above in this study. The expression has two emphases which are worth our attention, one conceptual and one methodological.

Conceptually, the notion of "truth" has reference to finding the underlying essence of reality (much as Aristotle's *nous* is discovering essences). In the *Science of Logic* he states:

The demonstrated absoluteness of the Concept relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and prior to the Concept has no truth; this it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Concept.⁸

The true is only in the Concept, which is the underlying basis of all that exists.

From the standpoint of method, we are solemnly warned that we must think the whole as found in the Concept. Since the true is the whole, and the false is the partial, it follows that whenever we are operating on a partial or one-sided level we have not yet found the true.

In the *Phenomenology* Hegel consistently uses the expression "the truth of" in his dialectical motion to express the overcoming of one-sided incompleteness. The expression "the truth of" serves to alert us to the fact that we have discovered the universal element which relates it to the whole. We frequently find that Hegel concludes sections of the *Phenomenology* with this expression, signalling that we are now ready to proceed to the next stage.

The best way to appreciate this is to simply pick up a copy of the *Phenomenology* and look at the last paragraph of each of the earlier sections. An excellent discussion of this is in *Phen.* pp. 66-67/*Phän.* 70-71. See also *Science of Logic* pp. 588, 577-578/*Wissenschaft der Logik II*, 226, 214.

The word "essence" is richly suggestive in this connection, for it brings to mind the numerous parallels which were probably also in Hegel's mind. We will mention only the most obvious one here, the connection with Aristotle's notion of essence.

One of Aristotle's most frequent ways of referring to the essence of something is with the expression τὸ τὸ ἦν εἶναι ["the something it was and continues to be"]. The ἦν, being the imperfect tense of "to be," expresses the underlying unity and continuity of the thing being investigated. Aristotle's theory of knowledge hinges on the underlying continuity of the subject [ὄνομα(μενον)], since the thing remains itself despite accidental (superficial) changes. Hegel says the same thing:

This knowledge [absolute scientific knowing] is a mediated knowing for it is not found immediately with and in essence, but starts from an other, from being, and has a preliminary path to tread, that of going beyond being, or rather, of penetrating into it. Not until knowing inwardizes, recollects [erinnert] itself out of immediate [merely subjective] being, does it through this mediation find essence. The German language has preserved essence in the past participle [gewesen] of the verb to be; for essence is past--but timelessly past--being.⁹

From what has been discussed in the pages above, it should be clear that the Concept is the "essence" of reality, the one underlying truth which is unchanging amidst all change.

Actuality is closely tied to truth, for Hegel, for actuality clearly involves balance and wholeness. The German word which in Hegel means "actuality" [*Wirklichkeit*] is ordinarily translated "reality" in other contexts, but not in Hegel. For Hegel, what is real [*reell*] is merely what exists, and is always particularized and one-sided. Actuality, on the otherhand, is a term which expresses what is ideal [*ideell*]. Actuality is the balanced and completed version of what here exists as partial; the actuality of something must be discovered by searching for the other side of its existing one-sidedness.

All existing reality is determinate. Thus, the task of philosophy is to find the universal which complements this particularity. This aim was expressed in a quotation cited earlier in this chapter:

In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not unessential determination, but determination insofar as it is essential; its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual, but the actual; that which posits itself and is living in itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which begets and passes through its own movements, and this entire movement constitutes the positive [in it] and its truth.¹⁰

c. Teleology in the Concept. As noted above in this paper, one of the key principles in the Hegelian system is that of an immanent teleology. Teleology is vital to the system, for without it there would not be an orderly system but something more like the blind, aimless, and malevolent "Will" of Schopenhauer. There must be rationally intelligible purpose in Hegel's universe, and this is furnished by the very character of the system itself.

Because logic and metaphysics are only two different ways to express the same truth, Hegel maintains that the very structure of the universe is logical and rational.

What has been said can also be expressed by saying that Reason is *purposive activity* [*zweckmäßige Thun*]. The exaltation of a supposed Nature over a misconceived thinking, and especially the rejection of external teleology, has brought the form of purpose in general into discredit. Still, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also *self-moving*, and as such is Subject.¹¹

3. The Conceptual dialectic of moments. The customary way of characterizing Hegel's dialectic is with the expression "thesis-antithesis-synthesis," but this is, in fact, a poor caricature of his dialectic. A far more accurate (though less catchy) expression is "Conceptual dialectic of moments." There are three aspects of this expression which need our attention: moments [*Momente*], mediation [*Vermittlung*]/reconciliation [*Versöhnung*], and the "cumulative effort."

a. Hegel refers to "moments" as synonymous with "stages." A moment is a step in the progress of Spirit towards the goal of complete knowledge. As such, each moment is a necessary part of the whole motion but is "true" only as it is considered as part of the whole dialectic. Each moment is caught up [*aufgehoben*] in the cumulative sweep of the Spirit's education.

There is a point of comparison with Aristotle's theory of time which may be interesting to note. Aristotle considered moments to be potential points in the continuum of time. For Aristotle, a "moment" is an "unreal" part of time, for true time is not composed of moments. Rather, time is potentially divisible into moments. While Hegel considers his "moments" to be real components of history, both Aristotle and Hegel agree that moments

considered apart from the flow of time are "unreal" or "untrue." For both, the truth of time lies in its actualized motion, not in the potential points along the way.

b. The notion of mediation is central to Hegel's philosophy. So far as I can determine, his two usual words for mediation [*Vermittlung*] and reconciliation [*Versöhnung*] are essentially synonymous but perhaps express different emphases. The different emphases are revealed in the etymological roots. *Mitte* is the word for a logical middle term, and thus *Vermittlung* has logical overtones which remind us of the logical/rational nature of mediation in his system. *Der Sohn* is the appellation for Christ in the German language, and his use of *Versöhnung* ought to call to mind the reconciliatory/redemptory work of Christ. On linguistic grounds we may say that *Vermittlung* emphasizes the logical necessity of mediation, while *Versöhnung* emphasizes the resulting unity of opposites, but in point of fact these lexical distinctions may be finer than he intends. At any rate, the two are virtually synonymous.

Hegel's unique concept of mediation/reconciliation centers in the notion of a "higher unity." The notion of "higher unity" is based on the notion of higher truth, which simply refers to "the truth of" a particular opposition. The higher truth of opposites lies in their being manifestations of the Concept, in which all opposites find their complement. Given the higher truth of two seemingly irreconcilable opposites, we can discover a unity which is "higher" than the opposites and unites them. What energizes this mediation is not a "third," but the very Concept which is the essence of the two opposites. Thus, mediation

is the self-movement of opposites to unity, or self-reflection.

For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving self-sameness, or is reflection into self, the moment of the 'I' which is for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, *simple becoming*. The 'I', or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the immediate self. Reason is, therefore, misunderstood when reflection is excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive moment of the Absolute. It is reflection that makes the True a result, but it is equally reflection that overcomes the antithesis between the process of its becoming and the result...¹²

c. The cumulative effort. As discussed in Chapter three, the education of Spirit is cumulative. The goal of Spirit in the world (as the Concept) is to probe all reality by discovering itself as the essence of all that exists. Thus Spirit is accumulating full and perfect knowledge of itself. This is the *telos* of the Hegelian philosophy.

Excursus: The Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Myth

In the interest of clarifying Hegel's dialectic, it is worth a few words to discuss the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis myth (we will refer to it as TAS). Since Hegel is one of those philosophers who are frequently alluded to but seldom read carefully, it is not surprising that he is glibly characterized as holding the TAS dialectic. This was actually foisted on Hegel by his erstwhile follower Karl Marx, based on the fact that Hegel borrowed aspects of his method from Fichte, who used this terminology and method explicitly.

The problem with the TAS scheme is that it misinterprets Hegel's philosophy at its most crucial point. The unique feature of Hegel's philosophy, what empowers it, is his claim that there

is an underlying reality in the world (viz., the Concept) which is not immediately evident but nonetheless functioning. The Concept is what interconnects everything, and in the Concept all opposition is reconciled to itself in its opposite.

The TAS scheme is the language of the Aristotelian syllogism, which operates by fixed rules. These rules carefully delineate the meaning of contradiction, identity, etc., and allow no exceptions. Hegel minces no words in telling us that this ordinary logic is stuck on the level of Understanding, and that this is insufficient for understanding the unifying operation of the Concept. If we persist in using the TAS language, we will consistently confuse ourselves about the main point of the Hegelian system. Most descriptions of the Hegelian system do mention the proper role of the Concept in overcoming opposition, but use of the language of propositional thinking hinders our proper understanding of the conceptual dialectic of moments. Eric Weil has magnificently summarized the problem:

At the risk of shocking those who hold to ^atradition too much accredited, the Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; it derives nothing from the Fichtean dialectic, to which it is violently opposed. It grasps the particular concept, purely and in its purity, sees it pass into its contrary, and testifies that this contrary is not =0, but is the contrary of the first, which is thus preserved in it, mediated with itself and, thus mediated, is itself preserved in being elevated and liberated from its particular finitude into a higher logico-ontological concept that is a result and at the same time the point of departure and uncovering of a new contradiction-harmony. The substance-accident pair moves into that of cause and effect, which passes into the category of interaction (*Wechselwirkung*), a still-not-established presence of the concept, the point of departure of a new chapter of the *Logic*. No particular concept is the concept; but the concept is only its own becoming within the movement of the particular concepts throughout the categories. ¹³

Other discussions are in Glockner, pp. 135ff., Mueller, p.4, Sarlemijn, p.122, and Kaufmann, pp. 167-69. Stace understands the basics of the dialectic, but discusses it in terms of propositions (TAS) instead of concepts; thus he castigates Hegel on p. 97 for having failed to succeed in carrying out his dialectic. Certainly Hegel did not intend a dialectic such as Stace attributes to him.

Notes to Chapter Four

- ¹ Translation mine; *Phenomenology* p.25. *Phänomenologie* p.32: "Im mathematischen Erkennen ist die Einsicht ein für die Sache äusserliches Thun; es folgt daraus, dass die wahre Sache dadurch verändert wird. Das Mittel, Construction und Beweis, enthält daher wohl wahre Sätze; aber ebensowohl muss gesagt werden, dass der Inhalt falsch ist."
- ² *Phenomenology* p.29; *Phänomenologie* p.36: "Dieser Formalismus... meynt die Natur und das Leben einer Gestalt begriffen und ausgesprochen zu haben, wenn er von ihr eine Bestimmung des Schema's als Prädicat ausgesagt, --es sey die Subjectivität, oder auch der Magnetismus, die Electricität, und so fort, die Contraction, oder Expansion, der Osten oder Westen und dergleichen, was sich ins unendliche vervielfältigen lässt, weil nach dieser Weise jede Bestimmung oder Gestalt bey der andern wieder als Form oder Moment des Schema's gebraucht werden, und jede dankbar der andern denselben Kienst leisten kann; --ein Cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit, wodurch man nicht erfährt, was die Sache selbst, weder was die eine noch die andre ist."
- ³ An excellent discussion of this topic was penned by Hegel in his Introduction to the *Science of Logic*, "General Notion of Logic" (*Wissenschaft der Logik I*, "Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik").
- ⁴ My translation; *Phenomenology* pp.32-33. *Phänomenologie* p.39: "Aber in die Materie versenkt und in deren Bewegung fortgehend, kommt es in sich selbst zurück, aber nicht eher als darin dass die Erfüllung oder der Inhalt sich in sich zurücknimmt, zur Bestimmtheit vereinfacht, sich selbst zu Einer Seite eines Daseyns herabsetzt, und in seine höhere Wahrheit übergeht. Dadurch emergirt das einfache sich übersehende Ganze selbst aus dem Reichthume, worin seine Reflexion verloren schein."
- ⁵ My translation; *Phenomenology* p.27. *Phänomenologie* p. 34: "Die Philosophie dagegen betrachtet nicht unwesentliche Bestimmung, sondern sie in sofern sie wesentliche ist; nicht das Abstrakte oder Unwirkliche ist ihr Element und Inhalt, sondern das Wirkliche, sich selbst setzende und in sich lebende, das Daseyn in seinem Begriffe. Es ist der Process, der sich seine Momente erzeugt und durchläuft, und diese ganze Bewegung macht das Positive und seine Wahrheit aus."
- ⁶ *Science of Logic*, p.107; *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, p.94: "Aufheben hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, dass es so viel als aufbewahren erhalten bedeutet und zugleich so viel als aufhören lassen, ein Ende machen. Das Aufbewahrenselbst schliesst schon das Negative in sich, dass etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und damit einem den äusserlichen Einwirkungen offenen Dasein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten. --So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist."

Chapter Four notes, continued

- ⁷ *Science of Logic*, pp. 577-8 (translation modified); *Wissenschaft der Logik, II*, p.214: "Die dialektische Bewegung der Substanz durch die Kausalität und Wechselwirkung hindurch ist daher die unmittelbare Genesis des Begriffes, durch welche sein Werden dargestellt wird. Aber sein Werden hat, wie das Werden überall, die Bedeutung, dass es die Reflexion des Uebergehenden in seinen Grund ist, und dass das zunächst anscheinend Andere, in welches das erstere übergegangen, dessen Wahrheit ausmacht. So ist der Begriff die Wahrheit der Substanz, und indem die bestimmte Verhältnissweise der Substanz die Notwendigkeit ist, zeigt sich die Freiheit als die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit und als die Verhältnissweise des Begriffes."
- ⁸ *Science of Logic*, p. 591 (translation modified); *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 230: "Darin besteht die gegen und an dem empirischen Stoff und genauer an seinen Kategorien und Reflexionsbestimmungen erwiesene Absolutheit des Begriffes, dass derselbe nicht, wie er ausser und vor dem Begriffe erscheint, Wahrheit habe, sondern allein in seiner Idealität oder Identität mit dem Begriffe."
- ⁹ *Science of Logic*, p.389; *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p.3: "Dieses Erkenntnis ist ein vermitteltes Wissen, denn sie befindet sich nicht unmittelbar beim und im Wesen, sondern beginnt von einem Andern, dem Sein, und hat einen vorläufigen Weg, den Weg des Hinausgehens über das Sein oder vielmehr des Hineingehens in dasselbe zu machen. Erst indem das Wissen sich aus dem unmittelbaren Sein erinnert, durch diese Vermittlung findet sich es das Wesen.-Die Sprache hat im Zeitwort sein das Wesen in der vergangenen Zeit, "gewesen", behalten; denn das Wesen ist das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Sein."
- ¹⁰ My translation; for the German text from *Phänomenologie* page 34 see note 5 above.
- ¹¹ My translation; *Phenomenology*, p.12. *Phänomenologie*, p.20: "Das Gesagte kann auch so ausgedrückt werden, dass die Vernunft das zweckmässige Thun ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur über das miskannte Denken, und zunächst die Verbannung der äussern Zweckmässigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks überhaupt in Misskredit gebraucht. Allein, wie auch Aristoteles die Natur als das zweckmässige Thun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend, oder Subject ist."

Chapter Four notes, continued

¹² *Phenomenology*, pp. 11-12; *Phänomenologie*, pp. 19-20: "Denn die Vermittlung ist nichts anders als die sich bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit, oder sie die Reflexion in sich selbst, das Moment des fürsichseyenden Ich, oder das Werden überhaupt, dieses Vermitteln ist um seiner Einfachheit willen eben die werdende Unmittelbarkeit und das Unmittelbare selbst.--Es ist daher ein Verkennen der Vernunft, wenn die Reflexion aus dem Wahren ausgeschlossen und nicht als positives Moment des Absoluten erfasst wird. Sie ist es, die das Wahre zum Resultate macht, aber diesen Gegensatz gegen sein Werden ebenso aufhebt..."

¹³ In O'Malley, *Legacy*, p. 56.

Chapter Five: Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

It is said by some that Hegel's philosophy is thoroughly secularized (because God is finitized) and it is said by others that Hegel's philosophy is supremely religious (because the goal of his philosophy is to reach divinity). Though both interpretations have considerable validity, neither is sufficiently accurate to command our assent without further clarification.

The curious fact facing the interpreter of Hegel's philosophy of religion is that he not only brings his own preconceived notions about religion and philosophy to the task, but that his very attitude already is shaped by Hegel. The ideological background of some interpreters (e.g. Marxists) has already inclined them to hold an atheistic reading of Hegel, the broad-minded theistic views of others has inclined them such that they find themselves attracted to the view that Hegel's philosophy is the epitome of Christian expression, and the traditional convictions of others has already led them to perhaps accept the theistic reading of Hegel but completely reject the possibility of incorporating his philosophy of religion into their own.

Among the secularists we note the names of Marx and Feuerbach (who denied that Hegel's claims are legitimate because they consider his claim to be literally that man "becomes God"), and also the more contemporary secularists Kaufmann, Kojève, and Findlay, who consider Hegel's discussion of "religious consciousness" to be a merely metaphorical reference to a completely secular

enrichment of the human consciousness. Among the supporters of Hegel's "theistic" philosophy we include the so-called Hegelian Right, and more recently, the interpretation of Iwan Iljin.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe some aspects of Hegel's philosophy of religion. The magnitude of this topic, demonstrated by the vast literature, dictates that this chapter and the one which follows it must be selective. This discussion will not pretend to be a full survey, as that can be found in the better books. Similarly, we cannot indulge in a discussion of later developments and interpretations of this philosophy. What we will do here is outline the progress of his thought to the mature position, and then show how certain biblical themes are given a speculative interpretation in his system.

In the Conclusion we will complete our survey of his system by shifting perspectives, from the standpoint of religion to the standpoint of philosophy. There we will see how religion fits into the entire scheme of speculative philosophy. In these chapters we will not give so much attention as before to the "literature reports" in past chapters, as the literature is vast and could not be effectively summarized in a few sentences. Rather, we will concentrate on introducing some key topics and allow the reader to use the books indicated in the Appendix devoted to an introductory bibliography to get started.

A. Hegel encounters religion

There is a wide variation of opinion regarding the value of Hegel's early manuscripts in establishing his philosophical doctrines. Some scholars view these notebooks as the musing

of a mere youth searching for self-identity. Others are more enthusiastic, claiming that these are among his best works and that all his later doctrines can be found lying dormant in these essays. The truth lies somewhere between these extreme opinions. We will discuss his early essays because they give us an understanding of the development of his later position, but it is essentially true that they are not vital to our understanding of his mature position,¹

1. Volksreligion and Volksggeist. In a series of fragments dating from about 1792 (age 22), entitled by Nohl (pp.1-72) *Volksreligion und Christentum*, Hegel discusses the relation of the "spirit" of a people [*Volksggeist*] and the religion of a people [*Volksreligion*]. Hegel claims that the spirit and the religion of a people go together, as the "spirit" is really the special product of the time and circumstances, while religion is both a shaper and the shaped as it interacts with the thought of the people. He extolls the Greeks for having a religion which achieved a good balance between the subjective will of the individual and the objective will of the state. His prosaic account is interesting, but too early and fragmentary to be of great importance.²

2. Das Leben Jesu. Hegel's "Life of Jesus" was written in 1795. This is a confusing work, not only because it is difficult to interpret but also because the interpretations are difficult. Some consider it to be nearly meaningless (Knox refused to include it, with the material mentioned immediately above, because "they have not seemed worth translation"), while others attach greater importance to it. This "life of Jesus" is not an ordinary

chronicle of the life of Christ, for it pays little attention to the historical events in his life (it stops at the cross) and devotes most of its space to the preaching of Jesus. The words of Jesus are those of a Kantian moral preacher. It seems that this was important in Hegel's development, for there are themes which are not part of the Kantian philosophical enterprise (e.g., "harmony"). Hegel realized that the Kantian morality is not an adequate basis for a religion, for there is a division between the will of the individual and the categorical (rigid universal) imperative which governs the acts of the individual which (as noted in Chapter One) Kant's moral philosophy simply does not adequately unite.

3. Die Positivität der christlichen Religion. With the unsatisfactory outcome of the "Life of Jesus" Hegel proceeded to construct a better synthesis of the aims of Kant and the Greeks in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" (1795-6). He unites the Kantian and Greek philosophies, and compares this to the Christian religion. He decided that the Christian religion is woefully lacking because he believed that Christianity tends to institutionalize and petrify the "spirit" instead of allowing it to develop. Because Christianity is concerned with historicity and dogma, it is unable to freely develop with a culture and thus is inadequate as a "people's religion."

In this text he sounds a complaint which is evident in all his later writings. The theme of "positivity" is important in Hegel's philosophy of religion. The main reason why Christianity failed was that it is too positivistic. (Positivism refers to limitation of inquiry to facts "posited" or given in any particular case.) By discussing his thoughts so frankly in this essay

Hegel gives an important insight into his later writings on religion. The reader will be rewarded generously if he carefully remembers to use this complaint against positivity as a basis for interpreting the Hegelian reinterpretation of Christianity, and also in reading the history of theology in subsequent decades.³

4. Der Geist Christentum und sein Schicksal. Upon further writing and thinking, Hegel concluded that his analysis of Christianity did not properly comprehend its full potential. After the composition of the "Positivity" essay, he had a sort of religious experience which led him to appreciate the place of "love" in life. He still accepted the Kantian notion of duty and the Greek religious ideal of beauty, but in his 1798-99 essay "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" he expressed the opinion that the Christian ideal of love is the proper combination of Kantian morality (a kind of love, he thought) and Greek beauty. Thus, for Hegel in this essay Christian "love" is moral beauty. Now he places the onus on Judaism for not having an open religion of love, since it killed Jesus.

5. Phenomenology and religion. The publication of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807 ended the early gropings for a clear understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. In this work he sets out an agenda which "puts religion in its place" in the strongest sense of the expression. As we will see, his very programme sets the result clearly in sight long before we come to the conclusion of the book. Before discussing the relation of religion to phenomenology, it may be helpful to expand on his definition of "phenomenology." For Hegel, phenomenology is simply the study (*logos*) of what appears in the world (*phenomena*).

It is the search for essences, the discovery of the Concept as we described it in the last chapter.

Hegel's agenda in the *Phenomenology* determines the final position of religion in his system; as Dr. Collins puts it aptly, phenomenology tames religion. Our discussion of the problem of a beginning in Chapter Three revealed that for Hegel the progress from the individual to Science begins wherever he may so desire. What matters is that this is the journey of Spirit (in the human spirit) back to itself as Absolute Spirit. It is, as we discussed above, Spirit observing itself in Nature and thereby explicating its own content. The religious experience is part of the self-education of Spirit, and as such is part of the phenomenological path which Spirit must traverse.

Hegel indicates frequently that the phenomenological path is one of intense struggle, a "labor of the Concept." As such, the experience of religion is part of the struggle of the human consciousness to reach absolutely complete knowledge. As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, religion is the stage penultimate to ultimate philosophical knowledge. This unquestionably subordinates religion to philosophy, since religion is only a moment on the way to the standpoint of Science.

Hegel indicates to us that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is an introduction to his entire ^{system} (see the subtitle of the *Phenomenology*). This is certainly so, and we can draw the obvious inference that this phenomenological approach to religion remains a part of his mature system throughout his career. Nonetheless, an examination of Chapters Seven and Eight in the *Phenomenology* reveals that his treatment of religion is less

subtle here than in later works. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the introduction to his mature philosophy of religion, but that philosophy of religion is much clearer in the *Encyclopedia* and the later collected lecture series.

B. Themes

The following themes are important in Hegel's philosophy simply because they recur quite often, and usually with some major philosophical import. It will be obvious from the start that he has no intention of "explaining" these conventional doctrines in any traditional way. From his criticism of positivity in Christianity and from his view of theology as servant to philosophy, it should be apparent that he is reinterpreting these traditional doctrines so as to make them pedagogical tools for the furtherance of philosophical understanding. We should be fair and note that he believed that these are more than literary parallels; he considered himself a pious Lutheran Christian and believed sincerely that these traditional doctrines are genuinely fulfilled in his philosophical system.

1. Trinity Hegel believed that the notion of the Trinity is a good tool for explaining the activity of Spirit. He viewed the traditional view of the Trinitarian procession as parallel to his Universal-Particular-Individual explanation of cosmic history. He divided the history of the world into three ages, as we have already seen: the age of contentless unity (the Father) the age of estrangement, in which the Universal becomes Particulars (age of the Son), and the reconciliation of Universal and Particular in the (balanced) individual, or the presence of the Spirit in

the community of believers.

In addition to numerous discussions of a Trinitarian nature in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Encyclopedia sections 566-571* and *Phenomenology section 770/ Phänomenologie pp. 410-411* are very explicit discussions.

2. Death of God. As the Trinity is a general representation of the principle that all things must pass into their opposites to find a higher unity, the death of God is a general picture which illustrates numerous aspects of philosophical truth. As Collins points out (*Emergence*, 262ff.), there are three basic ways in which Hegel wants to discuss the death of God. First, he can report (as Nietzsche did later in the same century) that God is dead in the sense that belief and piety have declined disastrously. God is also "dead" in a second sense, that Christian religion can well be understood as a symbol of the hindrance which institutionalization and dogma places on the progress of Spirit (again, the "positivity" critique). Third, and most important, is the speculative death of God. By this he means the truth that all things must "perish" before they can live.

In this speculative mode of discussion, Hegel is referring to the death and resurrection of God as symbolic of the negativity and double negativity which is the heartbeat of speculative metaphysics. Further, Hegel wants us to understand that in order to fit under the scheme of absolute philosophy the notion of a transcendent God must also perish. It ought to be clear by now that if the Absolute is what he calls God, and the Absolute becomes finite matter and mind in the world, then God is finite and humans are becoming gods. There is a question whether it is more correct to speak of Hegel "secularizing religion" or "sacralizing history," but the result is essentially the same. Human history is God's

history, and the human spirit (taken collectively) is becoming divine.

There are numerous applications of the "death of God" theme to philosophy. We will see that several of the upcoming themes are under the rubric of God's death.

Collin's discussion in *God; in Modern Philosophy* (pp.202ff.) is also helpful. The "historical report" aspect of the death of God can be found, for example, in the first lecture of the *Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes*. The second kind of "death" is evident in the "Positivity" essay and runs through several works. On the speculative "death" see Phen.pp. 454-5,470-71/ Phän. pp. 410, 414-5, and 418; in the *Encyclopedia* see sections 251 and 568ff; in *FAith and Knowledge* see p. 190 (*Gesammelte Werke* vol.4, 413-14). On the finitude of God, note the final words of the *Phenomenology* which include a quotation from Schiller which Hegel greatly altered by simply adding the word *nur* [only]. The impact of this is to assert that God is limited to this world. The notion of a transcendent God is killed conclusively in his reworking of the proofs of God's existence.

3. Incarnation. In keeping with his distrust of "positive" religion, Hegel is unwilling to speak very clearly regarding the historical life of Jesus Christ. He is more interested in discussing the philosophical significance of saying that there was a being who was both true God and true man.

There are three main points of significance for Hegel. First, the mention of *κενώσις* in Philippians chapter two is aptly symbolic of the creation of the world (for kenosis language see Phen. p.457 and 465/Phän.p.403 and410). The absolute, in creating the Son/world has emptied itself by alienating itself in particularized negativity. Hegel is fond of the terms *Entfremdung* [estrangement] and *Entäusserung* [externalization]. Christ is also to be considered the reconciliation [*Versöhnung*] and mediation [*Vermittlung*] between God and man, precisely because as divine he is most fully human. Third, Christ is an important symbol because he reminds

us that death is a prerequisite to new life. The death of Christ was necessary, because he was fully divine in a certain sense but not in the fullest sense. The full divinity (presence of the Spirit) did not come about until after his death, at which time the (Holy) Spirit came to live in the more perfect immaterial form of Spirit in the life of the religious community. This is symbolic of the relation of religion to philosophy, that religion is a physical-symbolic (and therefore incomplete) version of philosophical truth, which is not without symbolism but includes a higher level of representational thinking.

4. Creation. It is not a simple matter to discuss the Trinity, death of God, incarnation, creation, and the related biblical topics in a series of discrete parts, for each of these is inseparably bonded to the others. All these themes are interconnected by the theme of negativity, and express aspects of this basic part of his system.

According to the biblical record, the world was created *ex nihilo* by God. Since the Hegelian Trinity works out its progress in an act of self-alienation, Hegel's version of the creation account does not involve *ex nihilo* creation. Rather, instead of the Father creating the world and remaining transcendent above it (as the biblical record indicates), according to Hegel the Father is now alienated against himself in the world. The world is two-faced: the Father (as logical Idea or Concept) and its "other" (dead particularized matter) taken together are the new-born world. Thus, creation by Hegel's account is simply the coming of age of the Son, or the stage in the Father's quest for self-knowledge which is self-alienation. Though ostensibly

a destructive stage, the seeds of reconciliation are built into the world (in the presence of the Father as Concept). Since the Father is also the logical Concept which is the essence of the world, redemption consists in finding the God/essence which is in the world and becoming one with it.

5. The Fall. If Hegel sees the purpose of human nature as that of participating in and becoming one with the divine element in the world, we would expect his account of the Fall into sin as failure to meet that ideal. But his point is more profound.

Hegel understands the creation of man to be simply the existence of man in the world, with no responsibility for the world. This amoral condition of innocence [*Schuldlosigkeit*] is proper to a state of nature, not of spirit, because if Spirit is to be reunited to itself in the human consciousness there must be concern for nature. Thus it is necessary to "fall" from the state of innocence to a condition where the need for reconciliation is recognized. From the awareness ^{of the need} for reconciliation begins the long process of return to Absolute Spirit.

6. Redemption. Contrary to the traditional understanding of the doctrines of creation, incarnation, and redemption, Hegel is not particularly interested in the historical events with which these are traditionally associated. All three are understood to be processes which take place simultaneously on several levels of interaction. Creation is a negativity by which God is continually dividing itself into the matter and form of the world, incarnation is the process whereby rational Spirit observing itself in nature leads itself to divinization, and redemption is a religious term for the philosophical process of reuniting

Spirit with itself.

The terms "redemption" and "mediation" both refer to the reconciling process, which has been discussed at length above in various parts of this paper.

Notes to Chapter Five

¹Kroner has a good introduction to his early writings in the front of the translation by Knox.

²Crites treats this well on pages 35-40.

³Collins covers this thoroughly in *Emergence*, pp. 223-240.

Conclusion: Religion in the Speculative Philosophy

In the previous chapter we got a good picture of how Hegel wants to understand the Christian religion. Again, the key insight is his disdain for "positive" religion and his systematic avoidance of it. His interpretation of the traditional doctrines reflects this, and so does his placement of religion in the speculative philosophy. He has made certain that religion is adequately "tamed" so as to not usurp the place of philosophy.

In this chapter we conclude our outline of his philosophy of religion by showing how he can now channel the content of religion into his philosophy. Religion must be contained in the scope of philosophy; Absolute Science not including any aspect of reality is nonsensical.

Surely the reader has wondered by now what has happened to the non-Christian religions. The previous chapter was devoted to the Christian religion, because Hegel regarded Christianity as the epitome of religious thought. We cannot discuss his argumentation, but he did believe that his Lutheran religion is the highest stage of religious consciousness and most compatible with the demands of philosophy. In his later years he still spoke of "we Lutherans" and claimed that philosophy had not weakened his faith but actually made it stronger.

A. The identical content of religion and philosophy

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel claims that religion and philosophy have an identical content (see *Phen.* p.485/*Phän.* p. 427); there is an identity between the God of Christianity (as he understands it) and the Absolute Concept/Idea. Hegel sees the object of both religion and philosophy as the Absolute, and the difference between them lies in the way in which they come to know it.

In his later works, Hegel explicates this difference clearly. Since the third part of this chapter is devoted to this topic, we will simply mention the main point here. Religion apprehends the Absolute with both representational thinking [*Vorstellenden Denken*] and speculative reason, while true philosophy is able to move past the need for picture-thinking. Because religious thought is not yet fully conceptual, it is imperfect and is thus a stage on the way to philosophy. Still, the content of aesthetic, religious, and philosophical thought is identical.

B. Proofs of God's Existence

Hegel's reconstruction of the traditional proofs of the existence of God is extremely valuable in coming to grips with how he systematically relocates religion inside philosophy. We will cover his discussion under the following three headings: Hegel's "God," Hegel's critique of Kant, and Hegel's ontological proof.

1. Hegel's "God". As we noted previously, Hegel's version of the Christian God is radically non-traditional. Hegel's God

is not a personal God (God attains consciousness only in the human consciousness), nor is it transcendent. The traditional concept of God is useful to Hegel in formulating his philosophy, but finally it must be recognized that this is only a representational way of expressing philosophical truth.

We may isolate three particular features of Hegel's God. First, God is not the God of theism (i.e., neither personal nor transcendent). Second, neither the form nor the content of God is demonstrable by ordinary rational argument (i.e. the activity of mere Understanding). Third, God must be dialectically subordinated to the Absolute. That is, it must be understood that the notion of God is an inferior way of referring to the Absolute, and that speculative philosophy is the highest mode of knowing the Absolute. From this description of God, we see how Hegel can now fit a "proof" for the existence of God into his philosophy.

2. Hegel's Critique of Kant. In Chapter One we examined Kant's treatment of the proofs of God's existence. There it became clear that for Kant all proofs boil down to the ontological proof. Kant criticized the ontological proof for assuming that we can easily pass from conceptual existence to real existence. The problem, he asserted, is that we are never able to leap from analysis of observable existing things to claims about non-observable things, for the limit of certain knowledge is reached when we attempt to discuss what is not observable. Discussion of God, the World, and the Soul is not possible on the level of scientific certainty.

Hegel's attack on Kant centers on the notion of finitude. Kant has located the failure of these proofs in the gulf between the (observable) finite and the (unobservable) infinite, while

Hegel is not satisfied with this divorce. In keeping with his dialectic, Hegel asserts that the finite is merely the phenomenon which covers the infinite essence of all really existing things. In the Hegelian system, it is axiomatic that individual things exist only because there is an underlying infinite essence, which is the Absolute.

3. Hegel's ontological proof. Hegel distinguishes between the descriptive and the demonstrative functions of the three arguments. All three of the so-called proofs describe how we are led by observation of nature to affirm the existence of "God," but only the ontological proof is demonstrative. The two proofs which are merely descriptive (the cosmological and the teleological) lead us to affirm the existence of the infinite, because the finite is only partially existing. It is more usual to claim that God must exist because only the infinite could be the completion of finite beings, but Hegel prefers to argue from the fact of partial existence (as he puts it, "nonbeing") to show that something must fully possess being.

All three proofs reduce to the ontological, Hegel claims, because each contains in it an inner dialectic, and this dialectic leads to the ontological proof. Both the cosmological and the teleological proofs show that the existence of many partially existing beings is explained by the existence of the Absolute. This sounds pretty ordinary in the history of philosophy, except that at his definition of God puts this in an entirely new light. If God is immanent in nature and is only a moment in our philosophical cognition, then Hegel has not proved the existence of what is usually called God, but rather the existence of the absolute

essence in nature. What Hegel has done in his usual ingenious way is to use a conventional apparatus of thought and appropriate it for his own use in the System. Hegel has proved the existence of the essence of the world, and he has no qualms about calling this "God" the Absolute Idea or Absolute Spirit.

C. Art, Religion, Philosophy

In this section we are not so interested in each of the three areas of thought individually as in the relation which they have to each other in the Hegelian system. Thus, we will briefly survey the sweep of motion from the stage or moment of art to that of religion, and to philosophy.

Art, religion, and philosophy are simply different ways of getting at the same truth, according to Hegel. Their content is identical, but their forms are different. The artist recognizes the Absolute with the senses, whether in drawing, music, sculpting or another medium. This is indeed the Absolute, but since the form of Absolute Spirit is logical, such a non-logical approach is not appropriate and adequate for fully knowing the Absolute.

Religion is in a better position for knowing the Absolute. In religious thought there is both an element of "picture thinking" and rational (conceptual) thinking. On the one hand, there is a multitude of symbols which are operative in religion (the artistic aspect), but on the other hand, there is also the formulation of rational thought about God. This conceptualization is the "truth" of art in religion, and thus religion is a synthesis of art and philosophy, but not fully either.

Philosophy includes the element of religion, but now thinks conceptually instead of pictorially. Since the progress of Spirit is the same as world history, the Hegelian philosophical understanding of the relation of religion and philosophy boils down to this: the religious community is where philosophical enterprise is functioning at its finest level. Remembering Hegel's distaste for static, fact-oriented religion, we see that Hegel envisions a harmonious community (viz., the state-church) wherein philosophical thought takes place with the support of a version of Christianity which is dynamically changing to match the developments of philosophy.

GETTING STARTED IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION:
A BASIC ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Note: this list is restricted to English sources, beginning with the most general and basic and ending with the more specialized)

- Wiedmann, Franz. *Hegel: An Illustrated Biography*. Trans. by J. Neugroschel. New York: Pegasus Books, 1968.
A straight-forward brief biography, reasonably objective and quite accurate. The text can be rather dry, but the plates are excellent (they are far better in the German edition). A good chronology follows the text.
- Collins, James. *A History of Modern European Philosophy*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1954.
A solid introduction to Hegel (and others of interest in the volume). Written from a rather traditional Roman Catholic perspective, but this does not influence the exposition. Highly lucid.
- Copleston, Frederick, S.J. *History of Philosophy*. Vol. VII. Paramus, NJ: Newman Press, 1963.
An acceptable exposition in one of the staple histories. Though not exceptional, Fr. Copleston does cover the material in a brief and helpful fashion.
- Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel*. New York: Dover Publications, 1955 reprint of 1924 ed.
A standard exposition, showing undue attention to the *Logic* and insufficient attention to the *Phenomenology*. It does instigate and perpetuate some myths and inaccuracies, but generally helpful if not relied upon too heavily.
- Gray, J. Glenn. *Hegel's Hellenic Ideal*. New York: Columbia University Press (King's Crown division). 1941.
Covering more area than the title indicates, Gray masterfully ties numerous aspects of Hegel's thought together. Highly recommended.
- Kaufmann, Walter. *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary*. Garden City, New York: Doublday & Co., 1965.
As with G.E. Mueller's introduction, the main value of this book lies primarily in "debunking" Hegel, secondarily in presenting literary parallels and translations of some early manuscripts, and certainly NOT in "interpreting" or "commenting" on Hegel. His debunking of myths about Hegel (e.g., that he is the father of Naziism) is good, and the literary insights are interesting, but the reader will be unwise to trust any philosophical judgements on his word alone.

Taylor, Charles. *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. An excellent introduction on an intermediate level of difficulty. The opening chapter on the connections between the intellectual currents which preceded Hegel is magnificent. The remainder of the work requires some perseverance for the beginning reader to master, but will repay study generously.

Findlay, John N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976 (slight revision of 1958 edition). A helpful discussion from an "Analytic" perspective. Its brevity is good in reducing the volume of material a person must read to get the "meat," but there is sometimes a tendency to be rather cryptic. On the whole, none of Findlay's introductory discussions (including particularly that in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and in O'Connor, *Critical History*) have been especially helpful to me in putting Hegel's philosophy together.

Rosen, Stanley. *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974. An upper-level introduction which is rather demanding to use. The difficulty is not from opacity or imprecision, however, but due to the vigorous and searching character of his treatment. In my judgment, this is the best single volume in English on Hegel. A gold-mine of insights.

Welch, Claude. *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Volume I: 1799-1870*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. His discussion of Hegel's philosophy of religion is put in a valuable historical context and summarized ably.

Crites, Stephen. *In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History*. American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion, No. 2. Chambersberg, Penn.: American Academy of Religion, 1972. The discussion of Hegel is excellent, placing a helpful emphasis on his early philosophy of religion.

Collins, James. *The Emergence of the Philosophy of Religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. This is the magisterial exposition of Hegel's philosophy of religion in English. Though on a rather high plane of discussion, it will be intelligible and profitable to any reader.

Collins, James. *God in Modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. The section on Hegel's philosophy of God is excellent and will richly repay study.

Fabro, Cornelio. *God in Exile: Modern Atheism*. Trans. by Arthur Gibson. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968. Fabro's basic thesis in this magisterial study is that after Thomas Aquinas there is a marked decline in the quality of philosophy, and after Descartes' turn to the subjective the path to atheism is paved. Whether we want to buy his analysis, this work is a treasure chest of information.

Yerkes, James. *The Christology of Hegel*. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978. This dissertation is rather technical, but is a good study of the topic. Recommended highly.

PRIMARY SOURCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Sources most central to grasping Hegel's philosophy)

Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe in XX Bänden, Ed. Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart: F. Frommann Verlag, 1927-30. Now the basic "complete" edition, but Felix Meiner Verlag has been issuing text-critical editions of this edition on a volume-by-volume basis in their Philosophische Bibliothek.

Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969-75. Covers basically the same material as above, but with slightly different editing, set in Roman type, and bound inexpensively. A fine study edition for personal use.

Gesammelte Werke (Neue Kritische Ausgabe). Produced in cooperation with several commissions, notably the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and particularly the Hegel-Archiv at Ruhr-Universität, Bochum. Published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1968-. This is the edition which will supercede all other texts, to be completed in about 20 years and anticipated to reach 36 volumes.

These are the currently available volumes:

- Band 4: *Jenaer kritische Schriften*, Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler, 1968.
- Band 6: *Jenaer Systementwürfe I*, Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle, 1975.
- Band 7: *Jenaer Systementwürfe II*, Rolf Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede, 1971
- Band 8: *Jenaer Systementwürfe III*, Rolf Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede, 1976.
- Band 9: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, 1980.
- Band 11: *Wissenschaft der Logik, Die objektive Logik (1812-13)*, Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, 1978.
- Band 12: *Wissenschaft der Logik, Die subjektive Logik (1816)*, Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, 1980.

Volumes 1, 3, 5, and 20 are scheduled to appear in the next couple of years.

Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, Ed. by Herman Nohl. Tübingen, 1907. A collection of his notes and manuscripts from the 1790's.

Early Theological Writings. Trans. and edited by T.M. Knox and Richard Kroner. Chicago, 1948. Translation of parts of the work listed above.

The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. Trans. by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Translation of the 1801 *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie...* as edited in *Gesammelte Werke* Band 4.

Faith and Knowledge. Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Translation of the 1802 essay *Glauben und Wissen* as edited in *Gesammelte Werke* Band 4.

Phänomenologie des Geistes. Ed. Johannes Hofmeister. Sechste Auflage. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1952. The standard edition of this work which appeared first in 1807, until the *Gesammelte Werke* recension appeared in 1980. Note that the *Gesammelte Werke* edition was used in this paper.

Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller, text analysis by John Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. The older translation by Baillie has outlived its usefulness and ought to be avoided when possible.

Wissenschaft der Logik. Two volumes. Edited by Georg Lasson. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1932 (1971 reprint).

Science of Logic. Transl. by A. V. Miller. London and New York: George Allen & Unwin/Humanities Press, 1969 (reprint 1976). The definitive translation, replacing the old Johnston-Struthers translation.

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Ed. Nicolin and Pöggeler. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1969. A good edition, but for the important "comments" [Zusätze] one has to use the copy from either the Jubiläumsausgabe or the Suhrkamp edition. In my opinion (and others) the "Encyclopedia" is the best one place to experience Hegel.

Hegel's Logic, being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Trans. by William Wallace. Reprint of 1892 edition with new Preface. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, being Part Two of the Encyclopedia... Translation by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, being Part Three of the Encyclopedia... Translated by William Wallace. Reprint of 1894 edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Ed. by Georg Lasson. Two volumes. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1974 reprint of 1925.

Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes. Ed. by Georg Lasson. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1973.

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion... Trans. by Speirs and Sanderson. Three volumes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1895 (reprinted 1968). Translation of both of the above works (remember, they were compiled posthumously, as were those listed below). Translation poor but usable.

The Christian Religion. Ed. and trans. by Peter C. Hodgson. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1979. New translation of Part III of the *Philosophy der Religion* mentioned above. Quality of translation is far superior to Spiers-Sanderson.

Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Volumes 17-19 in the above-listed *Sämtliche Werke*.

Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. Haldane. Three volumes. New York: Humanities Press, 1955.

Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. Ed. Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1955. Highly instructive.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction. Trans. by H.B. Nisbet, Intro. by D. Forbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. A fine translation of the above.

G.W.F. Hegel on Art, Religion, Philosophy: Introductory Lectures to the Realm of Absolute Spirit. Edited by J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row (Torchbook #1463), 1970. After gaining an elementary grasp of his system, these lectures are an excellent means to fill out the picture in these three areas.

Berliner Schriften 1818-1831. Ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1956. Collection of valuable speeches, articles, notes, etc. from his Berlin period. More notable are his speech on the third centennial of the Augsburg Confession, his Preface to Hinrich's *Die Religion...* (translated in Weiss, *Beyond Epistemology* -- a very important statement of his mature philosophy of religion), and his review of Gössel's *Aphorismen*. Very little is translated.

Briefe von und an Hegel. Ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister. Four volumes in five. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1952 (vol. 4, part 2: 1981). A very important resource for study of his life and thought. Very little has been translated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS USED

- Barth, Karl. *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*. Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1973.
- Beck, Lewis White. *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard U. P, 1969.
- Becker, Werner. *Hegels Begriff der Dialektik und das Prinzip des Idealismus*. Stuttgart: Verlag. W. Kohlhammer, 1969.
- Bonsiepen, Wolfgang. *Der Begriff der Negitivität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels*. Hegel-Studien Beiheft 16. Bonn: Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1977.
- Brazill, William J. *The Young Hegelians*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Brunkhorst-Hasenclever, Annegrit. *Die Transformierung der theologischen Deutung des Todes bei G.W.F. Hegel*. Bern: Herbert Lang/ Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 1976.
- Christensen, Darrell E. *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*. The proceedings of the Wofford Symposium (1968). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- Collins, James . *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- . *God in Modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regener Company, 1959.
- . *A History of Modern European Philosophy*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1954.
- Cook, Daniel J. *Language in the Philosophy of Hegel*. The Hague: Mouton, 1973.
- Copleston, Frederick, S.J. *History of Philosophy*. Volume VII. Paramus, N.J.: Newman Press, 1963.
- Cornehl, Peter. *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung: Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklärung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971.
- Crites, Stephen. *In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History*. American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion, No. 2. Chambersberg, Penn.: American Academy of Religion, 1972.

- Erdmann, Johann Eduard. *Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. Dritter Band: *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Spekulation seit Kant*. Stuttgart: F. Frommanns Verlag, 1931.
- Fabro, Cornelio. *God in Exile: Modern Atheism*. Transl. Arthur Gibson. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968
- Fackenheim, Emil. *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1967.
- Findlay, John N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. (Slight revision of 1958 edition.)
- Fink, Eugen. *Hegel: Phänomenologische Interpretationen der "Phänomenologie des Geistes."* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
- Frank, Gustav. *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie*. Vierter Teil. *Die Theologie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1905.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*. Trans. and Intro. by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Garaudy, Roger. *Dieu est mort: Étude sur Hegel*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962.
- Gauvin, Joseph, Editor. *Wortindex zur Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bonn: Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1977. (Hegel-Studien Beiheft 14.)
- Gray, J. Glenn. *Hegel's Hellenic Ideal*. New York: Columbia University Press (King's Crown division), 1941
- de Guerenú, Ernesto. *Das Gottesbild des jungen Hegel*. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1969.
- Harris, Henry S. *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950
- Heinrichs, J. *Die Logik der "Phänomenologie des Geistes."* Bonn: Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974.
- Hirsch, Emanuel. *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie*. Fünfter Band. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1954.

- Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. by S. Cherniak and J. Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- Iljin, Iwan. *Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gotteslehre*. Bern: A Francke Verlag, 1946.
- Jones, Richard Foster. *Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Background of the Battle of the Books*. Washington University Studies-New Series. Language and Literature No. 6. St. Louis: Washington University, 1936.
- Kainz, Howard P. *Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary*. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1976.
- Kaufmann, Walter. *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1965.
- Koch, Traugott. *Differenz und Versöhnung: Eine Interpretation der Theologie G.W.F. Hegels nach seiner "Wissenschaft der Logik."* Gütersloh: Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967.
- Kojève, Alexandre. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Assembled by Queneau, ed. by Bloom, and trans. by Nichols. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969.
- Kroner, Richard. *Von Kant bis Hegel*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Second ed. 1961 (orig. 1921/24).
- Krüger, Hans-Joachim. *Theologie und Aufklärung: Untersuchungen zu ihrer Vermittlung beim jungen Hegel*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlerische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966.
- Lauer, Quentin, S.J. *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1976.
- . *Essays in Hegelian Dialectic*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1977.
- Link, Christian. *Hegels Wort "Gott selbst ist tot."* Theologischer Verlagshaus Zürich, 1974.
- Litt, Theodor. *Hegel: Versuch einer kritischen Erneuerung*. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1961.
- Loewenberg, J. *Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues on the Life of Mind*. LaSalle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1965.
- Lovejoy, Arthur. *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961 reprint of 1936 publication.

- Lucas, Georg. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*. Trans. by R. Livingstone. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976.
- Löwith, Karl. *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*. Trans. by D.E. Green. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair, Editor. *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976.
- Maluschke, Günther. *Kritik und absolute Methode in Hegels Dialektik*. Hegel-Studien Beiheft 13. Bonn: Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974.
- Marsch, Wolf-Dieter. *Gegenwart Christi in der Gesellschaft: Eine Studie zu Hegels Dialektik*. Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1965.
- Marx, Werner. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. by Peter Heath. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
- Müller, Friedrich. *Entfremdung: Zur anthropologischen Begründung der Staatstheorie bei Rousseau, Hegel, Marx*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970.
- Mueller, Gustav Emil. *Hegel: The Man, His Vision, and Work*. New York: Pageant Press, 1968.
- Mure, G.R.G. *An Introduction to Hegel*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
- Navickas, Joseph L. *Consciousness and Reality: Hegel's Philosophy of Subjectivity*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
- O'Connor, D.J., Editor. *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- O'Malley, et al. Editors, *Hegel and the History of Philosophy*. Proceedings of the 1972 Hegel Society of America Conference. The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- O'Malley, et al. Editors, *The Legacy of Hegel*. Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium, 1970. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Petry, Michael J. *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978.
- Plant, Raymond. *Hegel*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Puntel, L. Bruno. *Darstellung, Methode, Und Struktur: Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G.W.F. Hegels*. Hegel-Studien Beiheft 10. Bonn: Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973.
- Randall, J. H. *The Making of the Modern Mind*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926.

- Rosen, Stanley. *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
- Robinson, Jonathan. *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Rosenkranz, Karl. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*. Reprint of 1844 Berlin edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963.
- Reardon, Bernard M. G. *Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977.
- Rotenstreich, Nathan. *From Substance to Subject: Studies in Hegel*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- Sarlemijn, Andries. *Hegel's Dialectic*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975. Transl. by P. Kirschenmann.
- Simon, Josef. *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966.
- Splett, Jörg. *Die Trinitätslehre G.W.F. Hegels*. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1965.
- Stace, Walter T. *The Philosophy of Hegel*. Reprint of 1924 ed. New York: Dover Publications, 1955.
- Stiehler, Gottfried. *Die Dialektik in Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964.
- Taylor, Charles. *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Theunissen, Michael. *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970.
- Weiss, Frederick. *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- . *Hegel's Critique of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
- Welch, Claude. *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I, 1799-1870*. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1972.
- Westphal, Merold. *History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities Press, 1978.

Wiedmann, Franz. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten*. Hamburg: Rowolt, 1965. Far superior to the English version listed below, particularly respecting the number of plates.

Wiedmann, Franz. *Hegel: An Illustrated Biography*. Transl. by J. Neugroschel. New York: Pegasus Books, 1968.

Yerkes, James. *The Christology of Hegel*. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978.

ARTICLES USED

(Note: all articles, except that of Sherman, are from the publication *Hegel-Studien*.)

Buchner, Hartmut. "Zur Bedeutung des Skeptizismus beim jungen Hegel." Beiheft 4(1969)49-56.

Christensen, Darrel E. "Hegel's Altar to the Known God." Beiheft 11(1974)219-229.

van Dooren, Willem. "Die Bedeutung der Religion in der Phänomenologie des Geistes." Beiheft 4(1969)93-101.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Hegel und die antike Dialektik." I(1961)173-199.

Glockner, Hermann. "Der Begriff in Hegels Philosophie." Beiheft 2(1965)73-150.

Goedewaagen, Tobie. "Hegel und der Pantheismus." VI(1971)171-187.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Die Bedeutung des Christentums in der Philosophie Hegels." Beiheft 11(1974)175-202.

Peperzak, Adrian. "Hegels Philosophie der Religion und die Erfahrung des christlichen Glaubens." Beiheft 11(1974)203-13.

Pöggeler, Otto. "Perspektiven der Hegelforschung." Beiheft 11(1974)79-102.

Pöggeler, Otto. "Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes." I(1961)255-294.

Puder, Martin. "Diskussionsbeitrag." [to the presentations of Pannenberg and Peperzak, above] Beiheft 11(1974)215-218.

Reisinger, Peter. "Reflexion und Ichbegriff." VI(1971)231-265.

Sherman, Nancy. "Hegel's Two Dialectics." *Kantstudien* 71(1980)
238-253.

Wiehl, Reiner. "Platos Ontologie in Hegels Logik des Seins."
III(1965)157-180.